Objection 3: Further, if
ignorance
is a sin, this can only be in so far
as it is voluntary.
as it is voluntary.
Summa Theologica
Now every inordinate
movement in things concerning God, if it be deliberate, is a mortal
sin. Therefore venial sin is never in the higher reason as such.
Objection 3: Further, it happens sometimes that a sin which takes us
unawares, is a venial sin. Now a deliberate sin is a mortal sin,
through the reason, in deliberating, having recourse to some higher
good, by acting against which, man sins more grievously; just as when
the reason in deliberating about an inordinate pleasurable act,
considers that it is contrary to the law of God, it sins more
grievously in consenting, than if it only considered that it is
contrary to moral virtue. But the higher reason cannot have recourse to
any higher tribunal than its own object. Therefore if a movement that
takes us unawares is not a mortal sin, neither will the subsequent
deliberation make it a mortal sin; which is clearly false. Therefore
there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such.
On the contrary, A sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin. But it
belongs to the higher reason as such. Therefore there can be a venial
sin in the higher reason as such.
I answer that, The higher reason regards its own object otherwise than
the objects of the lower powers that are directed by the higher reason.
For it does not regard the objects of the lower powers, except in so
far as it consults the eternal law about them, and so it does not
regard them save by way of deliberation. Now deliberate consent to what
is a mortal sin in its genus, is itself a mortal sin; and consequently
the higher reason always sins mortally, if the acts of the lower powers
to which it consents are mortal sins.
With regard to its own object it has a twofold act, viz. simple
"intuition," and "deliberation," in respect of which it again consults
the eternal law about its own object. But in respect of simple
intuition, it can have an inordinate movement about Divine things, as
when a man suffers a sudden movement of unbelief. And although
unbelief, in its genus, is a mortal sin, yet a sudden movement of
unbelief is a venial sin, because there is no mortal sin unless it be
contrary to the law of God. Now it is possible for one of the articles
of faith to present itself to the reason suddenly under some other
aspect, before the eternal law, i. e. the law of God, is consulted, or
can be consulted, on the matter; as, for instance, when a man suddenly
apprehends the resurrection of the dead as impossible naturally, and
rejects it, as soon as he had thus apprehended it, before he has had
time to deliberate and consider that this is proposed to our belief in
accordance with the Divine law. If, however, the movement of unbelief
remains after this deliberation, it is a mortal sin. Therefore, in
sudden movements, the higher reason may sin venially in respect of its
proper object, even if it be a mortal sin in its genus; or it may sin
mortally in giving a deliberate consent; but in things pertaining to
the lower powers, it always sins mortally, in things which are mortal
sins in their genus, but not in those which are venial sins in their
genus.
Reply to Objection 1: A sin which is against the eternal law, though it
be mortal in its genus, may nevertheless be venial, on account of the
incompleteness of a sudden action, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: In matters of action, the simple intuition of the
principles from which deliberation proceeds, belongs to the reason, as
well as the act of deliberation: even as in speculative matters it
belongs to the reason both to syllogize and to form propositions:
consequently the reason also can have a sudden movement.
Reply to Objection 3: One and the same thing may be the subject of
different considerations, of which one is higher than the other; thus
the existence of God may be considered, either as possible to be known
by the human reason, or as delivered to us by Divine revelation, which
is a higher consideration. And therefore, although the object of the
higher reason is, in its nature, something sublime, yet it is reducible
to some yet higher consideration: and in this way, that which in the
sudden movement was not a mortal sin, becomes a mortal sin in virtue of
the deliberation which brought it into the light of a higher
consideration, as was explained above.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the causes of sin: (1) in general; (2) in
particular. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sin has a cause?
(2) Whether it has an internal cause?
(3) Whether it has an external cause?
(4) Whether one sin is the cause of another?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sin has a cause?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin has no cause. For sin has the
nature of evil, as stated above ([1760]Q[71], A[6]). But evil has no
cause, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore sin has no cause.
Objection 2: Further, a cause is that from which something follows of
necessity. Now that which is of necessity, seems to be no sin, for
every sin is voluntary. Therefore sin has no cause.
Objection 3: Further, if sin has a cause, this cause is either good or
evil. It is not a good, because good produces nothing but good, for "a
good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Mat. 7:18). Likewise neither
can evil be the cause of sin, because the evil of punishment is a
sequel to sin, and the evil of guilt is the same as sin. Therefore sin
has no cause.
On the contrary, Whatever is done has a cause, for, according to Job
5:6, "nothing upon earth is done without a cause. " But sin is something
done; since it a "word, deed, or desire contrary to the law of God. "
Therefore sin has a cause.
I answer that, A sin is an inordinate act. Accordingly, so far as it is
an act, it can have a direct cause, even as any other act; but, so far
as it is inordinate, it has a cause, in the same way as a negation or
privation can have a cause. Now two causes may be assigned to a
negation: in the first place, absence of the cause of affirmation; i. e.
the negation of the cause itself, is the cause of the negation in
itself; since the result of the removing the cause is the removal of
the effect: thus the absence of the sun is the cause of darkness. In
the second place, the cause of an affirmation, of which a negation is a
sequel, is the accidental cause of the resulting negation: thus fire by
causing heat in virtue of its principal tendency, consequently causes a
privation of cold. The first of these suffices to cause a simple
negation. But, since the inordinateness of sin and of every evil is not
a simple negation, but the privation of that which something ought
naturally to have, such an inordinateness must needs have an accidental
efficient cause. For that which naturally is and ought to be in a
thing, is never lacking except on account of some impeding cause. And
accordingly we are wont to say that evil, which consists in a certain
privation, has a deficient cause, or an accidental efficient cause. Now
every accidental cause is reducible to the direct cause. Since then
sin, on the part of its inordinateness, has an accidental efficient
cause, and on the part of the act, a direct efficient cause, it follows
that the inordinateness of sin is a result of the cause of the act.
Accordingly then, the will lacking the direction of the rule of reason
and of the Divine law, and intent on some mutable good, causes the act
of sin directly, and the inordinateness of the act, indirectly, and
beside the intention: for the lack of order in the act results from the
lack of direction in the will.
Reply to Objection 1: Sin signifies not only the privation of good,
which privation is its inordinateness, but also the act which is the
subject of that privation, which has the nature of evil: and how this
evil has a cause, has been explained.
Reply to Objection 2: If this definition is to be verified in all
cases, it must be understood as applying to a cause which is sufficient
and not impeded. For it happens that a thing is the sufficient cause of
something else, and that the effect does not follow of necessity, on
account of some supervening impediment: else it would follow that all
things happen of necessity, as is proved in Metaph. vi, text. 5.
Accordingly, though sin has a cause, it does not follow that this is a
necessary cause, since its effect can be impeded.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, the will in failing to apply the
rule of reason or of the Divine law, is the cause of sin. Now the fact
of not applying the rule of reason or of the Divine law, has not in
itself the nature of evil, whether of punishment or of guilt, before it
is applied to the act. Wherefore accordingly, evil is not the cause of
the first sin, but some good lacking some other good.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sin has an internal cause?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin has no internal cause. For that
which is within a thing is always in it. If therefore sin had an
internal cause, man would always be sinning, since given the cause, the
effect follows.
Objection 2: Further, a thing is not its own cause. But the internal
movements of a man are sins. Therefore they are not the cause of sin.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is within man is either natural or
voluntary. Now that which is natural cannot be the cause of sin, for
sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 3;
iv, 21); while that which is voluntary, if it be inordinate, is already
a sin. Therefore nothing intrinsic can be the cause of the first sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11; Retract. i,
9) that "the will is the cause of sin. "
I answer that, As stated above [1761](A[1]), the direct cause of sin
must be considered on the part of the act. Now we may distinguish a
twofold internal cause of human acts, one remote, the other proximate.
The proximate internal cause of the human act is the reason and will,
in respect of which man has a free-will; while the remote cause is the
apprehension of the sensitive part, and also the sensitive appetite.
For just as it is due to the judgment of reason, that the will is moved
to something in accord with reason, so it is due to an apprehension of
the senses that the sensitive appetite is inclined to something; which
inclination sometimes influences the will and reason, as we shall
explain further on (Q[77], A[1]). Accordingly a double interior cause
of sin may be assigned; one proximate, on the part of the reason and
will; and the other remote, on the part of the imagination or sensitive
appetite.
But since we have said above (A[1], ad 3) that the cause of sin is some
apparent good as motive, yet lacking the due motive, viz. the rule of
reason or the Divine law, this motive which is an apparent good,
appertains to the apprehension of the senses and to the appetite; while
the lack of the due rule appertains to the reason, whose nature it is
to consider this rule; and the completeness of the voluntary sinful act
appertains to the will, so that the act of the will, given the
conditions we have just mentioned, is already a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: That which is within a thing as its natural
power, is always in it: but that which is within it, as the internal
act of the appetitive or apprehensive power, is not always in it. Now
the power of the will is the potential cause of sin, but is made actual
by the preceding movements, both of the sensitive part, in the first
place, and afterwards, of the reason. For it is because a thing is
proposed as appetible to the senses, and because the appetite is
inclined, that the reason sometimes fails to consider the due rule, so
that the will produces the act of sin. Since therefore the movements
that precede it are not always actual, neither is man always actually
sinning.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not true that all the internal acts belong
to the substance of sin, for this consists principally in the act of
the will; but some precede and some follow the sin itself.
Reply to Objection 3: That which causes sin, as a power produces its
act, is natural; and again, the movement of the sensitive part, from
which sin follows, is natural sometimes, as, for instance, when anyone
sins through appetite for food. Yet sin results in being unnatural from
the very fact that the natural rule fails, which man, in accord with
his nature, ought to observe.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sin has an external cause?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin has no external cause. For sin is a
voluntary act. Now voluntary acts belong to principles that are within
us, so that they have no external cause. Therefore sin has no external
cause.
Objection 2: Further, as nature is an internal principle, so is the
will. Now in natural things sin can be due to no other than an internal
cause; for instance, the birth of a monster is due to the corruption of
some internal principle. Therefore in the moral order, sin can arise
from no other than an internal cause. Therefore it has no external
cause.
Objection 3: Further, if the cause is multiplied, the effect is
multiplied. Now the more numerous and weighty the external inducements
to sin are, the less is a man's inordinate act imputed to him as a sin.
Therefore nothing external is a cause of sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Num. 21:16): "Are not these they, that
deceived the children of Israel by the counsel of Balaam, and made you
transgress against the Lord by the sin of Phogor? " Therefore something
external can be a cause of sin.
I answer that, As stated above [1762](A[2]), the internal cause of sin
is both the will, as completing the sinful act, and the reason, as
lacking the due rule, and the appetite, as inclining to sin.
Accordingly something external might be a cause of sin in three ways,
either by moving the will itself immediately, or by moving the reason,
or by moving the sensitive appetite. Now, as stated above (Q[9], A[6];
Q[10], A[4]), none can move the will inwardly save God alone, who
cannot be a cause of sin, as we shall prove further on (Q[79], A[1]).
Hence it follows that nothing external can be a cause of sin, except by
moving the reason, as a man or devil by enticing to sin; or by moving
the sensitive appetite, as certain external sensibles move it. Yet
neither does external enticement move the reason, of necessity, in
matters of action, nor do things proposed externally, of necessity move
the sensitive appetite, except perhaps it be disposed thereto in a
certain way; and even the sensitive appetite does not, of necessity,
move the reason and will. Therefore something external can be a cause
moving to sin, but not so as to be a sufficient cause thereof: and the
will alone is the sufficient completive cause of sin being
accomplished.
Reply to Objection 1: From the very fact that the external motive
causes of sin do not lead to sin sufficiently and necessarily, it
follows that it remains in our power to sin or not to sin.
Reply to Objection 2: The fact that sin has an internal cause does not
prevent its having an external cause; for nothing external is a cause
of sin, except through the medium of the internal cause, as stated.
Reply to Objection 3: If the external causes inclining to sin be
multiplied, the sinful acts are multiplied, because they incline to the
sinful act in both greater numbers and greater frequency. Nevertheless
the character of guilt is lessened, since this depends on the act being
voluntary and in our power.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one sin is a cause of another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one sin cannot be the cause of another.
For there are four kinds of cause, none of which will fit in with one
sin causing another. Because the end has the character of good; which
is inconsistent with sin, which has the character of evil. In like
manner neither can a sin be an efficient cause, since "evil is not an
efficient cause, but is weak and powerless," as Dionysius declares
(Div. Nom. iv). The material and formal cause seems to have no place
except in natural bodies, which are composed of matter and form.
Therefore sin cannot have either a material or a formal cause.
Objection 2: Further, "to produce its like belongs to a perfect thing,"
as stated in Meteor. iv, 2 [*Cf. De Anima ii. ]. But sin is essentially
something imperfect. Therefore one sin cannot be a cause of another.
Objection 3: Further, if one sin is the cause of a second sin, in the
same way, yet another sin will be the cause of the first, and thus we
go on indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore one sin is not the cause
of another.
On the contrary, Gregory says on Ezechiel (Hom. xi): "A sin is not
quickly blotted out by repentance, is both a sin and a cause of sin. "
I answer that, Forasmuch as a sin has a cause on the part of the act of
sin, it is possible for one sin to be the cause of another, in the same
way as one human act is the cause of another. Hence it happens that one
sin may be the cause of another in respect of the four kinds of causes.
First, after the manner of an efficient or moving cause, both directly
and indirectly. Indirectly, as that which removes an impediment is
called an indirect cause of movement: for when man, by one sinful act,
loses grace, or charity, or shame, or anything else that withdraws him
from sin, he thereby falls into another sin, so that the first sin is
the accidental cause of the second. Directly, as when, by one sinful
act, man is disposed to commit more readily another like act: because
acts cause dispositions and habits inclining to like acts. Secondly,
after the manner of a material cause, one sin is the cause of another,
by preparing its matter: thus covetousness prepares the matter for
strife, which is often about the wealth a man has amassed together.
Thirdly, after the manner of a final cause, one sin causes another, in
so far as a man commits one sin for the sake of another which is his
end; as when a man is guilty of simony for the end of ambition, or
fornication for the purpose of theft. And since the end gives the form
to moral matters, as stated above ([1763]Q[1], A[3];[1764] Q[18],
AA[4],6), it follows that one sin is also the formal cause of another:
because in the act of fornication committed for the purpose of theft,
the former is material while the latter is formal.
Reply to Objection 1: Sin, in so far as it is inordinate, has the
character of evil; but, in so far as it is an act, it has some good, at
least apparent, for its end: so that, as an act, but not as being
inordinate, it can be the cause, both final and efficient, of another
sin. A sin has matter, not "of which" but "about which" it is: and it
has its form from its end. Consequently one sin can be the cause of
another, in respect of the four kinds of cause, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Sin is something imperfect on account of its
moral imperfection on the part of its inordinateness. Nevertheless, as
an act it can have natural perfection: and thus it can be the cause of
another sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Not every cause of one sin is another sin; so
there is no need to go on indefinitely: for one may come to one sin
which is not caused by another sin.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN PARTICULAR (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the causes of sin, in particular, and (1) The
internal causes of sin; (2) its external causes; and (3) sins which are
the causes of other sins. In view of what has been said above
[1765](A[2]), the first consideration will be threefold: so that in the
first place we shall treat of ignorance, which is the cause of sin on
the part of reason; secondly, of weakness or passion, which is the
cause of sin on the part of the sensitive appetite; thirdly, of malice,
which is the cause of sin on the part of the will.
Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether ignorance is a cause of sin?
(2) Whether ignorance is a sin?
(3) Whether it excuses from sin altogether?
(4) Whether it diminishes sin?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether ignorance can be a cause of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance cannot be a cause of sin:
because a non-being is not the cause of anything. Now ignorance is a
non-being, since it is a privation of knowledge. Therefore ignorance is
not a cause of sin.
Objection 2: Further, causes of sin should be reckoned in respect of
sin being a "turning to" something, as was stated above ([1766]Q[75],
A[1]). Now ignorance seems to savor of "turning away" from something.
Therefore it should not be reckoned a cause of sin.
Objection 3: Further, every sin is seated in the will. Now the will
does not turn to that which is not known, because its object is the
good apprehended. Therefore ignorance cannot be a cause of sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii) "that some sin
through ignorance. "
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 27) a moving
cause is twofold, direct and indirect. A direct cause is one that moves
by its own power, as the generator is the moving cause of heavy and
light things. An indirect cause, is either one that removes an
impediment, or the removal itself of an impediment: and it is in this
way that ignorance can be the cause of a sinful act; because it is a
privation of knowledge perfecting the reason that forbids the act of
sin, in so far as it directs human acts.
Now we must observe that the reason directs human acts in accordance
with a twofold knowledge, universal and particular: because in
conferring about what is to be done, it employs a syllogism, the
conclusion of which is an act of judgment, or of choice, or an
operation. Now actions are about singulars: wherefore the conclusion of
a practical syllogism is a singular proposition. But a singular
proposition does not follow from a universal proposition, except
through the medium of a particular proposition: thus a man is
restrained from an act of parricide, by the knowledge that it is wrong
to kill one's father, and that this man is his father. Hence ignorance
about either of these two propositions, viz. of the universal principle
which is a rule of reason, or of the particular circumstance, could
cause an act of parricide. Hence it is clear that not every kind of
ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone which removes the
knowledge which would prevent the sinful act. Consequently if a man's
will be so disposed that he would not be restrained from the act of
parricide, even though he recognized his father, his ignorance about
his father is not the cause of his committing the sin, but is
concomitant with the sin: wherefore such a man sins, not "through
ignorance" but "in ignorance," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii,
1).
Reply to Objection 1: Non-being cannot be the direct cause of anything:
but it can be an accidental cause, as being the removal of an
impediment.
Reply to Objection 2: As knowledge, which is removed by ignorance,
regards sin as turning towards something, so too, ignorance of this
respect of a sin is the cause of that sin, as removing its impediment.
Reply to Objection 3: The will cannot turn to that which is absolutely
unknown: but if something be known in one respect, and unknown in
another, the will can will it. It is thus that ignorance is the cause
of sin: for instance, when a man knows that what he is killing is a
man, but not that it is his own father; or when one knows that a
certain act is pleasurable, but not that it is a sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether ignorance is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance is not a sin. For sin is "a
word, deed or desire contrary to God's law," as stated above
([1767]Q[71], A[5]). Now ignorance does not denote an act, either
internal or external. Therefore ignorance is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, sin is more directly opposed to grace than to
knowledge. Now privation of grace is not a sin, but a punishment
resulting from sin. Therefore ignorance which is privation of knowledge
is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, if ignorance is a sin, this can only be in so far
as it is voluntary. But if ignorance is a sin, through being voluntary,
it seems that the sin will consist in the act itself of the will,
rather than in the ignorance. Therefore the ignorance will not be a
sin, but rather a result of sin.
Objection 4: Further, every sin is taken away by repentance, nor does
any sin, except only original sin, pass as to guilt, yet remain in act.
Now ignorance is not removed by repentance, but remains in act, all its
guilt being removed by repentance. Therefore ignorance is not a sin,
unless perchance it be original sin.
Objection 5: Further, if ignorance be a sin, then a man will be
sinning, as long as he remains in ignorance. But ignorance is continual
in the one who is ignorant. Therefore a person in ignorance would be
continually sinning, which is clearly false, else ignorance would be a
most grievous sin. Therefore ignorance is not a sin.
On the contrary, Nothing but sin deserves punishment. But ignorance
deserves punishment, according to 1 Cor. 14:38: "If any man know not,
he shall not be known. " Therefore ignorance is a sin.
I answer that, Ignorance differs from nescience, in that nescience
denotes mere absence of knowledge; wherefore whoever lacks knowledge
about anything, can be said to be nescient about it: in which sense
Dionysius puts nescience in the angels (Coel. Hier. vii). On the other
hand, ignorance denotes privation of knowledge, i. e. lack of knowledge
of those things that one has a natural aptitude to know. Some of these
we are under an obligation to know, those, to wit, without the
knowledge of which we are unable to accomplish a due act rightly.
Wherefore all are bound in common to know the articles of faith, and
the universal principles of right, and each individual is bound to know
matters regarding his duty or state. Meanwhile there are other things
which a man may have a natural aptitude to know, yet he is not bound to
know them, such as the geometrical theorems, and contingent
particulars, except in some individual case. Now it is evident that
whoever neglects to have or do what he ought to have or do, commits a
sin of omission. Wherefore through negligence, ignorance of what one is
bound to know, is a sin; whereas it is not imputed as a sin to man, if
he fails to know what he is unable to know. Consequently ignorance of
such like things is called "invincible," because it cannot be overcome
by study. For this reason such like ignorance, not being voluntary,
since it is not in our power to be rid of it, is not a sin: wherefore
it is evident that no invincible ignorance is a sin. On the other hand,
vincible ignorance is a sin, if it be about matters one is bound to
know; but not, if it be about things one is not bound to know.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([1768]Q[71], A[6], ad 1), when
we say that sin is a "word, deed or desire," we include the opposite
negations, by reason of which omissions have the character of sin; so
that negligence, in as much as ignorance is a sin, is comprised in the
above definition of sin; in so far as one omits to say what one ought,
or to do what one ought, or to desire what one ought, in order to
acquire the knowledge which we ought to have.
Reply to Objection 2: Although privation of grace is not a sin in
itself, yet by reason of negligence in preparing oneself for grace, it
may have the character of sin, even as ignorance; nevertheless even
here there is a difference, since man can acquire knowledge by his
acts, whereas grace is not acquired by acts, but by God's favor.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as in a sin of transgression, the sin
consists not only in the act of the will, but also in the act willed,
which is commanded by the will; so in a sin of omission not only the
act of the will is a sin, but also the omission, in so far as it is in
some way voluntary; and accordingly, the neglect to know, or even lack
of consideration is a sin.
Reply to Objection 4: Although when the guilt has passed away through
repentance, the ignorance remains, according as it is a privation of
knowledge, nevertheless the negligence does not remain, by reason of
which the ignorance is said to be a sin.
Reply to Objection 5: Just as in other sins of omission, man sins
actually only at the time at which the affirmative precept is binding,
so is it with the sin of ignorance. For the ignorant man sins actually
indeed, not continually, but only at the time for acquiring the
knowledge that he ought to have.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether ignorance excuses from sin altogether?
Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance excuses from sin altogether.
For as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9), every sin is voluntary. Now
ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above ([1769]Q[6], A[8]).
Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether.
Objection 2: Further, that which is done beside the intention, is done
accidentally. Now the intention cannot be about what is unknown.
Therefore what a man does through ignorance is accidental in human
acts. But what is accidental does not give the species. Therefore
nothing that is done through ignorance in human acts, should be deemed
sinful or virtuous.
Objection 3: Further, man is the subject of virtue and sin, inasmuch as
he is partaker of reason. Now ignorance excludes knowledge which
perfects the reason. Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) that "some
things done through ignorance are rightly reproved. " Now those things
alone are rightly reproved which are sins. Therefore some things done
through ignorance are sins. Therefore ignorance does not altogether
excuse from sin.
I answer that, Ignorance, by its very nature, renders the act which it
causes involuntary. Now it has already been stated ([1770]AA[1],2) that
ignorance is said to cause the act which the contrary knowledge would
have prevented; so that this act, if knowledge were to hand, would be
contrary to the will, which is the meaning of the word involuntary. If,
however, the knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, would not have
prevented the act, on account of the inclination of the will thereto,
the lack of this knowledge does not make that man unwilling, but not
willing, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1: and such like ignorance which is
not the cause of the sinful act, as already stated, since it does not
make the act to be involuntary, does not excuse from sin. The same
applies to any ignorance that does not cause, but follows or
accompanies the sinful act.
On the other hand, ignorance which is the cause of the act, since it
makes it to be involuntary, of its very nature excuses from sin,
because voluntariness is essential to sin. But it may fail to excuse
altogether from sin, and this for two reasons. First, on the part of
the thing itself which is not known. For ignorance excuses from sin, in
so far as something is not known to be a sin. Now it may happen that a
person ignores some circumstance of a sin, the knowledge of which
circumstance would prevent him from sinning, whether it belong to the
substance of the sin, or not; and nevertheless his knowledge is
sufficient for him to be aware that the act is sinful; for instance, if
a man strike someone, knowing that it is a man (which suffices for it
to be sinful) and yet be ignorant of the fact that it is his father,
(which is a circumstance constituting another species of sin); or,
suppose that he is unaware that this man will defend himself and strike
him back, and that if he had known this, he would not have struck him
(which does not affect the sinfulness of the act). Wherefore, though
this man sins through ignorance, yet he is not altogether excused,
because, not withstanding, he has knowledge of the sin. Secondly, this
may happen on the part of the ignorance itself, because, to wit, this
ignorance is voluntary, either directly, as when a man wishes of set
purpose to be ignorant of certain things that he may sin the more
freely; or indirectly, as when a man, through stress of work or other
occupations, neglects to acquire the knowledge which would restrain him
from sin. For such like negligence renders the ignorance itself
voluntary and sinful, provided it be about matters one is bound and
able to know. Consequently this ignorance does not altogether excuse
from sin. If, however, the ignorance be such as to be entirely
involuntary, either through being invincible, or through being of
matters one is not bound to know, then such like ignorance excuses from
sin altogether.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every ignorance causes involuntariness, as
stated above ([1771]Q[6], A[8]). Hence not every ignorance excuses from
sin altogether.
Reply to Objection 2: So far as voluntariness remains in the ignorant
person, the intention of sin remains in him: so that, in this respect,
his sin is not accidental.
Reply to Objection 3: If the ignorance be such as to exclude the use of
reason entirely, it excuses from sin altogether, as is the case with
madmen and imbeciles: but such is not always the ignorance that causes
the sin; and so it does not always excuse from sin altogether.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether ignorance diminishes a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance does not diminish a sin. For
that which is common to all sins does not diminish sin. Now ignorance
is common to all sins, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that
"every evil man is ignorant. " Therefore ignorance does not diminish
sin.
Objection 2: Further, one sin added to another makes a greater sin. But
ignorance is itself a sin, as stated above [1772](A[2]). Therefore it
does not diminish a sin.
Objection 3: Further, the same thing does not both aggravate and
diminish sin. Now ignorance aggravates sin; for Ambrose commenting on
Rom. 2:4, "Knowest thou not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to
penance? " says: "Thy sin is most grievous if thou knowest not. "
Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.
Objection 4: Further, if any kind of ignorance diminishes a sin, this
would seem to be chiefly the case as regards the ignorance which
removes the use of reason altogether. Now this kind of ignorance does
not diminish sin, but increases it: for the Philosopher says (Ethic.
iii, 5) that the "punishment is doubled for a drunken man. " Therefore
ignorance does not diminish sin.
On the contrary, Whatever is a reason for sin to be forgiven,
diminishes sin. Now such is ignorance, as is clear from 1 Tim. 1:13: "I
obtained . . . mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly. " Therefore
ignorance diminishes or alleviates sin.
I answer that, Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish
sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness; and if it does not
render it less voluntary, it nowise alleviates the sin. Now it is
evident that the ignorance which excuses from sin altogether (through
making it altogether involuntary) does not diminish a sin, but does
away with it altogether. On the other hand, ignorance which is not the
cause of the sin being committed, but is concomitant with it, neither
diminishes nor increases the sin.
Therefore sin cannot be alleviated by any ignorance, but only by such
as is a cause of the sin being committed, and yet does not excuse from
the sin altogether. Now it happens sometimes that such like ignorance
is directly and essentially voluntary, as when a man is purposely
ignorant that he may sin more freely, and ignorance of this kind seems
rather to make the act more voluntary and more sinful, since it is
through the will's intention to sin that he is willing to bear the hurt
of ignorance, for the sake of freedom in sinning. Sometimes, however,
the ignorance which is the cause of a sin being committed, is not
directly voluntary, but indirectly or accidentally, as when a man is
unwilling to work hard at his studies, the result being that he is
ignorant, or as when a man willfully drinks too much wine, the result
being that he becomes drunk and indiscreet, and this ignorance
diminishes voluntariness and consequently alleviates the sin. For when
a thing is not known to be a sin, the will cannot be said to consent to
the sin directly, but only accidentally; wherefore, in that case there
is less contempt, and therefore less sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The ignorance whereby "every evil man is
ignorant," is not the cause of sin being committed, but something
resulting from that cause, viz. of the passion or habit inclining to
sin.
Reply to Objection 2: One sin is added to another makes more sins, but
it does not always make a sin greater, since, perchance, the two sins
do not coincide, but are separate. It may happen, if the first
diminishes the second, that the two together have not the same gravity
as one of them alone would have; thus murder is a more grievous sin if
committed by a man when sober, than if committed by a man when drunk,
although in the latter case there are two sins: because drunkenness
diminishes the sinfulness of the resulting sin more than its own
gravity implies.
Reply to Objection 3: The words of Ambrose may be understood as
referring to simply affected ignorance; or they may have reference to a
species of the sin of ingratitude, the highest degree of which is that
man even ignores the benefits he has received; or again, they may be an
allusion to the ignorance of unbelief, which undermines the foundation
of the spiritual edifice.
Reply to Objection 4: The drunken man deserves a "double punishment"
for the two sins which he commits, viz. drunkenness, and the sin which
results from his drunkenness: and yet drunkenness, on account of the
ignorance connected therewith, diminishes the resulting sin, and more,
perhaps, than the gravity of the drunkenness implies, as stated above
(ad 2). It might also be said that the words quoted refer to an
ordinance of the legislator named Pittacus, who ordered drunkards to be
more severely punished if they assaulted anyone; having an eye, not to
the indulgence which the drunkard might claim, but to expediency, since
more harm is done by the drunk than by the sober, as the Philosopher
observes (Polit. ii).
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of the sensitive
appetite, as to whether a passion of the soul may be a cause of sin:
and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a passion of the sensitive appetite can move or incline the
will?
(2) Whether it can overcome the reason against the latter's knowledge?
(3) Whether a sin resulting from a passion is a sin of weakness?
(4) Whether the passion of self-love is the cause of every sin?
(5) Of three causes mentioned in 1 Jn. 2:16: "Concupiscence of the
eyes, Concupiscence of the flesh," and "Pride of life. "
(6) Whether the passion which causes a sin diminishes it?
(7) Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?
(8) Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will is moved by a passion of the senstive appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by a passion of
the sensitive appetite. For no passive power is moved except by its
object. Now the will is a power both passive and active, inasmuch as it
is mover and moved, as the Philosopher says of the appetitive power in
general (De Anima iii, text. 54). Since therefore the object of the
will is not a passion of the sensitive appetite, but good defined by
the reason, it seems that a passion of the sensitive appetite does not
move the will.
Objection 2: Further, the higher mover is not moved by the lower; thus
the soul is not moved by the body. Now the will, which is the rational
appetite, is compared to the sensitive appetite, as a higher mover to a
lower: for the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 57) that "the
rational appetite moves the sensitive appetite, even as, in the
heavenly bodies, one sphere moves another. " Therefore the will cannot
be moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite.
Objection 3: Further, nothing immaterial can be moved by that which is
material. Now the will is an immaterial power, because it does not use
a corporeal organ, since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima
iii, text. 42: whereas the sensitive appetite is a material force,
since it is seated in an organ of the body. Therefore a passion of the
sensitive appetite cannot move the intellective appetite.
On the contrary, It is written (Dan. 13:56): "Lust hath perverted thy
heart. "
I answer that, A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot draw or move
the will directly; but it can do so indirectly, and this in two ways.
First, by a kind of distraction: because, since all the soul's powers
are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it follows of necessity
that, when one power is intent in its act, another power becomes
remiss, or is even altogether impeded, in its act, both because all
energy is weakened through being divided, so that, on the contrary,
through being centered on one thing, it is less able to be directed to
several; and because, in the operations of the soul, a certain
attention is requisite, and if this be closely fixed on one thing, less
attention is given to another. In this way, by a kind of distraction,
when the movement of the sensitive appetite is enforced in respect of
any passion whatever, the proper movement of the rational appetite or
will must, of necessity, become remiss or altogether impeded.
Secondly, this may happen on the part of the will's object, which is
good apprehended by reason. Because the judgment and apprehension of
reason is impeded on account of a vehement and inordinate apprehension
of the imagination and judgment of the estimative power, as appears in
those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident that the
apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the estimative
power follow the passion of the sensitive appetite, even as the verdict
of the taste follows the disposition of the tongue: for which reason we
observe that those who are in some kind of passion, do not easily turn
their imagination away from the object of their emotion, the result
being that the judgment of the reason often follows the passion of the
sensitive appetite, and consequently the will's movement follows it
also, since it has a natural inclination always to follow the judgment
of the reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the passion of the sensitive appetite is
not the direct object of the will, yet it occasions a certain change in
the judgment about the object of the will, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: The higher mover is not directly moved by the
lower; but, in a manner, it can be moved by it indirectly, as stated.
The Third Objection is solved in like manner.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the reason can be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a
passion, against its knowledge. For the stronger is not overcome by the
weaker. Now knowledge, on account of its certitude, is the strongest
thing in us. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a passion, which is
weak and soon passes away.
Objection 2: Further, the will is not directed save to the good or the
apparent good. Now when a passion draws the will to that which is
really good, it does not influence the reason against its knowledge;
and when it draws it to that which is good apparently, but not really,
it draws it to that which appears good to the reason. But what appears
to the reason is in the knowledge of the reason. Therefore a passion
never influences the reason against its knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, if it be said that it draws the reason from its
knowledge of something in general, to form a contrary judgment about a
particular matter---on the contrary, if a universal and a particular
proposition be opposed, they are opposed by contradiction, e. g. "Every
man," and "Not every man. " Now if two opinions contradict one another,
they are contrary to one another, as stated in Peri Herm. ii. If
therefore anyone, while knowing something in general, were to pronounce
an opposite judgment in a particular case, he would have two contrary
opinions at the same time, which is impossible.
Objection 4: Further, whoever knows the universal, knows also the
particular which he knows to be contained in the universal: thus who
knows that every mule is sterile, knows that this particular animal is
sterile, provided he knows it to be a mule, as is clear from Poster. i,
text. 2. Now he who knows something in general, e. g. that "no
fornication is lawful," knows this general proposition to contain, for
example, the particular proposition, "This is an act of fornication. "
Therefore it seems that his knowledge extends to the particular.
Objection 5: Further, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i),
"words express the thoughts of the mind. " Now it often happens that
man, while in a state of passion, confesses that what he has chosen is
an evil, even in that particular case. Therefore he has knowledge, even
in particular.
Therefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the reason against its
universal knowledge; because it is impossible for it to have universal
knowledge together with an opposite particular judgment.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): "I see another law in my
members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the
law of sin. " Now the law that is in the members is concupiscence, of
which he had been speaking previously. Since then concupiscence is a
passion, it seems that a passion draws the reason counter to its
knowledge.
I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 2), the opinion
of Socrates was that knowledge can never be overcome by passion;
wherefore he held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge, and every sin
a kind of ignorance. In this he was somewhat right, because, since the
object of the will is a good or an apparent good, it is never moved to
an evil, unless that which is not good appear good in some respect to
the reason; so that the will would never tend to evil, unless there
were ignorance or error in the reason. Hence it is written (Prov.
14:22): "They err that work evil. "
Experience, however, shows that many act contrary to the knowledge that
they have, and this is confirmed by Divine authority, according to the
words of Lk. 12:47: "The servant who knew that the will of his lord . .
. and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes," and of James
4:17: "To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it
is a sin. " Consequently he was not altogether right, and it is
necessary, with the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 3) to make a distinction.
Because, since man is directed to right action by a twofold knowledge,
viz.
movement in things concerning God, if it be deliberate, is a mortal
sin. Therefore venial sin is never in the higher reason as such.
Objection 3: Further, it happens sometimes that a sin which takes us
unawares, is a venial sin. Now a deliberate sin is a mortal sin,
through the reason, in deliberating, having recourse to some higher
good, by acting against which, man sins more grievously; just as when
the reason in deliberating about an inordinate pleasurable act,
considers that it is contrary to the law of God, it sins more
grievously in consenting, than if it only considered that it is
contrary to moral virtue. But the higher reason cannot have recourse to
any higher tribunal than its own object. Therefore if a movement that
takes us unawares is not a mortal sin, neither will the subsequent
deliberation make it a mortal sin; which is clearly false. Therefore
there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such.
On the contrary, A sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin. But it
belongs to the higher reason as such. Therefore there can be a venial
sin in the higher reason as such.
I answer that, The higher reason regards its own object otherwise than
the objects of the lower powers that are directed by the higher reason.
For it does not regard the objects of the lower powers, except in so
far as it consults the eternal law about them, and so it does not
regard them save by way of deliberation. Now deliberate consent to what
is a mortal sin in its genus, is itself a mortal sin; and consequently
the higher reason always sins mortally, if the acts of the lower powers
to which it consents are mortal sins.
With regard to its own object it has a twofold act, viz. simple
"intuition," and "deliberation," in respect of which it again consults
the eternal law about its own object. But in respect of simple
intuition, it can have an inordinate movement about Divine things, as
when a man suffers a sudden movement of unbelief. And although
unbelief, in its genus, is a mortal sin, yet a sudden movement of
unbelief is a venial sin, because there is no mortal sin unless it be
contrary to the law of God. Now it is possible for one of the articles
of faith to present itself to the reason suddenly under some other
aspect, before the eternal law, i. e. the law of God, is consulted, or
can be consulted, on the matter; as, for instance, when a man suddenly
apprehends the resurrection of the dead as impossible naturally, and
rejects it, as soon as he had thus apprehended it, before he has had
time to deliberate and consider that this is proposed to our belief in
accordance with the Divine law. If, however, the movement of unbelief
remains after this deliberation, it is a mortal sin. Therefore, in
sudden movements, the higher reason may sin venially in respect of its
proper object, even if it be a mortal sin in its genus; or it may sin
mortally in giving a deliberate consent; but in things pertaining to
the lower powers, it always sins mortally, in things which are mortal
sins in their genus, but not in those which are venial sins in their
genus.
Reply to Objection 1: A sin which is against the eternal law, though it
be mortal in its genus, may nevertheless be venial, on account of the
incompleteness of a sudden action, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: In matters of action, the simple intuition of the
principles from which deliberation proceeds, belongs to the reason, as
well as the act of deliberation: even as in speculative matters it
belongs to the reason both to syllogize and to form propositions:
consequently the reason also can have a sudden movement.
Reply to Objection 3: One and the same thing may be the subject of
different considerations, of which one is higher than the other; thus
the existence of God may be considered, either as possible to be known
by the human reason, or as delivered to us by Divine revelation, which
is a higher consideration. And therefore, although the object of the
higher reason is, in its nature, something sublime, yet it is reducible
to some yet higher consideration: and in this way, that which in the
sudden movement was not a mortal sin, becomes a mortal sin in virtue of
the deliberation which brought it into the light of a higher
consideration, as was explained above.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the causes of sin: (1) in general; (2) in
particular. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sin has a cause?
(2) Whether it has an internal cause?
(3) Whether it has an external cause?
(4) Whether one sin is the cause of another?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sin has a cause?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin has no cause. For sin has the
nature of evil, as stated above ([1760]Q[71], A[6]). But evil has no
cause, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore sin has no cause.
Objection 2: Further, a cause is that from which something follows of
necessity. Now that which is of necessity, seems to be no sin, for
every sin is voluntary. Therefore sin has no cause.
Objection 3: Further, if sin has a cause, this cause is either good or
evil. It is not a good, because good produces nothing but good, for "a
good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Mat. 7:18). Likewise neither
can evil be the cause of sin, because the evil of punishment is a
sequel to sin, and the evil of guilt is the same as sin. Therefore sin
has no cause.
On the contrary, Whatever is done has a cause, for, according to Job
5:6, "nothing upon earth is done without a cause. " But sin is something
done; since it a "word, deed, or desire contrary to the law of God. "
Therefore sin has a cause.
I answer that, A sin is an inordinate act. Accordingly, so far as it is
an act, it can have a direct cause, even as any other act; but, so far
as it is inordinate, it has a cause, in the same way as a negation or
privation can have a cause. Now two causes may be assigned to a
negation: in the first place, absence of the cause of affirmation; i. e.
the negation of the cause itself, is the cause of the negation in
itself; since the result of the removing the cause is the removal of
the effect: thus the absence of the sun is the cause of darkness. In
the second place, the cause of an affirmation, of which a negation is a
sequel, is the accidental cause of the resulting negation: thus fire by
causing heat in virtue of its principal tendency, consequently causes a
privation of cold. The first of these suffices to cause a simple
negation. But, since the inordinateness of sin and of every evil is not
a simple negation, but the privation of that which something ought
naturally to have, such an inordinateness must needs have an accidental
efficient cause. For that which naturally is and ought to be in a
thing, is never lacking except on account of some impeding cause. And
accordingly we are wont to say that evil, which consists in a certain
privation, has a deficient cause, or an accidental efficient cause. Now
every accidental cause is reducible to the direct cause. Since then
sin, on the part of its inordinateness, has an accidental efficient
cause, and on the part of the act, a direct efficient cause, it follows
that the inordinateness of sin is a result of the cause of the act.
Accordingly then, the will lacking the direction of the rule of reason
and of the Divine law, and intent on some mutable good, causes the act
of sin directly, and the inordinateness of the act, indirectly, and
beside the intention: for the lack of order in the act results from the
lack of direction in the will.
Reply to Objection 1: Sin signifies not only the privation of good,
which privation is its inordinateness, but also the act which is the
subject of that privation, which has the nature of evil: and how this
evil has a cause, has been explained.
Reply to Objection 2: If this definition is to be verified in all
cases, it must be understood as applying to a cause which is sufficient
and not impeded. For it happens that a thing is the sufficient cause of
something else, and that the effect does not follow of necessity, on
account of some supervening impediment: else it would follow that all
things happen of necessity, as is proved in Metaph. vi, text. 5.
Accordingly, though sin has a cause, it does not follow that this is a
necessary cause, since its effect can be impeded.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, the will in failing to apply the
rule of reason or of the Divine law, is the cause of sin. Now the fact
of not applying the rule of reason or of the Divine law, has not in
itself the nature of evil, whether of punishment or of guilt, before it
is applied to the act. Wherefore accordingly, evil is not the cause of
the first sin, but some good lacking some other good.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sin has an internal cause?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin has no internal cause. For that
which is within a thing is always in it. If therefore sin had an
internal cause, man would always be sinning, since given the cause, the
effect follows.
Objection 2: Further, a thing is not its own cause. But the internal
movements of a man are sins. Therefore they are not the cause of sin.
Objection 3: Further, whatever is within man is either natural or
voluntary. Now that which is natural cannot be the cause of sin, for
sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 3;
iv, 21); while that which is voluntary, if it be inordinate, is already
a sin. Therefore nothing intrinsic can be the cause of the first sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11; Retract. i,
9) that "the will is the cause of sin. "
I answer that, As stated above [1761](A[1]), the direct cause of sin
must be considered on the part of the act. Now we may distinguish a
twofold internal cause of human acts, one remote, the other proximate.
The proximate internal cause of the human act is the reason and will,
in respect of which man has a free-will; while the remote cause is the
apprehension of the sensitive part, and also the sensitive appetite.
For just as it is due to the judgment of reason, that the will is moved
to something in accord with reason, so it is due to an apprehension of
the senses that the sensitive appetite is inclined to something; which
inclination sometimes influences the will and reason, as we shall
explain further on (Q[77], A[1]). Accordingly a double interior cause
of sin may be assigned; one proximate, on the part of the reason and
will; and the other remote, on the part of the imagination or sensitive
appetite.
But since we have said above (A[1], ad 3) that the cause of sin is some
apparent good as motive, yet lacking the due motive, viz. the rule of
reason or the Divine law, this motive which is an apparent good,
appertains to the apprehension of the senses and to the appetite; while
the lack of the due rule appertains to the reason, whose nature it is
to consider this rule; and the completeness of the voluntary sinful act
appertains to the will, so that the act of the will, given the
conditions we have just mentioned, is already a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: That which is within a thing as its natural
power, is always in it: but that which is within it, as the internal
act of the appetitive or apprehensive power, is not always in it. Now
the power of the will is the potential cause of sin, but is made actual
by the preceding movements, both of the sensitive part, in the first
place, and afterwards, of the reason. For it is because a thing is
proposed as appetible to the senses, and because the appetite is
inclined, that the reason sometimes fails to consider the due rule, so
that the will produces the act of sin. Since therefore the movements
that precede it are not always actual, neither is man always actually
sinning.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not true that all the internal acts belong
to the substance of sin, for this consists principally in the act of
the will; but some precede and some follow the sin itself.
Reply to Objection 3: That which causes sin, as a power produces its
act, is natural; and again, the movement of the sensitive part, from
which sin follows, is natural sometimes, as, for instance, when anyone
sins through appetite for food. Yet sin results in being unnatural from
the very fact that the natural rule fails, which man, in accord with
his nature, ought to observe.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sin has an external cause?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin has no external cause. For sin is a
voluntary act. Now voluntary acts belong to principles that are within
us, so that they have no external cause. Therefore sin has no external
cause.
Objection 2: Further, as nature is an internal principle, so is the
will. Now in natural things sin can be due to no other than an internal
cause; for instance, the birth of a monster is due to the corruption of
some internal principle. Therefore in the moral order, sin can arise
from no other than an internal cause. Therefore it has no external
cause.
Objection 3: Further, if the cause is multiplied, the effect is
multiplied. Now the more numerous and weighty the external inducements
to sin are, the less is a man's inordinate act imputed to him as a sin.
Therefore nothing external is a cause of sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Num. 21:16): "Are not these they, that
deceived the children of Israel by the counsel of Balaam, and made you
transgress against the Lord by the sin of Phogor? " Therefore something
external can be a cause of sin.
I answer that, As stated above [1762](A[2]), the internal cause of sin
is both the will, as completing the sinful act, and the reason, as
lacking the due rule, and the appetite, as inclining to sin.
Accordingly something external might be a cause of sin in three ways,
either by moving the will itself immediately, or by moving the reason,
or by moving the sensitive appetite. Now, as stated above (Q[9], A[6];
Q[10], A[4]), none can move the will inwardly save God alone, who
cannot be a cause of sin, as we shall prove further on (Q[79], A[1]).
Hence it follows that nothing external can be a cause of sin, except by
moving the reason, as a man or devil by enticing to sin; or by moving
the sensitive appetite, as certain external sensibles move it. Yet
neither does external enticement move the reason, of necessity, in
matters of action, nor do things proposed externally, of necessity move
the sensitive appetite, except perhaps it be disposed thereto in a
certain way; and even the sensitive appetite does not, of necessity,
move the reason and will. Therefore something external can be a cause
moving to sin, but not so as to be a sufficient cause thereof: and the
will alone is the sufficient completive cause of sin being
accomplished.
Reply to Objection 1: From the very fact that the external motive
causes of sin do not lead to sin sufficiently and necessarily, it
follows that it remains in our power to sin or not to sin.
Reply to Objection 2: The fact that sin has an internal cause does not
prevent its having an external cause; for nothing external is a cause
of sin, except through the medium of the internal cause, as stated.
Reply to Objection 3: If the external causes inclining to sin be
multiplied, the sinful acts are multiplied, because they incline to the
sinful act in both greater numbers and greater frequency. Nevertheless
the character of guilt is lessened, since this depends on the act being
voluntary and in our power.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one sin is a cause of another?
Objection 1: It would seem that one sin cannot be the cause of another.
For there are four kinds of cause, none of which will fit in with one
sin causing another. Because the end has the character of good; which
is inconsistent with sin, which has the character of evil. In like
manner neither can a sin be an efficient cause, since "evil is not an
efficient cause, but is weak and powerless," as Dionysius declares
(Div. Nom. iv). The material and formal cause seems to have no place
except in natural bodies, which are composed of matter and form.
Therefore sin cannot have either a material or a formal cause.
Objection 2: Further, "to produce its like belongs to a perfect thing,"
as stated in Meteor. iv, 2 [*Cf. De Anima ii. ]. But sin is essentially
something imperfect. Therefore one sin cannot be a cause of another.
Objection 3: Further, if one sin is the cause of a second sin, in the
same way, yet another sin will be the cause of the first, and thus we
go on indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore one sin is not the cause
of another.
On the contrary, Gregory says on Ezechiel (Hom. xi): "A sin is not
quickly blotted out by repentance, is both a sin and a cause of sin. "
I answer that, Forasmuch as a sin has a cause on the part of the act of
sin, it is possible for one sin to be the cause of another, in the same
way as one human act is the cause of another. Hence it happens that one
sin may be the cause of another in respect of the four kinds of causes.
First, after the manner of an efficient or moving cause, both directly
and indirectly. Indirectly, as that which removes an impediment is
called an indirect cause of movement: for when man, by one sinful act,
loses grace, or charity, or shame, or anything else that withdraws him
from sin, he thereby falls into another sin, so that the first sin is
the accidental cause of the second. Directly, as when, by one sinful
act, man is disposed to commit more readily another like act: because
acts cause dispositions and habits inclining to like acts. Secondly,
after the manner of a material cause, one sin is the cause of another,
by preparing its matter: thus covetousness prepares the matter for
strife, which is often about the wealth a man has amassed together.
Thirdly, after the manner of a final cause, one sin causes another, in
so far as a man commits one sin for the sake of another which is his
end; as when a man is guilty of simony for the end of ambition, or
fornication for the purpose of theft. And since the end gives the form
to moral matters, as stated above ([1763]Q[1], A[3];[1764] Q[18],
AA[4],6), it follows that one sin is also the formal cause of another:
because in the act of fornication committed for the purpose of theft,
the former is material while the latter is formal.
Reply to Objection 1: Sin, in so far as it is inordinate, has the
character of evil; but, in so far as it is an act, it has some good, at
least apparent, for its end: so that, as an act, but not as being
inordinate, it can be the cause, both final and efficient, of another
sin. A sin has matter, not "of which" but "about which" it is: and it
has its form from its end. Consequently one sin can be the cause of
another, in respect of the four kinds of cause, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Sin is something imperfect on account of its
moral imperfection on the part of its inordinateness. Nevertheless, as
an act it can have natural perfection: and thus it can be the cause of
another sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Not every cause of one sin is another sin; so
there is no need to go on indefinitely: for one may come to one sin
which is not caused by another sin.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN PARTICULAR (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the causes of sin, in particular, and (1) The
internal causes of sin; (2) its external causes; and (3) sins which are
the causes of other sins. In view of what has been said above
[1765](A[2]), the first consideration will be threefold: so that in the
first place we shall treat of ignorance, which is the cause of sin on
the part of reason; secondly, of weakness or passion, which is the
cause of sin on the part of the sensitive appetite; thirdly, of malice,
which is the cause of sin on the part of the will.
Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether ignorance is a cause of sin?
(2) Whether ignorance is a sin?
(3) Whether it excuses from sin altogether?
(4) Whether it diminishes sin?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether ignorance can be a cause of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance cannot be a cause of sin:
because a non-being is not the cause of anything. Now ignorance is a
non-being, since it is a privation of knowledge. Therefore ignorance is
not a cause of sin.
Objection 2: Further, causes of sin should be reckoned in respect of
sin being a "turning to" something, as was stated above ([1766]Q[75],
A[1]). Now ignorance seems to savor of "turning away" from something.
Therefore it should not be reckoned a cause of sin.
Objection 3: Further, every sin is seated in the will. Now the will
does not turn to that which is not known, because its object is the
good apprehended. Therefore ignorance cannot be a cause of sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii) "that some sin
through ignorance. "
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 27) a moving
cause is twofold, direct and indirect. A direct cause is one that moves
by its own power, as the generator is the moving cause of heavy and
light things. An indirect cause, is either one that removes an
impediment, or the removal itself of an impediment: and it is in this
way that ignorance can be the cause of a sinful act; because it is a
privation of knowledge perfecting the reason that forbids the act of
sin, in so far as it directs human acts.
Now we must observe that the reason directs human acts in accordance
with a twofold knowledge, universal and particular: because in
conferring about what is to be done, it employs a syllogism, the
conclusion of which is an act of judgment, or of choice, or an
operation. Now actions are about singulars: wherefore the conclusion of
a practical syllogism is a singular proposition. But a singular
proposition does not follow from a universal proposition, except
through the medium of a particular proposition: thus a man is
restrained from an act of parricide, by the knowledge that it is wrong
to kill one's father, and that this man is his father. Hence ignorance
about either of these two propositions, viz. of the universal principle
which is a rule of reason, or of the particular circumstance, could
cause an act of parricide. Hence it is clear that not every kind of
ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone which removes the
knowledge which would prevent the sinful act. Consequently if a man's
will be so disposed that he would not be restrained from the act of
parricide, even though he recognized his father, his ignorance about
his father is not the cause of his committing the sin, but is
concomitant with the sin: wherefore such a man sins, not "through
ignorance" but "in ignorance," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii,
1).
Reply to Objection 1: Non-being cannot be the direct cause of anything:
but it can be an accidental cause, as being the removal of an
impediment.
Reply to Objection 2: As knowledge, which is removed by ignorance,
regards sin as turning towards something, so too, ignorance of this
respect of a sin is the cause of that sin, as removing its impediment.
Reply to Objection 3: The will cannot turn to that which is absolutely
unknown: but if something be known in one respect, and unknown in
another, the will can will it. It is thus that ignorance is the cause
of sin: for instance, when a man knows that what he is killing is a
man, but not that it is his own father; or when one knows that a
certain act is pleasurable, but not that it is a sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether ignorance is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance is not a sin. For sin is "a
word, deed or desire contrary to God's law," as stated above
([1767]Q[71], A[5]). Now ignorance does not denote an act, either
internal or external. Therefore ignorance is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, sin is more directly opposed to grace than to
knowledge. Now privation of grace is not a sin, but a punishment
resulting from sin. Therefore ignorance which is privation of knowledge
is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, if ignorance is a sin, this can only be in so far
as it is voluntary. But if ignorance is a sin, through being voluntary,
it seems that the sin will consist in the act itself of the will,
rather than in the ignorance. Therefore the ignorance will not be a
sin, but rather a result of sin.
Objection 4: Further, every sin is taken away by repentance, nor does
any sin, except only original sin, pass as to guilt, yet remain in act.
Now ignorance is not removed by repentance, but remains in act, all its
guilt being removed by repentance. Therefore ignorance is not a sin,
unless perchance it be original sin.
Objection 5: Further, if ignorance be a sin, then a man will be
sinning, as long as he remains in ignorance. But ignorance is continual
in the one who is ignorant. Therefore a person in ignorance would be
continually sinning, which is clearly false, else ignorance would be a
most grievous sin. Therefore ignorance is not a sin.
On the contrary, Nothing but sin deserves punishment. But ignorance
deserves punishment, according to 1 Cor. 14:38: "If any man know not,
he shall not be known. " Therefore ignorance is a sin.
I answer that, Ignorance differs from nescience, in that nescience
denotes mere absence of knowledge; wherefore whoever lacks knowledge
about anything, can be said to be nescient about it: in which sense
Dionysius puts nescience in the angels (Coel. Hier. vii). On the other
hand, ignorance denotes privation of knowledge, i. e. lack of knowledge
of those things that one has a natural aptitude to know. Some of these
we are under an obligation to know, those, to wit, without the
knowledge of which we are unable to accomplish a due act rightly.
Wherefore all are bound in common to know the articles of faith, and
the universal principles of right, and each individual is bound to know
matters regarding his duty or state. Meanwhile there are other things
which a man may have a natural aptitude to know, yet he is not bound to
know them, such as the geometrical theorems, and contingent
particulars, except in some individual case. Now it is evident that
whoever neglects to have or do what he ought to have or do, commits a
sin of omission. Wherefore through negligence, ignorance of what one is
bound to know, is a sin; whereas it is not imputed as a sin to man, if
he fails to know what he is unable to know. Consequently ignorance of
such like things is called "invincible," because it cannot be overcome
by study. For this reason such like ignorance, not being voluntary,
since it is not in our power to be rid of it, is not a sin: wherefore
it is evident that no invincible ignorance is a sin. On the other hand,
vincible ignorance is a sin, if it be about matters one is bound to
know; but not, if it be about things one is not bound to know.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([1768]Q[71], A[6], ad 1), when
we say that sin is a "word, deed or desire," we include the opposite
negations, by reason of which omissions have the character of sin; so
that negligence, in as much as ignorance is a sin, is comprised in the
above definition of sin; in so far as one omits to say what one ought,
or to do what one ought, or to desire what one ought, in order to
acquire the knowledge which we ought to have.
Reply to Objection 2: Although privation of grace is not a sin in
itself, yet by reason of negligence in preparing oneself for grace, it
may have the character of sin, even as ignorance; nevertheless even
here there is a difference, since man can acquire knowledge by his
acts, whereas grace is not acquired by acts, but by God's favor.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as in a sin of transgression, the sin
consists not only in the act of the will, but also in the act willed,
which is commanded by the will; so in a sin of omission not only the
act of the will is a sin, but also the omission, in so far as it is in
some way voluntary; and accordingly, the neglect to know, or even lack
of consideration is a sin.
Reply to Objection 4: Although when the guilt has passed away through
repentance, the ignorance remains, according as it is a privation of
knowledge, nevertheless the negligence does not remain, by reason of
which the ignorance is said to be a sin.
Reply to Objection 5: Just as in other sins of omission, man sins
actually only at the time at which the affirmative precept is binding,
so is it with the sin of ignorance. For the ignorant man sins actually
indeed, not continually, but only at the time for acquiring the
knowledge that he ought to have.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether ignorance excuses from sin altogether?
Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance excuses from sin altogether.
For as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9), every sin is voluntary. Now
ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above ([1769]Q[6], A[8]).
Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether.
Objection 2: Further, that which is done beside the intention, is done
accidentally. Now the intention cannot be about what is unknown.
Therefore what a man does through ignorance is accidental in human
acts. But what is accidental does not give the species. Therefore
nothing that is done through ignorance in human acts, should be deemed
sinful or virtuous.
Objection 3: Further, man is the subject of virtue and sin, inasmuch as
he is partaker of reason. Now ignorance excludes knowledge which
perfects the reason. Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) that "some
things done through ignorance are rightly reproved. " Now those things
alone are rightly reproved which are sins. Therefore some things done
through ignorance are sins. Therefore ignorance does not altogether
excuse from sin.
I answer that, Ignorance, by its very nature, renders the act which it
causes involuntary. Now it has already been stated ([1770]AA[1],2) that
ignorance is said to cause the act which the contrary knowledge would
have prevented; so that this act, if knowledge were to hand, would be
contrary to the will, which is the meaning of the word involuntary. If,
however, the knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, would not have
prevented the act, on account of the inclination of the will thereto,
the lack of this knowledge does not make that man unwilling, but not
willing, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1: and such like ignorance which is
not the cause of the sinful act, as already stated, since it does not
make the act to be involuntary, does not excuse from sin. The same
applies to any ignorance that does not cause, but follows or
accompanies the sinful act.
On the other hand, ignorance which is the cause of the act, since it
makes it to be involuntary, of its very nature excuses from sin,
because voluntariness is essential to sin. But it may fail to excuse
altogether from sin, and this for two reasons. First, on the part of
the thing itself which is not known. For ignorance excuses from sin, in
so far as something is not known to be a sin. Now it may happen that a
person ignores some circumstance of a sin, the knowledge of which
circumstance would prevent him from sinning, whether it belong to the
substance of the sin, or not; and nevertheless his knowledge is
sufficient for him to be aware that the act is sinful; for instance, if
a man strike someone, knowing that it is a man (which suffices for it
to be sinful) and yet be ignorant of the fact that it is his father,
(which is a circumstance constituting another species of sin); or,
suppose that he is unaware that this man will defend himself and strike
him back, and that if he had known this, he would not have struck him
(which does not affect the sinfulness of the act). Wherefore, though
this man sins through ignorance, yet he is not altogether excused,
because, not withstanding, he has knowledge of the sin. Secondly, this
may happen on the part of the ignorance itself, because, to wit, this
ignorance is voluntary, either directly, as when a man wishes of set
purpose to be ignorant of certain things that he may sin the more
freely; or indirectly, as when a man, through stress of work or other
occupations, neglects to acquire the knowledge which would restrain him
from sin. For such like negligence renders the ignorance itself
voluntary and sinful, provided it be about matters one is bound and
able to know. Consequently this ignorance does not altogether excuse
from sin. If, however, the ignorance be such as to be entirely
involuntary, either through being invincible, or through being of
matters one is not bound to know, then such like ignorance excuses from
sin altogether.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every ignorance causes involuntariness, as
stated above ([1771]Q[6], A[8]). Hence not every ignorance excuses from
sin altogether.
Reply to Objection 2: So far as voluntariness remains in the ignorant
person, the intention of sin remains in him: so that, in this respect,
his sin is not accidental.
Reply to Objection 3: If the ignorance be such as to exclude the use of
reason entirely, it excuses from sin altogether, as is the case with
madmen and imbeciles: but such is not always the ignorance that causes
the sin; and so it does not always excuse from sin altogether.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether ignorance diminishes a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance does not diminish a sin. For
that which is common to all sins does not diminish sin. Now ignorance
is common to all sins, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that
"every evil man is ignorant. " Therefore ignorance does not diminish
sin.
Objection 2: Further, one sin added to another makes a greater sin. But
ignorance is itself a sin, as stated above [1772](A[2]). Therefore it
does not diminish a sin.
Objection 3: Further, the same thing does not both aggravate and
diminish sin. Now ignorance aggravates sin; for Ambrose commenting on
Rom. 2:4, "Knowest thou not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to
penance? " says: "Thy sin is most grievous if thou knowest not. "
Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.
Objection 4: Further, if any kind of ignorance diminishes a sin, this
would seem to be chiefly the case as regards the ignorance which
removes the use of reason altogether. Now this kind of ignorance does
not diminish sin, but increases it: for the Philosopher says (Ethic.
iii, 5) that the "punishment is doubled for a drunken man. " Therefore
ignorance does not diminish sin.
On the contrary, Whatever is a reason for sin to be forgiven,
diminishes sin. Now such is ignorance, as is clear from 1 Tim. 1:13: "I
obtained . . . mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly. " Therefore
ignorance diminishes or alleviates sin.
I answer that, Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish
sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness; and if it does not
render it less voluntary, it nowise alleviates the sin. Now it is
evident that the ignorance which excuses from sin altogether (through
making it altogether involuntary) does not diminish a sin, but does
away with it altogether. On the other hand, ignorance which is not the
cause of the sin being committed, but is concomitant with it, neither
diminishes nor increases the sin.
Therefore sin cannot be alleviated by any ignorance, but only by such
as is a cause of the sin being committed, and yet does not excuse from
the sin altogether. Now it happens sometimes that such like ignorance
is directly and essentially voluntary, as when a man is purposely
ignorant that he may sin more freely, and ignorance of this kind seems
rather to make the act more voluntary and more sinful, since it is
through the will's intention to sin that he is willing to bear the hurt
of ignorance, for the sake of freedom in sinning. Sometimes, however,
the ignorance which is the cause of a sin being committed, is not
directly voluntary, but indirectly or accidentally, as when a man is
unwilling to work hard at his studies, the result being that he is
ignorant, or as when a man willfully drinks too much wine, the result
being that he becomes drunk and indiscreet, and this ignorance
diminishes voluntariness and consequently alleviates the sin. For when
a thing is not known to be a sin, the will cannot be said to consent to
the sin directly, but only accidentally; wherefore, in that case there
is less contempt, and therefore less sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The ignorance whereby "every evil man is
ignorant," is not the cause of sin being committed, but something
resulting from that cause, viz. of the passion or habit inclining to
sin.
Reply to Objection 2: One sin is added to another makes more sins, but
it does not always make a sin greater, since, perchance, the two sins
do not coincide, but are separate. It may happen, if the first
diminishes the second, that the two together have not the same gravity
as one of them alone would have; thus murder is a more grievous sin if
committed by a man when sober, than if committed by a man when drunk,
although in the latter case there are two sins: because drunkenness
diminishes the sinfulness of the resulting sin more than its own
gravity implies.
Reply to Objection 3: The words of Ambrose may be understood as
referring to simply affected ignorance; or they may have reference to a
species of the sin of ingratitude, the highest degree of which is that
man even ignores the benefits he has received; or again, they may be an
allusion to the ignorance of unbelief, which undermines the foundation
of the spiritual edifice.
Reply to Objection 4: The drunken man deserves a "double punishment"
for the two sins which he commits, viz. drunkenness, and the sin which
results from his drunkenness: and yet drunkenness, on account of the
ignorance connected therewith, diminishes the resulting sin, and more,
perhaps, than the gravity of the drunkenness implies, as stated above
(ad 2). It might also be said that the words quoted refer to an
ordinance of the legislator named Pittacus, who ordered drunkards to be
more severely punished if they assaulted anyone; having an eye, not to
the indulgence which the drunkard might claim, but to expediency, since
more harm is done by the drunk than by the sober, as the Philosopher
observes (Polit. ii).
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of the sensitive
appetite, as to whether a passion of the soul may be a cause of sin:
and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a passion of the sensitive appetite can move or incline the
will?
(2) Whether it can overcome the reason against the latter's knowledge?
(3) Whether a sin resulting from a passion is a sin of weakness?
(4) Whether the passion of self-love is the cause of every sin?
(5) Of three causes mentioned in 1 Jn. 2:16: "Concupiscence of the
eyes, Concupiscence of the flesh," and "Pride of life. "
(6) Whether the passion which causes a sin diminishes it?
(7) Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?
(8) Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the will is moved by a passion of the senstive appetite?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by a passion of
the sensitive appetite. For no passive power is moved except by its
object. Now the will is a power both passive and active, inasmuch as it
is mover and moved, as the Philosopher says of the appetitive power in
general (De Anima iii, text. 54). Since therefore the object of the
will is not a passion of the sensitive appetite, but good defined by
the reason, it seems that a passion of the sensitive appetite does not
move the will.
Objection 2: Further, the higher mover is not moved by the lower; thus
the soul is not moved by the body. Now the will, which is the rational
appetite, is compared to the sensitive appetite, as a higher mover to a
lower: for the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 57) that "the
rational appetite moves the sensitive appetite, even as, in the
heavenly bodies, one sphere moves another. " Therefore the will cannot
be moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite.
Objection 3: Further, nothing immaterial can be moved by that which is
material. Now the will is an immaterial power, because it does not use
a corporeal organ, since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima
iii, text. 42: whereas the sensitive appetite is a material force,
since it is seated in an organ of the body. Therefore a passion of the
sensitive appetite cannot move the intellective appetite.
On the contrary, It is written (Dan. 13:56): "Lust hath perverted thy
heart. "
I answer that, A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot draw or move
the will directly; but it can do so indirectly, and this in two ways.
First, by a kind of distraction: because, since all the soul's powers
are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it follows of necessity
that, when one power is intent in its act, another power becomes
remiss, or is even altogether impeded, in its act, both because all
energy is weakened through being divided, so that, on the contrary,
through being centered on one thing, it is less able to be directed to
several; and because, in the operations of the soul, a certain
attention is requisite, and if this be closely fixed on one thing, less
attention is given to another. In this way, by a kind of distraction,
when the movement of the sensitive appetite is enforced in respect of
any passion whatever, the proper movement of the rational appetite or
will must, of necessity, become remiss or altogether impeded.
Secondly, this may happen on the part of the will's object, which is
good apprehended by reason. Because the judgment and apprehension of
reason is impeded on account of a vehement and inordinate apprehension
of the imagination and judgment of the estimative power, as appears in
those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident that the
apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the estimative
power follow the passion of the sensitive appetite, even as the verdict
of the taste follows the disposition of the tongue: for which reason we
observe that those who are in some kind of passion, do not easily turn
their imagination away from the object of their emotion, the result
being that the judgment of the reason often follows the passion of the
sensitive appetite, and consequently the will's movement follows it
also, since it has a natural inclination always to follow the judgment
of the reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the passion of the sensitive appetite is
not the direct object of the will, yet it occasions a certain change in
the judgment about the object of the will, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: The higher mover is not directly moved by the
lower; but, in a manner, it can be moved by it indirectly, as stated.
The Third Objection is solved in like manner.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the reason can be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge?
Objection 1: It would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a
passion, against its knowledge. For the stronger is not overcome by the
weaker. Now knowledge, on account of its certitude, is the strongest
thing in us. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a passion, which is
weak and soon passes away.
Objection 2: Further, the will is not directed save to the good or the
apparent good. Now when a passion draws the will to that which is
really good, it does not influence the reason against its knowledge;
and when it draws it to that which is good apparently, but not really,
it draws it to that which appears good to the reason. But what appears
to the reason is in the knowledge of the reason. Therefore a passion
never influences the reason against its knowledge.
Objection 3: Further, if it be said that it draws the reason from its
knowledge of something in general, to form a contrary judgment about a
particular matter---on the contrary, if a universal and a particular
proposition be opposed, they are opposed by contradiction, e. g. "Every
man," and "Not every man. " Now if two opinions contradict one another,
they are contrary to one another, as stated in Peri Herm. ii. If
therefore anyone, while knowing something in general, were to pronounce
an opposite judgment in a particular case, he would have two contrary
opinions at the same time, which is impossible.
Objection 4: Further, whoever knows the universal, knows also the
particular which he knows to be contained in the universal: thus who
knows that every mule is sterile, knows that this particular animal is
sterile, provided he knows it to be a mule, as is clear from Poster. i,
text. 2. Now he who knows something in general, e. g. that "no
fornication is lawful," knows this general proposition to contain, for
example, the particular proposition, "This is an act of fornication. "
Therefore it seems that his knowledge extends to the particular.
Objection 5: Further, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i),
"words express the thoughts of the mind. " Now it often happens that
man, while in a state of passion, confesses that what he has chosen is
an evil, even in that particular case. Therefore he has knowledge, even
in particular.
Therefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the reason against its
universal knowledge; because it is impossible for it to have universal
knowledge together with an opposite particular judgment.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): "I see another law in my
members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the
law of sin. " Now the law that is in the members is concupiscence, of
which he had been speaking previously. Since then concupiscence is a
passion, it seems that a passion draws the reason counter to its
knowledge.
I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 2), the opinion
of Socrates was that knowledge can never be overcome by passion;
wherefore he held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge, and every sin
a kind of ignorance. In this he was somewhat right, because, since the
object of the will is a good or an apparent good, it is never moved to
an evil, unless that which is not good appear good in some respect to
the reason; so that the will would never tend to evil, unless there
were ignorance or error in the reason. Hence it is written (Prov.
14:22): "They err that work evil. "
Experience, however, shows that many act contrary to the knowledge that
they have, and this is confirmed by Divine authority, according to the
words of Lk. 12:47: "The servant who knew that the will of his lord . .
. and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes," and of James
4:17: "To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it
is a sin. " Consequently he was not altogether right, and it is
necessary, with the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 3) to make a distinction.
Because, since man is directed to right action by a twofold knowledge,
viz.
