This
can have no weight if the triennial rotation is adopted,
and this plan may possibly tend to conciliate the mjnds of
the members of the convention on this subject, which have
varied more than on any other question.
can have no weight if the triennial rotation is adopted,
and this plan may possibly tend to conciliate the mjnds of
the members of the convention on this subject, which have
varied more than on any other question.
Hamilton - 1834 - Life on Hamilton - v2
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? HAMILTON. 511
ment will make future arrangements. "He would like the
system" of his colleague (Hamilton) "if it could be estab-
lished,"* but it was " a system without example. "
Mason wished to preserve the state governments, and to
draw lines of demarcation, trusting to posterity to amend.
He was in favour of a republican system with a legislature
of two branches.
Martin urged the grant of new powers, and such a mo-
dification of the existing system as would not endanger the
state governments. "The grant," he said, " is a state grant,
and the union must be so organized that the states are in-
terested in supporting it. " After further debate, the pro-
position to vest the powers of legislation in congress was
rejected, and the national plan was taken up. On the ques-
tion of constituting two branches of the legislature, Johnson
observed "that the Jersey plan would preserve the state
governments, and thus was a departure from that of Vir-
ginia, which, though it concentres in a distinct national gov-
ernment, is not wholly independent of those of the states.
"A gentleman from New-York, with boldness and deci-
sion, proposed a system totally different from both, and,
though he has been praised by every body, has been sup-
ported by none. He could have wished that the support-
ers of the Jersey system could have been satisfied with that
of Virginia, and the individuality of the states be sup-
ported. It is agreed on all hands that a portion of govern-
ment is to be left to the states; how can this be done?
By joining the states in their legislative capacities, with the
right of apportioning the second branch of the national
legislature to represent the states individually. " Wilson
would try to designate the powers of each. Madison ap-
prehended the greatest danger from the encroachments of
* In the original notes, "He would like my system if it could be estab-
lished--system without example. "
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? 512 THE LIFE OF
the states; an apprehension justified by experience. The
negative on the state laws afforded one security to the na-
tional government. To draw the line between the two
was a difficult task. He believed it could not be done, and
was inclined to a general government. A national legis-
lature of two branches was approved.
On the question of the election of the first branch by
the people, great diversity of opinion existed. Hamilton
again declared himself in favour of it. He observed,* "It
is essential to the democratic rights of the community,
that this branch be directly elected by the people. Let us
look to probable events. There may arrive a period when
the state legislatures may cease. Such an event ought not
to embarrass the national government. "
King concurred in support of this principle. He believed
that the magistrates of the states will ever pursue schemes
of their own; and this state policy will, if the states elect
the first branch, pervade the national government, to which
those of the states will ever be hostile. After an opposite
view by Pinckney and Rutledge, the resolve, giving the
election to the people, was carried, and the duration of this
branch considered. It was proposed to limit it to two years.
Sherman was for one. Hamilton said,f "There is a medium;
I confess three years is not too long a term: a representative
ought to have freedom of deliberation, and ought to exercise
an opinion of his own. I am convinced the public mind
will adopt a solid plan; although the government of New-
York is higher toned than that of any other state, yet the
electors are listless and indifferent. The public are not
now ready to receive the best plan of government, but the
progress of circumstances will give it a different complex-
ion. " A biennial term was then adopted.
* Yates, page 149, omitted in Madison's reports, 926.
t Yates, 151. See Madison, 931.
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? HAMILTON. 513
On the inquiry as to the compensation of the members,
Hamilton remarked that "the states ought not to pay the
members, nor ought the amount to be fixed by the consti-
tution. He who pays is master. If each state pays its
own members, the burden being according to their re-
spective distances from the seat of government, would be
disproportionate. It has been asserted that the interests
of the general and state legislatures are precisely the same.
This cannot be correct. The views of the governed are
often materially different from those who govern. The
science of policy is the knowledge of human nature. A
state government will ever be the rival power of the gen-
eral government. It is, therefore, highly improper that
the state legislatures should be the paymasters of the
national government. All political bodies love power,
and it will often be improperly attained. "* It was re-
solved that the members should be paid from the public
treasury.
To secure the representatives from influence, it had been
proposed to render them ineligible to any office establish-
ed by a particular state, or by the United States, during
their term of service. It was now proposed to expunge
the clause which extended the restriction to one year after
the expiration of that term. King considered it impossi-
ble to carry t he system of exclusion so far," and we refine,"
he said, "too much by going in this instance to Utopian
lengths. It is a mere cobweb. "--" If there was no exclusive
clause, Madison thought there might be danger of creating
offices, or augmenting the stipends of those already created,
in order to gratify members if they were not excluded.
Such an instance had fallen within his own observation.
He was of the opinion that no office ought to be open to a
member, which might be created or the emolument aug-
? Yates, 152-3.
65
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? 514
THE LIFE OF
mented while he was in the legislature. " Hamilton closed
the debate* with these remarks:--
"In all general questions which become the subjects of
discussion, there are always some truths mixed with false-
hoods. I confess there is danger where men are capable
of holding two offices. Mankind in general are vicious--
their passions may be operated upon: we have been
taught to reprobate the danger of influence in the British
government, without duly reflecting how far it is neces-
sary to support a good government. We have taken up
many ideas upon trust, and at last, pleased with our own
opinions, establish them as undoubted truths. Hume'sf
opinion of the British constitution confirms the remark,
that there is always a body of firm patriots, who often
shake a corrupt administration. Take mankind as they
are, and what are they governed by? Their passions.
"There may be in every government a few choice spirits,
who may act from more worthy motives. One great error
is, that we suppose mankind more honest than they are.
Our prevailing passions are ambition and interest; and it
ever will be the duty of a wise government to avail itself
of those passions, in order to make them subservient to the
public good, for these ever induce us to action.
"Perhaps a few men in a state may, from patriotic mo-
tives, or to display their talents, or to reap the public ap-
plause, step forward. But if we adopt this clause, we
destroy the motive. I am, therefore, against all exclusions
and refinements, except this exclusion--that when a mem-
ber takes his seat, he should vacate every other office. It
* Yates, 156.
t "It was known that one of the ablest politicians (Mr. Hume) had pro-
nounced all that influence on the side of the crown which went under the
name of corruption, an essential part of the weight which maintained the
equilibrium of the constitution. "
Madison, 938,~gives this version of Hamilton's remarks thus italicised.
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? HAMILTON.
515 -
is difficult to put any exclusive regulation into effect; we
must in some degree submit to the inconvenience. "
The second branch, or senate, was next considered.
Hamilton, in accordance with his plan, wished that it should
be chosen by the people, through the medium of electors;
but it was decided that the choice should be made by the
state legislatures. Its term of service was much debated.
Madison said, " We are now to determine whether the re-
publican form shall be the basis of our government. " He
admitted that great powers were to be given, and that they
might be abused. Members may also lose their attachment
to their states. Yet the first branch would control them
in many of their abuses. "But we are now forming a body
on whose wisdom we mean to rely, and their permanency
in office secures a proper field in which they may exert
their firmness and knowledge. Democratic communities
may be unsteady, and be led to action by the impulse of
the moment. They may be sensible of their own weak-
ness, and desire the counsels and checks of friends to guard
them against the turbulence and weakness of unruly pas-
sions. Such are the various pursuits of this life, that, in
all civilized countries, the interest of a community will be
divided; there will be debtors and creditors, and an une-
qual possession of property; and hence arise different
views and different objects in government. This, indeed,
is the ground-work of aristocracy, and we find it blended
in every government, both ancient and modern. Even
where titles have survived property, we discover the noble
beggar haughty and assuming. The man who is possessed
of wealth, who lolls on his sofa or rolls in his carriage,
cannot judge of the wants or feelings of the day-labourer.
"The government we mean to erect is intended to last
for ages. The landed interest at present is prevalent; will
it not in time, by the operation of trade and manufactures,
be overbalanced in future elections? and, unless wisely pro-
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? 516 THE LIFE OF ,
vided against, what will become of your government? In
England, at this day, if elections were open to all classes
of people, the property of the landed proprietors would be
insecure; an agrarian law would soon take place. If
these observations be just, our government ought to secure
^he permanent interests of the country against innovation.
Landholders ought to have a share in the government to
Support these valuable interests, and to balance and check
the other. They ought lobe so constituted as to protect the
minority of the opulent against the majority. The senate,
therefore, ought to be this body; and, to answer these pur-
poses, ought to have permanency and stability. Various
have been the propositions; but my opinion is, the longer
they continue in office, the better will their view be an-
swered. "* "\
Sherman replied," that a bad government was the worse
for being long; that frequent elections give security and
permanency. That in Connecticut an annual government
had existed one hundred and thirty-two years, and as long
as a man behaves well he is never turned out of office.
Four years to the senate is quite sufficient with the rota-
tion proposed. "
Hamilton observed, "This question has already been
considered in several points of view. We are now form-
ing a republican government. Real liberty in neither found
in despotism, nor in the extremes of democracy, but in mode-
rate governments. Those" who mean to form a solid re-
publican government, ought to proceed to the confines of
another government^ As long as offices are open to all
* Yates, 169.
t It will be remarked that a similar opinion was expressed by Jefferson a
few months before. Writing from Paris, February 28,1787, to La Fayette,
then about to take part in the deliberations of France, he observed, " I wish
you success in your meeting, (the assembled des notables. ) I should form
better hopes of it, if it were divided into two houses instead of seven; keep.
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? HAMILTON.
517'
men, and no constitutional rank is established, it is pure
republicanism. But if we incline too much to democracy, we
shall soon shoot into a monarchy. The difference of pro-
perty is already great among us. Commerce and industry
will stjll increase the disparity. Your government must
meet this state of things, or combinations will in process
of time undermine your system. What was the tribuni-
tial power of Rome? It was instituted by the plebeians as a
guard against the patricians. But was this a sufficient
check? No! The only distinction which remained at
Rome was, at last, between the rich and poor. The gen-
tleman from Connecticut forgets that the democratic body
is already secure in a representation. As to Connecticut,
what were the little objects of their government before the
revolution? Colonial concerns merely. They ought now
to act on a more extended scale; and dare they do this?
Dare they collect the taxes and requisitions of congress?
Such a government may do well if they do not tax, and
this is precisely their situation. "
Wilson remarked, " The motion is now for nine years, ?
and a triennial rotation. Every nation attends to its for-
eign intercourse to support its commerce, to prevent foreign
contempt, and to make war and peace. Our senate will
be possessed of these powers, and therefore ought to be
dignified and permanent. What is the reason that Great
Britain does not enter into a commercial treaty with us?
Because congress has not the powers to enforce its observ-
ance. But give them those powers, and give them the
stability proposed by the motion, and they will have more
ing the good model of your neighbouring country before your eyes, you may
get on step by step towards a good constitution. Though that model is not
perfect, yet, as it would unite more suffrages than any new one which could
be proposed, it is better to make that the object. If every advance is to be pur.
chased by filling the royal coffers with gold, it will be gold well employed"
--2 Jeff. Works, p. 101.
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? 518
THE LIFE OF
permanency than a monarchical government. The great
objection of many is, that this duration would give birth to
views inconsistent with the interests of the union.
This
can have no weight if the triennial rotation is adopted,
and this plan may possibly tend to conciliate the mjnds of
the members of the convention on this subject, which have
varied more than on any other question. " Delaware, Penn-
sylvania, and Virginia, were in favour of nine years, but
it was agreed that it should be six, with a biennial rota-
tion.
The discussion of the powers of the legislature was de-
ferred in order to consider the proportionate suffrage of
the states in its choice. Martin urged with great vehe-
mence an equal representation of the states as their right,
and as most promotive of the general welfare; and after
a motion of Lansing, that the representation in the first
branch should be according to the rule of the confederation,
Madison supported earnestly a proportionate representa-
tion of the states. "Some gentlemen," he said,* "are
afraid that the plan is not sufficiently national, while others
apprehend that it is too much so. If this point of re-
presentation was once well fixed, we would come nearer
to one another in sentiment. The necessity would then
be discovered of circumscribing more effectually the state
governments, and enlarging the bounds of the general gov-
ernment. Some contend that the states are sovereign, when
in fact they are only political societies. There is a gra-
dation of power in all societies, from the lowest corpora-
tion to the highest sovereign. The states never possessed
the essential rights of sovereignty. -These were always
vested in congress. Their voting as states in congress is
no evidence of sovereignty. The state of Maryland voted
by counties. Did this make the counties sovereign? The
? Yates, p. 184-5.
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? HAMILTON.
519
states at present are only great corporations, having the
power of making by-laws, and these are effectual only if
they are not contradictory to the general confederation.
The states ought to be placed under the control of the gen-
eral government, at least as much so as they formerly were
under the king and British parliament. The arguments,
I observe, have taken a different turn, and I hope may tend
to convince all of the necessity of a strong energetic gov-
ernment; which would equally tend to give energy to, and
protect the state governments. " He deprecated the jeal-
ousy of the states, and observed," If the power is not imme-
diately derived from the people, in proportion to their num-
bers, we make a paper confederacy, but that will be all! "
"I would have no objection," Judge Read observed, " if
the government was more national, but the proposed plan
is so great a mixture of both, that it is best to drop it alto-
gether. A state government is incompatible with a gen-
eral government. If it was more national, I would be for
a representation proportionate to population. The plan
of the gentleman from New-York (Hamilton) is certainly
the best. But the great evil is the unjust appropriation
of the public lands. If there was but one national govern-
ment, we would be all equally interested. "
Hamilton, in the progress of this discussion, remarked--
"The course of my experience in human affairs might,
perhaps, restrain me from saying much on this subject. I
shall, however, give utterance to some of the observations
I have made during the course of this debate. The gen-
tleman from Maryland has been at great pains to establish
positions which are not denied. Many of them, as drawn
from the best writers on government, are become self-
evident principles. But I doubt the propriety of his appli-
cation of those principles in the present discussion. He
deduces from them the necessity that states entering into
a confederacy must retain the equality of votes. This po-
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? 520
THE LIFE OF
sition cannot be correct. Facts contradict it. The par-
liament of Great Britain asserted a supremacy over the
whole empire, and the celebrated Judge Blackstone labours
for the legality of it, although many parts were not repre-
sented. This parliamentary power we opposed as con-
trary to our colonial rights. With that exception, through-
out that whole empire it is submitted to.
"May no"t the smaller and greater states so modify their
respective rights as to establish the general interest of the
whole without adhering to the right of equality? Strict
representation is not observed in any of the state govern-
ments. The senate of New-York are chosen by persons
of certain qualifications to the exclusion of others.
"The question after all is--Is it our interest, in modify-
ing this general government, to sacrifice individual rights
to the preservation of the rights of an artificial being, called
states? There can be no truer principle than this--That
every individual of the community at large has an equal rigid
to the protection of government. If, therefore, three states
contain a majority of the inhabitants of America, ought they
to be governed by a minority? Would the inhabitants of
the great states ever submit to this? If the smaller states
maintain this principle through a love of power, will not
the larger, from the same motives, be equally tenacious to
preserve their power? They are to surrender their rights
--for what 1 For the preservation of an artificial being.
We propose a free government. Can it be so, if partial
distinctions are maintained?
"I agree with the gentleman from Delaware, that if the
state governments are to act in the general government, it
affords the strongest reason for exclusion. In the state
of New-York five counties form a majority of representa-
tives, and yet the government is in no danger, because the
laws have a general operation. The small states exagger-
ate their danger, and on this ground contend for an undue
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? HAMILTON.
proportion of power. But their danger is increased if the
larger states will not submit to it. Where will they form
new alliances for their support? Will they do this with
foreign powers? Foreigners are jealous of our increasing
greatness, and would rejoice in our distractions. Those
who have had opportunities of conversing with foreigners
respecting sovereigns in Europe, have discovered in them
an anxiety for the preservation of our democratic gov-
ernments, probably for no other reason but to keep us
weak. Unless your government is respectable, foreigners
will invade your rights--and to maintain tranquillity, it
must be respectable. Even to observe neutrality you must
have a strong government.
"I confess our present situation is critical. We have just
finished a war which has established our independence, and
loaded us with a heavy debt. We have still every motive
to unite for our common defence. Our people are dis-
posed to have a good government, but this disposition may
not always prevail. It is difficult to amend confederations:
it has been attempted in vain, and it is perhaps a miracle
that we are now met. We must therefore improve the
opportunity, and render the present system as perfect as
possible. Their good sense, and, above all, the necessity
of their affairs, will induce the people to adopt it. "
Lansing's motion was negatived by six to four states,
Maryland being divided, and the original resolution passed.
Imperfect as these reports are, they are sufficient to
show the spirit in which Hamilton met the objections to
an energetic system, labouring to vindicate the cause of
an efficient moderate government.
Some private business calling him at this time to New-
York, he was absent from the convention a few davs.
From the influence of Washington he hoped much; and
soon after his departure he communicated to him his im-
pression of what he believed to be the opinion of the peo
66
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? 522
THE LIFE OF
pie, and his convictions as to the policy to be pursued. His
letter gives the important and interesting fact, that, previ-
ous to this moment, no disclosure of his sentiments had
been sought by Hamilton from Washington. Such was
the delicacy observed towards a personage to whom the
country looked as its probable head, if a general govern-
ment should be established.
HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.
DEAR SIR,
In my passage through the Jerseys, and since my arrival
here, I have taken particular pains to discover the public
sentiment, and I am more and more convinced that this is
the critical opportunity for establishing the prosperity of
this country on a solid foundation. I have conversed with
men of information, not only of this city, but from differ-
ent parts of the state; and they agree that there has been
an astonishing revolution for the better in the minds of
the people.
The prevailing apprehension among thinking men is, that
the convention, from the fear of shocking the popular opin-
ion, will not go far enough. They seem to be convinced,
that a strong, well-mounted government will better suit the
popular palate, than one of a different complexion. Men
in office are, indeed, taking all possible pains to give an un-
favourable impression of the convention; but the current
seems to be moving strongly the other way.
A plain but sensible man, in a conversation I had with
him yesterday, expressed himself nearly in this manner:--
The people begin to be convinced that their " excellent
form of government," as they have been used to call it,
will not answer their purpose, and that they must substitute
something not very remote from that which they have
lately quitted.
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? HAMILTON.
523
These appearances, though they will not warrant a con-
clusion that the people are yet ripe for such a plan as I advo-
cate, yet serve to prove that there is no reason to despair
of their adopting one equally energetic, if the convention
should think proper to propose it. They serve to prove
that we ought not to allow too much weight to objections,
drawn from the supposed repugnancy of the people to an
efficient constitution. I confess I am more and more in-
clined to believe that former habits of thinking are regain-
ing their influence with more rapidity than is generally
imagined.
Not having compared ideas with you, sir, I cannot judge
how far our sentiments agree; but, as I persuade myself,
the genuineness of my representations will receive credit
with you. My anxiety for the event of the deliberations
of the convention, induces me to make this communication
of what appears to be the tendency of the public mind.
I own to you, sir, that I am seriously and deeply dis-
tressed at the aspect of the counsels which prevailed when
I left Philadelphia. I fear that we shall let slip the golden
opportunity of rescuing the American empire from dis-
union, anarchy, and misery.
No motley or feeble measure can answer the end, or will
finally receive the public support. Decision is true wis-
dom, and will be not less reputable to the convention, than
salutary to the community.
I shall of necessity remain here ten or twelve days. If
I have reason to believe that my attendance at Philadel-
phia will not be mere waste of time, I shall, after that
period, rejoin the convention.
New-York, July 3d, 1787.
The apprehensions entertained by Hamilton were con-
firmed by the temper evinced during the renewed discus-
sion of a proposition of Ellsworth that each state should
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? 524
THE LIFE Of
have an equal vote in the second branch of the legislature.
At its termination the increased strength of the states right
party was shown by an equal division of the votes--five
states being in favour of the proposition and five in the ne-
gative--Maryland divided.
The pertinacity with which the claims to an equal par-
ticipation in the second branch were pressed, following the
warmth previously exhibited on the question of electing
the first branch by the people, threatened an utter prostra-
tion of all hope of concurring in a plan of government.
Under these circumstances, General Cotesworth Pinck-
ney proposed to appoint a committee to adjust the embar-
rassing controversy.
Martin objected to the measure as an attempt to com-
promise, and, feeling the strength of his party, declared,
"You must give each state an equal suffrage, or our business
is at an end. " Sherman replied, that "we had reached a
point from which we cannot move in either direction," and
urged the committee.
Gouverneur Morris followed, insisting on the necessity of
an aristocracy " of men of great and established property"
in the second branch, to be checked by the democratic
branch, and thus give stability to the government. "A
senate for seven years, excluded from office, would be," he
observed, "one of the baubles of the general government.
A government by compact is no government. While I
avow myself," he said, " the advocate of a strong govern-
ment, I admit that the influence of the rich must be guard-
ed: and a pure democracy is equally oppressive to the
lower orders of the community. " He threw out these re-
marks for the consideration of the committee to be ap-
pointed. Wilson did not approve of this expedient. If
adopted, he was for a smaller committee. Madison ob-
jected to it as only a source of delay. If appointed " from
each state, we shall have in it the whole force of state pre-
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? HAMILTON.
525
judices. " "The great difficulty is to conquer former opin-
ions. The motion can as well be decided here as in com-
mittee. " Gerry urged accommodation as absolutely neces-
sary, hoping that the defects might be amended by a future
convention. The motion was carried by nine states, Jer-
sey and Delaware dissenting, and a committee of a mem-
ber from each state was chosen by ballot, composed chiefly
of the advocates of the Jersey plan.
On the fifth of July a compromise was reported. It
proposed to give to each state one representative for every
forty thousand inhabitants, computing three-fifths of the
slaves as one white, and to a state containing a less num-
ber, one representative,- to compose the first branch; vest-
ing in that branch the exclusive origin and control of
money bills;--that in the second branch, each state should
have one vote. ,
The advocates of a strong government opposed the pro-
position. Wilson insisted upon a division of the question.
Madison declared that the originating money bills was no
concession on the part of the smaller states, as seven states
combining in the second branch, could control the first; it
being small in number and well connected, will ever pre-
vail. No provision is made as to the regulation of trade,
imposts, treaties. We are driven to an unhappy dilemma
Two-thirds of the inhabitants of the union are to please
the remaining third by sacrificing their essential rights.
In behalf of this compromise it was asserted, that the
power over money bills was an equivalent for the equal
representation in the senate. That it properly belonged to
the democratic branch. The senate being farther removed
from the people, would be less attentive to economy. It
was analogous to the parliamentary usage of England. *
The members most strenuous for retaining power in the
? Geny's State of Facts.
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? 526
THE LIFE OF
states wished to postpone the consideration of the first
proposition in order to enter upon the second, which was
not acceded to; and the question, whether numbers or rela-
tive contribution should determine the proportion of suf-
frage, was referred to a special committee. It was then
proposed to consider the constitution of the second branch.
This was postponed by the vote of six states--Massachu-
setts and New-York divided.
Having given a vote in favour of conferring on the first
branch the originating money bills, and thus fulfilling that
part of the proposed compromise, it was moved that in the
second branch the states should have an equal vote, which
was approved. On the ninth of July the special commit-
tee reported an apportionment of the members of the first
branch among the states, and that the legislature be au-
thorized to augment the number from time to time, and in
case a state be divided, or two or more united, or a new
state be created within the limits of the United States, it
be empowered to regulate the number of representatives
upon the principles of their wealth and number of inhabit-
ants; the provisional clause was approved, the equal vote
in the second branch temporarily sanctioned, and the ratio
was established on a conjectural basis. An objection being
taken to the small number of representatives, this sub-
ject was referred to the grand committee from each state. *
The following day King reported a new Scale of repre-
sentation, increased from fifty-six to sixty-five members.
At this important moment, when a large concession had
been made to the advocates of an equal power in the
states, and a basis had been formed upon which a compound
* Madison states a proposition, proceeding from himself, as a proper ground
of compromise; that in the first branch the states should be represented ac-
cording to the number of free inhabitants, and in the second, which had for
one of its primary objects the guardianship of property, according to the whole
number, including slaves--in effect, a southern predominance.
? ?
? HAMILTON. 511
ment will make future arrangements. "He would like the
system" of his colleague (Hamilton) "if it could be estab-
lished,"* but it was " a system without example. "
Mason wished to preserve the state governments, and to
draw lines of demarcation, trusting to posterity to amend.
He was in favour of a republican system with a legislature
of two branches.
Martin urged the grant of new powers, and such a mo-
dification of the existing system as would not endanger the
state governments. "The grant," he said, " is a state grant,
and the union must be so organized that the states are in-
terested in supporting it. " After further debate, the pro-
position to vest the powers of legislation in congress was
rejected, and the national plan was taken up. On the ques-
tion of constituting two branches of the legislature, Johnson
observed "that the Jersey plan would preserve the state
governments, and thus was a departure from that of Vir-
ginia, which, though it concentres in a distinct national gov-
ernment, is not wholly independent of those of the states.
"A gentleman from New-York, with boldness and deci-
sion, proposed a system totally different from both, and,
though he has been praised by every body, has been sup-
ported by none. He could have wished that the support-
ers of the Jersey system could have been satisfied with that
of Virginia, and the individuality of the states be sup-
ported. It is agreed on all hands that a portion of govern-
ment is to be left to the states; how can this be done?
By joining the states in their legislative capacities, with the
right of apportioning the second branch of the national
legislature to represent the states individually. " Wilson
would try to designate the powers of each. Madison ap-
prehended the greatest danger from the encroachments of
* In the original notes, "He would like my system if it could be estab-
lished--system without example. "
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? 512 THE LIFE OF
the states; an apprehension justified by experience. The
negative on the state laws afforded one security to the na-
tional government. To draw the line between the two
was a difficult task. He believed it could not be done, and
was inclined to a general government. A national legis-
lature of two branches was approved.
On the question of the election of the first branch by
the people, great diversity of opinion existed. Hamilton
again declared himself in favour of it. He observed,* "It
is essential to the democratic rights of the community,
that this branch be directly elected by the people. Let us
look to probable events. There may arrive a period when
the state legislatures may cease. Such an event ought not
to embarrass the national government. "
King concurred in support of this principle. He believed
that the magistrates of the states will ever pursue schemes
of their own; and this state policy will, if the states elect
the first branch, pervade the national government, to which
those of the states will ever be hostile. After an opposite
view by Pinckney and Rutledge, the resolve, giving the
election to the people, was carried, and the duration of this
branch considered. It was proposed to limit it to two years.
Sherman was for one. Hamilton said,f "There is a medium;
I confess three years is not too long a term: a representative
ought to have freedom of deliberation, and ought to exercise
an opinion of his own. I am convinced the public mind
will adopt a solid plan; although the government of New-
York is higher toned than that of any other state, yet the
electors are listless and indifferent. The public are not
now ready to receive the best plan of government, but the
progress of circumstances will give it a different complex-
ion. " A biennial term was then adopted.
* Yates, page 149, omitted in Madison's reports, 926.
t Yates, 151. See Madison, 931.
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? HAMILTON. 513
On the inquiry as to the compensation of the members,
Hamilton remarked that "the states ought not to pay the
members, nor ought the amount to be fixed by the consti-
tution. He who pays is master. If each state pays its
own members, the burden being according to their re-
spective distances from the seat of government, would be
disproportionate. It has been asserted that the interests
of the general and state legislatures are precisely the same.
This cannot be correct. The views of the governed are
often materially different from those who govern. The
science of policy is the knowledge of human nature. A
state government will ever be the rival power of the gen-
eral government. It is, therefore, highly improper that
the state legislatures should be the paymasters of the
national government. All political bodies love power,
and it will often be improperly attained. "* It was re-
solved that the members should be paid from the public
treasury.
To secure the representatives from influence, it had been
proposed to render them ineligible to any office establish-
ed by a particular state, or by the United States, during
their term of service. It was now proposed to expunge
the clause which extended the restriction to one year after
the expiration of that term. King considered it impossi-
ble to carry t he system of exclusion so far," and we refine,"
he said, "too much by going in this instance to Utopian
lengths. It is a mere cobweb. "--" If there was no exclusive
clause, Madison thought there might be danger of creating
offices, or augmenting the stipends of those already created,
in order to gratify members if they were not excluded.
Such an instance had fallen within his own observation.
He was of the opinion that no office ought to be open to a
member, which might be created or the emolument aug-
? Yates, 152-3.
65
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? 514
THE LIFE OF
mented while he was in the legislature. " Hamilton closed
the debate* with these remarks:--
"In all general questions which become the subjects of
discussion, there are always some truths mixed with false-
hoods. I confess there is danger where men are capable
of holding two offices. Mankind in general are vicious--
their passions may be operated upon: we have been
taught to reprobate the danger of influence in the British
government, without duly reflecting how far it is neces-
sary to support a good government. We have taken up
many ideas upon trust, and at last, pleased with our own
opinions, establish them as undoubted truths. Hume'sf
opinion of the British constitution confirms the remark,
that there is always a body of firm patriots, who often
shake a corrupt administration. Take mankind as they
are, and what are they governed by? Their passions.
"There may be in every government a few choice spirits,
who may act from more worthy motives. One great error
is, that we suppose mankind more honest than they are.
Our prevailing passions are ambition and interest; and it
ever will be the duty of a wise government to avail itself
of those passions, in order to make them subservient to the
public good, for these ever induce us to action.
"Perhaps a few men in a state may, from patriotic mo-
tives, or to display their talents, or to reap the public ap-
plause, step forward. But if we adopt this clause, we
destroy the motive. I am, therefore, against all exclusions
and refinements, except this exclusion--that when a mem-
ber takes his seat, he should vacate every other office. It
* Yates, 156.
t "It was known that one of the ablest politicians (Mr. Hume) had pro-
nounced all that influence on the side of the crown which went under the
name of corruption, an essential part of the weight which maintained the
equilibrium of the constitution. "
Madison, 938,~gives this version of Hamilton's remarks thus italicised.
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? HAMILTON.
515 -
is difficult to put any exclusive regulation into effect; we
must in some degree submit to the inconvenience. "
The second branch, or senate, was next considered.
Hamilton, in accordance with his plan, wished that it should
be chosen by the people, through the medium of electors;
but it was decided that the choice should be made by the
state legislatures. Its term of service was much debated.
Madison said, " We are now to determine whether the re-
publican form shall be the basis of our government. " He
admitted that great powers were to be given, and that they
might be abused. Members may also lose their attachment
to their states. Yet the first branch would control them
in many of their abuses. "But we are now forming a body
on whose wisdom we mean to rely, and their permanency
in office secures a proper field in which they may exert
their firmness and knowledge. Democratic communities
may be unsteady, and be led to action by the impulse of
the moment. They may be sensible of their own weak-
ness, and desire the counsels and checks of friends to guard
them against the turbulence and weakness of unruly pas-
sions. Such are the various pursuits of this life, that, in
all civilized countries, the interest of a community will be
divided; there will be debtors and creditors, and an une-
qual possession of property; and hence arise different
views and different objects in government. This, indeed,
is the ground-work of aristocracy, and we find it blended
in every government, both ancient and modern. Even
where titles have survived property, we discover the noble
beggar haughty and assuming. The man who is possessed
of wealth, who lolls on his sofa or rolls in his carriage,
cannot judge of the wants or feelings of the day-labourer.
"The government we mean to erect is intended to last
for ages. The landed interest at present is prevalent; will
it not in time, by the operation of trade and manufactures,
be overbalanced in future elections? and, unless wisely pro-
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? 516 THE LIFE OF ,
vided against, what will become of your government? In
England, at this day, if elections were open to all classes
of people, the property of the landed proprietors would be
insecure; an agrarian law would soon take place. If
these observations be just, our government ought to secure
^he permanent interests of the country against innovation.
Landholders ought to have a share in the government to
Support these valuable interests, and to balance and check
the other. They ought lobe so constituted as to protect the
minority of the opulent against the majority. The senate,
therefore, ought to be this body; and, to answer these pur-
poses, ought to have permanency and stability. Various
have been the propositions; but my opinion is, the longer
they continue in office, the better will their view be an-
swered. "* "\
Sherman replied," that a bad government was the worse
for being long; that frequent elections give security and
permanency. That in Connecticut an annual government
had existed one hundred and thirty-two years, and as long
as a man behaves well he is never turned out of office.
Four years to the senate is quite sufficient with the rota-
tion proposed. "
Hamilton observed, "This question has already been
considered in several points of view. We are now form-
ing a republican government. Real liberty in neither found
in despotism, nor in the extremes of democracy, but in mode-
rate governments. Those" who mean to form a solid re-
publican government, ought to proceed to the confines of
another government^ As long as offices are open to all
* Yates, 169.
t It will be remarked that a similar opinion was expressed by Jefferson a
few months before. Writing from Paris, February 28,1787, to La Fayette,
then about to take part in the deliberations of France, he observed, " I wish
you success in your meeting, (the assembled des notables. ) I should form
better hopes of it, if it were divided into two houses instead of seven; keep.
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? HAMILTON.
517'
men, and no constitutional rank is established, it is pure
republicanism. But if we incline too much to democracy, we
shall soon shoot into a monarchy. The difference of pro-
perty is already great among us. Commerce and industry
will stjll increase the disparity. Your government must
meet this state of things, or combinations will in process
of time undermine your system. What was the tribuni-
tial power of Rome? It was instituted by the plebeians as a
guard against the patricians. But was this a sufficient
check? No! The only distinction which remained at
Rome was, at last, between the rich and poor. The gen-
tleman from Connecticut forgets that the democratic body
is already secure in a representation. As to Connecticut,
what were the little objects of their government before the
revolution? Colonial concerns merely. They ought now
to act on a more extended scale; and dare they do this?
Dare they collect the taxes and requisitions of congress?
Such a government may do well if they do not tax, and
this is precisely their situation. "
Wilson remarked, " The motion is now for nine years, ?
and a triennial rotation. Every nation attends to its for-
eign intercourse to support its commerce, to prevent foreign
contempt, and to make war and peace. Our senate will
be possessed of these powers, and therefore ought to be
dignified and permanent. What is the reason that Great
Britain does not enter into a commercial treaty with us?
Because congress has not the powers to enforce its observ-
ance. But give them those powers, and give them the
stability proposed by the motion, and they will have more
ing the good model of your neighbouring country before your eyes, you may
get on step by step towards a good constitution. Though that model is not
perfect, yet, as it would unite more suffrages than any new one which could
be proposed, it is better to make that the object. If every advance is to be pur.
chased by filling the royal coffers with gold, it will be gold well employed"
--2 Jeff. Works, p. 101.
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? 518
THE LIFE OF
permanency than a monarchical government. The great
objection of many is, that this duration would give birth to
views inconsistent with the interests of the union.
This
can have no weight if the triennial rotation is adopted,
and this plan may possibly tend to conciliate the mjnds of
the members of the convention on this subject, which have
varied more than on any other question. " Delaware, Penn-
sylvania, and Virginia, were in favour of nine years, but
it was agreed that it should be six, with a biennial rota-
tion.
The discussion of the powers of the legislature was de-
ferred in order to consider the proportionate suffrage of
the states in its choice. Martin urged with great vehe-
mence an equal representation of the states as their right,
and as most promotive of the general welfare; and after
a motion of Lansing, that the representation in the first
branch should be according to the rule of the confederation,
Madison supported earnestly a proportionate representa-
tion of the states. "Some gentlemen," he said,* "are
afraid that the plan is not sufficiently national, while others
apprehend that it is too much so. If this point of re-
presentation was once well fixed, we would come nearer
to one another in sentiment. The necessity would then
be discovered of circumscribing more effectually the state
governments, and enlarging the bounds of the general gov-
ernment. Some contend that the states are sovereign, when
in fact they are only political societies. There is a gra-
dation of power in all societies, from the lowest corpora-
tion to the highest sovereign. The states never possessed
the essential rights of sovereignty. -These were always
vested in congress. Their voting as states in congress is
no evidence of sovereignty. The state of Maryland voted
by counties. Did this make the counties sovereign? The
? Yates, p. 184-5.
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? HAMILTON.
519
states at present are only great corporations, having the
power of making by-laws, and these are effectual only if
they are not contradictory to the general confederation.
The states ought to be placed under the control of the gen-
eral government, at least as much so as they formerly were
under the king and British parliament. The arguments,
I observe, have taken a different turn, and I hope may tend
to convince all of the necessity of a strong energetic gov-
ernment; which would equally tend to give energy to, and
protect the state governments. " He deprecated the jeal-
ousy of the states, and observed," If the power is not imme-
diately derived from the people, in proportion to their num-
bers, we make a paper confederacy, but that will be all! "
"I would have no objection," Judge Read observed, " if
the government was more national, but the proposed plan
is so great a mixture of both, that it is best to drop it alto-
gether. A state government is incompatible with a gen-
eral government. If it was more national, I would be for
a representation proportionate to population. The plan
of the gentleman from New-York (Hamilton) is certainly
the best. But the great evil is the unjust appropriation
of the public lands. If there was but one national govern-
ment, we would be all equally interested. "
Hamilton, in the progress of this discussion, remarked--
"The course of my experience in human affairs might,
perhaps, restrain me from saying much on this subject. I
shall, however, give utterance to some of the observations
I have made during the course of this debate. The gen-
tleman from Maryland has been at great pains to establish
positions which are not denied. Many of them, as drawn
from the best writers on government, are become self-
evident principles. But I doubt the propriety of his appli-
cation of those principles in the present discussion. He
deduces from them the necessity that states entering into
a confederacy must retain the equality of votes. This po-
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? 520
THE LIFE OF
sition cannot be correct. Facts contradict it. The par-
liament of Great Britain asserted a supremacy over the
whole empire, and the celebrated Judge Blackstone labours
for the legality of it, although many parts were not repre-
sented. This parliamentary power we opposed as con-
trary to our colonial rights. With that exception, through-
out that whole empire it is submitted to.
"May no"t the smaller and greater states so modify their
respective rights as to establish the general interest of the
whole without adhering to the right of equality? Strict
representation is not observed in any of the state govern-
ments. The senate of New-York are chosen by persons
of certain qualifications to the exclusion of others.
"The question after all is--Is it our interest, in modify-
ing this general government, to sacrifice individual rights
to the preservation of the rights of an artificial being, called
states? There can be no truer principle than this--That
every individual of the community at large has an equal rigid
to the protection of government. If, therefore, three states
contain a majority of the inhabitants of America, ought they
to be governed by a minority? Would the inhabitants of
the great states ever submit to this? If the smaller states
maintain this principle through a love of power, will not
the larger, from the same motives, be equally tenacious to
preserve their power? They are to surrender their rights
--for what 1 For the preservation of an artificial being.
We propose a free government. Can it be so, if partial
distinctions are maintained?
"I agree with the gentleman from Delaware, that if the
state governments are to act in the general government, it
affords the strongest reason for exclusion. In the state
of New-York five counties form a majority of representa-
tives, and yet the government is in no danger, because the
laws have a general operation. The small states exagger-
ate their danger, and on this ground contend for an undue
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? HAMILTON.
proportion of power. But their danger is increased if the
larger states will not submit to it. Where will they form
new alliances for their support? Will they do this with
foreign powers? Foreigners are jealous of our increasing
greatness, and would rejoice in our distractions. Those
who have had opportunities of conversing with foreigners
respecting sovereigns in Europe, have discovered in them
an anxiety for the preservation of our democratic gov-
ernments, probably for no other reason but to keep us
weak. Unless your government is respectable, foreigners
will invade your rights--and to maintain tranquillity, it
must be respectable. Even to observe neutrality you must
have a strong government.
"I confess our present situation is critical. We have just
finished a war which has established our independence, and
loaded us with a heavy debt. We have still every motive
to unite for our common defence. Our people are dis-
posed to have a good government, but this disposition may
not always prevail. It is difficult to amend confederations:
it has been attempted in vain, and it is perhaps a miracle
that we are now met. We must therefore improve the
opportunity, and render the present system as perfect as
possible. Their good sense, and, above all, the necessity
of their affairs, will induce the people to adopt it. "
Lansing's motion was negatived by six to four states,
Maryland being divided, and the original resolution passed.
Imperfect as these reports are, they are sufficient to
show the spirit in which Hamilton met the objections to
an energetic system, labouring to vindicate the cause of
an efficient moderate government.
Some private business calling him at this time to New-
York, he was absent from the convention a few davs.
From the influence of Washington he hoped much; and
soon after his departure he communicated to him his im-
pression of what he believed to be the opinion of the peo
66
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THE LIFE OF
pie, and his convictions as to the policy to be pursued. His
letter gives the important and interesting fact, that, previ-
ous to this moment, no disclosure of his sentiments had
been sought by Hamilton from Washington. Such was
the delicacy observed towards a personage to whom the
country looked as its probable head, if a general govern-
ment should be established.
HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.
DEAR SIR,
In my passage through the Jerseys, and since my arrival
here, I have taken particular pains to discover the public
sentiment, and I am more and more convinced that this is
the critical opportunity for establishing the prosperity of
this country on a solid foundation. I have conversed with
men of information, not only of this city, but from differ-
ent parts of the state; and they agree that there has been
an astonishing revolution for the better in the minds of
the people.
The prevailing apprehension among thinking men is, that
the convention, from the fear of shocking the popular opin-
ion, will not go far enough. They seem to be convinced,
that a strong, well-mounted government will better suit the
popular palate, than one of a different complexion. Men
in office are, indeed, taking all possible pains to give an un-
favourable impression of the convention; but the current
seems to be moving strongly the other way.
A plain but sensible man, in a conversation I had with
him yesterday, expressed himself nearly in this manner:--
The people begin to be convinced that their " excellent
form of government," as they have been used to call it,
will not answer their purpose, and that they must substitute
something not very remote from that which they have
lately quitted.
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? HAMILTON.
523
These appearances, though they will not warrant a con-
clusion that the people are yet ripe for such a plan as I advo-
cate, yet serve to prove that there is no reason to despair
of their adopting one equally energetic, if the convention
should think proper to propose it. They serve to prove
that we ought not to allow too much weight to objections,
drawn from the supposed repugnancy of the people to an
efficient constitution. I confess I am more and more in-
clined to believe that former habits of thinking are regain-
ing their influence with more rapidity than is generally
imagined.
Not having compared ideas with you, sir, I cannot judge
how far our sentiments agree; but, as I persuade myself,
the genuineness of my representations will receive credit
with you. My anxiety for the event of the deliberations
of the convention, induces me to make this communication
of what appears to be the tendency of the public mind.
I own to you, sir, that I am seriously and deeply dis-
tressed at the aspect of the counsels which prevailed when
I left Philadelphia. I fear that we shall let slip the golden
opportunity of rescuing the American empire from dis-
union, anarchy, and misery.
No motley or feeble measure can answer the end, or will
finally receive the public support. Decision is true wis-
dom, and will be not less reputable to the convention, than
salutary to the community.
I shall of necessity remain here ten or twelve days. If
I have reason to believe that my attendance at Philadel-
phia will not be mere waste of time, I shall, after that
period, rejoin the convention.
New-York, July 3d, 1787.
The apprehensions entertained by Hamilton were con-
firmed by the temper evinced during the renewed discus-
sion of a proposition of Ellsworth that each state should
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? 524
THE LIFE Of
have an equal vote in the second branch of the legislature.
At its termination the increased strength of the states right
party was shown by an equal division of the votes--five
states being in favour of the proposition and five in the ne-
gative--Maryland divided.
The pertinacity with which the claims to an equal par-
ticipation in the second branch were pressed, following the
warmth previously exhibited on the question of electing
the first branch by the people, threatened an utter prostra-
tion of all hope of concurring in a plan of government.
Under these circumstances, General Cotesworth Pinck-
ney proposed to appoint a committee to adjust the embar-
rassing controversy.
Martin objected to the measure as an attempt to com-
promise, and, feeling the strength of his party, declared,
"You must give each state an equal suffrage, or our business
is at an end. " Sherman replied, that "we had reached a
point from which we cannot move in either direction," and
urged the committee.
Gouverneur Morris followed, insisting on the necessity of
an aristocracy " of men of great and established property"
in the second branch, to be checked by the democratic
branch, and thus give stability to the government. "A
senate for seven years, excluded from office, would be," he
observed, "one of the baubles of the general government.
A government by compact is no government. While I
avow myself," he said, " the advocate of a strong govern-
ment, I admit that the influence of the rich must be guard-
ed: and a pure democracy is equally oppressive to the
lower orders of the community. " He threw out these re-
marks for the consideration of the committee to be ap-
pointed. Wilson did not approve of this expedient. If
adopted, he was for a smaller committee. Madison ob-
jected to it as only a source of delay. If appointed " from
each state, we shall have in it the whole force of state pre-
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? HAMILTON.
525
judices. " "The great difficulty is to conquer former opin-
ions. The motion can as well be decided here as in com-
mittee. " Gerry urged accommodation as absolutely neces-
sary, hoping that the defects might be amended by a future
convention. The motion was carried by nine states, Jer-
sey and Delaware dissenting, and a committee of a mem-
ber from each state was chosen by ballot, composed chiefly
of the advocates of the Jersey plan.
On the fifth of July a compromise was reported. It
proposed to give to each state one representative for every
forty thousand inhabitants, computing three-fifths of the
slaves as one white, and to a state containing a less num-
ber, one representative,- to compose the first branch; vest-
ing in that branch the exclusive origin and control of
money bills;--that in the second branch, each state should
have one vote. ,
The advocates of a strong government opposed the pro-
position. Wilson insisted upon a division of the question.
Madison declared that the originating money bills was no
concession on the part of the smaller states, as seven states
combining in the second branch, could control the first; it
being small in number and well connected, will ever pre-
vail. No provision is made as to the regulation of trade,
imposts, treaties. We are driven to an unhappy dilemma
Two-thirds of the inhabitants of the union are to please
the remaining third by sacrificing their essential rights.
In behalf of this compromise it was asserted, that the
power over money bills was an equivalent for the equal
representation in the senate. That it properly belonged to
the democratic branch. The senate being farther removed
from the people, would be less attentive to economy. It
was analogous to the parliamentary usage of England. *
The members most strenuous for retaining power in the
? Geny's State of Facts.
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? 526
THE LIFE OF
states wished to postpone the consideration of the first
proposition in order to enter upon the second, which was
not acceded to; and the question, whether numbers or rela-
tive contribution should determine the proportion of suf-
frage, was referred to a special committee. It was then
proposed to consider the constitution of the second branch.
This was postponed by the vote of six states--Massachu-
setts and New-York divided.
Having given a vote in favour of conferring on the first
branch the originating money bills, and thus fulfilling that
part of the proposed compromise, it was moved that in the
second branch the states should have an equal vote, which
was approved. On the ninth of July the special commit-
tee reported an apportionment of the members of the first
branch among the states, and that the legislature be au-
thorized to augment the number from time to time, and in
case a state be divided, or two or more united, or a new
state be created within the limits of the United States, it
be empowered to regulate the number of representatives
upon the principles of their wealth and number of inhabit-
ants; the provisional clause was approved, the equal vote
in the second branch temporarily sanctioned, and the ratio
was established on a conjectural basis. An objection being
taken to the small number of representatives, this sub-
ject was referred to the grand committee from each state. *
The following day King reported a new Scale of repre-
sentation, increased from fifty-six to sixty-five members.
At this important moment, when a large concession had
been made to the advocates of an equal power in the
states, and a basis had been formed upon which a compound
* Madison states a proposition, proceeding from himself, as a proper ground
of compromise; that in the first branch the states should be represented ac-
cording to the number of free inhabitants, and in the second, which had for
one of its primary objects the guardianship of property, according to the whole
number, including slaves--in effect, a southern predominance.
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