Objection
1: It would seem that the will is moved by the same act, to
the end and to the means.
the end and to the means.
Summa Theologica
And thus also is one accident
said to be in another; for we speak of color as being in the surface.
Accordingly, circumstances are related to acts in both these ways. For
some circumstances that have a relation to acts, belong to the agent
otherwise than through the act; as place and condition of person;
whereas others belong to the agent by reason of the act, as the manner
in which the act is done.
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Whether theologians should take note of the circumstances of human acts?
Objection 1: It would seem that theologians should not take note of the
circumstances of human acts. Because theologians do not consider human
acts otherwise than according to their quality of good or evil. But it
seems that circumstances cannot give quality to human acts; for a thing
is never qualified, formally speaking, by that which is outside it; but
by that which is in it. Therefore theologians should not take note of
the circumstances of acts.
Objection 2: Further, circumstances are the accidents of acts. But one
thing may be subject to an infinity of accidents; hence the Philosopher
says (Metaph. vi, 2) that "no art or science considers accidental
being, except only the art of sophistry. " Therefore the theologian has
not to consider circumstances.
Objection 3: Further, the consideration of circumstances belongs to the
orator. But oratory is not a part of theology. Therefore it is not a
theologian's business to consider circumstances.
On the contrary, Ignorance of circumstances causes an act to be
involuntary, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and Gregory
of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi. ]. But involuntariness excuses
from sin, the consideration of which belongs to the theologian.
Therefore circumstances also should be considered by the theologian.
I answer that, Circumstances come under the consideration of the
theologian, for a threefold reason. First, because the theologian
considers human acts, inasmuch as man is thereby directed to Happiness.
Now, everything that is directed to an end should be proportionate to
that end. But acts are made proportionate to an end by means of a
certain commensurateness, which results from the due circumstances.
Hence the theologian has to consider the circumstances. Secondly,
because the theologian considers human acts according as they are found
to be good or evil, better or worse: and this diversity depends on
circumstances, as we shall see further on ([1060]Q[18],
AA[10],11;[1061] Q[73], A[7]). Thirdly, because the theologian
considers human acts under the aspect of merit and demerit, which is
proper to human acts; and for this it is requisite that they be
voluntary. Now a human act is deemed to be voluntary or involuntary,
according to knowledge or ignorance of circumstances, as stated above
([1062]Q[6], A[8]). Therefore the theologian has to consider
circumstances.
Reply to Objection 1: Good directed to the end is said to be useful;
and this implies some kind of relation: wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. i, 6) that "the good in the genus 'relation' is the useful. "
Now, in the genus "relation" a thing is denominated not only according
to that which is inherent in the thing, but also according to that
which is extrinsic to it: as may be seen in the expressions "right" and
"left," "equal" and "unequal," and such like. Accordingly, since the
goodness of acts consists in their utility to the end, nothing hinders
their being called good or bad according to their proportion to
extrinsic things that are adjacent to them.
Reply to Objection 2: Accidents which are altogether accidental are
neglected by every art, by reason of their uncertainty and infinity.
But such like accidents are not what we call circumstances; because
circumstances although, as stated above [1063](A[1]), they are
extrinsic to the act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by
being related to it. Proper accidents, however, come under the
consideration of art.
Reply to Objection 3: The consideration of circumstances belongs to the
moralist, the politician, and the orator. To the moralist, in so far as
with respect to circumstances we find or lose the mean of virtue in
human acts and passions. To the politician and to the orator, in so far
as circumstances make acts to be worthy of praise or blame, of excuse
or indictment. In different ways, however: because where the orator
persuades, the politician judges. To the theologian this consideration
belongs, in all the aforesaid ways: since to him all the other arts are
subservient: for he has to consider virtuous and vicious acts, just as
the moralist does; and with the orator and politician he considers acts
according as they are deserving of reward or punishment.
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Whether the circumstances are properly set forth in the third book of
Ethics?
Objection 1: It would seem that the circumstances are not properly set
forth in Ethic. iii, 1. For a circumstance of an act is described as
something outside the act. Now time and place answer to this
description. Therefore there are only two circumstances, to wit, "when"
and "where. "
Objection 2: Further, we judge from the circumstances whether a thing
is well or ill done. But this belongs to the mode of an act. Therefore
all the circumstances are included under one, which is the "mode of
acting. "
Objection 3: Further, circumstances are not part of the substance of an
act. But the causes of an act seem to belong to its substance.
Therefore no circumstance should be taken from the cause of the act
itself. Accordingly, neither "who," nor "why," nor "about what," are
circumstances: since "who" refers to the efficient cause, "why" to the
final cause, and "about what" to the material cause.
On the contrary is the authority of the Philosopher in Ethic. iii, 1.
I answer that, Tully, in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhetor. i), gives
seven circumstances, which are contained in this verse:
"Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando---
Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and when. "
For in acts we must take note of "who" did it, "by what aids" or
"instruments" he did it, "what" he did, "where" he did it, "why" he did
it, "how" and "when" he did it. But Aristotle in Ethic. iii, 1 adds yet
another, to wit, "about what," which Tully includes in the circumstance
"what. "
The reason of this enumeration may be set down as follows. For a
circumstance is described as something outside the substance of the
act, and yet in a way touching it. Now this happens in three ways:
first, inasmuch as it touches the act itself; secondly, inasmuch as it
touches the cause of the act; thirdly, inasmuch as it touches the
effect. It touches the act itself, either by way of measure, as "time"
and "place"; or by qualifying the act as the "mode of acting. " It
touches the effect when we consider "what" is done. It touches the
cause of the act, as to the final cause, by the circumstance "why"; as
to the material cause, or object, in the circumstance "about what"; as
to the principal efficient cause, in the circumstance "who"; and as to
the instrumental efficient cause, in the circumstance "by what aids. "
Reply to Objection 1: Time and place surround [circumstant] the act by
way of measure; but the others surround the act by touching it in any
other way, while they are extrinsic to the substance of the act.
Reply to Objection 2: This mode "well" or "ill" is not a circumstance,
but results from all the circumstances. But the mode which refers to a
quality of the act is a special circumstance; for instance, that a man
walk fast or slowly; that he strike hard or gently, and so forth.
Reply to Objection 3: A condition of the cause, on which the substance
of the act depends, is not a circumstance; it must be an additional
condition. Thus, in regard to the object, it is not a circumstance of
theft that the object is another's property, for this belongs to the
substance of the act; but that it be great or small. And the same
applies to the other circumstances which are considered in reference to
the other causes. For the end that specifies the act is not a
circumstance, but some additional end. Thus, that a valiant man act
"valiantly for the sake of" the good of the virtue or fortitude, is not
a circumstance; but if he act valiantly for the sake of the delivery of
the state, or of Christendom, or some such purpose. The same is to be
said with regard to the circumstance "what"; for that a man by pouring
water on someone should happen to wash him, is not a circumstance of
the washing; but that in doing so he give him a chill, or scald him;
heal him or harm him, these are circumstances.
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Whether the most important circumstances are "why" and "in what the act
consists"?
Objection 1: It would seem that these are not the most important
circumstances, namely, "why" and those "in which the act is, [*hen ois
e praxis]" as stated in Ethic. iii, 1. For those in which the act is
seem to be place and time: and these do not seem to be the most
important of the circumstances, since, of them all, they are the most
extrinsic to the act. Therefore those things in which the act is are
not the most important circumstances.
Objection 2: Further, the end of a thing is extrinsic to it. Therefore
it is not the most important circumstance.
Objection 3: Further, that which holds the foremost place in regard to
each thing, is its cause and its form. But the cause of an act is the
person that does it; while the form of an act is the manner in which it
is done. Therefore these two circumstances seem to be of the greatest
importance.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi. ] says
that "the most important circumstances" are "why it is done" and "what
is done. "
I answer that, As stated above ([1064]Q[1], A[1]), acts are properly
called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Now, the motive and
object of the will is the end. Therefore that circumstance is the most
important of all which touches the act on the part of the end, viz. the
circumstance "why": and the second in importance, is that which touches
the very substance of the act, viz. the circumstance "what he did. " As
to the other circumstances, they are more or less important, according
as they more or less approach to these.
Reply to Objection 1: By those things "in which the act is" the
Philosopher does not mean time and place, but those circumstances that
are affixed to the act itself. Wherefore Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius,
De Nat. Hom. xxxi], as though he were explaining the dictum of the
Philosopher, instead of the latter's term---"in which the act
is"---said, "what is done. "
Reply to Objection 2: Although the end is not part of the substance of
the act, yet it is the most important cause of the act, inasmuch as it
moves the agent to act. Wherefore the moral act is specified chiefly by
the end.
Reply to Objection 3: The person that does the act is the cause of that
act, inasmuch as he is moved thereto by the end; and it is chiefly in
this respect that he is directed to the act; while other conditions of
the person have not such an important relation to the act. As to the
mode, it is not the substantial form of the act, for in an act the
substantial form depends on the object and term or end; but it is, as
it were, a certain accidental quality of the act.
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OF THE WILL, IN REGARD TO WHAT IT WILLS (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the different acts of the will; and in the first
place, those acts which belong to the will itself immediately, as being
elicited by the will; secondly, those acts which are commanded by the
will.
Now the will is moved to the end, and to the means to the end; we must
therefore consider: (1) those acts of the will whereby it is moved to
the end; and (2) those whereby it is moved to the means. And since it
seems that there are three acts of the will in reference to the end;
viz. "volition," "enjoyment," and "intention"; we must consider: (1)
volition; (2) enjoyment; (3) intention. Concerning the first, three
things must be considered: (1) Of what things is the will? (2) By what
is the will moved? (3) How is it moved?
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will is of good only?
(2) Whether it is of the end only, or also of the means?
(3) If in any way it be of the means, whether it be moved to the end
and to the means, by the same movement?
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Whether the will is of good only?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not of good only. For the
same power regards opposites; for instance, sight regards white and
black. But good and evil are opposites. Therefore the will is not only
of good, but also of evil.
Objection 2: Further, rational powers can be directed to opposite
purposes, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2). But the will is
a rational power, since it is "in the reason," as is stated in De Anima
iii, 9. Therefore the will can be directed to opposites; and
consequently its volition is not confined to good, but extends to evil.
Objection 3: Further, good and being are convertible. But volition is
directed not only to beings, but also to non-beings. For sometimes we
wish "not to walk," or "not to speak"; and again at times we wish for
future things, which are not actual beings. Therefore the will is not
of good only.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside
the scope of the will," and that "all things desire good. "
I answer that, The will is a rational appetite. Now every appetite is
only of something good. The reason of this is that the appetite is
nothing else than an inclination of a person desirous of a thing
towards that thing. Now every inclination is to something like and
suitable to the thing inclined. Since, therefore, everything, inasmuch
as it is being and substance, is a good, it must needs be that every
inclination is to something good. And hence it is that the Philosopher
says (Ethic. i, 1) that "the good is that which all desire. "
But it must be noted that, since every inclination results from a form,
the natural appetite results from a form existing in the nature of
things: while the sensitive appetite, as also the intellective or
rational appetite, which we call the will, follows from an apprehended
form. Therefore, just as the natural appetite tends to good existing in
a thing; so the animal or voluntary appetite tends to a good which is
apprehended. Consequently, in order that the will tend to anything, it
is requisite, not that this be good in very truth, but that it be
apprehended as good. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) that
"the end is a good, or an apparent good. "
Reply to Objection 1: The same power regards opposites, but it is not
referred to them in the same way. Accordingly, the will is referred
both to good and evil: but to good by desiring it: to evil, by shunning
it. Wherefore the actual desire of good is called "volition" [*In
Latin, 'voluntas'. To avoid confusion with "voluntas" (the will) St.
Thomas adds a word of explanation, which in the translation may appear
superfluous], meaning thereby the act of the will; for it is in this
sense that we are now speaking of the will. On the other hand, the
shunning of evil is better described as "nolition": wherefore, just as
volition is of good, so nolition is of evil.
Reply to Objection 2: A rational power is not to be directed to all
opposite purposes, but to those which are contained under its proper
object; for no power seeks other than its proper object. Now, the
object of the will is good. Wherefore the will can be directed to such
opposite purposes as are contained under good, such as to be moved or
to be at rest, to speak or to be silent, and such like: for the will
can be directed to either under the aspect of good.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is not a being in nature, is
considered as a being in the reason, wherefore negations and privations
are said to be "beings of reason. " In this way, too, future things, in
so far as they are apprehended, are beings. Accordingly, in so far as
such like are beings, they are apprehended under the aspect of good;
and it is thus that the will is directed to them. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "to lack evil is considered as a
good. "
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Whether volition is of the end only, or also of the means?
Objection 1: It would seem that volition is not of the means, but of
the end only. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "volition
is of the end, while choice is of the means. "
Objection 2: Further, "For objects differing in genus there are
corresponding different powers of the soul" (Ethic. vi, 1). Now, the
end and the means are in different genera of good: because the end,
which is a good either of rectitude or of pleasure, is in the genus
"quality," or "action," or "passion"; whereas the good which is useful,
and is directed to and end, is in the genus "relation" (Ethic. i, 6).
Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is not of the means.
Objection 3: Further, habits are proportionate to powers, since they
are perfections thereof. But in those habits which are called practical
arts, the end belongs to one, and the means to another art; thus the
use of a ship, which is its end, belongs to the (art of the) helmsman;
whereas the building of the ship, which is directed to the end, belongs
to the art of the shipwright. Therefore, since volition is of the end,
it is not of the means.
On the contrary, In natural things, it is by the same power that a
thing passes through the middle space, and arrives at the terminus. But
the means are a kind of middle space, through which one arrives at the
end or terminus. Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is also of
the means.
I answer that, The word "voluntas" sometimes designates the power of
the will, sometimes its act [*See note: above A[1], Reply OBJ[1]].
Accordingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both
to the end and to the means. For every power extends to those things in
which may be considered the aspect of the object of that power in any
way whatever: thus the sight extends to all things whatsoever that are
in any way colored. Now the aspect of good, which is the object of the
power of the will, may be found not only in the end, but also in the
means.
If, however, we speak of the will in regard to its act, then, properly
speaking, volition is of the end only. Because every act denominated
from a power, designates the simple act of that power: thus "to
understand" designates the simple act of the understanding. Now the
simple act of a power is referred to that which is in itself the object
of that power. But that which is good and willed in itself is the end.
Wherefore volition, properly speaking, is of the end itself. On the
other hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves, but as
referred to the end. Wherefore the will is directed to them, only in so
far as it is directed to the end: so that what it wills in them, is the
end. Thus, to understand, is properly directed to things that are known
in themselves, i. e. first principles: but we do not speak of
understanding with regard to things known through first principles,
except in so far as we see the principles in those things. For in
morals the end is what principles are in speculative science (Ethic.
viii, 8).
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of the will in
reference to the simple act of the will; not in reference to the power
of the will.
Reply to Objection 2: There are different powers for objects that
differ in genus and are on an equality; for instance, sound and color
are different genera of sensibles, to which are referred hearing and
sight. But the useful and the righteous are not on an equality, but are
as that which is of itself, and that which is in relation to another.
Now such like objects are always referred to the same power; for
instance, the power of sight perceives both color and light by which
color is seen.
Reply to Objection 3: Not everything that diversifies habits,
diversifies the powers: since habits are certain determinations of
powers to certain special acts. Moreover, every practical art considers
both the end and the means. For the art of the helmsman does indeed
consider the end, as that which it effects; and the means, as that
which it commands. On the other hand, the ship-building art considers
the means as that which it effects; but it considers that which is the
end, as that to which it refers what it effects. And again, in every
practical art there is an end proper to it and means that belong
properly to that art.
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Whether the will is moved by the same act to the end and to the means?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved by the same act, to
the end and to the means. Because according to the Philosopher (Topic.
iii, 2) "where one thing is on account of another there is only one. "
But the will does not will the means save on account of the end.
Therefore it is moved to both by the same act.
Objection 2: Further, the end is the reason for willing the means, just
as light is the reason of seeing colors. But light and colors are seen
by the same act. Therefore it is the same movement of the will, whereby
it wills the end and the means.
Objection 3: Further, it is one and the same natural movement which
tends through the middle space to the terminus. But the means are in
comparison to the end, as the middle space is to the terminus.
Therefore it is the same movement of the will whereby it is directed to
the end and to the means.
On the contrary, Acts are diversified according to their objects. But
the end is a different species of good from the means, which are a
useful good. Therefore the will is not moved to both by the same act.
I answer that, Since the end is willed in itself, whereas the means, as
such, are only willed for the end, it is evident that the will can be
moved to the end, without being moved to the means; whereas it cannot
be moved to the means, as such, unless it is moved to the end.
Accordingly the will is moved to the end in two ways: first, to the end
absolutely and in itself; secondly, as the reason for willing the
means. Hence it is evident that the will is moved by one and the same
movement, to the end, as the reason for willing the means; and to the
means themselves. But it is another act whereby the will is moved to
the end absolutely. And sometimes this act precedes the other in time;
for example when a man first wills to have health, and afterwards
deliberating by what means to be healed, wills to send for the doctor
to heal him. The same happens in regard to the intellect: for at first
a man understands the principles in themselves; but afterwards he
understands them in the conclusions, inasmuch as he assents to the
conclusions on account of the principles.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument holds in respect of the will being
moved to the end as the reason for willing the means.
Reply to Objection 2: Whenever color is seen, by the same act the light
is seen; but the light can be seen without the color being seen. In
like manner whenever a man wills the means, by the same act he wills
the end; but not the conversely.
Reply to Objection 3: In the execution of a work, the means are as the
middle space, and the end, as the terminus. Wherefore just as natural
movement sometimes stops in the middle and does not reach the terminus;
so sometimes one is busy with the means, without gaining the end. But
in willing it is the reverse: the will through (willing) the end comes
to will the means; just as the intellect arrives at the conclusions
through the principles which are called "means. " Hence it is that
sometimes the intellect understands a mean, and does not proceed thence
to the conclusion. And in like manner the will sometimes wills the end,
and yet does not proceed to will the means.
The solution to the argument in the contrary sense is clear from what
has been said above (A[2], ad 2). For the useful and the righteous are
not species of good in an equal degree, but are as that which is for
its own sake and that which is for the sake of something else:
wherefore the act of the will can be directed to one and not to the
other; but not conversely.
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OF THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider what moves the will: and under this head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will is moved by the intellect?
(2) Whether it is moved by the sensitive appetite?
(3) Whether the will moves itself?
(4) Whether it is moved by an extrinsic principle?
(5) Whether it is moved by a heavenly body?
(6) Whether the will is moved by God alone as by an extrinsic
principle?
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Whether the will is moved by the intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by the intellect.
For Augustine says on Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted to long for Thy
justifications: The intellect flies ahead, the desire follows
sluggishly or not at all: we know what is good, but deeds delight us
not. " But it would not be so, if the will were moved by the intellect:
because movement of the movable results from motion of the mover.
Therefore the intellect does not move the will.
Objection 2: Further, the intellect in presenting the appetible object
to the will, stands in relation to the will, as the imagination in
representing the appetible will to the sensitive appetite. But the
imagination, does not remove the sensitive appetite: indeed sometimes
our imagination affects us no more than what is set before us in a
picture, and moves us not at all (De Anima ii, 3). Therefore neither
does the intellect move the will.
Objection 3: Further, the same is not mover and moved in respect of the
same thing. But the will moves the intellect; for we exercise the
intellect when we will. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10) that "the
appetible object is a mover not moved, whereas the will is a mover
moved. "
I answer that, A thing requires to be moved by something in so far as
it is in potentiality to several things; for that which is in
potentiality needs to be reduced to act by something actual; and to do
this is to move. Now a power of the soul is seen to be in potentiality
to different things in two ways: first, with regard to acting and not
acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action. Thus the sight
sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not: and sometimes it sees
white, and sometimes black. It needs therefore a mover in two respects,
viz. as to the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination
of the act. The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is
sometimes acting, sometimes not acting: while the other is on the part
of the object, by reason of which the act is specified.
The motion of the subject itself is due to some agent. And since every
agent acts for an end, as was shown above ([1065]Q[1], A[2]), the
principle of this motion lies in the end. And hence it is that the art
which is concerned with the end, by its command moves the art which is
concerned with the means; just as the "art of sailing commands the art
of shipbuilding" (Phys. ii, 2). Now good in general, which has the
nature of an end, is the object of the will. Consequently, in this
respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for
we make use of the other powers when we will. For the end and
perfection of every other power, is included under the object of the
will as some particular good: and always the art or power to which the
universal end belongs, moves to their acts the arts or powers to which
belong the particular ends included in the universal end. Thus the
leader of an army, who intends the common good---i. e. the order of the
whole army---by his command moves one of the captains, who intends the
order of one company.
On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the
manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are
specified, as heating by heat. Now the first formal principle is
universal "being" and "truth," which is the object of the intellect.
And therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as
presenting its object to it.
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted proves, not that the intellect
does not move, but that it does not move of necessity.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the imagination of a form without
estimation of fitness or harmfulness, does not move the sensitive
appetite; so neither does the apprehension of the true without the
aspect of goodness and desirability. Hence it is not the speculative
intellect that moves, but the practical intellect (De Anima iii, 9).
Reply to Objection 3: The will moves the intellect as to the exercise
of its act; since even the true itself which is the perfection of the
intellect, is included in the universal good, as a particular good. But
as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from the
object, the intellect moves the will; since the good itself is
apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal true.
It is therefore evident that the same is not mover and moved in the
same respect.
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Whether the will is moved by the sensitive appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will cannot be moved by the
sensitive appetite. For "to move and to act is more excellent than to
be passive," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). But the
sensitive appetite is less excellent than the will which is the
intellectual appetite; just as sense is less excellent than intellect.
Therefore the sensitive appetite does not move the will.
Objection 2: Further, no particular power can produce a universal
effect. But the sensitive appetite is a particular power, because it
follows the particular apprehension of sense. Therefore it cannot cause
the movement of the will, which movement is universal, as following the
universal apprehension of the intellect.
Objection 3: Further, as is proved in Phys. viii, 5, the mover is not
moved by that which it moves, in such a way that there be reciprocal
motion. But the will moves the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as the
sensitive appetite obeys the reason. Therefore the sensitive appetite
does not move the will.
On the contrary, It is written (James 1:14): "Every man is tempted by
his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured. " But man would not
be drawn away by his concupiscence, unless his will were moved by the
sensitive appetite, wherein concupiscence resides. Therefore the
sensitive appetite moves the will.
I answer that, As stated above [1066](A[1]), that which is apprehended
as good and fitting, moves the will by way of object. Now, that a thing
appear to be good and fitting, happens from two causes: namely, from
the condition, either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it
is proposed. For fitness is spoken of by way of relation; hence it
depends on both extremes. And hence it is that taste, according as it
is variously disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being
fitting or unfitting. Wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
5): "According as a man is, such does the end seem to him. "
Now it is evident that according to a passion of the sensitive appetite
man is changed to a certain disposition. Wherefore according as man is
affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting, which does not
seem so when he is not so affected: thus that seems good to a man when
angered, which does not seem good when he is calm. And in this way, the
sensitive appetite moves the will, on the part of the object.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders that which is better simply and
in itself, from being less excellent in a certain respect. Accordingly
the will is simply more excellent than the sensitive appetite: but in
respect of the man in whom a passion is predominant, in so far as he is
subject to that passion, the sensitive appetite is more excellent.
Reply to Objection 2: Men's acts and choices are in reference to
singulars. Wherefore from the very fact that the sensitive appetite is
a particular power, it has great influence in disposing man so that
something seems to him such or otherwise, in particular cases.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), the
reason, in which resides the will, moves, by its command, the irascible
and concupiscible powers, not, indeed, "by a despotic sovereignty," as
a slave is moved by his master, but by a "royal and politic
sovereignty," as free men are ruled by their governor, and can
nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible and
concupiscible can move counter to the will: and accordingly nothing
hinders the will from being moved by them at times.
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Whether the will moves itself?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will does not move itself. For
every mover, as such, is in act: whereas what is moved, is in
potentiality; since "movement is the act of that which is in
potentiality, as such" [*Aristotle, Phys. iii, 1]. Now the same is not
in potentiality and in act, in respect of the same. Therefore nothing
moves itself. Neither, therefore, can the will move itself.
Objection 2: Further, the movable is moved on the mover being present.
But the will is always present to itself. If, therefore, it moved
itself, it would always be moving itself, which is clearly false.
Objection 3: Further, the will is moved by the intellect, as stated
above [1067](A[1]). If, therefore, the will move itself, it would
follow that the same thing is at once moved immediately by two movers;
which seems unreasonable. Therefore the will does not move itself.
On the contrary, The will is mistress of its own act, and to it belongs
to will and not to will. But this would not be so, had it not the power
to move itself to will. Therefore it moves itself.
I answer that, As stated above [1068](A[1]), it belongs to the will to
move the other powers, by reason of the end which is the will's object.
Now, as stated above (Q[8], A[2]), the end is in things appetible, what
the principle is in things intelligible. But it is evident that the
intellect, through its knowledge of the principle, reduces itself from
potentiality to act, as to its knowledge of the conclusions; and thus
it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will, through its volition of
the end, moves itself to will the means.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not in respect of the same that the will
moves itself and is moved: wherefore neither is it in act and in
potentiality in respect of the same. But forasmuch as it actually wills
the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act, in respect of the
means, so as, in a word, to will them actually.
Reply to Objection 2: The power of the will is always actually present
to itself; but the act of the will, whereby it wills an end, is not
always in the will. But it is by this act that it moves itself.
Accordingly it does not follow that it is always moving itself.
Reply to Objection 3: The will is moved by the intellect, otherwise
than by itself. By the intellect it is moved on the part of the object:
whereas it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, in
respect of the end.
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Whether the will is moved by an exterior principle?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by anything
exterior. For the movement of the will is voluntary. But it is
essential to the voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic principle,
just as it is essential to the natural act. Therefore the movement of
the will is not from anything exterior.
Objection 2: Further, the will cannot suffer violence, as was shown
above ([1069]Q[6], A[4]). But the violent act is one "the principle of
which is outside the agent" [*Aristotle, Ethic. iii, 1]. Therefore the
will cannot be moved by anything exterior.
Objection 3: Further, that which is sufficiently moved by one mover,
needs not to be moved by another. But the will moves itself
sufficiently. Therefore it is not moved by anything exterior.
On the contrary, The will is moved by the object, as stated above (A[1]
). But the object of the will can be something exterior, offered to the
sense. Therefore the will can be moved by something exterior.
I answer that, As far as the will is moved by the object, it is evident
that it can be moved by something exterior. But in so far as it is
moved in the exercise of its act, we must again hold it to be moved by
some exterior principle.
For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at another
time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover. Now it is
evident that the will begins to will something, whereas previously it
did not will it. Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by something
to will it. And, indeed, it moves itself, as stated above [1070](A[3]),
in so far as through willing the end it reduces itself to the act of
willing the means. Now it cannot do this without the aid of counsel:
for when a man wills to be healed, he begins to reflect how this can be
attained, and through this reflection he comes to the conclusion that
he can be healed by a physician: and this he wills. But since he did
not always actually will to have health, he must, of necessity, have
begun, through something moving him, to will to be healed. And if the
will moved itself to will this, it must, of necessity, have done this
with the aid of counsel following some previous volition. But this
process could not go on to infinity. Wherefore we must, of necessity,
suppose that the will advanced to its first movement in virtue of the
instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter
of the Eudemian Ethics (vii, 14).
Reply to Objection 1: It is essential to the voluntary act that its
principle be within the agent: but it is not necessary that this inward
principle be the first principle unmoved by another. Wherefore though
the voluntary act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless its
first principle is from without. Thus, too, the first principle of the
natural movement is from without, that, to wit, which moves nature.
Reply to Objection 2: For an act to be violent it is not enough that
its principle be extrinsic, but we must add "without the concurrence of
him that suffers violence. " This does not happen when the will is moved
by an exterior principle: for it is the will that wills, though moved
by another. But this movement would be violent, if it were counter to
the movement of the will: which in the present case is impossible;
since then the will would will and not will the same thing.
Reply to Objection 3: The will moves itself sufficiently in one
respect, and in its own order, that is to say as proximate agent; but
it cannot move itself in every respect, as we have shown. Wherefore it
needs to be moved by another as first mover.
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Whether the will is moved by a heavenly body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human will is moved by a heavenly
body. For all various and multiform movements are reduced, as to their
cause, to a uniform movement which is that of the heavens, as is proved
in Phys. viii, 9. But human movements are various and multiform, since
they begin to be, whereas previously they were not. Therefore they are
reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of the heavens, which is
uniform according to its nature.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) "the
lower bodies are moved by the higher. " But the movements of the human
body, which are caused by the will, could not be reduced to the
movement of the heavens, as to their cause, unless the will too were
moved by the heavens. Therefore the heavens move the human will.
Objection 3: Further, by observing the heavenly bodies astrologers
foretell the truth about future human acts, which are caused by the
will. But this would not be so, if the heavenly bodies could not move
man's will. Therefore the human will is moved by a heavenly body.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the
heavenly bodies are not the causes of our acts. " But they would be, if
the will, which is the principle of human acts, were moved by the
heavenly bodies. Therefore the will is not moved by the heavenly
bodies.
I answer that, It is evident that the will can be moved by the heavenly
bodies in the same way as it is moved by its object; that is to say, in
so far as exterior bodies, which move the will, through being offered
to the senses, and also the organs themselves of the sensitive powers,
are subject to the movements of the heavenly bodies.
But some have maintained that heavenly bodies have an influence on the
human will, in the same way as some exterior agent moves the will, as
to the exercise of its act. But this is impossible. For the "will," as
stated in De Anima iii, 9, "is in the reason. " Now the reason is a
power of the soul, not bound to a bodily organ: wherefore it follows
that the will is a power absolutely incorporeal and immaterial. But it
is evident that no body can act on what is incorporeal, but rather the
reverse: because things incorporeal and immaterial have a power more
formal and more universal than any corporeal things whatever. Therefore
it is impossible for a heavenly body to act directly on the intellect
or will. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 3) ascribed to those
who held that intellect differs not from sense, the theory that "such
is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods
bring on" [*Odyssey xviii. 135] (referring to Jupiter, by whom they
understand the entire heavens). For all the sensitive powers, since
they are acts of bodily organs, can be moved accidentally, by the
heavenly bodies, i. e. through those bodies being moved, whose acts they
are.
But since it has been stated [1071](A[2]) that the intellectual
appetite is moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite, the
movements of the heavenly bodies have an indirect bearing on the will;
in so far as the will happens to be moved by the passions of the
sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 1: The multiform movements of the human will are
reduced to some uniform cause, which, however, is above the intellect
and will. This can be said, not of any body, but of some superior
immaterial substance. Therefore there is no need for the movement of
the will to be referred to the movement of the heavens, as to its
cause.
said to be in another; for we speak of color as being in the surface.
Accordingly, circumstances are related to acts in both these ways. For
some circumstances that have a relation to acts, belong to the agent
otherwise than through the act; as place and condition of person;
whereas others belong to the agent by reason of the act, as the manner
in which the act is done.
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Whether theologians should take note of the circumstances of human acts?
Objection 1: It would seem that theologians should not take note of the
circumstances of human acts. Because theologians do not consider human
acts otherwise than according to their quality of good or evil. But it
seems that circumstances cannot give quality to human acts; for a thing
is never qualified, formally speaking, by that which is outside it; but
by that which is in it. Therefore theologians should not take note of
the circumstances of acts.
Objection 2: Further, circumstances are the accidents of acts. But one
thing may be subject to an infinity of accidents; hence the Philosopher
says (Metaph. vi, 2) that "no art or science considers accidental
being, except only the art of sophistry. " Therefore the theologian has
not to consider circumstances.
Objection 3: Further, the consideration of circumstances belongs to the
orator. But oratory is not a part of theology. Therefore it is not a
theologian's business to consider circumstances.
On the contrary, Ignorance of circumstances causes an act to be
involuntary, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and Gregory
of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi. ]. But involuntariness excuses
from sin, the consideration of which belongs to the theologian.
Therefore circumstances also should be considered by the theologian.
I answer that, Circumstances come under the consideration of the
theologian, for a threefold reason. First, because the theologian
considers human acts, inasmuch as man is thereby directed to Happiness.
Now, everything that is directed to an end should be proportionate to
that end. But acts are made proportionate to an end by means of a
certain commensurateness, which results from the due circumstances.
Hence the theologian has to consider the circumstances. Secondly,
because the theologian considers human acts according as they are found
to be good or evil, better or worse: and this diversity depends on
circumstances, as we shall see further on ([1060]Q[18],
AA[10],11;[1061] Q[73], A[7]). Thirdly, because the theologian
considers human acts under the aspect of merit and demerit, which is
proper to human acts; and for this it is requisite that they be
voluntary. Now a human act is deemed to be voluntary or involuntary,
according to knowledge or ignorance of circumstances, as stated above
([1062]Q[6], A[8]). Therefore the theologian has to consider
circumstances.
Reply to Objection 1: Good directed to the end is said to be useful;
and this implies some kind of relation: wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. i, 6) that "the good in the genus 'relation' is the useful. "
Now, in the genus "relation" a thing is denominated not only according
to that which is inherent in the thing, but also according to that
which is extrinsic to it: as may be seen in the expressions "right" and
"left," "equal" and "unequal," and such like. Accordingly, since the
goodness of acts consists in their utility to the end, nothing hinders
their being called good or bad according to their proportion to
extrinsic things that are adjacent to them.
Reply to Objection 2: Accidents which are altogether accidental are
neglected by every art, by reason of their uncertainty and infinity.
But such like accidents are not what we call circumstances; because
circumstances although, as stated above [1063](A[1]), they are
extrinsic to the act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by
being related to it. Proper accidents, however, come under the
consideration of art.
Reply to Objection 3: The consideration of circumstances belongs to the
moralist, the politician, and the orator. To the moralist, in so far as
with respect to circumstances we find or lose the mean of virtue in
human acts and passions. To the politician and to the orator, in so far
as circumstances make acts to be worthy of praise or blame, of excuse
or indictment. In different ways, however: because where the orator
persuades, the politician judges. To the theologian this consideration
belongs, in all the aforesaid ways: since to him all the other arts are
subservient: for he has to consider virtuous and vicious acts, just as
the moralist does; and with the orator and politician he considers acts
according as they are deserving of reward or punishment.
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Whether the circumstances are properly set forth in the third book of
Ethics?
Objection 1: It would seem that the circumstances are not properly set
forth in Ethic. iii, 1. For a circumstance of an act is described as
something outside the act. Now time and place answer to this
description. Therefore there are only two circumstances, to wit, "when"
and "where. "
Objection 2: Further, we judge from the circumstances whether a thing
is well or ill done. But this belongs to the mode of an act. Therefore
all the circumstances are included under one, which is the "mode of
acting. "
Objection 3: Further, circumstances are not part of the substance of an
act. But the causes of an act seem to belong to its substance.
Therefore no circumstance should be taken from the cause of the act
itself. Accordingly, neither "who," nor "why," nor "about what," are
circumstances: since "who" refers to the efficient cause, "why" to the
final cause, and "about what" to the material cause.
On the contrary is the authority of the Philosopher in Ethic. iii, 1.
I answer that, Tully, in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhetor. i), gives
seven circumstances, which are contained in this verse:
"Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando---
Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and when. "
For in acts we must take note of "who" did it, "by what aids" or
"instruments" he did it, "what" he did, "where" he did it, "why" he did
it, "how" and "when" he did it. But Aristotle in Ethic. iii, 1 adds yet
another, to wit, "about what," which Tully includes in the circumstance
"what. "
The reason of this enumeration may be set down as follows. For a
circumstance is described as something outside the substance of the
act, and yet in a way touching it. Now this happens in three ways:
first, inasmuch as it touches the act itself; secondly, inasmuch as it
touches the cause of the act; thirdly, inasmuch as it touches the
effect. It touches the act itself, either by way of measure, as "time"
and "place"; or by qualifying the act as the "mode of acting. " It
touches the effect when we consider "what" is done. It touches the
cause of the act, as to the final cause, by the circumstance "why"; as
to the material cause, or object, in the circumstance "about what"; as
to the principal efficient cause, in the circumstance "who"; and as to
the instrumental efficient cause, in the circumstance "by what aids. "
Reply to Objection 1: Time and place surround [circumstant] the act by
way of measure; but the others surround the act by touching it in any
other way, while they are extrinsic to the substance of the act.
Reply to Objection 2: This mode "well" or "ill" is not a circumstance,
but results from all the circumstances. But the mode which refers to a
quality of the act is a special circumstance; for instance, that a man
walk fast or slowly; that he strike hard or gently, and so forth.
Reply to Objection 3: A condition of the cause, on which the substance
of the act depends, is not a circumstance; it must be an additional
condition. Thus, in regard to the object, it is not a circumstance of
theft that the object is another's property, for this belongs to the
substance of the act; but that it be great or small. And the same
applies to the other circumstances which are considered in reference to
the other causes. For the end that specifies the act is not a
circumstance, but some additional end. Thus, that a valiant man act
"valiantly for the sake of" the good of the virtue or fortitude, is not
a circumstance; but if he act valiantly for the sake of the delivery of
the state, or of Christendom, or some such purpose. The same is to be
said with regard to the circumstance "what"; for that a man by pouring
water on someone should happen to wash him, is not a circumstance of
the washing; but that in doing so he give him a chill, or scald him;
heal him or harm him, these are circumstances.
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Whether the most important circumstances are "why" and "in what the act
consists"?
Objection 1: It would seem that these are not the most important
circumstances, namely, "why" and those "in which the act is, [*hen ois
e praxis]" as stated in Ethic. iii, 1. For those in which the act is
seem to be place and time: and these do not seem to be the most
important of the circumstances, since, of them all, they are the most
extrinsic to the act. Therefore those things in which the act is are
not the most important circumstances.
Objection 2: Further, the end of a thing is extrinsic to it. Therefore
it is not the most important circumstance.
Objection 3: Further, that which holds the foremost place in regard to
each thing, is its cause and its form. But the cause of an act is the
person that does it; while the form of an act is the manner in which it
is done. Therefore these two circumstances seem to be of the greatest
importance.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi. ] says
that "the most important circumstances" are "why it is done" and "what
is done. "
I answer that, As stated above ([1064]Q[1], A[1]), acts are properly
called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Now, the motive and
object of the will is the end. Therefore that circumstance is the most
important of all which touches the act on the part of the end, viz. the
circumstance "why": and the second in importance, is that which touches
the very substance of the act, viz. the circumstance "what he did. " As
to the other circumstances, they are more or less important, according
as they more or less approach to these.
Reply to Objection 1: By those things "in which the act is" the
Philosopher does not mean time and place, but those circumstances that
are affixed to the act itself. Wherefore Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius,
De Nat. Hom. xxxi], as though he were explaining the dictum of the
Philosopher, instead of the latter's term---"in which the act
is"---said, "what is done. "
Reply to Objection 2: Although the end is not part of the substance of
the act, yet it is the most important cause of the act, inasmuch as it
moves the agent to act. Wherefore the moral act is specified chiefly by
the end.
Reply to Objection 3: The person that does the act is the cause of that
act, inasmuch as he is moved thereto by the end; and it is chiefly in
this respect that he is directed to the act; while other conditions of
the person have not such an important relation to the act. As to the
mode, it is not the substantial form of the act, for in an act the
substantial form depends on the object and term or end; but it is, as
it were, a certain accidental quality of the act.
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OF THE WILL, IN REGARD TO WHAT IT WILLS (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the different acts of the will; and in the first
place, those acts which belong to the will itself immediately, as being
elicited by the will; secondly, those acts which are commanded by the
will.
Now the will is moved to the end, and to the means to the end; we must
therefore consider: (1) those acts of the will whereby it is moved to
the end; and (2) those whereby it is moved to the means. And since it
seems that there are three acts of the will in reference to the end;
viz. "volition," "enjoyment," and "intention"; we must consider: (1)
volition; (2) enjoyment; (3) intention. Concerning the first, three
things must be considered: (1) Of what things is the will? (2) By what
is the will moved? (3) How is it moved?
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will is of good only?
(2) Whether it is of the end only, or also of the means?
(3) If in any way it be of the means, whether it be moved to the end
and to the means, by the same movement?
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Whether the will is of good only?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not of good only. For the
same power regards opposites; for instance, sight regards white and
black. But good and evil are opposites. Therefore the will is not only
of good, but also of evil.
Objection 2: Further, rational powers can be directed to opposite
purposes, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2). But the will is
a rational power, since it is "in the reason," as is stated in De Anima
iii, 9. Therefore the will can be directed to opposites; and
consequently its volition is not confined to good, but extends to evil.
Objection 3: Further, good and being are convertible. But volition is
directed not only to beings, but also to non-beings. For sometimes we
wish "not to walk," or "not to speak"; and again at times we wish for
future things, which are not actual beings. Therefore the will is not
of good only.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside
the scope of the will," and that "all things desire good. "
I answer that, The will is a rational appetite. Now every appetite is
only of something good. The reason of this is that the appetite is
nothing else than an inclination of a person desirous of a thing
towards that thing. Now every inclination is to something like and
suitable to the thing inclined. Since, therefore, everything, inasmuch
as it is being and substance, is a good, it must needs be that every
inclination is to something good. And hence it is that the Philosopher
says (Ethic. i, 1) that "the good is that which all desire. "
But it must be noted that, since every inclination results from a form,
the natural appetite results from a form existing in the nature of
things: while the sensitive appetite, as also the intellective or
rational appetite, which we call the will, follows from an apprehended
form. Therefore, just as the natural appetite tends to good existing in
a thing; so the animal or voluntary appetite tends to a good which is
apprehended. Consequently, in order that the will tend to anything, it
is requisite, not that this be good in very truth, but that it be
apprehended as good. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) that
"the end is a good, or an apparent good. "
Reply to Objection 1: The same power regards opposites, but it is not
referred to them in the same way. Accordingly, the will is referred
both to good and evil: but to good by desiring it: to evil, by shunning
it. Wherefore the actual desire of good is called "volition" [*In
Latin, 'voluntas'. To avoid confusion with "voluntas" (the will) St.
Thomas adds a word of explanation, which in the translation may appear
superfluous], meaning thereby the act of the will; for it is in this
sense that we are now speaking of the will. On the other hand, the
shunning of evil is better described as "nolition": wherefore, just as
volition is of good, so nolition is of evil.
Reply to Objection 2: A rational power is not to be directed to all
opposite purposes, but to those which are contained under its proper
object; for no power seeks other than its proper object. Now, the
object of the will is good. Wherefore the will can be directed to such
opposite purposes as are contained under good, such as to be moved or
to be at rest, to speak or to be silent, and such like: for the will
can be directed to either under the aspect of good.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is not a being in nature, is
considered as a being in the reason, wherefore negations and privations
are said to be "beings of reason. " In this way, too, future things, in
so far as they are apprehended, are beings. Accordingly, in so far as
such like are beings, they are apprehended under the aspect of good;
and it is thus that the will is directed to them. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "to lack evil is considered as a
good. "
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Whether volition is of the end only, or also of the means?
Objection 1: It would seem that volition is not of the means, but of
the end only. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "volition
is of the end, while choice is of the means. "
Objection 2: Further, "For objects differing in genus there are
corresponding different powers of the soul" (Ethic. vi, 1). Now, the
end and the means are in different genera of good: because the end,
which is a good either of rectitude or of pleasure, is in the genus
"quality," or "action," or "passion"; whereas the good which is useful,
and is directed to and end, is in the genus "relation" (Ethic. i, 6).
Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is not of the means.
Objection 3: Further, habits are proportionate to powers, since they
are perfections thereof. But in those habits which are called practical
arts, the end belongs to one, and the means to another art; thus the
use of a ship, which is its end, belongs to the (art of the) helmsman;
whereas the building of the ship, which is directed to the end, belongs
to the art of the shipwright. Therefore, since volition is of the end,
it is not of the means.
On the contrary, In natural things, it is by the same power that a
thing passes through the middle space, and arrives at the terminus. But
the means are a kind of middle space, through which one arrives at the
end or terminus. Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is also of
the means.
I answer that, The word "voluntas" sometimes designates the power of
the will, sometimes its act [*See note: above A[1], Reply OBJ[1]].
Accordingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both
to the end and to the means. For every power extends to those things in
which may be considered the aspect of the object of that power in any
way whatever: thus the sight extends to all things whatsoever that are
in any way colored. Now the aspect of good, which is the object of the
power of the will, may be found not only in the end, but also in the
means.
If, however, we speak of the will in regard to its act, then, properly
speaking, volition is of the end only. Because every act denominated
from a power, designates the simple act of that power: thus "to
understand" designates the simple act of the understanding. Now the
simple act of a power is referred to that which is in itself the object
of that power. But that which is good and willed in itself is the end.
Wherefore volition, properly speaking, is of the end itself. On the
other hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves, but as
referred to the end. Wherefore the will is directed to them, only in so
far as it is directed to the end: so that what it wills in them, is the
end. Thus, to understand, is properly directed to things that are known
in themselves, i. e. first principles: but we do not speak of
understanding with regard to things known through first principles,
except in so far as we see the principles in those things. For in
morals the end is what principles are in speculative science (Ethic.
viii, 8).
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of the will in
reference to the simple act of the will; not in reference to the power
of the will.
Reply to Objection 2: There are different powers for objects that
differ in genus and are on an equality; for instance, sound and color
are different genera of sensibles, to which are referred hearing and
sight. But the useful and the righteous are not on an equality, but are
as that which is of itself, and that which is in relation to another.
Now such like objects are always referred to the same power; for
instance, the power of sight perceives both color and light by which
color is seen.
Reply to Objection 3: Not everything that diversifies habits,
diversifies the powers: since habits are certain determinations of
powers to certain special acts. Moreover, every practical art considers
both the end and the means. For the art of the helmsman does indeed
consider the end, as that which it effects; and the means, as that
which it commands. On the other hand, the ship-building art considers
the means as that which it effects; but it considers that which is the
end, as that to which it refers what it effects. And again, in every
practical art there is an end proper to it and means that belong
properly to that art.
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Whether the will is moved by the same act to the end and to the means?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved by the same act, to
the end and to the means. Because according to the Philosopher (Topic.
iii, 2) "where one thing is on account of another there is only one. "
But the will does not will the means save on account of the end.
Therefore it is moved to both by the same act.
Objection 2: Further, the end is the reason for willing the means, just
as light is the reason of seeing colors. But light and colors are seen
by the same act. Therefore it is the same movement of the will, whereby
it wills the end and the means.
Objection 3: Further, it is one and the same natural movement which
tends through the middle space to the terminus. But the means are in
comparison to the end, as the middle space is to the terminus.
Therefore it is the same movement of the will whereby it is directed to
the end and to the means.
On the contrary, Acts are diversified according to their objects. But
the end is a different species of good from the means, which are a
useful good. Therefore the will is not moved to both by the same act.
I answer that, Since the end is willed in itself, whereas the means, as
such, are only willed for the end, it is evident that the will can be
moved to the end, without being moved to the means; whereas it cannot
be moved to the means, as such, unless it is moved to the end.
Accordingly the will is moved to the end in two ways: first, to the end
absolutely and in itself; secondly, as the reason for willing the
means. Hence it is evident that the will is moved by one and the same
movement, to the end, as the reason for willing the means; and to the
means themselves. But it is another act whereby the will is moved to
the end absolutely. And sometimes this act precedes the other in time;
for example when a man first wills to have health, and afterwards
deliberating by what means to be healed, wills to send for the doctor
to heal him. The same happens in regard to the intellect: for at first
a man understands the principles in themselves; but afterwards he
understands them in the conclusions, inasmuch as he assents to the
conclusions on account of the principles.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument holds in respect of the will being
moved to the end as the reason for willing the means.
Reply to Objection 2: Whenever color is seen, by the same act the light
is seen; but the light can be seen without the color being seen. In
like manner whenever a man wills the means, by the same act he wills
the end; but not the conversely.
Reply to Objection 3: In the execution of a work, the means are as the
middle space, and the end, as the terminus. Wherefore just as natural
movement sometimes stops in the middle and does not reach the terminus;
so sometimes one is busy with the means, without gaining the end. But
in willing it is the reverse: the will through (willing) the end comes
to will the means; just as the intellect arrives at the conclusions
through the principles which are called "means. " Hence it is that
sometimes the intellect understands a mean, and does not proceed thence
to the conclusion. And in like manner the will sometimes wills the end,
and yet does not proceed to will the means.
The solution to the argument in the contrary sense is clear from what
has been said above (A[2], ad 2). For the useful and the righteous are
not species of good in an equal degree, but are as that which is for
its own sake and that which is for the sake of something else:
wherefore the act of the will can be directed to one and not to the
other; but not conversely.
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OF THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider what moves the will: and under this head there are
six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will is moved by the intellect?
(2) Whether it is moved by the sensitive appetite?
(3) Whether the will moves itself?
(4) Whether it is moved by an extrinsic principle?
(5) Whether it is moved by a heavenly body?
(6) Whether the will is moved by God alone as by an extrinsic
principle?
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Whether the will is moved by the intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by the intellect.
For Augustine says on Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted to long for Thy
justifications: The intellect flies ahead, the desire follows
sluggishly or not at all: we know what is good, but deeds delight us
not. " But it would not be so, if the will were moved by the intellect:
because movement of the movable results from motion of the mover.
Therefore the intellect does not move the will.
Objection 2: Further, the intellect in presenting the appetible object
to the will, stands in relation to the will, as the imagination in
representing the appetible will to the sensitive appetite. But the
imagination, does not remove the sensitive appetite: indeed sometimes
our imagination affects us no more than what is set before us in a
picture, and moves us not at all (De Anima ii, 3). Therefore neither
does the intellect move the will.
Objection 3: Further, the same is not mover and moved in respect of the
same thing. But the will moves the intellect; for we exercise the
intellect when we will. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10) that "the
appetible object is a mover not moved, whereas the will is a mover
moved. "
I answer that, A thing requires to be moved by something in so far as
it is in potentiality to several things; for that which is in
potentiality needs to be reduced to act by something actual; and to do
this is to move. Now a power of the soul is seen to be in potentiality
to different things in two ways: first, with regard to acting and not
acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action. Thus the sight
sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not: and sometimes it sees
white, and sometimes black. It needs therefore a mover in two respects,
viz. as to the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination
of the act. The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is
sometimes acting, sometimes not acting: while the other is on the part
of the object, by reason of which the act is specified.
The motion of the subject itself is due to some agent. And since every
agent acts for an end, as was shown above ([1065]Q[1], A[2]), the
principle of this motion lies in the end. And hence it is that the art
which is concerned with the end, by its command moves the art which is
concerned with the means; just as the "art of sailing commands the art
of shipbuilding" (Phys. ii, 2). Now good in general, which has the
nature of an end, is the object of the will. Consequently, in this
respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for
we make use of the other powers when we will. For the end and
perfection of every other power, is included under the object of the
will as some particular good: and always the art or power to which the
universal end belongs, moves to their acts the arts or powers to which
belong the particular ends included in the universal end. Thus the
leader of an army, who intends the common good---i. e. the order of the
whole army---by his command moves one of the captains, who intends the
order of one company.
On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the
manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are
specified, as heating by heat. Now the first formal principle is
universal "being" and "truth," which is the object of the intellect.
And therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as
presenting its object to it.
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted proves, not that the intellect
does not move, but that it does not move of necessity.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the imagination of a form without
estimation of fitness or harmfulness, does not move the sensitive
appetite; so neither does the apprehension of the true without the
aspect of goodness and desirability. Hence it is not the speculative
intellect that moves, but the practical intellect (De Anima iii, 9).
Reply to Objection 3: The will moves the intellect as to the exercise
of its act; since even the true itself which is the perfection of the
intellect, is included in the universal good, as a particular good. But
as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from the
object, the intellect moves the will; since the good itself is
apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal true.
It is therefore evident that the same is not mover and moved in the
same respect.
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Whether the will is moved by the sensitive appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will cannot be moved by the
sensitive appetite. For "to move and to act is more excellent than to
be passive," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). But the
sensitive appetite is less excellent than the will which is the
intellectual appetite; just as sense is less excellent than intellect.
Therefore the sensitive appetite does not move the will.
Objection 2: Further, no particular power can produce a universal
effect. But the sensitive appetite is a particular power, because it
follows the particular apprehension of sense. Therefore it cannot cause
the movement of the will, which movement is universal, as following the
universal apprehension of the intellect.
Objection 3: Further, as is proved in Phys. viii, 5, the mover is not
moved by that which it moves, in such a way that there be reciprocal
motion. But the will moves the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as the
sensitive appetite obeys the reason. Therefore the sensitive appetite
does not move the will.
On the contrary, It is written (James 1:14): "Every man is tempted by
his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured. " But man would not
be drawn away by his concupiscence, unless his will were moved by the
sensitive appetite, wherein concupiscence resides. Therefore the
sensitive appetite moves the will.
I answer that, As stated above [1066](A[1]), that which is apprehended
as good and fitting, moves the will by way of object. Now, that a thing
appear to be good and fitting, happens from two causes: namely, from
the condition, either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it
is proposed. For fitness is spoken of by way of relation; hence it
depends on both extremes. And hence it is that taste, according as it
is variously disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being
fitting or unfitting. Wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
5): "According as a man is, such does the end seem to him. "
Now it is evident that according to a passion of the sensitive appetite
man is changed to a certain disposition. Wherefore according as man is
affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting, which does not
seem so when he is not so affected: thus that seems good to a man when
angered, which does not seem good when he is calm. And in this way, the
sensitive appetite moves the will, on the part of the object.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders that which is better simply and
in itself, from being less excellent in a certain respect. Accordingly
the will is simply more excellent than the sensitive appetite: but in
respect of the man in whom a passion is predominant, in so far as he is
subject to that passion, the sensitive appetite is more excellent.
Reply to Objection 2: Men's acts and choices are in reference to
singulars. Wherefore from the very fact that the sensitive appetite is
a particular power, it has great influence in disposing man so that
something seems to him such or otherwise, in particular cases.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), the
reason, in which resides the will, moves, by its command, the irascible
and concupiscible powers, not, indeed, "by a despotic sovereignty," as
a slave is moved by his master, but by a "royal and politic
sovereignty," as free men are ruled by their governor, and can
nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible and
concupiscible can move counter to the will: and accordingly nothing
hinders the will from being moved by them at times.
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Whether the will moves itself?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will does not move itself. For
every mover, as such, is in act: whereas what is moved, is in
potentiality; since "movement is the act of that which is in
potentiality, as such" [*Aristotle, Phys. iii, 1]. Now the same is not
in potentiality and in act, in respect of the same. Therefore nothing
moves itself. Neither, therefore, can the will move itself.
Objection 2: Further, the movable is moved on the mover being present.
But the will is always present to itself. If, therefore, it moved
itself, it would always be moving itself, which is clearly false.
Objection 3: Further, the will is moved by the intellect, as stated
above [1067](A[1]). If, therefore, the will move itself, it would
follow that the same thing is at once moved immediately by two movers;
which seems unreasonable. Therefore the will does not move itself.
On the contrary, The will is mistress of its own act, and to it belongs
to will and not to will. But this would not be so, had it not the power
to move itself to will. Therefore it moves itself.
I answer that, As stated above [1068](A[1]), it belongs to the will to
move the other powers, by reason of the end which is the will's object.
Now, as stated above (Q[8], A[2]), the end is in things appetible, what
the principle is in things intelligible. But it is evident that the
intellect, through its knowledge of the principle, reduces itself from
potentiality to act, as to its knowledge of the conclusions; and thus
it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will, through its volition of
the end, moves itself to will the means.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not in respect of the same that the will
moves itself and is moved: wherefore neither is it in act and in
potentiality in respect of the same. But forasmuch as it actually wills
the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act, in respect of the
means, so as, in a word, to will them actually.
Reply to Objection 2: The power of the will is always actually present
to itself; but the act of the will, whereby it wills an end, is not
always in the will. But it is by this act that it moves itself.
Accordingly it does not follow that it is always moving itself.
Reply to Objection 3: The will is moved by the intellect, otherwise
than by itself. By the intellect it is moved on the part of the object:
whereas it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, in
respect of the end.
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Whether the will is moved by an exterior principle?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by anything
exterior. For the movement of the will is voluntary. But it is
essential to the voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic principle,
just as it is essential to the natural act. Therefore the movement of
the will is not from anything exterior.
Objection 2: Further, the will cannot suffer violence, as was shown
above ([1069]Q[6], A[4]). But the violent act is one "the principle of
which is outside the agent" [*Aristotle, Ethic. iii, 1]. Therefore the
will cannot be moved by anything exterior.
Objection 3: Further, that which is sufficiently moved by one mover,
needs not to be moved by another. But the will moves itself
sufficiently. Therefore it is not moved by anything exterior.
On the contrary, The will is moved by the object, as stated above (A[1]
). But the object of the will can be something exterior, offered to the
sense. Therefore the will can be moved by something exterior.
I answer that, As far as the will is moved by the object, it is evident
that it can be moved by something exterior. But in so far as it is
moved in the exercise of its act, we must again hold it to be moved by
some exterior principle.
For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at another
time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover. Now it is
evident that the will begins to will something, whereas previously it
did not will it. Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by something
to will it. And, indeed, it moves itself, as stated above [1070](A[3]),
in so far as through willing the end it reduces itself to the act of
willing the means. Now it cannot do this without the aid of counsel:
for when a man wills to be healed, he begins to reflect how this can be
attained, and through this reflection he comes to the conclusion that
he can be healed by a physician: and this he wills. But since he did
not always actually will to have health, he must, of necessity, have
begun, through something moving him, to will to be healed. And if the
will moved itself to will this, it must, of necessity, have done this
with the aid of counsel following some previous volition. But this
process could not go on to infinity. Wherefore we must, of necessity,
suppose that the will advanced to its first movement in virtue of the
instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter
of the Eudemian Ethics (vii, 14).
Reply to Objection 1: It is essential to the voluntary act that its
principle be within the agent: but it is not necessary that this inward
principle be the first principle unmoved by another. Wherefore though
the voluntary act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless its
first principle is from without. Thus, too, the first principle of the
natural movement is from without, that, to wit, which moves nature.
Reply to Objection 2: For an act to be violent it is not enough that
its principle be extrinsic, but we must add "without the concurrence of
him that suffers violence. " This does not happen when the will is moved
by an exterior principle: for it is the will that wills, though moved
by another. But this movement would be violent, if it were counter to
the movement of the will: which in the present case is impossible;
since then the will would will and not will the same thing.
Reply to Objection 3: The will moves itself sufficiently in one
respect, and in its own order, that is to say as proximate agent; but
it cannot move itself in every respect, as we have shown. Wherefore it
needs to be moved by another as first mover.
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Whether the will is moved by a heavenly body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human will is moved by a heavenly
body. For all various and multiform movements are reduced, as to their
cause, to a uniform movement which is that of the heavens, as is proved
in Phys. viii, 9. But human movements are various and multiform, since
they begin to be, whereas previously they were not. Therefore they are
reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of the heavens, which is
uniform according to its nature.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) "the
lower bodies are moved by the higher. " But the movements of the human
body, which are caused by the will, could not be reduced to the
movement of the heavens, as to their cause, unless the will too were
moved by the heavens. Therefore the heavens move the human will.
Objection 3: Further, by observing the heavenly bodies astrologers
foretell the truth about future human acts, which are caused by the
will. But this would not be so, if the heavenly bodies could not move
man's will. Therefore the human will is moved by a heavenly body.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the
heavenly bodies are not the causes of our acts. " But they would be, if
the will, which is the principle of human acts, were moved by the
heavenly bodies. Therefore the will is not moved by the heavenly
bodies.
I answer that, It is evident that the will can be moved by the heavenly
bodies in the same way as it is moved by its object; that is to say, in
so far as exterior bodies, which move the will, through being offered
to the senses, and also the organs themselves of the sensitive powers,
are subject to the movements of the heavenly bodies.
But some have maintained that heavenly bodies have an influence on the
human will, in the same way as some exterior agent moves the will, as
to the exercise of its act. But this is impossible. For the "will," as
stated in De Anima iii, 9, "is in the reason. " Now the reason is a
power of the soul, not bound to a bodily organ: wherefore it follows
that the will is a power absolutely incorporeal and immaterial. But it
is evident that no body can act on what is incorporeal, but rather the
reverse: because things incorporeal and immaterial have a power more
formal and more universal than any corporeal things whatever. Therefore
it is impossible for a heavenly body to act directly on the intellect
or will. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 3) ascribed to those
who held that intellect differs not from sense, the theory that "such
is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods
bring on" [*Odyssey xviii. 135] (referring to Jupiter, by whom they
understand the entire heavens). For all the sensitive powers, since
they are acts of bodily organs, can be moved accidentally, by the
heavenly bodies, i. e. through those bodies being moved, whose acts they
are.
But since it has been stated [1071](A[2]) that the intellectual
appetite is moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite, the
movements of the heavenly bodies have an indirect bearing on the will;
in so far as the will happens to be moved by the passions of the
sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 1: The multiform movements of the human will are
reduced to some uniform cause, which, however, is above the intellect
and will. This can be said, not of any body, but of some superior
immaterial substance. Therefore there is no need for the movement of
the will to be referred to the movement of the heavens, as to its
cause.
