No More Learning

2 Premeditation. ]--M. . Tourreil admires the greatness of mind of
Demosthenes, who, though he gloried in the pains and labour his orations
cost him, was yet superior to that low and malignant passion which
oftentimes prompts us to decry those taients which we do not possess.
I suspect, however, that this nassage was occasioned by some particular
circumstance in the debate. Perhaps some speaker, who opposed Demos-
thenes, might have urged his opinion somewhat dogmatically, as the
result of mature reflection and deliberation.
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? 86 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
cours may be sent from this city, and all former in -
conveniences be avoided; and that you should send
ambassadors to notify these things, and to secure
our interests by their presence. For as he is a man
of consummate policy, complete in the art of turning
every incident to his own advantage, there is the
utmost reason to fear, that partly by concessions,
where they may be seasonable, partly by menaces
(and his menaces may1 be believed), and partly by
rendering us and our absence suspected, he may tear
from us something of the last importance, and force
it into his own service.
Those very circumstances, however, which con-
tribute to the power of Philip are happily the most
favourable to us: for that uncontrolled command,
with which he governs all transactions public and
secret; his entire direction of his army, as their
leader, their sovereign, and their treasurer; and his
diligence, in giving life to every part of it by his
presence; these things greatly contribute to carrying
on a war with expedition and success, but are power-
ful obstacles to that accommodation which he would
gladly make with the Olynthians. For the Olyn-
thians see plainly that they do not now fight for glory,
or for part of their territory, but to defend their state
from dissolution and slavery. They know how he
rewarded those traitors of Amphipolis who made
him master of that city, and those of Pydna who
opened their gates to him. In a word, free states, I
think, must ever look with suspicion on an absolute
monarchy; but a neighbouring monarchy must double
their apprehensions.
Convinced of what hath now been offered, and
possessed with every other just and worthy senti-
ment, you must be resolved, Athenians, you must
exert your spirit; you must apply to the war now, if
ever; your fortunes, your persons, your whole
I His menaces may, &c. ]--Although his pr&miees could by no means
be relied ou.
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? third oivsnthiac oration. 89
powers, are now demanded. There is no excuse,
no pretence left for declining the performance of
your duty: for that which you were all ever urging
loudly, that the Olynthians should be engaged in a war
with Philip, hath now happened of itself; and this in
a manner most agreeable to our interest. For, if
they had entered into this war at our persuasion, they
must have been precarious allies, without steadiness
or resolution: but, as their private injuries have made
them enemies to Philip, it is probable that enmity
will be lasting, both on account of what they fear,
and what they have already suffered. My country-
men ! let not so favourable an opportunity escape
you: do not repeat that error which hath been so
often fatal to you. For when, at our return from
assisting the Eubosans,1 Hierax and Stratocles, citi-
zens of Amphipolis, mounted this gallery,2 and
pressed you to send out your navy, and to take their
city under your protection, had we discovered that
resolution in our own cause which we exerted for
the safety of Eubrea, then had Amphipolis been
yours, and all those difficulties had been avoided in
which you have been since involved. Again, when
we received advice of the sieges of Pydna, Potidaea,
Methone, Pagasae, and other places (for I would not
detain you with a particular recital), had we ourselves
marched with a due spirit and alacrity to the relief
of the first of these cities, we should now find much
more compliance, much more humility in Philip.
But by still neglecting the present, and imagining
our future interests will not demand our care, we
have aggrandized our enemy, we have raised him to
1 The Enhcenns. ]--This refers to the expedition in favour of the Eu-
bosans agamst the Thebans, which is mentioned in the note 3, p. 43. The
Athenians prepared for this expedition in three days, according to Demos-
thenes ; in five, according to jEschines : and their success was as sudden
ss their preparation. *
? This gallery. ]--In the original, roun to BHMA; that eminence
where all the public speakers were placed, and from whence the people
were addressed on all occasions.
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? 90
ORATIONS OF DKMOSTHENES.
a degree of eminence greater than any king of Mace-
don hath ever yet enjoyed. Now, we have another
opportunity--that which the Olynthians of them-
selves present to the state; one no less considerable
than any of the former.
And, m my opinion, Athenians, if a man were to
bring the dealings of the gods towards us to a fair
account, though many things might appear not quite
agreeable to our wishes, yet he would acknowledge
that we had been highly favoured by them; and with
great reason: for that many places have been lost
in the course of war is truly to be charged to our
own weak conduct. But that the difficulties arisen
from hence have not long affected us ; and that an
alliance now presents itself to remove them, if we
are disposed to make the just use of it; this I cannot
but ascribe to the Divine goodness. But the same
thing happens in this case as in the use of riches.
If a man be careful to save those he hath acquired,
he readily acknowledges the kindness of fortune;
but if by his imprudence they be once lost, with
them he also loses the sense of gratitude. So in
political affairs, they who neglect to improve their
opportunities, forget the favours which the gods have
bestowed; for it is the ultimate event which gene-
rally determines men's judgment of every thing
precedent: and, therefore, all affairs hereafter should
engage your strictest care; that, by correcting our
errors, we may wipe off the inglorious stain of past
actions. But should we be deaf to these men too,
and should he be suffered to subvert Olynthus; say,
what can prevent him from marching his forces into
whatever territory he pleases ?
Is there not a man among you, Athenians, who
reflects by what steps Philip, from a begmnmg so
inconsiderable, hath mounted to this height of power 1
First, he took Amphipohs; then he became master
of Pydna; then Potidaea fell; then Methone; then
name his inroad into Thessaly: after this, having
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? THIRD OLYNTHIAO ORATION.
91
disposed affairs at Pherae, at Pagasae, at Magnesia,
entirely as he pleased, he marched into Thrace.
Here, while engaged1 in expelling some, and estab-
lishing other princes, he fell sick. Again recovering,
he never turned a moment from his course to ease
or mdulgence, but instantly attacked the Olynthians.
His expeditions against the Illyrians, the Paeonians,
against Arymbas,2 I pass all over. --But I may be
asked, why this recital now * That you may know
and see your own error, in ever neglecting some
part of your affairs, as if beneath your regard; and
that active spirit with which Philip pursues his
designs; which ever fires him, and which never can
permit him to rest satisfied with those things he hath
already accomplished. If, then, he determines firmly
and invariably to pursue his conquests; and if we
are obstinately resolved against every vigorous and
effectual measure; think, what consequences may
i Into Thrace. Here, while engaged, Jkc. ]--Thrace was inhabited by
in inf^He number of different people, whose names Herodotus has
transmiited. And he observes, that could they have united under a
single chief, or connected themselves by interest or sentiment, they
would have formed a body infinitely superior to all their neighbours.
After Teres, the Thracians had divers kings. This prince had two sons,
Sitalces and Sparadocus, among whose descendants various contests
arose, till, after a series of usurpations and revolutions, Seuthes recov-
ered part of the territory of his father Msesades, and transmitted the
Recession peaceably to Cotis the father of Cersobleptes (as Demosthenes
says; not his brother, as Diodorus). At the death of Cotis the divisions
iecommenced, and in the place of one king Thrace had three, Cerso-
bleptes, Berisades, and Amadocus. Cersobleptes dispossessed the other
two, and was himself dethroned by Philip. Frontinus reports, that
Alexander, when he had conquered Thrace, brought the princes of that
country with him in his expedition into Asia, to prevent their raising any
commotions in his absence; a proof that Philip and Alexander had
established several petty kings in Thrace, who were vassals to Macedon.
-Tourreil.
> Arymbas. ]--He was the son of Alcetas. kingof Epirus, and brother
to Neoptolemus, whose daughter Olympian Philip married. About three
years before ihe date of this oration the death of their father produced
a dispute between the brothers about the succession. Arymbas was the
lawful heir; yet Philip obliged him, by force of arms, to divide the king-
dom with Neoptolemus: and not contented with this, at the death of
Arymbas, he found means by his intrigues and menaces, to prevail on
the Epirots to banish his son, and to constitute Alexander the son of
NeoptoNmus sole monarch. --Tourreil
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? 92 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
-we expect! In the name of Heaven! can any man
be so weak, as not to know that, by neglecting this
war, we are transferring it from that country to our
own ? And should this happen, I fear, Athenians,
that as they who inconsiderately borrow money on
high interest, after a short-lived affluence are deprived
of their own fortunes; so we, by this continued in-
dolence, by consulting only our ease and pleasure,
may be reduced to the grievous necessity of engag-
ing in affairs the most shocking and disagreeable,
and of exposing ourselves in the defence of this our
native territory.
To censure, some one may tell me, is easy, and in
the power of every man: but the true counsellor
should point out that conduct which the present
exigence demands. --Sensible as I am, Athenians,
that when your expectations have in any instance
been disappointed, your resentment frequently falls
not on those who merit it, but on him who hath
spoken last; yet I cannot, from a regard to my own
safety, suppress what I deem of moment to lay . cfore
you. I say. then, this occasion calls for a twofold
armament. First, we are to defend the cities of the
Olynthians; and for this purpose to detach a body
of forces: in the next place, in order to infest his
kingdom, we are to send out our navy manned with
other levies. If you neglect either of these, I fear
your expedition will be fruitless: for, if you content
yourselves with infesting his dominions, this he will
endure, until he is master of Olynthus ; and then he
can with ease repel the invasion: or, if you only send
succours to the Olynthians, when he sees his own
kingdom free from danger, he will apply with con-
stancy and vigilance to the war, and at length weary
out the besieged to a submission. Your levies, there-
fore, must be considerable enough to serve both pur-
poses. --These are my sentiments with respect to
our armament.
And now as to the exsense of these preparations.
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? THIRD OLYNTHIAC ORATION. 93
You are already provided for the payment of your
forces better than any other people. This provision
is distributed among yourselves in the manner most
agreeable; but if you restore it to the army, the sup-
plies will be complete without any addition; if not,
an addition will be necessary; or the whole, rather,
will remain to be raised. How then? (I may be
asked) do you move for a decree to apply those funds
to the military service ? By no means. It is my
opinion, indeed, that an army must be raised; that
this money really belongs to the army; and that the
same regulation which entitles our citizens to re-
ceive should oblige them also to act. At present
you expend the sums on entertainments, without
regard to your affairs. It remains then that a general
contribution be raised: a great one, if a great one be
required: a small one, if such may be sufficient.
Money must be found: without it nothing can be
effected. Various schemes are proposed by various
persons: do you make that choice which you think
most advantageous; and, while you have an oppor-
tunity, exert yourselves in the care of your interests.
It is worthy1 your attention to consider how the
affairs of Philip are at this time circumstanced: for
they are by no means so well disposed, so very
flourishing, as an inattentive observer would pro-
nounce. Nor would he have engaged in this war at
all had he thought he should have been obliged lo
maintain it. He hoped that the moment he appeared
1 It is worthy, dec. ]--Hitherto the orator has painted Philip in all hia
terrors. He is politic, and vigilant, and intrepid: he has risen gradually
to the highest pitch of power; and is now ready to appear before the
walls of Athens, if he is not instantly opposed: but, lest this desci iption
should dispirit the Athenians, he is now represented in a quite different
manner. His power is by no means real and solid; his allies are pre-
pared to revolt; his kingdom is threatened with war and desolation;
and he is just ready to be crushed by the very first effort that is made to
distress him : but as it was necessary that the danger to which they
were exposed should make the deepest impression on the minds of hia
hearers, he returns to his former description, and concludes with the-
dreadful image if a formidable enemy ravaging their territory, and
shutting them up within their walls.
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? 94 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
all things would fall before him. But these hopes
were vain; and this disappointment, in the first place,
troubles and dispirits him. Then the Thessalians
alarm him; a people remarkable for their perfidy1 on
all occasions, and to all persons; and just as they
have ever proved, even so he finds them now. For
they have resolved in council to demand the resti-
tution of Pagasae, and have opposed his attempt 'to
fortify Magnesia: and I am informed, that for the
future he is to be excluded from their ports and mar-
kets, as these conveniences belong to the states of
Thessaly, and are not to be intercepted by Philip.
And, should he be deprived of such a fund of wealth,
he. must be greatly straitened to support his foreign
troops. Besides this, we must suppose that the
Paeonian and the Illyrian, and all the others, would
prefer freedom and independence toa state of slavery.
They are not accustomed to subjection; and the
insolence of this man, it is said, knows no bounds:
nor is this improbable; for great and unexpected
success is apt to hurry weak minds into extrava-
gances. Hence it often proves much more difficult
to maintain acquisitions than to acquire. It is your
part, therefore, to regard the time of his distress as
your most favourable opportunity; improve it to the
utmost; send out your embassies; take the field
yourselves, and excite a general ardour abroad; ever
considering how readily Philip would attack us, if
he were favoured by any incident like this--if a war
had broken out on our borders. And would it not
be shameful to want the resolution to bring that dis-
tress on him which, had it been equally in his power,
he certainly would have made you feel?
l Their perfidy. ]--This people had a had character from the earliest
times, so as to become even proverbial; and Greece, and Athena particu-
larly, had experienced their want of faith on very important occasions.
They invited Xerxes into Greece, and were not ashamed to join Mar-
ionius after the battle of Salamis, and to serve him as guides in his
invasion of Attica; and in the heat of a battle between Athens and Sparta,
they on a sudden deserted their allies, the Athenians, and joined ttat
? Demy. See Thucyd. b. i. --Tourreit.
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? THIRD OLYNTHIAC ORATION.
95
This too demands your attention, Athenians, that
you are now to determine whether it be most expe-
dient to carry the war into his country, 01 to fight
him here. If Olynthus be defended, Macedon will
be the seat of war: you may harass his kingdom,
and enjoy your own territories free from apprehen-
sions. But should that nation be subdued by Philip,
who will oppose his marching hither? Will the
Thebans? Let it not be thought severe when I
affirm that they will join readily in the invasion. 1
Will the Phocians? a people scarcely able2 to defend
their own country without your assistance. Will
any others? 3 But, sir, cries some one, he would
make no such attempt. This would be the greatest
of absurdities; not to execute those threats, when
he hath full power, which now, when they appear so
idle and extravagant, he yet dares to utter. And I
think you are not yet to learn how great would be
the difference between our engaging him here and
there. Were we to be only thirty days abroad, and
to draw all the necessaries of the camp from our own
lands, even were there no enemy to ravage them,
the damage would, in my opinion, amount to more
than the whole expense of the late war. 4 Add then
the presence of an enemy, and how greatly must the
calamity be increased! But, farther, add the infamy;
and to those who judge rightly, no distress can be
more grievous than the scandal of misconduct.
It is incumbent, therefore, on us all (justly influ-
i Join readily In the invasion. '--The reasons of Thebes's hatred to
Athens have been already assigned. See note on Olynth. 11. p. 74.
* Scarcely able, &c. ]--The Phocians were at this time reduced to a
Tery low state, by a continued series of ill success in the sacred war.
Philomelus and Onomarchus had perished; Phayllus and Phalecus,
the.
, successors, had been frequently defeated; and the Thebans were
continually gaining advantages over them. --Tourrdl.
9 Will any others? ]--He avoids all mention of the Thessalians;
because he had just shown that they were ill-aflected to Philip, and
therefOie might be supposed willing to join with the Athenians.
4 Of the late war. ]--That is, their expedition into Thrace, in order to
recover Ampbipolis, which, according to the calculation of JEscbinetf,
eost them one thousand five hundred talents. --TourTM:.
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? 66 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
enced by these considerations) to unite vigorously
in the common cause, and repel the danger that
threatens this territory. Let the rich exert them-
selves on this occasion; that by contributing a small
portion of their affluence, they may secure the peace-
ful possession of the rest. Let those who are of the
age for military duty; that, by learning the art of
war in Philip's dominions, they may become for-
midable defenders of their native land. Let our
orators; that they may safely submit their conduct
to the public inspection: for your judgment of their
administrations will ever be determined by the event
of things. And may we all contribute to tender tha
favourable 1
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? THE ORATION ON THE PEACE:
VftONOUNCED IN THE ARCHONSHIP OF ARCHIAS, THRIK YEARS AFTER
TBS OLYNTHIAO ORATIONS.
INTRODUCTION.
The Athenians sent those succours to Olynthus which were recom
mended in the preceding oration. But they could not defend that state
against its domestic enemies; Tor, the year following, two of its citizens,
Lasthenes and Euthycrates, betrayed the city to Philip. He razed it,
threw part of the inhabitants in chains, sold another part, and distin-
guished the two traitors only by the cruelty of their death. His two
brothers, who had been harboured in Olynthus, he also sacrificed to his
jealousy and revenge.
Tbese events, no less than the repeated instances of Demosthenes,
prevailed on the Athenians to declare war against Philip in form.
Hitherto he had kept l ome measures with them, and had sought various
pretences for glossing over his hostilities; but now he fell with the
utmost fury on all their tributary states, and obliged Demosthenes to
appear once more in the assembly, to persuade the Athenians to defend
the islanders and their colonies which lay on the Hellespont. But
scarcely had the war been declared, when the vigour of their enemy, and
their own fickleness and indolence, made them weary of it. Ctesiphon
and Phrynon were sent to sound Philip's dispositions towards a separate
peace. This was as be could wish. The Phocian war was at present
the object of his views; and his arts had just regained the Thessalians
over to the confederacy, who had been prevailed on to stand neuter. To
the Athenian ministers, therefore, he made such professions, that Demos-
thenes and nine others were sent to negotiate the peace " who proceeded
as far as they were authorized, and returned with Antipater, Parmenio,
and Eurylochus, on the part of Philip. Ambassadors were sent soon
after from Athens, with full powers to conclude the treaty. In the first
of these embassies Demosthenes had met with some Athenian prisoners
in Macedon, whom he promised to redeem at his own expense, and took
this opportunity to perform it; while his colleagues, in the mean time,
were to proceed with all expedition, in order to conclude with Philip.
Three months elapsed, however, before they came to an audience with
the kjng, who was all this time making himself master of those places
in Thrace which the Athenians claimed as their right. At last the terns
of the treaty were agreed to; but by affected delays, and by corrupting
the ambassadors, he found means to defer the execution of it until he had
advanced his troops into Thessaly, in order to proceed against the Pho-
cians. He then conducted the peaces and, on their return, the ambas-
sadors who had conducted the treaty (and JEschines in particular)
ex natuUed on bis candour and sincerity. They declared at the very time
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? 98
INTRODUCTION.
when he was giving Thebes the most solemn assurances that he would
minate the Phocians, that his sole views were to screen this people
the Airy of their enemies, and to control the insolenee of the
ans. They also vouched for his performing several things in favour
of. the state, not formally stipulated in the treaty. Thus were the Athe-
nians amused, and Philip suffered to pass the straits of Thermopylae, and
to pursue his march into Phocis.
His reputation and approach struck such a terror into the Phocians,
that, although they received a reinforcement of a thousand Spartans,
they yet sent to treat, or rather to submit. He allowed Phalecus, with
eight thousand mercenaries, to retire. Into Peloponnesus; but the rest,
who were inhabitants of Phocis, were left at his mercy. The disposal
of these he referred to the amphictyons, from an affected regard. to the
authority of an assembly composed of the representatives of the-states
of Greece. They thundered out the severest decrees against this
wretched people. Among other things, it was enacted that they should
lose their seat in the amphictyonic council, and that the double voice
which they had enjoyed in it should be transferred to Philip, who, by the
same resolution, gained the superintendency of the Pythian games,
which the Corinthians forfeited by taking part with the Phocians.
The Athenians had not been present at Philip's election into this
council; and probably, to avoid all opposition, he had assembled only
such amphictyons as were devoted to his interest. He thought it proper
however, to send circular letters to the absent states, inviting them to
assemble at Delphos, and to ratify his election.
Athens, among others, received the invitation; and as Philip's am-
bitions designs could be no longer concealed, manv were for violent mea-
sures. The proposal raised a ferment in the assembly, which seems ta
have breathed nothing but indignation and opposition. On this occasion
Demosthenes thought it his duty to moderate their heat; and in the
following oration endeavours to prevent their being betrayed into an?
rash and imprudent measures.
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? THE ORATION ON THE PEACE,1
Athenians! I see that this debate must be at-
tended with many difficulties and great commotion,
not only because many of our interests are already
11 shall here take the liberty to transcribe a remark from the authors
of the Universal History.
Libatiius and Photius have taken pains to prove that the oration to
which we refer above ought not to be ascribed to Demosthenes. We
might well enough defend ourselves by alleging, that it has been gene-
rally esteemed his, and, as such, has constantly maintained its place in
his works. This would be sufficient for our purpose; but, in truth, the
arguments on which the opposite sentiment is built are so easily over-
turned, that we might be justly blamed for neglecting so favourable an
occasion of setting this point in a true light. Demosthenes, say those
who will not allow this oration to be his, charged iEschines with betray-
ing his country, on account of his recommending warmly a peace with
Philip; they cannot therefore f oink that Demosthenes would run openly
into those measures which he had so lately and so warmly decried; or
that be, who on every other occasion singly opposed Philip, and ran all
hazards to bring him into odium with the people, should now be single
on the other side, and attempt to cross the disposition of the Athenians,
in favour of peace and Philip. These objectors forget that Demosthenes
was a patriot as well as an orator; that he did not pursue Philip with
implacable hatred because he was king of Macedon, but because he
thought him both willing and able to obstruct the designs of Athens,
and even to reduce her, from that splendid pre-eminence which she now
held in Greece, to the ordinary rank of a state, in name free, but in
truth dependent on him: this was the motive of Demosthenes's heat on
other occasions; and the motive to his coolness now was the strict alli-
ance between Philip and the other Grecian states, which rendered it a
thing impracticable for Athens to contend with him and them alone.
Besides, as he rightly observes in the harangue, it would have been
ridiculous for those who refused to enter into an equal war for rich
cities and fertile provinces, to have rushed suddenly into a most unequal
contest about an empty title, or, as he emphatically expresses it, " To
take away the shadow of Delphos from him who was master of Delphos
Itself. " We therefore acknowledge this to be the oration of Demosthenes,
because he was worthy of it.
It is scarcely worth while to take notice of a small mistake in this
remark. Libanius does not deny that Demosthenes was the author of
this oration. He allows it to have been written by him, but is of opinion
that be never ventured to pronounce it.
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? 100 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
given up; and therefore unnecessary to be now laid
before you,; but because it is impossible to agree on
such expedients as may secure what yet remain:
but that a vai iety of clashing opinions must divide
the assembly. Then, to advise is naturally a diffi-
cult-arid distressing part. But you, Athenians, have
rendered it yet more distressing: for all other peo-
ple naturally seek counsel while affairs are yet de-
pending : you deliberate when the event hath made
it too late. Hence hath it happened, through the
whole course of my observation, tuat the man who
arraigns your conduct is heard with esteem, and his
sentiments approved f yet have your affairs ever
miscarried, and the objects of your deliberation have
all been lost. But, although this be too true, still I
am persuaded (and from this persuasion I arose to
speak) that if you will put an end to tumult and op-
position, and grant me that attention which becomes
those who are consulting for their country, and on
so important an occasion, I have some points to
urge, some measures to propose, which may serve
our present interests, and repair our past miscar-
, riages.
Sensible as I am, Athenians, that to expatiate on
those counsels one hath formerly given, and to speak
of onesself, is the most successful artifice of those
who dare to practise such artifice; yet to me it is
so odious, so detestable, that, although 1 see it neces-
sary, yet I loathe it. Howevei, it will assist your
judgment, I presume, on this occasion, if you recall
to mind something of what I formerly have men -
tioned. --You may remember, that during the disor-
ders of Eubrea, when certain persons persuaded you
to assist Plutarchus,1 and to undertake an inglorious
1 To assist Plutarchus. ! --Philip had long regarded Euboea as very
proper, by its situation, to favour the designs he meditated against
Greece. He therefore took pains to form a party in the island, and fo-
mented divisions and factions in the several states of which it was
composed. PJutarch, the governor of Eretria, one of the principal cities
of Eubcea, applied to the Athenians for assistance against some attempts
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? ORATION ON THE PEACE.
101
and expensive war, I was the first, the only one
who rose up to oppose it, and scarcely escaped their
fury, who for a trifling gain were urging you to
many highly pernicious measures. In a little time
when the load of infamy had fallen on you, and that
you had suffered such treatment as no people ever
received from those they had assisted, you were all
made sensible of the iniquity of your seducers, and
the justness and integrity of my counsels. Again,
when I saw Neoptolemus the player,1 in that full
security which his profession gave him, involving
the state in the greatest distress, and, in all his
public conduct, devoted to Philip, I appeared, and
warned you of the danger; and this from no secret
motive, no private enmity,2 no officious baseness,
as the event itself discovered. But it is not the de-
fenders of Neoptolemus that I accuse (for he was not
depending on a single one), but you yourselves; for;
had you been spectators in the theatre, not engaged
in affairs of the highest and most intimate concern-
ment to the public, you could not have heard him
with more indulgence, nor me with more resentment.
And now you all know, that he who then went over to
the enemy, pretending to collect some debts, that he
might bring them hither, as he said, to enable him to
serve the state; that he who was perpetually inveigh-
of Philip, and obtained it; but afterward (having probably been gained
over to Philip's party) he took up arms against the very auxiliaries he
had invited. But this perfidy did not disconcert Phocion, who com-
manded them. He gained a victory over the Macedonians, and drove
Plutarch out of Eretria. Phocion was afterward recalled, and Molossus,
his successor in this war, was defeated and taken prisoner by Philip. --
Ttmndl.
i Neoptole nus the player. ]--This Neoptolemus was also a great tragic
Kiet, though 'he orator only mentions the less honourable distinction,
ot that the profession of a player was held in disesteem in Greece.
Players were the favourites of princes, and were raised to the highest
employments in the state. This very man was nominated, the year
before, one of the ten ambassadors that were to conclude the peace with
Philip. -- Tourreil.
* No private enmity, &c. ]--Probably this is a repetition of the very
words of Neoptolemus'a party.
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? 102 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
ing against the cruelty of accusing a man for thus
transferring his effects from that country hither; the
moment that a peace freed him from all apprehensions
converted that estate1 into money, which he acquired
here, and brought it off with him to Philip.
These two instances which I have produced show
with what fidelity and truth I spoke on those occa-
sions. I shall mention one, and but one more, and
then proceed to the point now to be debated. When
we had received the solemn ratification of the treaty,
and that the embassy returned home; when certain
persons assured you that Thespia and Plataea were
to be repeopled f that if Philip became master of
the Phocians, he would spare them; that Thebes
was to submit to his regulation ;3 that Oropus was
to be ours ;* that Eubcea should be given up5 to us,
as an equivalent for Amphipolis; with other such
1 That estate. ]--The text has it, ovaiav Qaveaav. The Athenians dia
tinguished two sorts of goods or estates--apparent, by which they under
stood lands; and not-apparent, that is, money, slaves, moveables, &c.
2 That Thespia and Plataea were to be repeopled. ]--Thespia had been
razed by the Thebans under Epaminondas. Plataea had been twice de-
stroyed by them; once, when Archidamus, king of Sparta, obliged the
Platceans to surrender at discretion, in the fifth year of the Feloponne-
sian war. The Thebans, who were then joined with Lacedaemon, in-
sisted that they should be exterminated. The treaty of Antalcidas re-
stored them; but this did not last long; for, three years before the
battle of Leuctra, the Thebans reduced them to their former wretched
state, because they refused to join with them against the Lacedaemo-
nians. --Tourreil.
3 That Thebes was to submit to his regulation. ]--In the Greek it is
SiotKtiv, administraturum. Philip made use of this soft expression,
to persuade the Athenians that he would reduce the Thebans to reason,
and put it out of their power to undertake any act of outrage or injustice;
and, at the same time, to avoid alarming the Thebans or alienating them
from his party. Wolfius thinks that StotKciv is put for StotKilciv, and
translates it dissipaturum--that he would exterminate the Thebans.
But I cannot think that he would have expressed himself in a manner
so harsh, and so likely to make the Thebans his enemies. --Tourreil.
* That Oropus was to be ours. ]--This city had been taken from the
Athenians, the third year of the 103d Olympiad, by Themision, the
tyrant of Eretria, and afterward put into the hands of the Thebans.
Their mutual pretensions to this city had oftentimes embroiled these
two states. --Tourreil.
<< Eubcea should be given up, &c. ]--For he had by this time gained a
great authority in that island, and stationed his garrisons in most of its
cities.
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? ORATION ON THE PEACE.
103
insidious promises, which, in spite of interest, of jus-
tice, and of honour, drove you to abandon Phocis;
I never attempted to deceive you; I was not silent:
no ; you must remember I declared that I knew of
none, that I expected none of these things; but
thought that whoever mentioned them could scarcely
be serious.
And these instances of my superior foresight I do
by no means ascribe to any extraordinary penetra-
tion : I speak it not from boasting or arrogance: nor
do I pretend to any superiority but what arises from
these two causes. The first is fortune; which I find
more powerful than all the policy and wisdom of
man : the other, that perfect disinterestedness with
which my judgments are ever formed: so that no
man can hold out any advantage to my view to in-
fluence my public conduct. Hence it is, that on all
occasions of debate your true interest strikes my
eye directly. But when a bribe is, as it were, cast
into one scale, it then preponderates, and forces
down the judgment with it: so that it is not possible
that a person thus influenced can ever offer good and
salutary counsel.
And now to give my sentiments on the present
occasion. --Whether subsidies, or alliances, or what-
ever schemes are concerting for the public good, one
point must be secured--the continuance of the pres-
ent peace. Not that it is so very excellent, or so
worthy of you: but, of what kind soever it may be,
it were more for the interest of your affairs that it
had never been concluded, than that now, when it
is concluded, you should infringe it: for we have
suffered ourselves to be deprived of many advan-
tages which would have given cur arms much more
>>ecurity and strength.
In the next place, we must be careful not to drive
those to extremities who are now assembled, and
call themselves the council of amphictyons; nor to
ifford them a pretence for a general war against us.
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? 104 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
WeTe we again engaged with Philip for Amphipolis,'
or any such private matter of dispute, in which
neither Thessalians, nor Argians, nor Thebans were
concerned, in my opinion none of these would join
against us; and least of all--let me be heard out
without interruption--the Thebans: not that they
wish well to us, or would not willingly recommend
themselves to Philip; but they are perfectly sensible
(however mean their understandings may be thought)
that, were they to engage in a war with you, the
evils would all fall on themthe advantages others
would lie ready to intercept. They would therefore
never be betrayed into such a quarrel unless the
cause were general. In like manner, another war
with the Thebans for Oropus, or any such private
cause, could not, I think, distress us: for there are
those who would join either with us or them, to repel
an invasion; but, in offensive measures, would concur
with neither. This is the true nature, the very
spirit of alliances.