No More Learning

Now God is not something existing; but He is rather super-existence, as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God is not intelligible; but
above all intellect.

Objection 4: Further, there must be some proportion between the knower
and the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower. But no
proportion exists between the created intellect and God; for there is
an infinite distance between them. Therefore the created intellect
cannot see the essence of God.

On the contrary, It is written: "We shall see Him as He is" (1 Jn.
2:2).

I answer that, Since everything is knowable according as it is actual,
God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in
Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself,
may not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account of the excess
of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the
sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be seen by the bat by reason of
its excess of light.

Therefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can
see the essence of God. This opinion, however, is not tenable. For as
the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest
function, which is the operation of his intellect; if we suppose that
the created intellect could never see God, it would either never attain
to beatitude, or its beatitude would consist in something else beside
God; which is opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of the
rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its
being; since a thing is perfect so far as it attains to its principle.
Further the same opinion is also against reason. For there resides in
every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which he
sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect of the
rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause of
things, the natural desire would remain void.

Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of
God.

Reply to Objection 1: Both of these authorities speak of the vision of
comprehension. Hence Dionysius premises immediately before the words
cited, "He is universally to all incomprehensible," etc. Chrysostom
likewise after the words quoted says: "He says this of the most certain
vision of the Father, which is such a perfect consideration and
comprehension as the Father has of the Son. "

Reply to Objection 2: The infinity of matter not made perfect by form,
is unknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas
the infinity of the form not limited by matter, is in itself supremely
known. God is Infinite in this way, and not in the first way: as
appears from what was said above ([50]Q[7], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 3: God is not said to be not existing as if He did
not exist at all, but because He exists above all that exists; inasmuch
as He is His own existence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot be
known at all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge; which means
that He is not comprehended.

Reply to Objection 4: Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a
certain relation of one quantity to another, according as double,
treble and equal are species of proportion. In another sense every
relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And in this
sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it
is related to Him as the effect of its cause, and as potentiality to
its act; and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned to
know God.
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Whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect through an
image?

Objection 1: It seems that the essence of God is seen through an image
by the created intellect. For it is written: "We know that when He
shall appear, we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg. : 'because'] we shall
see Him as He is" (1 Jn. 3:2).

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v): "When we know God,
some likeness of God is made in us. "

Objection 3: Further, the intellect in act is the actual intelligible;
as sense in act is the actual sensible. But this comes about inasmuch
as sense is informed with the likeness of the sensible object, and the
intellect with the likeness of the thing understood. Therefore, if God
is seen by the created intellect in act, it must be that He is seen by
some similitude.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv) that when the Apostle
says, "We see through a glass and in an enigma [*Douay: 'in a dark
manner']," "by the terms 'glass' and 'enigma' certain similitudes are
signified by him, which are accommodated to the vision of God. " But to
see the essence of God is not an enigmatic nor a speculative vision,
but is, on the contrary, of an opposite kind. Therefore the divine
essence is not seen through a similitude.

I answer that, Two things are required both for sensible and for
intellectual vision---viz. power of sight, and union of the thing seen
with the sight. For vision is made actual only when the thing seen is
in a certain way in the seer. Now in corporeal things it is clear that
the thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its
likeness; as the similitude of a stone is in the eye, whereby the
vision is made actual; whereas the substance of the stone is not there.
But if the principle of the visual power and the thing seen were one
and the same thing, it would necessarily follow that the seer would
receive both the visual power and the form whereby it sees, from that
one same thing.

Now it is manifest both that God is the author of the intellect power,
and that He can be seen by the intellect. And since the intellective
power of the creature is not the essence of God, it follows that it is
some kind of participated likeness of Him who is the first intellect.
Hence also the intellectual power of the creature is called an
intelligible light, as it were, derived from the first light, whether
this be understood of the natural power, or of some perfection
superadded of grace or of glory. Therefore, in order to see God, there
must be some similitude of God on the part of the visual faculty,
whereby the intellect is made capable of seeing God. But on the part of
the object seen, which must necessarily be united to the seer, the
essence of God cannot be seen by any created similitude. First, because
as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), "by the similitudes of the inferior
order of things, the superior can in no way be known;" as by the
likeness of a body the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known.
Much less therefore can the essence of God be seen by any created
likeness whatever. Secondly, because the essence of God is His own very
existence, as was shown above ([51]Q[3], A[4]), which cannot be said of
any created form; and so no created form can be the similitude
representing the essence of God to the seer. Thirdly, because the
divine essence is uncircumscribed, and contains in itself
super-eminently whatever can be signified or understood by the created
intellect. Now this cannot in any way be represented by any created
likeness; for every created form is determined according to some aspect
of wisdom, or of power, or of being itself, or of some like thing.
Hence to say that God is seen by some similitude, is to say that the
divine essence is not seen at all; which is false.

Therefore it must be said that to see the essence of God, there is
required some similitude in the visual faculty, namely, the light of
glory strengthening the intellect to see God, which is spoken of in the
Ps. 35:10, "In Thy light we shall see light. " The essence of God,
however, cannot be seen by any created similitude representing the
divine essence itself as it really is.

Reply to Objection 1: That authority speaks of the similitude which is
caused by participation of the light of glory.

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine speaks of the knowledge of God here on
earth.

Reply to Objection 3: The divine essence is existence itself. Hence as
other intelligible forms which are not their own existence are united
to the intellect by means of some entity, whereby the intellect itself
is informed, and made in act; so the divine essence is united to the
created intellect, as the object actually understood, making the
intellect in act by and of itself.
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Whether the essence of God can be seen with the bodily eye?

Objection 1: It seems that the essence of God can be seen by the
corporeal eye. For it is written (Job 19:26): "In my flesh I shall see
. . . God," and (Job 42:5), "With the hearing of the ear I have heard
Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee. "

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxix, 29): "Those
eyes" (namely the glorified) "will therefore have a greater power of
sight, not so much to see more keenly, as some report of the sight of
serpents or of eagles (for whatever acuteness of vision is possessed by
these creatures, they can see only corporeal things) but to see even
incorporeal things. " Now whoever can see incorporeal things, can be
raised up to see God. Therefore the glorified eye can see God.

Objection 3: Further, God can be seen by man through a vision of the
imagination. For it is written: "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne,"
etc. (Is. 6:1). But an imaginary vision originates from sense; for the
imagination is moved by sense to act. Therefore God can be seen by a
vision of sense.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "No one has
ever seen God either in this life, as He is, nor in the angelic life,
as visible things are seen by corporeal vision. "

I answer that, It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of
sight, or by any other sense, or faculty of the sensitive power. For
every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ, as will be
shown later [52](Q[78]). Now act is proportional to the nature which
possesses it. Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal
things. For God is incorporeal, as was shown above ([53]Q[3], A[1]).
Hence He cannot be seen by the sense or the imagination, but only by
the intellect.

Reply to Objection 1: The words, "In my flesh I shall see God my
Saviour," do not mean that God will be seen with the eye of the flesh,
but that man existing in the flesh after the resurrection will see God.
Likewise the words, "Now my eye seeth Thee," are to be understood of
the mind's eye, as the Apostle says: "May He give unto you the spirit
of wisdom . . . in the knowledge of Him, that the eyes of your heart"
may be "enlightened" (Eph. 1:17,18).

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine speaks as one inquiring, and
conditionally. This appears from what he says previously: "Therefore
they will have an altogether different power (viz. the glorified eyes),
if they shall see that incorporeal nature;" and afterwards he explains
this, saying: "It is very credible, that we shall so see the mundane
bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see most clearly God
everywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we now see
the invisible things of God as understood by what is made; but as when
we see men among whom we live, living and exercising the functions of
human life, we do not believe they live, but see it. " Hence it is
evident how the glorified eyes will see God, as now our eyes see the
life of another. But life is not seen with the corporeal eye, as a
thing in itself visible, but as the indirect object of the sense; which
indeed is not known by sense, but at once, together with sense, by some
other cognitive power. But that the divine presence is known by the
intellect immediately on the sight of, and through, corporeal things,
happens from two causes---viz. from the perspicuity of the intellect,
and from the refulgence of the divine glory infused into the body after
its renovation.

Reply to Objection 3: The essence of God is not seen in a vision of the
imagination; but the imagination receives some form representing God
according to some mode of similitude; as in the divine Scripture divine
things are metaphorically described by means of sensible things.
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Whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the Divine
essence?

Objection 1: It seems that a created intellect can see the Divine
essence by its own natural power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv):
"An angel is a pure mirror, most clear, receiving, if it is right to
say so, the whole beauty of God. " But if a reflection is seen, the
original thing is seen. Therefore since an angel by his natural power
understands himself, it seems that by his own natural power he
understands the Divine essence.

Objection 2: Further, what is supremely visible, is made less visible
to us by reason of our defective corporeal or intellectual sight. But
the angelic intellect has no such defect. Therefore, since God is
supremely intelligible in Himself, it seems that in like manner He is
supremely so to an angel. Therefore, if he can understand other
intelligible things by his own natural power, much more can he
understand God.

Objection 3: Further, corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand
incorporeal substance, which is above its nature. Therefore if to see
the essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it
follows that no created intellect can reach up to see the essence of
God at all. But this is false, as appears from what is said above
[54](A[1]). Therefore it seems that it is natural for a created
intellect to see the Divine essence.

On the contrary, It is written: "The grace of God is life everlasting"
(Rom. 6:23). But life everlasting consists in the vision of the Divine
essence, according to the words: "This is eternal life, that they may
know Thee the only true God," etc. (Jn. 17:3). Therefore to see the
essence of God is possible to the created intellect by grace, and not
by nature.

I answer that, It is impossible for any created intellect to see the
essence of God by its own natural power. For knowledge is regulated
according as the thing known is in the knower. But the thing known is
in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence the knowledge
of every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If therefore the
mode of anything's being exceeds the mode of the knower, it must result
that the knowledge of the object is above the nature of the knower. Now
the mode of being of things is manifold. For some things have being
only in this one individual matter; as all bodies. But others are
subsisting natures, not residing in matter at all, which, however, are
not their own existence, but receive it; and these are the incorporeal
beings, called angels. But to God alone does it belong to be His own
subsistent being. Therefore what exists only in individual matter we
know naturally, forasmuch as our soul, whereby we know, is the form of
certain matter. Now our soul possesses two cognitive powers; one is the
act of a corporeal organ, which naturally knows things existing in
individual matter; hence sense knows only the singular. But there is
another kind of cognitive power in the soul, called the intellect; and
this is not the act of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the intellect
naturally knows natures which exist only in individual matter; not as
they are in such individual matter, but according as they are
abstracted therefrom by the considering act of the intellect; hence it
follows that through the intellect we can understand these objects as
universal; and this is beyond the power of the sense. Now the angelic
intellect naturally knows natures that are not in matter; but this is
beyond the power of the intellect of our soul in the state of its
present life, united as it is to the body. It follows therefore that to
know self-subsistent being is natural to the divine intellect alone;
and this is beyond the natural power of any created intellect; for no
creature is its own existence, forasmuch as its existence is
participated. Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of
God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the created intellect,
as an object made intelligible to it.

Reply to Objection 1: This mode of knowing God is natural to an
angel---namely, to know Him by His own likeness refulgent in the angel
himself. But to know God by any created similitude is not to know the
essence of God, as was shown above [55](A[2]). Hence it does not follow
that an angel can know the essence of God by his own power.

Reply to Objection 2: The angelic intellect is not defective, if defect
be taken to mean privation, as if it were without anything which it
ought to have. But if the defect be taken negatively, in that sense
every creature is defective, when compared with God; forasmuch as it
does not possess the excellence which is in God.

Reply to Objection 3: The sense of sight, as being altogether material,
cannot be raised up to immateriality. But our intellect, or the angelic
intellect, inasmuch as it is elevated above matter in its own nature,
can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level by grace. The
proof is, that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly what it knows
concretely; for in no way can it perceive a nature except as this one
particular nature; whereas our intellect is able to consider
abstractedly what it knows concretely. Now although it knows things
which have a form residing in matter, still it resolves the composite
into both of these elements; and it considers the form separately by
itself. Likewise, also, the intellect of an angel, although it
naturally knows the concrete in any nature, still it is able to
separate that existence by its intellect; since it knows that the thing
itself is one thing, and its existence is another. Since therefore the
created intellect is naturally capable of apprehending the concrete
form, and the concrete being abstractedly, by way of a kind of
resolution of parts; it can by grace be raised up to know separate
subsisting substance, and separate subsisting existence.
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Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the
essence of God?

Objection 1: It seems that the created intellect does not need any
created light in order to see the essence of God. For what is of itself
lucid in sensible things does not require any other light in order to
be seen. Therefore the same applies to intelligible things. Now God is
intelligible light. Therefore He is not seen by means of any created
light.

Objection 2: Further, if God is seen through a medium, He is not seen
in His essence. But if seen by any created light, He is seen through a
medium. Therefore He is not seen in His essence.

Objection 3: Further, what is created can be natural to some creature.
Therefore if the essence of God is seen through any created light, such
a light can be made natural to some other creature; and thus, that
creature would not need any other light to see God; which is
impossible. Therefore it is not necessary that every creature should
require a superadded light in order to see the essence of God.

On the contrary, It is written: "In Thy light we shall see light" (Ps.
35:10).

I answer that, Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its
nature, must be prepared by some disposition above its nature; as, for
example, if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be prepared by
some disposition for such a form. But when any created intellect sees
the essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible
form of the intellect. Hence it is necessary that some supernatural
disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it may be
raised up to such a great and sublime height. Now since the natural
power of the created intellect does not avail to enable it to see the
essence of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary
that the power of understanding should be added by divine grace. Now
this increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of
the intellect, as we also call the intelligible object itself by the
name of light of illumination. And this is the light spoken of in the
Apocalypse (Apoc. 21:23): "The glory of God hath enlightened it"---viz.
the society of the blessed who see God. By this light the blessed are
made "deiform"---i. e. like to God, according to the saying: "When He
shall appear we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg. : 'because'] we shall
see Him as He is" (1 Jn. 3:2).

Reply to Objection 1: The created light is necessary to see the essence
of God, not in order to make the essence of God intelligible, which is
of itself intelligible, but in order to enable the intellect to
understand in the same way as a habit makes a power abler to act. Even
so corporeal light is necessary as regards external sight, inasmuch as
it makes the medium actually transparent, and susceptible of color.

Reply to Objection 2: This light is required to see the divine essence,
not as a similitude in which God is seen, but as a perfection of the
intellect, strengthening it to see God. Therefore it may be said that
this light is to be described not as a medium in which God is seen, but
as one by which He is seen; and such a medium does not take away the
immediate vision of God.

Reply to Objection 3: The disposition to the form of fire can be
natural only to the subject of that form. Hence the light of glory
cannot be natural to a creature unless the creature has a divine
nature; which is impossible. But by this light the rational creature is
made deiform, as is said in this article.
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Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than
another?

Objection 1: It seems that of those who see the essence of God, one
does not see more perfectly than another. For it is written (1 Jn.
3:2): "We shall see Him as He is. " But He is only in one way. Therefore
He will be seen by all in one way only; and therefore He will not be
seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly by another.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu.
xxxii):
"One person cannot see one and the same thing more perfectly than
another. " But all who see the essence of God, understand the Divine
essence, for God is seen by the intellect and not by sense, as was
shown above (A[3] ). Therefore of those who see the divine essence, one
does not see more clearly than another.

Objection 3: Further, That anything be seen more perfectly than another
can happen in two ways: either on the part of the visible object, or on
the part of the visual power of the seer. On the part of the object, it
may so happen because the object is received more perfectly in the
seer, that is, according to the greater perfection of the similitude;
but this does not apply to the present question, for God is present to
the intellect seeing Him not by way of similitude, but by His essence.
It follows then that if one sees Him more perfectly than another, this
happens according to the difference of the intellectual power; thus it
follows too that the one whose intellectual power is higher, will see
Him the more clearly; and this is incongruous; since equality with
angels is promised to men as their beatitude.

On the contrary, Eternal life consists in the vision of God, according
to Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only
true God," etc. Therefore if all saw the essence of God equally in
eternal life, all would be equal; the contrary to which is declared by
the Apostle: "Star differs from star in glory" (1 Cor. 15:41).

I answer that, Of those who see the essence of God, one sees Him more
perfectly than another. This, indeed, does not take place as if one had
a more perfect similitude of God than another, since that vision will
not spring from any similitude; but it will take place because one
intellect will have a greater power or faculty to see God than another.
The faculty of seeing God, however, does not belong to the created
intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of glory, which
establishes the intellect in a kind of "deiformity," as appears from
what is said above, in the preceding article.

Hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God
the more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation of the
light of glory who has more charity; because where there is the greater
charity, there is the more desire; and desire in a certain degree makes
the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired. Hence
he who possesses the more charity, will see God the more perfectly, and
will be the more beatified.

Reply to Objection 1: In the words,"We shall see Him as He is," the
conjunction "as" determines the mode of vision on the part of the
object seen, so that the meaning is, we shall see Him to be as He is,
because we shall see His existence, which is His essence. But it does
not determine the mode of vision on the part of the one seeing; as if
the meaning was that the mode of seeing God will be as perfect as is
the perfect mode of God's existence.

Thus appears the answer to the Second Objection. For when it is said
that one intellect does not understand one and the same thing better
than another, this would be true if referred to the mode of the thing
understood, for whoever understands it otherwise than it really is,
does not truly understand it, but not if referred to the mode of
understanding, for the understanding of one is more perfect than the
understanding of another.

Reply to Objection 3: The diversity of seeing will not arise on the
part of the object seen, for the same object will be presented to
all---viz. the essence of God; nor will it arise from the diverse
participation of the object seen by different similitudes; but it will
arise on the part of the diverse faculty of the intellect, not, indeed,
the natural faculty, but the glorified faculty.
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Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him?

Objection 1: It seems that those who see the divine essence, comprehend
God. For the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "But I follow after, if I may
by any means comprehend [Douay: 'apprehend']. " But the Apostle did not
follow in vain; for he said (1 Cor. 9:26): "I . . . so run, not as at
an uncertainty. " Therefore he comprehended; and in the same way, others
also, whom he invites to do the same, saying: "So run that you may
comprehend. "

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "That
is comprehended which is so seen as a whole, that nothing of it is
hidden from the seer. " But if God is seen in His essence, He is seen
whole, and nothing of Him is hidden from the seer, since God is simple.
Therefore whoever sees His essence, comprehends Him.

Objection 3: Further, if we say that He is seen as a "whole," but not
"wholly," it may be contrarily urged that "wholly" refers either to the
mode of the seer, or to the mode of the thing seen. But he who sees the
essence of God, sees Him wholly, if the mode of the thing seen is
considered; forasmuch as he sees Him as He is; also, likewise, he sees
Him wholly if the mode of the seer is meant, forasmuch as the intellect
will with its full power see the Divine essence. Therefore all who see
the essence of God see Him wholly; therefore they comprehend Him.

On the contrary, It is written: "O most mighty, great, and powerful,
the Lord of hosts is Thy Name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible
in thought" (Jer. 32:18,19). Therefore He cannot be comprehended.

I answer that, It is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend
God; yet "for the mind to attain to God in some degree is great
beatitude," as Augustine says (De Verb. Dim. , Serm. xxxvii).

In proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended is
perfectly known; and that is perfectly known which is known so far as
it can be known. Thus, if anything which is capable of scientific
demonstration is held only by an opinion resting on a probably proof,
it is not comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by scientific
demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two right
angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if anyone accepts it as a
probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it, he cannot be
said to comprehend the thing itself, because he does not attain to that
perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable. But no
created intellect can attain to that perfect mode of the knowledge of
the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable. Which thus
appears---Everything is knowable according to its actuality. But God,
whose being is infinite, as was shown above [56](Q[7]) is infinitely
knowable. Now no created intellect can know God infinitely. For the
created intellect knows the Divine essence more or less perfectly in
proportion as it receives a greater or lesser light of glory. Since
therefore the created light of glory received into any created
intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly impossible for any created
intellect to know God in an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible
that it should comprehend God.

Reply to Objection 1: "Comprehension" is twofold: in one sense it is
taken strictly and properly, according as something is included in the
one comprehending; and thus in no way is God comprehended either by
intellect, or in any other way; forasmuch as He is infinite and cannot
be included in any finite being; so that no finite being can contain
Him infinitely, in the degree of His own infinity. In this sense we now
take comprehension. But in another sense "comprehension" is taken more
largely as opposed to "non-attainment"; for he who attains to anyone is
said to comprehend him when he attains to him. And in this sense God is
comprehended by the blessed, according to the words, "I held him, and I
will not let him go" (Cant 3:4); in this sense also are to be
understood the words quoted from the Apostle concerning comprehension.
And in this way "comprehension" is one of the three prerogatives of the
soul, responding to hope, as vision responds to faith, and fruition
responds to charity. For even among ourselves not everything seen is
held or possessed, forasmuch as things either appear sometimes afar
off, or they are not in our power of attainment. Neither, again, do we
always enjoy what we possess; either because we find no pleasure in
them, or because such things are not the ultimate end of our desire, so
as to satisfy and quell it. But the blessed possess these three things
in God; because they see Him, and in seeing Him, possess Him as
present, having the power to see Him always; and possessing Him, they
enjoy Him as the ultimate fulfilment of desire.

Reply to Objection 2: God is called incomprehensible not because
anything of Him is not seen; but because He is not seen as perfectly as
He is capable of being seen; thus when any demonstrable proposition is
known by probable reason only, it does not follow that any part of it
is unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the composition;
but that it is not as perfectly known as it is capable of being known.
Hence Augustine, in his definition of comprehension, says the whole is
comprehended when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden
from the seer, or when its boundaries can be completely viewed or
traced; for the boundaries of a thing are said to be completely
surveyed when the end of the knowledge of it is attained.

Reply to Objection 3: The word "wholly" denotes a mode of the object;
not that the whole object does not come under knowledge, but that the
mode of the object is not the mode of the one who knows. Therefore he
who sees God's essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely, and is
infinitely knowable; nevertheless, this infinite mode does not extend
to enable the knower to know infinitely; thus, for instance, a person
can have a probable opinion that a proposition is demonstrable,
although he himself does not know it as demonstrated.
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Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God?

Objection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God see all
things in God. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv): "What do they not see,
who see Him Who sees all things? " But God sees all things. Therefore
those who see God see all things.

Objection 2: Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees what is reflected in
the mirror. But all actual or possible things shine forth in God as in
a mirror; for He knows all things in Himself. Therefore whoever sees
God, sees all actual things in Him, and also all possible things.

Objection 3: Further, whoever understands the greater, can understand
the least, as is said in De Anima iii. But all that God does, or can
do, are less than His essence. Therefore whoever understands God, can
understand all that God does, or can do.

Objection 4: Further, the rational creature naturally desires to know
all things. Therefore if in seeing God it does not know all things, its
natural desire will not rest satisfied; thus, in seeing God it will not
be fully happy; which is incongruous. Therefore he who sees God knows
all things.

On the contrary, The angels see the essence of God; and yet do not know
all things. For as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), "the inferior
angels are cleansed from ignorance by the superior angels. " Also they
are ignorant of future contingent things, and of secret thoughts; for
this knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore whosoever sees the
essence of God, does not know all things.

I answer that, The created intellect, in seeing the divine essence,
does not see in it all that God does or can do. For it is manifest that
things are seen in God as they are in Him. But all other things are in
God as effects are in the power of their cause. Therefore all things
are seen in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is clear that
the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects can be seen
in it. For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon as one
demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge of
many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a weaker intellect, for he
needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect can
know all the effects of a cause and the reasons for those effects in
the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no created
intellect can comprehend God wholly, as shown above [57](A[7]).
Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know all that God does
or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power; but of what God
does or can do any intellect can know the more, the more perfectly it
sees God.

Reply to Objection 1: Gregory speaks as regards the object being
sufficient, namely, God, who in Himself sufficiently contains and shows
forth all things; but it does not follow that whoever sees God knows
all things, for he does not perfectly comprehend Him.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not necessary that whoever sees a mirror
should see all that is in the mirror, unless his glance comprehends the
mirror itself.

Reply to Objection 3: Although it is more to see God than to see all
things else, still it is a greater thing to see Him so that all things
are known in Him, than to see Him in such a way that not all things,
but the fewer or the more, are known in Him. For it has been shown in
this article that the more things are known in God according as He is
seen more or less perfectly.

Reply to Objection 4: The natural desire of the rational creature is to
know everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect,
namely, the species and the genera of things and their types, and these
everyone who sees the Divine essence will see in God. But to know other
singulars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to the
perfection of the created intellect nor does its natural desire go out
to these things; neither, again, does it desire to know things that
exist not as yet, but which God can call into being. Yet if God alone
were seen, Who is the fount and principle of all being and of all
truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that nothing
else would be desired, and the seer would be completely beatified.
Hence Augustine says (Confess. v): "Unhappy the man who knoweth all
these" (i. e. all creatures) "and knoweth not Thee! but happy whoso
knoweth Thee although he know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee
and them is not the happier for them, but for Thee alone. "
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Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen
through any similitude?

Objection 1: It seems that what is seen in God by those who see the
Divine essence, is seen by means of some similitude. For every kind of
knowledge comes about by the knower being assimilated to the object
known. For thus the intellect in act becomes the actual intelligible,
and the sense in act becomes the actual sensible, inasmuch as it is
informed by a similitude of the object, as the eye by the similitude of
color. Therefore if the intellect of one who sees the Divine essence
understands any creatures in God, it must be informed by their
similitudes.

Objection 2: Further, what we have seen, we keep in memory. But Paul,
seeing the essence of God whilst in ecstasy, when he had ceased to see
the Divine essence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 28,34),
remembered many of the things he had seen in the rapture; hence he
said: "I have heard secret words which it is not granted to man to
utter" (2 Cor. 12:4). Therefore it must be said that certain
similitudes of what he remembered, remained in his mind; and in the
same way, when he actually saw the essence of God, he had certain
similitudes or ideas of what he actually saw in it.

On the contrary, A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one
likeness. But all things are seen in God as in an intelligible mirror.
Therefore if God Himself is not seen by any similitude but by His own
essence, neither are the things seen in Him seen by any similitudes or
ideas.

I answer that, Those who see the divine essence see what they see in
God not by any likeness, but by the divine essence itself united to
their intellect. For each thing is known in so far as its likeness is
in the one who knows. Now this takes place in two ways. For as things
which are like one and the same thing are like to each other, the
cognitive faculty can be assimilated to any knowable object in two
ways. In one way it is assimilated by the object itself, when it is
directly informed by a similitude, and then the object is known in
itself. In another way when informed by a similitude which resembles
the object; and in this way, the knowledge is not of the thing in
itself, but of the thing in its likeness. For the knowledge of a man in
himself differs from the knowledge of him in his image. Hence to know
things thus by their likeness in the one who knows, is to know them in
themselves or in their own nature; whereas to know them by their
similitudes pre-existing in God, is to see them in God. Now there is a
difference between these two kinds of knowledge. Hence, according to
the knowledge whereby things are known by those who see the essence of
God, they are seen in God Himself not by any other similitudes but by
the Divine essence alone present to the intellect; by which also God
Himself is seen.

Reply to Objection 1: The created intellect of one who sees God is
assimilated to what is seen in God, inasmuch as it is united to the
Divine essence, in which the similitudes of all things pre-exist.

Reply to Objection 2: Some of the cognitive faculties form other images
from those first conceived; thus the imagination from the preconceived
images of a mountain and of gold can form the likeness of a golden
mountain; and the intellect, from the preconceived ideas of genus and
difference, forms the idea of species; in like manner from the
similitude of an image we can form in our minds the similitude of the
original of the image. Thus Paul, or any other person who sees God, by
the very vision of the divine essence, can form in himself the
similitudes of what is seen in the divine essence, which remained in
Paul even when he had ceased to see the essence of God. Still this kind
of vision whereby things are seen by this likeness thus conceived, is
not the same as that whereby things are seen in God.
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Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the same
time?

Objection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God do not see
all they see in Him at one and the same time. For according to the
Philosopher (Topic. ii): "It may happen that many things are known, but
only one is understood. " But what is seen in God, is understood; for
God is seen by the intellect. Therefore those who see God do not see
all in Him at the same time.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 22,23), "God
moves the spiritual creature according to time"---i. e. by intelligence
and affection. But the spiritual creature is the angel who sees God.
Therefore those who see God understand and are affected successively;
for time means succession.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xvi): "Our thoughts will not
be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another; but we shall
see all we know at one glance. "

I answer that, What is seen in the Word is seen not successively, but
at the same time. In proof whereof, we ourselves cannot know many
things all at once, forasmuch as understand many things by means of
many ideas. But our intellect cannot be actually informed by many
diverse ideas at the same time, so as to understand by them; as one
body cannot bear different shapes simultaneously. Hence, when many
things can be understood by one idea, they are understood at the same
time; as the parts of a whole are understood successively, and not all
at the same time, if each one is understood by its own idea; whereas if
all are understood under the one idea of the whole, they are understood
simultaneously. Now it was shown above that things seen in God, are not
seen singly by their own similitude; but all are seen by the one
essence of God. Hence they are seen simultaneously, and not
successively.

Reply to Objection 1: We understand one thing only when we understand
by one idea; but many things understood by one idea are understood
simultaneously, as in the idea of a man we understand "animal" and
"rational"; and in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the
roof.

Reply to Objection 2: As regards their natural knowledge, whereby they
know things by diverse ideas given them, the angels do not know all
things simultaneously, and thus they are moved in the act of
understanding according to time; but as regards what they see in God,
they see all at the same time.
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Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?

Objection 1: It seems that one can in this life see the Divine essence.
For Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face" (Gn. 32:30). But to see
Him face to face is to see His essence, as appears from the words: "We
see now in a glass and in a dark manner, but then face to face" (1 Cor.
13:12).

Objection 2: Further, the Lord said to Moses: "I speak to him mouth to
mouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see the
Lord" (Num. 12:8); but this is to see God in His essence. Therefore it
is possible to see the essence of God in this life.

Objection 3: Further, that wherein we know all other things, and
whereby we judge of other things, is known in itself to us. But even
now we know all things in God; for Augustine says (Confess. viii): "If
we both see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say
is true; where, I ask, do we see this? neither I in thee, nor thou in
me; but both of us in the very incommutable truth itself above our
minds. " He also says (De Vera Relig. xxx) that, "We judge of all things
according to the divine truth"; and (De Trin. xii) that, "it is the
duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things according to the
incorporeal and eternal ideas; which unless they were above the mind
could not be incommutable. " Therefore even in this life we see God
Himself.

Objection 4: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24,
25), those things that are in the soul by their essence are seen by
intellectual vision. But intellectual vision is of intelligible things,
not by similitudes, but by their very essences, as he also says (Gen.
ad lit. xiii, 24,25). Therefore since God is in our soul by His
essence, it follows that He is seen by us in His essence.

On the contrary, It is written, "Man shall not see Me, and live" (Ex.
32:20), and a gloss upon this says, "In this mortal life God can be
seen by certain images, but not by the likeness itself of His own
nature. "

I answer that, God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human being,
except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is because, as
was said above [58](A[4]), the mode of knowledge follows the mode of
the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live in this
life, has its being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only
what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form. Now it
is evident that the Divine essence cannot be known through the nature
of material things. For it was shown above ([59]AA[2],9) that the
knowledge of God by means of any created similitude is not the vision
of His essence. Hence it is impossible for the soul of man in this life
to see the essence of God. This can be seen in the fact that the more
our soul is abstracted from corporeal things, the more it is capable of
receiving abstract intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations
of the bodily senses divine revelations and foresight of future events
are perceived the more clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the
soul in this mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of
intelligible objects, i. e. to the divine essence.

Reply to Objection 1: According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier.