No More Learning

The first of these evils was that
principally evident in the period here dealt with; the second that of
the period which succeeded.


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CHAPTER XIX
THE EXCLUSION OF MHE FRENCH, 1784-1815
THE French rivalry must be reckoned in that series of lucky events
and fortunate conditions which did so much in the second half of the
eighteenth century to enable the English East India Company to rise
to a position of predominance in India. Without intending it, French
adventurers played the part of agents provocateurs. Indian princes
were encouraged by their sanguine estimates of French co-operation
to entertain designs against the English, while the impossibility of
effective French support, from European considerations in time of
peace and from lack of the necessary naval superiority in time of war,
ensured that they would take up arms without the assistance on
which they had reckoned. Since the previous century there had
always been a certain number of adventurers in the service of the
Indian states; and after the great period of Dupleix various causes
combined to increase their numbers, activity and influence. The career
of Dupleix, like that of Clive, had served to attract great attention
in his country to India. It seemed to Frenchmen, as to Englishmen
of the time, the land of easy wealth, so that the number of those who
sought fortunes there rose. At the same time the decay of the Moghul
Empire, and the rise of the numerous military states on its ruins,
enlarged the demand for military leaders and organisers; while the
resounding victories won by European arms, whether French or
English, raised the value set upon all who could pretend to any
knowledge of European tactics and discipline; so that the adventurers
found themselves no longer mere artillerymen but commanders of
regiments and brigades, personally consulted by the princes whose
pay they drew. Finally the ideas of Dupleix and the Anglo-French
rivalry which had sprung out of them had opened out new possibilities
promising personal gain and national aggrandisement.
The result was that from the government of Warren Hastings
down to that of Wellesley the Indian courts were full of Frenchmen,
commanding large or small bodies of sepoys, and eager for the most
part to serve their country by the exercise of their profession. A
typical example of them is afforded by René Madec, who, after serving
in the ranks under Lally, and then joining the English service for a
while, deserted and passed from court to court, serving now a Jai
chief, now Shah Alam, and now Begam Samru, until in 1778 he
retired and went home to his native Brittany. With him and others
in a like condition Chevalier, head of French affairs in Bengal, was
in constant communication, discussing schemes, now for the march
of Madec into Bengal, now for the cession and occupation of Sind,
4


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324
EXCLUSION OF THE FRENCH, 1784-1815
whence a French army was to march to Delhi, and then drive the
English into the sea. Chevalier's policy was to spread great ideas
abroad regarding French power, and he had no hesitation in offering
to the emperor in 1772 the services of two or three thousand French-
men from the Isle of France. [adec in 1775 writes from Agra that
when war breaks out with the English he will march down the
Ganges and ravage the upper provinces of Bengal, holding the towns
to ransom and doing his utmost to destroy the English revenues. A
little later we find St Lubin and Montigny at Poona, making treaties
which neither party attempted to carry out, and venting large promises
which the Marathas were much too astute to trust.
On the whole these political activities were more harmful than
advantageous to the French cause, for they achieved nothing beyond
a reputation for big words. Nor did Bussy's expedition of 1782 add
much to the French position. It arrived too late. Before it had
accomplished anything, it was paralysed by_the news of peace, and
that too of a peace which merely put the French back where they
had been before. It was difficult for their agents to persuade Indian
princes of the great successes they claimed to have won in America
when they still remained in their old position of inferiority in India.
Souillac might write assuring Sindhia that the English had been
driven out of all their American possessions and declare that now the
great object of the king of France was to compel the English to restore
the provinces which they had stolen from the princes of India; 2 but
Sindhia simply did not believe him. Bussy, who viewed the position
with tired and disappointed eyes, wrote nevertheless with great truth
to the minister, de Castries (9 September, 1783), that the terms of
peace had produced an unfavourable impression, and that impossible
hopes of Indian co-operation had been raised in France by the fables
sent home inspired by vanity and self-interest. He actually advised
the recall of the various parties serving with Indian princes, as being
nothing but a lot of brigands-un amas de bandits. 3
As regarded the future, too, the French plans were quite inde-
finite. It was proposed, for instance, to remove the French head-
quarters from Pondichery, as too near the English power at Madras,
and too remote from the possible allies of France—Tipu and the
Marathas. For a while the minister thought of removing it to Mahé
on the other side of India, where perhaps Tipu would cede a suitable
extent of territory, or else to Trinkomali, if it could be obtained from
the Dutch, or to some point on the coast of Burma. But either of
the last two presupposed the maintenance of a large naval force.
Bussy again went to the heart of the matter. All this consideration
of possible allies, he said, was beside the mark. Pondichery was suit-
able enough if the ministry would find the money to fortify it and
1 Barbé, René Madec, passim.
8. Idem, p. 137.
2 Gaudart, Catalogue, I, 321.
4 Idem, p. 183.


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FRENCH PROJECTS
326
garrison it with 1800 Europeans and 2000 sepoys; the French should
do like the English-depend on themselves alone. The only way to
get allies, he says again a year later, is to send out large military and
naval forces with plenty of money, and “everything to the contrary
that you will be told on this point will be derived from that charlatanry
that has so long obscured the facts". 2
As vegards possible allies against the English in India the views
of the ministry were frankly hostile. In 1787 de Castries resolved to
recall one Frenchman, Aumont, who was then with the Nizam, and
to replace the French agent, Montigny, at Poona by a Brahman
vakil, since nothing was to be got out of the first, while with the
second no common interests could be discovered. But Tipu was to be
informed of the French desire to co-operate with him in hindering
the English from remaining the masters of India. The king's intention,
de Castries went on, is to
tacher de conserver les princes de l'Inde dans la tranquillité entre eux jusqu'à ce
qu'il soit en mesure de les secourir, et comme nous parviendrons sans doute à
combiner un jour nos forces avec celles de la Hollande, il faut attendre que cet
arrangement soit fini pour pouvoir poser quelques bases avec cette puissance. :)
Indeed at this moment, when Holland was sharply split into French
and Orangist factions, the French seem to have counted on being
able in a time of war to employ Dutch naval power and naval bases
against the English, as partly came to pass in the Revolutionary and
Napoleonic Wars, though even then the French were to find that the
lukewarm assistance which they received from the Dutch was a poor
counterpoise to the overwhelming force of the English navy and an
incomplete compensation for having to protect the Dutch possessions
as well as their own. In 1787, when these proposals were being
considered, the Orangists were urging the adoption of an exactly
opposite policy, that of an alliance with Great Britain. Neither treaty
was formally concluded; but the eyes of both French and English
seem to have been fixed upon the same points—Dundas declaring that
the only thing which would make the alliance useful to us was the
cession of Trinkomali, while de Castries issued orders that in the
event of war with England Pondichery was to be evacuated and all
troops and munitions of war removed to Trinkomali, which harbour
seems to have been promised them by the French party in Holland.
• It was while these matters were under discussion that Tipu sent
to France the first of the embassies by which he tried in vain to secure
material assistance against the English in the event of war. The
ambassadors proceeded by a French vessel, the Aurore, and were
received with every courtesy; but beyond that they obtained nothing,
for, as has been seen, de Castries did not, and indeed with any degree
4
1 Gaudart, Catalogue, I, 142.
2 Idem, pp. 157 sqq.
3 Idem, p. 361.
4 Cornwallis Correspondence, I, 357; Wilks, Historical Sketches, u, 124.


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326
EXCLUSION OF THE FRENCH, 1784-1815
of financial prudence could not, desire so soon to renew the struggle.
But they must have received a good deal of encouragement in view
of future contingencies, and that must have contributed to stiffen
Tipu's attitude. However, with the usual English good fortune, Tipu
selected as the time for his provocative attack upon Travancore the
time when the French were much too engrossed by their domestic
affairs to spare a thought to India; so that he was left to meet Corn-
wallis's attack alone, and had already been reduced to sign away half
his kingdom and surrender much of his treasure before the year 1793
renewed war in Europe.
Indeed French intrigues had been somewhat interrupted by the
outbreak of the Revolution. In the French settlements in India the
latter produced more excitement than bloodshed; and as soon as war
broke out Pondichery was immediately besieged and quickly taken,
and the other factories could offer no resistance; so that the revolu-
tionary spirits soon found themselves under a foreign and military
control, while of their possible allies Tipu was crippled, and the
Marathas were looking rather to the conquest of their weaker neigh-
bours in the north and south than to the attack of the powerful East
India Company. So the Revolutionary War brought no immediate
troubles on Indian soil. At sea, indeed, French privateers, fitted out
at the Isle of France, captured many prizes; but though these losses
weighed heavily on private merchants, they scarcely affected the
resources of the East India Company, while at the same time the
naval squadron under Rainier accompanied by an expedition equipped
at Madras in 1795 occupied Ceylon, Malacca, Banda and Amboina,
not unassisted by the partisans of the Orangist party, indignant at
the establishment of the republic in Holland. An expedition from
England occupied the Cape. The position in India, however, was
thought too uncertain to launch enterprises against the French islands,
which would have made a stouter resistance and required a
considerable proportion of the English forces in India for their
subjugation.
Although the French settlements in India had all been occupied,
there still remained considerable forces under French control. At
Hyderabad Raymond had built up a body of sepoy troops under
French instruction and leadership; under Sindhia Perron had done
the same; and although these armies were in the pay of Indian
princes, no one could say when they might not be marched against
the Company's possessions, with or without the consent of their
ostensible masters. The appearance of a French expedition would
almost certainly set them in movement. But such an expedition by
the ordinary route was hardly practicable in view of the English
superiority at sea and the absence of stations at which provisions or
protection could be found. In these circumstances the French pressed
into realisation a scheme which had long floated in their minds, that,


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EGYPT
327
namely, of establishing themselves in Egypt, and thence preparing an
attack on India.
A quarter of a century earlier Warren Hastings had attempted to
open a trade with Suez. He had probably been impelled by con-
siderations of imperial policy; the traders whom he supported may
have been influenced by hopes of evading the regulations which
confined the English trade to Europe to the East India Company
itself. At a later time George Baldwin, under the influence of both
motives, for a time succeeded in convincing ministry and Company
of the need of a British consul in Egypt and the advisability of naming
him to the office. But his efforts had come to nothing under the
persistent opposition of the Turks to a policy which would have
placed the half-independent ruling beys in intimate association with
a European power. These ideas of the importance of Egypt had not
been confined to the English. The French had shared them; and from
about 1770 onwards many mémoires had been submitted to the
ministers urging the importance of Egypt upon their attention. The
trade between Alexandria and Marseilles was active; the French had
maintained a consul in Egypt; and after the war of the American
Revolution, de Castries's eastern projects had included the occupation
of Egypt in case Austria and Russia combined to partition Turkey.
In 1785 a French agent succeeded in concluding treaties with the
leading beys; and these would have reopened the Red Sea route for
Indian trade had not the Porte at once resolved to vindicate its
authority and sent an expedition which overthrew the beys and for
the moment re-established Turkish authority. When therefore in
1798 Napoleon decided on the expedition to Egypt as a stroke aimed
against the English, he was carrying into effect plans laid long before.
But though he was locally successful, this partial success did the
French cause more harm than good. Napoleon himself accurately
appreciated the situation when he wrote: La puissance qui est
maîtresse de l'Egypte doit l'être à la longue de l'Inde. Time was needed
to concert measures with Tipu or the Marathas, to prepare and
organise transport, whether by way of the Red Sea or by the route of
Alexander. Establishment in Egypt did not and could not lead at
once to an attack on India; so that while in March, 1800, Napoleon was
still talking of appearing on the Indus, Tipu had fallen and the
French force at Hyderabad had been broken up.
The immediate effect of the French appearance in Egypt was to
set all the English authorities in India on the alert; and at their head
was a man of exceptional energy, of keen insight, of great organising
power, Lord Mornington, better known by his later title of the
Marquess Wellesley. On arriving at Calcutta in May, 1798, he was
>
1 Charles-Roux, Autour d'une route, passim; Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 29210,
ff. 341 sqq.
2 Charles-Roux, L'Angleterre et l'expédition francaise, I, 227-9.


## p. 328 (#356) ############################################

328
EXCLUSION OF THE FRENCH, 1784-1815
a
struck by the diffusion of French influence, and resolved not to allow
it to gather to a head. At almost the same time he learnt that Tipu
had recently sent an embassy to the Isle of France, seeking military
help, that the governor, Malartic, had issued a proclamation calling
for volunteers, and that the embassy had returned to Mangalore with
a small party thus collected. Mornington regarded, and rightly
regarded, this as a sign of Tipu's reviving hopes. Then came news of
Napoleon's success in Egypt, impelling the governor-general to meet
the danger before it grew greater, and inspiring Tipu with the hope
that help was nearer than it really was. As a first measure Mornington
entered into negotiations with the Nizam, who in 1795 had suffered
a severe defeat by the Marathas followed by considerable loss of
territory. He was willing enough to sacrifice his French-led troops
who had been beaten, though not by any fault of theirs, at Kharda,
if thereby he could secure the services of a body of the Company's
forces. Thus was signed the first of that group of treaties which
contributed so much to establish the Company's dominion in India;
and then Mornington demanded of Tipu that he should expel all
Frenchmen from Mysore. Tipu, encouraged by the apparent approach
of the French, could not bring himself to answer these demands till
the English troops had already crossed his frontiers and the last
Mysore war had begun. Once more French attempts had gone far
enough to involve their friends in trouble without going far enougă
to afford them material aid.
As soon as the danger from Mysore had been overcome, Morn-
ington contemplated three further objects. One was the conquest of
the French islands, as the only effective measure that could be taken
to stop the privateers from preying on English vessels; the second was
the capture of Batavia; and the third was an expedition directed
against the French in Egypt. With these alternatives in view, he
assembled troops at Trinkomali. But the last of these was a project
which the governor-general perceived could not be prudently under-
taken except in co-operation with an expedition from England; and
the first was prevented by the refusal of Commodore Rainier to co-
operate, as he had received no specific instructions to that end. At
first, therefore, Mornington's views were limited to his design against
Batavia. But various circumstances deferred the dispatch of the
expedition till at length on 6 February, 1801, dispatches arrived
announcing Abercromby's expedition to Egypt, and desiring the
assistance of a force from India. Mornington's reluctance therefore
to send the expedition so far to the east as Batavia was rewarded by
his now being able to send it to the Red Sea with a minimum of
delay. Baird, to whom the command had been entrusted, landed
at Kosseir, marched across the desert to Thebes, and on 10 August
reached Cairo, six weeks after it had surrendered to Hutchinson,
1 Wellesley Despatches, II, 436.


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RENEWAL OF WAR
1
329
3
Abercromby's successor, but in time to impress Menou at Alexandria
with a full consciousness of his inability to continue the struggle.
The first French attempt to establish themselves on the overland
route to India had been defeated.
The Revolutionary War thus came to an end in 1802 with a marked
advantage to the English in the East. Nor did the brief breathing-
space which followed last long enough to permit the French to regain
a positive foothold in India. The treaty which had closed the war
merely stipulated for the retrocession of the French and Dutch
factories in India and of the Cape and the spice-islands to the Dutch.
Ceylon remained permanently in English hands. But before Decaen,
the newly appointed captain-general of French India, could reach
Pondichery, the English ministry was already doubtful of the dura-
tion of peace. A dispatch (17 October, 1802) received by Wellesley
30 March, 1803, directed him to delay the restitution of the French
factories; and though these instructions were cancelled by later orders
of 16 November (received 8 May), yet even then the Indian govern-
ment was warned against the possibility of French attempts upon the
Portuguese possessions in Asia. Soon after came news of the critical
situation in Europe; and on 6 July the governor-general learnt that
the renewal of war was officially thought very probable. In the first
week of September he learnt that diplomatic relations had been
broken off, and a few days later that war had been declared. It was
what with his usual discernment he had expected. At the close of
the previous year, more than four months before Decaen had sailed
from Brest, Wellesley had directed the governor of Madras not to
deliver up the French possessions without specific orders from Bengal.
On 15 June, 1803, Binot, Decaen's chief of staff, arrived at Pondichery
in the frigate Belle Poule with authority to take over the place. He
was allowed to land, and his dispatches were sent up to Calcutta,
arriving there 4 July. Wellesley resolved at once not to hand over
the French possessions until receiving further orders from Europe;
and accordingly deferred answering the dispatches from Decaen until
that officer should actually arrive in India. This event took place on.
11 July, and was known at Calcutta on the 23rd, together with the
further news that a French packet had come in the day after Decaen's
arrival, and that Decaen's squadron had quitted the Pondichery
roads that night. The packet was the Belier, sent out after Decaen
with orders that if war had broken out by the time of his arrival in
Indian waters, he was to proceed, not to Pondichery, but to the
French islands. Binot and his party, being ashore, were left behind,
and when the news of war arrived, were obliged to surrender. 4
But though the French flag was thus excluded from India,
French intrigue was active. Binot had employed his brief sojourn at
1 Charles-Roux, op. cit. II, 213-4. 2 Wellesley Despatches, ID, 72, 98.
3 Prentout, Dacaen et l'ile de France, p. 437.
4 Gaudart, op. cit. II, 460 sqq. ; Prentout, op. cit. pp. 39 sqq.


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330
EXCLUSION OF THE FRENCH, 1784-1815
11
Pondichery in sounding the rulers who seemed likely to welcome his
overtures. Thus he opened relations with the rajas of Tanjore and
Travancore, and sent to visit the Marathas an officer who obtained
an English passport under the assumed guise of a German painter.
Decaen took up the quest for allies. He had agents at Tranquebar
in the south, and Serampur in the north, until, after the breach
between England and Denmark, these places passed temporarily into
English keeping. These men, with their spies constantly coming and
going, deemed all India ready for revolt against the English. They
represented the Vellore mutiny as having spread to every cantonment
in the south. The lesser southern chiefs were all ready, and only
needed a small sum of money, for a rising. To them the English cause
was maintained (as one of them wrote) by nothing but violence and
corruption. A manifesto, addressed by Decaen to the chiefs of
Hindustan, urged them to attack the Company with their united
force if they would save themselves from the fate of Oudh, Arcot and
Mysore. But all this, as Prentout has justly remarked, served the
English cause better than the French. It assisted the English to recog-
nise their enemies, without providing the latter with anything more
serviceable than encouragement in what was to prove a suicidal
policy.
The fact was that the French, now as in the Revolutionary War,
could not get within reach in India. “It is painful”, wrote Decaen
commenting on the sanguine reports of his agents in India, “to learn
of all these good dispositions and to be unable to support them. " 3
But his military forces were barely enough to garrison the islands;
the French squadron-one ship of the line and three frigates——under
the unenterprising leadership of Admiral Linois was not even able
to take the China convoy under the protection of the Company's
armed vessels (14 February, 1804); and the only serious means of
attack in Decaen's power was the encouragement of the privateers,
which again covered the Indian seas in all directions, capturing a
great number of private merchantmen and even a few Company's
ships. The two Surcoufs, in the Caroline and the Revenant, were
perhaps the boldest and most enterprising of the privateers; and after
Linois' departure from Indian waters in 1805 (to fall in with an
English squadron off the Canaries 13 March, 1806) the frigates which
then came under Decaen's control vigorously seconded the efforts of
the privateers. Obstinate conflicts took place on many occasions
when these met armed English vessels, as when the Psyche was
taken by the English frigate San Fiorenzo. But all these efforts did
nothing beyond inflicting heavy private losses, and left the Company's
position in India untouched, while the reoccupation of the Cape by
the English in 1805 deprived the French islands of their nearest
supplies of foodstuffs.
1 Prentout, op. cit. pp. 374-7.
Wellesley Despatches, m, 663.
3 Prentout, op. cit. pp. 460 sqq.
2


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GARDANE'S MISSION
331
In Europe Napoleon planned eastern expeditions-in 1805 three
squadrons and 20,000 men; ' in 1807 a triple plan which was to have
combined land expeditions through Central Asia and Egypt with a
sea expedition round the Cape 2-but these fell through, in part
because of the English command of the sea, in part because of
Napoleon's continental preoccupations. It was in preparation for the
second of these that the embassy of General Gardane to Persia was
arranged. In 1803 war had broken out between Persia and Russia;
and in 1805 the latter power had joined England in the Third
Coalition. Persia naturally turned to France for help, and on 4 May,
1807, was signed the Treaty of Finkenstein, by which Napoleon
guaranteed the integrity of Persia, engaged to use every effort to
compel Russia to evacuate Georgia, and promised supplies of field
guns and small arms; while the shah engaged to break off all relations,
political and economic, with the English (thus subscribing to the
Continental System) and to give all facilities and assistance to French
military and naval forces on their way to attack the British in India.
On this agreement, Gardane was sent to Teheran, to promote Persian
hostility against England and Russia, and to collect information about
routes and resources for the projected expedition. But Gardane's
mission, like Decaen's, was foredoomed to failure. When the Treaty
of Finkenstein was signed Napoleon was already contemplating peace
and even alliance with Russia; and when he realised these ideas by
the Treaty of Tilsit and the entente with Alexander, he was no longer
willing to do anything to support the Persians against his new ally.
Here was one more example of the way in which the interests of a
world power are apt to diverge and become irreconcilable. So long
as the Persians could hope for French support in the recovery of
Georgia, they remained willing to exclude the English from Persia,
as Malcolm found in 1808, when he was sent by Minto to counter the
French mission but failed even to get a footing in the country,
although backed by an armed force; but when in the autumn of that
year the Persians perceived that they would have to negotiate with
Russia direct, and that the French would not even act as mediators,
they concluded naturally that the advantages of the French alliance
were all on one side; on the arrival of Harford Jones to replace
Malcolm, not even Gardane's threats of departure could prevent the
reception of the new English mission; and so, early in 1809, Harford
Jones replaced Gardane at Teheran, while Napoleon, involved in
continental interests, abandoned his schemes of emulating the exploits
of Alexander the Great. 3
1 Prentout, op. cit. pp. 402 sqq.
2 Gardane's Instructions, 10 May, 1807, ap. Gardane, Mission du Général
Gardane, pp. 81 sqq.
3 Gardane, Mission du Général Gardane; Kaye, Life of Malcolm, I, 395,
etc. , Minto in India, pp. 55 sqg.


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EXCLUSION OF THE FRENCH, 1784-1815
The time had now come also for the complete expulsion of the
French from the East. The English squadrons at the Cape and in
India were strengthened. The French islands were blockaded by
English vessels; and although over-rashness on the part of their
commanders led to the loss of two sunk and, two taken, in the course
of 1810 both the Isle of France and the Ile Bonaparte (as Bourbon had
been renamed) were compelled to surrender to Admiral Bertie and
General Abercromby; while in the next year another expedition
occupied Java, to which island a French regiment had been sent some
time before by Decaen. These captures brought to an end the acti-
vities of the privateers, who thus lost the bases at which they had
refitted, revictualled, and sold their prizes; and wiped out the French
reputation in India. The settlement brought by the treaties of 1814
and 1815 confirmed the position established by force of arms. The
French and the Dutch recognised for the first time British sovereignty
over the Company's possessions; the French agreed to maintain no
troops and erect no fortresses; and so the Company was at last com-
pletely freed from European menace just at the moment when it was,
under the leadership of Lord Hastings, about to establish
an
unquestioned predominance in India.


## p. 333 (#361) ############################################

CHAPTER XX
>
TIPU SULTAN, 1785-1802
B Y that “humiliating pacification” (as Hastings called it), the Treaty
of Mangalore, Tipu appeared as a conqueror. Grand Duff, years
afterwards, asserted that the governor-general was
only prevented from disavowing and annulling it by the confusion which must
have resulted to the Company's affairs in consequence of the fulfilment of a
part of the terms, before it could have been possible to obtain their ratification.
1
There is no doubt, indeed, that Hastings regarded it with the dislike
and disapproval with which he viewed almost the whole of the policy
and actions of the rulers of Madras; but, on the other hand, when he
wrote his Memoirs relative to the State of India during the long
journey home which began on 5 February, 1785, he seemed not to
anticipate any immediate consequences of danger.
It is not likely that Tipoo should so soon choose to involve himself in a
new war with us, deprived of all his confederates, and these become his rivals;
nor that, whenever he shall have formed such a design, he will suffer it to
break out in petty broils with our borderers. 2
None the less it was quite evident that war was pending between
Tipu and the Marathas. The Nizam and Nana were known to be
in negotiation if not in alliance : the power of Sindhia cast its mantle
of supremacy over the Moghul. The claim which Tipu, as it seemed
with unjustifiable audacity, advanced upon Bijapur-which mean-
while Nana had promised to surrender to the Nizam-may have
been based on an imperial grant to Hyder of a portion of the Deccan,
and was certainly not one which in 1785 could be confirmed or made
effective. But, while wisdom would have persuaded Tipu to be content
with the successes he had won, his inherent passion and restlessness
urged him to new aggression. Thomas Munro, when he summed up
his career in 1799, said "a restless spirit of innovation, and a wish to
have everything to originate from himself, was the predominant
feature of his character". 3 Upon the success of the war which ended
in 1784 he formed the designs first of crushing the Nizam and the
Marathas and then turning, flushed with victory, upon the English.
This project he avowed to the French. * Early in 1785 he attacked
the hill-post of Nargund, belonging to a Brahmin desai, with whoni
he had already had unfriendly relations, the one making extravagant
1 Grant Duff, u, 469.
2 Forrest, Selections from the State Papers of . . . Warren Hastings, II, 54.
8 Gleig, Life of Munro, I, 233.
4 Wilks, Historical Sketches of Southern India, a, 535 sqq.


## p. 334 (#362) ############################################

334
TIPU SULTAN, 1785-1802
demands, the other claiming tribute. 1 In vain the Marathas inter-
vened to save Nargund and Kittur : by guile as well as force Tipu
made a successful conquest which he foresaw. He appealed to the
Treaty of Şalbai and asked for aid against Tipu : Macpherson, in the
cautious spirit of the non-intervention policy which was now ascen.
dant in the counsels of the Company, replied that the treaty
did not stipulate that the friends and enemies of the two States should be
mutual, but that neither party should afford assistance to the enemies of the
other, and that by the treaty of Mangalore the English were bound not to
assist the enemies of Tipu.
Thus he gave the sultan of Mysore reason to think that he could
proceed undisturbed.
But Nana was not going to fall without a struggle. He applied
to Goa for alliance : a. step which alarmed Macpherson into estab-
lishing a resident (C. W. Malet) at Poona.
By the fifth month of 1786 the Marathas were in alliance with the
Nizam and ready to move. Their forces joined on 1 May, and on
20 May they took Badami. Against Tipu also were Holkar and
Mudaji Bhonsle : Kittur was recovered: the victors returned home
flushed with success : Hari Pant advanced, and relieved Adoni, while
Tipu captured Savanur. The end was a peace which hardly modified
the status quo. The Marathas retained important districts (Nargund,
Kittur, Badami) and Tipu recovered others. His brother-in-law
regained Savanur, and a kinsman of the Nizam Adoni. On the whole
the treaty of 1787 was a rebuff for Tipu. He had begun to perceive
that the English were more dangerous than he had thought. Malet
at Poona and the military preparations of Cornwallis gave him pause.
Hardly had Cornwallis arrived in India when his attention was
turned to Tipu. His knowledge of international politics made him
consider India as a vital point in the enduring rivalry between
England and France : perhaps he was the first English statesman in
India who fully grasped its importance. A letter of March, 1788. ?
shows that he had considered the situation in all its bearings.
"I look upon a rupture with Tipu as a certain and immediate consequence
of a war with France”, he wrote to Malet, "and in that event a vigorous co-
operation of the Marathas would certainly be of the utmost importance to our
interests in this country. ”
The settlement of the Guntoor Sarkar affair caused a new settlement
with the Nizam, and this, embodied in a curiously disingenuous
message--which kept the non-intervention order of the act of 1734
in the letter but broke it in the spirit-brought about the war which
+ See Kirkpatrick's Letters of Tipu, referred to by Wilks, Historical Sket-
ches, 11, 535.
2 Cornwallis Correspondence, 1, 345.


## p. 335 (#363) ############################################

THE WAR OF 1790
335
1
3
Cornwallis had foreseen. Wilks, the historian of Southern India at
this period, sardonically remarks that
it is highly instructive to observe a statesman, justly extolled for moderate and
pacific dispositions, thus indirectly violating a law, enacted for the enforce-
ment of these virtues, by entering into a very intelligible offensive alliance.
Cornwallis, of course, knew well what he was doing, and was con-
vinced that he could do nothing else with any regard for the safety
of the English in Madras : he expressed himself strongly to Maleta
on the danger of having to make war without efficient allies.
The actual ignition of the flame (foreseen by Tipu, who had long
ago promised the French to attack the English, as well as by Corn-
wallis) was caused by Tipu's attack on Travancore, 29 December,
1789. The ostensible reason for this was the sale of Jaikottai and
Kranganur to the raja by the Dutch, Tipu asserting that they
belonged to his feudatory the raja of Cochin. The raja of Travancore
said that the Dutch had held them so long ago as 1654 and acquired
them from the Portuguese, and he applied to Hollond, the governor
of Madras, for aid. It seems probable that Hollond was already
warned of what was about to happen, and had taken a bribe from
Tipu; he certainly delayed preparations and endeavoured to persuade
the governor-general that they were unnecessary. Then when Tipu
attacked Travancore, the raja, though included by name among
England's allies in the Treaty of Mangalore, was left to his fate.
Tipu carried all before him till Cornwallis, indignant at the disgrace-
ful sacrifice "that had been made of British honour", intervened in
person, preluding his action by a letter condemning the conduct of
the Madras Government in the most vigorous terms. Orders had
been disobeyed, preparations not made, and allies betrayed. Now
the resources of the Carnatic must be exploited : even the sums set
apart for the payment of the nawab's enormous debts must be
seized; at the same time the necessary alliances with the Marathas
and the Nizam must be immediately stabilised; Cornwallis hoped,
that "the common influence of passion and the considerations of
evident interest” would draw them to his side. And so it proved.
On 1 June, and 4 July, 1790, treaties were made with the Marathas
and the Nizam in view of the imminent war with Tipu. These formed
"the Triple Alliance”; and the war began in May, 1790.
Briefly the objects may be expressed as follows. Tipu was con-
tinuing his father's attempt to win supremacy in Southern India. The
Nizam and the Marathas were in greater fear of him than of the
English. Cornwallis saw danger near and far, to all British interests
in India, and in the wider international spheres of Europe and
America. His experience had accustomed his mind to world-wide
maps.
1 Wilks, op. cit. Mi, 38.
2 Cornwallis Correspondence, I, 496.
3 Cf. Malcolm, Political History of India, I, 72.
4 Cornwallis Correspondence, 1, 491.


## p. 336 (#364) ############################################

336
TIPU SULTAN, 1785-1802
a
The war lasted for nearly two years, and the result was both
disastrous to Tipu and the prelude to greater and final disaster. It
fell into three campaigns. The first was commanded by General
Medows, whose devotion to duty and universal popularity were
contrasted by Cornwallis 1 with the qualities and estimation of the
late governor of Madras. Transferred from Bombay (where Ralph
Abercromby replaced him) to Madras, this gallant but precipitate
officer was to lead the principal force of the Carnatic to seize the
Coimbatore district and then to penetrate through the Gazzalhatti
pass to the heart of Mysore. Colonel Kelly was to watch over the
safety of the Carnatic and the passes that led into it most. directly
from Mysore. To General Abercromby with the army of Bombay
was given the task of subjugating the territory of Tipu on the Malabar
Coast, a task which he accomplished in a few weeks. Medows was less
immediately successful. A chain of forts stretched from the Coro-
mandel Coast to the Gazzalhatti Gorge; all these were eventually
captured and by July, 1790, Medows stood at Coimbatore sixty miles
from his nearest support and ninety from the farthest. Then Tipu
suddenly descended the famous pass and with rapidity and skill
inflicted sharp blows on the British troops in different quarters. On
10 November he was narrowly prevented from destroying the force
of Colonel Maxwell, successor to Kelly; six days later Medows came
up and the British force was saved. But Tipu, moving rapidly, was
still a source of considerable danger, and it was thought well that
Cornwallis himself should come to the scene of action. The Marathas
and the Nizam, however, were giving useful aid, and the capture of
Dharwar added greatly to the allies' security and power.
The year 1791 found Cornwallis in command, and in politics the
project broached of deposing the usurper Tipu in favour of the heir
of the old Hindu rajas of Mysore. The governor-general recovered
in India not a little of the military reputation he had lost in America;
it is not insignificant that the favourite portrait of him shows a
background of eastern tents and turbaned soldiery. Taking a new
point of attack he moved by Vellore and Ambur to the capture of
Bangalore, which he achieved on 21 March, 1791; and by 13 May he
was witnin nine miles of Seringapatam. But the campaign ended in
disappointment. Tipu showed unexpected generalship, and Corn-
wallis when the rains came was compelled to retreat by the utter
failure (as Wilks reports) of all the equipments of his army : Madras,
incompetent and sluggish, again at fault. It seemed necessary to open
negotiations with Mysore, but Cornwallis was not disposed to yield,
and when Tipu sent a propitiatory offering, it was with delight that
“the whole army beheld the loads of fruit untouched and the camels
unaccepted returning to Seringapatam”.
When the fighting was resumed, though Tipu succeeded, in
1 Cornwallis Correspondence, I, 429.


## p. 337 (#365) ############################################

TREATY OF SERINGAPATAM
337
capturing Coimbatore (3 November, 1791), which had been most
gallantly defended, the troops of Cornwallis, gradually removing all
obstacles, and after arduous efforts (recounted with enthusiastic
vigour by Wilks), occupying the chain of forts which was interposed,
drew near to the capital; and on 5 February, 1792, the lines were
drawn round Seringapatam. Cornwallis's letters give graphic des-
criptions of the attacks which followed. Tipu displayed much military
and diplomatic skill, the native allies were urgent with Cornwallis to
conclude the war by negotiation, and the governor-general was never
keen completely to crush an enemy. Three days before peace was
signed he wrote to Sir Charles Oakeley, governor of Madras, that “an
arrangement which effectually destroys the dangerous power of Tipu
will be more beneficial to the public than the capture of Seringapatam,
and it will render the final settlement with our Allies, who seem very
partial to it, much more easy"; and the Secret Committee had antici-
pated such an arrangement with approval. 1 Half Tipu's territory
was surrendered, and a large portion of this went to the Nizam (from
the Krishna to beyond the Pennar river with the forts of Ganjkottai
and Cuddapah) and to the Marathas (extending their boundary to
the Tungabhadra); while the English secured all his lands on the
Malabar Coast between Travancore and the Kaway, the Baramahal
district and that of Dindigul, and Tipu was obliged to grant independ-
ence to the much persecuted raja of Coorg. At home great interest
was aroused by one provision : two sons of Tipu were surrendered as
hostages for his good faith. A popular picture represents them being
presented to Cornwallis amid an assemblage of perturbed Muham-
madans. They were nurtured carefully at Calcutta : their portraits,
not uninteresting, are still at Government House. In England also
the treaty seemed a most satisfactory example of “our old and true
policy”,3 presumably one of deliberate avoidance of territorial acqui-
sitions beyond the necessities of safety-for it was on this ground in
his letters home that Cornwallis justified his seizures; but he was
utterly deceived in thinking that Tipu recognised defeat or ceased
to plan renewed aggression. Yet the English alliance with the Nizam
undoubtedly received a new accession of strength; it may be said to
have now reached something of the traditional stability which in
Europe linked Portugal and England in unbroken alliance. The
jealous Poona Marathas "saw with regret the shield of British power
held up between them and the Nizam”: new seeds for future war
were planted though they did not grow up for some years. Cornwallis
was not blind either, though he did not go much beyond declaring *
(to Sir C. Malet at Poona) that the allies were bound mutually to
guarantee what each had won from Tipu. But before he left India a
a
2 Idem, p. 537.
1 Cornwallis Correspondence, a, 159.
8 Annual Register, 1792.
* Cornwallis Correspondence, I, 176 sqq.
22


## p. 338 (#366) ############################################

338
TIPU SULTAN, 1785-1802
1
cloud was beginning to rise on the horizon towards Mysore. Early
in October, 1793, the governor-general returned to England, and his
successor had none of his military interests or international experience,
and little of his political sagacity.
The war between the Marathas and the Nizam (1794-5), in which
Shore not unnaturally avoided intervention, ended in the Nizam's
defeat and in Sir John Shore's belief that he was a less valuable ally
than his conquerors, with the inept anticipation that there was “no
immediate probability that we shall be involved in war”. ? He had,
says his biographer,; anticipated no danger from the union of the
Marathas and Tipu against the Nizam, and contemplated without
apprehension the total collapse of the latter's government. It is
sufficient comment on Sir John Shore's political wisdom that it, alone
of the three, survives to-day.
The results of Shore's non-intervention were speedily seen. The
Nizam dismissed his English troops and increased the French, and
but for his son's rebellion, which the English had remained long
enough to suppress, would have thrown himself entirely on the French
side, and thus have come inevitably into alliance with Tipu. Shore
returned to England in 1798. A very careful and conscientious
administrator, he was succeeded by a man of genius, who became one
of the makers of British India. Himself without Indian experience,
Richard Wellesley, Earl of Mornington_(who arrived on 26 April,
1798), approached the problems of the East with a mind unbiassed
though not uninformed. He was already on the Board of Control
and had studied the history, politics and government of India
assiduously. He had accepted the governorship of Madras, and had
therefore observed the difficulties of Southern India particularly, on
Lord Cornwallis being appointed governor-general a second time (1
February, 1797); but when Cornwallis accepted the lord-lieutenancy
of Ireland a few months later, Wellesley was sent on instead to
Calcutta. His earliest letters to Dundas, on his way out to India,
evince a remarkable knowledge of Indian affairs, and on 28 February,
1798, though he did not know of Tipu's recent negotiations with
France, he saw that in the power of Mysore lay the key to the whole
position. Since Cornwallis had left India the fruits of his successes
had disappeared.
4
“The balance of power in India”, he wrote, “no longer exists upon the same
footing on which it was placed by the peace of Seringapatam. The question
therefore must arise how it may best be brought back to the state in which
you have directed me to maintain it. ”
But he soon saw that the balance of power, if such there were to be,
1 Cornwallis Correspondence, in, 219.
2 See his state papers, Malcolm's History, II, App. O, XLIV sqq.
3 The second Lord Teignmouth, Life, I, 320.
1 From Cape of Good Hope : Despatches, I, 25: Cf. The Wellesley Papers.
vol. 1.


## p. 339 (#367) ############################################

CAUSES OF WAR
339
must stand on a very different footing from that on which Cornwallis,
or Shore, or even Dundas, believed that it would rest securely.
An admirable paper written years after by the Duke of Wellington
-Mornington's younger brother Arthur, who arrived in India in
January, 1797–describes the condition of the country when the new
governor-general arrived. To Wellesley, actively though he inter-
vened in the affairs of other countries, especially those of the Nizam,
the centre of interest was Mysore. He landed on 26 April, 1798, and
immediately learnt of the negotiations of Tipu with France and her
dependency Mauritius. 1 Tipu had sent envoys to Versailles (where
they were received with almost as much mirth as satisfaction), called
himself "Citoyen", and addressed the most urgent and flattering
application to Malartic, the governor of Mauritius, for alliance and
aid. In the name of the French Republic one and indivisible, the
governor of the Isles of France and Bourbon issued a vigorous
proclamation to the "citoyens de couleur libres", announcing Tipu's
desire for an offensive and defensive alliance, and welcoming his
assistance to expel the English from India. Tipu's ambassadors
returned home and landed at Mangalore accompanied by a small
French force on the very day (26 April, 1798)2 that Sir John Shore
received a letter from him desiring "to cultivate and improve the
friendship and good understanding subsisting between the two states
and an inviolable adherence to the engagements by which they are
connected". The new governor-general was not deceived. He ad-
dressed a friendly letter to Tipu and received an effusive reply; but
he left no ground for doubt as to the seriousness of his intentions,
of which he desired the sultan to be aware. On 18 October he heard
of Bonaparte's landing in Egypt, and two days later he ordered Lord
Clive, governor of Madras, to prepare for war. He was now secure
on the side of Hyderabad, and he began a series of exploratory
operations (as surgeons might say) in the direction of Mysore. He
wrote: Tipu replied : more than once : the governor-general courteous
with a touch of imperiousness, the Muhammadan despot evasive and
deceitful. At first Mornington's plan was merely to require a repu-
diation of the French alliance; it developed, through increasing
requirements of territory, into a determinacion utterly to annihilate
the power of the usurper of Mysore.
The Mysore War with the destruction of Tipu has often been
criticised as unjustifiable and unjust, precipitate and unwarranted by
the conduct of the vanquished. The great majority of contemporary
opinion is entirely against this view. Indeed it may be said that
hardly a single writer or speaker who had personal knowledge of
India doubted that the war, and its object, were absolutely necessary.
England was already in danger from France, and the danger for
2 Idem, 1. App. pp. viii-xi.
1 Wellesley Despatches, 1, 213.
8 Cf. p. 328 supra.


## p. 340 (#368) ############################################

340
TIPU SULTAN, 1785-1802
several years grew greater; how much greater would it have been
had the life and death struggle been carried on in India as well as
in Europe! Already a French force was in Egypt. Did not the classical
models which the ambitious pedants of the Revolution delighted to
follow point towards the creation of a new western dominion in the
East? The armies of Tipu, daily growing in numbers and efficiency,
were ready implements to make this achievement possible. "His
resources”, said the Madras Government to Mornington, "are more
prompt than our own. " Yet war was embarked on by the English
only after serious attempts at negotiation, and it seemed to the
governor-general that it needed the vindication which the course of
events would afford.
“It will soon be evident”, he said, “to all the powers of India that the
fundamental principle of our policy is invariably repugnant to every schene
of conguest, extension of dominion, aggrandisement or ambition either for our-
selves or our allies. "
It may be wondered whether the serious attempts at negotiation
were ever regarded by Tipu as anything but endeavours to gain time.
His letters to Lord Mornington were no doubt amusing from their
fulsome professions of sincerity and friendship mingled with denun-
ciations of all that had happened in the Isle of France. They
continued all through the winter of 1798-9, and were in no way
influenced by the vigorous letter sent from Constantinople by the
sultan, Selim III, urging the necessity of opposing the faithless French,
enemies of the Muhammadan faith. Mornington suffered them to
continue, for, as early as 12 August, 1798," he had drawn up a minute
in the Secret Department sketching measures necessary for "frustrat-
ing the united efforts of Tipoo Sultaun and of France". Yet he was
still anxious to defend himself against any charge of aggressiveness.
“The rights of states applicable to every case of contest with foreign
powers”, he asserted, "are created and limited by the necessity of
preserving the public safety. ” This necessity was now obvious. By
the beginning of 1799 both sides were ready for the contest. Tipu
retorted to Constantinople the charges made against his allies (10
February): Mornington issued to General Harris at Madras his
instructions for the political conduct of the inevitable war (22 Febru-
ary). A commission was appointed to negotiate with any neighbouring
chiefs, to conciliate the population and to watch over the family of
the ancient Hindu rajas, whom the governor-general already thought
of restoring to the throne of Mysore. On this commission Colonel
Arthur Wellesley served. It was the first important political work
of one, who was to become England's prime minister as well as
commander-in-chief. On the same day there was issued from Madras
a declaration by the Governor-General in Council of the causes of
the war, and Mornington addressed from Fort St George an order
1 Wellesley Despatches, I, 159.
2 Idem, p. 171


## p. 341 (#369) ############################################

FALL OF SËRINGAPATAM
341
1
to General Harris not to delay the march of the army one hour, but
to enter Mysore and march upon Seringapatam.
The. circumstances were favourable. The armies of the Nizam and
the Peshwa might be useful, and relations with the Nizam at least
were cordial. But the chief dependence was on the British troops.
The army of the Carnatic was believed to be
the best appointed, the most completely equipped, the most amply and libe-
rally supplied, the most perfect in point of discipline, and the most fortunate
in the acknowledged experience and abilities of its officers in every department
which ever took the field of India,
and the Malabar force was also efficient. The object of the war was
plain : the general in command had full powers, and the country was
well known from the experience of the earlier war. British ships were
at sea, successfully scouring it of French vessels. The governor-general
himself was at Madras masterfully directing every step in advance,
and acting in cordial association with the governor, the son of the
great Clive. On 3 February General Harris moved from Vellore and
General Stewart from Kannanur. On 8 March Stewart defeated Tipu
at Sedasere, and on the 27th he was again defeated at Mallavelly,
by Harris. The raja of Coorg, Tipu's bitter enemy, witnessed the
achievements of Stewart with enthusiasm. Arthur Wellesley was in
command of the contingent from Hyderabad, largely troops of the
Nizam. Tipu was utterly out-generalled, and could do no more tha).
turn to bay in his capital. The English armies met before Seringa-
patam early in April, and on 17 April the siege began.