No More Learning



## p. 425 (#643) ############################################

NOTES. 425
What follows is clear enough. Zarathustra sees a
young shepherd struggling on the ground with a
snake holding fast to the back of his throat. The
sage, assuming that the snake must have crawled into
the young man's mouth while he lay sleeping, runs
to his help and pulls at the loathsome reptile with all
his might, but in vain. At last, in despair, Zarathustra
appeals to the young man's will. Knowing full well
what a ghastly operation he is recommending, he
nevertheless cries, "Bite! Bite! Its head off! Bite! "
as the only possible solution of the difficulty. The
young shepherd bites, and far away he spits the
snake's head, whereupon he rises, "No longer shep-
herd, no longer man—a transfigured being, a light-
surrounded being, that laughed! Never on earth
laughed a man as he laughed! "
In this parable the young shepherd is obviously the
man of to-day; the snake that chokes him represents
the stultifying and paralysing social values that threaten
to shatter humanity, and the advice "Bite! Bite! "
is but Nietzsche's exasperated cry to mankind to alter
their values before it is too late.
This, like "The Wanderer," is one of the many Chapter
introspective passages in the work, and is full of XLVII.
innuendos and hints as to the Nietzschean outlook Invo,untary
,. , Bliss,
on life.
Here we have a record of Zarathustra's avowal of Chapter
optimism, as also the important statement concerning XLVIII.
"Chance" or "Accident" (verse 27). Those who Befo^e
are familiar with Nietzsche's philosophy will not'
require to be told what an important role his doctrine
of chance plays in his teaching. The Giant Chance
has hitherto played with the puppet "man,"—this is
the fact he cannot contemplate with equanimity.
Man shall now exploit chance, he says again and


## p. 426 (#644) ############################################

426 APPENDIX.
ing Virtue.
again, and make it fall on its knees before him!
(see verse a in "On the Olive Mount," and verses
9-10 in "The Bed warring Virtue").
Chapter This requires scarcely any comment. It is a satire
XLIX. on modern man and his belittling virtues. In verses
23 and 24 of the second part of the discourse we are
reminded of Nietzsche's powerful indictment of the
great of to-day, in the Antichrist (Aphorism 43):—
"At present nobody has any longer the courage for
separate rights, for rights of domination, for a feeling
of reverence for himself and his equals,—-for pathos of
distance. . . . Our politics are morbid from this want
of courage! —The aristocracy of character has been
undermined most craftily by the lie of the equality
of souls; and if the belief in the 'privilege of the
many,' makes revolutions and will continue to make
them, it is Christianity, let us not doubt it, it is
Christian valuations, which translate every revolution
merely into blood and crime! " (see also "Beyond
Good and Evil," pp. 120, 121). Nietzsche thought
it was a bad sign of the times that even rulers have
lost the courage of their positions, and that a man of
Frederick the Great's power and distinguished gifts
should have been able to say: "Ich bin der erste
Diener des Staates" (I am the first servant of the
State). To this utterance of the great sovereign, verse
24 undoubtedly refers. "Cowardice" and "Medio-
crity," are the names with which he labels modern
notions of virtue and moderation.
In Part III. , we get the sentiments of the discourse
"In the Happy Isles," but perhaps in stronger terms.
Once again we find Nietzsche thoroughly at ease, if
not cheerful, as an atheist, and speaking with ver-
tiginous daring of making chance go on its knees to
him. In verse 20, Zarathustra makes yet another


## p. 427 (#645) ############################################

NOTES. 427
attempt at defining his entirely anti-anarchical attitude,
and unless such passages have been completely over-
looked or deliberately ignored hitherto by those who
will persist in laying anarchy at his door, it is im-
possible to understand how he ever became associated
with that foul political party.
The last verse introduces the expression, "the great
noontide! " In the poem to be found at the end of
"Beyond Good and Evil," we meet with the expres-
sion again, and we shall find it occurring time and
again in Nietzsche's works. It will be found fully
elucidated in the fifth part of " The Twilight of the
Idols "; but for those who cannot refer to this book,
it were well to point out that Nietzsche called the
present period—our period—the noon of man's history.
Dawn is behind us. The childhood of mankind is
over. Now we know; there is now no longer any
excuse for mistakes which will tend to botch and
disfigure the type man. "With respect to what is
past," he says, "I have, like all discerning ones, great
toleration, that is to say, generous self-control. . . .
But my feeling changes suddenly, and breaks out as
soon as I enter the modern period, our period. Our
age knows. . . . " (see Note on Chap. LXX. ).
Here we find Nietzsche confronted with his Chapter LI.
extreme opposite, with him therefore for whom he Pn Pass'
is most frequently mistaken by the unwary. "Zara-lng" y'
thustra's ape" he is called in the discourse. He is
one of those at whose hands Nietzsche had to suffer
most during his life-time, and at whose hands his
philosophy has suffered most since his death. In
this respect it may seem a little trivial to speak of
extremes meeting; but it is wonderfully apt. Many
have adopted Nietzsche's mannerisms and word-
coinages, who had nothing in common with him


## p. 428 (#646) ############################################

428 APPENDIX.
beyond the ideas and "business" they plagiarised;
but the superficial observer ayid a large portion of the
public, not knowing of these things,—not knowing
perhaps that there are iconoclasts who destroy out
of love and are therefore creators, and that there are
others who destroy out of resentment and revenge-
fulness and who are therefore revolutionists and
anarchists,—are prone to confound the two, to the
detriment of the nobler type.
If we now read what the fool says to Zarathustra,
and note the tricks of speech he has borrowed from
him: if we carefully follow the attitude he assumes,
we shall understand why Zarathustra finally interrupts
him. "Stop this at once," Zarathustra cries, "long
have thy speech and thy species disgusted me. . . .
Out of love alone shall my contempt and my warning
bird take wing; but not out of the swamp! " It
were well if this discourse were taken to heart by
all those who are too ready to associate Nietzsche
with lesser and noisier men,—with mountebanks and
mummers.
Chapter LII. It is clear that this applies to all those breathless
The and hasty "tasters of everything," who plunge too
Apostates. rashly into the sea of independent thought and
"heresy," and who, having miscalculated their
strength, find it impossible to keep their head above
water. "A little older, a little colder," says Nietzsche.
They soon clamber back to the conventions of the
age they intended reforming. The French then say,
"te diable se fait hennite" but these men, as a rule,
have never been devils, neither do they become
angels; for, in order to be really good or evil, some
strength and deep breathing is required. Those who
are more interested in supporting orthodoxy than in
being over nice concerning the kind of support they


## p. 429 (#647) ############################################

NOTES. 429
give it, often refer to these people as evidence in
favour of the true faith.
This is an example of a class of writing which may Chapter LIII.
be passed over too lightly by those whom poetasters The Return
have made distrustful of poetry. From first to last Home*
it is extremely valuable as an autobiographical note.
The inevitable superficiality of the rabble is con-
trasted with the peaceful and profound depths of the ,
anchorite. Here we first get a direct hint concern-
ing Nietzsche's fundamental passion—the main force
behind all his new values and scathing criticism of
existing values. In verse 30 we are told that pity
was his greatest danger. The broad altruism of the
law-giver, thinking over vast eras of time, was con-
tinually being pitted by Nietzsche, in himself,
against that transient and meaner sympathy for the
neighbour which he more perhaps than any of his con-
temporaries had suffered from, but which he was certain
involved enormous dangers not only for himself but
also to the next and subsequent generations (see Note
B. , where "pity " is mentioned among the degenerate
virtues). Later in the book we shall see how his
profound compassion leads him into temptation, and
how frantically he struggles against it. In verses 31
and 32, he tells us to what extent he had to modify
himself in order to be endured by his fellows whom
he loved (see also verse 12 in "Manly Prudence").
Nietzsche's great love for his fellows, which he
confesses in the Prologue, and which is at the root
of all his teaching, seems rather to elude the discerning
powers of the average philanthropist and modern
man. He cannot see the wood for the trees. A
philanthropy that sacrifices the minority of the
present-day for the majority constituting posterity,
completely evades his mental grasp, and Nietzsche's


## p. 429 (#648) ############################################

428 APPENDIX.
beyond the ideas and "business" they plagiarised;
but the superficial observer and a large portion of the
public, not knowing of these things,—not knowing
perhaps that there are iconoclasts who destroy out
of love and are therefore creators, and that there are
others who destroy out of resentment and revenge-
fulness and who are therefore revolutionists and
anarchists,—are prone to confound the two, to the
detriment of the nobler type.
If we now read what the fool says to Zarathustra,
and note the tricks of speech he has borrowed from
him: if we carefully follow the attitude he assumes,
we shall understand why Zarathustra finally interrupts
him. "Stop this at once," Zarathustra cries, "long
have thy speech and thy species disgusted me. . . .
Out of love alone shall my contempt and my warning
bird take wing; but not out of the swamp 1" It
were well if this discourse were taken to heart by
all those who are too ready to associate Nietzsche
with lesser and noisier men,—with mountebanks and
mummers.
Chapter I. II. It is clear that this applies to all those breathless
The and hasty "tasters of everything," who plunge too
Apostates. rashly into the sea of independent thought and
"heresy," and who, having miscalculated their
strength, find it impossible to keep their head above
water. "A little older, a little colder," says Nietzsche.
They soon clamber back to the conventions of the
age they intended reforming. The French then say,
"/<; diabk se fait hermite" but these men, as a rule,
have never been devils, neither do they become
angels; for, in order to be really good or evil, some
strength and deep breathing is required. Those who
are more interested in supporting orthodoxy than in
being over nice concerning the kind of support they
r
\


## p. 429 (#649) ############################################

NOTES. 429
give it, often refer to these people as evidence in
favour of the true faith.
This is an example of a class of writing which may Chapter LIU.
be passed over too lightly by those whom poetasters The Return
have made distrustful of poetry. From first to last HomCi
it is extremely valuable as an autobiographical note.
The inevitable superficiality of the rabble is con-
trasted with the peaceful and profound depths of the ,
anchorite. Here we first get a direct hint concern-
ing Nietzsche's fundamental passion—the main force
behind all his new values and scathing criticism of
existing values. In verse 30 we are told that pity
was his greatest danger. The broad altruism of the
law-giver, thinking over vast eras of time, was con-
tinually being pitted by Nietzsche, in himself,
against that transient and meaner sympathy for the
neighbour which he more perhaps than any of his con-
temporaries had suffered from, but which he was certain
involved enormous dangers not only for himself but
also to the next and subsequent generations (see Note
B. , where "pity " is mentioned among the degenerate
virtues). Later in the book we shall see how his
profound compassion leads him into temptation, and
how frantically he struggles against it. In verses 31
and 32, he tells us to what extent he had to modify
himself in order to be endured by his fellows whom
he loved (see also verse 12 in "Manly Prudence").
Nietzsche's great love for his fellows, which he
confesses in the Prologue, and which is at the root
of all his teaching, seems rather to elude the discerning
powers of the average philanthropist and modern
man. He cannot see the wood for the trees. A
philanthropy that sacrifices the minority of the
present-day for the majority constituting posterity,
completely evades his mental grasp, and Nietzsche's


## p. 430 (#650) ############################################

430
APPENDIX.
philosophy, because it declares Christian values to
be a danger to the future of our kind, is therefore
shelved as brutal, cold, and hard (see Note on
Chap. XXXVI. ). Nietzsche tried to be all things to
all men; he was sufficiently fond of his fellows for
that: in the Return Home he describes how he
ultimately returns to loneliness in order to recover
from the effects of his experiment.
Chapter LIV. Nietzsche is here completely in his element. Three
The Three things hitherto best-cursed and most calumniated on
Evil Things. eartn, are brought forward to be weighed. Voluptuous-
ness, thirst of power, and selfishness,—the three forces
in humanity which Christianity has done most to
garble and besmirch,—Nietzsche endeavours to rein-
state in their former places of honour. Voluptuous-
ness, or sensual pleasure, is a dangerous thing to discuss
nowadays. If we mention it with favour we may be
regarded, however unjustly, as the advocate of savages,
satyrs, and pure sensuality. If we condemn it, we
either go over to the Puritans or we join those who are
wont to come to table with no edge to their appetites
and who therefore grumble at all good fare. There
can be no doubt that the value of healthy innocent
voluptuousness, like the value of health itself, must
have been greatly discounted by all those who, resent-
ing their inability to partake of this world's goods,
cried like St Paul: "I would that all men were even
as I myself. " Now Nietzsche's philosophy might be
called an attempt at giving back to healthy and
normal men innocence and a clean conscience in
their desires—not to applaud the vulgar sensualists
who respond to every stimulus and whose passions
are out of hand; not to tell the mean, selfish individual,
whose selfishness is a pollution (see Aphorism 33,
"Twilight of the Idols"), that he is right, nor to assure


## p. 431 (#651) ############################################

NOTES. 431
the weak, the sick, and the crippled, that the thirst of
power, which they gratify by exploiting the happier
and healthier individuals, is justified;—but to save
the clean healthy man from the values of those around
him, who look at everything through the mud that is
in their own bodies,—to give him, and him alone, a
clean conscience in his manhood and the desires
of his manhood. "Do I counsel you to slay your
instincts? I counsel to innocence in your instincts. "
In verse 7 of the second paragraph (as in verse 1 of
par. 19 in "The Old and New Tables") Nietzsche
gives us a reason for his occasional obscurity (see also
verses 3 to 7 of " Poets "). As I have already pointed
out, his philosophy is quite esoteric. It can serve
no purpose with the ordinary, mediocre type of man.
I, personally, can no longer have any doubt that
Nietzsche's only object, in that part of his philosophy
where he bids his friends stand " Beyond Good and
Evil" with him, was to save higher men, whose growth
and scope might be limited by the too strict observance
of modern values from foundering on the rocks of a
"Compromise" between their own genius and tradi-
tional conventions. The only possible way in which
the great man can achieve greatness is by means of
exceptional freedom—the freedom which assists him
in experiencing himself. Verses 20 to 30 afford an
excellent supplement to Nietzsche's description of the
attitude of the noble type towards the slaves in
Aphorism 260 of the work " Beyond Good and Evil"
(see also Note B. in Foreword).
(See Note on Chap. XLVI. ) In Part II. of this Chapter LV.
discourse we meet with a doctrine not touched upon The Spirit of
hitherto, save indirectly;—I refer to the doctrine of Gravity.
self-love. We should try to understand this perfectly
before proceeding; for it is precisely views of this


## p. 431 (#652) ############################################

430 APPENDIX.
philosophy, because it declares Christian values to
be a danger to the future of our kind, is therefore
shelved as brutal, cold, and hard (see Note on
Chap. XXXVI. ). Nietzsche tried to be all things to
all men; he was sufficiently fond of his fellows for
that: in the Return Home he describes how he
ultimately returns to loneliness in order to recover
from the effects of his experiment.
Chapter LIV. Nietzsche is here completely in his element. Three
The Three things hitherto best-cursed and most calumniated on
Evil Things. earth, are brought forward to be weighed. Voluptuous-
ness, thirst of power, and selfishness,—the three forces
in humanity which Christianity has done most to
garble and besmirch,—Nietzsche endeavours to rein-
state in their former places of honour. Voluptuous-
ness, or sensual pleasure, is a dangerous thing to discuss
nowadays. If we mention it with favour we may be
regarded, however unjustly, as the advocate of savages,
satyrs, and pure sensuality. If we condemn it, we
either go over to the Puritans or we join those who are
wont to come to table with no edge to their appetites
and who therefore grumble at all good fare. There
can be no doubt that the value of healthy innocent
voluptuousness, like the value of health itself, must
have been greatly discounted by all those who, resent-
ing their inability to partake of this world's goods,
cried like St Paul: "I would that all men were even
as I myself. " Now Nietzsche's philosophy might be
called an attempt at giving back to healthy and
normal men innocence and a clean conscience in
their desires—not to applaud the vulgar sensualists
who respond to every stimulus and whose passions
are out of hand; not to tell the mean, selfish individual,
whose selfishness is a pollution (see Aphorism 33,
"Twilight of the Idols"), that he is right, nor to assure


## p. 431 (#653) ############################################

NOTES. 431
the weak, the sick, and the crippled, that the thirst of
power, which they gratify by exploiting the happier
and healthier individuals, is justified;—but to save
the clean healthy man from the values of those around
him, who look at everything through the mud that is
in their own bodies,—to give him, and him alone, a
clean conscience in his manhood and the desires
of his manhood. "Do I counsel you to slay your
instincts? I counsel to innocence in your instincts. "
In verse 7 of the second paragraph (as in verse 1 of
par. 19 in "The Old and New Tables") Nietzsche
gives us a reason for his occasional obscurity (see also
verses 3 to 7 of " Poets "). As I have already pointed
out, his philosophy is quite esoteric. It can serve
no purpose with the ordinary, mediocre type of man.
I, personally, can no longer have any doubt that
Nietzsche's only object, in that part of his philosophy
where he bids his friends stand " Beyond Good and
Evil" with him, was to save higher men, whose growth
and scope might be limited by the too strict observance
of modern values from foundering on the rocks of a
"Compromise " between their own genius and tradi-
tional conventions. The only possible way in which
the great man can achieve greatness is by means of
exceptional freedom—the freedom which assists him
in experiencing himself. Verses 20 to 30 afford an
excellent supplement to Nietzsche's description of the
attitude of the noble type towards the slaves in
Aphorism 260 of the work "Beyond Good and Evil"
(see also Note B. in Foreword).
(See Note on Chap. XLVI. ) In Part II. of this chapter LV.
discourse we meet with a doctrine not touched upon The Spirit of
hitherto, save indirectly;—I refer to the doctrine of Gravity,
self-love.
We should try to understand this perfectly
before proceeding; for it is precisely views of this


## p. 432 (#654) ############################################

432 APPENDIX.
sort which, after having been cut out of the original
context, are repeated far and wide as internal evidence
proving the general unsoundness of Nietzsche's philo-
sophy. Already in the last of the "Thoughts out of
Season" Nietzsche speaks as follows about modern
men: ". . . these modern creatures wish rather to
be hunted down, wounded and torn to shreds, than
to live alone with themselves in solitary calm. Alone
with oneself! —this thought terrifies the modern soul;
it is his one anxiety, his one ghastly fear" (English
Edition, p. 141). In his feverish scurry to find
entertainment and diversion, whether in a novel, a
newspaper, or a play, the modern man condemns his
own age utterly; for he shows that in his heart of
hearts he despises himself. One cannot change a
condition of this sort in a day; to become endurable
to oneself an inner transformation is necessary. Too
long have we lost ourselves in our friends and enter-
tainments to be able to find ourselves so soon at
another's bidding. "And verily, it is no command-
ment for to-day and to-morrow to learn to love oneself.
Rather is it of all arts the finest, subtlest, last, and
patientest. "
In the last verse Nietzsche challenges us to show
that our way is the right way. In his teaching he does
not coerce us, nor does he overpersuade; he simply
says: "I am a law only for mine own, I am not a law
for all. This—is now my way,—where is yours? "
Chapter LVI. Nietzsche himself declares this to be the most
Par. a. decisive portion of the whole of "Thus Spake
The Old and Zarathustra. " It is a sort of epitome of his leading
New Tables, doctrines. In verse 12 of the second paragraph, we
learn how he himself would fain have abandoned the
poetical method of expression had he not known
only too well that the only chance a new doctrine


## p. 433 (#655) ############################################

NOTES. 433
has of surviving, nowadays, depends upon its being
given to the world in some kind of art-form. Just
as prophets, centuries ago, often had to have recourse
to the mask of madness in order to mitigate the
hatred of those who did not and could not see as
they did; so, to-day, the struggle for existence among
opinions and values is so great, that an art-form is
practically the only garb in which a new philosophy
can dare to introduce itself to us.
Many of the paragraphs will be found to be merely
reminiscent of former discourses. For instance,
par. 3 recalls "Redemption. " The last verse of Par. 3.
par. 4 is important. Freedom which, as I have Par. 4.
pointed out before, Nietzsche considered a danger-
ous acquisition in inexperienced or unworthy hands,
here receives its death-blow as a general desideratum.
In the first Part we read under "The Way of the
Creating One," that freedom as an end in itself does
not concern Zarathustra at all. He says there:
"Free from what? What doth that matter to Zara-
thustra? Clearly, however, shall thine eye answer
me: free for what? " And in "The Bedwarfing
Virtue": "Ah that ye understood my word: 'Do
ever what ye will—but first be such as can will. '"
Here we have a description of the kind of altruism Par. 5.
Nietzsche exacted from higher men. It is really
a comment upon "The Bestowing Virtue" (see
Note on Chap. XXII. ).
This refers, of course, to the reception pioneers Par. 6.
of Nietzsche's stamp meet with at the hands of their
contemporaries.
Nietzsche teaches that nothing is stable,—not even Par. 8.
values,—not even the concepts good and evil. He
likens life unto a stream. But foot-bridges and
railings span the stream, and they seem to stand firm.
2 E


## p. 434 (#656) ############################################

434 APPENDIX.
Many will be reminded of good and evil when they
look upon these structures; for thus these same
values stand over the stream of life, and life flows on
beneath them and leaves them standing. When,
however, winter comes and the stream gets frozen,
many inquire: "Should not everything—stand stilll
Fundamentally everything standeth still. " But soon
the spring cometh and with it the thaw-wind. It
breaks the ice, and the ice breaks down the foot-
bridges and railings, whereupon everything is swept
away. This state of affairs, according to Nietzsche,
has now been reached. "O, my brethren, is not
everything at present in flux 1 Have not all railings
and foot-bridges fallen into the water? Who would
still hold on to 'good' and 'evil'? "
Par. 9. This is complementary to the first three verses
of par. 2.
Par. 10. So far, this is perhaps the most important paragraph.
It is a protest against reading a moral order of things
in life. "Life is something essentially immoral! "
Nietzsche tells us in the introduction to the "Birth
of Tragedy. " Even to call life " activity," or to define
it further as "the continuous adjustment of internal
relations to external relations," as Spencer has it,
Nietzsche characterises as a "democratic idiosyncracy. "
He says to define it in this way, "is to mistake the
true nature and function of life, which is Will to
Power. . . . Life is essentially appropriation, injury,
conquest of the strange and weak, suppression,
severity, obtrusion of its own forms, incorporation
and at least, putting it mildest, exploitation. " Adapta-
tion is merely a secondary activity, a mere re-activity
(see Note on Chap. LVII. ).
Pars. 11, 12. These deal with Nietzsche's principle of the
desirability of rearing a select race. The biological


## p. 435 (#657) ############################################

NOTES. 435
and historical grounds for his insistence upon this
principle are, of course, manifold. Gobineau in his
great work, "L'Inegalite des Races Humaines," lays
strong emphasis upon the evils which arise from
promiscuous and inter-social marriages. He alone
would suffice to carry Nietzsche's point against all
those who are opposed to the other conditions, to
the conditions which would have saved Rome, which
have maintained the strength of the Jewish race,
and which are strictly maintained by every breeder
of animals throughout the world. Darwin in his
remarks relative to the degeneration of cultivated
types of animals through the action of promiscuous
breeding, brings Gobineau support from the realm of
biology.
The last two verses of par. 12 were discussed in
the Notes on Chaps. XXXVI. and LIII.
This, like the first part of "The Soothsayer," is Par. 13.
obviously a reference to Schopenhauerian Pessimism.
These are supplementary to the discourse "Back- Pars. 14, 15,
world's-men. " l6> «7-
We must be careful to separate this paragraph, Par. 18.
in sense, from the previous four paragraphs. Nietz-
sche is. still dealing with Pessimism here; but it is
the pessimism of the hero—the man most susceptible
of all to desperate views of life, owing to the obstacles
that are arrayed against him in a world where men of
his kind are very rare and are continually being
sacrificed. It was to save this man that Nietzsche
wrote. Heroism foiled, thwarted, and wrecked, hoping
and fighting until the last, is at length overtaken by
despair, and renounces all struggle for sleep. This
is not the natural or constitutional pessimism which
proceeds from an unhealthy body—the dyspeptic's
lack of appetite; it is rather the desperation of the


## p. 436 (#658) ############################################

436 APPENDIX.
netted lion that ultimately stops all movement, because
the more it moves the more involved it becomes.
Par. 20. "All that increases power is good, all that springs
from weakness is bad. The weak and ill-constituted
shall perish: first principle of our charity. And one
shall also help them thereto. " Nietzsche partly
divined the kind of reception moral values of this
stamp would meet with at the hands of the effeminate
manhood of Europe. Here we see that he had
anticipated the most likely form their criticism would
take (see also the last two verses of par. 17).
Par. 21. The first ten verses, here, are reminiscent of "War
and Warriors" and of "The Flies in the Market-
place. " Verses 11 and 12, however, are particularly
important. There is a strong argument in favour of
the sharp differentiation of castes and of races (and
even of sexes; see Note on Chap. XVIII. ) running
all through Nietzsche's writings. But sharp differentia-
tion also implies antagonism in some form or other—
hence Nietzsche's fears for modern men. What
modern men desire above all, is peace and the
cessation of pain. But neither great races nor great
castes have ever been built up in this way. "Who
still wanteth to rule? " Zarathustra asks in the
"Prologue. " "Who still wanteth to obey? Both are
too burdensome. " This is rapidly becoming every-
body's attitude to-day. The tame moral reading of
the face of nature, together with such democratic
interpretations of life as those suggested by Herbert
Spencer, are signs of a physiological condition which
is the reverse of that bounding and irresponsible
healthiness in which harder and more tragic values
rule.
Par. 24. This should be read in conjunction with, "Child
and Marriage. " In the fifth verse wc shall recognise


## p. 437 (#659) ############################################

NOTES. 437
our old friend "Marriage on the ten-years system,"
which George Meredith suggested some years ago.
This, however, must not be taken too literally. I
do not think Nietzsche's profoundest views on
marriage were ever intended to be given over to the
public at all, at least not for the present. They
appear in the biography by his sister, and although
their wisdom is unquestionable, the nature of the
reforms he suggests render it impossible for them to
become popular just now.
See Note on "The Prologue. " Pars. 26, 27.
Nietzsche was not an iconoclast from predilection. Par. 28.
No bitterness or empty hate dictated his vitupera-
tions against existing values and against the dogmas of
his parents and forefathers. He knew too well what
these things meant to the millions who profess them,
to approach the task of uprooting them with levity
or even with haste. He saw what modern anarchists
and revolutionists do not see—namely, that man is in
danger of actual destruction when his customs and
values are broken. I need hardly point out, there-
fore, how deeply he was conscious of the responsibility
he threw upon our shoulders when he invited us to
reconsider our position. The lines in this paragraph
are evidence enough of his earnestness.
We meet with several puzzles here. Zarathustra Chapter
calls himself the advocate of the circle (the Eternal LVII.
Recurrence of all things), and he calls this doctrine :,
his abysmal thought. In the last verse of the first
paragraph, however, after hailing his deepest thought,
he cries: "Disgust, disgust, disgust! " We know
Nietzsche's ideal man was that "world-approving,
exuberant, and vivacious creature, who has not only
learnt to compromise and arrange with that which
was and is, but wishes to have it again, as it was and


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438 APPENDIX.
is, for all eternity insatiably calling out da capo, not
only to himself, but to the whole piece and play"
(see Note on Chap. XLIL). But if one ask oneself
what the conditions to such an attitude are, one will
realise immediately how utterly different Nietzsche
was from his ideal. The man who insatiably cries
da capo to himself and to the whole of his misc-tn-
scene, must be in a position to desire every incident
in his life to be repeated, not once, but again and
again eternally. Now, Nietzsche's life had been too
full of disappointments, illness, unsuccessful struggles,
and snubs, to allow of his thinking of the Eternal
Recurrence without loathing—hence probably the
words of the last verse.
In verses 15 and 16, we have Nietzsche declaring him-
self an evolutionist in the broadest sense—that is to
say, that he believes in the Development Hypothesis
as the description of the process by which species have
originated. Now, to understand his position correctly
we must show his relationship to the two greatest
of modern evolutionists—Darwin and Spencer. As
a philosopher, however, Nietzsche does not stand or
fall by his objections to the Darwinian or Spencerian
cosmogony. He never laid claim to a very profound
knowledge of biology, and his criticism is far more
valuable as the attitude of a fresh mind than as that
of a specialist towards the question. Moreover, in
his objections many difficulties are raised which are
not settled by an appeal to either of the men above
mentioned. We have given Nietzsche's definition of
life in the Note on Chap. LVI. , par. 10. Still, there
remains a hope that Darwin and Nietzsche may some
day become reconciled by a new description of the
processes by which varieties occur. The appearance
of varieties among animals and of "sporting plants"


## p. 439 (#661) ############################################

notes. 439
in the vegetable kingdom, is still shrouded in
mystery, and the question whether this is not
precisely the ground on which Darwin and Nietzsche
will meet, is an interesting one. The former says
in his "Origin of Species," concerning the causes of
variability: ". . . there are two factors, namely, the
nature of the organism, and the nature of the con-
ditions. The former seems to be much the more im-
portant,* for nearly similar variations sometimes arise
under, as far as we can judge, dissimilar conditions;
and on the other hand, dissimilar variations arise
under conditions which appear to be nearly uniform. "
Nietzsche, recognising this same truth, would ascribe
practically all the importance to the "highest func-
tionaries in the organism, in which the life-will
appears as an active and formative principle," and
except in certain cases (where passive organisms
alone are concerned) would not give such a prominent
place to the influence of environment. Adaptation,
according to him, is merely a secondary activity, a
mere re-activity, and he is therefore quite opposed to
Spencer's definition: "Life is the continuous adjust-
ment of internal relations to external relations. "
Again in the motive force behind animal and plant
life, Nietzsche disagrees with Darwin. He trans-
forms the "Struggle for Existence "—the passive and
involuntary condition—into the "Struggle for Power,"
which is active and creative, and much more in
harmony with Darwin's own view, given above, con-
cerning the importance of the organism itself. The
change is one of such far-reaching importance that
we cannot dispose of it in a breath, as a mere play
upon words. "Much is reckoned higher than life
* The italics are mine.


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440 APPENDIX.
itself by the living one. " Nietzsche says that to
speak of the activity of life as a "straggle for
existence," is to state the case inadequately. He
warns us not to confound Malthus with nature. There
is something more than this struggle between the
organic beings on this earth; want, which is supposed
to bring this struggle about, is not so common as is
supposed; some other force must be operative. The
Will to Power is this force, "the instinct of self-
preservation is only one of the indirect and most
frequent results thereof. " A certain lack of acumen
in psychological questions and the condition of affairs
in England at the time Darwin wrote, may both,
according to Nietzsche, have induced the renowned
naturalist to describe the forces of nature as he did
in his "Origin of Species. "
In verses 28, 29, and 30 of the second portion of
this discourse we meet with a doctrine which, at first
sight, seems to be merely "k manoir a fenvers,"
indeed one English critic has actually said of Nietz-
sche, that "Thus Spake Zarathustra" is no more
than a compendium of modern views and maxims
turned upside down. Examining these heterodox
pronouncements a little more closely, however, we
may possibly perceive their truth.