Asked whether he would rather have all the Ford Motor
dividends
or company control, the average man would probably choose the dividends.
Lundberg - The-Rich-and-the-Super-Rich-by-Ferdinand-Lundberg
O.
) 1.
16
$6,821,025
Bethlehem Steel Corp. . 41
$10,379,268
Consolidated Edison (N. Y. ) . 28
$10,170,255
Consolidated Oil Corp. (S. O. ) 5. 71
$49,058,436
Continental Oil Co. (S. O. ) . 84
$14,055,174
Illinois Central R. R.
(now Illinois Central Ind. ) . 32
$536,364
Int'l Harvester Co. 2. 31
$24,604,360
Middle West Corporation
(now constituent companies) 2. 11
$8,272,495
Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. R. 1. 14
$115,679
Norfolk and Western Ry. . 32
$782,073
Ohio Oil Co.
(now Marathon Oil Co. [S. O]) 19. 52
$190,165,807
Pere Marquette Ry.
(exchanged for Chesapeake &
$16,000,000
Largest 1937
Ohio R. R. stock) 1. 45
$23,927
Phelps Dodge Corp. . 74
$5,381,811
Radio Corporation . 22
$4,362,775
Santa Fe Railway . 38
$1,576,563
Socony Vacuum Oil Co.
(now Socony Mobil Oil Co. [S. O] 16. 34
$771,303,099
Standard Oil Co. of Calif. 12. 32
$664,330,693
Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) 11. 36
$334,335,677
Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey)
$2,628,070,253
U. S. Steel Corp.
$3,361,473
Western Pacific R. R.
$3,916,487
____________
$4,741,515,014
$76,000,000
$47,250,000
$58,000,000
13. 51* $163,000,000
. 12
4. 79
* The Rockefellers actually had voting power over 20. 20 per cent
of the vast New Jersey Company, in assets the largest industrial
enterprise
of the world, enough to assure control, by reason of New Jersey stock
owned
by the minority-controlled Standard Oil Company (Indiana).
Considering only the largest holdings, it will be seen how magnificently these properties have risen from depression-level valuations--from seven to nearly seventeen times in less than thirty years (the latter in the case of the giant Standard Oil Company of New Jersey). How many persons in the same period have seen their salaries or propertied status improve by as much? If a school teacher, starting out at a salary of $3,000 a year in 1937, had experienced the same ratio of gain in remuneration he would now be paid in the range of $21,000-$51,000. Actually, the school teacher now receives in the range of $6,000-10,000, if that, and is facing early retirement at half pay. There never comes a time when property, large or small, is put on half pay because of age.
In the case of the Rockefellers, as of the Mellons, it has been publicly announced that they have sold some of these holdings: JDR, Jr. , in Socony Mobil Oil and the Mellons in Gulf Oil. What the proceeds were used for--new investments or trust funds for others--is not indicated. At any rate, the foregoing table should not be taken as a recent breakdown of major Rockefeller investments, which in some cases may be larger or smaller, in others may include different properties. But, I argue, whatever the present holdings are, their relative value is almost certainly not smaller than the total for the tabulation and is, for a variety of sound reasons, very probably larger.
What the TNEC study singled out as the personal largest industrial holdings of the Rockefeller family, individuals and trust funds, is shown in the following table computed at closing 1964 prices:
Closing
Largest 1964
__ Total
Value
Stockholdings
(percentage)
Atlantic Refining Co. 1. 16
$6,812,085
Bethlehem Steel Corp. . 41
$10,379,268
Consolidated Oil Corp. 5. 71
$49,058,436
Ohio Oil Co. 9. 83
$190,165,807
Socony Vacuum Oil Co. 16. 34
$771,303. 099
Standard Oil Co. of Calif. 11. 86
$639,326,406
Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) 7. 83
$236,721,770
Standard Oil Co, (New Jersey) 8. 69*
$1,691,696,720
____
$3,595,463,591
__________
Personal
Market
*By reason of the Standard Oil (Indiana) interest in the New
Jersey company,
the personal Rockefeller voting power in the latter company was 15. 38
per cent,
enough to give practical control or "dominance," in the language of
the TNEC study.
If we subtract from this $100 million for the widow (assuming her holdings had appreciated to, this level since 1960) there is left for each of the six third-generation Rockefeller children personally $570,077,232 (including whatever is laid up in trust for the grandchildren, which has lightened the financial burden of the parents). In view of the many ancillary Rockefeller holdings that are not here considered, this figure is far nearer what one should have for each more recently rather than the Fortune figure of $100-$200 million. Market values rose between 1957 and 1964, it is true, but broadly allowing for the rise and excluding grandchildren's trusts, it would seem that each of six Rockefellers must be worth at least in the range of $425-$475 million, including trust funds, and possibly more than $570 million. The apportionment ratio of trusts as between children and grandchildren is not publicly known but, as the grandchildren take from the parents, it is probable that direct trust provision for the grandchildren was made, if at all, on a much smaller scale than for their parents. To venture further into the labyrinth of family trusts without possessing the accountants' figures could only be unwarrantably speculative.
As the foundations make public reports of their holdings, there would be a way of partially checking the correctness of these computations if the same foundations were now in existence as figured in the TNEC study. Unfortunately, the structure and number of Rockefeller foundations have greatly changed since 1937 and only the sketchiest sort of check is possible. just as the Rockefellers have probably shuffled their personal investments, so have they publicly shuffled their foundations consonant with the introduction of a third generation into the management of affairs.
The foundation holdings, reckoning by the TNEC percentages, should have stood at $1,146,051,423 at the end of 1964. At the end of 1962 (the only figures yet available)
Total
the actual foundation holdings, when market values were somewhat lower than at the end of 1964, were $823,485,972, according to the Foundation Directory, 1964. My computations, it is clear, produce a figure that is $322,565,451 higher than seems to be the case.
Before we consider this not inconsiderable discrepancy and what may account for it, the recent foundation holdings should be examined. The Foundation Directory shows them and their stated assets to have been as follows:
Date Founded
General Education Board 1902
Rockefeller Foundation 1913
Sealantic Fund
(Community fund for Seal Harbor,
Me. , and Pocantico Hills, N. Y. ,
where Rockefellers reside) 1938
Jackson Preserve, Inc. 1940
Rockefeller Brothers Fund 1940
American Int'l Ass'n for
Economic and Social Development
(part Rockefeller) 1946
Council on Economic and Cultural
Development 1953
Chase National Bank Foundation
(part Rockefeller) 1958
Total $823,485,972
At the time of the TNEC study there were only the Rockefeller Foundation, the General Education Board and the Spelman Fund of New York in the field. The latter has gone out of business and six others have been added since 1938.
Applying the TNEC pattern, which found that 30 per cent of Rockefeller holdings were in foundations and 30 per cent in personal trusts, with 40 per cent individually held, and using the 1962 foundation holdings as the base of computation, one would have the following as the figure of dominated and owned holdings in 1962:
Foundations--30 per cent
Individual trust funds--30 per cent
Individual holdings--40 per cent
$823,485,972
$823,485,972
$1,077,981,296
______________
Total $2,724,953,240
Using recent foundation holdings as the base to which the TNEC percentage is applied appears to me to result in a downward distortion, first because the individual holdings were concentrated in the upward-spiraling oil industry while much of the foundation investment is in fixed-interest securities, and secondly because the foundation pattern has been altered. My conclusion is that proportional to individual holdings and trust funds the foundation holdings are now either less than 30 per cent of the whole or that their assets by 1964 had moved up in value closer to the projected figure of $1,146,051,423 obtained by my computation.
As the foundation reports are issued at a more leisurely pace than company reports and are not available for 1964 at this writing, direct comparison cannot be made. But critical readers can make the comparison at any time, when the reports become available, provided they always apply market values rather than book values of holdings.
Assets at
End of 1962
$342,834
$632,282,137
$11,639,033
$21,939,398 (1961)
$152,386,637
$752,585 (1961)
$3,360,950
$782,398
____________
If one wishes to examine still another possibility, one can put together the figure of $3,595,463,591 for the 1964 value of the personal holdings obtained by my computation with the 1962 figure of $823,485,972 for foundation holdings. This gives a total of $4,418,949,563 for the combined holdings. I still believe, however, that my original figure of $4,741,515,014 is an understatement of the combined family holding, because the TNEC did not survey all the family properties (only the largest) and notwithstanding the fact that Rockefeller, Jr. , had to pay gift taxes in the establishment of his chain of trust funds for children and grandchildren.
When one throws the Chase Bank, Rockefeller Center and various real estate properties into the pot and considers that Laurance Rockefeller has blossomed in his own right as a venture capitalist in luxury hotels and advanced-technology enterprises, the combined Rockefeller financial "punch" should be above $5 billion. Although apparently outpaced by the Du Ponts in the super-wealth sweepstakes, the Rockefellers seem to me to be running at least neck and neck with the Mellons.
The TNEC study, it must again be stressed, did not pretend to produce the totals of wealth held, for it confined itself only to the twenty largest stockholdings in the 200 largest nonfinancial companies and ignored ownership of banks, insurance companies, bonds, real estate and smaller stockholdings. Relying on the TNEC method alone there might have been missed even larger concentration of wealth, for example if the twenty- first largest stockholder in all 200 companies had been the same person or family; but on other evidential grounds it is known that such a logical possibility did not hold in fact.
The Fords of Dearborn
Mrs. Edsel Ford and her three sons--Henry II, Benson and William-were assigned a combined minimal wealth of $325 million and a maximum of $500 million by Fortune in 1957. Her daughter Josephine (Mrs. Walter Buhl Ford II) was not noticed by Fortune.
It is always fairly easy to compute the collective personal wealth of the Fords because they own 10 per cent of the outstanding stock (but 40 per cent of the voting power) of the Ford Motor Company (always assuming there have been no secret sales or purchases and that there are no side interests). On the face of it (although not really) 10 per cent of the entire stock issue of the company appears to be the sole personal financial strength of the family.
What slightly impedes any computation of Ford wealth is the rather complicated capital structure of the company as created under the wills of Henry and his son Edsel.
At the end of 1964 this capital structure, after split-ups in each class, stood as follows:
Common stock (owned by investors)
Class A stock (owned by the Ford Foundation)
Class B stock (owned by the Ford family)
Shares
52,338,152
46,283,756
12,267,794
___________
Total 110,889,702
The Class A stock is nonvoting until it is either sold by the foundation or given by it to some approved nonprofit organization, when it acquires one vote per share; but never at any time can all the common stock cast more than 60 per cent of the vote at a stockholders' meeting. For, as noted, 40 per cent of voting power is concentrated by charter in all the Class B stock, giving the Ford family very nearly absolute control of the company at all times. All classes of stock participate equally, share for share, in dividends. Control is what counts.
At the closing 1964 quotation of 54-1/2 per share this capitalization had a gross market value of $6,043,488,759. This left the Fords 10-plus per cent apparently valued at $604,348,876. But, considering the factor of control, the Ford family stock has as much voting power as two-thirds of the common, which was valued in the market at $1,901,619,450. Anyone who owns two-thirds of the common stock would have as much voting power as the Fords but would get more dividends--on 34,892,100 shares as against 12,267,794 shares--and to that extent would have more value in hand. But the Class B stock, owing to the heavy weight of voting privileges embodied in it, is worth more, share for share, than the market value of the common stock (although nobody would seek to get that value unless he sought control of the company). If, however, a buyer of control were to show himself, the Ford-held stock at closing 1964 prices would have, in relation to the common, the value of close to $2 billion I have assigned it by this computation. While the Ford stock gets dividends of only about a third of the equivalent amount of voting-power common, this isn't too much of a hardship as the Fords are in an income-tax bracket that hits such soaring dividends hard. Besides, the men all drew high salaries as officers of the company. They have plenty of pocket money.
So, at a price of around 54 for the present outstanding stock of the company, I would rate the value of the family holding at a minimal 82 billion, although any syndicate interested in buying the company would probably have to pay more for it (assuming current or higher levels of profitability).
Compared, then, with the Du Ponts, Mellons and Rockefellers, the Fords are in comparatively modest circumstances although individually the members of the three latter families are on the average richer owing to the participation of a greater number of Du Ponts in the heady Du Pont mixture.
Since 1964, however, there has been a slight alteration in the foundation holdings, which does not affect my computation nor the conclusions drawn from it. In June, 1965, the foundation marketed more shares. Originally it received precisely 88 per cent of all stock in the form of Class A nonvoting shares. Adjusting for stock splits after the 1965 sale it had disposed of very nearly half or 46. 9 million present shares. The 45. 7 million shares it retained composed 35. 8 per cent of the entire capital stock of Ford Motor.
In terms of its own book values of the various securities it held, Ford Motor plus others, the foundation at the end of 1964 was worth $2. 4 billion.
The great care taken by the two elder Fords to see that control remained in the family is shown by the voting provisions for the stocks. If the outstanding Class B stock falls below 5. 4 million shares (which it can do only if it is called in by the family) the total voting power of the common rises to 70 per cent; and if the B stock outstanding falls below 3 million shares it votes equally with the common.
Until the family, then, quixotically decides to call in the B stock (thus cutting its own throat as far as control is concerned) it holds 40 per cent of voting power in the company, tantamount to absolute control. Should some syndicate attempt to buy control in the market the Fords need purchase only 16-2/3 per cent of outstanding common to give it 50 per cent voting power, whereas a syndicate would have to purchase 83-1/3 per cent of all common to reach the same dead-heat point. In such an unequal race the Fords would necessarily win.
But even if a syndicate turned up with all the common, giving it absolute control, the Fords have an ace in reserve. And this ace shows one of the many ways foundation control can be synchronized with industrial control, The Fords control the foundation. And the A stock held by the foundation acquires voting power as it is sold or given to a nonprofit institution. Faced with an opponent who owned all the common, giving him a
60 per cent vote and control, the Fords need merely activate the voting power of the foundation stock by selling it or giving it to friendly hands, thus diluting the voting power of the outstanding common. By converting all its remaining Class A stock into voting stock the foundation could dilute the voting power of the presently outstanding common to 30 per cent of the present capital structure. With the 30 per cent of the voting power in the newly converted common plus the 40 per cent of voting power in the Class B stock the Fords would actually have, as they now potentially have, 70 per cent of the voting power. The foundation, indeed, could sell somewhat more than half of its remaining Ford stock and leave the Fords able to muster 55 per cent of the voting power in any critical showdown.
The ins and outs of this situation may have puzzled some readers. The point to be made is only to show the great care taken to guard control, revealing what the wealthy intend. In acting as they do they are only being reasonable; for the humanly normal thing to do is to guard one's possessions. But we have many propagandists around, led by such errant professors as A. A. Berle, Jr. , who apparently are not afraid of being judged certifiably silly by contending that control as well as ownership of the large companies is being widely spread around, that the big fortunes are being broken up to right and left. The Berle thesis, refuted on every hand by the facts, is that as ownership is dispersed (which it is not in fact), free-lance company managements install themselves in the drivers' seats as something of a new corporate breed. These new managers--the "managerial revolution"--proceed in this fairy tale to elbow aside the Du Ponts, Mellons, Rockefellers, Fords, Pews, Gettys and various others--and thus introduce a new set of actors on the stage of history, a set of actors that conquer by sheer bureaucratic techniques.
Such being the case, reason many readers, we can all just sit back and watch the fun as bright young men rise to conjure the corporations away from the big owners. Like all fantasies, this one has quite a coterie of bemused devotees.
The surviving Fords would have been a great deal richer today than they are if Henry Ford, founder and original master mind of the automotive behemoth, who died in 1947 at eighty-three years of age, had been personally less grasping and if the deaths of central figures in the family had not occurred before the very rich could get a tractable Congress around to trimming the New Deal inheritance taxes. This trimming process was no doubt hastened by the example of the tax-speared disaster that engulfed the massive Ford fortune.
Ford's only son, Edsel, a far more likeable, intelligent and informed man than his flinty father but kept unhappily subordinate all his life, died prematurely at age forty- nine in 1943. The oldest grandson, Henry Ford II, at the age of twenty-five, inexperienced in business and up to 1940 a sociology major at Yale, was hastily spirited out of the wartime Navy where he was an ensign and installed as a director and executive vice president of the vast company, a miraculous corporate success story. His brothers Benson and William, twenty-five and eighteen years old at the time, trailed him into the company later, where they also showed their mettle by quickly rising to the top. Their mother, whom I have perhaps ill-advisedly listed as a rentier, played a strong and constructive role (from a family and property point of view) on the board of directors with Henry II. She backed him particularly, if she did not indeed take the lead, in getting rid of much accumulated deadwood in the cracker-barrel executive suite of Henry I.
Holding tightly ( and tax-expensively) to 58-1/2 per cent of the company's voting stock, Henry Ford at his death was publicly assigned a net worth of $500-$700 million. 45 The value at the time of the Ford Motor Company, since reorganized and vastly
improved internally by the grandsons, was in the vicinity of $1 billion. Ford's death came none too soon for the family fortunes, as the company under his old-style heavy- handed administration had for more than fifteen years been losing ground to free- swinging General Motors and stepped-up Chrysler and had long since tumbled from the top of the motor heap. Definitely on the skids, the company was thought in the automobile industry to be headed for the junkyard that had already engulfed scores of automobile companies.
But the deaths of Edsel and Henry, with the company slipping mainly because the views of Edsel were continually overruled by the feudal owner and his sycophantic cronies in the management, also came at an inopportune time with respect to the tax laws. For the marital deduction and the option of estate splitting had not yet been enacted. Both Edsel's and his father's holdings were faced by a flat 91 per cent inheritance tax, designed under the New Deal expressly to break down big fortunes topheavy with political power. Had the later law been in effect, the two Fords could have assigned half their holdings to their wives, tax free, and the wives could have worked their funds with the help of lawyers into much lower tax brackets. This splitting, it should be noticed, also often puts the testator into a lower tax bracket as well, although it could not have had that effect with the two Fords unless they had made free use of trust funds for the grandchildren. Henry Ford was apparently too tightfisted to do that, which would have cost him only bargain-counter gift taxes.
A partial way out of this tax disaster was engineered in The Ford Foundation for Human Advancement established by Edsel in 1936. (Henry Ford himself was hostile to public benefactions and spoke out freely against them. ) 46 But even with the help of the Ford Foundation, the personal Ford fortune, which under standard tax management would have been much larger today, was literally decimated nine times over.
Edsel left the greater part of his holdings to the Ford Foundation, thus escaping the big tax, and his father eventually had to do the same or see his money go largely to Washington and its hated New Dealers.
In this flukey way the Ford Foundation received nearly 90 per cent of the stock in the Ford Motor Company, all of it nonvoting as long as the foundation held it but participating equally in dividends. 47 As far as Henry Ford himself was concerned, the foundation was an unwilling benefaction, the lesser of two ghastly evils.
"On the Foundation's books, this [Ford money] was given the value, for tax purposes, of $416,000,000, but its real value, as measured by the earnings of Ford Motors, was at least $2,500,000,000. This is considerably more than half as much money as all the other foundations in the country have among them. " 48
Still salvaging what they could in a bad situation, the Fords stipulated that the stock made over to the foundation should be nonvoting, leaving the 10 per cent in the hands of the family with an initial 100 per cent voting power.
Asked whether he would rather have all the Ford Motor dividends or company control, the average man would probably choose the dividends. He would be mistaken, for those in control determine whether there shall be any dividends at all. One in control could decide to invest earnings elsewhere until the designated dividend-receiver came to some sort of terms, not disadvantageous to a controller. Control is always the prime objective of the true leaders in all large organizations--political, financial, economic, philanthropic, educational or otherwise. For control determines everything that is subject to the will.
And, finally, the family, now controlling the company, was also placed by the elder Fords' testaments in control of the foundation. Although it could not receive foundation
income or any part of it, the family could manage the foundation (as it has since done) to the advantage of the Ford Motor Company, the goose that lays the golden eggs.
The Ford Foundation, which when Henry Ford was alive was devoted purely to community projects in and around Detroit that were beneficial to the Ford Motor Company, began its national operations only in 1950, when it started spewing forth huge grants for educational and other purposes in unprecedented fashion. Ordinarily hard-to-get money began to float around the country in huge gobs. In 1954 the foundation bestowed $68 million, four times the annual Rockefeller contribution to the charitable kitty and ten times that of the third largest foundation, The Carnegie Corporation. This figure, a mere taste of what was yet to come, was as much as all American foundations combined spent in any single year up to 1948 and was about a quarter of the spending of all foundations in 1954. 49 If the Ford Foundation is a good thing, as many maintain, then it must be attributed to New Deal tax laws.
In connection with trust funds earlier, the reader may recall there was a somewhat cryptic reference to "standard doctrine. " The two Fords relied on standard doctrine in creating the Ford Foundation. just what is standard doctrine? Most broadly and informally, and applicable in all social and political contexts, standard doctrine was perhaps most pungently expressed by the late W. C. Fields when he voiced the deathless maxim: "Never give a sucker an even break. " But, more specifically, it relates in our social system to known legal ways of maximizing advantages and minimizing disadvantages for property, especially under existing tax laws. Moreover, it shows one in detail how to accomplish these ends. With reference to the tax laws in all their ramifications the doctrine is now well codified, notably in a series of multiple-volume loose-leaf publications titled the Standard Federal Tax Reporter published by the Commerce Clearing House in New York. Supplementing the income-tax series there are the sub-series titled Federal Excise Tax Reporter and Federal Estate and Gift Tax Reporter .
With respect to a structure like the Ford Foundation, standard doctrine holds:
"Charitable giving through the channels of charitable, tax-exempt foundations has achieved a position of importance in estate planning. Apart from the humanitarian aspects involved, the family foundation can be an effective means of reducing income and estate taxes and of continuing control of a closely held corporation in the family of the donor. " 5O These are precisely the ends that were achieved by the testamentary dispositions of the Ford estates.
Foundations, in other words, are a way of reducing taxes, and this is part of standard doctrine. Newspapers and other propaganda media, however, have long referred to them in their whimsical way as benefactions (which in certain cases they may also be) and their creators as philanthropists rather than as tax-sensitive acquisitors (which they may or may not be), and invariably refer to the transferred money as donations and gifts (which they are not necessarily). The donations, so-called, are the consequence of big tax write-downs offered by the government precisely for such a possibly benign placement of funds.
But a large section of the public has been instilled with the unwarranted belief that something is being given away for nothing. And, anomalously, as I have had occasion before to point out 51 these huge so-called gifts sprang from the hoards of men who in their active lifetimes left no stone unturned to amass for themselves great wealth. The most acquisitive, it would seem in this fantastic newspaper scenario, turn out to be the most benevolently inclined.
More broadly, standard doctrine holds that one should always pay the lowest possible wages and taxes, charge the highest possible prices and rents, and never give anything
away unless the gift confers some hidden possibly overcompensatory personal benefit. The big propertied usually do their level best to adhere to it.
This may sound cynical to some, but only because they have witlessly allowed themselves to be deluded by unrealistic propaganda lullabies. It is not only standard but sound doctrine in any social system that pits its citizens competitively against each other and makes property ownership a cornerstone of well being. Would any property owner be considered sensible if he elected to pay maximum wages and taxes, charge minimal prices and then, if he had anything left, gave it away to Tom, Dick and Harry? Even to steer a middle course between the two extremes would not be considered very astute.
Although Henry Ford died worth $500-$700 million at 1947 values, he met his final tax problem well, even though until then he had steered a less than canny course. His federal tax was only $21,108,160. 91 on a taxable estate of $70 million which consisted of $31,451,909. 36 plus some Ford stock. 52
Edsel paid about $12 million, or 6 per cent, on an estate then estimated to be worth $200 million. 53 But in 1935 he had established trusts for his four children. In addition to Ford stock, he owned most of the stock of the Manufacturers National Bank of Detroit, which he left to his widow. As it was disclosed, Henry Ford owned 55 per cent of the stock of Ford Motor, Edsel 41-1/2 per cent and Mrs. Henry Ford 3-1/2 per cent. 54 Together Henry and Edsel paid inheritance taxes of a little more than $30 million. The elder Ford would have done better, as the elder Rockefeller did, by giving his son, wife and grandchildren stock over a period of years.
But if Edsel and Henry had not had recourse to the foundation--at the last moment almost--the estate would have been forced to pay a 91 per cent tax. This would have left a mere 9 per cent of outstanding ordinary stock in Ford family hands, hardly enough to control the corporation. Instead, they were left with 10 per cent of the stock (clothed by charter with 40 per cent voting power) and 100 per cent control over the asset-logged foundation, which as it engages in good works cannot help but generate friendly feelings for the Ford Motor Company in many worthy bosoms. 55
A further advantage in the plan adopted (for which some unsung lawyer deserves a summa cum laude) is that its provision for selling foundation stock created a horde of stockholding allies for the Ford family, which was dangerously isolated when it was the sole owner. Now when anyone wishes to make a face at the Ford Motor Company, the Ford Foundation or, indeed, at any of the Fords, he must reckon not only with all the grateful beneficiaries of foundation grants but with thousands of dividend-hungry small stockholders. Big owners have many small partners.
The Realm of Super-Wealth
The Du Ponts, Mellons, Rockefellers and Fords, in any event, are the four cardinal points of the compass in the realm of super-wealth. The Fords must be included by reason of the sheer magnitude of their controlled holdings even though they do not yet have as varied an organizational task force as their peers.
On the basis of sheer magnitude, again, J. Paul Getty should probably be thought of in the same class, although we do not yet know what will be the post mortem status of his holdings.
The other major clear-cut claimants to super-wealth status--and theirs would be minor super-wealth--are the Pews of the Sun Oil Company.
Neither the Houghtons of Corning Glass nor the Olins of Olin Mathieson Chemical appear to quite make it. But the Hartfords and Rosenwalds should be considered. The Houghtons, incidentally, were missed by the TNEC dragnet.
Fortune mentioned only two Pews, but the TNEC study showed them to be a numerous clan: J. Howard Pew, Marv Ethel Pew, J. N. Pew, Jr. , Mabel Pew Myrin, Walter C. Pew, Albert H. Pew, Mrs. Mary C. Pew, Arthur E. Pew, Jr. , John G. Pew, Helen T. Pew, Alberta C. Pew and others. The Pews collectively--individually and through estates and trust funds--owned 70. 6 per cent of Sun Oil Company common stock as of February 15, 1938. 56
Assuming that this same percentage of ownership was maintained, they would be collectively worth $708,458,121 at closing prices for Sun Oil in 1964.
But the Pews since TNEC days have also set up foundations. As of March 2, 1965, the Pew Memorial Trust (through The Glenmede Trust Company) owned 21. 7 per cent of Sun Oil stock and held as fiduciary for other Pew trusts and estates 20. 9 per cent. 57 The Foundation Directory, 1964, states the 1960 assets of the Memorial Trust alone, leaving out its fiduciary holdings, at $135,309,481.
Before we pass to lesser but interesting wealth-holders (the extremely wealthy as distinguished from the super-wealthy), we may scan those we have examined in this chapter for common characteristics apart from their holdings of wealth.
Characteristics of the Super-Wealthy
All were born American citizens; their families have been in the United States for generations. All are inheritors in greater or less degree and, except for the Du Ponts who sprang from a revolutionary savant, all are far better educated than their family founders. Such being the case, they have a broader awareness of the world and its vagaries. None of these groups has its younger members placed in less than the third generation of wealth; the Du Ponts stand at least seven generations in the stream of gold. Such being the case they all together contradict the American folk-belief that a family passes from shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three generations. None of these gilt- edged people, obviously, are having any of that.
Offhand it would be said that they are all white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants; but such a statement would be somewhat misleading. The Du Ponts are of French Huguenot origin, and there is a Jewish crossing (Belin) in one of their lines of descent. Nor can it be said categorically that they are all Protestants. For Henry Ford II became a convert to Catholicism on the occasion of his first marriage and, through the foundation, funnels large sums to Catholic schools and colleges. As a consequence of his divorce and remarriage outside the Church, he is now automatically excommunicated but remains a Catholic. His children are Catholic.
Despite the fuss made by outsiders about being white, Anglo-Saxon and Protestant (or Catholic-Jewish) it is doubtful that any of these people attach much importance to the point. Most of them, from all indications, are pretty worldly wise and wear their ethincity and religiosity debonairly. Money, they know, is what counts in the established scheme.
Sinews of Republicanism
A far more significant common characteristic of all these super-wealthy families is that they have long been the main supporters nationally of the Republican Party, the party of plutocratic oligarchy. They have been its big sinews. Except for some minor Democratic deviants among the Du Ponts (and the Du Ponts can show many kinds of deviants from the basic family pattern) all leading members are Republican and their forebears were Republican.
With the exception of the Fords each has at various times played strong forward roles in the Republican party--the Rockefellers particularly under the McKinley
Administration; the Mellons under the Harding-Coolidge-Hoover Administrations; the Du Ponts with the Liberty League in fighting a strong rearguard action during the 1930's against the resurgent Democratic Party; and the Pews ever since in being the wealthiest supporters (among many) of unreconstructed right-wing Republicanism down to the present. If not kings themselves, they are king-makers.
The RockefelIers have in recent years come again to play a forward role through the person of Nelson A. Rockefeller. Thrice elected governor of New York, until his divorce and remarriage to a divorced woman he was considered a chief Republican presidential prospect. Every professional politician in the country agrees that if the personable and outgoing Nelson had pressed for the Republican presidential nomination in 1960 he would have obtained it and beaten John F. Kennedy. While his divorce might not under other circumstances have kept him from the presidency its inflation to a major issue by ultra-rightist Republicans tended to have that effect in the 1960's.
But the Rockefellers still play a very strong role in Republican politics and Winthrop has become the Republican governor of Arkansas. Ultra-rightist Republicans, however, give them credit for too much by blaming them chiefly for the electoral disaster that overtook their implausible darling, Barry Goldwater, in 1964.
As important wheels in the political process these families have always had quick and direct access to the White House, no matter what the party of the president. Not only in times of war (when gossamer party lines tend to blur) but in times of peace, representatives of these families have always been able to obtain an audience even with a Democratic president, and sometimes have been summoned for counsel, comfort and advice by dazed Republican presidents. But the name of Rockefeller was once under such a public cloud that on a visit to the White House the younger Rockefeller was spirited in by a back entrance to talk to President William Howard Taft. 58
Yet these and other magnates of extreme wealth have been far from Strangers to the Democratic Party. Both the political parties have been supported--the Republican mainly by weightily propertied elements. The parties are opposite sides of the same coin. Instead of saying that the United States has a two-party system, it would be more nearly correct to say it has a dual-party system.
After the Civil War, with the plantation owners self-destroyed, the Democratic Party always attracted large propertied elements whenever it made strong bids to win national elections. The Cleveland Administrations were as close to Wall Street, manned by Wall Streeters, as any Republican Administration. William Jennings Bryan, although anathema to the Wall Street Establishment, was supported by western mining interests, for whom "free silver" was so much extra gravy. The Wilson Administration was as completely under the thumb of Wall Street as the subsequent Harding, Coolidge and Hoover Administrations. 59 John W. Davis, the Democratic candidate for president in 1924 was a Wall Street corporation lawyer.
In 1928 Al Smith had his chief backing, financial and emotional, from fellow-Catholic John J. Raskob, prime minister of the Du Ponts. If Smith had won he would have been far less a Catholic than a Du Pont president, although the religious question was what was pushed to the fore by a politically obtuse electorate. Hoover, the Republican, was a J. P. Morgan puppet; Smith, his democratic opponent, was in the pocket of the Du Ponts, for whom J. P. Morgan and Company was the banker. By 1936 Smith was a roaring Liberty Leaguer. The victory of either man put J. P. Morgan and the Du Pouts into the presidential driver's seat. W. Averell Harriman was one of the leading wealthy Republicans who crossed the line to the Democrats in 1928 and has been a Democrat, and a high government official, in all subsequent Democratic Administrations.
Under Franklin Delano Roosevelt, owing chiefly to troubled circumstances, for the first time it appeared that some of the magnates might be unwelcome at the White House. The wealthiest, especially the Du Ponts, opposed him bitterly, which meant that he was opposed by the banks and heavy industry. Those numerous wealthy persons who became staunch Rooseveltians were mainly of the second or third tier of wealth and nearly all in merchandising and light industry, immediately dependent upon the stagnating mass-consumption market. They were down-the-line New Dealers but not, as misconceived Republican propaganda had it, Socialists, Populists or even Welfare- Staters.
But owing to the disastrous Republican-fostered and Wall Street nurtured economic depression, which interrupted seventy-two years of unbroken rule by the magnates through either Republican or Democratic puppets, the Democratic Party became the inheritor of vast social problems informally created largely by Republican neglect. The big special problems in the United States always develop through neglect, in part because so many active and intelligent elements are permanently siphoned off into the chicaneries of the money-making process. If profitability cannot be shown for an activity, such as raising the cultural level and tending to the lame, the halt, the blind and the stricken, such activity is left to quixotic and somewhat suspect elements--quixotic at least by prevailing standards.
Not that the Democratic Party moved very far to the Left in coping with domestic disaster, as hostile propaganda has it; for the magnates had ready to their call almost the entire southern congressional delegation, which had been their ready tool ever since Reconstruction days in a deal that left the Negroes to the mercies of their former masters in return for giving southern Support to the Republican magnates in Congress. The southern wing of the Democratic Party, rooted in grass-roots ineptitude, was as much a political tool of big wealth as was the Republican Party.
Under the impact of the depression the Democratic Party became the national spokesman for the suddenly risen industrial city with all its problems. its mass base was urban. The mass base of the Republican Party had always been in the small towns and rural areas, close to the fly-blown cracker barrel, although its telltale inaction in the 1920's lost it the overexploited western farmers. But behind these disparate mass bases-- city dwellers for the Democrats and country dwellers for the Republicans, with southern Democrat politicos spiritually in harmony with the Republicans, and western Republicans veering into the Democratic fold--there was at all times, in both parties, big wealth pulling the strings and arranging the scenes in its own succulent interests, a grotesque spectacle.
It simply so happened that the biggest wealth, shaped by policies since the Civil War, was Republican, and included the Rockefellers, Du Ponts, Mellons and Fords. The Democrats had with them, however, plenty of heavy money, committed to different handling of the domestic mess created by the Republicans.
Although Roosevelt and his New Deal became the hated devil of big wealth, which brought 85 per cent of the newspapers to bear against him through its control of corporate advertising, with the advent of war and the adoption of a bipartisan foreign policy it was Roosevelt who made the first overtures toward bringing the less fanatical Republicans into the government. He brought into his Cabinet, for example, Colonel Frank Knox, Republican vice presidential candidate of 1940; Henry L. Stimson, Hoover's secretary of state; E. R. Stettinius, Jr. , of J. P. Morgan and Company; and James V. Forrestal of the investment banking house of Dillon Read and Company. He gave Nelson A. Rockefeller his first leg up in political office by making him Coordinator of Latin-American Affairs. With these and similar appointments Roosevelt
made his third administration seem a Bar Harbor, Newport and Park Avenue affair. As FDR himself said, "the New Deal is out the window. "
After two Republican Administrations from 1952 to 1960, gained by using a clearly apolitical war hero as a stalking horse, the country again went Democratic under John F. Kennedy, himself a wealthy heir although basically a political man from a political family. Kennedy, even with no war providing an excuse for a coalition, awarded his chief Cabinet posts to Republicans from the camp of big wealth. Douglas Dillon, Republican and very wealthy heir of the founder of Dillon Read and Company, Forrestal's old firm, was made Secretary of the Treasury. Robert S. McNamara, Republican president of the Ford Motor Company, was made Secretary of Defense. McGeorge Bundy, Republican, was made liaison man to the CIA. Dean Rusk, a Democrat, but president of the Rockefeller Foundation from 1952 to 1960, was made Secretary of State.
The basic government posts, in other words, went to men deep in the camp of big wealth. But those posts that required dealings with the hoi polloi in social contexts went to party men versed in the rhetoric of inspirational ambiguity.
Dillon resigned under Johnson and was replaced by Henry H. Fowler, a career Democrat; but most of the rest of the Kennedy team continued, with the distant goal a mirage: the Great Society. The laudable stated ends of this Great Society are the end of want and of inequalities of opportunity.
As Princeton University political sociologist Richard F. Hamilton remarks,
In an affluent society, a liberal, welfare-oriented party can go a long way toward satisfying the wishes of its followers. Rather than preside over a drawn-out struggle between the people and the interests, as if it were an either/or game, the new style is to give both what they want and pay for it out of the returns from a stable and rapidly growing economy. In essence this is the Galbraithian solution--not to struggle over the "take" but to increase its size. Thus, the typical new figure on the political scene is the liberal demagogue--one who can cater to the masses because he is willing to pay them off and can do so without depriving the interests of what they want. He can be for civil rights, for improved housing, for urban renewal, for a poverty program, and at the same time can vote against a reduction of the depletion allowance. The Great Society synthesis overcomes that age-old problem of liberal politics: how to reward the clientele. Before affluence, the result was a long, hard and usually indecisive fight with the interests or it was capitulation. The new liberal, however, does not have to fight or switch. 60
The attraction of the Great Society for the wealthy, however, is the new opportunities it creates for making money on huge government contracts. In the area of defense there is a huge tax-supported military establishment making constant highly profitable demands--up to 40 and 50 per cent profit--on industry for complex new weapons. In urban renewal there is the vast profitable enterprise, replete with windfalls, of rehabilitating the commercial heart of the big cities. In slum clearance and school buildings there are vast slushy construction projects of low quality in the offing. And in the antipoverty program itself there is vast roadbuilding, as in Appalachia (which needs few roads), as well as opportunities for the local political machines.
As Dr. Hamilton remarks, "Large numbers of entrepreneurial types have recently discovered that 'there's money in poverty. '"
We have, then, as he notes, now developed "liberals of convenience" as contrasted with "liberals of conviction," and staunch Republicanism is no longer to be taken for
granted among the big wealthy, whatever their past history. For big wealth cannot afford to back political losers.
Everything about the Great Society as blueprinted spells lucrative contracts for someone. Hence the party of the Great Society now has special attractions for the wealthy that the Republican Party, fallen into the hands of dervishes of the cracker barrel, no longer has.
$6,821,025
Bethlehem Steel Corp. . 41
$10,379,268
Consolidated Edison (N. Y. ) . 28
$10,170,255
Consolidated Oil Corp. (S. O. ) 5. 71
$49,058,436
Continental Oil Co. (S. O. ) . 84
$14,055,174
Illinois Central R. R.
(now Illinois Central Ind. ) . 32
$536,364
Int'l Harvester Co. 2. 31
$24,604,360
Middle West Corporation
(now constituent companies) 2. 11
$8,272,495
Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. R. 1. 14
$115,679
Norfolk and Western Ry. . 32
$782,073
Ohio Oil Co.
(now Marathon Oil Co. [S. O]) 19. 52
$190,165,807
Pere Marquette Ry.
(exchanged for Chesapeake &
$16,000,000
Largest 1937
Ohio R. R. stock) 1. 45
$23,927
Phelps Dodge Corp. . 74
$5,381,811
Radio Corporation . 22
$4,362,775
Santa Fe Railway . 38
$1,576,563
Socony Vacuum Oil Co.
(now Socony Mobil Oil Co. [S. O] 16. 34
$771,303,099
Standard Oil Co. of Calif. 12. 32
$664,330,693
Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) 11. 36
$334,335,677
Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey)
$2,628,070,253
U. S. Steel Corp.
$3,361,473
Western Pacific R. R.
$3,916,487
____________
$4,741,515,014
$76,000,000
$47,250,000
$58,000,000
13. 51* $163,000,000
. 12
4. 79
* The Rockefellers actually had voting power over 20. 20 per cent
of the vast New Jersey Company, in assets the largest industrial
enterprise
of the world, enough to assure control, by reason of New Jersey stock
owned
by the minority-controlled Standard Oil Company (Indiana).
Considering only the largest holdings, it will be seen how magnificently these properties have risen from depression-level valuations--from seven to nearly seventeen times in less than thirty years (the latter in the case of the giant Standard Oil Company of New Jersey). How many persons in the same period have seen their salaries or propertied status improve by as much? If a school teacher, starting out at a salary of $3,000 a year in 1937, had experienced the same ratio of gain in remuneration he would now be paid in the range of $21,000-$51,000. Actually, the school teacher now receives in the range of $6,000-10,000, if that, and is facing early retirement at half pay. There never comes a time when property, large or small, is put on half pay because of age.
In the case of the Rockefellers, as of the Mellons, it has been publicly announced that they have sold some of these holdings: JDR, Jr. , in Socony Mobil Oil and the Mellons in Gulf Oil. What the proceeds were used for--new investments or trust funds for others--is not indicated. At any rate, the foregoing table should not be taken as a recent breakdown of major Rockefeller investments, which in some cases may be larger or smaller, in others may include different properties. But, I argue, whatever the present holdings are, their relative value is almost certainly not smaller than the total for the tabulation and is, for a variety of sound reasons, very probably larger.
What the TNEC study singled out as the personal largest industrial holdings of the Rockefeller family, individuals and trust funds, is shown in the following table computed at closing 1964 prices:
Closing
Largest 1964
__ Total
Value
Stockholdings
(percentage)
Atlantic Refining Co. 1. 16
$6,812,085
Bethlehem Steel Corp. . 41
$10,379,268
Consolidated Oil Corp. 5. 71
$49,058,436
Ohio Oil Co. 9. 83
$190,165,807
Socony Vacuum Oil Co. 16. 34
$771,303. 099
Standard Oil Co. of Calif. 11. 86
$639,326,406
Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) 7. 83
$236,721,770
Standard Oil Co, (New Jersey) 8. 69*
$1,691,696,720
____
$3,595,463,591
__________
Personal
Market
*By reason of the Standard Oil (Indiana) interest in the New
Jersey company,
the personal Rockefeller voting power in the latter company was 15. 38
per cent,
enough to give practical control or "dominance," in the language of
the TNEC study.
If we subtract from this $100 million for the widow (assuming her holdings had appreciated to, this level since 1960) there is left for each of the six third-generation Rockefeller children personally $570,077,232 (including whatever is laid up in trust for the grandchildren, which has lightened the financial burden of the parents). In view of the many ancillary Rockefeller holdings that are not here considered, this figure is far nearer what one should have for each more recently rather than the Fortune figure of $100-$200 million. Market values rose between 1957 and 1964, it is true, but broadly allowing for the rise and excluding grandchildren's trusts, it would seem that each of six Rockefellers must be worth at least in the range of $425-$475 million, including trust funds, and possibly more than $570 million. The apportionment ratio of trusts as between children and grandchildren is not publicly known but, as the grandchildren take from the parents, it is probable that direct trust provision for the grandchildren was made, if at all, on a much smaller scale than for their parents. To venture further into the labyrinth of family trusts without possessing the accountants' figures could only be unwarrantably speculative.
As the foundations make public reports of their holdings, there would be a way of partially checking the correctness of these computations if the same foundations were now in existence as figured in the TNEC study. Unfortunately, the structure and number of Rockefeller foundations have greatly changed since 1937 and only the sketchiest sort of check is possible. just as the Rockefellers have probably shuffled their personal investments, so have they publicly shuffled their foundations consonant with the introduction of a third generation into the management of affairs.
The foundation holdings, reckoning by the TNEC percentages, should have stood at $1,146,051,423 at the end of 1964. At the end of 1962 (the only figures yet available)
Total
the actual foundation holdings, when market values were somewhat lower than at the end of 1964, were $823,485,972, according to the Foundation Directory, 1964. My computations, it is clear, produce a figure that is $322,565,451 higher than seems to be the case.
Before we consider this not inconsiderable discrepancy and what may account for it, the recent foundation holdings should be examined. The Foundation Directory shows them and their stated assets to have been as follows:
Date Founded
General Education Board 1902
Rockefeller Foundation 1913
Sealantic Fund
(Community fund for Seal Harbor,
Me. , and Pocantico Hills, N. Y. ,
where Rockefellers reside) 1938
Jackson Preserve, Inc. 1940
Rockefeller Brothers Fund 1940
American Int'l Ass'n for
Economic and Social Development
(part Rockefeller) 1946
Council on Economic and Cultural
Development 1953
Chase National Bank Foundation
(part Rockefeller) 1958
Total $823,485,972
At the time of the TNEC study there were only the Rockefeller Foundation, the General Education Board and the Spelman Fund of New York in the field. The latter has gone out of business and six others have been added since 1938.
Applying the TNEC pattern, which found that 30 per cent of Rockefeller holdings were in foundations and 30 per cent in personal trusts, with 40 per cent individually held, and using the 1962 foundation holdings as the base of computation, one would have the following as the figure of dominated and owned holdings in 1962:
Foundations--30 per cent
Individual trust funds--30 per cent
Individual holdings--40 per cent
$823,485,972
$823,485,972
$1,077,981,296
______________
Total $2,724,953,240
Using recent foundation holdings as the base to which the TNEC percentage is applied appears to me to result in a downward distortion, first because the individual holdings were concentrated in the upward-spiraling oil industry while much of the foundation investment is in fixed-interest securities, and secondly because the foundation pattern has been altered. My conclusion is that proportional to individual holdings and trust funds the foundation holdings are now either less than 30 per cent of the whole or that their assets by 1964 had moved up in value closer to the projected figure of $1,146,051,423 obtained by my computation.
As the foundation reports are issued at a more leisurely pace than company reports and are not available for 1964 at this writing, direct comparison cannot be made. But critical readers can make the comparison at any time, when the reports become available, provided they always apply market values rather than book values of holdings.
Assets at
End of 1962
$342,834
$632,282,137
$11,639,033
$21,939,398 (1961)
$152,386,637
$752,585 (1961)
$3,360,950
$782,398
____________
If one wishes to examine still another possibility, one can put together the figure of $3,595,463,591 for the 1964 value of the personal holdings obtained by my computation with the 1962 figure of $823,485,972 for foundation holdings. This gives a total of $4,418,949,563 for the combined holdings. I still believe, however, that my original figure of $4,741,515,014 is an understatement of the combined family holding, because the TNEC did not survey all the family properties (only the largest) and notwithstanding the fact that Rockefeller, Jr. , had to pay gift taxes in the establishment of his chain of trust funds for children and grandchildren.
When one throws the Chase Bank, Rockefeller Center and various real estate properties into the pot and considers that Laurance Rockefeller has blossomed in his own right as a venture capitalist in luxury hotels and advanced-technology enterprises, the combined Rockefeller financial "punch" should be above $5 billion. Although apparently outpaced by the Du Ponts in the super-wealth sweepstakes, the Rockefellers seem to me to be running at least neck and neck with the Mellons.
The TNEC study, it must again be stressed, did not pretend to produce the totals of wealth held, for it confined itself only to the twenty largest stockholdings in the 200 largest nonfinancial companies and ignored ownership of banks, insurance companies, bonds, real estate and smaller stockholdings. Relying on the TNEC method alone there might have been missed even larger concentration of wealth, for example if the twenty- first largest stockholder in all 200 companies had been the same person or family; but on other evidential grounds it is known that such a logical possibility did not hold in fact.
The Fords of Dearborn
Mrs. Edsel Ford and her three sons--Henry II, Benson and William-were assigned a combined minimal wealth of $325 million and a maximum of $500 million by Fortune in 1957. Her daughter Josephine (Mrs. Walter Buhl Ford II) was not noticed by Fortune.
It is always fairly easy to compute the collective personal wealth of the Fords because they own 10 per cent of the outstanding stock (but 40 per cent of the voting power) of the Ford Motor Company (always assuming there have been no secret sales or purchases and that there are no side interests). On the face of it (although not really) 10 per cent of the entire stock issue of the company appears to be the sole personal financial strength of the family.
What slightly impedes any computation of Ford wealth is the rather complicated capital structure of the company as created under the wills of Henry and his son Edsel.
At the end of 1964 this capital structure, after split-ups in each class, stood as follows:
Common stock (owned by investors)
Class A stock (owned by the Ford Foundation)
Class B stock (owned by the Ford family)
Shares
52,338,152
46,283,756
12,267,794
___________
Total 110,889,702
The Class A stock is nonvoting until it is either sold by the foundation or given by it to some approved nonprofit organization, when it acquires one vote per share; but never at any time can all the common stock cast more than 60 per cent of the vote at a stockholders' meeting. For, as noted, 40 per cent of voting power is concentrated by charter in all the Class B stock, giving the Ford family very nearly absolute control of the company at all times. All classes of stock participate equally, share for share, in dividends. Control is what counts.
At the closing 1964 quotation of 54-1/2 per share this capitalization had a gross market value of $6,043,488,759. This left the Fords 10-plus per cent apparently valued at $604,348,876. But, considering the factor of control, the Ford family stock has as much voting power as two-thirds of the common, which was valued in the market at $1,901,619,450. Anyone who owns two-thirds of the common stock would have as much voting power as the Fords but would get more dividends--on 34,892,100 shares as against 12,267,794 shares--and to that extent would have more value in hand. But the Class B stock, owing to the heavy weight of voting privileges embodied in it, is worth more, share for share, than the market value of the common stock (although nobody would seek to get that value unless he sought control of the company). If, however, a buyer of control were to show himself, the Ford-held stock at closing 1964 prices would have, in relation to the common, the value of close to $2 billion I have assigned it by this computation. While the Ford stock gets dividends of only about a third of the equivalent amount of voting-power common, this isn't too much of a hardship as the Fords are in an income-tax bracket that hits such soaring dividends hard. Besides, the men all drew high salaries as officers of the company. They have plenty of pocket money.
So, at a price of around 54 for the present outstanding stock of the company, I would rate the value of the family holding at a minimal 82 billion, although any syndicate interested in buying the company would probably have to pay more for it (assuming current or higher levels of profitability).
Compared, then, with the Du Ponts, Mellons and Rockefellers, the Fords are in comparatively modest circumstances although individually the members of the three latter families are on the average richer owing to the participation of a greater number of Du Ponts in the heady Du Pont mixture.
Since 1964, however, there has been a slight alteration in the foundation holdings, which does not affect my computation nor the conclusions drawn from it. In June, 1965, the foundation marketed more shares. Originally it received precisely 88 per cent of all stock in the form of Class A nonvoting shares. Adjusting for stock splits after the 1965 sale it had disposed of very nearly half or 46. 9 million present shares. The 45. 7 million shares it retained composed 35. 8 per cent of the entire capital stock of Ford Motor.
In terms of its own book values of the various securities it held, Ford Motor plus others, the foundation at the end of 1964 was worth $2. 4 billion.
The great care taken by the two elder Fords to see that control remained in the family is shown by the voting provisions for the stocks. If the outstanding Class B stock falls below 5. 4 million shares (which it can do only if it is called in by the family) the total voting power of the common rises to 70 per cent; and if the B stock outstanding falls below 3 million shares it votes equally with the common.
Until the family, then, quixotically decides to call in the B stock (thus cutting its own throat as far as control is concerned) it holds 40 per cent of voting power in the company, tantamount to absolute control. Should some syndicate attempt to buy control in the market the Fords need purchase only 16-2/3 per cent of outstanding common to give it 50 per cent voting power, whereas a syndicate would have to purchase 83-1/3 per cent of all common to reach the same dead-heat point. In such an unequal race the Fords would necessarily win.
But even if a syndicate turned up with all the common, giving it absolute control, the Fords have an ace in reserve. And this ace shows one of the many ways foundation control can be synchronized with industrial control, The Fords control the foundation. And the A stock held by the foundation acquires voting power as it is sold or given to a nonprofit institution. Faced with an opponent who owned all the common, giving him a
60 per cent vote and control, the Fords need merely activate the voting power of the foundation stock by selling it or giving it to friendly hands, thus diluting the voting power of the outstanding common. By converting all its remaining Class A stock into voting stock the foundation could dilute the voting power of the presently outstanding common to 30 per cent of the present capital structure. With the 30 per cent of the voting power in the newly converted common plus the 40 per cent of voting power in the Class B stock the Fords would actually have, as they now potentially have, 70 per cent of the voting power. The foundation, indeed, could sell somewhat more than half of its remaining Ford stock and leave the Fords able to muster 55 per cent of the voting power in any critical showdown.
The ins and outs of this situation may have puzzled some readers. The point to be made is only to show the great care taken to guard control, revealing what the wealthy intend. In acting as they do they are only being reasonable; for the humanly normal thing to do is to guard one's possessions. But we have many propagandists around, led by such errant professors as A. A. Berle, Jr. , who apparently are not afraid of being judged certifiably silly by contending that control as well as ownership of the large companies is being widely spread around, that the big fortunes are being broken up to right and left. The Berle thesis, refuted on every hand by the facts, is that as ownership is dispersed (which it is not in fact), free-lance company managements install themselves in the drivers' seats as something of a new corporate breed. These new managers--the "managerial revolution"--proceed in this fairy tale to elbow aside the Du Ponts, Mellons, Rockefellers, Fords, Pews, Gettys and various others--and thus introduce a new set of actors on the stage of history, a set of actors that conquer by sheer bureaucratic techniques.
Such being the case, reason many readers, we can all just sit back and watch the fun as bright young men rise to conjure the corporations away from the big owners. Like all fantasies, this one has quite a coterie of bemused devotees.
The surviving Fords would have been a great deal richer today than they are if Henry Ford, founder and original master mind of the automotive behemoth, who died in 1947 at eighty-three years of age, had been personally less grasping and if the deaths of central figures in the family had not occurred before the very rich could get a tractable Congress around to trimming the New Deal inheritance taxes. This trimming process was no doubt hastened by the example of the tax-speared disaster that engulfed the massive Ford fortune.
Ford's only son, Edsel, a far more likeable, intelligent and informed man than his flinty father but kept unhappily subordinate all his life, died prematurely at age forty- nine in 1943. The oldest grandson, Henry Ford II, at the age of twenty-five, inexperienced in business and up to 1940 a sociology major at Yale, was hastily spirited out of the wartime Navy where he was an ensign and installed as a director and executive vice president of the vast company, a miraculous corporate success story. His brothers Benson and William, twenty-five and eighteen years old at the time, trailed him into the company later, where they also showed their mettle by quickly rising to the top. Their mother, whom I have perhaps ill-advisedly listed as a rentier, played a strong and constructive role (from a family and property point of view) on the board of directors with Henry II. She backed him particularly, if she did not indeed take the lead, in getting rid of much accumulated deadwood in the cracker-barrel executive suite of Henry I.
Holding tightly ( and tax-expensively) to 58-1/2 per cent of the company's voting stock, Henry Ford at his death was publicly assigned a net worth of $500-$700 million. 45 The value at the time of the Ford Motor Company, since reorganized and vastly
improved internally by the grandsons, was in the vicinity of $1 billion. Ford's death came none too soon for the family fortunes, as the company under his old-style heavy- handed administration had for more than fifteen years been losing ground to free- swinging General Motors and stepped-up Chrysler and had long since tumbled from the top of the motor heap. Definitely on the skids, the company was thought in the automobile industry to be headed for the junkyard that had already engulfed scores of automobile companies.
But the deaths of Edsel and Henry, with the company slipping mainly because the views of Edsel were continually overruled by the feudal owner and his sycophantic cronies in the management, also came at an inopportune time with respect to the tax laws. For the marital deduction and the option of estate splitting had not yet been enacted. Both Edsel's and his father's holdings were faced by a flat 91 per cent inheritance tax, designed under the New Deal expressly to break down big fortunes topheavy with political power. Had the later law been in effect, the two Fords could have assigned half their holdings to their wives, tax free, and the wives could have worked their funds with the help of lawyers into much lower tax brackets. This splitting, it should be noticed, also often puts the testator into a lower tax bracket as well, although it could not have had that effect with the two Fords unless they had made free use of trust funds for the grandchildren. Henry Ford was apparently too tightfisted to do that, which would have cost him only bargain-counter gift taxes.
A partial way out of this tax disaster was engineered in The Ford Foundation for Human Advancement established by Edsel in 1936. (Henry Ford himself was hostile to public benefactions and spoke out freely against them. ) 46 But even with the help of the Ford Foundation, the personal Ford fortune, which under standard tax management would have been much larger today, was literally decimated nine times over.
Edsel left the greater part of his holdings to the Ford Foundation, thus escaping the big tax, and his father eventually had to do the same or see his money go largely to Washington and its hated New Dealers.
In this flukey way the Ford Foundation received nearly 90 per cent of the stock in the Ford Motor Company, all of it nonvoting as long as the foundation held it but participating equally in dividends. 47 As far as Henry Ford himself was concerned, the foundation was an unwilling benefaction, the lesser of two ghastly evils.
"On the Foundation's books, this [Ford money] was given the value, for tax purposes, of $416,000,000, but its real value, as measured by the earnings of Ford Motors, was at least $2,500,000,000. This is considerably more than half as much money as all the other foundations in the country have among them. " 48
Still salvaging what they could in a bad situation, the Fords stipulated that the stock made over to the foundation should be nonvoting, leaving the 10 per cent in the hands of the family with an initial 100 per cent voting power.
Asked whether he would rather have all the Ford Motor dividends or company control, the average man would probably choose the dividends. He would be mistaken, for those in control determine whether there shall be any dividends at all. One in control could decide to invest earnings elsewhere until the designated dividend-receiver came to some sort of terms, not disadvantageous to a controller. Control is always the prime objective of the true leaders in all large organizations--political, financial, economic, philanthropic, educational or otherwise. For control determines everything that is subject to the will.
And, finally, the family, now controlling the company, was also placed by the elder Fords' testaments in control of the foundation. Although it could not receive foundation
income or any part of it, the family could manage the foundation (as it has since done) to the advantage of the Ford Motor Company, the goose that lays the golden eggs.
The Ford Foundation, which when Henry Ford was alive was devoted purely to community projects in and around Detroit that were beneficial to the Ford Motor Company, began its national operations only in 1950, when it started spewing forth huge grants for educational and other purposes in unprecedented fashion. Ordinarily hard-to-get money began to float around the country in huge gobs. In 1954 the foundation bestowed $68 million, four times the annual Rockefeller contribution to the charitable kitty and ten times that of the third largest foundation, The Carnegie Corporation. This figure, a mere taste of what was yet to come, was as much as all American foundations combined spent in any single year up to 1948 and was about a quarter of the spending of all foundations in 1954. 49 If the Ford Foundation is a good thing, as many maintain, then it must be attributed to New Deal tax laws.
In connection with trust funds earlier, the reader may recall there was a somewhat cryptic reference to "standard doctrine. " The two Fords relied on standard doctrine in creating the Ford Foundation. just what is standard doctrine? Most broadly and informally, and applicable in all social and political contexts, standard doctrine was perhaps most pungently expressed by the late W. C. Fields when he voiced the deathless maxim: "Never give a sucker an even break. " But, more specifically, it relates in our social system to known legal ways of maximizing advantages and minimizing disadvantages for property, especially under existing tax laws. Moreover, it shows one in detail how to accomplish these ends. With reference to the tax laws in all their ramifications the doctrine is now well codified, notably in a series of multiple-volume loose-leaf publications titled the Standard Federal Tax Reporter published by the Commerce Clearing House in New York. Supplementing the income-tax series there are the sub-series titled Federal Excise Tax Reporter and Federal Estate and Gift Tax Reporter .
With respect to a structure like the Ford Foundation, standard doctrine holds:
"Charitable giving through the channels of charitable, tax-exempt foundations has achieved a position of importance in estate planning. Apart from the humanitarian aspects involved, the family foundation can be an effective means of reducing income and estate taxes and of continuing control of a closely held corporation in the family of the donor. " 5O These are precisely the ends that were achieved by the testamentary dispositions of the Ford estates.
Foundations, in other words, are a way of reducing taxes, and this is part of standard doctrine. Newspapers and other propaganda media, however, have long referred to them in their whimsical way as benefactions (which in certain cases they may also be) and their creators as philanthropists rather than as tax-sensitive acquisitors (which they may or may not be), and invariably refer to the transferred money as donations and gifts (which they are not necessarily). The donations, so-called, are the consequence of big tax write-downs offered by the government precisely for such a possibly benign placement of funds.
But a large section of the public has been instilled with the unwarranted belief that something is being given away for nothing. And, anomalously, as I have had occasion before to point out 51 these huge so-called gifts sprang from the hoards of men who in their active lifetimes left no stone unturned to amass for themselves great wealth. The most acquisitive, it would seem in this fantastic newspaper scenario, turn out to be the most benevolently inclined.
More broadly, standard doctrine holds that one should always pay the lowest possible wages and taxes, charge the highest possible prices and rents, and never give anything
away unless the gift confers some hidden possibly overcompensatory personal benefit. The big propertied usually do their level best to adhere to it.
This may sound cynical to some, but only because they have witlessly allowed themselves to be deluded by unrealistic propaganda lullabies. It is not only standard but sound doctrine in any social system that pits its citizens competitively against each other and makes property ownership a cornerstone of well being. Would any property owner be considered sensible if he elected to pay maximum wages and taxes, charge minimal prices and then, if he had anything left, gave it away to Tom, Dick and Harry? Even to steer a middle course between the two extremes would not be considered very astute.
Although Henry Ford died worth $500-$700 million at 1947 values, he met his final tax problem well, even though until then he had steered a less than canny course. His federal tax was only $21,108,160. 91 on a taxable estate of $70 million which consisted of $31,451,909. 36 plus some Ford stock. 52
Edsel paid about $12 million, or 6 per cent, on an estate then estimated to be worth $200 million. 53 But in 1935 he had established trusts for his four children. In addition to Ford stock, he owned most of the stock of the Manufacturers National Bank of Detroit, which he left to his widow. As it was disclosed, Henry Ford owned 55 per cent of the stock of Ford Motor, Edsel 41-1/2 per cent and Mrs. Henry Ford 3-1/2 per cent. 54 Together Henry and Edsel paid inheritance taxes of a little more than $30 million. The elder Ford would have done better, as the elder Rockefeller did, by giving his son, wife and grandchildren stock over a period of years.
But if Edsel and Henry had not had recourse to the foundation--at the last moment almost--the estate would have been forced to pay a 91 per cent tax. This would have left a mere 9 per cent of outstanding ordinary stock in Ford family hands, hardly enough to control the corporation. Instead, they were left with 10 per cent of the stock (clothed by charter with 40 per cent voting power) and 100 per cent control over the asset-logged foundation, which as it engages in good works cannot help but generate friendly feelings for the Ford Motor Company in many worthy bosoms. 55
A further advantage in the plan adopted (for which some unsung lawyer deserves a summa cum laude) is that its provision for selling foundation stock created a horde of stockholding allies for the Ford family, which was dangerously isolated when it was the sole owner. Now when anyone wishes to make a face at the Ford Motor Company, the Ford Foundation or, indeed, at any of the Fords, he must reckon not only with all the grateful beneficiaries of foundation grants but with thousands of dividend-hungry small stockholders. Big owners have many small partners.
The Realm of Super-Wealth
The Du Ponts, Mellons, Rockefellers and Fords, in any event, are the four cardinal points of the compass in the realm of super-wealth. The Fords must be included by reason of the sheer magnitude of their controlled holdings even though they do not yet have as varied an organizational task force as their peers.
On the basis of sheer magnitude, again, J. Paul Getty should probably be thought of in the same class, although we do not yet know what will be the post mortem status of his holdings.
The other major clear-cut claimants to super-wealth status--and theirs would be minor super-wealth--are the Pews of the Sun Oil Company.
Neither the Houghtons of Corning Glass nor the Olins of Olin Mathieson Chemical appear to quite make it. But the Hartfords and Rosenwalds should be considered. The Houghtons, incidentally, were missed by the TNEC dragnet.
Fortune mentioned only two Pews, but the TNEC study showed them to be a numerous clan: J. Howard Pew, Marv Ethel Pew, J. N. Pew, Jr. , Mabel Pew Myrin, Walter C. Pew, Albert H. Pew, Mrs. Mary C. Pew, Arthur E. Pew, Jr. , John G. Pew, Helen T. Pew, Alberta C. Pew and others. The Pews collectively--individually and through estates and trust funds--owned 70. 6 per cent of Sun Oil Company common stock as of February 15, 1938. 56
Assuming that this same percentage of ownership was maintained, they would be collectively worth $708,458,121 at closing prices for Sun Oil in 1964.
But the Pews since TNEC days have also set up foundations. As of March 2, 1965, the Pew Memorial Trust (through The Glenmede Trust Company) owned 21. 7 per cent of Sun Oil stock and held as fiduciary for other Pew trusts and estates 20. 9 per cent. 57 The Foundation Directory, 1964, states the 1960 assets of the Memorial Trust alone, leaving out its fiduciary holdings, at $135,309,481.
Before we pass to lesser but interesting wealth-holders (the extremely wealthy as distinguished from the super-wealthy), we may scan those we have examined in this chapter for common characteristics apart from their holdings of wealth.
Characteristics of the Super-Wealthy
All were born American citizens; their families have been in the United States for generations. All are inheritors in greater or less degree and, except for the Du Ponts who sprang from a revolutionary savant, all are far better educated than their family founders. Such being the case, they have a broader awareness of the world and its vagaries. None of these groups has its younger members placed in less than the third generation of wealth; the Du Ponts stand at least seven generations in the stream of gold. Such being the case they all together contradict the American folk-belief that a family passes from shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three generations. None of these gilt- edged people, obviously, are having any of that.
Offhand it would be said that they are all white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants; but such a statement would be somewhat misleading. The Du Ponts are of French Huguenot origin, and there is a Jewish crossing (Belin) in one of their lines of descent. Nor can it be said categorically that they are all Protestants. For Henry Ford II became a convert to Catholicism on the occasion of his first marriage and, through the foundation, funnels large sums to Catholic schools and colleges. As a consequence of his divorce and remarriage outside the Church, he is now automatically excommunicated but remains a Catholic. His children are Catholic.
Despite the fuss made by outsiders about being white, Anglo-Saxon and Protestant (or Catholic-Jewish) it is doubtful that any of these people attach much importance to the point. Most of them, from all indications, are pretty worldly wise and wear their ethincity and religiosity debonairly. Money, they know, is what counts in the established scheme.
Sinews of Republicanism
A far more significant common characteristic of all these super-wealthy families is that they have long been the main supporters nationally of the Republican Party, the party of plutocratic oligarchy. They have been its big sinews. Except for some minor Democratic deviants among the Du Ponts (and the Du Ponts can show many kinds of deviants from the basic family pattern) all leading members are Republican and their forebears were Republican.
With the exception of the Fords each has at various times played strong forward roles in the Republican party--the Rockefellers particularly under the McKinley
Administration; the Mellons under the Harding-Coolidge-Hoover Administrations; the Du Ponts with the Liberty League in fighting a strong rearguard action during the 1930's against the resurgent Democratic Party; and the Pews ever since in being the wealthiest supporters (among many) of unreconstructed right-wing Republicanism down to the present. If not kings themselves, they are king-makers.
The RockefelIers have in recent years come again to play a forward role through the person of Nelson A. Rockefeller. Thrice elected governor of New York, until his divorce and remarriage to a divorced woman he was considered a chief Republican presidential prospect. Every professional politician in the country agrees that if the personable and outgoing Nelson had pressed for the Republican presidential nomination in 1960 he would have obtained it and beaten John F. Kennedy. While his divorce might not under other circumstances have kept him from the presidency its inflation to a major issue by ultra-rightist Republicans tended to have that effect in the 1960's.
But the Rockefellers still play a very strong role in Republican politics and Winthrop has become the Republican governor of Arkansas. Ultra-rightist Republicans, however, give them credit for too much by blaming them chiefly for the electoral disaster that overtook their implausible darling, Barry Goldwater, in 1964.
As important wheels in the political process these families have always had quick and direct access to the White House, no matter what the party of the president. Not only in times of war (when gossamer party lines tend to blur) but in times of peace, representatives of these families have always been able to obtain an audience even with a Democratic president, and sometimes have been summoned for counsel, comfort and advice by dazed Republican presidents. But the name of Rockefeller was once under such a public cloud that on a visit to the White House the younger Rockefeller was spirited in by a back entrance to talk to President William Howard Taft. 58
Yet these and other magnates of extreme wealth have been far from Strangers to the Democratic Party. Both the political parties have been supported--the Republican mainly by weightily propertied elements. The parties are opposite sides of the same coin. Instead of saying that the United States has a two-party system, it would be more nearly correct to say it has a dual-party system.
After the Civil War, with the plantation owners self-destroyed, the Democratic Party always attracted large propertied elements whenever it made strong bids to win national elections. The Cleveland Administrations were as close to Wall Street, manned by Wall Streeters, as any Republican Administration. William Jennings Bryan, although anathema to the Wall Street Establishment, was supported by western mining interests, for whom "free silver" was so much extra gravy. The Wilson Administration was as completely under the thumb of Wall Street as the subsequent Harding, Coolidge and Hoover Administrations. 59 John W. Davis, the Democratic candidate for president in 1924 was a Wall Street corporation lawyer.
In 1928 Al Smith had his chief backing, financial and emotional, from fellow-Catholic John J. Raskob, prime minister of the Du Ponts. If Smith had won he would have been far less a Catholic than a Du Pont president, although the religious question was what was pushed to the fore by a politically obtuse electorate. Hoover, the Republican, was a J. P. Morgan puppet; Smith, his democratic opponent, was in the pocket of the Du Ponts, for whom J. P. Morgan and Company was the banker. By 1936 Smith was a roaring Liberty Leaguer. The victory of either man put J. P. Morgan and the Du Pouts into the presidential driver's seat. W. Averell Harriman was one of the leading wealthy Republicans who crossed the line to the Democrats in 1928 and has been a Democrat, and a high government official, in all subsequent Democratic Administrations.
Under Franklin Delano Roosevelt, owing chiefly to troubled circumstances, for the first time it appeared that some of the magnates might be unwelcome at the White House. The wealthiest, especially the Du Ponts, opposed him bitterly, which meant that he was opposed by the banks and heavy industry. Those numerous wealthy persons who became staunch Rooseveltians were mainly of the second or third tier of wealth and nearly all in merchandising and light industry, immediately dependent upon the stagnating mass-consumption market. They were down-the-line New Dealers but not, as misconceived Republican propaganda had it, Socialists, Populists or even Welfare- Staters.
But owing to the disastrous Republican-fostered and Wall Street nurtured economic depression, which interrupted seventy-two years of unbroken rule by the magnates through either Republican or Democratic puppets, the Democratic Party became the inheritor of vast social problems informally created largely by Republican neglect. The big special problems in the United States always develop through neglect, in part because so many active and intelligent elements are permanently siphoned off into the chicaneries of the money-making process. If profitability cannot be shown for an activity, such as raising the cultural level and tending to the lame, the halt, the blind and the stricken, such activity is left to quixotic and somewhat suspect elements--quixotic at least by prevailing standards.
Not that the Democratic Party moved very far to the Left in coping with domestic disaster, as hostile propaganda has it; for the magnates had ready to their call almost the entire southern congressional delegation, which had been their ready tool ever since Reconstruction days in a deal that left the Negroes to the mercies of their former masters in return for giving southern Support to the Republican magnates in Congress. The southern wing of the Democratic Party, rooted in grass-roots ineptitude, was as much a political tool of big wealth as was the Republican Party.
Under the impact of the depression the Democratic Party became the national spokesman for the suddenly risen industrial city with all its problems. its mass base was urban. The mass base of the Republican Party had always been in the small towns and rural areas, close to the fly-blown cracker barrel, although its telltale inaction in the 1920's lost it the overexploited western farmers. But behind these disparate mass bases-- city dwellers for the Democrats and country dwellers for the Republicans, with southern Democrat politicos spiritually in harmony with the Republicans, and western Republicans veering into the Democratic fold--there was at all times, in both parties, big wealth pulling the strings and arranging the scenes in its own succulent interests, a grotesque spectacle.
It simply so happened that the biggest wealth, shaped by policies since the Civil War, was Republican, and included the Rockefellers, Du Ponts, Mellons and Fords. The Democrats had with them, however, plenty of heavy money, committed to different handling of the domestic mess created by the Republicans.
Although Roosevelt and his New Deal became the hated devil of big wealth, which brought 85 per cent of the newspapers to bear against him through its control of corporate advertising, with the advent of war and the adoption of a bipartisan foreign policy it was Roosevelt who made the first overtures toward bringing the less fanatical Republicans into the government. He brought into his Cabinet, for example, Colonel Frank Knox, Republican vice presidential candidate of 1940; Henry L. Stimson, Hoover's secretary of state; E. R. Stettinius, Jr. , of J. P. Morgan and Company; and James V. Forrestal of the investment banking house of Dillon Read and Company. He gave Nelson A. Rockefeller his first leg up in political office by making him Coordinator of Latin-American Affairs. With these and similar appointments Roosevelt
made his third administration seem a Bar Harbor, Newport and Park Avenue affair. As FDR himself said, "the New Deal is out the window. "
After two Republican Administrations from 1952 to 1960, gained by using a clearly apolitical war hero as a stalking horse, the country again went Democratic under John F. Kennedy, himself a wealthy heir although basically a political man from a political family. Kennedy, even with no war providing an excuse for a coalition, awarded his chief Cabinet posts to Republicans from the camp of big wealth. Douglas Dillon, Republican and very wealthy heir of the founder of Dillon Read and Company, Forrestal's old firm, was made Secretary of the Treasury. Robert S. McNamara, Republican president of the Ford Motor Company, was made Secretary of Defense. McGeorge Bundy, Republican, was made liaison man to the CIA. Dean Rusk, a Democrat, but president of the Rockefeller Foundation from 1952 to 1960, was made Secretary of State.
The basic government posts, in other words, went to men deep in the camp of big wealth. But those posts that required dealings with the hoi polloi in social contexts went to party men versed in the rhetoric of inspirational ambiguity.
Dillon resigned under Johnson and was replaced by Henry H. Fowler, a career Democrat; but most of the rest of the Kennedy team continued, with the distant goal a mirage: the Great Society. The laudable stated ends of this Great Society are the end of want and of inequalities of opportunity.
As Princeton University political sociologist Richard F. Hamilton remarks,
In an affluent society, a liberal, welfare-oriented party can go a long way toward satisfying the wishes of its followers. Rather than preside over a drawn-out struggle between the people and the interests, as if it were an either/or game, the new style is to give both what they want and pay for it out of the returns from a stable and rapidly growing economy. In essence this is the Galbraithian solution--not to struggle over the "take" but to increase its size. Thus, the typical new figure on the political scene is the liberal demagogue--one who can cater to the masses because he is willing to pay them off and can do so without depriving the interests of what they want. He can be for civil rights, for improved housing, for urban renewal, for a poverty program, and at the same time can vote against a reduction of the depletion allowance. The Great Society synthesis overcomes that age-old problem of liberal politics: how to reward the clientele. Before affluence, the result was a long, hard and usually indecisive fight with the interests or it was capitulation. The new liberal, however, does not have to fight or switch. 60
The attraction of the Great Society for the wealthy, however, is the new opportunities it creates for making money on huge government contracts. In the area of defense there is a huge tax-supported military establishment making constant highly profitable demands--up to 40 and 50 per cent profit--on industry for complex new weapons. In urban renewal there is the vast profitable enterprise, replete with windfalls, of rehabilitating the commercial heart of the big cities. In slum clearance and school buildings there are vast slushy construction projects of low quality in the offing. And in the antipoverty program itself there is vast roadbuilding, as in Appalachia (which needs few roads), as well as opportunities for the local political machines.
As Dr. Hamilton remarks, "Large numbers of entrepreneurial types have recently discovered that 'there's money in poverty. '"
We have, then, as he notes, now developed "liberals of convenience" as contrasted with "liberals of conviction," and staunch Republicanism is no longer to be taken for
granted among the big wealthy, whatever their past history. For big wealth cannot afford to back political losers.
Everything about the Great Society as blueprinted spells lucrative contracts for someone. Hence the party of the Great Society now has special attractions for the wealthy that the Republican Party, fallen into the hands of dervishes of the cracker barrel, no longer has.
