Objection
1: It would seem that a priest cannot always absolve his
subject.
subject.
Summa Theologica
Therefore He
needed no key, and it would have been useless to Him to have it.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 3:7): "These things saith . . .
He that hath the key of David," etc.
I answer that, The power to do a thing is both in the instrument and in
the principal agent, but not in the same way since it is more perfectly
in the latter. Now the power of the keys which we have, like other
sacramental powers, is instrumental: whereas it is in Christ as
principal agent in the matter of our salvation, by authority, if we
consider Him as God, by merit, if we consider Him as man [*For St.
Thomas' later teaching on this point, Cf. [4872]TP, Q[48], A[6];
[4873]FS, Q[112], A[1], AD 1]. But the very notion of a key expresses a
power to open and shut, whether this be done by the principal agent or
by an instrument. Consequently we must admit that Christ had the key,
but in a higher way than His ministers, wherefore He is said to have
the key of "excellence. "
Reply to Objection 1: A character implies the notion of something
derived from another, hence the power of the keys which we receive from
Christ results from the character whereby we are conformed to Christ,
whereas in Christ it results not from a character, but from the
principal form.
Reply to Objection 2: The key, which Christ had was not sacramental,
but the origin of the sacramental key.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether priests alone have the keys?
Objection 1: It would seem that not only priests have the keys. For
Isidore says (Etym. vii, 12) that the "doorkeepers have to tell the
good from the bad, so as to admit the good and keep out the bad. " Now
this is the definition of the keys, as appears from what has been said
([4874]Q[17], A[2]). Therefore not only priests but even doorkeepers
have the keys.
Objection 2: Further, the keys are conferred on priests when by being
anointed they receive power from God. But kings of Christian peoples
also receive power from God and are consecrated by being anointed.
Therefore not only priests have the keys.
Objection 3: Further, the priesthood is an order belonging to an
individual person. But sometimes a number of people together seem to
have the key, because certain Chapters can pass a sentence of
excommunication, which pertains to the power of the keys. Therefore not
only priests have the key.
Objection 4: Further, a woman is not capable of receiving the
priesthood, since she is not competent to teach, according to the
Apostle (1 Cor. 14:34). But some women (abbesses, for instance, who
exercise a spiritual power over their subjects), seem to have the keys.
Therefore not only priests have the keys.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Poenit. i): "This right," viz. of
binding and loosing, "is granted to priests alone. "
Further, by receiving the power of the keys, a man is set up between
the people and God. But this belongs to the priest alone, who is
"ordained . . . in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer
up gifts and sacrifices for sins" (Heb. 5:1). Therefore only priests
have the keys.
I answer that, There are two kinds of key. one reaches to heaven itself
directly, by remitting sin and thus removing the obstacles to the
entrance into heaven; and this is called the key of "order. " Priests
alone have this key, because they alone are ordained for the people in
the things which appertain to God directly. The other key reaches to
heaven, not directly but through the medium of the Church Militant. By
this key a man goes to heaven, since, by its means, a man is shut out
from or admitted to the fellowship of the Church Militant, by
excommunication or absolution. This is called the key of "jurisdiction"
in the external court, wherefore even those who are not priests can
have this key, e. g. archdeacons, bishops elect, and others who can
excommunicate. But it is not properly called a key of heaven, but a
disposition thereto.
Reply to Objection 1: The doorkeepers have the key for taking care of
those things which are contained in a material temple, and they have to
judge whether a person should be excluded from or admitted to that
temple; which judgment they pronounce, not by their own authority, but
in pursuance to the priest's judgment, so that they appear to be the
administrators of the priestly power.
Reply to Objection 2: Kings have no power in spiritual matters, so that
they do not receive the key of the heavenly kingdom. Their power is
confined to temporal matters, and this too can only come to them from
God, as appears from Rom. 13:1. Nor are they consecrated by the unction
of a sacred order: their anointing is merely a sign that the excellence
of their power comes down to them from Christ, and that, under Christ,
they reign over the Christian people.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as in civil matters the whole power is
sometimes vested in a judge, as in a kingdom, whereas sometimes it is
vested in many exercising various offices but acting together with
equal rights (Ethic. viii, 10,11), so too, spiritual jurisdiction may
be exercised both by one alone, e. g. a bishop, and by many together,
e. g. by a Chapter, and thus they have the key of jurisdiction, but they
have not all together the key of order.
Reply to Objection 4: According to the Apostle (1 Tim. 2:11; Titus
2:5), woman is in a state of subjection: wherefore she can have no
spiritual jurisdiction, since the Philosopher also says (Ethic. viii)
that it is a corruption of public life when the government comes into
the hands of a woman. Consequently a woman has neither the key of order
nor the key of jurisdiction. Nevertheless a certain use of the keys is
allowed to women, such as the right to correct other women who are
under them, on account of the danger that might threaten if men were to
dwell under the same roof.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether holy men who are not priests have the keys?
Objection 1: It would seem that holy men, even those who are not
priests, have the use of the keys. For loosing and binding, which are
the effects of the keys, derive their efficacy from the merit of
Christ's Passion. Now those are most conformed to Christ's Passion, who
follow Christ, suffering by patience and other virtues. Therefore it
seems that even if they have not the priestly order, they can bind and
loose.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Heb. 7:7): "Without all
contradiction, that which is less is blessed by the greater [Vulg. :
'better']. " Now "in spiritual matters," according to Augustine (De
Trin. vi, 8), "to be better is to be greater. " Therefore those who are
better, i. e. who have more charity, can bless others by absolving them.
Hence the same conclusion follows.
On the contrary, "Action belongs to that which has the power," as the
Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigil. i). But the key which is a
spiritual power belongs to priests alone. Therefore priests alone are
competent to have the use of the keys.
I answer that, There is this difference between a principal and an
instrumental agent, that the latter does not produce, in the effect,
its own likeness, but the likeness of the principal agent, whereas the
principal agent produces its own likeness. Consequently a thing becomes
a principal agent through having a form, which it can reproduce in
another, whereas an instrumental agent is not constituted thus, but
through being applied by the principal agent in order to produce a
certain effect. Since therefore in the act of the keys the principal
agent by authority is Christ as God, and by merit is Christ as man,* it
follows that on account of the very fulness of Divine goodness in Him,
and of the perfection of His grace, He is competent to exercise the act
of the keys. [*For St. Thomas' later teaching on this point, cf.
[4875]TP, Q[48], A[6]; [4876]FS, Q[112], A[1], ad 1]. But another man
is not competent to exercise this act as principal agent, since neither
can he give another man grace whereby sins are remitted, nor can he
merit sufficiently, so that he is nothing more than an instrumental
agent. Consequently the recipient of the effect of the keys, is
likened, not to the one who uses the keys, but to Christ. Therefore, no
matter how much grace a man may have, he cannot produce the effect of
the keys, unless he be appointed to that purpose by receiving orders.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as between instrument and effect there is
need or likeness, not of a similar form, but of aptitude in the
instrument for the effect, so is it as regards the instrument and the
principal agent. The former is the likeness between holy men and the
suffering Christ, nor does it bestow on them the use of the keys.
Reply to Objection 2: Although a mere man cannot merit grace for
another man condignly, yet the merit of one man can co-operate in the
salvation of another. Hence there is a twofold blessing. One proceeds
from a mere man, as meriting by his own act: this blessing can be
conferred by any holy person in whom Christ dwells by His grace, in so
far as he excels in goodness the person whom he blesses. The other
blessing is when a man blesses, as applying a blessing instrumentally
through the merit of Christ, and this requires excellence of order and
not of virtue.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether wicked priests have the use of the keys?
Objection 1: It would seem that wicked priests have not the use of the
keys. For in the passage where the use of the keys is bestowed on the
apostles (Jn. 20:22,23), the gift of the Holy Ghost is promised. But
wicked men have not the Holy Ghost. Therefore they have not the use of
the keys.
Objection 2: Further, no wise king entrusts his enemy with the
dispensation of his treasure. Now the use of the keys consists in
dispensing the treasure of the King of heaven, Who is Wisdom itself.
Therefore the wicked, who are His enemies on account of sin, have not
the use of the keys.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Bapt. v, 21) that God "gives
the sacrament of grace even through wicked men, but grace itself only
by Himself or through His saints. " Hence He forgives sin by Himself, or
by those who are members of the Dove. But the remission of sins is the
use of the keys. Therefore sinners, who are not "members of the Dove,"
have not the use of the keys.
Objection 4: Further, the prayer of a wicked priest cannot effect
reconciliation, for, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 11), "if an
unacceptable person is sent to intercede, anger is provoked to yet
greater severity. " But the use of the keys implies a kind of
intercession, as appears in the form of absolution. Therefore wicked
priests cannot use the keys effectively.
On the contrary, No man can know whether another man is in the state of
grace. If, therefore, no one could use the keys in giving absolution
unless he were in a state of grace, no one would know that he had been
absolved, which would be very unfitting.
Further, the wickedness of the minister cannot void the liberality of
his lord. But the priest is no more than a minister. Therefore he
cannot by his wickedness take away from us the gift which God has given
through him.
I answer that, Just as participation of a form to be induced into an
effect does not make a thing to be an instrument, so neither does the
loss of that form prevent that thing being used as an instrument.
Consequently, since man is merely an instrument in the use of the keys,
however much he may through sin be deprived of grace, whereby sins are
forgiven, yet he is by no means deprived of the use of the keys.
Reply to Objection 1: The gift of the Holy Ghost is requisite for the
use of the keys, not as being indispensable for the purpose, but
because it is unbecoming for the user to use them without it, though he
that submits to them receives their effect.
Reply to Objection 2: An earthly king can be cheated and deceived in
the matter of his treasure, and so he does not entrust his enemy with
the dispensation thereof. But the King of heaven cannot be cheated,
because all tends to His own glory, even the abuse of the keys by some,
for He can make good come out of evil, and produce many good effects
through evil men. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine speaks of the remission of sins in so
far as holy men co-operate therein, not by virtue of the keys, but by
merit of congruity. Hence He says that God confers the sacraments even
through evil men, and among the other sacraments, absolution which is
the use of the keys should be reckoned: but that through "members of
the Dove," i. e. holy men, He grants forgiveness of sins, in so far as
He remits sins on account of their intercession.
We might also reply that by "members of the Dove" he means all who are
not cut off from the Church, for those who receive the sacraments from
them, receive grace, whereas those who receive the sacraments from
those who are cut off from the Church, do not receive grace, because
they sin in so doing, except in the case of Baptism, which, in cases of
necessity, may be received even from one who is excommunicate.
Reply to Objection 4: The prayer which the wicked priest proffers on
his own account, is not efficacious: but that which he makes as a
minister of the Church, is efficacious through the merit of Christ. Yet
in both ways the priest's prayer should profit those who are subject to
him.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate, suspended or
degraded have the use of the keys?
Objection 1: It would seem that those who are schismatics, heretics,
excommunicate, suspended or degraded have the use of the keys. For just
as the power of the keys results from orders, so does the power of
consecration. But the above cannot lose the use of the power of
consecration, since if they do consecrate it is valid, though they sin
in doing so. Therefore neither can they lose the use of the keys.
Objection 2: Further, any active spiritual power in one who has the use
of his free-will can be exercised by him when he wills. Now the power
of the keys remains in the aforesaid, for, since it is only conferred
with orders, they would have to be reordained when they return to the
Church. Therefore, since it is an active power, they can exercise it
when they will.
Objection 3: Further, spiritual grace is hindered by guilt more than by
punishment. Now excommunication, suspension and degradation are
punishments. Therefore, since a man does not lose the use of the keys
on account of guilt, it seems that he does not lose it on account of
the aforesaid.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. cxxi in Joan. ) that the
"charity of the Church forgives sins. " Now it is the charity of the
Church which unites its members. Since therefore the above are
disunited from the Church, it seems that they have not the use of the
keys in remitting sins.
Further, no man is absolved from sin by sinning. Now it is a sin for
anyone to seek absolution of his sins from the above, for he disobeys
the Church in so doing. Therefore he cannot be absolved by them: and so
the same conclusion follows.
I answer that, In all the above the power of the keys remains as to its
essence, but its use is hindered on account of the lack of matter. For
since the use of the keys requires in the user authority over the
person on whom they are used, as stated above ([4877]Q[17], A[2], ad
2), the proper matter on whom one can exercise the use of the keys is a
man under one's authority. And since it is by appointment of the Church
that one man has authority over another, so a man may be deprived of
his authority over another by his ecclesiastical superiors.
Consequently, since the Church deprives heretics, schismatics and the
like, by withdrawing their subjects from them either altogether or in
some respect, in so far as they are thus deprived, they cannot have the
use of the keys.
Reply to Objection 1: The matter of the sacrament of the Eucharist, on
which the priest exercises his power, is not a man but wheaten bread,
and in Baptism, the matter is simply a man. Wherefore, just as, were a
heretic to be without wheaten bread, he could not consecrate, so
neither can a prelate absolve if he be deprived of his authority, yet
he can baptize and consecrate, albeit to his own damnation.
Reply to Objection 2: The assertion is true, provided matter be not
lacking as it is in the case in point.
Reply to Objection 3: Sin, of itself, does not remove matter, as
certain punishments do: so that punishment is a hindrance not because
it is contrary to the effect, but for the reason stated.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THOSE ON WHOM THE POWER OF THE KEYS CAN BE EXERCISED (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider those on whom the power of the keys can be
exercised. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a priest can use the key, which he has, on any man?
(2) Whether a priest can always absolve his subject?
(3) Whether anyone can use the keys on his superior?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a priest can use the key which he has, on any man?
Objection 1: It would seem that a priest can use the key which he has,
on any man. For the power of the keys was bestowed on priests by Divine
authority in the words: "Receive ye the Holy Ghost; whose sins you
shall forgive, they are forgiven them" (Jn. 20:22,23). But this was
said without any restriction. Therefore he that has the key, can use it
on any without restriction.
Objection 2: Further, a material key that opens one lock, opens all
locks of the same pattern. Now every sin of every man is the same kind
of obstacle against entering into heaven. Therefore if a priest can, by
means of the key which he has, absolve one man, he can do the same for
all others.
Objection 3: Further, the priesthood of the New Testament is more
perfect than that of the Old Testament. But the priest of the Old
Testament could use the power which he had of discerning between
different kinds of leprosy, with regard to all indiscriminately. Much
more therefore can the priest of the Gospel use his power with regard
to all.
On the contrary, It is written in the Appendix of Gratian: "It is not
lawful for every priest to loose or bind another priest's parishioner. "
Therefore a priest cannot absolve everybody.
Further, judgment in spiritual matters should be better regulated than
in temporal matters. But in temporal matters a judge cannot judge
everybody. Therefore, since the use of the keys is a kind of judgment,
it is not within the competency of a priest to use his key with regard
to everyone.
I answer that, That which has to do with singular matters is not
equally in the power of all. Thus, even as besides the general
principles of medicine, it is necessary to have physicians, who adapt
those general principles to individual patients or diseases, according
to their various requirements, so in every kingdom, besides that one
who proclaims the universal precepts of law, there is need for others
to adapt those precepts to individual cases, according as each case
demands. For this reason, in the heavenly hierarchy also, under the
Powers who rule indiscriminately, a place is given to the
Principalities, who are appointed to individual kingdoms, and to the
Angels who are given charge over individual men, as we have explained
above ([4878]FP, Q[113], AA[1],2). Consequently there should be a like
order of authority in the Church Militant, so that an indiscriminate
authority over all should be vested in one individual, and that there
should be others under him, having distinct authority over various
people. Now the use of the keys implies a certain power to exercise
authority, whereby the one on whom the keys are used, becomes the
proper matter of that act. Therefore he that has power over all
indiscriminately, can use the keys on all, whereas those who have
received authority over distinct persons, cannot use the keys on
everyone, but only on those over whom they are appointed, except in
cases of necessity, when the sacraments should be refused to no one.
Reply to Objection 1: A twofold power is required in order to absolve
from sins, namely, power of order and power of jurisdiction. The former
power is equally in all priests, but not the latter. And therefore,
when our Lord (Jn. 20:23) gave all the apostles in general, the power
of forgiving sins, this is to be understood of the power which results
from receiving orders, wherefore these words are addressed to priests
when they are ordained. But to Peter in particular He gave the power of
forgiving sins (Mat. 16:19), that we may understand that he has the
power of jurisdiction before the others. But the power of orders,
considered in itself, extends to all who can be absolved: wherefore our
Lord said indeterminately, "Whose sins you shall forgive, they are
forgiven them," on the understanding that this power should be used in
dependence on the power given to Peter, according to His appointment.
Reply to Objection 2: A material key can open only its own lock. nor
can any active force act save on its own matter. Now a man becomes the
matter of the power of order by jurisdiction: and consequently no one
can use the key in respect of another over whom he has not
jurisdiction.
Reply to Objection 3: The people of Israel were one people, and had but
one temple, so that there was no need for a distinction in priestly
jurisdiction, as there is now in the Church which comprises various
peoples and nations.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a priest can always absolve his subject?
Objection 1: It would seem that a priest cannot always absolve his
subject. For, as Augustine says (De vera et false Poenitentia [*Work of
an unknown author]), "no man should exercise the priestly office,
unless he be free from those things which he condemns in others. " But a
priest might happen to share in a sin committed by his subject, e. g. by
knowledge of a woman who is his subject. Therefore it seems that he
cannot always use the power of the keys on his subjects.
Objection 2: Further, by the power of the keys a man is healed of all
his shortcomings. Now it happens sometimes that a sin has attached to
it a defect of irregularity or a sentence of excommunication, from
which a simple priest cannot absolve. Therefore it seems that he cannot
use the power of the keys on such as are shackled by these things in
the above manner.
Objection 3: Further, the judgment and power of our priesthood was
foreshadowed by the judgment of the ancient priesthood. Now according
to the Law, the lesser judges were not competent to decide all cases,
and had recourse to the higher judges, according to Ex. 24:14: "If any
question shall arise" among you, "you shall refer it to them. " It
seems, therefore, that a priest cannot absolve his subject from graver
sins, but should refer him to his superior.
On the contrary, Whoever has charge of the principal has charge of the
accessory. Now priests are charged with the dispensation of the
Eucharist to their subjects, to which sacrament the absolution of sins
is subordinate [*Cf. [4879] Q[17], A[2], ad 1]. Therefore, as far as the
power of the keys is concerned, a priest can absolve his subject from
any sins whatever.
Further, grace, however small, removes all sin. But a priest dispenses
sacraments whereby grace is given. Therefore, as far as the power of
the keys is concerned, he can absolve from all sins.
I answer that, The power of order, considered in itself, extends to the
remission of all sins. But since, as stated above, the use of this
power requires jurisdiction which inferiors derive from their
superiors, it follows that the superior can reserve certain matters to
himself, the judgment of which he does not commit to his inferior;
otherwise any simple priest who has jurisdiction can absolve from any
sin. Now there are five cases in which a simple priest must refer his
penitent to his superior. The first is when a public penance has to be
imposed, because in that case the bishop is the proper minister of the
sacrament. The second is the case of those who are excommunicated when
the inferior priest cannot absolve a penitent through the latter being
excommunicated by his superior. The third case is when he finds that an
irregularity has been contracted, for the dispensation of which he has
to have recourse to his superior. The fourth is the case of arson. The
fifth is when it is the custom in a diocese for the more heinous crimes
to be reserved to the bishop, in order to inspire fear, because custom
in these cases either gives the power or takes it away.
Reply to Objection 1: In this case the priest should not hear the
confession of his accomplice, with regard to that particular sin, but
must refer her to another: nor should she confess to him but should ask
permission to go to another, or should have recourse to his superior if
he refused, both on account of the danger, and for the sake of less
shame. If, however, he were to absolve her it would be valid*: because
when Augustine says that they should not be guilty of the same sin, he
is speaking of what is congruous, not of what is essential to the
sacrament. [*Benedict XIV declared the absolution of an accomplice "in
materia turpi" to be invalid. ]
Reply to Objection 2: Penance delivers man from all defects of guilt,
but not from all defects of punishment, since even after doing penance
for murder, a man remains irregular. Hence a priest can absolve from a
crime, but for the remission of the punishment he must refer the
penitent to the superior, except in the case of excommunication,
absolution from which should precede absolution from sin, for as long
as a man is excommunicated, he cannot receive any sacrament of the
Church.
Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers those cases in which
superiors reserve the power of jurisdiction to themselves.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a man can use the keys with regard to his superior?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot use the keys in respect of
a superior. For every sacramental act requires its proper matter. Now
the proper matter for the use of the keys, is a person who is subject,
as stated above ([4880]Q[19], A[6]). Therefore a priest cannot use the
keys in respect of one who is not his subject.
Objection 2: Further, the Church Militant is an image of the Church
Triumphant. Now in the heavenly Church an inferior angel never
cleanses, enlightens or perfects a higher angel. Therefore neither can
an inferior priest exercise on a superior a hierarchical action such as
absolution.
Objection 3: Further, the judgment of Penance should be better
regulated than the judgment of an external court. Now in the external
court an inferior cannot excommunicate or absolve his superior.
Therefore, seemingly, neither can he do so in the penitential court.
On the contrary, The higher prelate is also "compassed with infirmity,"
and may happen to sin. Now the power of the keys is the remedy for sin.
Therefore, since he cannot use the key on himself, for he cannot be
both judge and accused at the same time, it seems that an inferior can
use the power of the keys on him.
Further, absolution which is given through the power of the keys, is
ordained to the reception of the Eucharist. But an inferior can give
Communion to his superior, if the latter asks him to. Therefore he can
use the power of the keys on him if he submit to him.
I answer that, The power of the keys, considered in itself, is
applicable to all, as stated above [4881](A[2]): and that a priest is
unable to use the keys on some particular person is due to his power
being limited to certain individuals. Therefore he who limited his
power can extend it to whom he wills, so that he can give him power
over himself, although he cannot use the power of the keys on himself,
because this power requires to be exercised on a subject, and therefore
on someone else, for no man can be subject to himself.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the bishop whom a simple priest absolves
is his superior absolutely speaking, yet he is beneath him in so far as
he submits himself as a sinner to him.
Reply to Objection 2: In the angels there can be no defect by reason of
which the higher angel can submit to the lower, such as there can
happen to be among men; and so there is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 3: External judgment is according to men, whereas
the judgment of confession is according to God, in Whose sight a man is
lessened by sinning, which is not the case in human prelacy. Therefore
just as in external judgment no man can pass sentence of
excommunication on himself, so neither can he empower another to
excommunicate him. On the other hand, in the tribunal of conscience he
can give another the power to absolve him, though he cannot use that
power himself.
It may also be replied that absolution in the tribunal of the
confessional belongs principally to the power of the keys and
consequently to the power of jurisdiction, whereas excommunication
regards jurisdiction exclusively. And, as to the power of orders, all
are equal, but not as to jurisdiction. Wherefore there is no
comparison.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE DEFINITION, CONGRUITY AND CAUSE OF EXCOMMUNICATION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now treat of excommunication: we shall consider: (1) the
definition, congruity and cause of excommunication; (2) who has the
power to excommunicate; (3) communication with excommunicated persons;
(4) absolution from excommunication.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether excommunication is suitably defined?
(2) Whether the Church should excommunicate anyone?
(3) Whether anyone should be excommunicated for inflicting temporal
harm?
(4) Whether an excommunication unjustly pronounced has any effect?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether excommunication is suitably defined as separation from the communion
of the Church, etc?
Objection 1: It would seem that excommunication is unsuitably defined
by some thus: "Excommunication is separation from the communion of the
Church, as to fruit and general suffrages. " For the suffrages of the
Church avail for those for whom they are offered. But the Church prays
for those who are outside the Church, as, for instance, for heretics
and pagans. Therefore she prays also for the excommunicated, since they
are outside the Church, and so the suffrages of the Church avail for
them.
Objection 2: Further, no one loses the suffrages of the Church except
by his own fault. Now excommunication is not a fault, but a punishment.
Therefore excommunication does not deprive a man of the general
suffrages of the Church.
Objection 3: Further, the fruit of the Church seems to be the same as
the Church's suffrages, for it cannot mean the fruit of temporal goods,
since excommunication does not deprive a man of these. Therefore there
is no reason for mentioning both.
Objection 4: Further, there is a kind of excommunication called minor*,
by which man is not deprived of the suffrages of the Church. [*Minor
excommunication is no longer recognized by Canon Law. ] Therefore this
definition is unsuitable.
I answer that, When a man enters the Church by Baptism, he is admitted
to two things, viz. the body of the faithful and the participation of
the sacraments: and this latter presupposes the former, since the
faithful are united together in the participation of the sacraments.
Consequently a person may be expelled from the Church in two ways.
First, by being deprived merely of the participation of the sacraments,
and this is the minor excommunication. Secondly, by being deprived of
both, and this is the major excommunication, of which the above is the
definition. Nor can there be a third, consisting in the privation of
communion with the faithful, but not of the participation of the
sacraments, for the reason already given, because, to wit, the faithful
communicate together in the sacraments. Now communion with the faithful
is twofold. One consists in spiritual things, such as their praying for
one another, and meeting together for the reception of sacred things;
while another consists in certain legitimate bodily actions. These
different manners of communion are signified in the verse which
declares that those who are excommunicate are deprived of---
"os, orare, vale, communio, mensa. "
"Os," i. e. we must not give them tokens of goodwill; "orare," i. e. we
must not pray with them; "vale," we must not give them marks of
respect; "communio," i. e. we must not communicate with them in the
sacraments; "mensa," i. e. we must not take meals with them. Accordingly
the above definition includes privation of the sacraments in the words
"as to the fruit," and from partaking together with the faithful in
spiritual things, in the words, "and the general prayers of the
Church. "
Another definition is given which expresses the privation of both kinds
of acts, and is as follows: "Excommunication is the privation of all
lawful communion with the faithful. "
Reply to Objection 1: Prayers are said for unbelievers, but they do not
receive the fruit of those prayers unless they be converted to the
faith. In like manner prayers may be offered up for those who are
excommunicated, but not among the prayers that are said for the members
of the Church. Yet they do not receive the fruit so long as they remain
under the excommunication, but prayers are said for them that they may
receive the spirit of repentance, so that they may be loosed from
excommunication.
Reply to Objection 2: One man's prayers profit another in so far as
they can reach to him. Now the action of one man may reach to another
in two ways. First, by virtue of charity which unites all the faithful,
making them one in God, according to Ps. 118:63: "I am a partaker with
all them that fear Thee. " Now excommunication does not interrupt this
union, since no man can be justly excommunicated except for a mortal
sin, whereby a man is already separated from charity, even without
being excommunicated. An unjust excommunication cannot deprive a man of
charity, since this is one of the greatest of all goods, of which a man
cannot be deprived against his will. Secondly, through the intention of
the one who prays, which intention is directed to the person he prays
for, and this union is interrupted by excommunication, because by
passing sentence of excommunication, the Church severs a man from the
whole body of the faithful, for whom she prays. Hence those prayers of
the Church which are offered up for the whole Church, do not profit
those who are excommunicated. Nor can prayers be said for them among
the members of the Church as speaking in the Church's name, although a
private individual may say a prayer with the intention of offering it
for their conversion.
Reply to Objection 3: The spiritual fruit of the Church is derived not
only from her prayers, but also from the sacraments received and from
the faithful dwelling together.
Reply to Objection 4: The minor excommunication does not fulfill all
the conditions of excommunication but only a part of them, hence the
definition of excommunication need not apply to it in every respect,
but only in some.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Church should excommunicate anyone?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Church ought not to excommunicate
anyone, because excommunication is a kind of curse, and we are
forbidden to curse (Rom. 12:14). Therefore the Church should not
excommunicate.
Objection 2: Further, the Church Militant should imitate the Church
Triumphant. Now we read in the epistle of Jude (verse 9) that "when
Michael the Archangel disputing with the devil contended about the body
of Moses, he durst not bring against him the judgment of railing
speech, but said: The Lord command thee. " Therefore the Church Militant
ought not to judge any man by cursing or excommunicating him.
Objection 3: Further, no man should be given into the hands of his
enemies, unless there be no hope for him. Now by excommunication a man
is given into the hands of Satan, as is clear from 1 Cor. 5:5. Since
then we should never give up hope about anyone in this life, the Church
should not excommunicate anyone.
On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor. 5:5) ordered a man to be
excommunicated.
Further, it is written (Mat. 18:17) about the man who refuses to hear
the Church: "Let him be to thee as the heathen or publican. " But
heathens are outside the Church. Therefore they also who refuse to hear
the Church, should be banished from the Church by excommunication.
I answer that, The judgment of the Church should be conformed to the
judgment of God. Now God punishes the sinner in many ways, in order to
draw him to good, either by chastising him with stripes, or by leaving
him to himself so that being deprived of those helps whereby he was
kept out of evil, he may acknowledge his weakness, and humbly return to
God Whom he had abandoned in his pride. In both these respects the
Church by passing sentence of excommunication imitates the judgment of
God. For by severing a man from the communion of the faithful that he
may blush with shame, she imitates the judgment whereby God chastises
man with stripes; and by depriving him of prayers and other spiritual
things, she imitates the judgment of God in leaving man to himself, in
order that by humility he may learn to know himself and return to God.
Reply to Objection 1: A curse may be pronounced in two ways: first, so
that the intention of the one who curses is fixed on the evil which he
invokes or pronounces, and cursing in this sense is altogether
forbidden. Secondly, so that the evil which a man invokes in cursing is
intended for the good of the one who is cursed, and thus cursing is
sometimes lawful and salutary: thus a physician makes a sick man
undergo pain, by cutting him, for instance, in order to deliver him
from his sickness.
Reply to Objection 2: The devil cannot be brought to repentance,
wherefore the pain of excommunication cannot do him any good.
Reply to Objection 3: From the very fact that a man is deprived of the
prayers of the Church, he incurs a triple loss, corresponding to the
three things which a man acquires through the Church's prayers. For
they bring an increase of grace to those who have it, or merit grace
for those who have it not; and in this respect the Master of the
Sentences says (Sent. iv, D, 18): "The grace of God is taken away by
excommunication. " They also prove a safeguard of virtue; and in this
respect he says that "protection is taken away," not that the
excommunicated person is withdrawn altogether from God's providence,
but that he is excluded from that protection with which He watches over
the children of the Church in a more special way. Moreover, they are
useful as a defense against the enemy, and in this respect he says that
"the devil receives greater power of assaulting the excommunicated
person, both spiritually and corporally. " Hence in the early Church,
when men had to be enticed to the faith by means of outward signs (thus
the gift of the Holy Ghost was shown openly by a visible sign), so too
excommunication was evidenced by a person being troubled in his body by
the devil. Nor is it unreasonable that one, for whom there is still
hope, be given over to the enemy, for he is surrendered, not unto
damnation, but unto correction, since the Church has the power to
rescue him from the hands of the enemy, whenever he is willing.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anyone should be excommunicated for inflicting temporal harm?
Objection 1: It would seem that no man should be excommunicated for
inflicting a temporal harm. For the punishment should not exceed the
fault. But the punishment of excommunication is the privation of a
spiritual good, which surpasses all temporal goods. Therefore no man
should be excommunicated for temporal injuries.
Objection 2: Further, we should render to no man evil for evil,
according to the precept of the Apostle (Rom. 12:17). But this would be
rendering evil for evil, if a man were to be excommunicated for doing
such an injury. Therefore this ought by no means to be done.
On the contrary, Peter sentenced Ananias and Saphira to death for
keeping back the price of their piece of land (Acts 5:1-10). Therefore
it is lawful for the Church to excommunicate for temporal injuries.
I answer that, By excommunication the ecclesiastical judge excludes a
man, in a sense, from the kingdom. Wherefore, since he ought not to
exclude from the kingdom others than the unworthy, as was made clear
from the definition of the keys ([4882]Q[17], A[2]), and since no one
becomes unworthy, unless, through committing a mortal sin, he lose
charity which is the way leading to the kingdom, it follows that no man
should be excommunicated except for a mortal sin. And since by injuring
a man in his body or in his temporalities, one may sin mortally and act
against charity, the Church can excommunicate a man for having
inflicted temporal injury on anyone. Yet, as excommunication is the
most severe punishment, and since punishments are intended as remedies,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii), and again since a prudent
physician begins with lighter and less risky remedies, therefore
excommunication should not be inflicted, even for a mortal sin, unless
the sinner be obstinate, either by not coming up for judgment, or by
going away before judgment is pronounced, or by failing to obey the
decision of the court. For then, if, after due warning, he refuse to
obey, he is reckoned to be obstinate, and the judge, not being able to
proceed otherwise against him, must excommunicate him.
Reply to Objection 1: A fault is not measured by the extent of the
damage a man does, but by the will with which he does it, acting
against charity. Wherefore, though the punishment of excommunication
exceeds the harm done, it does not exceed the measure of the sin.
Reply to Objection 2: When a man is corrected by being punished, evil
is not rendered to him, but good: since punishments are remedies, as
stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether an excommunication unjustly pronounced has any effect?
Objection 1: It would seem that an excommunication which is pronounced
unjustly has no effect at all. Because excommunication deprives a man
of the protection and grace of God, which cannot be forfeited unjustly.
Therefore excommunication has no effect if it be unjustly pronounced.
Objection 2: Further, Jerome says (on Mat. 16:19: "I will give to thee
the keys"): "It is a pharisaical severity to reckon as really bound or
loosed, that which is bound or loosed unjustly. " But that severity was
proud and erroneous. Therefore an unjust excommunication has no effect.
On the contrary, According to Gregory (Hom. xxvi in Evang. ), "the
sentence of the pastor is to be feared whether it be just or unjust. "
Now there would be no reason to fear an unjust excommunication if it
did not hurt. Therefore, etc.
I answer that, An excommunication may be unjust for two reasons. First,
on the part of its author, as when anyone excommunicates through hatred
or anger, and then, nevertheless, the excommunication takes effect,
though its author sins, because the one who is excommunicated suffers
justly, even if the author act wrongly in excommunicating him.
Secondly, on the part of the excommunication, through there being no
proper cause, or through the sentence being passed without the forms of
law being observed. In this case, if the error, on the part of the
sentence, be such as to render the sentence void, this has no effect,
for there is no excommunication; but if the error does not annul the
sentence, this takes effect, and the person excommunicated should
humbly submit (which will be credited to him as a merit), and either
seek absolution from the person who has excommunicated him, or appeal
to a higher judge. If, however, he were to contemn the sentence, he
would "ipso facto" sin mortally.
But sometimes it happens that there is sufficient cause on the part of
the excommunicator, but not on the part of the excommunicated, as when
a man is excommunicated for a crime which he has not committed, but
which has been proved against him: in this case, if he submit humbly,
the merit of his humility will compensate him for the harm of
excommunication.
Reply to Objection 1: Although a man cannot lose God's grace unjustly,
yet he can unjustly lose those things which on our part dispose us to
receive grace. for instance, a man may be deprived of the instruction
which he ought to have. It is in this sense that excommunication is
said to deprive a man of God's grace, as was explained above (A[2], ad
3).
Reply to Objection 2: Jerome is speaking of sin not of its punishments,
which can be inflicted unjustly by ecclesiastical superiors.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THOSE WHO CAN EXCOMMUNICATE OR BE EXCOMMUNICATED (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider those who can excommunicate or be excommunicated.
Under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether every priest can excommunicate?
(2) Whether one who is not a priest can excommunicate?
(3) Whether one who is excommunicated or suspended, can excommunicate?
(4) Whether anyone can excommunicate himself, or an equal, or a
superior?
(5) Whether a multitude can be excommunicated?
(6) Whether one who is already excommunicated can be excommunicated
again?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether every priest can excommunicate?
Objection 1: It would seem that every priest can excommunicate. For
excommunication is an act of the keys. But every priest has the keys.
Therefore every priest can excommunicate.
Objection 2: Further, it is a greater thing to loose and bind in the
tribunal of penance than in the tribunal of judgment. But every priest
can loose and bind his subjects in the tribunal of Penance.
needed no key, and it would have been useless to Him to have it.
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 3:7): "These things saith . . .
He that hath the key of David," etc.
I answer that, The power to do a thing is both in the instrument and in
the principal agent, but not in the same way since it is more perfectly
in the latter. Now the power of the keys which we have, like other
sacramental powers, is instrumental: whereas it is in Christ as
principal agent in the matter of our salvation, by authority, if we
consider Him as God, by merit, if we consider Him as man [*For St.
Thomas' later teaching on this point, Cf. [4872]TP, Q[48], A[6];
[4873]FS, Q[112], A[1], AD 1]. But the very notion of a key expresses a
power to open and shut, whether this be done by the principal agent or
by an instrument. Consequently we must admit that Christ had the key,
but in a higher way than His ministers, wherefore He is said to have
the key of "excellence. "
Reply to Objection 1: A character implies the notion of something
derived from another, hence the power of the keys which we receive from
Christ results from the character whereby we are conformed to Christ,
whereas in Christ it results not from a character, but from the
principal form.
Reply to Objection 2: The key, which Christ had was not sacramental,
but the origin of the sacramental key.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether priests alone have the keys?
Objection 1: It would seem that not only priests have the keys. For
Isidore says (Etym. vii, 12) that the "doorkeepers have to tell the
good from the bad, so as to admit the good and keep out the bad. " Now
this is the definition of the keys, as appears from what has been said
([4874]Q[17], A[2]). Therefore not only priests but even doorkeepers
have the keys.
Objection 2: Further, the keys are conferred on priests when by being
anointed they receive power from God. But kings of Christian peoples
also receive power from God and are consecrated by being anointed.
Therefore not only priests have the keys.
Objection 3: Further, the priesthood is an order belonging to an
individual person. But sometimes a number of people together seem to
have the key, because certain Chapters can pass a sentence of
excommunication, which pertains to the power of the keys. Therefore not
only priests have the key.
Objection 4: Further, a woman is not capable of receiving the
priesthood, since she is not competent to teach, according to the
Apostle (1 Cor. 14:34). But some women (abbesses, for instance, who
exercise a spiritual power over their subjects), seem to have the keys.
Therefore not only priests have the keys.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Poenit. i): "This right," viz. of
binding and loosing, "is granted to priests alone. "
Further, by receiving the power of the keys, a man is set up between
the people and God. But this belongs to the priest alone, who is
"ordained . . . in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer
up gifts and sacrifices for sins" (Heb. 5:1). Therefore only priests
have the keys.
I answer that, There are two kinds of key. one reaches to heaven itself
directly, by remitting sin and thus removing the obstacles to the
entrance into heaven; and this is called the key of "order. " Priests
alone have this key, because they alone are ordained for the people in
the things which appertain to God directly. The other key reaches to
heaven, not directly but through the medium of the Church Militant. By
this key a man goes to heaven, since, by its means, a man is shut out
from or admitted to the fellowship of the Church Militant, by
excommunication or absolution. This is called the key of "jurisdiction"
in the external court, wherefore even those who are not priests can
have this key, e. g. archdeacons, bishops elect, and others who can
excommunicate. But it is not properly called a key of heaven, but a
disposition thereto.
Reply to Objection 1: The doorkeepers have the key for taking care of
those things which are contained in a material temple, and they have to
judge whether a person should be excluded from or admitted to that
temple; which judgment they pronounce, not by their own authority, but
in pursuance to the priest's judgment, so that they appear to be the
administrators of the priestly power.
Reply to Objection 2: Kings have no power in spiritual matters, so that
they do not receive the key of the heavenly kingdom. Their power is
confined to temporal matters, and this too can only come to them from
God, as appears from Rom. 13:1. Nor are they consecrated by the unction
of a sacred order: their anointing is merely a sign that the excellence
of their power comes down to them from Christ, and that, under Christ,
they reign over the Christian people.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as in civil matters the whole power is
sometimes vested in a judge, as in a kingdom, whereas sometimes it is
vested in many exercising various offices but acting together with
equal rights (Ethic. viii, 10,11), so too, spiritual jurisdiction may
be exercised both by one alone, e. g. a bishop, and by many together,
e. g. by a Chapter, and thus they have the key of jurisdiction, but they
have not all together the key of order.
Reply to Objection 4: According to the Apostle (1 Tim. 2:11; Titus
2:5), woman is in a state of subjection: wherefore she can have no
spiritual jurisdiction, since the Philosopher also says (Ethic. viii)
that it is a corruption of public life when the government comes into
the hands of a woman. Consequently a woman has neither the key of order
nor the key of jurisdiction. Nevertheless a certain use of the keys is
allowed to women, such as the right to correct other women who are
under them, on account of the danger that might threaten if men were to
dwell under the same roof.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether holy men who are not priests have the keys?
Objection 1: It would seem that holy men, even those who are not
priests, have the use of the keys. For loosing and binding, which are
the effects of the keys, derive their efficacy from the merit of
Christ's Passion. Now those are most conformed to Christ's Passion, who
follow Christ, suffering by patience and other virtues. Therefore it
seems that even if they have not the priestly order, they can bind and
loose.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Heb. 7:7): "Without all
contradiction, that which is less is blessed by the greater [Vulg. :
'better']. " Now "in spiritual matters," according to Augustine (De
Trin. vi, 8), "to be better is to be greater. " Therefore those who are
better, i. e. who have more charity, can bless others by absolving them.
Hence the same conclusion follows.
On the contrary, "Action belongs to that which has the power," as the
Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigil. i). But the key which is a
spiritual power belongs to priests alone. Therefore priests alone are
competent to have the use of the keys.
I answer that, There is this difference between a principal and an
instrumental agent, that the latter does not produce, in the effect,
its own likeness, but the likeness of the principal agent, whereas the
principal agent produces its own likeness. Consequently a thing becomes
a principal agent through having a form, which it can reproduce in
another, whereas an instrumental agent is not constituted thus, but
through being applied by the principal agent in order to produce a
certain effect. Since therefore in the act of the keys the principal
agent by authority is Christ as God, and by merit is Christ as man,* it
follows that on account of the very fulness of Divine goodness in Him,
and of the perfection of His grace, He is competent to exercise the act
of the keys. [*For St. Thomas' later teaching on this point, cf.
[4875]TP, Q[48], A[6]; [4876]FS, Q[112], A[1], ad 1]. But another man
is not competent to exercise this act as principal agent, since neither
can he give another man grace whereby sins are remitted, nor can he
merit sufficiently, so that he is nothing more than an instrumental
agent. Consequently the recipient of the effect of the keys, is
likened, not to the one who uses the keys, but to Christ. Therefore, no
matter how much grace a man may have, he cannot produce the effect of
the keys, unless he be appointed to that purpose by receiving orders.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as between instrument and effect there is
need or likeness, not of a similar form, but of aptitude in the
instrument for the effect, so is it as regards the instrument and the
principal agent. The former is the likeness between holy men and the
suffering Christ, nor does it bestow on them the use of the keys.
Reply to Objection 2: Although a mere man cannot merit grace for
another man condignly, yet the merit of one man can co-operate in the
salvation of another. Hence there is a twofold blessing. One proceeds
from a mere man, as meriting by his own act: this blessing can be
conferred by any holy person in whom Christ dwells by His grace, in so
far as he excels in goodness the person whom he blesses. The other
blessing is when a man blesses, as applying a blessing instrumentally
through the merit of Christ, and this requires excellence of order and
not of virtue.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether wicked priests have the use of the keys?
Objection 1: It would seem that wicked priests have not the use of the
keys. For in the passage where the use of the keys is bestowed on the
apostles (Jn. 20:22,23), the gift of the Holy Ghost is promised. But
wicked men have not the Holy Ghost. Therefore they have not the use of
the keys.
Objection 2: Further, no wise king entrusts his enemy with the
dispensation of his treasure. Now the use of the keys consists in
dispensing the treasure of the King of heaven, Who is Wisdom itself.
Therefore the wicked, who are His enemies on account of sin, have not
the use of the keys.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Bapt. v, 21) that God "gives
the sacrament of grace even through wicked men, but grace itself only
by Himself or through His saints. " Hence He forgives sin by Himself, or
by those who are members of the Dove. But the remission of sins is the
use of the keys. Therefore sinners, who are not "members of the Dove,"
have not the use of the keys.
Objection 4: Further, the prayer of a wicked priest cannot effect
reconciliation, for, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 11), "if an
unacceptable person is sent to intercede, anger is provoked to yet
greater severity. " But the use of the keys implies a kind of
intercession, as appears in the form of absolution. Therefore wicked
priests cannot use the keys effectively.
On the contrary, No man can know whether another man is in the state of
grace. If, therefore, no one could use the keys in giving absolution
unless he were in a state of grace, no one would know that he had been
absolved, which would be very unfitting.
Further, the wickedness of the minister cannot void the liberality of
his lord. But the priest is no more than a minister. Therefore he
cannot by his wickedness take away from us the gift which God has given
through him.
I answer that, Just as participation of a form to be induced into an
effect does not make a thing to be an instrument, so neither does the
loss of that form prevent that thing being used as an instrument.
Consequently, since man is merely an instrument in the use of the keys,
however much he may through sin be deprived of grace, whereby sins are
forgiven, yet he is by no means deprived of the use of the keys.
Reply to Objection 1: The gift of the Holy Ghost is requisite for the
use of the keys, not as being indispensable for the purpose, but
because it is unbecoming for the user to use them without it, though he
that submits to them receives their effect.
Reply to Objection 2: An earthly king can be cheated and deceived in
the matter of his treasure, and so he does not entrust his enemy with
the dispensation thereof. But the King of heaven cannot be cheated,
because all tends to His own glory, even the abuse of the keys by some,
for He can make good come out of evil, and produce many good effects
through evil men. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine speaks of the remission of sins in so
far as holy men co-operate therein, not by virtue of the keys, but by
merit of congruity. Hence He says that God confers the sacraments even
through evil men, and among the other sacraments, absolution which is
the use of the keys should be reckoned: but that through "members of
the Dove," i. e. holy men, He grants forgiveness of sins, in so far as
He remits sins on account of their intercession.
We might also reply that by "members of the Dove" he means all who are
not cut off from the Church, for those who receive the sacraments from
them, receive grace, whereas those who receive the sacraments from
those who are cut off from the Church, do not receive grace, because
they sin in so doing, except in the case of Baptism, which, in cases of
necessity, may be received even from one who is excommunicate.
Reply to Objection 4: The prayer which the wicked priest proffers on
his own account, is not efficacious: but that which he makes as a
minister of the Church, is efficacious through the merit of Christ. Yet
in both ways the priest's prayer should profit those who are subject to
him.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate, suspended or
degraded have the use of the keys?
Objection 1: It would seem that those who are schismatics, heretics,
excommunicate, suspended or degraded have the use of the keys. For just
as the power of the keys results from orders, so does the power of
consecration. But the above cannot lose the use of the power of
consecration, since if they do consecrate it is valid, though they sin
in doing so. Therefore neither can they lose the use of the keys.
Objection 2: Further, any active spiritual power in one who has the use
of his free-will can be exercised by him when he wills. Now the power
of the keys remains in the aforesaid, for, since it is only conferred
with orders, they would have to be reordained when they return to the
Church. Therefore, since it is an active power, they can exercise it
when they will.
Objection 3: Further, spiritual grace is hindered by guilt more than by
punishment. Now excommunication, suspension and degradation are
punishments. Therefore, since a man does not lose the use of the keys
on account of guilt, it seems that he does not lose it on account of
the aforesaid.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. cxxi in Joan. ) that the
"charity of the Church forgives sins. " Now it is the charity of the
Church which unites its members. Since therefore the above are
disunited from the Church, it seems that they have not the use of the
keys in remitting sins.
Further, no man is absolved from sin by sinning. Now it is a sin for
anyone to seek absolution of his sins from the above, for he disobeys
the Church in so doing. Therefore he cannot be absolved by them: and so
the same conclusion follows.
I answer that, In all the above the power of the keys remains as to its
essence, but its use is hindered on account of the lack of matter. For
since the use of the keys requires in the user authority over the
person on whom they are used, as stated above ([4877]Q[17], A[2], ad
2), the proper matter on whom one can exercise the use of the keys is a
man under one's authority. And since it is by appointment of the Church
that one man has authority over another, so a man may be deprived of
his authority over another by his ecclesiastical superiors.
Consequently, since the Church deprives heretics, schismatics and the
like, by withdrawing their subjects from them either altogether or in
some respect, in so far as they are thus deprived, they cannot have the
use of the keys.
Reply to Objection 1: The matter of the sacrament of the Eucharist, on
which the priest exercises his power, is not a man but wheaten bread,
and in Baptism, the matter is simply a man. Wherefore, just as, were a
heretic to be without wheaten bread, he could not consecrate, so
neither can a prelate absolve if he be deprived of his authority, yet
he can baptize and consecrate, albeit to his own damnation.
Reply to Objection 2: The assertion is true, provided matter be not
lacking as it is in the case in point.
Reply to Objection 3: Sin, of itself, does not remove matter, as
certain punishments do: so that punishment is a hindrance not because
it is contrary to the effect, but for the reason stated.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THOSE ON WHOM THE POWER OF THE KEYS CAN BE EXERCISED (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider those on whom the power of the keys can be
exercised. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a priest can use the key, which he has, on any man?
(2) Whether a priest can always absolve his subject?
(3) Whether anyone can use the keys on his superior?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a priest can use the key which he has, on any man?
Objection 1: It would seem that a priest can use the key which he has,
on any man. For the power of the keys was bestowed on priests by Divine
authority in the words: "Receive ye the Holy Ghost; whose sins you
shall forgive, they are forgiven them" (Jn. 20:22,23). But this was
said without any restriction. Therefore he that has the key, can use it
on any without restriction.
Objection 2: Further, a material key that opens one lock, opens all
locks of the same pattern. Now every sin of every man is the same kind
of obstacle against entering into heaven. Therefore if a priest can, by
means of the key which he has, absolve one man, he can do the same for
all others.
Objection 3: Further, the priesthood of the New Testament is more
perfect than that of the Old Testament. But the priest of the Old
Testament could use the power which he had of discerning between
different kinds of leprosy, with regard to all indiscriminately. Much
more therefore can the priest of the Gospel use his power with regard
to all.
On the contrary, It is written in the Appendix of Gratian: "It is not
lawful for every priest to loose or bind another priest's parishioner. "
Therefore a priest cannot absolve everybody.
Further, judgment in spiritual matters should be better regulated than
in temporal matters. But in temporal matters a judge cannot judge
everybody. Therefore, since the use of the keys is a kind of judgment,
it is not within the competency of a priest to use his key with regard
to everyone.
I answer that, That which has to do with singular matters is not
equally in the power of all. Thus, even as besides the general
principles of medicine, it is necessary to have physicians, who adapt
those general principles to individual patients or diseases, according
to their various requirements, so in every kingdom, besides that one
who proclaims the universal precepts of law, there is need for others
to adapt those precepts to individual cases, according as each case
demands. For this reason, in the heavenly hierarchy also, under the
Powers who rule indiscriminately, a place is given to the
Principalities, who are appointed to individual kingdoms, and to the
Angels who are given charge over individual men, as we have explained
above ([4878]FP, Q[113], AA[1],2). Consequently there should be a like
order of authority in the Church Militant, so that an indiscriminate
authority over all should be vested in one individual, and that there
should be others under him, having distinct authority over various
people. Now the use of the keys implies a certain power to exercise
authority, whereby the one on whom the keys are used, becomes the
proper matter of that act. Therefore he that has power over all
indiscriminately, can use the keys on all, whereas those who have
received authority over distinct persons, cannot use the keys on
everyone, but only on those over whom they are appointed, except in
cases of necessity, when the sacraments should be refused to no one.
Reply to Objection 1: A twofold power is required in order to absolve
from sins, namely, power of order and power of jurisdiction. The former
power is equally in all priests, but not the latter. And therefore,
when our Lord (Jn. 20:23) gave all the apostles in general, the power
of forgiving sins, this is to be understood of the power which results
from receiving orders, wherefore these words are addressed to priests
when they are ordained. But to Peter in particular He gave the power of
forgiving sins (Mat. 16:19), that we may understand that he has the
power of jurisdiction before the others. But the power of orders,
considered in itself, extends to all who can be absolved: wherefore our
Lord said indeterminately, "Whose sins you shall forgive, they are
forgiven them," on the understanding that this power should be used in
dependence on the power given to Peter, according to His appointment.
Reply to Objection 2: A material key can open only its own lock. nor
can any active force act save on its own matter. Now a man becomes the
matter of the power of order by jurisdiction: and consequently no one
can use the key in respect of another over whom he has not
jurisdiction.
Reply to Objection 3: The people of Israel were one people, and had but
one temple, so that there was no need for a distinction in priestly
jurisdiction, as there is now in the Church which comprises various
peoples and nations.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a priest can always absolve his subject?
Objection 1: It would seem that a priest cannot always absolve his
subject. For, as Augustine says (De vera et false Poenitentia [*Work of
an unknown author]), "no man should exercise the priestly office,
unless he be free from those things which he condemns in others. " But a
priest might happen to share in a sin committed by his subject, e. g. by
knowledge of a woman who is his subject. Therefore it seems that he
cannot always use the power of the keys on his subjects.
Objection 2: Further, by the power of the keys a man is healed of all
his shortcomings. Now it happens sometimes that a sin has attached to
it a defect of irregularity or a sentence of excommunication, from
which a simple priest cannot absolve. Therefore it seems that he cannot
use the power of the keys on such as are shackled by these things in
the above manner.
Objection 3: Further, the judgment and power of our priesthood was
foreshadowed by the judgment of the ancient priesthood. Now according
to the Law, the lesser judges were not competent to decide all cases,
and had recourse to the higher judges, according to Ex. 24:14: "If any
question shall arise" among you, "you shall refer it to them. " It
seems, therefore, that a priest cannot absolve his subject from graver
sins, but should refer him to his superior.
On the contrary, Whoever has charge of the principal has charge of the
accessory. Now priests are charged with the dispensation of the
Eucharist to their subjects, to which sacrament the absolution of sins
is subordinate [*Cf. [4879] Q[17], A[2], ad 1]. Therefore, as far as the
power of the keys is concerned, a priest can absolve his subject from
any sins whatever.
Further, grace, however small, removes all sin. But a priest dispenses
sacraments whereby grace is given. Therefore, as far as the power of
the keys is concerned, he can absolve from all sins.
I answer that, The power of order, considered in itself, extends to the
remission of all sins. But since, as stated above, the use of this
power requires jurisdiction which inferiors derive from their
superiors, it follows that the superior can reserve certain matters to
himself, the judgment of which he does not commit to his inferior;
otherwise any simple priest who has jurisdiction can absolve from any
sin. Now there are five cases in which a simple priest must refer his
penitent to his superior. The first is when a public penance has to be
imposed, because in that case the bishop is the proper minister of the
sacrament. The second is the case of those who are excommunicated when
the inferior priest cannot absolve a penitent through the latter being
excommunicated by his superior. The third case is when he finds that an
irregularity has been contracted, for the dispensation of which he has
to have recourse to his superior. The fourth is the case of arson. The
fifth is when it is the custom in a diocese for the more heinous crimes
to be reserved to the bishop, in order to inspire fear, because custom
in these cases either gives the power or takes it away.
Reply to Objection 1: In this case the priest should not hear the
confession of his accomplice, with regard to that particular sin, but
must refer her to another: nor should she confess to him but should ask
permission to go to another, or should have recourse to his superior if
he refused, both on account of the danger, and for the sake of less
shame. If, however, he were to absolve her it would be valid*: because
when Augustine says that they should not be guilty of the same sin, he
is speaking of what is congruous, not of what is essential to the
sacrament. [*Benedict XIV declared the absolution of an accomplice "in
materia turpi" to be invalid. ]
Reply to Objection 2: Penance delivers man from all defects of guilt,
but not from all defects of punishment, since even after doing penance
for murder, a man remains irregular. Hence a priest can absolve from a
crime, but for the remission of the punishment he must refer the
penitent to the superior, except in the case of excommunication,
absolution from which should precede absolution from sin, for as long
as a man is excommunicated, he cannot receive any sacrament of the
Church.
Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers those cases in which
superiors reserve the power of jurisdiction to themselves.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a man can use the keys with regard to his superior?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot use the keys in respect of
a superior. For every sacramental act requires its proper matter. Now
the proper matter for the use of the keys, is a person who is subject,
as stated above ([4880]Q[19], A[6]). Therefore a priest cannot use the
keys in respect of one who is not his subject.
Objection 2: Further, the Church Militant is an image of the Church
Triumphant. Now in the heavenly Church an inferior angel never
cleanses, enlightens or perfects a higher angel. Therefore neither can
an inferior priest exercise on a superior a hierarchical action such as
absolution.
Objection 3: Further, the judgment of Penance should be better
regulated than the judgment of an external court. Now in the external
court an inferior cannot excommunicate or absolve his superior.
Therefore, seemingly, neither can he do so in the penitential court.
On the contrary, The higher prelate is also "compassed with infirmity,"
and may happen to sin. Now the power of the keys is the remedy for sin.
Therefore, since he cannot use the key on himself, for he cannot be
both judge and accused at the same time, it seems that an inferior can
use the power of the keys on him.
Further, absolution which is given through the power of the keys, is
ordained to the reception of the Eucharist. But an inferior can give
Communion to his superior, if the latter asks him to. Therefore he can
use the power of the keys on him if he submit to him.
I answer that, The power of the keys, considered in itself, is
applicable to all, as stated above [4881](A[2]): and that a priest is
unable to use the keys on some particular person is due to his power
being limited to certain individuals. Therefore he who limited his
power can extend it to whom he wills, so that he can give him power
over himself, although he cannot use the power of the keys on himself,
because this power requires to be exercised on a subject, and therefore
on someone else, for no man can be subject to himself.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the bishop whom a simple priest absolves
is his superior absolutely speaking, yet he is beneath him in so far as
he submits himself as a sinner to him.
Reply to Objection 2: In the angels there can be no defect by reason of
which the higher angel can submit to the lower, such as there can
happen to be among men; and so there is no comparison.
Reply to Objection 3: External judgment is according to men, whereas
the judgment of confession is according to God, in Whose sight a man is
lessened by sinning, which is not the case in human prelacy. Therefore
just as in external judgment no man can pass sentence of
excommunication on himself, so neither can he empower another to
excommunicate him. On the other hand, in the tribunal of conscience he
can give another the power to absolve him, though he cannot use that
power himself.
It may also be replied that absolution in the tribunal of the
confessional belongs principally to the power of the keys and
consequently to the power of jurisdiction, whereas excommunication
regards jurisdiction exclusively. And, as to the power of orders, all
are equal, but not as to jurisdiction. Wherefore there is no
comparison.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE DEFINITION, CONGRUITY AND CAUSE OF EXCOMMUNICATION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now treat of excommunication: we shall consider: (1) the
definition, congruity and cause of excommunication; (2) who has the
power to excommunicate; (3) communication with excommunicated persons;
(4) absolution from excommunication.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether excommunication is suitably defined?
(2) Whether the Church should excommunicate anyone?
(3) Whether anyone should be excommunicated for inflicting temporal
harm?
(4) Whether an excommunication unjustly pronounced has any effect?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether excommunication is suitably defined as separation from the communion
of the Church, etc?
Objection 1: It would seem that excommunication is unsuitably defined
by some thus: "Excommunication is separation from the communion of the
Church, as to fruit and general suffrages. " For the suffrages of the
Church avail for those for whom they are offered. But the Church prays
for those who are outside the Church, as, for instance, for heretics
and pagans. Therefore she prays also for the excommunicated, since they
are outside the Church, and so the suffrages of the Church avail for
them.
Objection 2: Further, no one loses the suffrages of the Church except
by his own fault. Now excommunication is not a fault, but a punishment.
Therefore excommunication does not deprive a man of the general
suffrages of the Church.
Objection 3: Further, the fruit of the Church seems to be the same as
the Church's suffrages, for it cannot mean the fruit of temporal goods,
since excommunication does not deprive a man of these. Therefore there
is no reason for mentioning both.
Objection 4: Further, there is a kind of excommunication called minor*,
by which man is not deprived of the suffrages of the Church. [*Minor
excommunication is no longer recognized by Canon Law. ] Therefore this
definition is unsuitable.
I answer that, When a man enters the Church by Baptism, he is admitted
to two things, viz. the body of the faithful and the participation of
the sacraments: and this latter presupposes the former, since the
faithful are united together in the participation of the sacraments.
Consequently a person may be expelled from the Church in two ways.
First, by being deprived merely of the participation of the sacraments,
and this is the minor excommunication. Secondly, by being deprived of
both, and this is the major excommunication, of which the above is the
definition. Nor can there be a third, consisting in the privation of
communion with the faithful, but not of the participation of the
sacraments, for the reason already given, because, to wit, the faithful
communicate together in the sacraments. Now communion with the faithful
is twofold. One consists in spiritual things, such as their praying for
one another, and meeting together for the reception of sacred things;
while another consists in certain legitimate bodily actions. These
different manners of communion are signified in the verse which
declares that those who are excommunicate are deprived of---
"os, orare, vale, communio, mensa. "
"Os," i. e. we must not give them tokens of goodwill; "orare," i. e. we
must not pray with them; "vale," we must not give them marks of
respect; "communio," i. e. we must not communicate with them in the
sacraments; "mensa," i. e. we must not take meals with them. Accordingly
the above definition includes privation of the sacraments in the words
"as to the fruit," and from partaking together with the faithful in
spiritual things, in the words, "and the general prayers of the
Church. "
Another definition is given which expresses the privation of both kinds
of acts, and is as follows: "Excommunication is the privation of all
lawful communion with the faithful. "
Reply to Objection 1: Prayers are said for unbelievers, but they do not
receive the fruit of those prayers unless they be converted to the
faith. In like manner prayers may be offered up for those who are
excommunicated, but not among the prayers that are said for the members
of the Church. Yet they do not receive the fruit so long as they remain
under the excommunication, but prayers are said for them that they may
receive the spirit of repentance, so that they may be loosed from
excommunication.
Reply to Objection 2: One man's prayers profit another in so far as
they can reach to him. Now the action of one man may reach to another
in two ways. First, by virtue of charity which unites all the faithful,
making them one in God, according to Ps. 118:63: "I am a partaker with
all them that fear Thee. " Now excommunication does not interrupt this
union, since no man can be justly excommunicated except for a mortal
sin, whereby a man is already separated from charity, even without
being excommunicated. An unjust excommunication cannot deprive a man of
charity, since this is one of the greatest of all goods, of which a man
cannot be deprived against his will. Secondly, through the intention of
the one who prays, which intention is directed to the person he prays
for, and this union is interrupted by excommunication, because by
passing sentence of excommunication, the Church severs a man from the
whole body of the faithful, for whom she prays. Hence those prayers of
the Church which are offered up for the whole Church, do not profit
those who are excommunicated. Nor can prayers be said for them among
the members of the Church as speaking in the Church's name, although a
private individual may say a prayer with the intention of offering it
for their conversion.
Reply to Objection 3: The spiritual fruit of the Church is derived not
only from her prayers, but also from the sacraments received and from
the faithful dwelling together.
Reply to Objection 4: The minor excommunication does not fulfill all
the conditions of excommunication but only a part of them, hence the
definition of excommunication need not apply to it in every respect,
but only in some.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Church should excommunicate anyone?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Church ought not to excommunicate
anyone, because excommunication is a kind of curse, and we are
forbidden to curse (Rom. 12:14). Therefore the Church should not
excommunicate.
Objection 2: Further, the Church Militant should imitate the Church
Triumphant. Now we read in the epistle of Jude (verse 9) that "when
Michael the Archangel disputing with the devil contended about the body
of Moses, he durst not bring against him the judgment of railing
speech, but said: The Lord command thee. " Therefore the Church Militant
ought not to judge any man by cursing or excommunicating him.
Objection 3: Further, no man should be given into the hands of his
enemies, unless there be no hope for him. Now by excommunication a man
is given into the hands of Satan, as is clear from 1 Cor. 5:5. Since
then we should never give up hope about anyone in this life, the Church
should not excommunicate anyone.
On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor. 5:5) ordered a man to be
excommunicated.
Further, it is written (Mat. 18:17) about the man who refuses to hear
the Church: "Let him be to thee as the heathen or publican. " But
heathens are outside the Church. Therefore they also who refuse to hear
the Church, should be banished from the Church by excommunication.
I answer that, The judgment of the Church should be conformed to the
judgment of God. Now God punishes the sinner in many ways, in order to
draw him to good, either by chastising him with stripes, or by leaving
him to himself so that being deprived of those helps whereby he was
kept out of evil, he may acknowledge his weakness, and humbly return to
God Whom he had abandoned in his pride. In both these respects the
Church by passing sentence of excommunication imitates the judgment of
God. For by severing a man from the communion of the faithful that he
may blush with shame, she imitates the judgment whereby God chastises
man with stripes; and by depriving him of prayers and other spiritual
things, she imitates the judgment of God in leaving man to himself, in
order that by humility he may learn to know himself and return to God.
Reply to Objection 1: A curse may be pronounced in two ways: first, so
that the intention of the one who curses is fixed on the evil which he
invokes or pronounces, and cursing in this sense is altogether
forbidden. Secondly, so that the evil which a man invokes in cursing is
intended for the good of the one who is cursed, and thus cursing is
sometimes lawful and salutary: thus a physician makes a sick man
undergo pain, by cutting him, for instance, in order to deliver him
from his sickness.
Reply to Objection 2: The devil cannot be brought to repentance,
wherefore the pain of excommunication cannot do him any good.
Reply to Objection 3: From the very fact that a man is deprived of the
prayers of the Church, he incurs a triple loss, corresponding to the
three things which a man acquires through the Church's prayers. For
they bring an increase of grace to those who have it, or merit grace
for those who have it not; and in this respect the Master of the
Sentences says (Sent. iv, D, 18): "The grace of God is taken away by
excommunication. " They also prove a safeguard of virtue; and in this
respect he says that "protection is taken away," not that the
excommunicated person is withdrawn altogether from God's providence,
but that he is excluded from that protection with which He watches over
the children of the Church in a more special way. Moreover, they are
useful as a defense against the enemy, and in this respect he says that
"the devil receives greater power of assaulting the excommunicated
person, both spiritually and corporally. " Hence in the early Church,
when men had to be enticed to the faith by means of outward signs (thus
the gift of the Holy Ghost was shown openly by a visible sign), so too
excommunication was evidenced by a person being troubled in his body by
the devil. Nor is it unreasonable that one, for whom there is still
hope, be given over to the enemy, for he is surrendered, not unto
damnation, but unto correction, since the Church has the power to
rescue him from the hands of the enemy, whenever he is willing.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anyone should be excommunicated for inflicting temporal harm?
Objection 1: It would seem that no man should be excommunicated for
inflicting a temporal harm. For the punishment should not exceed the
fault. But the punishment of excommunication is the privation of a
spiritual good, which surpasses all temporal goods. Therefore no man
should be excommunicated for temporal injuries.
Objection 2: Further, we should render to no man evil for evil,
according to the precept of the Apostle (Rom. 12:17). But this would be
rendering evil for evil, if a man were to be excommunicated for doing
such an injury. Therefore this ought by no means to be done.
On the contrary, Peter sentenced Ananias and Saphira to death for
keeping back the price of their piece of land (Acts 5:1-10). Therefore
it is lawful for the Church to excommunicate for temporal injuries.
I answer that, By excommunication the ecclesiastical judge excludes a
man, in a sense, from the kingdom. Wherefore, since he ought not to
exclude from the kingdom others than the unworthy, as was made clear
from the definition of the keys ([4882]Q[17], A[2]), and since no one
becomes unworthy, unless, through committing a mortal sin, he lose
charity which is the way leading to the kingdom, it follows that no man
should be excommunicated except for a mortal sin. And since by injuring
a man in his body or in his temporalities, one may sin mortally and act
against charity, the Church can excommunicate a man for having
inflicted temporal injury on anyone. Yet, as excommunication is the
most severe punishment, and since punishments are intended as remedies,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii), and again since a prudent
physician begins with lighter and less risky remedies, therefore
excommunication should not be inflicted, even for a mortal sin, unless
the sinner be obstinate, either by not coming up for judgment, or by
going away before judgment is pronounced, or by failing to obey the
decision of the court. For then, if, after due warning, he refuse to
obey, he is reckoned to be obstinate, and the judge, not being able to
proceed otherwise against him, must excommunicate him.
Reply to Objection 1: A fault is not measured by the extent of the
damage a man does, but by the will with which he does it, acting
against charity. Wherefore, though the punishment of excommunication
exceeds the harm done, it does not exceed the measure of the sin.
Reply to Objection 2: When a man is corrected by being punished, evil
is not rendered to him, but good: since punishments are remedies, as
stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether an excommunication unjustly pronounced has any effect?
Objection 1: It would seem that an excommunication which is pronounced
unjustly has no effect at all. Because excommunication deprives a man
of the protection and grace of God, which cannot be forfeited unjustly.
Therefore excommunication has no effect if it be unjustly pronounced.
Objection 2: Further, Jerome says (on Mat. 16:19: "I will give to thee
the keys"): "It is a pharisaical severity to reckon as really bound or
loosed, that which is bound or loosed unjustly. " But that severity was
proud and erroneous. Therefore an unjust excommunication has no effect.
On the contrary, According to Gregory (Hom. xxvi in Evang. ), "the
sentence of the pastor is to be feared whether it be just or unjust. "
Now there would be no reason to fear an unjust excommunication if it
did not hurt. Therefore, etc.
I answer that, An excommunication may be unjust for two reasons. First,
on the part of its author, as when anyone excommunicates through hatred
or anger, and then, nevertheless, the excommunication takes effect,
though its author sins, because the one who is excommunicated suffers
justly, even if the author act wrongly in excommunicating him.
Secondly, on the part of the excommunication, through there being no
proper cause, or through the sentence being passed without the forms of
law being observed. In this case, if the error, on the part of the
sentence, be such as to render the sentence void, this has no effect,
for there is no excommunication; but if the error does not annul the
sentence, this takes effect, and the person excommunicated should
humbly submit (which will be credited to him as a merit), and either
seek absolution from the person who has excommunicated him, or appeal
to a higher judge. If, however, he were to contemn the sentence, he
would "ipso facto" sin mortally.
But sometimes it happens that there is sufficient cause on the part of
the excommunicator, but not on the part of the excommunicated, as when
a man is excommunicated for a crime which he has not committed, but
which has been proved against him: in this case, if he submit humbly,
the merit of his humility will compensate him for the harm of
excommunication.
Reply to Objection 1: Although a man cannot lose God's grace unjustly,
yet he can unjustly lose those things which on our part dispose us to
receive grace. for instance, a man may be deprived of the instruction
which he ought to have. It is in this sense that excommunication is
said to deprive a man of God's grace, as was explained above (A[2], ad
3).
Reply to Objection 2: Jerome is speaking of sin not of its punishments,
which can be inflicted unjustly by ecclesiastical superiors.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THOSE WHO CAN EXCOMMUNICATE OR BE EXCOMMUNICATED (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider those who can excommunicate or be excommunicated.
Under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether every priest can excommunicate?
(2) Whether one who is not a priest can excommunicate?
(3) Whether one who is excommunicated or suspended, can excommunicate?
(4) Whether anyone can excommunicate himself, or an equal, or a
superior?
(5) Whether a multitude can be excommunicated?
(6) Whether one who is already excommunicated can be excommunicated
again?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether every priest can excommunicate?
Objection 1: It would seem that every priest can excommunicate. For
excommunication is an act of the keys. But every priest has the keys.
Therefore every priest can excommunicate.
Objection 2: Further, it is a greater thing to loose and bind in the
tribunal of penance than in the tribunal of judgment. But every priest
can loose and bind his subjects in the tribunal of Penance.
