Objection
1: It would seem that no religious order should be
established for the works of the active life.
established for the works of the active life.
Summa Theologica
If, however, these motives
of necessity and profit be lacking, the weak might possibly be
scandalized thereby; and this should be avoided. Yet the same scandal
might be occasioned through those who live in idleness on the common
revenues.
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Whether it is lawful for religious to beg?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to beg. For Augustine
says (De oper. Monach. xxviii): "The most cunning foe has scattered on
all sides a great number of hypocrites wearing the monastic habit, who
go wandering about the country," and afterwards he adds: "They all ask,
they all demand to be supported in their profitable penury, or to be
paid for a pretended holiness. " Therefore it would seem that the life
of mendicant religious is to be condemned.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Thess. 4:11): "That you . . .
work with your own hands as we commanded you, and that you walk
honestly towards them that are without: and that you want nothing of
any man's": and a gloss on this passage says: "You must work and not be
idle, because work is both honorable and a light to the unbeliever: and
you must not covet that which belongs to another and much less beg or
take anything. " Again a gloss [*St. Augustine, (De oper. Monach. iii)]
on 2 Thess. 3:10, "If any man will not work," etc. says: "He wishes the
servants of God to work with the body, so as to gain a livelihood, and
not be compelled by want to ask for necessaries. " Now this is to beg.
Therefore it would seem unlawful to beg while omitting to work with
one's hands.
Objection 3: Further, that which is forbidden by law and contrary to
justice, is unbecoming to religious. Now begging is forbidden in the
divine law; for it is written (Dt. 15:4): "There shall be no poor nor
beggar among you," and (Ps. 36:25): "I have not seen the just forsaken,
nor his seed seeking bread. " Moreover an able-bodied mendicant is
punished by civil law, according to the law (XI, xxvi, de Valid.
Mendicant. ). Therefore it is unfitting for religious to beg.
Objection 4: Further, "Shame is about that which is disgraceful," as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15). Now Ambrose says (De Offic. i,
30) that "to be ashamed to beg is a sign of good birth. " Therefore it
is disgraceful to beg: and consequently this is unbecoming to
religious.
Objection 5: Further, according to our Lord's command it is especially
becoming to preachers of the Gospel to live on alms, as stated above
[3809](A[4]). Yet it is not becoming that they should beg, since a
gloss on 2 Tim. 2:6, "The husbandman, that laboreth," etc. says: "The
Apostle wishes the gospeler to understand that to accept necessaries
from those among whom he labors is not mendicancy but a right. "
Therefore it would seem unbecoming for religious to beg.
On the contrary, It becomes religious to live in imitation of Christ.
Now Christ was a mendicant, according to Ps. 39:18, "But I am a beggar
and poor"; where a gloss says: "Christ said this of Himself as bearing
the 'form of a servant,'" and further on: "A beggar is one who entreats
another, and a poor man is one who has not enough for himself. " Again
it is written (Ps. 69:6): "I am needy and poor"; where a gloss says:
"'Needy,' that is a suppliant; 'and poor,' that is, not having enough
for myself, because I have no worldly wealth. " And Jerome says in a
letter [*Reference unknown]: "Beware lest whereas thy Lord," i. e.
Christ, "begged, thou amass other people's wealth. " Therefore it
becomes religious to beg.
I answer that, Two things may be considered in reference to mendicancy.
The first is on the part of the act itself of begging, which has a
certain abasement attaching to it; since of all men those would seem
most abased who are not only poor, but are so needy that they have to
receive their meat from others. In this way some deserve praise for
begging out of humility, just as they abase themselves in other ways,
as being the most efficacious remedy against pride which they desire to
quench either in themselves or in others by their example. For just as
a disease that arises from excessive heat is most efficaciously healed
by things that excel in cold, so proneness to pride is most
efficaciously healed by those things which savor most of abasement.
Hence it is said in the Decretals (II, cap. Si quis semel, de
Paenitentia): "To condescend to the humblest duties, and to devote
oneself to the lowliest service is an exercise of humility; for thus
one is able to heal the disease of pride and human glory. " Hence Jerome
praises Fabiola (Ep. lxxvii ad ocean. ) for that she desired "to receive
alms, having poured forth all her wealth for Christ's sake. " The
Blessed Alexis acted in like manner, for, having renounced all his
possessions for Christ's sake he rejoiced in receiving alms even from
his own servants. It is also related of the Blessed Arsenius in the
Lives of the Fathers (v, 6) that he gave thanks because he was forced
by necessity to ask for alms. Hence it is enjoined to some people as a
penance for grievous sins to go on a pilgrimage begging. Since,
however, humility like the other virtues should not be without
discretion, it behooves one to be discreet in becoming a mendicant for
the purpose of humiliation, lest a man thereby incur the mark of
covetousness or of anything else unbecoming. Secondly, mendicancy may
be considered on the part of that which one gets by begging: and thus a
man may be led to beg by a twofold motive. First, by the desire to have
wealth or meat without working for it, and such like mendicancy is
unlawful; secondly, by a motive of necessity or usefulness. The motive
is one of necessity if a man has no other means of livelihood save
begging; and it is a motive of usefulness if he wishes to accomplish
something useful, and is unable to do so without the alms of the
faithful. Thus alms are besought for the building of a bridge, or
church, or for any other work whatever that is conducive to the common
good: thus scholars may seek alms that they may devote themselves to
the study of wisdom. In this way mendicancy is lawful to religious no
less than to seculars.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there explicitly of those
who beg from motives of covetousness.
Reply to Objection 2: The first gloss speaks of begging from motives of
covetousness, as appears from the words of the Apostle; while the
second gloss speaks of those who without effecting any useful purpose,
beg their livelihood in order to live in idleness. on the other hand,
he lives not idly who in any way lives usefully.
Reply to Objection 3: This precept of the divine law does not forbid
anyone to beg, but it forbids the rich to be so stingy that some are
compelled by necessity to beg. The civil law imposes a penalty on
able-bodied mendicants who beg from motives neither of utility nor of
necessity.
Reply to Objection 4: Disgrace is twofold; one arises from lack of
honesty [*Cf. [3810] Q[145], A[1]], the other from an external defect,
thus it is disgraceful for a man to be sick or poor. Such like
uncomeliness of mendicancy does not pertain to sin, but it may pertain
to humility, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 5: Preachers have the right to be fed by those to
whom they preach: yet if they wish to seek this by begging so as to
receive it as a free gift and not as a right this will be a mark of
greater humility.
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Whether it is lawful for religious to wear coarser clothes than others?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to wear coarser
clothes than others. For according to the Apostle (1 Thess. 5:22) we
ought to "refrain from all appearance of evil. " Now coarseness of
clothes has an appearance of evil; for our Lord said (Mat. 7:15):
"Beware of false prophets who come to you in the clothing of sheep":
and a gloss on Apoc. 6:8, "Behold a pale horse," says: "The devil
finding that he cannot succeed, neither by outward afflictions nor by
manifest heresies, sends in advance false brethren, who under the guise
of religion assume the characteristics of the black and red horses by
corrupting the faith. " Therefore it would seem that religious should
not wear coarse clothes.
Objection 2: Further, Jerome says (Ep. lii ad Nepotian. ): "Avoid
somber," i. e. black, "equally with glittering apparel. Fine and coarse
clothes are equally to be shunned, for the one exhales pleasure, the
other vainglory. " Therefore, since vainglory is a graver sin than the
use of pleasure, it would seem that religious who should aim at what is
more perfect ought to avoid coarse rather than fine clothes.
Objection 3: Further, religious should aim especially at doing works of
penance. Now in works of penance we should use, not outward signs of
sorrow, but rather signs of joy; for our Lord said (Mat. 6:16): "When
you fast, be not, as the hypocrites, sad," and afterwards He added:
"But thou, when thou fastest, anoint thy head and wash thy face. "
Augustine commenting on these words (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12):
"In this chapter we must observe that not only the glare and pomp of
outward things, but even the weeds of mourning may be a subject of
ostentation, all the more dangerous as being a decoy under the guise of
God's service. " Therefore seemingly religious ought not to wear coarse
clothes.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:37): "They wandered about in
sheep-skins in goat-skins," and a gloss adds---"as Elias and others. "
Moreover it is said in the Decretal XXI, qu. iv, can. Omnis jactantia:
"If any persons be found to deride those who wear coarse and religious
apparel they must be reproved. For in the early times all those who
were consecrated to God went about in common and coarse apparel. "
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12), "in all
external things, it is not the use but the intention of the user that
is at fault. " In order to judge of this it is necessary to observe that
coarse and homely apparel may be considered in two ways. First, as
being a sign of a man's disposition or condition, because according to
Ecclus. 19:27, "the attire . . . of the man" shows "what he is. " In
this way coarseness of attire is sometimes a sign of sorrow: wherefore
those who are beset with sorrow are wont to wear coarser clothes, just
as on the other hand in times of festivity and joy they wear finer
clothes. Hence penitents make use of coarse apparel, for example, the
king (Jonah 3:6) who "was clothed with sack-cloth," and Achab (3 Kings
21:27) who "put hair-cloth upon his flesh. " Sometimes, however, it is a
sign of the contempt of riches and worldly ostentation. Wherefore
Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustico Monach. ): "Let your somber attire
indicate your purity of mind, your coarse robe prove your contempt of
the world, yet so that your mind be not inflated withal, lest your
speech belie your habit. " In both these ways it is becoming for
religious to wear coarse attire, since religion is a state of penance
and of contempt of worldly glory.
But that a person wish to signify this to others arises from three
motives. First, in order to humble himself: for just as a man's mind is
uplifted by fine clothes, so is it humbled by lowly apparel. Hence
speaking of Achab who "put hair-cloth on his flesh," the Lord said to
Elias: "Hast thou not seen Achab humbled before Me? " (3 Kings 21:29).
Secondly, in order to set an example to others; wherefore a gloss on
Mat. 3:4, "(John) had his garments of camel's hair," says: "He who
preaches penance is clothed in the habit of penance. " Thirdly, on
account of vainglory; thus Augustine says (cf. OBJ[3]) that "even the
weeds of mourning may be a subject of ostentation. "
Accordingly in the first two ways it is praiseworthy to wear humble
apparel, but in the third way it is sinful.
Secondly, coarse and homely attire may be considered as the result of
covetousness or negligence, and thus also it is sinful.
Reply to Objection 1: Coarseness of attire has not of itself the
appearance of evil, indeed it has more the appearance of good, namely
of the contempt of worldly glory. Hence it is that wicked persons hide
their wickedness under coarse clothing. Hence Augustine says (De Serm.
Dom. in Monte ii, 24) that "the sheep should not dislike their clothing
for the reason that the wolves sometimes hide themselves under it. "
Reply to Objection 2: Jerome is speaking there of the coarse attire
that is worn on account of human glory.
Reply to Objection 3: According to our Lord's teaching men should do no
deeds of holiness for the sake of show: and this is especially the case
when one does something strange. Hence Chrysostom [*Hom. xiii in Matth.
in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says:
"While praying a man should do nothing strange, so as to draw the gaze
of others, either by shouting or striking his breast, or casting up his
hands," because the very strangeness draws people's attention to him.
Yet blame does not attach to all strange behavior that draws people's
attention, for it may be done well or ill. Hence Augustine says (De
Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12) that "in the practice of the Christian
religion when a man draws attention to himself by unwonted squalor and
shabbiness, since he acts thus voluntarily and not of necessity, we can
gather from his other deeds whether his behavior is motivated by
contempt of excessive dress or by affectation. " Religious, however,
would especially seem not to act thus from affectation, since they wear
a coarse habit as a sign of their profession whereby they profess
contempt of the world.
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OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the different kinds of religious life, and under
this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are different kinds of religious life or only one?
(2) Whether a religious order can be established for the works of the
active life?
(3) Whether a religious order can be directed to soldiering?
(4) Whether a religious order can be established for preaching and the
exercise of like works?
(5) Whether a religious order can be established for the study of
science?
(6) Whether a religious order that is directed to the contemplative
life is more excellent than one that is directed to the active life?
(7) Whether religious perfection is diminished by possessing something
in common?
(8) Whether the religious life of solitaries is to be preferred to the
religious life of those who live in community?
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Whether there is only one religious order?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one religious order. For
there can be no diversity in that which is possessed wholly and
perfectly; wherefore there can be only one sovereign good, as stated in
the [3811]FP, Q[6] , AA[2],3,4. Now as Gregory says (Hom. xx in
Ezech. ), "when a man vows to Almighty God all that he has, all his
life, all his knowledge, it is a holocaust," without which there is no
religious life. Therefore it would seem that there are not many
religious orders but only one.
Objection 2: Further, things which agree in essentials differ only
accidentally. Now there is no religious order without the three
essential vows of religion, as stated above ([3812]Q[186], AA[6],7).
Therefore it would seem that religious orders differ not specifically,
but only accidentally.
Objection 3: Further, the state of perfection is competent both to
religious and to bishops, as stated above ([3813]Q[185], AA[5],7). Now
the episcopate is not diversified specifically, but is one wherever it
may be; wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxlvi ad Evan. ): "Wherever a bishop
is, whether at Rome, or Gubbio, or Constantinople, or Reggio, he has
the same excellence, the same priesthood. " Therefore in like manner
there is but one religious order.
Objection 4: Further, anything that may lead to confusion should be
removed from the Church. Now it would seem that a diversity of
religious orders might confuse the Christian people, as stated in the
Decretal de Statu Monach. et Canon. Reg. [*Cap. Ne Nimia, de Relig.
Dom. ]. Therefore seemingly there ought not to be different religious
orders.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 44:10) that it pertains to the
adornment of the queen that she is "surrounded with variety. "
I answer that, As stated above (Q[186], A, 7;[3814] Q[187], A[2]), the
religious state is a training school wherein one aims by practice at
the perfection of charity. Now there are various works of charity to
which a man may devote himself; and there are also various kinds of
exercise. Wherefore religious orders may be differentiated in two ways.
First, according to the different things to which they may be directed:
thus one may be directed to the lodging of pilgrims, another to
visiting or ransoming captives. Secondly, there may be various
religious orders according to the diversity of practices; thus in one
religious order the body is chastised by abstinence in food, in another
by the practice of manual labor, scantiness of clothes, or the like.
Since, however, the end imports most in every matter, [*Arist. , Topic.
vi 8] religious orders differ more especially according to their
various ends than according to their various practices.
Reply to Objection 1: The obligation to devote oneself wholly to God's
service is common to every religious order; hence religious do not
differ in this respect, as though in one religious order a person
retained some one thing of his own, and in another order some other
thing. But the difference is in respect of the different things wherein
one may serve God, and whereby a man may dispose himself to the service
of God.
Reply to Objection 2: The three essential vows of religion pertain to
the practice of religion as principles to which all other matters are
reduced, as stated above ([3815]Q[186], A[7]). But there are various
ways of disposing oneself to the observance of each of them. For
instance one disposes oneself to observe the vow of continence, by
solitude of place, by abstinence, by mutual fellowship, and by many
like means. Accordingly it is evident that the community of the
essential vows is compatible with diversity of religious life, both on
account of the different dispositions and on account of the different
ends, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: In matters relating to perfection, the bishop
stands in the position of agent, and the religious as passive, as
stated above ([3816]Q[184], A[7]). Now the agent, even in natural
things, the higher it is, is so much the more one, whereas the things
that are passive are various. Hence with reason the episcopal state is
one, while religious orders are many.
Reply to Objection 4: Confusion is opposed to distinction and order.
Accordingly the multitude of religious orders would lead to confusion,
if different religious orders were directed to the same end and in the
same way, without necessity or utility. Wherefore to prevent this
happening it has been wholesomely forbidden to establish a new
religious order without the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff.
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Whether a religious order should be established for the works of the active
life?
Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order should be
established for the works of the active life. For every religious order
belongs to the state of perfection, as stated above ([3817]Q[184],
A[5];[3818] Q[186], A[1]). Now the perfection of the religious state
consists in the contemplation of divine things. For Dionysius says
(Eccl. Hier. vi) that they are "called servants of God by reason of
their rendering pure service and subjection to God, and on account of
the indivisible and singular life which unites them by holy
reflections," i. e. contemplations, "on invisible things, to the Godlike
unity and the perfection beloved of God. " Therefore seemingly no
religious order should be established for the works of the active life.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly the same judgment applies to canons
regular as to monks, according to Extra, De Postul. , cap. Ex parte; and
De Statu Monach. , cap. Quod Dei timorem: for it is stated that "they
are not considered to be separated from the fellowship of monks": and
the same would seem to apply to all other religious. Now the monastic
rule was established for the purpose of the contemplative life;
wherefore Jerome says (Ep. lviii ad Paulin. ): "If you wish to be what
you are called, a monk," i. e. a solitary, "what business have you in a
city? " The same is found stated in Extra, De Renuntiatione, cap. Nisi
cum pridem; and De Regular. , cap. Licet quibusdam. Therefore it would
seem that every religious order is directed to the contemplative life,
and none to the active life.
Objection 3: Further, the active life is concerned with the present
world. Now all religious are said to renounce the world; wherefore
Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech. ): "He who renounces this world, and
does all the good he can, is like one who has gone out of Egypt and
offers sacrifice in the wilderness. " Therefore it would seem that no
religious order can be directed to the active life.
On the contrary, It is written (James 1:27): "Religion clean and
undefiled before God and the Father, is this: to visit the fatherless
and widows in their tribulation. " Now this belongs to the active life.
Therefore religious life can be fittingly directed to the active life.
I answer that, As stated above [3819](A[1]), the religious state is
directed to the perfection of charity, which extends to the love of God
and of our neighbor. Now the contemplative life which seeks to devote
itself to God alone belongs directly to the love of God, while the
active life, which ministers to our neighbor's needs, belongs directly
to the love of one's neighbor. And just as out of charity we love our
neighbor for God's sake, so the services we render our neighbor redound
to God, according to Mat. 25:40, "What you have done [Vulg. : 'As long
as you did it'] to one of these My least brethren, you did it to Me. "
Consequently those services which we render our neighbor, in so far as
we refer them to God, are described as sacrifices, according to Heb.
13:16, "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices
God's favor is obtained. " And since it belongs properly to religion to
offer sacrifice to God, as stated above (Q[81], A[1], ad 1; A[4], ad
1), it follows that certain religious orders are fittingly directed to
the works of the active life. Wherefore in the Conferences of the
Fathers (Coll. xiv, 4) the Abbot Nesteros in distinguishing the various
aims of religious orders says: "Some direct their intention exclusively
to the hidden life of the desert and purity of heart; some are occupied
with the instruction of the brethren and the care of the monasteries;
while others delight in the service of the guesthouse," i. e. in
hospitality.
Reply to Objection 1: Service and subjection rendered to God are not
precluded by the works of the active life, whereby a man serves his
neighbor for God's sake, as stated in the Article. Nor do these works
preclude singularity of life; not that they involve man's living apart
from his fellow-men, but in the sense that each man individually
devotes himself to things pertaining to the service of God; and since
religious occupy themselves with the works of the active life for God's
sake, it follows that their action results from their contemplation of
divine things. Hence they are not entirely deprived of the fruit of the
contemplative life.
Reply to Objection 2: The same judgment applies to monks and to all
other religious, as regards things common to all religious orders: for
instance as regards their devoting themselves wholly to the divine
service, their observance of the essential vows of religion, and their
refraining from worldly business. But it does not follow that this
likeness extends to other things that are proper to the monastic
profession, and are directed especially to the contemplative life.
Hence in the aforesaid Decretal, De Postulando, it is not simply stated
that "the same judgment applies to canons regular" as "to monks," but
that it applies "in matters already mentioned," namely that "they are
not to act as advocates in lawsuits. " Again the Decretal quoted, De
Statu Monach. , after the statement that "canons regular are not
considered to be separated from the fellowship of monks," goes on to
say: "Nevertheless they obey an easier rule. " Hence it is evident that
they are not bound to all that monks are bound.
Reply to Objection 3: A man may be in the world in two ways: in one way
by his bodily presence, in another way by the bent of his mind. Hence
our Lord said to His disciples (Jn. 15:19): "I have chosen you out of
the world," and yet speaking of them to His Father He said (Jn. 17:11):
"These are in the world, and I come to Thee. " Although, then, religious
who are occupied with the works of the active life are in the world as
to the presence of the body, they are not in the world as regards their
bent of mind, because they are occupied with external things, not as
seeking anything of the world, but merely for the sake of serving God:
for "they . . . use this world, as if they used it not," to quote 1
Cor. 7:31. Hence (James 1:27) after it is stated that "religion clean
and undefiled . . . is . . . to visit the fatherless and widows in
their tribulation," it is added, "and to keep one's self unspotted from
this world," namely to avoid being attached to worldly things.
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Whether a religious order can be directed to soldiering?
Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order can be directed to
soldiering. For all religious orders belong to the state of perfection.
Now our Lord said with reference to the perfection of Christian life
(Mat. 5:39): "I say to you not to resist evil; but if one strike thee
on the right cheek, turn to him also the other," which is inconsistent
with the duties of a soldier. Therefore no religious order can be
established for soldiering.
Objection 2: Further, the bodily encounter of the battlefield is more
grievous than the encounter in words that takes place between counsel
at law. Yet religious are forbidden to plead at law, as appears from
the Decretal De Postulando quoted above (A[2], OBJ[2]). Therefore it is
much less seemly for a religious order to be established for
soldiering.
Objection 3: Further, the religious state is a state of penance, as we
have said above ([3820]Q[187], A[6]). Now according to the code of laws
soldiering is forbidden to penitents. for it is said in the Decretal De
Poenit. , Dist. v, cap. 3: "It is altogether opposed to the rules of the
Church, to return to worldly soldiering after doing penance. " Therefore
it is unfitting for any religious order to be established for
soldiering.
Objection 4: Further, no religious order may be established for an
unjust object. But as Isidore says (Etym. xviii, 1), "A just war is one
that is waged by order of the emperor. " Since then religious are
private individuals, it would seem unlawful for them to wage war; and
consequently no religious order may be established for this purpose.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. clxxxix; ad Bonifac. ), "Beware of
thinking that none of those can please God who handle war-like weapons.
Of such was holy David to whom the Lord gave great testimony. " Now
religious orders are established in order that men may please God.
Therefore nothing hinders the establishing of a religious order for the
purpose of soldiering.
I answer that, As stated above [3821](A[2]), a religious order may be
established not only for the works of the contemplative life, but also
for the works of the active life, in so far as they are concerned in
helping our neighbor and in the service of God, but not in so far as
they are directed to a worldly object. Now the occupation of soldiering
may be directed to the assistance of our neighbor, not only as regards
private individuals, but also as regards the defense of the whole
commonwealth. Hence it is said of Judas Machabeus (1 Macc. 3:2,3) that
"he [Vulg. : 'they'] fought with cheerfulness the battle of Israel, and
he got his people great honor. " It can also be directed to the upkeep
of divine worship, wherefore (1 Macc. 3:21) Judas is stated to have
said: "We will fight for our lives and our laws," and further on (1
Macc. 13:3) Simon said: "You know what great battles I and my brethren,
and the house of my father, have fought for the laws and the
sanctuary. "
Hence a religious order may be fittingly established for soldiering,
not indeed for any worldly purpose, but for the defense of divine
worship and public safety, or also of the poor and oppressed, according
to Ps. 81:4: "Rescue the poor, and deliver the needy out of the hand of
the sinner. "
Reply to Objection 1: Not to resist evil may be understood in two ways.
First, in the sense of forgiving the wrong done to oneself, and thus it
may pertain to perfection, when it is expedient to act thus for the
spiritual welfare of others. Secondly, in the sense of tolerating
patiently the wrongs done to others: and this pertains to imperfection,
or even to vice, if one be able to resist the wrongdoer in a becoming
manner. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 27): "The courage whereby a
man in battle defends his country against barbarians, or protects the
weak at home, or his friends against robbers is full of justice": even
so our Lord says in the passage quoted [*Lk. 6:30 "Of him that taketh
away thy goods, ask them not again"; Cf. Mat. 5:40], " . . . thy goods,
ask them not again. " If, however, a man were not to demand the return
of that which belongs to another, he would sin if it were his business
to do so: for it is praiseworthy to give away one's own, but not
another's property. And much less should the things of God be
neglected, for as Chrysostom [*Hom. v in Matth. in the Opus
Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says, "it is most
wicked to overlook the wrongs done to God. "
Reply to Objection 2: It is inconsistent with any religious order to
act as counsel at law for a worldly object, but it is not inconsistent
to do so at the orders of one's superior and in favor of one's
monastery, as stated in the same Decretal, or for the defense of the
poor and widows. Wherefore it is said in the Decretals (Dist. lxxxviii,
cap. 1): "The holy synod has decreed that henceforth no cleric is to
buy property or occupy himself with secular business, save with a view
to the care of the fatherless . . . and widows. " Likewise to be a
soldier for the sake of some worldly object is contrary to all
religious life, but this does not apply to those who are soldiers for
the sake of God's service.
Reply to Objection 3: Worldly soldiering is forbidden to penitents, but
the soldiering which is directed to the service of God is imposed as a
penance on some people, as in the case of those upon whom it is
enjoined to take arms in defense of the Holy Land.
Reply to Objection 4: The establishment of a religious order for the
purpose of soldiering does not imply that the religious can wage war on
their own authority; but they can do so only on the authority of the
sovereign or of the Church.
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Whether a religious order can be established for preaching or hearing
confessions?
Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order may be established
for preaching, or hearing confessions. For it is said (VII, qu. i
[*Cap. Hoc nequaquam; Cf. [3822] Q[187], A[1], OBJ[1]]): "The monastic
life is one of subjection and discipleship, not of teaching, authority,
or pastoral care," and the same apparently applies to religious. Now
preaching and hearing confessions are the actions of a pastor and
teacher. Therefore a religious order should not be established for this
purpose.
Objection 2: Further, the purpose for which a religious order is
established would seem to be something most proper to the religious
life, as stated above [3823](A[1]). Now the aforesaid actions are not
proper to religious but to bishops. Therefore a religious order should
not be established for the purpose of such actions.
Objection 3: Further, it seems unfitting that the authority to preach
and hear confessions should be committed to an unlimited number of men;
and there is no fixed number of those who are received into a religious
order. Therefore it is unfitting for a religious order to be
established for the purpose of the aforesaid actions.
Objection 4: Further, preachers have a right to receive their
livelihood from the faithful of Christ, according to 1 Cor. 9. If then
the office of preaching be committed to a religious order established
for that purpose, it follows that the faithful of Christ are bound to
support an unlimited number of persons, which would be a heavy burden
on them. Therefore a religious order should not be established for the
exercise of these actions.
Objection 5: Further, the organization of the Church should be in
accordance with Christ's institution. Now Christ sent first the twelve
apostles to preach, as related in Luke 9, and afterwards He sent the
seventy-two disciples, as stated in Luke 10. Moreover, according to the
gloss of Bede on "And after these things" (Lk. 10:1), "the apostles are
represented by the bishops, the seventy-two disciples by the lesser
priests," i. e. the parish priests. Therefore in addition to bishops and
parish priests, no religious order should be established for the
purpose of preaching and hearing confessions.
On the contrary, In the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xiv, 4),
Abbot Nesteros, speaking of the various kinds of religious orders,
says: "Some choosing the care of the sick, others devoting themselves
to the relief of the afflicted and oppressed, or applying themselves to
teaching, or giving alms to the poor, have been most highly esteemed on
account of their devotion and piety. " Therefore just as a religious
order may be established for the care of the sick, so also may one be
established for teaching the people by preaching and like works.
I answer that, As stated above [3824](A[2]), it is fitting for a
religious order to be established for the works of the active life, in
so far as they are directed to the good of our neighbor, the service of
God, and the upkeep of divine worship. Now the good of our neighbor is
advanced by things pertaining to the spiritual welfare of the soul
rather than by things pertaining to the supplying of bodily needs, in
proportion to the excellence of spiritual over corporal things. Hence
it was stated above (Q[32], A[3]) that spiritual works of mercy surpass
corporal works of mercy. Moreover this is more pertinent to the service
of God, to Whom no sacrifice is more acceptable than zeal for souls, as
Gregory says (Hom. xii in Ezech. ). Furthermore, it is a greater thing
to employ spiritual arms in defending the faithful against the errors
of heretics and the temptations of the devil, than to protect the
faithful by means of bodily weapons. Therefore it is most fitting for a
religious order to be established for preaching and similar works
pertaining to the salvation of souls.
Reply to Objection 1: He who works by virtue of another, acts as an
instrument. And a minister is like an "animated instrument," as the
Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2 [*Cf. Ethic. viii, 11]). Hence if a man
preach or do something similar by the authority of his superiors, he
does not rise above the degree of "discipleship" or "subjection," which
is competent to religious.
Reply to Objection 2: Some religious orders are established for
soldiering, to wage war, not indeed on their own authority, but on that
of the sovereign or of the Church who are competent to wage war by
virtue of their office, as stated above (A[3], ad 4). In the same way
certain religious orders are established for preaching and hearing
confessions, not indeed by their own authority, but by the authority of
the higher and lower superiors, to whom these things belong by virtue
of their office. Consequently to assist one's superiors in such a
ministry is proper to a religious order of this kind.
Reply to Objection 3: Bishops do not allow these religious severally
and indiscriminately to preach or hear confessions, but according to
the discretion of the religious superiors, or according to their own
appointment.
Reply to Objection 4: The faithful are not bound by law to contribute
to the support of other than their ordinary prelates, who receive the
tithes and offerings of the faithful for that purpose, as well as other
ecclesiastical revenues. But if some men are willing to minister to the
faithful by exercising the aforesaid acts gratuitously, and without
demanding payment as of right, the faithful are not burdened thereby
because their temporal contributions can be liberally repaid by those
men, nor are they bound by law to contribute, but by charity, and yet
not so that they be burdened thereby and others eased, as stated in 2
Cor. 8:13. If, however, none be found to devote themselves gratuitously
to services of this kind, the ordinary prelate is bound, if he cannot
suffice by himself, to seek other suitable persons and support them
himself.
Reply to Objection 5: The seventy-two disciples are represented not
only by the parish priests, but by all those of lower order who in any
way assist the bishops in their office. For we do not read that our
Lord appointed the seventy-two disciples to certain fixed parishes, but
that "He sent them two and two before His face into every city and
place whither He Himself was to come. " It was fitting, however, that in
addition to the ordinary prelates others should be chosen for these
duties on account of the multitude of the faithful, and the difficulty
of finding a sufficient number of persons to be appointed to each
locality, just as it was necessary to establish religious orders for
military service, on account of the secular princes being unable to
cope with unbelievers in certain countries.
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Whether a religious order should be established for the purpose of study?
Objection 1: It would seem that a religious order should not be
established for the purpose of study. For it is written (Ps. 70:15,16):
"Because I have not known letters [Douay: 'learning'], I will enter
into the powers of the Lord," i. e. "Christian virtue," according to a
gloss. Now the perfection of Christian virtue, seemingly, pertains
especially to religious. Therefore it is not for them to apply
themselves to the study of letters.
Objection 2: Further, that which is a source of dissent is unbecoming
to religious, who are gathered together in the unity of peace. Now
study leads to dissent: wherefore different schools of thought arose
among the philosophers. Hence Jerome (Super Epist. ad Tit. 1:5) says:
"Before a diabolical instinct brought study into religion, and people
said: I am of Paul, I of Apollo, I of Cephas," etc. Therefore it would
seem that no religious order should be established for the purpose of
study.
Objection 3: Further, those who profess the Christian religion should
profess nothing in common with the Gentiles. Now among the Gentiles
were some who professed philosophy, and even now some secular persons
are known as professors of certain sciences. Therefore the study of
letters does not become religious.
On the contrary, Jerome (Ep.
of necessity and profit be lacking, the weak might possibly be
scandalized thereby; and this should be avoided. Yet the same scandal
might be occasioned through those who live in idleness on the common
revenues.
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Whether it is lawful for religious to beg?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to beg. For Augustine
says (De oper. Monach. xxviii): "The most cunning foe has scattered on
all sides a great number of hypocrites wearing the monastic habit, who
go wandering about the country," and afterwards he adds: "They all ask,
they all demand to be supported in their profitable penury, or to be
paid for a pretended holiness. " Therefore it would seem that the life
of mendicant religious is to be condemned.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Thess. 4:11): "That you . . .
work with your own hands as we commanded you, and that you walk
honestly towards them that are without: and that you want nothing of
any man's": and a gloss on this passage says: "You must work and not be
idle, because work is both honorable and a light to the unbeliever: and
you must not covet that which belongs to another and much less beg or
take anything. " Again a gloss [*St. Augustine, (De oper. Monach. iii)]
on 2 Thess. 3:10, "If any man will not work," etc. says: "He wishes the
servants of God to work with the body, so as to gain a livelihood, and
not be compelled by want to ask for necessaries. " Now this is to beg.
Therefore it would seem unlawful to beg while omitting to work with
one's hands.
Objection 3: Further, that which is forbidden by law and contrary to
justice, is unbecoming to religious. Now begging is forbidden in the
divine law; for it is written (Dt. 15:4): "There shall be no poor nor
beggar among you," and (Ps. 36:25): "I have not seen the just forsaken,
nor his seed seeking bread. " Moreover an able-bodied mendicant is
punished by civil law, according to the law (XI, xxvi, de Valid.
Mendicant. ). Therefore it is unfitting for religious to beg.
Objection 4: Further, "Shame is about that which is disgraceful," as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15). Now Ambrose says (De Offic. i,
30) that "to be ashamed to beg is a sign of good birth. " Therefore it
is disgraceful to beg: and consequently this is unbecoming to
religious.
Objection 5: Further, according to our Lord's command it is especially
becoming to preachers of the Gospel to live on alms, as stated above
[3809](A[4]). Yet it is not becoming that they should beg, since a
gloss on 2 Tim. 2:6, "The husbandman, that laboreth," etc. says: "The
Apostle wishes the gospeler to understand that to accept necessaries
from those among whom he labors is not mendicancy but a right. "
Therefore it would seem unbecoming for religious to beg.
On the contrary, It becomes religious to live in imitation of Christ.
Now Christ was a mendicant, according to Ps. 39:18, "But I am a beggar
and poor"; where a gloss says: "Christ said this of Himself as bearing
the 'form of a servant,'" and further on: "A beggar is one who entreats
another, and a poor man is one who has not enough for himself. " Again
it is written (Ps. 69:6): "I am needy and poor"; where a gloss says:
"'Needy,' that is a suppliant; 'and poor,' that is, not having enough
for myself, because I have no worldly wealth. " And Jerome says in a
letter [*Reference unknown]: "Beware lest whereas thy Lord," i. e.
Christ, "begged, thou amass other people's wealth. " Therefore it
becomes religious to beg.
I answer that, Two things may be considered in reference to mendicancy.
The first is on the part of the act itself of begging, which has a
certain abasement attaching to it; since of all men those would seem
most abased who are not only poor, but are so needy that they have to
receive their meat from others. In this way some deserve praise for
begging out of humility, just as they abase themselves in other ways,
as being the most efficacious remedy against pride which they desire to
quench either in themselves or in others by their example. For just as
a disease that arises from excessive heat is most efficaciously healed
by things that excel in cold, so proneness to pride is most
efficaciously healed by those things which savor most of abasement.
Hence it is said in the Decretals (II, cap. Si quis semel, de
Paenitentia): "To condescend to the humblest duties, and to devote
oneself to the lowliest service is an exercise of humility; for thus
one is able to heal the disease of pride and human glory. " Hence Jerome
praises Fabiola (Ep. lxxvii ad ocean. ) for that she desired "to receive
alms, having poured forth all her wealth for Christ's sake. " The
Blessed Alexis acted in like manner, for, having renounced all his
possessions for Christ's sake he rejoiced in receiving alms even from
his own servants. It is also related of the Blessed Arsenius in the
Lives of the Fathers (v, 6) that he gave thanks because he was forced
by necessity to ask for alms. Hence it is enjoined to some people as a
penance for grievous sins to go on a pilgrimage begging. Since,
however, humility like the other virtues should not be without
discretion, it behooves one to be discreet in becoming a mendicant for
the purpose of humiliation, lest a man thereby incur the mark of
covetousness or of anything else unbecoming. Secondly, mendicancy may
be considered on the part of that which one gets by begging: and thus a
man may be led to beg by a twofold motive. First, by the desire to have
wealth or meat without working for it, and such like mendicancy is
unlawful; secondly, by a motive of necessity or usefulness. The motive
is one of necessity if a man has no other means of livelihood save
begging; and it is a motive of usefulness if he wishes to accomplish
something useful, and is unable to do so without the alms of the
faithful. Thus alms are besought for the building of a bridge, or
church, or for any other work whatever that is conducive to the common
good: thus scholars may seek alms that they may devote themselves to
the study of wisdom. In this way mendicancy is lawful to religious no
less than to seculars.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there explicitly of those
who beg from motives of covetousness.
Reply to Objection 2: The first gloss speaks of begging from motives of
covetousness, as appears from the words of the Apostle; while the
second gloss speaks of those who without effecting any useful purpose,
beg their livelihood in order to live in idleness. on the other hand,
he lives not idly who in any way lives usefully.
Reply to Objection 3: This precept of the divine law does not forbid
anyone to beg, but it forbids the rich to be so stingy that some are
compelled by necessity to beg. The civil law imposes a penalty on
able-bodied mendicants who beg from motives neither of utility nor of
necessity.
Reply to Objection 4: Disgrace is twofold; one arises from lack of
honesty [*Cf. [3810] Q[145], A[1]], the other from an external defect,
thus it is disgraceful for a man to be sick or poor. Such like
uncomeliness of mendicancy does not pertain to sin, but it may pertain
to humility, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 5: Preachers have the right to be fed by those to
whom they preach: yet if they wish to seek this by begging so as to
receive it as a free gift and not as a right this will be a mark of
greater humility.
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Whether it is lawful for religious to wear coarser clothes than others?
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to wear coarser
clothes than others. For according to the Apostle (1 Thess. 5:22) we
ought to "refrain from all appearance of evil. " Now coarseness of
clothes has an appearance of evil; for our Lord said (Mat. 7:15):
"Beware of false prophets who come to you in the clothing of sheep":
and a gloss on Apoc. 6:8, "Behold a pale horse," says: "The devil
finding that he cannot succeed, neither by outward afflictions nor by
manifest heresies, sends in advance false brethren, who under the guise
of religion assume the characteristics of the black and red horses by
corrupting the faith. " Therefore it would seem that religious should
not wear coarse clothes.
Objection 2: Further, Jerome says (Ep. lii ad Nepotian. ): "Avoid
somber," i. e. black, "equally with glittering apparel. Fine and coarse
clothes are equally to be shunned, for the one exhales pleasure, the
other vainglory. " Therefore, since vainglory is a graver sin than the
use of pleasure, it would seem that religious who should aim at what is
more perfect ought to avoid coarse rather than fine clothes.
Objection 3: Further, religious should aim especially at doing works of
penance. Now in works of penance we should use, not outward signs of
sorrow, but rather signs of joy; for our Lord said (Mat. 6:16): "When
you fast, be not, as the hypocrites, sad," and afterwards He added:
"But thou, when thou fastest, anoint thy head and wash thy face. "
Augustine commenting on these words (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12):
"In this chapter we must observe that not only the glare and pomp of
outward things, but even the weeds of mourning may be a subject of
ostentation, all the more dangerous as being a decoy under the guise of
God's service. " Therefore seemingly religious ought not to wear coarse
clothes.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:37): "They wandered about in
sheep-skins in goat-skins," and a gloss adds---"as Elias and others. "
Moreover it is said in the Decretal XXI, qu. iv, can. Omnis jactantia:
"If any persons be found to deride those who wear coarse and religious
apparel they must be reproved. For in the early times all those who
were consecrated to God went about in common and coarse apparel. "
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12), "in all
external things, it is not the use but the intention of the user that
is at fault. " In order to judge of this it is necessary to observe that
coarse and homely apparel may be considered in two ways. First, as
being a sign of a man's disposition or condition, because according to
Ecclus. 19:27, "the attire . . . of the man" shows "what he is. " In
this way coarseness of attire is sometimes a sign of sorrow: wherefore
those who are beset with sorrow are wont to wear coarser clothes, just
as on the other hand in times of festivity and joy they wear finer
clothes. Hence penitents make use of coarse apparel, for example, the
king (Jonah 3:6) who "was clothed with sack-cloth," and Achab (3 Kings
21:27) who "put hair-cloth upon his flesh. " Sometimes, however, it is a
sign of the contempt of riches and worldly ostentation. Wherefore
Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustico Monach. ): "Let your somber attire
indicate your purity of mind, your coarse robe prove your contempt of
the world, yet so that your mind be not inflated withal, lest your
speech belie your habit. " In both these ways it is becoming for
religious to wear coarse attire, since religion is a state of penance
and of contempt of worldly glory.
But that a person wish to signify this to others arises from three
motives. First, in order to humble himself: for just as a man's mind is
uplifted by fine clothes, so is it humbled by lowly apparel. Hence
speaking of Achab who "put hair-cloth on his flesh," the Lord said to
Elias: "Hast thou not seen Achab humbled before Me? " (3 Kings 21:29).
Secondly, in order to set an example to others; wherefore a gloss on
Mat. 3:4, "(John) had his garments of camel's hair," says: "He who
preaches penance is clothed in the habit of penance. " Thirdly, on
account of vainglory; thus Augustine says (cf. OBJ[3]) that "even the
weeds of mourning may be a subject of ostentation. "
Accordingly in the first two ways it is praiseworthy to wear humble
apparel, but in the third way it is sinful.
Secondly, coarse and homely attire may be considered as the result of
covetousness or negligence, and thus also it is sinful.
Reply to Objection 1: Coarseness of attire has not of itself the
appearance of evil, indeed it has more the appearance of good, namely
of the contempt of worldly glory. Hence it is that wicked persons hide
their wickedness under coarse clothing. Hence Augustine says (De Serm.
Dom. in Monte ii, 24) that "the sheep should not dislike their clothing
for the reason that the wolves sometimes hide themselves under it. "
Reply to Objection 2: Jerome is speaking there of the coarse attire
that is worn on account of human glory.
Reply to Objection 3: According to our Lord's teaching men should do no
deeds of holiness for the sake of show: and this is especially the case
when one does something strange. Hence Chrysostom [*Hom. xiii in Matth.
in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says:
"While praying a man should do nothing strange, so as to draw the gaze
of others, either by shouting or striking his breast, or casting up his
hands," because the very strangeness draws people's attention to him.
Yet blame does not attach to all strange behavior that draws people's
attention, for it may be done well or ill. Hence Augustine says (De
Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12) that "in the practice of the Christian
religion when a man draws attention to himself by unwonted squalor and
shabbiness, since he acts thus voluntarily and not of necessity, we can
gather from his other deeds whether his behavior is motivated by
contempt of excessive dress or by affectation. " Religious, however,
would especially seem not to act thus from affectation, since they wear
a coarse habit as a sign of their profession whereby they profess
contempt of the world.
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OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the different kinds of religious life, and under
this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are different kinds of religious life or only one?
(2) Whether a religious order can be established for the works of the
active life?
(3) Whether a religious order can be directed to soldiering?
(4) Whether a religious order can be established for preaching and the
exercise of like works?
(5) Whether a religious order can be established for the study of
science?
(6) Whether a religious order that is directed to the contemplative
life is more excellent than one that is directed to the active life?
(7) Whether religious perfection is diminished by possessing something
in common?
(8) Whether the religious life of solitaries is to be preferred to the
religious life of those who live in community?
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Whether there is only one religious order?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one religious order. For
there can be no diversity in that which is possessed wholly and
perfectly; wherefore there can be only one sovereign good, as stated in
the [3811]FP, Q[6] , AA[2],3,4. Now as Gregory says (Hom. xx in
Ezech. ), "when a man vows to Almighty God all that he has, all his
life, all his knowledge, it is a holocaust," without which there is no
religious life. Therefore it would seem that there are not many
religious orders but only one.
Objection 2: Further, things which agree in essentials differ only
accidentally. Now there is no religious order without the three
essential vows of religion, as stated above ([3812]Q[186], AA[6],7).
Therefore it would seem that religious orders differ not specifically,
but only accidentally.
Objection 3: Further, the state of perfection is competent both to
religious and to bishops, as stated above ([3813]Q[185], AA[5],7). Now
the episcopate is not diversified specifically, but is one wherever it
may be; wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxlvi ad Evan. ): "Wherever a bishop
is, whether at Rome, or Gubbio, or Constantinople, or Reggio, he has
the same excellence, the same priesthood. " Therefore in like manner
there is but one religious order.
Objection 4: Further, anything that may lead to confusion should be
removed from the Church. Now it would seem that a diversity of
religious orders might confuse the Christian people, as stated in the
Decretal de Statu Monach. et Canon. Reg. [*Cap. Ne Nimia, de Relig.
Dom. ]. Therefore seemingly there ought not to be different religious
orders.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 44:10) that it pertains to the
adornment of the queen that she is "surrounded with variety. "
I answer that, As stated above (Q[186], A, 7;[3814] Q[187], A[2]), the
religious state is a training school wherein one aims by practice at
the perfection of charity. Now there are various works of charity to
which a man may devote himself; and there are also various kinds of
exercise. Wherefore religious orders may be differentiated in two ways.
First, according to the different things to which they may be directed:
thus one may be directed to the lodging of pilgrims, another to
visiting or ransoming captives. Secondly, there may be various
religious orders according to the diversity of practices; thus in one
religious order the body is chastised by abstinence in food, in another
by the practice of manual labor, scantiness of clothes, or the like.
Since, however, the end imports most in every matter, [*Arist. , Topic.
vi 8] religious orders differ more especially according to their
various ends than according to their various practices.
Reply to Objection 1: The obligation to devote oneself wholly to God's
service is common to every religious order; hence religious do not
differ in this respect, as though in one religious order a person
retained some one thing of his own, and in another order some other
thing. But the difference is in respect of the different things wherein
one may serve God, and whereby a man may dispose himself to the service
of God.
Reply to Objection 2: The three essential vows of religion pertain to
the practice of religion as principles to which all other matters are
reduced, as stated above ([3815]Q[186], A[7]). But there are various
ways of disposing oneself to the observance of each of them. For
instance one disposes oneself to observe the vow of continence, by
solitude of place, by abstinence, by mutual fellowship, and by many
like means. Accordingly it is evident that the community of the
essential vows is compatible with diversity of religious life, both on
account of the different dispositions and on account of the different
ends, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: In matters relating to perfection, the bishop
stands in the position of agent, and the religious as passive, as
stated above ([3816]Q[184], A[7]). Now the agent, even in natural
things, the higher it is, is so much the more one, whereas the things
that are passive are various. Hence with reason the episcopal state is
one, while religious orders are many.
Reply to Objection 4: Confusion is opposed to distinction and order.
Accordingly the multitude of religious orders would lead to confusion,
if different religious orders were directed to the same end and in the
same way, without necessity or utility. Wherefore to prevent this
happening it has been wholesomely forbidden to establish a new
religious order without the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a religious order should be established for the works of the active
life?
Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order should be
established for the works of the active life. For every religious order
belongs to the state of perfection, as stated above ([3817]Q[184],
A[5];[3818] Q[186], A[1]). Now the perfection of the religious state
consists in the contemplation of divine things. For Dionysius says
(Eccl. Hier. vi) that they are "called servants of God by reason of
their rendering pure service and subjection to God, and on account of
the indivisible and singular life which unites them by holy
reflections," i. e. contemplations, "on invisible things, to the Godlike
unity and the perfection beloved of God. " Therefore seemingly no
religious order should be established for the works of the active life.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly the same judgment applies to canons
regular as to monks, according to Extra, De Postul. , cap. Ex parte; and
De Statu Monach. , cap. Quod Dei timorem: for it is stated that "they
are not considered to be separated from the fellowship of monks": and
the same would seem to apply to all other religious. Now the monastic
rule was established for the purpose of the contemplative life;
wherefore Jerome says (Ep. lviii ad Paulin. ): "If you wish to be what
you are called, a monk," i. e. a solitary, "what business have you in a
city? " The same is found stated in Extra, De Renuntiatione, cap. Nisi
cum pridem; and De Regular. , cap. Licet quibusdam. Therefore it would
seem that every religious order is directed to the contemplative life,
and none to the active life.
Objection 3: Further, the active life is concerned with the present
world. Now all religious are said to renounce the world; wherefore
Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech. ): "He who renounces this world, and
does all the good he can, is like one who has gone out of Egypt and
offers sacrifice in the wilderness. " Therefore it would seem that no
religious order can be directed to the active life.
On the contrary, It is written (James 1:27): "Religion clean and
undefiled before God and the Father, is this: to visit the fatherless
and widows in their tribulation. " Now this belongs to the active life.
Therefore religious life can be fittingly directed to the active life.
I answer that, As stated above [3819](A[1]), the religious state is
directed to the perfection of charity, which extends to the love of God
and of our neighbor. Now the contemplative life which seeks to devote
itself to God alone belongs directly to the love of God, while the
active life, which ministers to our neighbor's needs, belongs directly
to the love of one's neighbor. And just as out of charity we love our
neighbor for God's sake, so the services we render our neighbor redound
to God, according to Mat. 25:40, "What you have done [Vulg. : 'As long
as you did it'] to one of these My least brethren, you did it to Me. "
Consequently those services which we render our neighbor, in so far as
we refer them to God, are described as sacrifices, according to Heb.
13:16, "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices
God's favor is obtained. " And since it belongs properly to religion to
offer sacrifice to God, as stated above (Q[81], A[1], ad 1; A[4], ad
1), it follows that certain religious orders are fittingly directed to
the works of the active life. Wherefore in the Conferences of the
Fathers (Coll. xiv, 4) the Abbot Nesteros in distinguishing the various
aims of religious orders says: "Some direct their intention exclusively
to the hidden life of the desert and purity of heart; some are occupied
with the instruction of the brethren and the care of the monasteries;
while others delight in the service of the guesthouse," i. e. in
hospitality.
Reply to Objection 1: Service and subjection rendered to God are not
precluded by the works of the active life, whereby a man serves his
neighbor for God's sake, as stated in the Article. Nor do these works
preclude singularity of life; not that they involve man's living apart
from his fellow-men, but in the sense that each man individually
devotes himself to things pertaining to the service of God; and since
religious occupy themselves with the works of the active life for God's
sake, it follows that their action results from their contemplation of
divine things. Hence they are not entirely deprived of the fruit of the
contemplative life.
Reply to Objection 2: The same judgment applies to monks and to all
other religious, as regards things common to all religious orders: for
instance as regards their devoting themselves wholly to the divine
service, their observance of the essential vows of religion, and their
refraining from worldly business. But it does not follow that this
likeness extends to other things that are proper to the monastic
profession, and are directed especially to the contemplative life.
Hence in the aforesaid Decretal, De Postulando, it is not simply stated
that "the same judgment applies to canons regular" as "to monks," but
that it applies "in matters already mentioned," namely that "they are
not to act as advocates in lawsuits. " Again the Decretal quoted, De
Statu Monach. , after the statement that "canons regular are not
considered to be separated from the fellowship of monks," goes on to
say: "Nevertheless they obey an easier rule. " Hence it is evident that
they are not bound to all that monks are bound.
Reply to Objection 3: A man may be in the world in two ways: in one way
by his bodily presence, in another way by the bent of his mind. Hence
our Lord said to His disciples (Jn. 15:19): "I have chosen you out of
the world," and yet speaking of them to His Father He said (Jn. 17:11):
"These are in the world, and I come to Thee. " Although, then, religious
who are occupied with the works of the active life are in the world as
to the presence of the body, they are not in the world as regards their
bent of mind, because they are occupied with external things, not as
seeking anything of the world, but merely for the sake of serving God:
for "they . . . use this world, as if they used it not," to quote 1
Cor. 7:31. Hence (James 1:27) after it is stated that "religion clean
and undefiled . . . is . . . to visit the fatherless and widows in
their tribulation," it is added, "and to keep one's self unspotted from
this world," namely to avoid being attached to worldly things.
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Whether a religious order can be directed to soldiering?
Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order can be directed to
soldiering. For all religious orders belong to the state of perfection.
Now our Lord said with reference to the perfection of Christian life
(Mat. 5:39): "I say to you not to resist evil; but if one strike thee
on the right cheek, turn to him also the other," which is inconsistent
with the duties of a soldier. Therefore no religious order can be
established for soldiering.
Objection 2: Further, the bodily encounter of the battlefield is more
grievous than the encounter in words that takes place between counsel
at law. Yet religious are forbidden to plead at law, as appears from
the Decretal De Postulando quoted above (A[2], OBJ[2]). Therefore it is
much less seemly for a religious order to be established for
soldiering.
Objection 3: Further, the religious state is a state of penance, as we
have said above ([3820]Q[187], A[6]). Now according to the code of laws
soldiering is forbidden to penitents. for it is said in the Decretal De
Poenit. , Dist. v, cap. 3: "It is altogether opposed to the rules of the
Church, to return to worldly soldiering after doing penance. " Therefore
it is unfitting for any religious order to be established for
soldiering.
Objection 4: Further, no religious order may be established for an
unjust object. But as Isidore says (Etym. xviii, 1), "A just war is one
that is waged by order of the emperor. " Since then religious are
private individuals, it would seem unlawful for them to wage war; and
consequently no religious order may be established for this purpose.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. clxxxix; ad Bonifac. ), "Beware of
thinking that none of those can please God who handle war-like weapons.
Of such was holy David to whom the Lord gave great testimony. " Now
religious orders are established in order that men may please God.
Therefore nothing hinders the establishing of a religious order for the
purpose of soldiering.
I answer that, As stated above [3821](A[2]), a religious order may be
established not only for the works of the contemplative life, but also
for the works of the active life, in so far as they are concerned in
helping our neighbor and in the service of God, but not in so far as
they are directed to a worldly object. Now the occupation of soldiering
may be directed to the assistance of our neighbor, not only as regards
private individuals, but also as regards the defense of the whole
commonwealth. Hence it is said of Judas Machabeus (1 Macc. 3:2,3) that
"he [Vulg. : 'they'] fought with cheerfulness the battle of Israel, and
he got his people great honor. " It can also be directed to the upkeep
of divine worship, wherefore (1 Macc. 3:21) Judas is stated to have
said: "We will fight for our lives and our laws," and further on (1
Macc. 13:3) Simon said: "You know what great battles I and my brethren,
and the house of my father, have fought for the laws and the
sanctuary. "
Hence a religious order may be fittingly established for soldiering,
not indeed for any worldly purpose, but for the defense of divine
worship and public safety, or also of the poor and oppressed, according
to Ps. 81:4: "Rescue the poor, and deliver the needy out of the hand of
the sinner. "
Reply to Objection 1: Not to resist evil may be understood in two ways.
First, in the sense of forgiving the wrong done to oneself, and thus it
may pertain to perfection, when it is expedient to act thus for the
spiritual welfare of others. Secondly, in the sense of tolerating
patiently the wrongs done to others: and this pertains to imperfection,
or even to vice, if one be able to resist the wrongdoer in a becoming
manner. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 27): "The courage whereby a
man in battle defends his country against barbarians, or protects the
weak at home, or his friends against robbers is full of justice": even
so our Lord says in the passage quoted [*Lk. 6:30 "Of him that taketh
away thy goods, ask them not again"; Cf. Mat. 5:40], " . . . thy goods,
ask them not again. " If, however, a man were not to demand the return
of that which belongs to another, he would sin if it were his business
to do so: for it is praiseworthy to give away one's own, but not
another's property. And much less should the things of God be
neglected, for as Chrysostom [*Hom. v in Matth. in the Opus
Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says, "it is most
wicked to overlook the wrongs done to God. "
Reply to Objection 2: It is inconsistent with any religious order to
act as counsel at law for a worldly object, but it is not inconsistent
to do so at the orders of one's superior and in favor of one's
monastery, as stated in the same Decretal, or for the defense of the
poor and widows. Wherefore it is said in the Decretals (Dist. lxxxviii,
cap. 1): "The holy synod has decreed that henceforth no cleric is to
buy property or occupy himself with secular business, save with a view
to the care of the fatherless . . . and widows. " Likewise to be a
soldier for the sake of some worldly object is contrary to all
religious life, but this does not apply to those who are soldiers for
the sake of God's service.
Reply to Objection 3: Worldly soldiering is forbidden to penitents, but
the soldiering which is directed to the service of God is imposed as a
penance on some people, as in the case of those upon whom it is
enjoined to take arms in defense of the Holy Land.
Reply to Objection 4: The establishment of a religious order for the
purpose of soldiering does not imply that the religious can wage war on
their own authority; but they can do so only on the authority of the
sovereign or of the Church.
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Whether a religious order can be established for preaching or hearing
confessions?
Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order may be established
for preaching, or hearing confessions. For it is said (VII, qu. i
[*Cap. Hoc nequaquam; Cf. [3822] Q[187], A[1], OBJ[1]]): "The monastic
life is one of subjection and discipleship, not of teaching, authority,
or pastoral care," and the same apparently applies to religious. Now
preaching and hearing confessions are the actions of a pastor and
teacher. Therefore a religious order should not be established for this
purpose.
Objection 2: Further, the purpose for which a religious order is
established would seem to be something most proper to the religious
life, as stated above [3823](A[1]). Now the aforesaid actions are not
proper to religious but to bishops. Therefore a religious order should
not be established for the purpose of such actions.
Objection 3: Further, it seems unfitting that the authority to preach
and hear confessions should be committed to an unlimited number of men;
and there is no fixed number of those who are received into a religious
order. Therefore it is unfitting for a religious order to be
established for the purpose of the aforesaid actions.
Objection 4: Further, preachers have a right to receive their
livelihood from the faithful of Christ, according to 1 Cor. 9. If then
the office of preaching be committed to a religious order established
for that purpose, it follows that the faithful of Christ are bound to
support an unlimited number of persons, which would be a heavy burden
on them. Therefore a religious order should not be established for the
exercise of these actions.
Objection 5: Further, the organization of the Church should be in
accordance with Christ's institution. Now Christ sent first the twelve
apostles to preach, as related in Luke 9, and afterwards He sent the
seventy-two disciples, as stated in Luke 10. Moreover, according to the
gloss of Bede on "And after these things" (Lk. 10:1), "the apostles are
represented by the bishops, the seventy-two disciples by the lesser
priests," i. e. the parish priests. Therefore in addition to bishops and
parish priests, no religious order should be established for the
purpose of preaching and hearing confessions.
On the contrary, In the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xiv, 4),
Abbot Nesteros, speaking of the various kinds of religious orders,
says: "Some choosing the care of the sick, others devoting themselves
to the relief of the afflicted and oppressed, or applying themselves to
teaching, or giving alms to the poor, have been most highly esteemed on
account of their devotion and piety. " Therefore just as a religious
order may be established for the care of the sick, so also may one be
established for teaching the people by preaching and like works.
I answer that, As stated above [3824](A[2]), it is fitting for a
religious order to be established for the works of the active life, in
so far as they are directed to the good of our neighbor, the service of
God, and the upkeep of divine worship. Now the good of our neighbor is
advanced by things pertaining to the spiritual welfare of the soul
rather than by things pertaining to the supplying of bodily needs, in
proportion to the excellence of spiritual over corporal things. Hence
it was stated above (Q[32], A[3]) that spiritual works of mercy surpass
corporal works of mercy. Moreover this is more pertinent to the service
of God, to Whom no sacrifice is more acceptable than zeal for souls, as
Gregory says (Hom. xii in Ezech. ). Furthermore, it is a greater thing
to employ spiritual arms in defending the faithful against the errors
of heretics and the temptations of the devil, than to protect the
faithful by means of bodily weapons. Therefore it is most fitting for a
religious order to be established for preaching and similar works
pertaining to the salvation of souls.
Reply to Objection 1: He who works by virtue of another, acts as an
instrument. And a minister is like an "animated instrument," as the
Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2 [*Cf. Ethic. viii, 11]). Hence if a man
preach or do something similar by the authority of his superiors, he
does not rise above the degree of "discipleship" or "subjection," which
is competent to religious.
Reply to Objection 2: Some religious orders are established for
soldiering, to wage war, not indeed on their own authority, but on that
of the sovereign or of the Church who are competent to wage war by
virtue of their office, as stated above (A[3], ad 4). In the same way
certain religious orders are established for preaching and hearing
confessions, not indeed by their own authority, but by the authority of
the higher and lower superiors, to whom these things belong by virtue
of their office. Consequently to assist one's superiors in such a
ministry is proper to a religious order of this kind.
Reply to Objection 3: Bishops do not allow these religious severally
and indiscriminately to preach or hear confessions, but according to
the discretion of the religious superiors, or according to their own
appointment.
Reply to Objection 4: The faithful are not bound by law to contribute
to the support of other than their ordinary prelates, who receive the
tithes and offerings of the faithful for that purpose, as well as other
ecclesiastical revenues. But if some men are willing to minister to the
faithful by exercising the aforesaid acts gratuitously, and without
demanding payment as of right, the faithful are not burdened thereby
because their temporal contributions can be liberally repaid by those
men, nor are they bound by law to contribute, but by charity, and yet
not so that they be burdened thereby and others eased, as stated in 2
Cor. 8:13. If, however, none be found to devote themselves gratuitously
to services of this kind, the ordinary prelate is bound, if he cannot
suffice by himself, to seek other suitable persons and support them
himself.
Reply to Objection 5: The seventy-two disciples are represented not
only by the parish priests, but by all those of lower order who in any
way assist the bishops in their office. For we do not read that our
Lord appointed the seventy-two disciples to certain fixed parishes, but
that "He sent them two and two before His face into every city and
place whither He Himself was to come. " It was fitting, however, that in
addition to the ordinary prelates others should be chosen for these
duties on account of the multitude of the faithful, and the difficulty
of finding a sufficient number of persons to be appointed to each
locality, just as it was necessary to establish religious orders for
military service, on account of the secular princes being unable to
cope with unbelievers in certain countries.
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Whether a religious order should be established for the purpose of study?
Objection 1: It would seem that a religious order should not be
established for the purpose of study. For it is written (Ps. 70:15,16):
"Because I have not known letters [Douay: 'learning'], I will enter
into the powers of the Lord," i. e. "Christian virtue," according to a
gloss. Now the perfection of Christian virtue, seemingly, pertains
especially to religious. Therefore it is not for them to apply
themselves to the study of letters.
Objection 2: Further, that which is a source of dissent is unbecoming
to religious, who are gathered together in the unity of peace. Now
study leads to dissent: wherefore different schools of thought arose
among the philosophers. Hence Jerome (Super Epist. ad Tit. 1:5) says:
"Before a diabolical instinct brought study into religion, and people
said: I am of Paul, I of Apollo, I of Cephas," etc. Therefore it would
seem that no religious order should be established for the purpose of
study.
Objection 3: Further, those who profess the Christian religion should
profess nothing in common with the Gentiles. Now among the Gentiles
were some who professed philosophy, and even now some secular persons
are known as professors of certain sciences. Therefore the study of
letters does not become religious.
On the contrary, Jerome (Ep.
