Example: a man
attached
to
daughter and a mother.
daughter and a mother.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-3-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991-PDF-Search-Engine
In the Sutra a neutral question is a question which should be set aside: that is, this type of question is called neutral, not answered, because it should be set aside, or rejected.
The object of such a question is termed "an undefined point.
"
There are four types of questions: 1. a question to which one responds in a categorical manner; 2. a question to which one responds by distinguishing; 3. a question to which one responds by another question; and 4. a question which one should not answer.
22. Categorical response, as for death; a distinguishing
response, as for rebirth; a response by a question, as for
superiority; and a response by rejecting the question, as for
78 non-identity.
1. If one asks, "Do all beings die/' one should answer in a categorical manner, "They do. "
2. If one asks, "Will all being be reborn? " one should answer by distinguishing, "Beings endowed with defilements will be reborn; being freed from defilements will not be reborn. "
79
3. If one asks, "Is a person superior or inferior? ," one should
answer by the question, "In comparison with whom? " If he answers, "In comparison with the gods," one should answer, "He is inferior. " If one answers, "In comparison with beings in the
? painful realms of rebirth,"one should answer, "He is superior. "
4. If one asks, "Are the skandhas the same thing as a sattva or living being, or are they different? ," this is a question that is to be rejected because the thing called a "living being" does not exist. In the same way one would reject the question, "Is the child of a sterile woman white or black? "
***
How can you say (in Karika 22) that one has responded to this fourth question, since one did not answer whether the skandhas are, yes or no, identical to a living being?
This question is answered by saying, "This question is to be
80 rejected": thus there is a response to it.
***
Another says that the second question, like the first question, calls for a categorical response, "All beings do not arise. "
But the author says that in order to justify the example given
[by the Vaibhasikas] to the second type of question, to someone
81
who asks, "Will those who die be reborn? ," one should answer by
distinguishing, ["All will not be reborn; those who are endowed with the defilements will be reborn, but not those who are freed from them. ]
[He says again that the third question also calls for a categorical response. ]A human being in fact is at one and the same time superior and inferior according to the point of comparison. In the same manner as if one were to ask, "Is consciousness (vijndna) a cause, or is it a result? ," [one should answer, "It is a cause with respect to its result, and it is a result with respect to its cause. "]But, says the author, to someone who asks in a categorical manner "Is a person superior or inferior? /' it is not suitable to respond
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categorically, "He is superior" or "He is inferior;" one should thus respond by distinguishing: one must first be assured of the intention of the questioner.
***
The Abhidharmikas
someone asks, "Is the Blessed One the Arhat Samyaksambuddha? Is the Dharma that he speaks well spoken? Is the Samgha of the Sravakas well instructed? Is physical matter {rupa) impermanent? . . . Is consciousness (vijndna) impermanent? Can Suffering be known . . . Can the Path be known? ," then to these questions one should answer in a categorical manner, by reason of the superior
83
2. An answer by distinguishing: If a person asks, "I desire that the Venerable One teaches me the dharmas" one should distin- guish, "The dharmas are numerous, past, present, and future: which do you desire that I should teach you? . " If he answers, "Teach me the past dharmas** one should distinguish, "The past dharmas are numerous: rupa} vedana, samjnd, samskdras, and vijndna" If he asks, "Teach me concerning rupa** one should distinguish, "There are three rupas, the good, the bad, and the neutral. " If one asks, "Teach me concerning the good," one should distinguish, "There are seven types of good rupa: abstention from killing . . . and abstention from idle words. " If one asks, "Teach me abstention from killing," one should distinguish, "It is of three types, arisen from the three roots of good, non-greed (alobha), non-anger {advesa), and non-ignorance (amoha)** If one asks, "Teach me the abstention from killing arisen from non-greed," one should distinguish, "It is twofold, vijnapti and avijnapti. Which do you desire that I teach you? "
3. A response by a question: The same question, put by a false-hearted person, is a question to which one should respond by another question. If such a person asks, "I desire that the Venerable
benefit (of such an answer).
82
say: 1. A categorical response: If
? One teach me the dharmas" one should counter-interrogate him,
"The dfoarmas are numerous: which do you desire that I teach
you? " But one need not establish the distinctions (past, present,
and future dharmas); one should continue to counter-interrogate
84
But if a good-hearted person and a false-hearted person do not question you, but content themselves with expressing a desire, "Teach me the dharmas;" and if, on the other hand, one does not answer them, if one does not explain to them, and if one is content to interrogate them, "Which dharmas shall I teach you? ," how can you say that there is a question and a response?
The author answers: He who says, "Teach me the Path," asks concerning the Path, exactly as if he has said, "Which is the Path? " One the other hand, through this counter-interrogation, one explains to the questioner concerning his questions: is the Path then not explained (vj/dkrta)?
If this is the case, then is there an answer by means of a question in the second and third type of question?
No, the responses differ, for sometimes there is distinction,
85
4. A question to be rejected: If one asks "Are the number of persons finite or infinite, etc. ? ," then this question should be rejected.
***
One may find in the Sutra itself the definition of these four questions and answers: the venerable Mahasarhghikas read a Sutra (Dtrgha, TD 1, p. 51bl, Madhyama, TD 1, p. 609a24) which says, "Bhiksus, there are four responses to questions. What are these four? There are some questions which one should reply categori- cally . . . ; there are some questions which one should reject. What is
him until the questioner remains silent or he himself explains. (Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 76al5ff).
and sometimes there is no distinction.
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the question to which one should respond categorically? When one asks if all the skandhas are impermanent. What is the question to which one should respond by distinguishing? When someone asks what retribution in sensation a voluntary action requires. What is the question to which one should repsond by a question? When
84
someone asks if sarhjna is the soul of a person, counter-interrogate, "My friend, what do you think of the soul? ," and if he answers, "My friend, I think that the soul is coarse," one should respond that the sarhjna is other than the soul (Digha, i. 195). What is the question to be rejected? When someone asks if the world is eternal, non-eternal, eternal and non-eternal, neither eternal nor non-eternal; if the number of persons is finite, infinite,
87 finite and infinite, neither finite and infinite; if the Tathagata
exists after death . . . ; or if the vital principle is other than the body. These questions, Oh Bhiksus, are to be rejected. "
***
Within a certain person, an anusaya or latent defilement attaches itself to a certain object; this person is bound to this object by this anusaya.
We must examine to what object a person is bound by a past, present, or future anusaya.
From this point of view the anusayas or klesas are of two types: 88
specific Mesas, namely lust, anger, egotism; and general klesas^ namely views, doubt, and ignorance.
23. One is bound by lust, anger, and egotism, past and present, to the object from whence they have been produced without their having been abandoned.
When the specific klesas have arisen with respect to a certain object--an object past, present or future, an object abandoned through Seeing, etc. --and is thus found in the past or in the
one should
? present, when they have not been abandoned, the person in whom they are produced is bound to this object by these specific klesas. For, being specific, they are not necessarily produced within all persons with respect to all things, but rather within a certain person with respect to a certain thing.
24a-b. One is bound to all objects by the same future klesas, since they are mental states.
One is bound to any and all objects, past, present, and future, [and of the five categories: to be abandoned through Seeing, etc. , according to the case], by these same specific future klesas, since they belong to the tnanovijnana. For the sphere of the manas is tritemporal.
24b. One is bound to the object of their time period by the same future klesas, since they are not mental states.
One is bound to future objects through future lust and anger which differ from the preceeding--that is, non-mental states in a relationship with the five sense consciousnesses. The five consciousnesses, in fact, cognize only objects contemporaneous to them.
Sometimes this rule concerns only future lust and anger of the utpattidharmin or "destined to arise" category. It is otherwise when they are not destined to arise.
24c. Not destined to arise, one is bound everywhere by the same.
"Everywhere," this is, to all objects, past, present, and future.
24c-d. One is bound everywhere by the others, whatever they are.
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One is bound to all the objects of the three time periods and the five categories, according to the case, by the other, general klesas--which, having for their object the five upadanaskandhas, are produced within all and relative to all--in whatever period the said klesas belong.
***
89
[The Sautrantikas criticize this theory. ] Do the klesas, and
past and future objects, really exist?
If one says that they really exist, one admits that conditioned things always exist and are thus eternal; if they do not exist, how is it possible to say that a person is bound to these objects by the klesas, or that he is liberated from them?
The Vaibhasikas maintain that past and future dharmas really exist; conditioned things nevertheless are not eternal for they are endowed with the characteristics (laksanas, ii. 45c-d) of conditioned things. In order to better illustrate their position we present, in summary fashion, their doctrine:
25a. The dharmas exist in the three time periods.
Why is this?
90 25a. Because the Blessed One has said it.
1. The Blessed One taught in his own words the existence of the past and the future, "Monks, if past rupa did not exist, the learned holy Sravakas would 'not take into consideration' past rupa . . . If future rupa did not exist, the learned holy Sravakas would
'not delight in' future rupa. It is because future rupa exists that the
learned holy Sravakas . . . "
91
? 25b. Because mental consciousness preceeds from two.
2. The Blessed One implicitly teaches the same doctrine when
he says, "Consciousness is produced by reason of two. What are
these two? The organ of sight and a visible thing. . . the manas and 92
the dharmas" Now if the past and future dharmas do not exist, mental consciousness which has them for its object would not arise by reason of these two.
[These are the proofs taken from Scripture. As for proofs ' taken from reasoning:]
25c. Because it has an object.
3. A consciousness can arise given an object, but not if an object is not present. If past and future things do not exist, there would be consciousness without an object; thus there is no conciousness without an object.
25d. And because the past bears a result.
4. If the past does not exist, how can good and bad action give forth a result? In fact, at the moment when the result is produced, the retributive cause (ii. 54c-d) is past.
Therefore, because of the proofs from Scripture and reasoning quoted above, the Vaibhasikas affirm the existence of both the past and the future.
***
The masters who call themselves Sarvastivadins, "belivers in the existence of all," maintain that the past and the future exist.
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25c-d. He who affirms the existence of the dhannas of the three time periods is held to be a Sarvastivadin.
The masters who affirms the existence of all things, past,
present and future, are Sarvastivadins. Those who affirm the
existence of the present and a part of the past, namely the
existence of action which has not given forth its result; and the
non-existence of the future and a part of the past, namely the
non-existence of action which has given forth its result, are
regarded as Vibhajyavadins; [they do not belong to the Sarvasti-
93 vadin School. ]
***
How many systems are there in this School? [How many ways are there of understanding the doctrine of the existence of all (sarvastivada)? which is the best? ]
25d. There are four types of Sarvastivadins accordingly as
they teach a difference in existence {bhava), a difference in
characteristic, a difference in condition, and mutual
94 difference.
1. The Bhadanta Dharmatrata defends bhavanyathatva, that is, he affirms that the three time periods, past, present, and future, are differenciated by their non-identity of existence (bhdva).
When a dharma goes from one time period to another its nature is not modified, but its existence is. A gold vase which one breaks is an example which shows the difference of figure: its figure (samsthdna, i. l0a) is modified, but not its color. An example which shows difference in qualities: milk becomes whey; its taste, force, and digestibility change, but not its color. In the same way, when a future dharma passes from the future into the present, its
? future existence is abandoned, and its present existence is acquired, but its nature remains the same. When it passes from the present into the past, its present existence is abandoned, and its past existence is acquired, but its nature remains the same.
2. The Bhadanta Ghosaka defends laksandnyathdtva, that is, the time periods differ through the difference in their characteris- tics.
A dharma goes through the time periods. When it is past, it is endowed with past characteristics (laksana),b\xt it is not deprived of its present and future characteristics; when it is future, it is endowed with its future characteristics, but it is not deprived of its present and past characteristics; and when it is present, it is endowed with its present characteristics, but it is not deprived of
95
one woman is not detached with respect to other women.
3. The Bhadanta Vasumitra defends avasthdnyathdtva, that is, the time periods differ through the difference of condition (avastha). A dharma, going through the time periods, having taken up a certain condition, becomes different through the difference of its condition, not through a difference in its substance. Example: a token placed on the square of ones, is called one; placed on the square of tens, ten; and placed on the square of hundreds, one hundred.
4. The Bhadanta Buddhadeva defends anyonyathdtva, that is, the time periods are established through their mutual relation- ships.
A dharma, going throughout the time periods, takes different names through different relationships, that is, it is called past, future, or present, through a relationship with what preceeds and
with what follows. For example, the same woman is both a
96
its past and future characteristics.
Example: a man attached to
daughter and a mother.
***
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It is in this manner that these four masters maintain the
98 existence of all.
The first, professing "transformation" (parindma) may be 98
refuted along with the Samkhyas.
In the thesis of the second master, the time periods, past, present, and future, are confounded, since the three characteristics are found everywhere. The example moreover is lacking any similarity to the problem, for, within the man in question, there is active lust with respect to one woman, but there is only the "possession of lust" (ii. 36) with respect to other women.
In the thesis of the fourth master, the three time periods exist at the same time: a past dharma, for example, is past in relation to that whch preceeds it, future in relation to that which follows, and present in relation to what preceeds and what follows.
26a. The third is the best.
Consequently the best system is that of Vasumitra,
26b. The three time periods are proven by reason of their activity,
According to which the time periods and the conditions are established through the operation of the activity of a dharma: when a dharma does not accomplish its operation, it is future; when it is accomplishing it, it is present; and when its operation has come to an end, it is past.
*##
[The Sautrantikas criticize:] If the past and the future exist as things, they are present: why are they thus qualified as past and future?
? It is action not yet completed, in the act of being completed, or already completed, which determine the time period of a dharma. "
Good enough. But what action would you assign to a tatsabhdga eye? The action of an eye is to see, and a tatsabhdga eye does not now see (i. 42). Would you say that its action is to project and to give forth a result (phaladdnaparigraha, ii. 59)? But then if giving forth a result is an "action," then sabhdgahetu causes, etc. (ii. 59c) give forth their result when they are past, and so one arrives at the conclusion that they accomplish their action in the past and so would be as a consequence in the present. Or if an action, in order to be complete, calls for a projection and a giving forth of a result, these past causes would be at least semi-present. Thus the time periods are confounded.
27a. What is opposed [to the activity of a dharma? ]
But, if it always exists, why doesn't a dharma always exercise its activity? What obstacle causes it to sometimes produce and sometimes not to produce its action? One cannot say that its inaction results from the non-presence of certain causes, since these causes also always exist.
27a. How can activity be past, etc. ?
And how can activity itself be past, etc. ? Would you imagine a second activity of activity? That would be absurd. But if the activity, in and of itself (svarilpasattdpeksaya), is past, etc. , why not admit that the same holds for the dharma! And who says that the time periods depend on past activity, etc. ? Would you say that activity is neither past, present, nor future, but that, nevertheless, it exists? Then, being unconditioned (asamskrta), it is eternal (nitya), and how can you then say that a dharma is future when it does not exercise its activity, or past when it not longer exercises it?
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These objections would hold, [answer the Sarvastivadins,] if 100
activity were other than the dharma itself.
27b. But it is not other than the dharma.
Thus this error does not exist. Therefore
27b. The time periods are no longer justified.
If activity is the same as the dharma, and if the dharma always exist, its activity would also always exist. Why and how does one say that sometimes it is past, sometimes future? The distinction of the time periods is not justified.
[The Sarvastivadins answer:]How is it not justified? In fact a conditioned dharma which has not arisen is called future; that which, having arisen, is not destroyed, is called present; and that which is destroyed is called past.
[The Sautrantikas answer:] If, in the past and future, a dharma exists with the same nature {tenaivatmana) as when it is present,
27b-c. Existing in the same manner, how can it be non-ari- sen or destroyed?
If the unique self-nature of a dharma continues to exist, how can this dharma be non-arisen or destroyed? What is it that it is lacking now, through the absence of which it is qualified as non-arisen? What is it that it is lacking later, through the absence of which it is qualified as destroyed? Consequently, if one does not admit that the dharma exists after having been non-existent and no longer exists after having existed, the three time periods cannot
101 be established or proved to exist.
#*#
? [It is useful to examine the reasoning of the Sarvastivadins. ]
1. The argument that, possessing the characteristics of conditioned things (arising, etc. , ii. 452), conditioned things are not eternal even though they exist both in the past and in the future, is pure verbiage, for, if it always exists, a dharma is not susceptible either of arising or of perishing. "A dharma is eternal, and it is not eternal:" to speak in this manner is to contradict oneself through one's own words.
This is what the stanza explains when it says, "Self nature
always exists, but this does not mean that being is eternal, nor that
being is different from its self nature: this is clearly stated by the
102 Lord. "
2. With regard to the argument that the Blessed One taught the
existence of the past and the future since he said "Past action
103
exists, and future results exist", we would also say that the past
exists, and that the future exists. Past is that which was existent; future is that which, given its cause, will exist: it is in this sense that we say that the past and the future exists. But they do not exist as substantial entities (dravyatas) as does the present.
[The Sarvastivadins protest:] Who says that they exist like the present?
If they don't exist like the present, how do they exist?
The Sarvastivadins answer: They exist with the nature of the past and the future.
But, if they now. exist, how can one attribute the nature of past
and future to them? In fact, the Blessed One, in a text quoted by the
Sarvastivadins, had the intention of condemning the view that
negates cause and effect (iv. 79, v. 7). He said "the past exists" in
the sense of "the past was;" he said "the future exists" in the sense
104
of "the future will be. " The word "is" (asti) is a nipdta, in the
same sense as the expressions, "There is (asti) previous non-exist- ence of the lamp," "there is later non-existence of the lamp," and again, "This lamp is extinguished, but it was not extinguished by
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me. " It is in this same way that the text says "the past exists, and the future exists. " To understand otherwise, being in the past, the past would not now be the past.
[The Sarvastivadins answer:] We see that the Blessed One,
105
addressing the Lagudasikhlyaka ascetics, expressed himself in
this way, "Past action, which has been destroyed, which has perished, and which has ceased, does exist. " According to the proposed explanation, the sense would be, "This action was. " Now can we suppose that the ascetics would not admit that past action has already passed away?
[The Sautrantikas reply:]When the Blessed One says that past action exists, he had in view its power of giving forth a result, a power which was placed in the series of the agent through action which has now passed away. To understand otherwise, that is, if past action actually exists now in and of itself, how can it be considered as past?
Of the rest, Scripture contains a formal declaration. The
Blessed One said in the Paramarthasunyatasutra, "The eye, Oh
Bhiksus, arising, does not come from any place; perishing, it does
not remain in any place. In this way, Oh Bhik? us, the eye exists
after having been non-existent and, after having existed, disap-
106
pears. " If a future eye existed, the Blessed One would not have
said that the eye exists only after having been non-existent.
[The Sarvastivadins would perhaps say:] The expression, "It exists after having been non-existent" signifies "after having been non-existent in the present" (yartamane'dhvany abhutva), that is, "after having been non-existent as present" {vartamanabhavena abhutva).
This is inadmissible, for the time periods do not differ from the eye.
Does this mean that one should understand this as, "After having been non-existent in its own nature (svalaksanatas)? " But this is to explicitely acknowledge that a future eye does not now
? exist.
3. As for the argument that "the past and the future exist, since the consciousness arises by reason of two things," should one understand that since the mental consciousness arises by reason of a mental organ and past, present, or future dharmas, these dharmas are a necessary condition for the mental consciousness to arise to the same extent as is the mental organ, that is, in the quality of "generating condition" (janakapratyaya)} Or are they solely "conditions in a quality of object" {alambanamatra, ii. 62c)? Evidently future dharmas, which will be produced after thousands of years or which will never be produced, are not the generating causes of a present mental consciousness. Evidently Nirvana, which is contradictory to all arising, cannot be a generating cause. It is enough that the dharmas are a condition for the arising of a consciousness in their qualtiy of being an object: let us admit that it is thus for future and past dharmas.
[The Sarvastivadins ask:] If the past and future dharmas do not exist, how can they be the objects of consciousness?
They exist in the manner in which they are taken as objects.
And in what manner are they taken as objects?
[They are taken as objects with the mark of the past and the
107
future, as having existed or as coming into existence. ] In fact, a
person who remembers a past visible object of a past sensation, does not see "this is;" but he remembers "this was;" the man who foresees the future does not see the future as existing, but he foresees it as coming into existence (bhavisyat). . .
Another point. Memory (which is a certain mental conscious- ness) grasps a visible thing that has been seen, a sensation that has been felt, that is, a visible object and a sensation in a present state of being. If a dharma which one remembers is, in fact, the one grasped by the memory, it is presently manifested; if it is not one that one grasps through the memory, then the memory conscious- ness certainly has a non-existent object.
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Would one say that past and future visible objects exist without being present, because past or future visible objects are nothing other than atoms (paramdnu) in a state of dispersion (viprakirna)? But we would say: (1) when the consciousness takes as its object, through memory or prevision, a past or future visible object, it does not take it as an object in a state of dispersion, but on the contrary, as an assembled collection {sarhcita) of atoms; (2) if a past or future visible object is the visible object of the present with this small difference that the atoms are dispersed, then the atoms are thus eternal; there is never either production (utpdda) nor destruction of them; there is only association and dispersion of the atoms. To maintain such a thesis is to adopt the doctrine of the Ajlvikas and to reject the Sutras of the Sugata: 'The eye, Oh Bhiksus, arising, does not come from any place . . . ;" (3) the argument does not hold for sensation and other "non-solid" (amurta) dharmas: not being combinations of atoms {aparamanu- samcita), we do not see how they can be, in the past or in the future, atoms in a state of dispersion. In fact, moreover, one remembers the sensation as it was experienced when it was present; one foresees it as it will be experienced when it will be present. If, past and future, it is such that one grasps it through memory or prevision, it would be eternal. Thus the mental consciousness termed "memory" has a non-existent object, namely a sensation that does not now presently exist.
***
[The Vaibhasikas say:] If that which does not absolutely exist can be the object of consciousness, then a thirteenth dyatana (i. 14) could be the object of consciousness.
[The author answers:] Then what is, according to you, the object of a consciousness which says, "There is no thirteenth ayatana! "
It is its name, "thirteenth ayatana. "
? Then this object is only a name; the thing designated, the object, does not exist. Furthermore, what will be the presently existing object upon which the consciousness of the previous non-existence of sound bears?
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] The object of this consciousness is the sound itself [and not its non-existence. ]
Then, anyone who is in quest of the non-existence of sound should make a noise!
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] No, for the sound of which there is previous non-existence, exists in a future state, and it is this sound in its future state which is the object of the previously non-existent consciousness.
But if future sound, of which there is previous non-existence, exists in fact, how can there be the idea that it does not now exist?
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] It does not presently exist {varta- mdno nasti)\ from whence there is the idea, "it does not now exist. "
You do not have the right to speak in this manner, for it is the same dharma which is past, present, and future. Or, if there is a difference between future and present sound, and the idea "it does not now exist" bears on this difference, then you recognize that the distinctive characteristic of the present exists after not having existed. We will therefore have to prove that existence (bhava) and non-existence (abhdva) can be an object of consciousness.
***
[The Vaibhasikas say:] If a non-existent thing can be an object of consciousness, how could the Bodhisattva in his last existence say, "It is impossible that I know, that I see that which does not exist in this world? "
The meaning of this text is clear: "I am not like other prideful (dbhimdnika, v. 10a) ascetics who attribute to themselves a
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108
non-existent illumination':
which is. " Moreover, to admit your thesis, the object of any idea (buddhi) would be real: if all that one thinks is real, there is no longer any place for doubt or examination (vimarsa); there would be no difference between the Bodhisattva and others.
Let us add moreover that ideas certainly have existent and
non-existent things for their object, for the Blessed One explicitly
said, "From the moment when I said to him, 'Come, Oh BhiksusP
(iv. 26c), my Sravaka is instructed from evening until morning: he
will know that which is as is (sacca satto jnasyati) and that which is
not as not, that which is not the highest (sa-uttara) as not the
highest, and that which is the highest (anuttara=Nirvdna) as the 10
Consequently the reason that the Sarvastivadins gave in favor of the existence of the past and the future, that is, "because the object of the consciousness is existent" does not hold.
4. The Sarvastivadins also deduce an argument from the result of action. But the Sautrantikas do not admit that a result arises directly from a past action. A result arises from a special state of the series (cittasarhtdnavifesdt), a state which proceeds from the action, as one shall see at the end of this work wherein we refute the doctrine of the Vatsiputriyas (dtmavddapratisedha, see iv. 85a).
But the masters who affirm the real existence {dravyatas) of the past and the future should also admit the eternity of the result: what efficacy {sdmarthya) can they attribute to the action? An efficacy with regard to production (utpdda)? An efficacy with regard to the action of making something present (vartamdmka- rana)?
a. This is to admit that arising exists after having been non-existent (abhutvd bhavati). If you say that arising itself pre-exists, how can you attribute the efficacy of a thing to that same thing? You cannot but join the School of the Varsaganyas, "That which is, solely is; that which is not, solely is not; that which
110 is not, does not arise; and that which is, is not destroyed. "
highest. " (iv. l27d) 9
as for me, I only see as existing that
? b. What should we understand by "the action of making something present? "
Will this be the fact of drawing something to another place? We see three difficulties in this: (1) the result will thus be eternal; (2) how could the result, when it is non-material (aruupin), be achieved? ; and (3) movement would exist after having been non-existent.
Would this be the fact of modifying the unique or self nature of a pre-existent result (svabhavavisesana)? But is there not, in this thesis, the appearance of a modification previously non-existent?
*##
Consequently, the sarvastivada, "the doctrine of the existence of all," of the Sarvastivadins who affirm the real existence of the past and the future, is not good within Buddhism. It is not in this sense that one should understand sarvastivada. Good sarvastivada consists in affirming the existence of "all" by understanding the word "all" as Scripture understands it. How do the Sutras affirm that all exists? "When one says, 'all exists/ Oh Brahmins, this
111 refers to the twelve ayatanas: these are equivalent terms. "
Or rather, the "all" that exists is the three time periods. And it has been said how they exist: "That which has previously been, is the past. . . " (see above, p. 813).
But if the past and future do not exist, how can one be bound (samyukta) by a past or future klesa to a thing (vastu) which is past or future?
One is bound by a past klesa by reason of the existence, in the series, of an anusaya which has arisen from a past klesa; one is bound by a future klesa by reason of the existence of an anusaya which is the cause of the future anusaya of a klesa which has had or will have this thing for its object.
The Vaibhasikas say: "The past and the future truly exist. As
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regards that which cannot be explained, one should know that
27d. The nature of things is indeed profound;
112 certainly, it cannot be proven through reasoning. "
113 [Thus one need not deny the past and the future].
One can say that that which arises perishes: for example a visible. One can say that that which arises differes from that which perishes: in fact, that which arises is the future; that which perishes is the present. Time also arises, for that which is arising is
114
embraced within time, it has time for its nature; and a dharma
arises from time, by reason of the multiplicity of the moments of
115 future time.
We have thus finished with the problem presented to us by the theory of the anusayas.
***
116
When a person abandons an object through the disappear-
ance of the possession that he had of this object, is there for him "disconnection" from this object through the cutting off of the possession of the defilements which bears on this object? And inversely, when there is disconnection, is there abandoning?
When there is disconnection from an object, there is always an abandoning of this object; but one can have abandoning without disconnection.
28. When that which is to be abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering is abandoned, the ascetic remains in connection
? ^
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with it from the fact of the other universal defilements; when the first category is abandoned, he remains in connection with it from the fact of the other defilements
117 which have it as their object.
Let us suppose a person enters on to the path of the Seeing of Truths; the Seeing of Suffering has arisen in him, but not yet the
118
Seeing of Arising.
There are four types of questions: 1. a question to which one responds in a categorical manner; 2. a question to which one responds by distinguishing; 3. a question to which one responds by another question; and 4. a question which one should not answer.
22. Categorical response, as for death; a distinguishing
response, as for rebirth; a response by a question, as for
superiority; and a response by rejecting the question, as for
78 non-identity.
1. If one asks, "Do all beings die/' one should answer in a categorical manner, "They do. "
2. If one asks, "Will all being be reborn? " one should answer by distinguishing, "Beings endowed with defilements will be reborn; being freed from defilements will not be reborn. "
79
3. If one asks, "Is a person superior or inferior? ," one should
answer by the question, "In comparison with whom? " If he answers, "In comparison with the gods," one should answer, "He is inferior. " If one answers, "In comparison with beings in the
? painful realms of rebirth,"one should answer, "He is superior. "
4. If one asks, "Are the skandhas the same thing as a sattva or living being, or are they different? ," this is a question that is to be rejected because the thing called a "living being" does not exist. In the same way one would reject the question, "Is the child of a sterile woman white or black? "
***
How can you say (in Karika 22) that one has responded to this fourth question, since one did not answer whether the skandhas are, yes or no, identical to a living being?
This question is answered by saying, "This question is to be
80 rejected": thus there is a response to it.
***
Another says that the second question, like the first question, calls for a categorical response, "All beings do not arise. "
But the author says that in order to justify the example given
[by the Vaibhasikas] to the second type of question, to someone
81
who asks, "Will those who die be reborn? ," one should answer by
distinguishing, ["All will not be reborn; those who are endowed with the defilements will be reborn, but not those who are freed from them. ]
[He says again that the third question also calls for a categorical response. ]A human being in fact is at one and the same time superior and inferior according to the point of comparison. In the same manner as if one were to ask, "Is consciousness (vijndna) a cause, or is it a result? ," [one should answer, "It is a cause with respect to its result, and it is a result with respect to its cause. "]But, says the author, to someone who asks in a categorical manner "Is a person superior or inferior? /' it is not suitable to respond
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categorically, "He is superior" or "He is inferior;" one should thus respond by distinguishing: one must first be assured of the intention of the questioner.
***
The Abhidharmikas
someone asks, "Is the Blessed One the Arhat Samyaksambuddha? Is the Dharma that he speaks well spoken? Is the Samgha of the Sravakas well instructed? Is physical matter {rupa) impermanent? . . . Is consciousness (vijndna) impermanent? Can Suffering be known . . . Can the Path be known? ," then to these questions one should answer in a categorical manner, by reason of the superior
83
2. An answer by distinguishing: If a person asks, "I desire that the Venerable One teaches me the dharmas" one should distin- guish, "The dharmas are numerous, past, present, and future: which do you desire that I should teach you? . " If he answers, "Teach me the past dharmas** one should distinguish, "The past dharmas are numerous: rupa} vedana, samjnd, samskdras, and vijndna" If he asks, "Teach me concerning rupa** one should distinguish, "There are three rupas, the good, the bad, and the neutral. " If one asks, "Teach me concerning the good," one should distinguish, "There are seven types of good rupa: abstention from killing . . . and abstention from idle words. " If one asks, "Teach me abstention from killing," one should distinguish, "It is of three types, arisen from the three roots of good, non-greed (alobha), non-anger {advesa), and non-ignorance (amoha)** If one asks, "Teach me the abstention from killing arisen from non-greed," one should distinguish, "It is twofold, vijnapti and avijnapti. Which do you desire that I teach you? "
3. A response by a question: The same question, put by a false-hearted person, is a question to which one should respond by another question. If such a person asks, "I desire that the Venerable
benefit (of such an answer).
82
say: 1. A categorical response: If
? One teach me the dharmas" one should counter-interrogate him,
"The dfoarmas are numerous: which do you desire that I teach
you? " But one need not establish the distinctions (past, present,
and future dharmas); one should continue to counter-interrogate
84
But if a good-hearted person and a false-hearted person do not question you, but content themselves with expressing a desire, "Teach me the dharmas;" and if, on the other hand, one does not answer them, if one does not explain to them, and if one is content to interrogate them, "Which dharmas shall I teach you? ," how can you say that there is a question and a response?
The author answers: He who says, "Teach me the Path," asks concerning the Path, exactly as if he has said, "Which is the Path? " One the other hand, through this counter-interrogation, one explains to the questioner concerning his questions: is the Path then not explained (vj/dkrta)?
If this is the case, then is there an answer by means of a question in the second and third type of question?
No, the responses differ, for sometimes there is distinction,
85
4. A question to be rejected: If one asks "Are the number of persons finite or infinite, etc. ? ," then this question should be rejected.
***
One may find in the Sutra itself the definition of these four questions and answers: the venerable Mahasarhghikas read a Sutra (Dtrgha, TD 1, p. 51bl, Madhyama, TD 1, p. 609a24) which says, "Bhiksus, there are four responses to questions. What are these four? There are some questions which one should reply categori- cally . . . ; there are some questions which one should reject. What is
him until the questioner remains silent or he himself explains. (Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 76al5ff).
and sometimes there is no distinction.
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the question to which one should respond categorically? When one asks if all the skandhas are impermanent. What is the question to which one should respond by distinguishing? When someone asks what retribution in sensation a voluntary action requires. What is the question to which one should repsond by a question? When
84
someone asks if sarhjna is the soul of a person, counter-interrogate, "My friend, what do you think of the soul? ," and if he answers, "My friend, I think that the soul is coarse," one should respond that the sarhjna is other than the soul (Digha, i. 195). What is the question to be rejected? When someone asks if the world is eternal, non-eternal, eternal and non-eternal, neither eternal nor non-eternal; if the number of persons is finite, infinite,
87 finite and infinite, neither finite and infinite; if the Tathagata
exists after death . . . ; or if the vital principle is other than the body. These questions, Oh Bhiksus, are to be rejected. "
***
Within a certain person, an anusaya or latent defilement attaches itself to a certain object; this person is bound to this object by this anusaya.
We must examine to what object a person is bound by a past, present, or future anusaya.
From this point of view the anusayas or klesas are of two types: 88
specific Mesas, namely lust, anger, egotism; and general klesas^ namely views, doubt, and ignorance.
23. One is bound by lust, anger, and egotism, past and present, to the object from whence they have been produced without their having been abandoned.
When the specific klesas have arisen with respect to a certain object--an object past, present or future, an object abandoned through Seeing, etc. --and is thus found in the past or in the
one should
? present, when they have not been abandoned, the person in whom they are produced is bound to this object by these specific klesas. For, being specific, they are not necessarily produced within all persons with respect to all things, but rather within a certain person with respect to a certain thing.
24a-b. One is bound to all objects by the same future klesas, since they are mental states.
One is bound to any and all objects, past, present, and future, [and of the five categories: to be abandoned through Seeing, etc. , according to the case], by these same specific future klesas, since they belong to the tnanovijnana. For the sphere of the manas is tritemporal.
24b. One is bound to the object of their time period by the same future klesas, since they are not mental states.
One is bound to future objects through future lust and anger which differ from the preceeding--that is, non-mental states in a relationship with the five sense consciousnesses. The five consciousnesses, in fact, cognize only objects contemporaneous to them.
Sometimes this rule concerns only future lust and anger of the utpattidharmin or "destined to arise" category. It is otherwise when they are not destined to arise.
24c. Not destined to arise, one is bound everywhere by the same.
"Everywhere," this is, to all objects, past, present, and future.
24c-d. One is bound everywhere by the others, whatever they are.
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One is bound to all the objects of the three time periods and the five categories, according to the case, by the other, general klesas--which, having for their object the five upadanaskandhas, are produced within all and relative to all--in whatever period the said klesas belong.
***
89
[The Sautrantikas criticize this theory. ] Do the klesas, and
past and future objects, really exist?
If one says that they really exist, one admits that conditioned things always exist and are thus eternal; if they do not exist, how is it possible to say that a person is bound to these objects by the klesas, or that he is liberated from them?
The Vaibhasikas maintain that past and future dharmas really exist; conditioned things nevertheless are not eternal for they are endowed with the characteristics (laksanas, ii. 45c-d) of conditioned things. In order to better illustrate their position we present, in summary fashion, their doctrine:
25a. The dharmas exist in the three time periods.
Why is this?
90 25a. Because the Blessed One has said it.
1. The Blessed One taught in his own words the existence of the past and the future, "Monks, if past rupa did not exist, the learned holy Sravakas would 'not take into consideration' past rupa . . . If future rupa did not exist, the learned holy Sravakas would
'not delight in' future rupa. It is because future rupa exists that the
learned holy Sravakas . . . "
91
? 25b. Because mental consciousness preceeds from two.
2. The Blessed One implicitly teaches the same doctrine when
he says, "Consciousness is produced by reason of two. What are
these two? The organ of sight and a visible thing. . . the manas and 92
the dharmas" Now if the past and future dharmas do not exist, mental consciousness which has them for its object would not arise by reason of these two.
[These are the proofs taken from Scripture. As for proofs ' taken from reasoning:]
25c. Because it has an object.
3. A consciousness can arise given an object, but not if an object is not present. If past and future things do not exist, there would be consciousness without an object; thus there is no conciousness without an object.
25d. And because the past bears a result.
4. If the past does not exist, how can good and bad action give forth a result? In fact, at the moment when the result is produced, the retributive cause (ii. 54c-d) is past.
Therefore, because of the proofs from Scripture and reasoning quoted above, the Vaibhasikas affirm the existence of both the past and the future.
***
The masters who call themselves Sarvastivadins, "belivers in the existence of all," maintain that the past and the future exist.
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25c-d. He who affirms the existence of the dhannas of the three time periods is held to be a Sarvastivadin.
The masters who affirms the existence of all things, past,
present and future, are Sarvastivadins. Those who affirm the
existence of the present and a part of the past, namely the
existence of action which has not given forth its result; and the
non-existence of the future and a part of the past, namely the
non-existence of action which has given forth its result, are
regarded as Vibhajyavadins; [they do not belong to the Sarvasti-
93 vadin School. ]
***
How many systems are there in this School? [How many ways are there of understanding the doctrine of the existence of all (sarvastivada)? which is the best? ]
25d. There are four types of Sarvastivadins accordingly as
they teach a difference in existence {bhava), a difference in
characteristic, a difference in condition, and mutual
94 difference.
1. The Bhadanta Dharmatrata defends bhavanyathatva, that is, he affirms that the three time periods, past, present, and future, are differenciated by their non-identity of existence (bhdva).
When a dharma goes from one time period to another its nature is not modified, but its existence is. A gold vase which one breaks is an example which shows the difference of figure: its figure (samsthdna, i. l0a) is modified, but not its color. An example which shows difference in qualities: milk becomes whey; its taste, force, and digestibility change, but not its color. In the same way, when a future dharma passes from the future into the present, its
? future existence is abandoned, and its present existence is acquired, but its nature remains the same. When it passes from the present into the past, its present existence is abandoned, and its past existence is acquired, but its nature remains the same.
2. The Bhadanta Ghosaka defends laksandnyathdtva, that is, the time periods differ through the difference in their characteris- tics.
A dharma goes through the time periods. When it is past, it is endowed with past characteristics (laksana),b\xt it is not deprived of its present and future characteristics; when it is future, it is endowed with its future characteristics, but it is not deprived of its present and past characteristics; and when it is present, it is endowed with its present characteristics, but it is not deprived of
95
one woman is not detached with respect to other women.
3. The Bhadanta Vasumitra defends avasthdnyathdtva, that is, the time periods differ through the difference of condition (avastha). A dharma, going through the time periods, having taken up a certain condition, becomes different through the difference of its condition, not through a difference in its substance. Example: a token placed on the square of ones, is called one; placed on the square of tens, ten; and placed on the square of hundreds, one hundred.
4. The Bhadanta Buddhadeva defends anyonyathdtva, that is, the time periods are established through their mutual relation- ships.
A dharma, going throughout the time periods, takes different names through different relationships, that is, it is called past, future, or present, through a relationship with what preceeds and
with what follows. For example, the same woman is both a
96
its past and future characteristics.
Example: a man attached to
daughter and a mother.
***
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It is in this manner that these four masters maintain the
98 existence of all.
The first, professing "transformation" (parindma) may be 98
refuted along with the Samkhyas.
In the thesis of the second master, the time periods, past, present, and future, are confounded, since the three characteristics are found everywhere. The example moreover is lacking any similarity to the problem, for, within the man in question, there is active lust with respect to one woman, but there is only the "possession of lust" (ii. 36) with respect to other women.
In the thesis of the fourth master, the three time periods exist at the same time: a past dharma, for example, is past in relation to that whch preceeds it, future in relation to that which follows, and present in relation to what preceeds and what follows.
26a. The third is the best.
Consequently the best system is that of Vasumitra,
26b. The three time periods are proven by reason of their activity,
According to which the time periods and the conditions are established through the operation of the activity of a dharma: when a dharma does not accomplish its operation, it is future; when it is accomplishing it, it is present; and when its operation has come to an end, it is past.
*##
[The Sautrantikas criticize:] If the past and the future exist as things, they are present: why are they thus qualified as past and future?
? It is action not yet completed, in the act of being completed, or already completed, which determine the time period of a dharma. "
Good enough. But what action would you assign to a tatsabhdga eye? The action of an eye is to see, and a tatsabhdga eye does not now see (i. 42). Would you say that its action is to project and to give forth a result (phaladdnaparigraha, ii. 59)? But then if giving forth a result is an "action," then sabhdgahetu causes, etc. (ii. 59c) give forth their result when they are past, and so one arrives at the conclusion that they accomplish their action in the past and so would be as a consequence in the present. Or if an action, in order to be complete, calls for a projection and a giving forth of a result, these past causes would be at least semi-present. Thus the time periods are confounded.
27a. What is opposed [to the activity of a dharma? ]
But, if it always exists, why doesn't a dharma always exercise its activity? What obstacle causes it to sometimes produce and sometimes not to produce its action? One cannot say that its inaction results from the non-presence of certain causes, since these causes also always exist.
27a. How can activity be past, etc. ?
And how can activity itself be past, etc. ? Would you imagine a second activity of activity? That would be absurd. But if the activity, in and of itself (svarilpasattdpeksaya), is past, etc. , why not admit that the same holds for the dharma! And who says that the time periods depend on past activity, etc. ? Would you say that activity is neither past, present, nor future, but that, nevertheless, it exists? Then, being unconditioned (asamskrta), it is eternal (nitya), and how can you then say that a dharma is future when it does not exercise its activity, or past when it not longer exercises it?
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These objections would hold, [answer the Sarvastivadins,] if 100
activity were other than the dharma itself.
27b. But it is not other than the dharma.
Thus this error does not exist. Therefore
27b. The time periods are no longer justified.
If activity is the same as the dharma, and if the dharma always exist, its activity would also always exist. Why and how does one say that sometimes it is past, sometimes future? The distinction of the time periods is not justified.
[The Sarvastivadins answer:]How is it not justified? In fact a conditioned dharma which has not arisen is called future; that which, having arisen, is not destroyed, is called present; and that which is destroyed is called past.
[The Sautrantikas answer:] If, in the past and future, a dharma exists with the same nature {tenaivatmana) as when it is present,
27b-c. Existing in the same manner, how can it be non-ari- sen or destroyed?
If the unique self-nature of a dharma continues to exist, how can this dharma be non-arisen or destroyed? What is it that it is lacking now, through the absence of which it is qualified as non-arisen? What is it that it is lacking later, through the absence of which it is qualified as destroyed? Consequently, if one does not admit that the dharma exists after having been non-existent and no longer exists after having existed, the three time periods cannot
101 be established or proved to exist.
#*#
? [It is useful to examine the reasoning of the Sarvastivadins. ]
1. The argument that, possessing the characteristics of conditioned things (arising, etc. , ii. 452), conditioned things are not eternal even though they exist both in the past and in the future, is pure verbiage, for, if it always exists, a dharma is not susceptible either of arising or of perishing. "A dharma is eternal, and it is not eternal:" to speak in this manner is to contradict oneself through one's own words.
This is what the stanza explains when it says, "Self nature
always exists, but this does not mean that being is eternal, nor that
being is different from its self nature: this is clearly stated by the
102 Lord. "
2. With regard to the argument that the Blessed One taught the
existence of the past and the future since he said "Past action
103
exists, and future results exist", we would also say that the past
exists, and that the future exists. Past is that which was existent; future is that which, given its cause, will exist: it is in this sense that we say that the past and the future exists. But they do not exist as substantial entities (dravyatas) as does the present.
[The Sarvastivadins protest:] Who says that they exist like the present?
If they don't exist like the present, how do they exist?
The Sarvastivadins answer: They exist with the nature of the past and the future.
But, if they now. exist, how can one attribute the nature of past
and future to them? In fact, the Blessed One, in a text quoted by the
Sarvastivadins, had the intention of condemning the view that
negates cause and effect (iv. 79, v. 7). He said "the past exists" in
the sense of "the past was;" he said "the future exists" in the sense
104
of "the future will be. " The word "is" (asti) is a nipdta, in the
same sense as the expressions, "There is (asti) previous non-exist- ence of the lamp," "there is later non-existence of the lamp," and again, "This lamp is extinguished, but it was not extinguished by
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me. " It is in this same way that the text says "the past exists, and the future exists. " To understand otherwise, being in the past, the past would not now be the past.
[The Sarvastivadins answer:] We see that the Blessed One,
105
addressing the Lagudasikhlyaka ascetics, expressed himself in
this way, "Past action, which has been destroyed, which has perished, and which has ceased, does exist. " According to the proposed explanation, the sense would be, "This action was. " Now can we suppose that the ascetics would not admit that past action has already passed away?
[The Sautrantikas reply:]When the Blessed One says that past action exists, he had in view its power of giving forth a result, a power which was placed in the series of the agent through action which has now passed away. To understand otherwise, that is, if past action actually exists now in and of itself, how can it be considered as past?
Of the rest, Scripture contains a formal declaration. The
Blessed One said in the Paramarthasunyatasutra, "The eye, Oh
Bhiksus, arising, does not come from any place; perishing, it does
not remain in any place. In this way, Oh Bhik? us, the eye exists
after having been non-existent and, after having existed, disap-
106
pears. " If a future eye existed, the Blessed One would not have
said that the eye exists only after having been non-existent.
[The Sarvastivadins would perhaps say:] The expression, "It exists after having been non-existent" signifies "after having been non-existent in the present" (yartamane'dhvany abhutva), that is, "after having been non-existent as present" {vartamanabhavena abhutva).
This is inadmissible, for the time periods do not differ from the eye.
Does this mean that one should understand this as, "After having been non-existent in its own nature (svalaksanatas)? " But this is to explicitely acknowledge that a future eye does not now
? exist.
3. As for the argument that "the past and the future exist, since the consciousness arises by reason of two things," should one understand that since the mental consciousness arises by reason of a mental organ and past, present, or future dharmas, these dharmas are a necessary condition for the mental consciousness to arise to the same extent as is the mental organ, that is, in the quality of "generating condition" (janakapratyaya)} Or are they solely "conditions in a quality of object" {alambanamatra, ii. 62c)? Evidently future dharmas, which will be produced after thousands of years or which will never be produced, are not the generating causes of a present mental consciousness. Evidently Nirvana, which is contradictory to all arising, cannot be a generating cause. It is enough that the dharmas are a condition for the arising of a consciousness in their qualtiy of being an object: let us admit that it is thus for future and past dharmas.
[The Sarvastivadins ask:] If the past and future dharmas do not exist, how can they be the objects of consciousness?
They exist in the manner in which they are taken as objects.
And in what manner are they taken as objects?
[They are taken as objects with the mark of the past and the
107
future, as having existed or as coming into existence. ] In fact, a
person who remembers a past visible object of a past sensation, does not see "this is;" but he remembers "this was;" the man who foresees the future does not see the future as existing, but he foresees it as coming into existence (bhavisyat). . .
Another point. Memory (which is a certain mental conscious- ness) grasps a visible thing that has been seen, a sensation that has been felt, that is, a visible object and a sensation in a present state of being. If a dharma which one remembers is, in fact, the one grasped by the memory, it is presently manifested; if it is not one that one grasps through the memory, then the memory conscious- ness certainly has a non-existent object.
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Would one say that past and future visible objects exist without being present, because past or future visible objects are nothing other than atoms (paramdnu) in a state of dispersion (viprakirna)? But we would say: (1) when the consciousness takes as its object, through memory or prevision, a past or future visible object, it does not take it as an object in a state of dispersion, but on the contrary, as an assembled collection {sarhcita) of atoms; (2) if a past or future visible object is the visible object of the present with this small difference that the atoms are dispersed, then the atoms are thus eternal; there is never either production (utpdda) nor destruction of them; there is only association and dispersion of the atoms. To maintain such a thesis is to adopt the doctrine of the Ajlvikas and to reject the Sutras of the Sugata: 'The eye, Oh Bhiksus, arising, does not come from any place . . . ;" (3) the argument does not hold for sensation and other "non-solid" (amurta) dharmas: not being combinations of atoms {aparamanu- samcita), we do not see how they can be, in the past or in the future, atoms in a state of dispersion. In fact, moreover, one remembers the sensation as it was experienced when it was present; one foresees it as it will be experienced when it will be present. If, past and future, it is such that one grasps it through memory or prevision, it would be eternal. Thus the mental consciousness termed "memory" has a non-existent object, namely a sensation that does not now presently exist.
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[The Vaibhasikas say:] If that which does not absolutely exist can be the object of consciousness, then a thirteenth dyatana (i. 14) could be the object of consciousness.
[The author answers:] Then what is, according to you, the object of a consciousness which says, "There is no thirteenth ayatana! "
It is its name, "thirteenth ayatana. "
? Then this object is only a name; the thing designated, the object, does not exist. Furthermore, what will be the presently existing object upon which the consciousness of the previous non-existence of sound bears?
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] The object of this consciousness is the sound itself [and not its non-existence. ]
Then, anyone who is in quest of the non-existence of sound should make a noise!
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] No, for the sound of which there is previous non-existence, exists in a future state, and it is this sound in its future state which is the object of the previously non-existent consciousness.
But if future sound, of which there is previous non-existence, exists in fact, how can there be the idea that it does not now exist?
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] It does not presently exist {varta- mdno nasti)\ from whence there is the idea, "it does not now exist. "
You do not have the right to speak in this manner, for it is the same dharma which is past, present, and future. Or, if there is a difference between future and present sound, and the idea "it does not now exist" bears on this difference, then you recognize that the distinctive characteristic of the present exists after not having existed. We will therefore have to prove that existence (bhava) and non-existence (abhdva) can be an object of consciousness.
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[The Vaibhasikas say:] If a non-existent thing can be an object of consciousness, how could the Bodhisattva in his last existence say, "It is impossible that I know, that I see that which does not exist in this world? "
The meaning of this text is clear: "I am not like other prideful (dbhimdnika, v. 10a) ascetics who attribute to themselves a
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non-existent illumination':
which is. " Moreover, to admit your thesis, the object of any idea (buddhi) would be real: if all that one thinks is real, there is no longer any place for doubt or examination (vimarsa); there would be no difference between the Bodhisattva and others.
Let us add moreover that ideas certainly have existent and
non-existent things for their object, for the Blessed One explicitly
said, "From the moment when I said to him, 'Come, Oh BhiksusP
(iv. 26c), my Sravaka is instructed from evening until morning: he
will know that which is as is (sacca satto jnasyati) and that which is
not as not, that which is not the highest (sa-uttara) as not the
highest, and that which is the highest (anuttara=Nirvdna) as the 10
Consequently the reason that the Sarvastivadins gave in favor of the existence of the past and the future, that is, "because the object of the consciousness is existent" does not hold.
4. The Sarvastivadins also deduce an argument from the result of action. But the Sautrantikas do not admit that a result arises directly from a past action. A result arises from a special state of the series (cittasarhtdnavifesdt), a state which proceeds from the action, as one shall see at the end of this work wherein we refute the doctrine of the Vatsiputriyas (dtmavddapratisedha, see iv. 85a).
But the masters who affirm the real existence {dravyatas) of the past and the future should also admit the eternity of the result: what efficacy {sdmarthya) can they attribute to the action? An efficacy with regard to production (utpdda)? An efficacy with regard to the action of making something present (vartamdmka- rana)?
a. This is to admit that arising exists after having been non-existent (abhutvd bhavati). If you say that arising itself pre-exists, how can you attribute the efficacy of a thing to that same thing? You cannot but join the School of the Varsaganyas, "That which is, solely is; that which is not, solely is not; that which
110 is not, does not arise; and that which is, is not destroyed. "
highest. " (iv. l27d) 9
as for me, I only see as existing that
? b. What should we understand by "the action of making something present? "
Will this be the fact of drawing something to another place? We see three difficulties in this: (1) the result will thus be eternal; (2) how could the result, when it is non-material (aruupin), be achieved? ; and (3) movement would exist after having been non-existent.
Would this be the fact of modifying the unique or self nature of a pre-existent result (svabhavavisesana)? But is there not, in this thesis, the appearance of a modification previously non-existent?
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Consequently, the sarvastivada, "the doctrine of the existence of all," of the Sarvastivadins who affirm the real existence of the past and the future, is not good within Buddhism. It is not in this sense that one should understand sarvastivada. Good sarvastivada consists in affirming the existence of "all" by understanding the word "all" as Scripture understands it. How do the Sutras affirm that all exists? "When one says, 'all exists/ Oh Brahmins, this
111 refers to the twelve ayatanas: these are equivalent terms. "
Or rather, the "all" that exists is the three time periods. And it has been said how they exist: "That which has previously been, is the past. . . " (see above, p. 813).
But if the past and future do not exist, how can one be bound (samyukta) by a past or future klesa to a thing (vastu) which is past or future?
One is bound by a past klesa by reason of the existence, in the series, of an anusaya which has arisen from a past klesa; one is bound by a future klesa by reason of the existence of an anusaya which is the cause of the future anusaya of a klesa which has had or will have this thing for its object.
The Vaibhasikas say: "The past and the future truly exist. As
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regards that which cannot be explained, one should know that
27d. The nature of things is indeed profound;
112 certainly, it cannot be proven through reasoning. "
113 [Thus one need not deny the past and the future].
One can say that that which arises perishes: for example a visible. One can say that that which arises differes from that which perishes: in fact, that which arises is the future; that which perishes is the present. Time also arises, for that which is arising is
114
embraced within time, it has time for its nature; and a dharma
arises from time, by reason of the multiplicity of the moments of
115 future time.
We have thus finished with the problem presented to us by the theory of the anusayas.
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When a person abandons an object through the disappear-
ance of the possession that he had of this object, is there for him "disconnection" from this object through the cutting off of the possession of the defilements which bears on this object? And inversely, when there is disconnection, is there abandoning?
When there is disconnection from an object, there is always an abandoning of this object; but one can have abandoning without disconnection.
28. When that which is to be abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering is abandoned, the ascetic remains in connection
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with it from the fact of the other universal defilements; when the first category is abandoned, he remains in connection with it from the fact of the other defilements
117 which have it as their object.
Let us suppose a person enters on to the path of the Seeing of Truths; the Seeing of Suffering has arisen in him, but not yet the
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Seeing of Arising.
