No More Learning

(3) Whether He ought to have assumed a soul?

(4) Whether He ought to have assumed an intellect?
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Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a true
body. For it is written (Phil. 2:7), that He was "made in the likeness
of men. " But what is something in truth is not said to be in the
likeness thereof. Therefore the Son of God did not assume a true body.

Objection 2: Further, the assumption of a body in no way diminishes the
dignity of the Godhead; for Pope Leo says (Serm. de Nativ. ) that "the
glorification did not absorb the lesser nature, nor did the assumption
lessen the higher. " But it pertains to the dignity of God to be
altogether separated from bodies. Therefore it seems that by the
assumption God was not united to a body.

Objection 3: Further, signs ought to correspond to the realities. But
the apparitions of the Old Testament which were signs of the
manifestation of Christ were not in a real body, but by visions in the
imagination, as is plain from Is. 60:1: "I saw the Lord sitting," etc.
Hence it would seem that the apparition of the Son of God in the world
was not in a real body, but only in imagination.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 13): "If the body of
Christ was a phantom, Christ deceived us, and if He deceived us, He is
not the Truth. But Christ is the Truth. Therefore His body was not a
phantom. " Hence it is plain that He assumed a true body.

I answer that, As is said (De Eccles. Dogm. ii). The Son of God was not
born in appearance only, as if He had an imaginary body; but His body
was real. The proof of this is threefold. First, from the essence of
human nature to which it pertains to have a true body. Therefore
granted, as already proved ([3905]Q[4], A[1]), that it was fitting for
the Son of God to assume human nature, He must consequently have
assumed a real body. The second reason is taken from what was done in
the mystery of the Incarnation. For if His body was not real but
imaginary, He neither underwent a real death, nor of those things which
the Evangelists recount of Him, did He do any in very truth, but only
in appearance; and hence it would also follow that the real salvation
of man has not taken place; since the effect must be proportionate to
the cause. The third reason is taken from the dignity of the Person
assuming, Whom it did not become to have anything fictitious in His
work, since He is the Truth. Hence our Lord Himself deigned to refute
this error (Lk. 24:37, 39), when the disciples, "troubled and frighted,
supposed that they saw a spirit," and not a true body; wherefore He
offered Himself to their touch, saying: "Handle, and see; for a spirit
hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have. "

Reply to Objection 1: This likeness indicates the truth of the human
nature in Christ---just as all that truly exist in human nature are
said to be like in species---and not a mere imaginary likeness. In
proof of this the Apostle subjoins (Phil. 2:8) that He became "obedient
unto death, even to the death of the cross"; which would have been
impossible, had it been only an imaginary likeness.

Reply to Objection 2: By assuming a true body the dignity of the Son of
God is nowise lessened. Hence Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad
Petrum ii): "He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, that He
might become a servant; yet did He not lose the fulness of the form of
God. " For the Son of God assumed a true body, not so as to become the
form of a body, which is repugnant to the Divine simplicity and
purity---for this would be to assume a body to the unity of the nature,
which is impossible, as is plain from what has been stated above
([3906]Q[2], A[1]): but, the natures remaining distinct, He assumed a
body to the unity of Person.

Reply to Objection 3: The figure ought to correspond to the reality as
regards the likeness and not as regards the truth of the thing. For if
they were alike in all points, it would no longer be a likeness but the
reality itself, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 26). Hence it was
more fitting that the apparitions of the old Testament should be in
appearance only, being figures; and that the apparition of the Son of
God in the world should be in a real body, being the thing prefigured
by these figures. Hence the Apostle says (Col. 2:17): "Which are a
shadow of things to come, but the body is Christ's. "
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Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a carnal or earthly body?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ had not a carnal or earthly, but
a heavenly body. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:41): "The first man
was of the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven, heavenly. " But
the first man, i. e. Adam, was of the earth as regards his body, as is
plain from Gn. 1. Therefore the second man, i. e. Christ, was of heaven
as regards the body.

Objection 2: Further, it is said (1 Cor. 15:50): "Flesh and blood shall
not [Vulg. : 'cannot'] possess the kingdom of God. " But the kingdom of
God is in Christ chiefly. Therefore there is no flesh or blood in Him,
but rather a heavenly body.

Objection 3: Further, whatever is best is to be attributed to God. But
of all bodies a heavenly body is the best. Therefore it behooved Christ
to assume such a body.

On the contrary, our Lord says (Lk. 24:39): "A spirit hath not flesh
and bones, as you see Me to have. " Now flesh and bones are not of the
matter of heavenly bodies, but are composed of the inferior elements.
Therefore the body of Christ was not a heavenly, but a carnal and
earthly body.

I answer that, By the reasons which proved that the body of Christ was
not an imaginary one, it may also be shown that it was not a heavenly
body. First, because even as the truth of the human nature of Christ
would not have been maintained had His body been an imaginary one, such
as Manes supposed, so likewise it would not have been maintained if we
supposed, as did Valentine, that it was a heavenly body. For since the
form of man is a natural thing, it requires determinate matter, to wit,
flesh and bones, which must be placed in the definition of man, as is
plain from the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 39). Secondly, because this
would lessen the truth of such things as Christ did in the body. For
since a heavenly body is impassible and incorruptible, as is proved De
Coel. i, 20, if the Son of God had assumed a heavenly body, He would
not have truly hungered or thirsted, nor would he have undergone His
passion and death. Thirdly, this would have detracted from God's
truthfulness. For since the Son of God showed Himself to men, as if He
had a carnal and earthly body, the manifestation would have been false,
had He had a heavenly body. Hence (De Eccles. Dogm. ii) it is said:
"The Son of God was born, taking flesh of the Virgin's body, and not
bringing it with Him from heaven. "

Reply to Objection 1: Christ is said in two ways to have come down from
heaven. First, as regards His Divine Nature; not indeed that the Divine
Nature ceased to be in heaven, but inasmuch as He began to be here
below in a new way, viz. by His assumed. nature, according to Jn. 3:13:
"No man hath ascended into heaven, but He that descended from heaven,
the Son of Man, Who is in heaven. "

Secondly, as regards His body, not indeed that the very substance of
the body of Christ descended from heaven, but that His body was formed
by a heavenly power, i. e. by the Holy Ghost. Hence Augustine,
explaining the passage quoted, says (Ad Orosium [*Dial. Qq. lxv, qu. 4,
work of an unknown author]): "I call Christ a heavenly man because He
was not conceived of human seed. " And Hilary expounds it in the same
way (De Trin. x).

Reply to Objection 2: Flesh and blood are not taken here for the
substance of flesh and blood, but for the corruption of flesh, which
was not in Christ as far as it was sinful; but as far as it was a
punishment; thus, for a time, it was in Christ, that He might carry
through the work of our redemption.

Reply to Objection 3: It pertains to the greatest glory of God to have
raised a weak and earthly body to such sublimity. Hence in the General
Council of Ephesus (P. II, Act. I) we read the saying of St.
Theophilus: "Just as the best workmen are esteemed not merely for
displaying their skill in precious materials, but very often because by
making use of the poorest . . . lay and commonest earth, they show the
power of their craft; so the best of all workmen, the Word of God, did
not come down to us by taking a heavenly body of some most precious
matter, but shewed the greatness of His skill in clay. "
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Whether the Son of God assumed a soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul.
For John has said, teaching the mystery of the Incarnation (Jn. 1:14):
"The Word was made flesh"---no mention being made of a soul. Now it is
not said that "the Word was made flesh" as if changed to flesh, but
because He assumed flesh. Therefore He seems not to have assumed a
soul.

Objection 2: Further, a soul is necessary to the body, in order to
quicken it. But this was not necessary for the body of Christ, as it
would seem, for of the Word of God it is written (Ps. 35:10): Lord,
"with Thee is the fountain of life. " Therefore it would seem altogether
superfluous for the soul to be there, when the Word was present. But
"God and nature do nothing uselessly," as the Philosopher says (De
Coel. i, 32; ii, 56). Therefore the Word would seem not to have assumed
a soul.

Objection 3: Further, by the union of soul and body is constituted the
common nature, which is the human species. But "in the Lord Jesus
Christ we are not to look for a common species," as Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. iii, 3). Therefore He did not assume a soul.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xxi): "Let us not
hearken to such as say that only a human body was assumed by the Word
of God; and take 'the Word was made flesh' to mean that the man had no
soul nor any other part of a man, save flesh. "

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Haeres. 69,55), it was first of
all the opinion of Arius and then of Apollinaris that the Son of God
assumed only flesh, without a soul, holding that the Word took the
place of a soul to the body. And consequently it followed that there
were not two natures in Christ, but only one; for from a soul and body
one human nature is constituted. But this opinion cannot hold, for
three reasons. First, because it is counter to the authority of
Scripture, in which our Lord makes mention of His soul, Mat. 26:38: "My
soul is sorrowful even unto death"; and Jn. 10:18: "I have power to lay
down My soul [animam meam: Douay: 'My life']. " But to this Apollinaris
replied that in these words soul is taken metaphorically, in which way
mention is made in the Old Testament of the soul of God (Is. 1:14): "My
soul hateth your new moons and your solemnities. " But, as Augustine
says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80), the Evangelists relate how Jesus wondered,
was angered, sad, and hungry. Now these show that He had a true soul,
just as that He ate, slept and was weary shows that He had a true human
body: otherwise, if these things are a metaphor, because the like are
said of God in the Old Testament, the trustworthiness of the Gospel
story is undermined. For it is one thing that things were foretold in a
figure, and another that historical events were related in very truth
by the Evangelists. Secondly, this error lessens the utility of the
Incarnation, which is man's liberation. For Augustine [*Vigilius
Tapsensis] argues thus (Contra Felician. xiii): "If the Son of God in
taking flesh passed over the soul, either He knew its sinlessness, and
trusted it did not need a remedy; or He considered it unsuitable to
Him, and did not bestow on it the boon of redemption; or He reckoned it
altogether incurable, and was unable to heal it; or He cast it off as
worthless and seemingly unfit for any use. Now two of these reasons
imply a blasphemy against God. For how shall we call Him omnipotent, if
He is unable to heal what is beyond hope? Or God of all, if He has not
made our soul. And as regards the other two reasons, in one the cause
of the soul is ignored, and in the other no place is given to merit. Is
He to be considered to understand the cause of the soul, Who seeks to
separate it from the sin of wilful transgression, enabled as it is to
receive the law by the endowment of the habit of reason? Or how can His
generosity be known to any one who says it was despised on account of
its ignoble sinfulness? If you look at its origin, the substance of the
soul is more precious than the body: but if at the sin of
transgression, on account of its intelligence it is worse than the
body. Now I know and declare that Christ is perfect wisdom, nor have I
any doubt that He is most loving; and because of the first of these He
did not despise what was better and more capable of prudence; and
because of the second He protected what was most wounded. " Thirdly,
this position is against the truth of the Incarnation. For flesh and
the other parts of man receive their species through the soul. Hence,
if the soul is absent, there are no bones nor flesh, except
equivocally, as is plain from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9; Metaph.
vii, 34).

Reply to Objection 1: When we say, "The Word was made flesh," "flesh"
is taken for the whole man, as if we were to say, "The Word was made
man," as Is. 40:5: "All flesh together shall see that the mouth of the
Lord hath spoken. " And the whole man is signified by flesh, because, as
is said in the authority quoted, the Son of God became visible by
flesh; hence it is subjoined: "And we saw His glory. " Or because, as
Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80), "in all that union the Word is
the highest, and flesh the last and lowest. Hence, wishing to commend
the love of God's humility to us, the Evangelist mentioned the Word and
flesh, leaving the soul on one side, since it is less than the Word and
nobler than flesh. " Again, it was reasonable to mention flesh, which,
as being farther away from the Word, was less assumable, as it would
seem.

Reply to Objection 2: The Word is the fountain of life, as the first
effective cause of life; but the soul is the principle of the life of
the body, as its form. Now the form is the effect of the agent. Hence
from the presence of the Word it might rather have been concluded that
the body was animated, just as from the presence of fire it may be
concluded that the body, in which fire adheres, is warm.

Reply to Objection 3: It is not unfitting, indeed it is necessary to
say that in Christ there was a nature which was constituted by the soul
coming to the body. But Damascene denied that in Jesus Christ there was
a common species, i. e. a third something resulting from the Godhead and
the humanity.
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Whether the Son of God assumed a human mind or intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a human
mind or intellect. For where a thing is present, its image is not
required. But man is made to God's image, as regards his mind, as
Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 3,6). Hence, since in Christ there was
the presence of the Divine Word itself, there was no need of a human
mind.

Objection 2: Further, the greater light dims the lesser. But the Word
of God, Who is "the light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh
into this world," as is written Jn. 1:9, is compared to the mind as the
greater light to the lesser; since our mind is a light, being as it
were a lamp enkindled by the First Light (Prov. 20:27): "The spirit of
a man is the lamp of the Lord. " Therefore in Christ Who is the Word of
God, there is no need of a human mind.

Objection 3: Further, the assumption of human nature by the Word of God
is called His Incarnation. But the intellect or human mind is nothing
carnal, either in its substance or in its act. for it is not the act of
a body, as is proved De Anima iii, 6. Hence it would seem that the Son
of God did not assume a human mind.

On the contrary, Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum xiv):
"Firmly hold and nowise doubt that Christ the Son of God has true flesh
and a rational soul of the same kind as ours, since of His flesh He
says (Lk. 24:39): 'Handle, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and
bones, as you see Me to have. ' And He proves that He has a soul, saying
(Jn. 10:17): 'I lay down My soul [Douay: 'life'] that I may take it
again. ' And He proves that He has an intellect, saying (Mat. 11:29):
'Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart. ' And God says of
Him by the prophet (Is. 52:13): 'Behold my servant shall understand. '"

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Haeres. 49,50), "the Apollinarists
thought differently from the Catholic Church concerning the soul of
Christ, saying with the Arians, that Christ took flesh alone, without a
soul; and on being overcome on this point by the Gospel witness, they
went on to say that the mind was wanting to Christ's soul, but that the
Word supplied its place. " But this position is refuted by the same
arguments as the preceding. First, because it runs counter to the
Gospel story, which relates how He marveled (as is plain from Mat.
8:10). Now marveling cannot be without reason, since it implies the
collation of effect and cause, i. e. inasmuch as when we see an effect
and are ignorant of its cause, we seek to know it, as is said Metaph.
i, 2.
Secondly, it is inconsistent with the purpose of the Incarnation,
which is the justification of man from sin. For the human soul is not
capable of sin nor of justifying grace except through the mind. Hence
it was especially necessary for the mind to be assumed. Hence Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that "the Word of God assumed a body and an
intellectual and rational soul," and adds afterwards: "The whole was
united to the whole, that He might bestow salvation on me wholly; for
what was not assumed is not curable. " Thirdly, it is against the truth
of the Incarnation. For since the body is proportioned to the soul as
matter to its proper form, it is not truly human flesh if it is not
perfected by human, i. e. a rational soul. And hence if Christ had had a
soul without a mind, He would not have had true human flesh, but
irrational flesh, since our soul differs from an animal soul by the
mind alone. Hence Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80) that from this
error it would have followed that the Son of God "took an animal with
the form of a human body," which, again, is against the Divine truth,
which cannot suffer any fictitious untruth.

Reply to Objection 1: Where a thing is by its presence, its image is
not required to supply the place of the thing, as where the emperor is
the soldiers do not pay homage to his image. Yet the image of a thing
is required together with its presence, that it may be perfected by the
presence of the thing, just as the image in the wax is perfected by the
impression of the seal, and as the image of man is reflected in the
mirror by his presence. Hence in order to perfect the human mind it was
necessary that the Word should unite it to Himself.

Reply to Objection 2: The greater light dims the lesser light of
another luminous body; but it does not dim, rather it perfects the
light of the body illuminated---at the presence of the sun the light of
the stars is put out, but the light of the air is perfected. Now the
intellect or mind of man is, as it were, a light lit up by the light of
the Divine Word; and hence by the presence of the Word the mind of man
is perfected rather than overshadowed.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the intellective power is not the act of
a body, nevertheless the essence of the human soul, which is the form
of the body, requires that it should be more noble, in order that it
may have the power of understanding; and hence it is necessary that a
better disposed body should correspond to it.
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OF THE ORDER OF ASSUMPTION (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the order of the foregoing assumption, and under
this head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the
soul?

(2) Whether He assumed the soul through the medium of the spirit or
mind?

(3) Whether the soul was assumed previous to the flesh?

(4) Whether the flesh of Christ was assumed by the Word previous to
being united to the soul?

(5) Whether the whole human nature was assumed through the medium of
the parts?

(6) Whether it was assumed through the medium of grace?
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Whether the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume flesh
through the medium of the soul. For the mode in which the Son of God is
united to human nature and its parts, is more perfect than the mode
whereby He is in all creatures. But He is in all creatures immediately
by essence, power and presence. Much more, therefore, is the Son of God
united to flesh without the medium of the soul.

Objection 2: Further, the soul and flesh are united to the Word of God
in unity of hypostasis or person. But the body pertains immediately to
the human hypostasis or person, even as the soul. Indeed, the human
body, since it is matter, would rather seem to be nearer the hypostasis
than the soul, which is a form, since the principle of individuation,
which is implied in the word "hypostasis," would seem to be matter.
Hence the Son of God did not assume flesh through the medium of the
soul.

Objection 3: Further, take away the medium and you separate what were
joined by the medium; for example, if the superficies be removed color
would leave the body, since it adheres to the body through the medium
of the superficies. But though the soul was separated from the body by
death, yet there still remained the union of the Word to the flesh, as
will be shown ([3907]Q[50], AA[2],3). Hence the Word was not joined to
flesh through the medium of the soul.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvi): "The
greatness of the Divine power fitted to itself a rational soul, and
through it a human body, so as to raise the whole man to something
higher. "

I answer that, A medium is in reference to a beginning and an end.
Hence as beginning and end imply order, so also does a medium. Now
there is a twofold order: one, of time; the other, of nature. But in
the mystery of the Incarnation nothing is said to be a medium in the
order of time, for the Word of God united the whole human nature to
Himself at the same time, as will appear ([3908]Q[30], A[3]). An order
of nature between things may be taken in two ways: first, as regards
rank of dignity, as we say the angels are midway between man and God;
secondly, as regards the idea of causality, as we say a cause is midway
between the first cause and the last effect. And this second order
follows the first to some extent; for as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
xiii), God acts upon the more remote substances through the less
remote. Hence if we consider the rank of dignity, the soul is found to
be midway between God and flesh; and in this way it may be said that
the Son of God united flesh to Himself, through the medium of the soul.
But even as regards the second order of causality the soul is to some
extent the cause of flesh being united to the Son of God. For the flesh
would not have been assumable, except by its relation to the rational
soul, through which it becomes human flesh. For it was said above
([3909]Q[4], A[1]) that human nature was assumable before all others.

Reply to Objection 1: We may consider a twofold order between creatures
and God: the first is by reason of creatures being caused by God and
depending on Him as on the principle of their being; and thus on
account of the infinitude of His power God touches each thing
immediately, by causing and preserving it, and so it is that God is in
all things by essence, presence and power. But the second order is by
reason of things being directed to God as to their end; and it is here
that there is a medium between the creature and God, since lower
creatures are directed to God by higher, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier.
v); and to this order pertains the assumption of human nature by the
Word of God, Who is the term of the assumption; and hence it is united
to flesh through the soul.

Reply to Objection 2: If the hypostasis of the Word of God were
constituted simply by human nature, it would follow that the body was
nearest to it, since it is matter which is the principle of
individuation; even as the soul, being the specific form, would be
nearer the human nature. But because the hypostasis of the Word is
prior to and more exalted than the human nature, the more exalted any
part of the human nature is, the nearer it is to the hypostasis of the
Word. And hence the soul is nearer the Word of God than the body is.

Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents one thing being the cause of the
aptitude and congruity of another, and yet if it be taken away the
other remains; because although a thing's becoming may depend on
another, yet when it is in being it no longer depends on it, just as a
friendship brought about by some other may endure when the latter has
gone; or as a woman is taken in marriage on account of her beauty,
which makes a woman's fittingness for the marriage tie, yet when her
beauty passes away, the marriage tie still remains. So likewise, when
the soul was separated, the union of the Word with flesh still endured.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the Son of God assumed a soul through the medium of the spirit or
mind?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul
through the medium of the spirit or mind. For nothing is a medium
between itself and another. But the spirit is nothing else in essence
but the soul itself, as was said above ([3910]FP, Q[77], A[1], ad 1).
Therefore the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of
the spirit or mind.

Objection 2: Further, what is the medium of the assumption is itself
more assumable. But the spirit or mind is not more assumable than the
soul; which is plain from the fact that angelic spirits are not
assumable, as was said above ([3911]Q[4], A[1]). Hence it seems that
the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit.

Objection 3: Further, that which comes later is assumed by the first
through the medium of what comes before. But the soul implies the very
essence, which naturally comes before its power---the mind. Therefore
it would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul through the
medium of the spirit or mind.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xviii): "The
invisible and unchangeable Truth took a soul by means of the spirit,
and a body by means of the soul. "

I answer that, As stated above [3912](A[1]), the Son of God is said to
have assumed flesh through the medium of the soul, on account of the
order of dignity, and the congruity of the assumption. Now both these
may be applied to the intellect, which is called the spirit, if we
compare it with the other parts of the soul. For the soul is assumed
congruously only inasmuch as it has a capacity for God, being in His
likeness: which is in respect of the mind that is called the spirit,
according to Eph. 4:23: "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind. " So,
too, the intellect is the highest and noblest of the parts of the soul,
and the most like to God, and hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
6) that "the Word of God is united to flesh through the medium of the
intellect; for the intellect is the purest part of the soul, God
Himself being an intellect. "

Reply to Objection 1: Although the intellect is not distinct from the
soul in essence, it is distinct from the other parts of the soul as a
power; and it is in this way that it has the nature of a medium.

Reply to Objection 2: Fitness for assumption is wanting to the angelic
spirits, not from any lack of dignity, but because of the
irremediableness of their fall, which cannot be said of the human
spirit, as is clear from what has been said above ([3913]FP, Q[62],
A[8]; [3914]FP, Q[64], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 3: The soul, between which and the Word of God the
intellect is said to be a medium, does not stand for the essence of the
soul, which is common to all the powers, but for the lower powers,
which are common to every soul.
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Whether the soul was assumed before the flesh by the Son of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ was assumed before
the flesh by the Word. For the Son of God assumed flesh through the
medium of the soul, as was said above [3915](A[1]). Now the medium is
reached before the end. Therefore the Son of God assumed the soul
before the body.

Objection 2: Further, the soul of Christ is nobler than the angels,
according to Ps. 96:8: "Adore Him, all you His angels. " But the angels
were created in the beginning, as was said above ([3916]FP, Q[46],
A[3]). Therefore the soul of Christ also (was created in the
beginning). But it was not created before it was assumed, for Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 2,3,9), that "neither the soul nor the body of
Christ ever had any hypostasis save the hypostasis of the Word. "
Therefore it would seem that the soul was assumed before the flesh,
which was conceived in the womb of the Virgin.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Jn. 1:14): "We saw Him [Vulg. :
'His glory'] full of grace and truth," and it is added afterwards that
"of His fulness we have all received" (Jn. 1:16), i. e. all the faithful
of all time, as Chrysostom expounds it (Hom. xiii in Joan. ). Now this
could not have been unless the soul of Christ had all fulness of grace
and truth before all the saints, who were from the beginning of the
world, for the cause is not subsequent to the effect. Hence since the
fulness of grace and truth was in the soul of Christ from union with
the Word, according to what is written in the same place: "We saw His
glory, the glory as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father, full of
grace and truth," it would seem in consequence that from the beginning
of the world the soul of Christ was assumed by the Word of God.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 6): "The intellect
was not, as some untruthfully say, united to the true God, and
henceforth called Christ, before the Incarnation which was of the
Virgin. "

I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon i, 7,8; ii, 8) maintained that all
souls, amongst which he placed Christ's soul, were created in the
beginning. But this is not fitting, if we suppose that it was first of
all created, but not at once joined to the Word, since it would follow
that this soul once had its proper subsistence without the Word; and
thus, since it was assumed by the Word, either the union did not take
place in the subsistence, or the pre-existing subsistence of the soul
was corrupted. So likewise it is not fitting to suppose that this soul
was united to the Word from the beginning, and that it afterwards
became incarnate in the womb of the Virgin; for thus His soul would not
seem to be of the same nature as ours, which are created at the same
time that they are infused into bodies. Hence Pope Leo says (Ep. ad
Julian. xxxv) that "Christ's flesh was not of a different nature to
ours, nor was a different soul infused into it in the beginning than
into other men. "

Reply to Objection 1: As was said above [3917](A[1]), the soul of
Christ is said to be the medium in the union of the flesh with the
Word, in the order of nature; but it does not follow from this that it
was the medium in the order of time.

Reply to Objection 2: As Pope Leo says in the same Epistle, Christ's
soul excels our soul "not by diversity of genus, but by sublimity of
power"; for it is of the same genus as our souls, yet excels even the
angels in "fulness of grace and truth. " But the mode of creation is in
harmony with the generic property of the soul; and since it is the form
of the body, it is consequently created at the same time that it is
infused into and united with the body; which does not happen to angels,
since they are substances entirely free from matter.

Reply to Objection 3: Of the fulness of Christ all men receive
according to the faith they have in Him; for it is written (Rom. 3:22)
that "the justice of God is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon
all them that believe in Him. " Now just as we believe in Him as already
born; so the ancients believed in Him as about to be born, since
"having the same spirit of faith . . . we also believe," as it is
written (2 Cor. 4:13). But the faith which is in Christ has the power
of justifying by reason of the purpose of the grace of God, according
to Rom. 4:5: "But to him that worketh not, yet believeth in Him that
justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice according to
the purpose of the grace of God. " Hence because this purpose is
eternal, there is nothing to hinder some from being justified by the
faith of Jesus Christ, even before His soul was full of grace and
truth.
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Whether the flesh of Christ was assumed by the Word before being united to
the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the flesh of Christ was assumed by the
Word before being united to the soul. For Augustine [*Fulgentius] says
(De Fide ad Petrum xviii): "Most firmly hold, and nowise doubt that the
flesh of Christ was not conceived in the womb of the Virgin without the
Godhead before it was assumed by the Word. " But the flesh of Christ
would seem to have been conceived before being united to the rational
soul, because matter or disposition is prior to the completive form in
order of generation. Therefore the flesh of Christ was assumed before
being united to the soul.

Objection 2: Further, as the soul is a part of human nature, so is the
body. But the human soul in Christ had no other principle of being than
in other men, as is clear from the authority of Pope Leo, quoted above
(A[3] ). Therefore it would seem that the body of Christ had no other
principle of being than we have. But in us the body is begotten before
the rational soul comes to it. Therefore it was the same in Christ; and
thus the flesh was assumed by the Word before being united to the soul.

Objection 3: Further, as is said (De Causis), the first cause excels
the second in bringing about the effect, and precedes it in its union
with the effect. But the soul of Christ is compared to the Word as a
second cause to a first. Hence the Word was united to the flesh before
it was to the soul.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 2): "At the same
time the Word of God was made flesh, and flesh was united to a rational
and intellectual soul. " Therefore the union of the Word with the flesh
did not precede the union with the soul.

I answer that, The human flesh is assumable by the Word on account of
the order which it has to the rational soul as to its proper form. Now
it has not this order before the rational soul comes to it, because
when any matter becomes proper to any form, at the same time it
receives that form; hence the alteration is terminated at the same
instant in which the substantial form is introduced. And hence it is
that the flesh ought not to have been assumed before it was human
flesh; and this happened when the rational soul came to it. Therefore
since the soul was not assumed before the flesh, inasmuch as it is
against the nature of the soul to be before it is united to the body,
so likewise the flesh ought not to have been assumed before the soul,
since it is not human flesh before it has a rational soul.

Reply to Objection 1: Human flesh depends upon the soul for its being;
and hence, before the coming of the soul, there is no human flesh, but
there may be a disposition towards human flesh. Yet in the conception
of Christ, the Holy Ghost, Who is an agent of infinite might, disposed
the matter and brought it to its perfection at the same time.

Reply to Objection 2: The form actually gives the species; but the
matter in itself is in potentiality to the species. And hence it would
be against the nature of a form to exist before the specific nature.
And therefore the dissimilarity between our origin and Christ's origin,
inasmuch as we are conceived before being animated, and Christ's flesh
is not, is by reason of what precedes the perfection of the nature,
viz. that we are conceived from the seed of man, and Christ is not. But
a difference which would be with reference to the origin of the soul,
would bespeak a diversity of nature.

Reply to Objection 3: The Word of God is understood to be united to the
flesh before the soul by the common mode whereby He is in the rest of
creatures by essence, power, and presence. Yet I say "before," not in
time, but in nature; for the flesh is understood as a being, which it
has from the Word, before it is understood as animated, which it has
from the soul. But by the personal union we understand the flesh as
united to the soul before it is united to the Word, for it is from its
union with the soul that it is capable of being united to the Word in
Person; especially since a person is found only in the rational nature
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Whether the whole human nature was assumed through the medium of the parts?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God assumed the whole human
nature through the medium of its parts. For Augustine says (De Agone
Christ. xviii) that "the invisible and unchangeable Truth assumed the
soul through the medium of the spirit, and the body through the medium
of the soul, and in this way the whole man. " But the spirit, soul, and
body are parts of the whole man. Therefore He assumed all, through the
medium of the parts.

Objection 2: Further, the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium
of the soul because the soul is more like to God than the body. But the
parts of human nature, since they are simpler than the body, would seem
to be more like to God, Who is most simple, than the whole. Therefore
He assumed the whole through the medium of the parts.

Objection 3: Further, the whole results from the union of parts. But
the union is taken to be the term of the assumption, and the parts are
presupposed to the assumption. Therefore He assumed the whole by the
parts.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 16): "In our Lord
Jesus Christ we do not behold parts of parts, but such as are
immediately joined, i. e. the Godhead and the manhood. " Now the humanity
is a whole, which is composed of soul and body, as parts. Therefore the
Son of God assumed the parts through the medium of the whole.

I answer that, When anything is said to be a medium in the assumption
of the Incarnation, we do not signify order of time, because the
assumption of the whole and the parts was simultaneous. For it has been
shown ([3918]AA[3] ,4) that the soul and body were mutually united at
the same time in order to constitute the human nature of the Word. But
it is order of nature that is signified. Hence by what is prior in
nature, that is assumed which is posterior in nature. Now a thing is
prior in nature in two ways: First on the part of the agent, secondly
on the part of the matter; for these two causes precede the thing. On
the part of the agent---that is simply first, which is first included
in his intention; but that is relatively first, with which his
operation begins---and this because the intention is prior to the
operation. On the part of the matter---that is first which exists first
in the transmutation of the matter. Now in the Incarnation the order
depending on the agent must be particularly considered, because, as
Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvii), "in such things the whole
reason of the deed is the power of the doer. " But it is manifest that,
according to the intention of the doer, what is complete is prior to
what is incomplete, and, consequently, the whole to the parts. Hence it
must be said that the Word of God assumed the parts of human nature,
through the medium of the whole; for even as He assumed the body on
account of its relation to the rational soul, so likewise He assumed a
body and soul on account of their relation to human nature.

Reply to Objection 1: From these words nothing may be gathered, except
that the Word, by assuming the parts of human nature, assumed the whole
human nature. And thus the assumption of parts is prior in the order of
the intellect, if we consider the operation, but not in order of time;
whereas the assumption of the nature is prior if we consider the
intention: and this is to be simply first, as was said above.

Reply to Objection 2: God is so simple that He is also most perfect;
and hence the whole is more like to God than the parts, inasmuch as it
is more perfect.

Reply to Objection 3: It is a personal union wherein the assumption is
terminated, not a union of nature, which springs from a conjunction of
parts.
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Whether the human nature was assumed through the medium of grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God assumed human nature
through the medium of grace. For by grace we are united to God. But the
human nature in Christ was most closely united to God. Therefore the
union took place by grace.

Objection 2: Further, as the body lives by the soul, which is its
perfection, so does the soul by grace. But the human nature was fitted
for the assumption by the soul. Therefore the Son of God assumed the
soul through the medium of grace.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 11) that the
incarnate Word is like our spoken word. But our word is united to our
speech by means of "breathing" [spiritus]. Therefore the Word of God is
united to flesh by means of the Holy Spirit, and hence by means of
grace, which is attributed to the Holy Spirit, according to 1 Cor.
12:4: "Now there are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit. "

On the contrary, Grace is an accident in the soul, as was shown above
([3919]FS, Q[110], A[2]).