No
considerable
facilities were given to
prosecution in Parliament; nothing was done to prevent complaint from being far more dangerous to the
sufferer than injustice to the oppressor.
prosecution in Parliament; nothing was done to prevent complaint from being far more dangerous to the
sufferer than injustice to the oppressor.
Edmund Burke
?
?
?
6 NINTH REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
Proceedings The first design of this kind was formed
1773. in the session of the year 1773. In that
year, Parliament, taking up the consideration of the
affairs of India, through two of its committees collected a very great body of details concerning the interior economy of the Company's possessions, and
concerning many particulars of abuse which prevailed
at the time when those committees made their ample
and instructive reports. But it does not appear that
the body of regulations enacted in that year, that is,
in the East India Act of the thirteenth of his Majesty's
reign, were altogether grounded on that information,
but were adopted rather on probable speculations and
general ideas of good policy and good government.
New establishments, civil and judicial, were therefore
formed at a very great expense, and with much complexity of constitution. Checks and counter-checks of all kinds were contrived in the execution, as well
as in the formation of this system, in which all the
existing authorities of this kingdom had a share: for
Parliament appointed the members of the presiding
part of the new establishment, the Crown appointed
the judicial, and the Company preserved the nomination of the other officers. So that, if the act has not fully answered its purposes, the failure cannot be attributed to any want of officers of every description, or to the deficiency of any mode of patronage in their
appointment. The cause must be sought elsewhere.
Powersand The act had in its view (independently
objects of act
of 1773, and of several detached regulations) five fundathe effects
thereof. mental objects.
1st. The reformation of the Court of Proprietors
of the East India Company.
2ndly. A new model of the Court of Directors, and
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 7
an enforcement of their authority over the servants
abroad.
3rdly. The establishment of a court of justice capable of protecting the natives from the oppressions
of British subjects.
4thly. The establishment of a general council, to
be seated in Bengal, whose authority should, in many
particulars, extend over all the British settlements in
India.
5thly. To furnish the ministers of the crown with
constant information concerning the whole of the
Company's correspondence with India, in order that
they might be enabled to inspect the conduct of the
Directors and servants, and to watch over the execution of all parts of the act; that they might be furnished with matter to lay before Parliament from time to time, according as the state of things should
render regulation or animadversion necessary.
The first object of the policy of this act CourtofProwas to improve the constitution of the Court prietors.
of Proprietors. In this case, as in almost all the rest,
the remedy was not applied directly to the disease.
The complaint was, that factions in the Court of Proprietors had shown, in several instances, a disposition
to support the servants of the Company against the
just coercion and legal prosecution of the Directors.
Instead of applying a corrective to the distemper, a
change was proposed in the constitution. By this
reform, it was presumed that an interest would arise
in the General Court more independent in itself,
and more connected with the commercial prosperity
of the Company. Under the new consti- Newqualifitution, no proprietor, not possessed of a cation.
thousand pounds capital stock, was permitted to
? ? ? ? 8 NINTH REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
vote in the General Court: before the act, five hun
dred pounds was a sufficient qualification for one vote;
and no value gave more. But as the lower classes
were disabled, the power was increased in the higher:
proprietors of three thousand pounds were allowed
two votes; those of six thousand were entitled to
three; ten thousand pounds was made the qualification for four. The votes were thus regulated in the scale and gradation of property. On this scale, and
on some provisions to prevent occasional qualifications
and splitting of votes, the whole reformation rested.
Several essential points, however, seem to have
been omitted or misunderstood. No regulation was
made to abolish the pernicious custom of voting by
The ballot. allot, by means of which acts of the highest concern to the Company and to the state
might be done by individuals with perfect impunity;
and even the body itself might be subjected to a forfeiture of all its privileges for defaults of persons who, so far from being under control, could not be
so much as known in any mode of legal cognizance.
Nothing was done or attempted to prevent the operaIndian in- tion of the interest of delinquent servants terest. of the Company in the General Court, by
which they might even come to be their own judges,
and, in effect, under another description, to become
the masters in that body which ought to govern them.
Nor was anything provided to secure the independency of the proprietary body from the various exterior interests by which it might be disturbed, and diverted from the conservation of that pecuniary concern which the act laid down as the sole security for preventing a collusion between the General Court and the powerful delinquent servants in India. The
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 9
wnole of the regulations concerning the Court of
Proprietors relied upon two principles, which have
often proved fallacious: namely, that small numbers
were a security against faction and disorder; and
that integrity of conduct would follow the greater
property. In no case could these principles be less
depended upon than in the affairs of the East Indial
Company. However, by wholly cutting off the lower,
and adding to the power of the higher classes, it was
supposed that the higher would keep their money in
that fund to make profit, - that the vote would be a
secondary consideration, and no more than a guard
to the property, - and that therefore any abuse which
tended to depreciate the value of their stock would
be warmly resented by such proprietors.
If the ill effects of every misdemeanor in the Company's servants were to be immediate, and had a tendency to lower the value of the stock, something might justly be expected from the pecuniary security
taken by the act. But from the then state of things,
it was more than probable that proceedings ruinous to the permanent interest of the Company might
commence in great lucrative advantages. Against
this evil large pecuniary interests were rather the
reverse of a remedy. Accordingly, the Company's
servants have ever since covered over the worst oppressions of the people under their government, and
the most cruel and wanton ravages of all the neighboring countries, by holding out, and for a time actually realizing, additions of revenue to the territorial funds of the Company, and great quantities of valuable goods to their investment.
But this consideration of mere income,
whatever weight it might have, could not
? ? ? ? 10 NINTH REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
be the first object of a proprietor, in a body so circumstanced. The East India Company is not, like
the Bank of England, a mere moneyed society for
the sole purpose of the preservation or improvement
of their capital; and therefore every attempt to regulate it upon the same principles must inevitably fail. When it is considered that a certain share in
the stock gives a share in the government of so vast
an empire, with such a boundless patronage, civil,
military, marine, commercial, and financial, in every
department of which such fortunes have been made
as could be made nowhere else, it is impossible not
to perceive that capitals far superior to any qualifications appointed to proprietors, or even to Directors, would readily be laid out for a participation in that
power. The India proprietor, therefore, will always
be, in the first instance, a politician; and the bolder
his enterprise, and the more corrupt his views, the
less will be his consideration of the price to be paid
for compassing them. The new regulations did not
reduce the number so low as not to leave the assembly still liable to all the disorder which might be supposed to arise from multitude. But if the principle had been well established and well executed, a much greater inconveniency grew out of the reform
than that which had attended the old abuse: for if
tumult and disorder be lessened by reducing the
number of proprietors, private cabal and intrigue
are facilitated at least in an equal degree; and it is
cabal and corruption, rather than disorder and confusion, that was most to be dreaded in transacting the affairs of India. Whilst the votes of the smaller
proprietors continued, a door was left open for the
public sense to enter into that society: since that
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 11
door has been closed, the proprietary has become,
even more than formerly, an aggregate of private interests, which subsist at the expense of the collective body. At the moment of this revolution in the proprietary, as it might naturally be expected, those who had either no very particular interest in their vote or
but a petty object to pursue immediately disqualified; but those who were deeply interested in the Company's patronage, those who were concerned in
the supply of ships and of the other innumerable
objects required for their immense establishments,
those who were engaged in contracts with the Treasury, Admiralty, and Ordnance, together with the clerks in public offices, found means of securing
qualifications at the enlarged standard. All these
composed a much greater proportion than formerly
they had done of the proprietary body.
Against the great, predominant, radical corruption
of the Court of Proprietors the raising the qualification proved no sort of remedy. The return of the Company's servants into Europe poured in a constant
supply of proprietors, whose ability to purchase the
highest qualifications for themselves, their agents,
and dependants could not be dubious. And this
latter description form a very considerable, and by
far the most active and efficient part of that body.
To add to the votes, which is adding to the power in
proportion to the wealth, of men whose very offences
were supposed to consist in acts which lead to the acquisition of enormous riches, appears by no means a well-considered method of checking rapacity and oppression. In proportion as these interests prevailed, the means of cabal, of concealment, and of corrupt
confederacy became far more easy than before. Ac
? ? ? ? 12 NINTH REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
cordingly, there was no fault with respect to the
Company's government over its servants, charged
or chargeable on the General Court as it originally
stood, of which since the reform it has not been notoriously guilty. It was not, therefore, a matter of surprise to your Committee, that the General Court,
so composed, has at length grown to such a degree of
contempt both of its duty and of the permanent interest of the whole corporation as to put itself into open
defiance of the salutary admonitions of this House,
given for the purpose of asserting and enforcing the
legal authority of their own body over their own servants.
The failure in this part of the reform of 1773 is
not stated by your Committee as recommending a
return to the ancient constitution of the Company,
which was nearly as far as the new from containing
any principle tending to the prevention or remedy of
abuses,- but to point out the probable failure of any
future regulations which do not apply directly to the
grievance, but which may be taken up as experiments
to ascertain theories of the operation of councils
formed of greater or lesser numbers, or such as shall
be composed of men of more or less opulence, or of
interests of newer or longer standing, or concerning
the distribution of power to various descriptions or
professions of men, or of the election to office by one
authority rather than another.
Court of The second object of the act was the
Directors. Court of Directors. Under the arrangement of the year 1773 that court appeared to have its
authority much strengthened. It was made' less dependent than formerly upon its constituents, the proprietary. The duration of the Directors in office was
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 13
rendered more permanent, and the tenure itself diversified by a varied and intricate rotation. At the
same time their authority was held high over their
servants of all descriptions; and the only rule prescribed to the Council-General of Bengal, in the exercise of the large and ill-defined powers given to them, was that they were to yield obedience to tile
orders of the Court of Directors. As to the Court of
Directors itself, it was left with very little regulation.
The custom of ballot, infinitely the most mischievous
in a body possessed of all the ordinary executive powers, was still left; and your Committee have found
the ill effects of this practice in the course of their
inquiries. Nothing was done to oblige the Directors
to attend to the promotion of their servants according
to their rank and merits. In judging of those merits
nothing was done to bind them to any observation of
what appeared on their records. Nothing was done
to compel them to prosecution or complaint where
delinquency became visible. The act, indeed, prescribed that no servant of the Company abroad should
be eligible into the direction until two years after
his return to England. But as this regulation rather
presumes than provides for an inquiry into their conduct, a very ordinary neglect in the Court of Directors
might easily defeat it, and a short remission might in
this particular operate as a total indemnity. In fact,
however, the servants have of late seldom attempted a seat in the direction, - an attempt which might
possibly rouse a dormant spirit of inquiry; but, satisfied with an interest in the proprietary, they have,
through that name, brought the direction very much
under their own control.
As to the general authority of the Court of Direc
? ? ? ? 14 NINTH REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
tors, there is reason to apprehend that on the whole
it was somewhat degraded by the act whose professed
purpose was to exalt it, and that the only effect of
the Parliamentary sanction to their orders has been,
that along with those orders the law of the land has
been despised and trampled under foot. The Directors were not suffered either to nominate or to remove
those whom they were empowered to instruct; from
masters they were reduced to the situation of complainants,-a situation the imbecility of which no
laws or regulations could wholly alter; and when the
Directors were afterwards restored in some degree to
their ancient power, on the expiration of the lease
given to their principal servants, it became impossible
for them to recover any degree of their ancient respect, even if they had not in the mean time been so
modelled as to be entirely free from all ambition of
that sort.
From that period the orders of the Court of Directors became to be so habitually despised by their servants abroad, and at length to be so little regard ed even by themselves, that this contempt of orders
forms almost the whole subject-matter of the voluminous reports of two of your committees. If any
doubt, however, remains concerning the cause of this
fatal decline of the authority of the Court of Directors, no doubt whatsoever can remain of the fact
itself, nor of the total failure of one of the great
leading regulations of the act of 1773.
Supreme The third object was a new judicial arCourt of
Judicature. rangement, the chief purpose of which was
to form a strong and solid security for the natives
against the wrongs and oppressions of British subjects resident in Bengal. An operose and expensive
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 15
establishment of a Supreme Court was made, and
charged upon the revenues of the country. The
charter of justice was by the act left to the crown, as
well as the appointment of the magistrates. The defect in the institution seemed to be this, -- that no
rule was laid down, either in the act or the charter,
by which the court was to judge. No descriptions of
offenders or species of delinquency were properly ascertained, according to the nature of the place, or to
the prevalent mode of abuse. Provision was made
for the administration of justice in the remotest part
of Hindostan as if it were a province in Great Britain. Your Committee have long had the constitution and conduct of this court before them, and they have not yet been able to discover very few instances
(not one that appears to them of leading importance)
of relief given to the natives against the corruptions
or oppressions of British subjects in power, - though
they do find one very strong and marked instance
of the judges having employed an unwarrantable extension or application of the municipal law of England, to destroy a person of the highest rank among those natives whom they were sent to protect. One
circumstance rendered the proceeding in this case
fatal to all the good purposes for which the court
had been established. The sufferer (the Rajah Nundcomar) appears, at the very time of this extraordinary prosecution, a discoverer of some particulars of illicit gain then charged upon Mr. Hastings, the
Governor-General. Although in ordinary cases, and
in some lesser instances of grievance, it is very probable that this court has done its duty, and has been,
as every court must be, of some service, yet one example of this kind must do more towards deterring
? ? ? ? 16 NINTH REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
the natives from complaint, and consequently from
the means of redress, than many decisions favorable
to them, in the ordinary course of proceeding, call
do for their encouragement and relief. So far as
your Committee has been able to discover, the
court has been generally terrible to the natives, and
has distracted the government of the Company without substantially reforming any one of its abuses. This court, which in its constitution seems not to
have had sufficiently in view the necessities of the
people for whose relief it was intended, and was, or
thought itself, bound in some instances to too strict
an adherence to the forms and rules of English practice, in others was framed upon principles perhaps too remote from the constitution of English tribunals. By the usual course of English practice, the
far greater part of the redress to be obtained against
oppressions of power is by process in the nature
of civil actions. In these a trial by jury is a necessary part, with regard to the finding the offence
and to the assessment of the damages. Both these
were in the charter of justice left entirely to the
judges. It was presumed, and not wholly without
reason, that the British subjects were liable to fall
into factions and combinations, in order to support
themselves in the abuses of an authority of which
every man might in his turn become a sharer. And
with regard to the natives, it was presumed (perhaps
a little too hastily) that they were not capable of
sharing in the functions of jurors. But it was not
foreseen that the judges were also liable to be engaged in the factions of the settlement, - and if they should ever happen to be so engaged, that the native people were then without that remedy which
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 17
obviously lay in the chance that the court and jury,
though both liable to bias, might not easily unite
in the same identical act of injustice. Your Committee, on full inquiry, are of opinion that the use
of juries is neither impracticable nor dangerous in
Bengal.
Your Committee refer to their report made in the
year 1781, for the manner in which this court, attempting to extend its jurisdiction, and falling with
extreme severity on the native magistrates, a violent
contest arose between the English judges and the
English civil authority. This authority, calling inr
the military arm, (by a most dangerous example,)
overpowered, and for a while suspended, the functions of the court; but at length those functions,
which were suspended by the quarrel of the parties,
were destroyed by their reconciliation, and by the
arrangements made in consequence of it. By these
the court was virtually annihilated; or if substantially it exists, it is to be apprehended it exists
only for purposes very different from those of its
institution.
The fourth object of the act of 1773 was the Council-General. This institution was intended to produce uniformity, consistency, and the effective cooperation of all the settlements in their common defence. By the ancient constitution of the Company's foreign settlements, they were each of them
under the orders of a President or Chief, and a Counlcil, more or fewer, according to the discretion of the
Company. Among those, Parliament (probably on ac
count of the largeness of the territorial acquisitions,
rather than the conveniency of the situation) chose
Bengal for the residence of the controlling power,
VOL. VIII. 2
? ? ? ? 18 NINTH REPORl OF SELECT COMMITTEE
and, dissolving the Presidency, appointed a new establishment, upon a plan somewhat similar to that which had prevailed before; but the number was
smaller. This establishment was composed of a
Governor-General and four Counsellors, all named in
the act of Parliament. They were to hold their offices for five years, after which term the patronage
was to revert to the Court of Directors. In the
nean time such vacancies as should happen were to
be filled by that court, with the concurrence of the
crown. The first Governor-General and one of the
Counsellors had been old servants of the Company;
the others were new men.
On this new arrangement the Courts of Proprietors and Directors considered the details of commerce
as not perfectly consistent with the enlarged sphere
of duty and the reduced number of the Council.
Therefore, to relieve them from this burden, they
instituted a new office, called the Board of Trade,
for the subordinate management of their commercial
concerns, and appointed eleven of the senior servants to fill the commission.
Object of The powers given by the act to the new
powers to
Governor- Governor-General and Council had for their
General and
Council. direct object the kingdom of Bengal and its
dependencies. Within that sphere (and it is not a
small one) their authority extended over all the Company's concerns of whatever description. In matters of peace and war it seems to have been meant that
the other Presidencies should be subordinate to their
board. But the law is loose and defective, where it
professes to restrain the subordinate Presidencies from
making war without the consent and approbation of
the Supreme Council. They are left free to act with
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 19
out it in cases of imminent necessity, or where they shall
have received special orders from the Company. The
first exception leaves it open to the subordinate to
judge of the necessity of measures which, when
taken, bind or involve the superior: the second refers a question of peace or war to two jurisdictions,
which may give different judgments. In both instances cases in point have occurred. * With regard to
their local administration, their powers were exceedingly and dangerously loose and undetermined.
Their powers were not given directly, but in words
of reference, in which neither the objects related to
nor the mode of the relation were sufficiently expressed. Their legislative and executive capacities
were not so accurately drawn, and marked by such
strong and penal lines of distinction, as to keep these
capacities separate. Where legislative and merely executive powers were lodged in the same hands, the legislative, which is the larger and the more ready
for all occasions, was constantly resorted to. The
Governor-General and Council, therefore, immediately gave constructions to their ill-defined authority
which rendered it perfectly despotic, - constructions
which if they were allowed, no action of theirs ought
to be regarded as criminal.
Armed as they were with an authority in itself so
ample, and by abuse so capable of an unlimited extent, very few, and these very insufficient correctives,
were administered. Ample salaries were provided
for them, which indeed removed the necessity, but
by no means the inducements to corruption and oppression. Nor was any barrier whatsoever opposed
on the part of the natives against their injustice, ex* See the Secret Committee's Reports on the Mahratta War.
? ? ? ? 20 NINTH REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
cept the Supreme Court of Judicature, which never
could be capable of controlling a government with
such powers, without becoming such a government
itself.
There was, indeed, a prohibition against all concerns in trade to the whole Council, and against all
taking of presents by any in authority. A right of
prosecution in the King's Bench was also established;
but it was a right the exercise of which is difficult,
and in many, and those the most weighty cases, impracticable.
No considerable facilities were given to
prosecution in Parliament; nothing was done to prevent complaint from being far more dangerous to the
sufferer than injustice to the oppressor. No overt
acts were fixed, upon which corruption should be
presumed in transactions of which secrecy and collusion formed the very basis; no rules of evidence nor
authentic mode of transmission were settled in conformity to the unalterable circumstances of the country and the people. One provision, indeed, was made for reRemoval of
servants. straining the servants, in itself very wise
and substantial: a delinquent once dismissed, could
not be restored, but by the votes of three fourths of
the Directors and three fourths of the proprietors:
this was well aimed. But no method was settled for
bringing delinquents to the question of removal: and
if they should be brought to it, a door lay wide open
for evasion of the law, and for a return into the service, in defiance of its plain intention, --that is, by
resigning to avoid removal; by which measure this
provision of the act has proved as unoperative as all
the rest. By this management a mere majority may
bring in the greater delinquent, whilst the person re
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 21
moved for offences comparatively trivial may remain
excluded forever.
The new Council nominated in the act Council.
was composed of two totally discordant ele- General.
ments, which soon distinguished themselves into permanent parties. One of the principal instructions
which the three members of the Council sent immediately from England, namely, General Clavering,
Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, carried out with
them was, to " cause the strictest inquiry to be made
into all oppressions and abuses," among which the
practice of receiving presents from the natives, at that
time generally charged upon men in power, was principally aimed at.
Presents to any considerable value were justly reputed by the legislature, not as marks of attention
and respect, but as bribes or extortions, for which
either the beneficial and gratuitous duties of government were sold, or they were the price paid for acts
of partiality, or, finally, they were sums of money
extorted from the givers by the terrors of power.
Against the system of presents, therefore, the new
commission was in general opinion particularly pointed. In the commencement of reformation, at a period when a rapacious conquest had overpowered and succeeded to a corrupt government, an act of indemnity might have been thought advisable; perhaps a
new account ought to have been opened; all retrospect ought to have been forbidden, at least to certain
periods. If this had not been thought advisable, none
in the higher departments of a suspected and decried
government ought to have been kept in their posts,
until an examination had rendered their proceedings
clear, or until length of time had obliterated, by an
? ? ? ? 22 NINTH REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
even course of irreproachable conduct, the errors
which so naturally grow out of a new power. But
the policy adopted was different: it was to begin with
examples. The cry against the abuses was strong and
vehement throughout the whole nation, and the practice of presents was represented to be as general as it
was mischievous. In such a case, indeed in any case,
it seemed not to be a measure the most provident,
without a great deal of previous inquiry, to place two
persons, who from their situation must- be the most
exposed to such imputations, in the commission which
was to inquire into their own conduct, -much less
to place one of them at the head of that commission,
and with a casting vote in case of an equality. The
persons who could not be liable to that charge were,
indeed, three to two; but any accidental difference
of opinion, the death of any one of them or his occasional absence or sickness, threw the whole power into the hands of the other two, who were Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell, one the President, and the other
high in the Council of that establishment on which
the reform was to operate. Thus those who were liable to process as delinquents were in effect set over
the reformers; and that did actually happen which
might be expected to happen from so preposterous an
arrangement: a stop was soon put to all inquiries
into the capital abuses.
Nor was the great political end proposed in the
formation of a superintending Council over all the
Presidencies better answered than that of an inquiry
into corruptions and abuses. The several Presidencies have acted in a great degree upon their own separate authority; and as little of unity, concert, or regular system has appeared in their conduct as was,
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 23:
ever known before this institution. . India is, indeed,
so vast a country, and the settlements are so divided,
that their intercourse with each other is liable to as
many delays and difficulties as the intercourse between distant and separate states. But one evil may possibly have arisen from an attempt to produce an
unrion, which, though undoubtedly to be aimed at, is
opposed in some degree by the unalterable nature
of their situation,- that it has taught the servants
rather to look to a superior among themselves than to
their common superiors. This evil, growing out of
the abuse of the principle of subordination, can only
be corrected by a very strict enforcement of authority
over that part of the chain of dependence which is
next to the original power.
That which your Committee considers as Powers
the fifth and last of the capital objects of ginistersot
the act, and as the binding regulation of the crown
the whole, is the introduction (then for the first
time) of the ministers of the crown into the affairs
of the Company. The state claiming a concern and
share of property in the Company's profits, the servants of the crown were presumed the more likely to preserve with a scrupulous attention the sources of
the great revenues which they were to administer,
and for the rise and fall of which they were to render
an account.
The interference of government was introduced by
this act in two ways: one by a control, in effect by a
share, in the appointment to vacancies in the Supreme Council. The act provided that his Majesty's approbation should be had to the persons named to
that duty. Partaking thus in the patronage of the
Company, administration was bound to an attention
? ? ? ? 24 NINTH REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
to the characters and capacities of the persons employed in that high trust. The other part of then interference was by way of inspection. By this right
of inspection, everything in the Company's correspondence from India, which related to the civil or military affairs and government of the Company, was
directed by the act to be within fourteen days after
the receipt laid before the Secretary of State, and
everything that related to the management of the
revenues was to be laid before the Commissioners of
the Treasury. In fact, both description of these papers have been generally communicated to that board. Defects in It appears to your Committee that there
the plan. were great and material defects in both
parts of the plan. With regard to the approbation
of persons nominated to the Supreme Council by the
Court of Directors, no sufficient means were provided
for carrying to his Majesty, along with the nomination, the particulars in the conduct of those who had been in the service before, which might render them
proper objects of approbation or rejection. The India House possesses an office of record capable of furnishing, in almost all cases, materials for judging
on the behavior of the servants in their progress from
the lowest to the highest stations; and the whole discipline of the service, civil and military, must depend upon an examination of these records inseparably attending every application for an appointment to the highest stations. But in the present state of the
nomination the ministers of the crown are not furnished with the proper means of exercising the power of control intended by the law, even if they were
scrupulously attentive to the use of it. There are
modes of proceeding favorable to neglect. Others
excite inquiry and stimulate to vigilance.
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 25
Your Committee, therefore, are of opinion, Proposition
to remedy
that for the future prevention of cabal, and them.
of private and partial representation, whether above
or below, that, whenever any person who has been in
the service shall be recommended to the king's ministers to fill a vacancy in the Council-General, the
Secretary of the Court of Directors shall be ordered
to make a strict search into the records of the Company, and shall annex to the recommendation the
reasons of the Court of Directors for their choice,
together with a faithful copy of whatever shall be
found (if anything can be found) relative to his
character and conduct, - as also an account of his
standing in the Company's service, the time of his
abode in India, the reasons for his return, and the
stations, whether civil or military, in which he has
been successively placed.
With this account ought to be transmitted the
names of those who were proposed as candidates
for the same office, with the correspondent particulars relative to their conduct and situation: for not
only the separate, but the comparative merit, probably would, and certainly ought, to have great influence in the approbation or rejection of the party presented to the ministers of the crown. These papers should be laid before the Commissioners of the
Treasury and one of the Secretaries of State, and
entered in books to be kept in the Treasury and the
Secretary's office.
These precautions, in case of the nom- Appoint.
ination of any who have served the Com- went of
CounseUors,
pany, appear to be necessary from the im- &c.
proper nomination and approbation of Mr. la,pheJohn Macpherson, notwithstanding the ob- pointmen.
? ? ? ? 26 NINTH REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
jections which stood against him on the Company's
Stables's. records. The choice of Mr. John Stables,
from all inferior military to the highest civil
capacity, was by no means proper, nor an encouraging
example to either service. His conduct, indeed, in
the subaltern military situation, had received, and
seems to have deserved, commendation; but no sufficient ground was furnished for confounding the lines and gradations of service. This measure was, however, far less exceptionable than the former; because an irregular choice of a less competent person, and
the preference given to proved delinquency in prejudice to uncensured service, are very different things. But even this latter appointment would in all likelihood have been avoided, if rules of promotion had
been established. If such rules were settled, candidates qualified from ability, knowledge, and service would not be discouraged by finding that everything
was open to every man, and that favor alone stood
in the place of civil or military experience. The
elevation from the lowest stations unfaithfully and
negligently filled to the highest trusts, the total inattention to rank and seniority, and, much more, the combination of this neglect of rank with a confusion
(unaccompanied with strong and evident reasons) of
the lines of service, cannot operate as useful examples on those who serve the public in India. These servants, beholding men who have been condemned
for improper behavior to the Company in inferior
civil stations elevated above them, or (what is less
blamable, but still mischievous) persons without any
distinguished civil talents taken from the subordinate
situations of another line to their prejudice, will despair by any good behavior of ascending to the digni
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 27
ties of their own: they will be led to improve, to the
utmost advantage of thei' fortune, the lower stages
of power, and will endeavor to make up in lucre
what they can never hope to acquire in station.
The temporary appointment by Parliament of the
Supreme Council of India arose from an opinion that
the Company, at that time at least, was not in a condition or not disposed to a proper exercise of the
privileges which they held under their charter. It
therefore behoved the Directors to be particularly attentive to their choice of Counsellors, on the expiration of the period during which their patronage had been suspended. The duties of the Supreme Council had been reputed of so arduous a nature as to
require even ha legislative interposition. They were
called upon, by all possible care and impartiality, to
justify Parliament at least as fully in the restoration
of their privileges as the circumstances of the time
had done in their suspension.
But interests have lately prevailed in the Court
of Directors, which, by the violation of every rule,
seemed to be resolved on the destruction of those
privileges of which they were the natural guardians.
Every new power given has been made the source of
a new abuse; and the acts of Parliament themselves,
which provide but imperfectly for the prevention of
the mischief, have, it is to be feared, made provisions
(contrary, without doubt, to the intention of the legislature) which operate against the possibility of any
cure in the ordinary course.
In the original institution of the Supreme Council,
reasons may have existed against rendering the tenure of the Counsellors in their office precarious. A
plan of reform might have required the permanence
? ? ? ? 28 NINTH REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
of the persons who were just appointed by Parliament to execute it. But the act of 1780 gave a duration coexistent with the statute itself to a Council not appointed by act of Parliament, nor chosen for any temporary or special purpose; by which
means the servants in the highest situation, let their
conduct be never so grossly criminal, cannot be removed, unless the Court of Directors and ministers of the crown can be found to concur in the same
opinion of it. The prevalence of the Indian factions
in the Court of Directors and Court of Proprietors,
and sometimes in the state itself, renders this agreement extremely difficult: if the principal members of the Direction should be in a conspiracy with any
principal servant under censure, it will be impracticable; because the first act must originate there. The reduced state of the authority of this kingdom
in Bengal may be traced in a great measure to that
very natural source of independence. In many cases
the instant removal of an offender from his power of
doing mischief is the only mode of preventing the
utter and perhaps irretrievable ruin of public affairs.
In such a case the process ought to be simple, and
the power absolute in one or in either hand separately. By contriving the balance of interests formed in the act, notorious offence, gross error, or palpable
insufficiency have many chances of retaining and
abusing authority, whilst the variety of representations, hearings, and conferences, and possibly the mere jealousy and competition between rival powers,
may prevent any decision, and at length give time
and means for settlements and compromises among
parties, made at the expense of justice and true
policy. But this act of 1780, not properly distin
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 29
guishing judicial process from executive arrangements, requires in effect nearly the same degree of
solemnity, delay, and detail for removing a political
inconvenience which attends a criminal proceeding
for the punishment of offences. It goes further,
and gives the same tenure to all who shall succeed
to vacancies which was given to those whom the
act found in office.
Another regulation was made in the act, which has
a tendency to render the control of delinquency or
the removal of incapacity in the Council-General extremely difficult, as well as to introduce many other
abuses into the original appointment of Counsellors.
The inconveniences of a vacancy in that im- Provisional
portant office, at a great distance from the fopracanauthority that is to fill it, were visible; but Cies.
your Committee have doubts whether they balance
the mischief which may arise from the power given
in this act, of a provisional appointment to vacancies,
not on the event, but on foresight. This mode of
providing for the succession has a tendency to promote cabal, and to prevent inquiry into the qualifications of the persons to be appointed. An attempt has been actually made, in consequence of this power, in
a very marked manner, to confound the whole order
and discipline of the Company's service. Means are
furnished thereby for perpetuating the powers of some
given Court of Directors. They may forestall the patronage of their successors, on whom they entail a line
of Supreme Counsellors and Governors-General. And
if the exercise of this power should happen in its outset to fall into bad hands, the ordinary chances for
mending an ill choice upon death or resignation are
cut off.
? ? ? ? 30 NINTH REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
In these provisional arrangements it is to be considered that the appointment is not in consequence
of any marked event which calls strongly on the attention of the public, but is made at the discretion
of those who lead in the Court of Directors, and may
therefore be brought forward at times the most favorable to the views of partiality and corruption. Candidates have not, therefore, the notice that may be necessary for their claims; and as the possession of
the office to which the survivors are to succeed seems
remote, all inquiry into the qualifications and character of those who are to fill it will naturally be dull
and languid.
Your Committee are not also without a grounded
apprehension of the ill effect on any existing CouncilGeneral of all strong marks of influence and favor
which appear in the subordinates of Bengal. This
previous designation to a great and arduous trust,
(the greatest that can be reposed in subjects,) when
made out of any regular course of succession, marks
that degree of countenance and support at home which
may overshadow the existing government. That government may thereby be disturbed by factions, and
led to corrupt and dangerous compliances. At best,
when these Counsellors elect are engaged in no fixed
employment, and have no lawful intermediate emolument, the natural impatience for their situations may
bring on a traffic for resignations between them and
the persons in possession, very unfavorable to the interests of the public and to the duty of their situations.
Since the act two persons have been nominated to
the ministers of the crown by the Court of Directors
for this succession. Neither has yet been approved.
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 31
But by the description of the persons a judgment may
be formed of the principles on which this power is
likely to be exercised.
Your Committee find, that, in consequence Stuart and
Sulivan's
of the above-mentioned act, the Honorable appointment
to succeed to
Charles Stuart and Mr. Sulivan were ap- vacancies.
pointed to succeed to the first vacancies in the Supreme Council. Mr. Stuart's first appointment in
the Company's service was in the year 1761. lie
returned to England in 1775, and was permitted to
go back to India in 1780. In August, 1781, he
was nominated by the Court of Directors (Mr. Sulivan and Sir William James were Chairman and
Deputy-Chairman) to succeed to the first vacancy
in the Supreme Council, and on the 19th of September following his Majesty's approval of such nomination was requested. In the nomination of Mr. Stuart, the Mr. Stuart's
situation at
consideration of rank in the service was the time of
his appointnot neglected; but if the Court of Direc- ment.
tors had thought fit to examine their records, they
would have found matter at least strongly urging
them to a suspension of this appointment, until the
charges against Mr. Stuart should be fully cleared
up. That matter remained (as it still remains) unexplained from the month of May, 1775, where, on
the Bengal Revenue Coosultations of the 12th of
that month, peculations to a large amount are charged
upon oath against Mr. Stuart under the following title: "' The Particulars of the Money uvjustly taken by
Mr. Stuart, during the Time he lwas at Burdwan. "
The sum charged against him in this account is
2,17,684 Sicca rupees (that is, 25,2531. sterling);
besides which there is another account with the fol
? ? ? ? 32 NINTH REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
lowing title: " The Particulars of the Money unjustly
taken by Callypersaud Bose, Banian to the Honorable
Charles Stuart, Esquire, at Burdwan, and amounting
to Sicca Rupees 1,01,675" (that is, 11,7851. ), --a
large sum to be received by a person in that subordinate situation.
The minuteness with which these accounts appear
to have been kept, and the precision with which the
date of each particular, sometimes of very small sums,
is stated, give them the appearance of authenticity,
as far as it can be conveyed on the face or in the
construction of such accounts, and, if they were forgeries, laid them open to an easy detection. But
no detection is easy, when no inquiry is made. It
appears an offence of the highest order in the Directors concerned in this business, when,. not satisfied with leaving such charges so long unexamined, they should venture to present to the king's servants
the object of them for the highest trust which they
have to bestow. If Mr. Stuart was really guilty,
the possession of this post must furnish him not only
with the means of renewing the former evil practices
charged upon him, and of executing them upon a
still larger scale, but of oppressing those unhappy
persons who, under the supposed protection of the
faith of the Company, had appeared to give evidence
concerning his former misdemeanors.
This attempt in the Directors was the more surprising, when it is considered that two committees
of this House were at that very time sitting upon an
inquiry that related directly to their conduct, and
that of their servants in India.
It was in the same spirit of defiance of Parliament,
that at the same time they nominated Mr. Sulivan,
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 338
son to the then Chairman of the Court of Mr. SuliDirectors, to the succession to the same tion atsthue
time of his
high trust in India. On these appoint- appointments, your Committee thought it proper ment.
to make those inquiries which the Court of Directors
thought proper to omit. They first conceived it fitting to inquire what rank Mr. Sulivan bore in the
service; and they thought it not unnecessary here
to state the gradations in the service, according to
the established usage of the Company.
The Company's civil servants generally go to India as writers, in which capacity they serve the Companyfive years. The next step, in point of rank, is to be a factor, and next to that a junior merchant;
in each of which capacities they serve the Companythree years. They then rise to the rank of senior
merchant, in which situation they remain till called
by rotation to the Board of Trade. Until the passing of the Regulation Act, in 1773, seniority entitled them to succeed to the Council, and finally gave them pretensions to the government of the Presidency.
The above gradation of the service, your Committee conceive, ought never to be superseded by the
Court of Directors, without evident reason, in persons or circumstances, to justify the breach of an ancient order. The names, whether taken from civil or commercial gradation, are of no moment. The
order itself is wisely established, and tends to provide a natural guard against partiality, precipitancy,
and corruption in patronage. It affords means and
opportunities for an examination into character; and
among the servants it secures a strong motive to preserve a fair reputation. Your Committee find that
no respect whatsoever was paid to this gradation in
VOL. VIII. 3
? ? ? ? 34 NINTH REPO[RT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
the instance of Mr.
Proceedings The first design of this kind was formed
1773. in the session of the year 1773. In that
year, Parliament, taking up the consideration of the
affairs of India, through two of its committees collected a very great body of details concerning the interior economy of the Company's possessions, and
concerning many particulars of abuse which prevailed
at the time when those committees made their ample
and instructive reports. But it does not appear that
the body of regulations enacted in that year, that is,
in the East India Act of the thirteenth of his Majesty's
reign, were altogether grounded on that information,
but were adopted rather on probable speculations and
general ideas of good policy and good government.
New establishments, civil and judicial, were therefore
formed at a very great expense, and with much complexity of constitution. Checks and counter-checks of all kinds were contrived in the execution, as well
as in the formation of this system, in which all the
existing authorities of this kingdom had a share: for
Parliament appointed the members of the presiding
part of the new establishment, the Crown appointed
the judicial, and the Company preserved the nomination of the other officers. So that, if the act has not fully answered its purposes, the failure cannot be attributed to any want of officers of every description, or to the deficiency of any mode of patronage in their
appointment. The cause must be sought elsewhere.
Powersand The act had in its view (independently
objects of act
of 1773, and of several detached regulations) five fundathe effects
thereof. mental objects.
1st. The reformation of the Court of Proprietors
of the East India Company.
2ndly. A new model of the Court of Directors, and
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 7
an enforcement of their authority over the servants
abroad.
3rdly. The establishment of a court of justice capable of protecting the natives from the oppressions
of British subjects.
4thly. The establishment of a general council, to
be seated in Bengal, whose authority should, in many
particulars, extend over all the British settlements in
India.
5thly. To furnish the ministers of the crown with
constant information concerning the whole of the
Company's correspondence with India, in order that
they might be enabled to inspect the conduct of the
Directors and servants, and to watch over the execution of all parts of the act; that they might be furnished with matter to lay before Parliament from time to time, according as the state of things should
render regulation or animadversion necessary.
The first object of the policy of this act CourtofProwas to improve the constitution of the Court prietors.
of Proprietors. In this case, as in almost all the rest,
the remedy was not applied directly to the disease.
The complaint was, that factions in the Court of Proprietors had shown, in several instances, a disposition
to support the servants of the Company against the
just coercion and legal prosecution of the Directors.
Instead of applying a corrective to the distemper, a
change was proposed in the constitution. By this
reform, it was presumed that an interest would arise
in the General Court more independent in itself,
and more connected with the commercial prosperity
of the Company. Under the new consti- Newqualifitution, no proprietor, not possessed of a cation.
thousand pounds capital stock, was permitted to
? ? ? ? 8 NINTH REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
vote in the General Court: before the act, five hun
dred pounds was a sufficient qualification for one vote;
and no value gave more. But as the lower classes
were disabled, the power was increased in the higher:
proprietors of three thousand pounds were allowed
two votes; those of six thousand were entitled to
three; ten thousand pounds was made the qualification for four. The votes were thus regulated in the scale and gradation of property. On this scale, and
on some provisions to prevent occasional qualifications
and splitting of votes, the whole reformation rested.
Several essential points, however, seem to have
been omitted or misunderstood. No regulation was
made to abolish the pernicious custom of voting by
The ballot. allot, by means of which acts of the highest concern to the Company and to the state
might be done by individuals with perfect impunity;
and even the body itself might be subjected to a forfeiture of all its privileges for defaults of persons who, so far from being under control, could not be
so much as known in any mode of legal cognizance.
Nothing was done or attempted to prevent the operaIndian in- tion of the interest of delinquent servants terest. of the Company in the General Court, by
which they might even come to be their own judges,
and, in effect, under another description, to become
the masters in that body which ought to govern them.
Nor was anything provided to secure the independency of the proprietary body from the various exterior interests by which it might be disturbed, and diverted from the conservation of that pecuniary concern which the act laid down as the sole security for preventing a collusion between the General Court and the powerful delinquent servants in India. The
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 9
wnole of the regulations concerning the Court of
Proprietors relied upon two principles, which have
often proved fallacious: namely, that small numbers
were a security against faction and disorder; and
that integrity of conduct would follow the greater
property. In no case could these principles be less
depended upon than in the affairs of the East Indial
Company. However, by wholly cutting off the lower,
and adding to the power of the higher classes, it was
supposed that the higher would keep their money in
that fund to make profit, - that the vote would be a
secondary consideration, and no more than a guard
to the property, - and that therefore any abuse which
tended to depreciate the value of their stock would
be warmly resented by such proprietors.
If the ill effects of every misdemeanor in the Company's servants were to be immediate, and had a tendency to lower the value of the stock, something might justly be expected from the pecuniary security
taken by the act. But from the then state of things,
it was more than probable that proceedings ruinous to the permanent interest of the Company might
commence in great lucrative advantages. Against
this evil large pecuniary interests were rather the
reverse of a remedy. Accordingly, the Company's
servants have ever since covered over the worst oppressions of the people under their government, and
the most cruel and wanton ravages of all the neighboring countries, by holding out, and for a time actually realizing, additions of revenue to the territorial funds of the Company, and great quantities of valuable goods to their investment.
But this consideration of mere income,
whatever weight it might have, could not
? ? ? ? 10 NINTH REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
be the first object of a proprietor, in a body so circumstanced. The East India Company is not, like
the Bank of England, a mere moneyed society for
the sole purpose of the preservation or improvement
of their capital; and therefore every attempt to regulate it upon the same principles must inevitably fail. When it is considered that a certain share in
the stock gives a share in the government of so vast
an empire, with such a boundless patronage, civil,
military, marine, commercial, and financial, in every
department of which such fortunes have been made
as could be made nowhere else, it is impossible not
to perceive that capitals far superior to any qualifications appointed to proprietors, or even to Directors, would readily be laid out for a participation in that
power. The India proprietor, therefore, will always
be, in the first instance, a politician; and the bolder
his enterprise, and the more corrupt his views, the
less will be his consideration of the price to be paid
for compassing them. The new regulations did not
reduce the number so low as not to leave the assembly still liable to all the disorder which might be supposed to arise from multitude. But if the principle had been well established and well executed, a much greater inconveniency grew out of the reform
than that which had attended the old abuse: for if
tumult and disorder be lessened by reducing the
number of proprietors, private cabal and intrigue
are facilitated at least in an equal degree; and it is
cabal and corruption, rather than disorder and confusion, that was most to be dreaded in transacting the affairs of India. Whilst the votes of the smaller
proprietors continued, a door was left open for the
public sense to enter into that society: since that
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 11
door has been closed, the proprietary has become,
even more than formerly, an aggregate of private interests, which subsist at the expense of the collective body. At the moment of this revolution in the proprietary, as it might naturally be expected, those who had either no very particular interest in their vote or
but a petty object to pursue immediately disqualified; but those who were deeply interested in the Company's patronage, those who were concerned in
the supply of ships and of the other innumerable
objects required for their immense establishments,
those who were engaged in contracts with the Treasury, Admiralty, and Ordnance, together with the clerks in public offices, found means of securing
qualifications at the enlarged standard. All these
composed a much greater proportion than formerly
they had done of the proprietary body.
Against the great, predominant, radical corruption
of the Court of Proprietors the raising the qualification proved no sort of remedy. The return of the Company's servants into Europe poured in a constant
supply of proprietors, whose ability to purchase the
highest qualifications for themselves, their agents,
and dependants could not be dubious. And this
latter description form a very considerable, and by
far the most active and efficient part of that body.
To add to the votes, which is adding to the power in
proportion to the wealth, of men whose very offences
were supposed to consist in acts which lead to the acquisition of enormous riches, appears by no means a well-considered method of checking rapacity and oppression. In proportion as these interests prevailed, the means of cabal, of concealment, and of corrupt
confederacy became far more easy than before. Ac
? ? ? ? 12 NINTH REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
cordingly, there was no fault with respect to the
Company's government over its servants, charged
or chargeable on the General Court as it originally
stood, of which since the reform it has not been notoriously guilty. It was not, therefore, a matter of surprise to your Committee, that the General Court,
so composed, has at length grown to such a degree of
contempt both of its duty and of the permanent interest of the whole corporation as to put itself into open
defiance of the salutary admonitions of this House,
given for the purpose of asserting and enforcing the
legal authority of their own body over their own servants.
The failure in this part of the reform of 1773 is
not stated by your Committee as recommending a
return to the ancient constitution of the Company,
which was nearly as far as the new from containing
any principle tending to the prevention or remedy of
abuses,- but to point out the probable failure of any
future regulations which do not apply directly to the
grievance, but which may be taken up as experiments
to ascertain theories of the operation of councils
formed of greater or lesser numbers, or such as shall
be composed of men of more or less opulence, or of
interests of newer or longer standing, or concerning
the distribution of power to various descriptions or
professions of men, or of the election to office by one
authority rather than another.
Court of The second object of the act was the
Directors. Court of Directors. Under the arrangement of the year 1773 that court appeared to have its
authority much strengthened. It was made' less dependent than formerly upon its constituents, the proprietary. The duration of the Directors in office was
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 13
rendered more permanent, and the tenure itself diversified by a varied and intricate rotation. At the
same time their authority was held high over their
servants of all descriptions; and the only rule prescribed to the Council-General of Bengal, in the exercise of the large and ill-defined powers given to them, was that they were to yield obedience to tile
orders of the Court of Directors. As to the Court of
Directors itself, it was left with very little regulation.
The custom of ballot, infinitely the most mischievous
in a body possessed of all the ordinary executive powers, was still left; and your Committee have found
the ill effects of this practice in the course of their
inquiries. Nothing was done to oblige the Directors
to attend to the promotion of their servants according
to their rank and merits. In judging of those merits
nothing was done to bind them to any observation of
what appeared on their records. Nothing was done
to compel them to prosecution or complaint where
delinquency became visible. The act, indeed, prescribed that no servant of the Company abroad should
be eligible into the direction until two years after
his return to England. But as this regulation rather
presumes than provides for an inquiry into their conduct, a very ordinary neglect in the Court of Directors
might easily defeat it, and a short remission might in
this particular operate as a total indemnity. In fact,
however, the servants have of late seldom attempted a seat in the direction, - an attempt which might
possibly rouse a dormant spirit of inquiry; but, satisfied with an interest in the proprietary, they have,
through that name, brought the direction very much
under their own control.
As to the general authority of the Court of Direc
? ? ? ? 14 NINTH REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
tors, there is reason to apprehend that on the whole
it was somewhat degraded by the act whose professed
purpose was to exalt it, and that the only effect of
the Parliamentary sanction to their orders has been,
that along with those orders the law of the land has
been despised and trampled under foot. The Directors were not suffered either to nominate or to remove
those whom they were empowered to instruct; from
masters they were reduced to the situation of complainants,-a situation the imbecility of which no
laws or regulations could wholly alter; and when the
Directors were afterwards restored in some degree to
their ancient power, on the expiration of the lease
given to their principal servants, it became impossible
for them to recover any degree of their ancient respect, even if they had not in the mean time been so
modelled as to be entirely free from all ambition of
that sort.
From that period the orders of the Court of Directors became to be so habitually despised by their servants abroad, and at length to be so little regard ed even by themselves, that this contempt of orders
forms almost the whole subject-matter of the voluminous reports of two of your committees. If any
doubt, however, remains concerning the cause of this
fatal decline of the authority of the Court of Directors, no doubt whatsoever can remain of the fact
itself, nor of the total failure of one of the great
leading regulations of the act of 1773.
Supreme The third object was a new judicial arCourt of
Judicature. rangement, the chief purpose of which was
to form a strong and solid security for the natives
against the wrongs and oppressions of British subjects resident in Bengal. An operose and expensive
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 15
establishment of a Supreme Court was made, and
charged upon the revenues of the country. The
charter of justice was by the act left to the crown, as
well as the appointment of the magistrates. The defect in the institution seemed to be this, -- that no
rule was laid down, either in the act or the charter,
by which the court was to judge. No descriptions of
offenders or species of delinquency were properly ascertained, according to the nature of the place, or to
the prevalent mode of abuse. Provision was made
for the administration of justice in the remotest part
of Hindostan as if it were a province in Great Britain. Your Committee have long had the constitution and conduct of this court before them, and they have not yet been able to discover very few instances
(not one that appears to them of leading importance)
of relief given to the natives against the corruptions
or oppressions of British subjects in power, - though
they do find one very strong and marked instance
of the judges having employed an unwarrantable extension or application of the municipal law of England, to destroy a person of the highest rank among those natives whom they were sent to protect. One
circumstance rendered the proceeding in this case
fatal to all the good purposes for which the court
had been established. The sufferer (the Rajah Nundcomar) appears, at the very time of this extraordinary prosecution, a discoverer of some particulars of illicit gain then charged upon Mr. Hastings, the
Governor-General. Although in ordinary cases, and
in some lesser instances of grievance, it is very probable that this court has done its duty, and has been,
as every court must be, of some service, yet one example of this kind must do more towards deterring
? ? ? ? 16 NINTH REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
the natives from complaint, and consequently from
the means of redress, than many decisions favorable
to them, in the ordinary course of proceeding, call
do for their encouragement and relief. So far as
your Committee has been able to discover, the
court has been generally terrible to the natives, and
has distracted the government of the Company without substantially reforming any one of its abuses. This court, which in its constitution seems not to
have had sufficiently in view the necessities of the
people for whose relief it was intended, and was, or
thought itself, bound in some instances to too strict
an adherence to the forms and rules of English practice, in others was framed upon principles perhaps too remote from the constitution of English tribunals. By the usual course of English practice, the
far greater part of the redress to be obtained against
oppressions of power is by process in the nature
of civil actions. In these a trial by jury is a necessary part, with regard to the finding the offence
and to the assessment of the damages. Both these
were in the charter of justice left entirely to the
judges. It was presumed, and not wholly without
reason, that the British subjects were liable to fall
into factions and combinations, in order to support
themselves in the abuses of an authority of which
every man might in his turn become a sharer. And
with regard to the natives, it was presumed (perhaps
a little too hastily) that they were not capable of
sharing in the functions of jurors. But it was not
foreseen that the judges were also liable to be engaged in the factions of the settlement, - and if they should ever happen to be so engaged, that the native people were then without that remedy which
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 17
obviously lay in the chance that the court and jury,
though both liable to bias, might not easily unite
in the same identical act of injustice. Your Committee, on full inquiry, are of opinion that the use
of juries is neither impracticable nor dangerous in
Bengal.
Your Committee refer to their report made in the
year 1781, for the manner in which this court, attempting to extend its jurisdiction, and falling with
extreme severity on the native magistrates, a violent
contest arose between the English judges and the
English civil authority. This authority, calling inr
the military arm, (by a most dangerous example,)
overpowered, and for a while suspended, the functions of the court; but at length those functions,
which were suspended by the quarrel of the parties,
were destroyed by their reconciliation, and by the
arrangements made in consequence of it. By these
the court was virtually annihilated; or if substantially it exists, it is to be apprehended it exists
only for purposes very different from those of its
institution.
The fourth object of the act of 1773 was the Council-General. This institution was intended to produce uniformity, consistency, and the effective cooperation of all the settlements in their common defence. By the ancient constitution of the Company's foreign settlements, they were each of them
under the orders of a President or Chief, and a Counlcil, more or fewer, according to the discretion of the
Company. Among those, Parliament (probably on ac
count of the largeness of the territorial acquisitions,
rather than the conveniency of the situation) chose
Bengal for the residence of the controlling power,
VOL. VIII. 2
? ? ? ? 18 NINTH REPORl OF SELECT COMMITTEE
and, dissolving the Presidency, appointed a new establishment, upon a plan somewhat similar to that which had prevailed before; but the number was
smaller. This establishment was composed of a
Governor-General and four Counsellors, all named in
the act of Parliament. They were to hold their offices for five years, after which term the patronage
was to revert to the Court of Directors. In the
nean time such vacancies as should happen were to
be filled by that court, with the concurrence of the
crown. The first Governor-General and one of the
Counsellors had been old servants of the Company;
the others were new men.
On this new arrangement the Courts of Proprietors and Directors considered the details of commerce
as not perfectly consistent with the enlarged sphere
of duty and the reduced number of the Council.
Therefore, to relieve them from this burden, they
instituted a new office, called the Board of Trade,
for the subordinate management of their commercial
concerns, and appointed eleven of the senior servants to fill the commission.
Object of The powers given by the act to the new
powers to
Governor- Governor-General and Council had for their
General and
Council. direct object the kingdom of Bengal and its
dependencies. Within that sphere (and it is not a
small one) their authority extended over all the Company's concerns of whatever description. In matters of peace and war it seems to have been meant that
the other Presidencies should be subordinate to their
board. But the law is loose and defective, where it
professes to restrain the subordinate Presidencies from
making war without the consent and approbation of
the Supreme Council. They are left free to act with
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 19
out it in cases of imminent necessity, or where they shall
have received special orders from the Company. The
first exception leaves it open to the subordinate to
judge of the necessity of measures which, when
taken, bind or involve the superior: the second refers a question of peace or war to two jurisdictions,
which may give different judgments. In both instances cases in point have occurred. * With regard to
their local administration, their powers were exceedingly and dangerously loose and undetermined.
Their powers were not given directly, but in words
of reference, in which neither the objects related to
nor the mode of the relation were sufficiently expressed. Their legislative and executive capacities
were not so accurately drawn, and marked by such
strong and penal lines of distinction, as to keep these
capacities separate. Where legislative and merely executive powers were lodged in the same hands, the legislative, which is the larger and the more ready
for all occasions, was constantly resorted to. The
Governor-General and Council, therefore, immediately gave constructions to their ill-defined authority
which rendered it perfectly despotic, - constructions
which if they were allowed, no action of theirs ought
to be regarded as criminal.
Armed as they were with an authority in itself so
ample, and by abuse so capable of an unlimited extent, very few, and these very insufficient correctives,
were administered. Ample salaries were provided
for them, which indeed removed the necessity, but
by no means the inducements to corruption and oppression. Nor was any barrier whatsoever opposed
on the part of the natives against their injustice, ex* See the Secret Committee's Reports on the Mahratta War.
? ? ? ? 20 NINTH REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
cept the Supreme Court of Judicature, which never
could be capable of controlling a government with
such powers, without becoming such a government
itself.
There was, indeed, a prohibition against all concerns in trade to the whole Council, and against all
taking of presents by any in authority. A right of
prosecution in the King's Bench was also established;
but it was a right the exercise of which is difficult,
and in many, and those the most weighty cases, impracticable.
No considerable facilities were given to
prosecution in Parliament; nothing was done to prevent complaint from being far more dangerous to the
sufferer than injustice to the oppressor. No overt
acts were fixed, upon which corruption should be
presumed in transactions of which secrecy and collusion formed the very basis; no rules of evidence nor
authentic mode of transmission were settled in conformity to the unalterable circumstances of the country and the people. One provision, indeed, was made for reRemoval of
servants. straining the servants, in itself very wise
and substantial: a delinquent once dismissed, could
not be restored, but by the votes of three fourths of
the Directors and three fourths of the proprietors:
this was well aimed. But no method was settled for
bringing delinquents to the question of removal: and
if they should be brought to it, a door lay wide open
for evasion of the law, and for a return into the service, in defiance of its plain intention, --that is, by
resigning to avoid removal; by which measure this
provision of the act has proved as unoperative as all
the rest. By this management a mere majority may
bring in the greater delinquent, whilst the person re
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 21
moved for offences comparatively trivial may remain
excluded forever.
The new Council nominated in the act Council.
was composed of two totally discordant ele- General.
ments, which soon distinguished themselves into permanent parties. One of the principal instructions
which the three members of the Council sent immediately from England, namely, General Clavering,
Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, carried out with
them was, to " cause the strictest inquiry to be made
into all oppressions and abuses," among which the
practice of receiving presents from the natives, at that
time generally charged upon men in power, was principally aimed at.
Presents to any considerable value were justly reputed by the legislature, not as marks of attention
and respect, but as bribes or extortions, for which
either the beneficial and gratuitous duties of government were sold, or they were the price paid for acts
of partiality, or, finally, they were sums of money
extorted from the givers by the terrors of power.
Against the system of presents, therefore, the new
commission was in general opinion particularly pointed. In the commencement of reformation, at a period when a rapacious conquest had overpowered and succeeded to a corrupt government, an act of indemnity might have been thought advisable; perhaps a
new account ought to have been opened; all retrospect ought to have been forbidden, at least to certain
periods. If this had not been thought advisable, none
in the higher departments of a suspected and decried
government ought to have been kept in their posts,
until an examination had rendered their proceedings
clear, or until length of time had obliterated, by an
? ? ? ? 22 NINTH REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
even course of irreproachable conduct, the errors
which so naturally grow out of a new power. But
the policy adopted was different: it was to begin with
examples. The cry against the abuses was strong and
vehement throughout the whole nation, and the practice of presents was represented to be as general as it
was mischievous. In such a case, indeed in any case,
it seemed not to be a measure the most provident,
without a great deal of previous inquiry, to place two
persons, who from their situation must- be the most
exposed to such imputations, in the commission which
was to inquire into their own conduct, -much less
to place one of them at the head of that commission,
and with a casting vote in case of an equality. The
persons who could not be liable to that charge were,
indeed, three to two; but any accidental difference
of opinion, the death of any one of them or his occasional absence or sickness, threw the whole power into the hands of the other two, who were Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell, one the President, and the other
high in the Council of that establishment on which
the reform was to operate. Thus those who were liable to process as delinquents were in effect set over
the reformers; and that did actually happen which
might be expected to happen from so preposterous an
arrangement: a stop was soon put to all inquiries
into the capital abuses.
Nor was the great political end proposed in the
formation of a superintending Council over all the
Presidencies better answered than that of an inquiry
into corruptions and abuses. The several Presidencies have acted in a great degree upon their own separate authority; and as little of unity, concert, or regular system has appeared in their conduct as was,
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 23:
ever known before this institution. . India is, indeed,
so vast a country, and the settlements are so divided,
that their intercourse with each other is liable to as
many delays and difficulties as the intercourse between distant and separate states. But one evil may possibly have arisen from an attempt to produce an
unrion, which, though undoubtedly to be aimed at, is
opposed in some degree by the unalterable nature
of their situation,- that it has taught the servants
rather to look to a superior among themselves than to
their common superiors. This evil, growing out of
the abuse of the principle of subordination, can only
be corrected by a very strict enforcement of authority
over that part of the chain of dependence which is
next to the original power.
That which your Committee considers as Powers
the fifth and last of the capital objects of ginistersot
the act, and as the binding regulation of the crown
the whole, is the introduction (then for the first
time) of the ministers of the crown into the affairs
of the Company. The state claiming a concern and
share of property in the Company's profits, the servants of the crown were presumed the more likely to preserve with a scrupulous attention the sources of
the great revenues which they were to administer,
and for the rise and fall of which they were to render
an account.
The interference of government was introduced by
this act in two ways: one by a control, in effect by a
share, in the appointment to vacancies in the Supreme Council. The act provided that his Majesty's approbation should be had to the persons named to
that duty. Partaking thus in the patronage of the
Company, administration was bound to an attention
? ? ? ? 24 NINTH REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
to the characters and capacities of the persons employed in that high trust. The other part of then interference was by way of inspection. By this right
of inspection, everything in the Company's correspondence from India, which related to the civil or military affairs and government of the Company, was
directed by the act to be within fourteen days after
the receipt laid before the Secretary of State, and
everything that related to the management of the
revenues was to be laid before the Commissioners of
the Treasury. In fact, both description of these papers have been generally communicated to that board. Defects in It appears to your Committee that there
the plan. were great and material defects in both
parts of the plan. With regard to the approbation
of persons nominated to the Supreme Council by the
Court of Directors, no sufficient means were provided
for carrying to his Majesty, along with the nomination, the particulars in the conduct of those who had been in the service before, which might render them
proper objects of approbation or rejection. The India House possesses an office of record capable of furnishing, in almost all cases, materials for judging
on the behavior of the servants in their progress from
the lowest to the highest stations; and the whole discipline of the service, civil and military, must depend upon an examination of these records inseparably attending every application for an appointment to the highest stations. But in the present state of the
nomination the ministers of the crown are not furnished with the proper means of exercising the power of control intended by the law, even if they were
scrupulously attentive to the use of it. There are
modes of proceeding favorable to neglect. Others
excite inquiry and stimulate to vigilance.
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 25
Your Committee, therefore, are of opinion, Proposition
to remedy
that for the future prevention of cabal, and them.
of private and partial representation, whether above
or below, that, whenever any person who has been in
the service shall be recommended to the king's ministers to fill a vacancy in the Council-General, the
Secretary of the Court of Directors shall be ordered
to make a strict search into the records of the Company, and shall annex to the recommendation the
reasons of the Court of Directors for their choice,
together with a faithful copy of whatever shall be
found (if anything can be found) relative to his
character and conduct, - as also an account of his
standing in the Company's service, the time of his
abode in India, the reasons for his return, and the
stations, whether civil or military, in which he has
been successively placed.
With this account ought to be transmitted the
names of those who were proposed as candidates
for the same office, with the correspondent particulars relative to their conduct and situation: for not
only the separate, but the comparative merit, probably would, and certainly ought, to have great influence in the approbation or rejection of the party presented to the ministers of the crown. These papers should be laid before the Commissioners of the
Treasury and one of the Secretaries of State, and
entered in books to be kept in the Treasury and the
Secretary's office.
These precautions, in case of the nom- Appoint.
ination of any who have served the Com- went of
CounseUors,
pany, appear to be necessary from the im- &c.
proper nomination and approbation of Mr. la,pheJohn Macpherson, notwithstanding the ob- pointmen.
? ? ? ? 26 NINTH REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
jections which stood against him on the Company's
Stables's. records. The choice of Mr. John Stables,
from all inferior military to the highest civil
capacity, was by no means proper, nor an encouraging
example to either service. His conduct, indeed, in
the subaltern military situation, had received, and
seems to have deserved, commendation; but no sufficient ground was furnished for confounding the lines and gradations of service. This measure was, however, far less exceptionable than the former; because an irregular choice of a less competent person, and
the preference given to proved delinquency in prejudice to uncensured service, are very different things. But even this latter appointment would in all likelihood have been avoided, if rules of promotion had
been established. If such rules were settled, candidates qualified from ability, knowledge, and service would not be discouraged by finding that everything
was open to every man, and that favor alone stood
in the place of civil or military experience. The
elevation from the lowest stations unfaithfully and
negligently filled to the highest trusts, the total inattention to rank and seniority, and, much more, the combination of this neglect of rank with a confusion
(unaccompanied with strong and evident reasons) of
the lines of service, cannot operate as useful examples on those who serve the public in India. These servants, beholding men who have been condemned
for improper behavior to the Company in inferior
civil stations elevated above them, or (what is less
blamable, but still mischievous) persons without any
distinguished civil talents taken from the subordinate
situations of another line to their prejudice, will despair by any good behavior of ascending to the digni
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 27
ties of their own: they will be led to improve, to the
utmost advantage of thei' fortune, the lower stages
of power, and will endeavor to make up in lucre
what they can never hope to acquire in station.
The temporary appointment by Parliament of the
Supreme Council of India arose from an opinion that
the Company, at that time at least, was not in a condition or not disposed to a proper exercise of the
privileges which they held under their charter. It
therefore behoved the Directors to be particularly attentive to their choice of Counsellors, on the expiration of the period during which their patronage had been suspended. The duties of the Supreme Council had been reputed of so arduous a nature as to
require even ha legislative interposition. They were
called upon, by all possible care and impartiality, to
justify Parliament at least as fully in the restoration
of their privileges as the circumstances of the time
had done in their suspension.
But interests have lately prevailed in the Court
of Directors, which, by the violation of every rule,
seemed to be resolved on the destruction of those
privileges of which they were the natural guardians.
Every new power given has been made the source of
a new abuse; and the acts of Parliament themselves,
which provide but imperfectly for the prevention of
the mischief, have, it is to be feared, made provisions
(contrary, without doubt, to the intention of the legislature) which operate against the possibility of any
cure in the ordinary course.
In the original institution of the Supreme Council,
reasons may have existed against rendering the tenure of the Counsellors in their office precarious. A
plan of reform might have required the permanence
? ? ? ? 28 NINTH REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
of the persons who were just appointed by Parliament to execute it. But the act of 1780 gave a duration coexistent with the statute itself to a Council not appointed by act of Parliament, nor chosen for any temporary or special purpose; by which
means the servants in the highest situation, let their
conduct be never so grossly criminal, cannot be removed, unless the Court of Directors and ministers of the crown can be found to concur in the same
opinion of it. The prevalence of the Indian factions
in the Court of Directors and Court of Proprietors,
and sometimes in the state itself, renders this agreement extremely difficult: if the principal members of the Direction should be in a conspiracy with any
principal servant under censure, it will be impracticable; because the first act must originate there. The reduced state of the authority of this kingdom
in Bengal may be traced in a great measure to that
very natural source of independence. In many cases
the instant removal of an offender from his power of
doing mischief is the only mode of preventing the
utter and perhaps irretrievable ruin of public affairs.
In such a case the process ought to be simple, and
the power absolute in one or in either hand separately. By contriving the balance of interests formed in the act, notorious offence, gross error, or palpable
insufficiency have many chances of retaining and
abusing authority, whilst the variety of representations, hearings, and conferences, and possibly the mere jealousy and competition between rival powers,
may prevent any decision, and at length give time
and means for settlements and compromises among
parties, made at the expense of justice and true
policy. But this act of 1780, not properly distin
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 29
guishing judicial process from executive arrangements, requires in effect nearly the same degree of
solemnity, delay, and detail for removing a political
inconvenience which attends a criminal proceeding
for the punishment of offences. It goes further,
and gives the same tenure to all who shall succeed
to vacancies which was given to those whom the
act found in office.
Another regulation was made in the act, which has
a tendency to render the control of delinquency or
the removal of incapacity in the Council-General extremely difficult, as well as to introduce many other
abuses into the original appointment of Counsellors.
The inconveniences of a vacancy in that im- Provisional
portant office, at a great distance from the fopracanauthority that is to fill it, were visible; but Cies.
your Committee have doubts whether they balance
the mischief which may arise from the power given
in this act, of a provisional appointment to vacancies,
not on the event, but on foresight. This mode of
providing for the succession has a tendency to promote cabal, and to prevent inquiry into the qualifications of the persons to be appointed. An attempt has been actually made, in consequence of this power, in
a very marked manner, to confound the whole order
and discipline of the Company's service. Means are
furnished thereby for perpetuating the powers of some
given Court of Directors. They may forestall the patronage of their successors, on whom they entail a line
of Supreme Counsellors and Governors-General. And
if the exercise of this power should happen in its outset to fall into bad hands, the ordinary chances for
mending an ill choice upon death or resignation are
cut off.
? ? ? ? 30 NINTH REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
In these provisional arrangements it is to be considered that the appointment is not in consequence
of any marked event which calls strongly on the attention of the public, but is made at the discretion
of those who lead in the Court of Directors, and may
therefore be brought forward at times the most favorable to the views of partiality and corruption. Candidates have not, therefore, the notice that may be necessary for their claims; and as the possession of
the office to which the survivors are to succeed seems
remote, all inquiry into the qualifications and character of those who are to fill it will naturally be dull
and languid.
Your Committee are not also without a grounded
apprehension of the ill effect on any existing CouncilGeneral of all strong marks of influence and favor
which appear in the subordinates of Bengal. This
previous designation to a great and arduous trust,
(the greatest that can be reposed in subjects,) when
made out of any regular course of succession, marks
that degree of countenance and support at home which
may overshadow the existing government. That government may thereby be disturbed by factions, and
led to corrupt and dangerous compliances. At best,
when these Counsellors elect are engaged in no fixed
employment, and have no lawful intermediate emolument, the natural impatience for their situations may
bring on a traffic for resignations between them and
the persons in possession, very unfavorable to the interests of the public and to the duty of their situations.
Since the act two persons have been nominated to
the ministers of the crown by the Court of Directors
for this succession. Neither has yet been approved.
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 31
But by the description of the persons a judgment may
be formed of the principles on which this power is
likely to be exercised.
Your Committee find, that, in consequence Stuart and
Sulivan's
of the above-mentioned act, the Honorable appointment
to succeed to
Charles Stuart and Mr. Sulivan were ap- vacancies.
pointed to succeed to the first vacancies in the Supreme Council. Mr. Stuart's first appointment in
the Company's service was in the year 1761. lie
returned to England in 1775, and was permitted to
go back to India in 1780. In August, 1781, he
was nominated by the Court of Directors (Mr. Sulivan and Sir William James were Chairman and
Deputy-Chairman) to succeed to the first vacancy
in the Supreme Council, and on the 19th of September following his Majesty's approval of such nomination was requested. In the nomination of Mr. Stuart, the Mr. Stuart's
situation at
consideration of rank in the service was the time of
his appointnot neglected; but if the Court of Direc- ment.
tors had thought fit to examine their records, they
would have found matter at least strongly urging
them to a suspension of this appointment, until the
charges against Mr. Stuart should be fully cleared
up. That matter remained (as it still remains) unexplained from the month of May, 1775, where, on
the Bengal Revenue Coosultations of the 12th of
that month, peculations to a large amount are charged
upon oath against Mr. Stuart under the following title: "' The Particulars of the Money uvjustly taken by
Mr. Stuart, during the Time he lwas at Burdwan. "
The sum charged against him in this account is
2,17,684 Sicca rupees (that is, 25,2531. sterling);
besides which there is another account with the fol
? ? ? ? 32 NINTH REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
lowing title: " The Particulars of the Money unjustly
taken by Callypersaud Bose, Banian to the Honorable
Charles Stuart, Esquire, at Burdwan, and amounting
to Sicca Rupees 1,01,675" (that is, 11,7851. ), --a
large sum to be received by a person in that subordinate situation.
The minuteness with which these accounts appear
to have been kept, and the precision with which the
date of each particular, sometimes of very small sums,
is stated, give them the appearance of authenticity,
as far as it can be conveyed on the face or in the
construction of such accounts, and, if they were forgeries, laid them open to an easy detection. But
no detection is easy, when no inquiry is made. It
appears an offence of the highest order in the Directors concerned in this business, when,. not satisfied with leaving such charges so long unexamined, they should venture to present to the king's servants
the object of them for the highest trust which they
have to bestow. If Mr. Stuart was really guilty,
the possession of this post must furnish him not only
with the means of renewing the former evil practices
charged upon him, and of executing them upon a
still larger scale, but of oppressing those unhappy
persons who, under the supposed protection of the
faith of the Company, had appeared to give evidence
concerning his former misdemeanors.
This attempt in the Directors was the more surprising, when it is considered that two committees
of this House were at that very time sitting upon an
inquiry that related directly to their conduct, and
that of their servants in India.
It was in the same spirit of defiance of Parliament,
that at the same time they nominated Mr. Sulivan,
? ? ? ? ON THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA. 338
son to the then Chairman of the Court of Mr. SuliDirectors, to the succession to the same tion atsthue
time of his
high trust in India. On these appoint- appointments, your Committee thought it proper ment.
to make those inquiries which the Court of Directors
thought proper to omit. They first conceived it fitting to inquire what rank Mr. Sulivan bore in the
service; and they thought it not unnecessary here
to state the gradations in the service, according to
the established usage of the Company.
The Company's civil servants generally go to India as writers, in which capacity they serve the Companyfive years. The next step, in point of rank, is to be a factor, and next to that a junior merchant;
in each of which capacities they serve the Companythree years. They then rise to the rank of senior
merchant, in which situation they remain till called
by rotation to the Board of Trade. Until the passing of the Regulation Act, in 1773, seniority entitled them to succeed to the Council, and finally gave them pretensions to the government of the Presidency.
The above gradation of the service, your Committee conceive, ought never to be superseded by the
Court of Directors, without evident reason, in persons or circumstances, to justify the breach of an ancient order. The names, whether taken from civil or commercial gradation, are of no moment. The
order itself is wisely established, and tends to provide a natural guard against partiality, precipitancy,
and corruption in patronage. It affords means and
opportunities for an examination into character; and
among the servants it secures a strong motive to preserve a fair reputation. Your Committee find that
no respect whatsoever was paid to this gradation in
VOL. VIII. 3
? ? ? ? 34 NINTH REPO[RT OF SELECT COMMITTEE
the instance of Mr.
