"
If, however, the avenger's intention be directed chiefly to some good,
to be obtained by means of the punishment of the person who has sinned
(for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may be
restrained and others be not disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and
God honored), then vengeance may be lawful, provided other due
circumstances be observed.
If, however, the avenger's intention be directed chiefly to some good,
to be obtained by means of the punishment of the person who has sinned
(for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may be
restrained and others be not disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and
God honored), then vengeance may be lawful, provided other due
circumstances be observed.
Summa Theologica
Now virtue does not strive at the indefinite, since "the
indefinite removes the nature of good" (Metaph. ii, text. 8). Therefore
repayment of gratitude should not surpass the favor received.
Objection 3: Further, justice consists in equality. But "more" is
excess of equality. Since therefore excess is sinful in every virtue,
it seems that to repay more than the favor received is sinful and
opposed to justice.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5): "We should repay
those who are gracious to us, by being gracious to them return," and
this is done by repaying more than we have received. Therefore
gratitude should incline to do something greater.
I answer that, As stated above [3190](A[5]), gratitude regards the
favor received according the intention of the benefactor; who seems be
deserving of praise, chiefly for having conferred the favor gratis
without being bound to do so. Wherefore the beneficiary is under a
moral obligation to bestow something gratis in return. Now he does not
seem to bestow something gratis, unless he exceeds the quantity of the
favor received: because so long as he repays less or an equivalent, he
would seem to do nothing gratis, but only to return what he has
received. Therefore gratitude always inclines, as far as possible, to
pay back something more.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[3], ad 5; A[5]), in repaying
favors we must consider the disposition rather than the deed.
Accordingly, if we consider the effect of beneficence, which a son
receives from his parents namely, to be and to live, the son cannot
make an equal repayment, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14).
But if we consider the will of the giver and of the repayer, then it is
possible for the son to pay back something greater to his father, as
Seneca declares (De Benef. iii). If, however, he were unable to do so,
the will to pay back would be sufficient for gratitude.
Reply to Objection 2: The debt of gratitude flows from charity, which
the more it is paid the more it is due, according to Rom. 13:8, "Owe no
man anything, but to love one another. " Wherefore it is not
unreasonable if the obligation of gratitude has no limit.
Reply to Objection 3: As in injustice, which is a cardinal virtue, we
consider equality of things, so in gratitude we consider equality of
wills. For while on the one hand the benefactor of his own free-will
gave something he was not bound to give, so on the other hand the
beneficiary repays something over and above what he has received.
__________________________________________________________________
OF INGRATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider ingratitude, under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether ingratitude is always a sin?
(2) Whether ingratitude is a special sin?
(3) Whether every act of ingratitude is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether favors should be withdrawn from the ungrateful?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether ingratitude is always a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is not always a sin. For Seneca
says (De Benef. iii) that "he who does not repay a favor is
ungrateful. " But sometimes it is impossible to repay a favor without
sinning, for instance if one man has helped another to commit a sin.
Therefore, since it is not a sin to refrain from sinning, it seems that
ingratitude is not always a sin.
Objection 2: Further, every sin is in the power of the person who
commits it: because, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract.
i), "no man sins in what he cannot avoid. " Now sometimes it is not in
the power of the sinner to avoid ingratitude, for instance when he has
not the means of repaying. Again forgetfulness is not in our power, and
yet Seneca declares (De Benef. iii) that "to forget a kindness is the
height of ingratitude. " Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.
Objection 3: Further, there would seem to be no repayment in being
unwilling to owe anything, according to the Apostle (Rom. 13:8), "Owe
no man anything. " Yet "an unwilling debtor is ungrateful," as Seneca
declares (De Benef. iv). Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.
On the contrary, Ingratitude is reckoned among other sins (2 Tim. 3:2),
where it is written: "Disobedient to parents, ungrateful, wicked. " etc.
I answer that, As stated above ([3191]Q[106], A[4], ad 1, A[6]) a debt
of gratitude is a moral debt required by virtue. Now a thing is a sin
from the fact of its being contrary to virtue. Wherefore it is evident
that every ingratitude is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Gratitude regards a favor received: and he that
helps another to commit a sin does him not a favor but an injury: and
so no thanks are due to him, except perhaps on account of his good
will, supposing him to have been deceived, and to have thought to help
him in doing good, whereas he helped him to sin. In such a case the
repayment due to him is not that he should be helped to commit a sin,
because this would be repaying not good but evil, and this is contrary
to gratitude.
Reply to Objection 2: No man is excused from ingratitude through
inability to repay, for the very reason that the mere will suffices for
the repayment of the debt of gratitude, as stated above ([3192]Q[106],
A[6], ad 1).
Forgetfulness of a favor received amounts to ingratitude, not indeed
the forgetfulness that arises from a natural defect, that is not
subject to the will, but that which arises from negligence. For, as
Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), "when forgetfulness of favors lays
hold of a man, he has apparently given little thought to their
repayment. "
Reply to Objection 3: The debt of gratitude flows from the debt of
love, and from the latter no man should wish to be free. Hence that
anyone should owe this debt unwillingly seems to arise from lack of
love for his benefactor.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether ingratitude is a special sin?
Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is not a special sin. For
whoever sins acts against God his sovereign benefactor. But this
pertains to ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.
Objection 2: Further, no special sin is contained under different kinds
of sin. But one can be ungrateful by committing different kinds of sin,
for instance by calumny, theft, or something similar committed against
a benefactor. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.
Objection 3: Further, Seneca writes (De Benef. iii): "It is ungrateful
to take no notice of a kindness, it is ungrateful not to repay one, but
it is the height of ingratitude to forget it. " Now these do not seem to
belong to the same species of sin. Therefore ingratitude is not a
special sin.
On the contrary, Ingratitude is opposed to gratitude or thankfulness,
which is a special virtue. Therefore it is a special sin.
I answer that, Every vice is denominated from a deficiency of virtue,
because deficiency is more opposed to virtue: thus illiberality is more
opposed to liberality than prodigality is. Now a vice may be opposed to
the virtue of gratitude by way of excess, for instance if one were to
show gratitude for things for which gratitude is not due, or sooner
than it is due, as stated above ([3193]Q[106], A[4]). But still more
opposed to gratitude is the vice denoting deficiency of gratitude,
because the virtue of gratitude, as stated above ([3194]Q[106], A[6]),
inclines to return something more. Wherefore ingratitude is properly
denominated from being a deficiency of gratitude. Now every deficiency
or privation takes its species from the opposite habit: for blindness
and deafness differ according to the difference of sight and hearing.
Therefore just as gratitude or thankfulness is one special virtue, so
also is ingratitude one special sin.
It has, however, various degrees corresponding in their order to the
things required for gratitude. The first of these is to recognize the
favor received, the second to express one's appreciation and thanks,
and the third to repay the favor at a suitable place and time according
to one's means. And since what is last in the order of generation is
first in the order of destruction, it follows that the first degree of
ingratitude is when a man fails to repay a favor, the second when he
declines to notice or indicate that he has received a favor, while the
third and supreme degree is when a man fails to recognize the reception
of a favor, whether by forgetting it or in any other way. Moreover,
since opposite affirmation includes negation, it follows that it
belongs to the first degree of ingratitude to return evil for good, to
the second to find fault with a favor received, and to the third to
esteem kindness as though it were unkindness.
Reply to Objection 1: In every sin there is material ingratitude to
God, inasmuch as a man does something that may pertain to ingratitude.
But formal ingratitude is when a favor is actually contemned, and this
is a special sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders the formal aspect of some special
sin from being found materially in several kinds of sin, and in this
way the aspect of ingratitude is to be found in many kinds of sin.
Reply to Objection 3: These three are not different species but
different degrees of one special sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether ingratitude is always a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is always a mortal sin. For one
ought to be grateful to God above all. But one is not ungrateful to God
by committing a venial sin: else every man would be guilty of
ingratitude. Therefore no ingratitude is a venial sin.
Objection 2: Further, a sin is mortal through being contrary to
charity, as stated above ([3195]Q[24], A[12]). But ingratitude is
contrary to charity, since the debt of gratitude proceeds from that
virtue, as stated above ([3196]Q[106], A[1], ad 3; A[6], ad 2).
Therefore ingratitude is always a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Between the giver
and the receiver of a favor there is this law, that the former should
forthwith forget having given, and the latter should never forget
having received. " Now, seemingly, the reason why the giver should
forget is that he may be unaware of the sin of the recipient, should
the latter prove ungrateful; and there would be no necessity for that
if ingratitude were a slight sin. Therefore ingratitude is always a
mortal sin.
Objection 4: On the contrary, No one should be put in the way of
committing a mortal sin. Yet, according to Seneca (De Benef. ii),
"sometimes it is necessary to deceive the person who receives
assistance, in order that he may receive without knowing from whom he
has received. " But this would seem to put the recipient in the way of
ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not always a mortal sin.
I answer that, As appears from what we have said above [3197](A[2]), a
man may be ungrateful in two ways: first, by mere omission, for
instance by failing to recognize the favor received, or to express his
appreciation of it or to pay something in return, and this is not
always a mortal sin, because, as stated above (Q[106], A[6]), the debt
of gratitude requires a man to make a liberal return, which, however,
he is not bound to do; wherefore if he fail to do so, he does not sin
mortally. It is nevertheless a venial sin, because it arises either
from some kind of negligence or from some disinclination to virtue in
him. And yet ingratitude of this kind may happen to be a mortal sin, by
reason either of inward contempt, or of the kind of thing withheld,
this being needful to the benefactor, either simply, or in some case of
necessity.
Secondly, a man may be ungrateful, because he not only omits to pay the
debt of gratitude, but does the contrary. This again is sometimes
mortal and sometimes a venial sin, according to the kind of thing that
is done.
It must be observed, however, that when ingratitude arises from a
mortal sin, it has the perfect character of ingratitude, and when it
arises from venial sin, it has the imperfect character.
Reply to Objection 1: By committing a venial sin one is not ungrateful
to God to the extent of incurring the guilt of perfect ingratitude: but
there is something of ingratitude in a venial sin, in so far as it
removes a virtuous act of obedience to God.
Reply to Objection 2: When ingratitude is a venial sin it is not
contrary to, but beside charity: since it does not destroy the habit of
charity, but excludes some act thereof.
Reply to Objection 3: Seneca also says (De Benef. vii): "When we say
that a man after conferring a favor should forget about it, it is a
mistake to suppose that we mean him to shake off the recollection of a
thing so very praiseworthy. When we say: He must not remember it, we
mean that he must not publish it abroad and boast about it. "
Reply to Objection 4: He that is unaware of a favor conferred on him is
not ungrateful, if he fails to repay it, provided he be prepared to do
so if he knew. It is nevertheless commendable at times that the object
of a favor should remain in ignorance of it, both in order to avoid
vainglory, as when Blessed Nicolas threw gold into a house secretly,
wishing to avoid popularity: and because the kindness is all the
greater through the benefactor wishing not to shame the person on whom
he is conferring the favor.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether favors should be withheld from the ungrateful?
Objection 1: It seems that favors should withheld from the ungrateful.
For it is written (Wis. 16:29): "The hope of the unthankful shall melt
away as the winter's ice. " But this hope would not melt away unless
favors were withheld from him. Therefore favors should be withheld from
the ungrateful.
Objection 2: Further, no one should afford another an occasion of
committing sin. But the ungrateful in receiving a favor is given an
occasion of ingratitude. Therefore favors should not be bestowed on the
ungrateful.
Objection 3: Further, "By what things a man sinneth, by the same also
he is tormented" (Wis. 11:17). Now he that is ungrateful when he
receives a favor sins against the favor. Therefore he should be
deprived of the favor.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 6:35) that "the Highest . . . is
kind to the unthankful, and to the evil. " Now we should prove ourselves
His children by imitating Him (Lk. 6:36). Therefore we should not
withhold favors from the ungrateful.
I answer that, There are two points to be considered with regard to an
ungrateful person. The first is what he deserves to suffer and thus it
is certain that he deserves to be deprived of our favor. The second is,
what ought his benefactor to do? For in the first place he should not
easily judge him to be ungrateful, since, as Seneca remarks (De Benef.
iii), "a man is often grateful although he repays not," because perhaps
he has not the means or the opportunity of repaying. Secondly, he
should be inclined to turn his ungratefulness into gratitude, and if he
does not achieve this by being kind to him once, he may by being so a
second time. If, however, the more he repeats his favors, the more
ungrateful and evil the other becomes, he should cease from bestowing
his favors upon him.
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted speaks of what the ungrateful
man deserves to suffer.
Reply to Objection 2: He that bestows a favor on an ungrateful person
affords him an occasion not of sin but of gratitude and love. And if
the recipient takes therefrom an occasion of ingratitude, this is not
to be imputed to the bestower.
Reply to Objection 3: He that bestows a favor must not at once act the
part of a punisher of ingratitude, but rather that of a kindly
physician, by healing the ingratitude with repeated favors.
__________________________________________________________________
OF VENGEANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider vengeance, under which head there are four points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether vengeance is lawful?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Of the manner of taking vengeance;
(4) On whom should vengeance be taken?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether vengeance is lawful?
Objection 1: It seems that vengeance is not lawful. For whoever usurps
what is God's sins. But vengeance belongs to God, for it is written
(Dt. 32:35, Rom. 12:19): "Revenge to Me, and I will repay. " Therefore
all vengeance is unlawful.
Objection 2: Further, he that takes vengeance on a man does not bear
with him. But we ought to bear with the wicked, for a gloss on Cant
2:2, "As the lily among the thorns," says: "He is not a good man that
cannot bear with a wicked one. " Therefore we should not take vengeance
on the wicked.
Objection 3: Further, vengeance is taken by inflicting punishment,
which is the cause of servile fear. But the New Law is not a law of
fear, but of love, as Augustine states (Contra Adamant. xvii).
Therefore at least in the New Testament all vengeance is unlawful.
Objection 4: Further, a man is said to avenge himself when he takes
revenge for wrongs inflicted on himself. But, seemingly, it is unlawful
even for a judge to punish those who have wronged him: for Chrysostom
[*Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth. , falsely ascribed to St.
Chrysostom] says: "Let us learn after Christ's example to bear our own
wrongs with magnanimity, yet not to suffer God's wrongs, not even by
listening to them. " Therefore vengeance seems to be unlawful.
Objection 5: Further, the sin of a multitude is more harmful than the
sin of only one: for it is written (Ecclus. 26:5-7): "Of three things
my heart hath been afraid . . . the accusation of a city, and the
gathering together of the people, and a false calumny. " But vengeance
should not be taken on the sin of a multitude, for a gloss on Mat.
13:29,30, "Lest perhaps . . . you root up the wheat . . . suffer both
to grow," says that "a multitude should not be excommunicated, nor
should the sovereign. " Neither therefore is any other vengeance lawful.
On the contrary, We should look to God for nothing save what is good
and lawful. But we are to look to God for vengeance on His enemies: for
it is written (Lk. 18:7): "Will not God revenge His elect who cry to
Him day and night? " as if to say: "He will indeed. " Therefore vengeance
is not essentially evil and unlawful.
I answer that, Vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil on
one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we must
consider the mind of the avenger. For if his intention is directed
chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance and rests
there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because to take
pleasure in another's evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary to the
charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor is it an excuse that
he intends the evil of one who has unjustly inflicted evil on him, as
neither is a man excused for hating one that hates him: for a man may
not sin against another just because the latter has already sinned
against him, since this is to be overcome by evil, which was forbidden
by the Apostle, who says (Rom. 12:21): "Be not overcome by evil, but
overcome evil by good.
"
If, however, the avenger's intention be directed chiefly to some good,
to be obtained by means of the punishment of the person who has sinned
(for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may be
restrained and others be not disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and
God honored), then vengeance may be lawful, provided other due
circumstances be observed.
Reply to Objection 1: He who takes vengeance on the wicked in keeping
with his rank and position does not usurp what belongs to God but makes
use of the power granted him by God. For it is written (Rom. 13:4) of
the earthly prince that "he is God's minister, an avenger to execute
wrath upon him that doeth evil. " If, however, a man takes vengeance
outside the order of divine appointment, he usurps what is God's and
therefore sins.
Reply to Objection 2: The good bear with the wicked by enduring
patiently, and in due manner, the wrongs they themselves receive from
them: but they do not bear with them as to endure the wrongs they
inflict on God and their neighbor. For Chrysostom [*Cf. Opus
Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth. , falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom]
says: "It is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to
overlook God's wrongs is most wicked. "
Reply to Objection 3: The law of the Gospel is the law of love, and
therefore those who do good out of love, and who alone properly belong
to the Gospel, ought not to be terrorized by means of punishment, but
only those who are not moved by love to do good, and who, though they
belong to the Church outwardly, do not belong to it in merit.
Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes a wrong done to a person reflects on
God and the Church: and then it is the duty of that person to avenge
the wrong. For example, Elias made fire descend on those who were come
to seize him (4 Kings 1); likewise Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked
him (4 Kings 2); and Pope Sylverius excommunicated those who sent him
into exile (XXIII, Q. iv, Cap. Guilisarius). But in so far as the wrong
inflicted on a man affects his person, he should bear it patiently if
this be expedient. For these precepts of patience are to be understood
as referring to preparedness of the mind, as Augustine states (De Serm.
Dom. in Monte i).
Reply to Objection 5: When the whole multitude sins, vengeance must be
taken on them, either in respect of the whole multitude---thus the
Egyptians were drowned in the Red Sea while they were pursuing the
children of Israel (Ex. 14), and the people of Sodom were entirely
destroyed (Gn. 19)---or as regards part of the multitude, as may be
seen in the punishment of those who worshipped the calf.
Sometimes, however, if there is hope of many making amends, the
severity of vengeance should be brought to bear on a few of the
principals, whose punishment fills the rest with fear; thus the Lord
(Num 25) commanded the princes of the people to be hanged for the sin
of the multitude.
On the other hand, if it is not the whole but only a part of the
multitude that has sinned, then if the guilty can be separated from the
innocent, vengeance should be wrought on them: provided, however, that
this can be done without scandal to others; else the multitude should
be spared and severity foregone. The same applies to the sovereign,
whom the multitude follow. For his sin should be borne with, if it
cannot be punished without scandal to the multitude: unless indeed his
sin were such, that it would do more harm to the multitude, either
spiritually or temporally, than would the scandal that was feared to
arise from his punishment.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether vengeance is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that vengeance is not a special and distinct
virtue. For just as the good are rewarded for their good deeds, so are
the wicked punished for their evil deeds. Now the rewarding of the good
does not belong to a special virtue, but is an act of commutative
justice. Therefore in the same way vengeance should not be accounted a
special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, there is no need to appoint a special virtue for
an act to which a man is sufficiently disposed by the other virtues.
Now man is sufficiently disposed by the virtues of fortitude or zeal to
avenge evil. Therefore vengeance should not be reckoned a special
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, there is a special vice opposed to every special
virtue. But seemingly no special vice is opposed to vengeance.
Therefore it is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of
justice.
I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1), aptitude to
virtue is in us by nature, but the complement of virtue is in us
through habituation or some other cause. Hence it is evident that
virtues perfect us so that we follow in due manner our natural
inclinations, which belong to the natural right. Wherefore to every
definite natural inclination there corresponds a special virtue. Now
there is a special inclination of nature to remove harm, for which
reason animals have the irascible power distinct from the
concupiscible. Man resists harm by defending himself against wrongs,
lest they be inflicted on him, or he avenges those which have already
been inflicted on him, with the intention, not of harming, but of
removing the harm done. And this belongs to vengeance, for Tully says
(De Invent. Rhet. ii) that by "vengeance we resist force, or wrong, and
in general whatever is obscure" [*'Obscurum' Cicero wrote 'obfuturum'
but the sense is the same as St. Thomas gives in the parenthesis]
"(i. e. derogatory), either by self-defense or by avenging it. "
Therefore vengeance is a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as repayment of a legal debt belongs to
commutative justice, and as repayment of a moral debt, arising from the
bestowal of a particular favor, belongs to the virtue of gratitude, so
too the punishment of sins, so far as it is the concern of public
justice, is an act of commutative justice; while so far as it is
concerned in defending the rights of the individual by whom a wrong is
resisted, it belongs to the virtue of revenge.
Reply to Objection 2: Fortitude disposes to vengeance by removing an
obstacle thereto, namely, fear of an imminent danger. Zeal, as denoting
the fervor of love, signifies the primary root of vengeance, in so far
as a man avenges the wrong done to God and his neighbor, because
charity makes him regard them as his own. Now every act of virtue
proceeds from charity as its root, since, according to Gregory (Hom.
xxvii in Ev. ), "there are no green leaves on the bough of good works,
unless charity be the root. "
Reply to Objection 3: Two vices are opposed to vengeance: one by way of
excess, namely, the sin of cruelty or brutality, which exceeds the
measure in punishing: while the other is a vice by way of deficiency
and consists in being remiss in punishing, wherefore it is written
(Prov. 13:24): "He that spareth the rod hateth his son. " But the virtue
of vengeance consists in observing the due measure of vengeance with
regard to all the circumstances.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether vengeance should be wrought by means of punishments customary among
men?
Objection 1: It seems that vengeance should not be wrought by means of
punishments customary among men. For to put a man to death is to uproot
him. But our Lord forbade (Mat. 13:29) the uprooting of the cockle,
whereby the children of the wicked one are signified. Therefore sinners
should not be put to death.
Objection 2: Further, all who sin mortally seem to be deserving of the
same punishment. Therefore if some who sin mortally are punished with
death, it seems that all such persons should be punished with death:
and this is evidently false.
Objection 3: Further, to punish a man publicly for his sin seems to
publish his sin: and this would seem to have a harmful effect on the
multitude, since the example of sin is taken by them as an occasion for
sin. Therefore it seems that the punishment of death should not be
inflicted for a sin.
On the contrary, These punishments are fixed by the divine law as
appears from what we have said above ([3198]FS, Q[105], A[2]).
I answer that, Vengeance is lawful and virtuous so far as it tends to
the prevention of evil. Now some who are not influenced by motive of
virtue are prevented from committing sin, through fear of losing those
things which they love more than those they obtain by sinning, else
fear would be no restraint to sin. Consequently vengeance for sin
should be taken by depriving a man of what he loves most. Now the
things which man loves most are life, bodily safety, his own freedom,
and external goods such as riches, his country and his good name.
Wherefore, according to Augustine's reckoning (De Civ. Dei xxi), "Tully
writes that the laws recognize eight kinds of punishment": namely,
"death," whereby man is deprived of life; "stripes," "retaliation," or
the loss of eye for eye, whereby man forfeits his bodily safety;
"slavery," and "imprisonment," whereby he is deprived of freedom;
"exile" whereby he is banished from his country; "fines," whereby he is
mulcted in his riches; "ignominy," whereby he loses his good name.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord forbids the uprooting of the cockle,
when there is fear lest the wheat be uprooted together with it. But
sometimes the wicked can be uprooted by death, not only without danger,
but even with great profit, to the good. Wherefore in such a case the
punishment of death may be inflicted on sinners.
Reply to Objection 2: All who sin mortally are deserving of eternal
death, as regards future retribution, which is in accordance with the
truth of the divine judgment. But the punishments of this life are more
of a medicinal character; wherefore the punishment of death is
inflicted on those sins alone which conduce to the grave undoing of
others.
Reply to Objection 3: The very fact that the punishment, whether of
death or of any kind that is fearsome to man, is made known at the same
time as the sin, makes man's will avers to sin: because the fear of
punishment is greater than the enticement of the example of sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether vengeance should be taken on those who have sinned involuntarily?
Objection 1: It seems that vengeance should be taken on those who have
sinned involuntarily. For the will of one man does not follow from the
will of another. Yet one man is punished for another, according to Ex.
20:5, "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the
fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation. " Thus
for the sin of Cham, his son Chanaan was curse (Gn. 9:25) and for the
sin of Giezi, his descendants were struck with leprosy (4 Kings 5).
Again the blood of Christ lays the descendants of the Jews under the
ban of punishment, for they said (Mat. 27:25): "His blood be upon us
and upon our children. " Moreover we read (Josue 7) that the people of
Israel were delivered into the hands of their enemies for the sin of
Achan, and that the same people were overthrown by the Philistines on
account of the sin of the sons of Heli (1 Kings 4). Therefore a person
is to be punished without having deserved it voluntarily.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is voluntary except what is in a man's
power. But sometimes a man is punished for what is not in his power;
thus a man is removed from the administration of the Church on account
of being infected with leprosy; and a Church ceases to be an episcopal
see on account of the depravity or evil of the people. Therefore
vengeance is taken not only for voluntary sins.
Objection 3: Further, ignorance makes an act involuntary. Now vengeance
is sometimes taken on the ignorant. Thus the children of the people of
Sodom, though they were in invincible ignorance, perished with their
parents (Gn. 19). Again, for the sin of Dathan and Abiron their
children were swallowed up together with them (Num 16). Moreover, dumb
animals, which are devoid of reason, were commanded to be slain on
account of the sin of the Amalekites (1 Kings 15). Therefore vengeance
is sometimes taken on those who have deserved it involuntarily.
Objection 4: Further, compulsion is most opposed to voluntariness. But
a man does not escape the debt of punishment through being compelled by
fear to commit a sin. Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those
who have deserved it involuntarily.
Objection 5: Further Ambrose says on Lk. 5 that "the ship in which
Judas was, was in distress"; wherefore "Peter, who was calm in the
security of his own merits, was in distress about those of others. " But
Peter did not will the sin of Judas. Therefore a person is sometimes
punished without having voluntarily deserved it.
On the contrary, Punishment is due to sin. But every sin is voluntary
according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i). Therefore
vengeance should be taken only on those who have deserved it
voluntarily.
I answer that, Punishment may be considered in two ways. First, under
the aspect of punishment, and in this way punishment is not due save
for sin, because by means of punishment the equality of justice is
restored, in so far as he who by sinning has exceeded in following his
own will suffers something that is contrary to this will. Wherefore,
since every sin is voluntary, not excluding original sin, as stated
above ([3199]FS, Q[81], A[1]), it follows that no one is punished in
this way, except for something done voluntarily. Secondly, punishment
may be considered as a medicine, not only healing the past sin, but
also preserving from future sin, or conducing to some good, and in this
way a person is sometimes punished without any fault of his own, yet
not without cause.
It must, however, be observed that a medicine never removes a greater
good in order to promote a lesser; thus the medicine of the body never
blinds the eye, in order to repair the heel: yet sometimes it is
harmful in lesser things that it may be helpful in things of greater
consequence. And since spiritual goods are of the greatest consequence,
while temporal goods are least important, sometimes a person is
punished in his temporal goods without any fault of his own. Such are
many of the punishments inflicted by God in this present life for our
humiliation or probation. But no one is punished in spiritual goods
without any fault on his part, neither in this nor in the future life,
because in the latter punishment is not medicinal, but a result of
spiritual condemnation.
Reply to Objection 1: A man is never condemned to a spiritual
punishment for another man's sin, because spiritual punishment affects
the soul, in respect of which each man is master of himself. But
sometimes a man is condemned to punishment in temporal matters for the
sin of another, and this for three reasons. First, because one man may
be the temporal goods of another, and so he may be punished in
punishment of the latter: thus children, as to the body, are a
belonging of their father, and slaves are a possession of their master.
Secondly, when one person's sin is transmitted to another, either by
"imitation," as children copy the sins of their parents, and slaves the
sins of their masters, so as to sin with greater daring; or by way of
"merit," as the sinful subjects merit a sinful superior, according to
Job 34:30, "Who maketh a man that is a hypocrite to reign for the sins
of the people? " Hence the people of Israel were punished for David's
sin in numbering the people (2 Kings 24). This may also happen through
some kind of "consent" or "connivance": thus sometimes even the good
are punished in temporal matters together with the wicked, for not
having condemned their sins, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9).
Thirdly, in order to mark the unity of human fellowship, whereby one
man is bound to be solicitous for another, lest he sin; and in order to
inculcate horror of sin, seeing that the punishment of one affects all,
as though all were one body, as Augustine says in speaking of the sin
of Achan (QQ. sup. Josue viii). The saying of the Lord, "Visiting the
iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth
generation," seems to belong to mercy rather than to severity, since He
does not take vengeance forthwith, but waits for some future time, in
order that the descendants at least may mend their ways; yet should the
wickedness of the descendants increase, it becomes almost necessary to
take vengeance on them.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine states (QQ. sup. Josue viii), human
judgment should conform to the divine judgment, when this is manifest,
and God condemns men spiritually for their own sins. But human judgment
cannot be conformed to God's hidden judgments, whereby He punishes
certain persons in temporal matters without any fault of theirs, since
man is unable to grasp the reasons of these judgments so as to know
what is expedient for each individual. Wherefore according to human
judgment a man should never be condemned without fault of his own to an
inflictive punishment, such as death, mutilation or flogging. But a man
may be condemned, even according to human judgment, to a punishment of
forfeiture, even without any fault on his part, but not without cause:
and this in three ways.
First, through a person becoming, without any fault of his,
disqualified for having or acquiring a certain good: thus for being
infected with leprosy a man is removed from the administration of the
Church: and for bigamy, or through pronouncing a death sentence a man
is hindered from receiving sacred orders.
Secondly, because the particular good that he forfeits is not his own
but common property: thus that an episcopal see be attached to a
certain church belongs to the good of the whole city, and not only to
the good of the clerics.
Thirdly, because the good of one person may depend on the good of
another: thus in the crime of high treason a son loses his inheritance
through the sin of his parent.
Reply to Objection 3: By the judgment of God children are punished in
temporal matters together with their parents, both because they are a
possession of their parents, so that their parents are punished also in
their person, and because this is for their good lest, should they be
spared, they might imitate the sins of their parents, and thus deserve
to be punished still more severely. Vengeance is wrought on dumb
animals and any other irrational creatures, because in this way their
owners are punished; and also in horror of sin.
Reply to Objection 4: An act done through compulsion of fear is not
involuntary simply, but has an admixture of voluntariness, as stated
above ([3200]FS, Q[6], AA[5],6).
Reply to Objection 5: The other apostles were distressed about the sin
of Judas, in the same way as the multitude is punished for the sin of
one, in commendation of unity, as state above (Reply OBJ[1],2).
__________________________________________________________________
OF TRUTH (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider truth and the vices opposed thereto. Concerning
truth there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether truth is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Whether it is a part of justice?
(4) Whether it inclines to that which is less?
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Whether truth is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a virtue. For the first of
virtues is faith, whose object is truth. Since then the object precedes
the habit and the act, it seems that truth is not a virtue, but
something prior to virtue.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), it
belongs to truth that a man should state things concerning himself to
be neither more nor less than they are. But this is not always
praiseworthy---neither in good things, since according to Prov. 27:2,
"Let another praise thee, and not thy own mouth"---nor even in evil
things, because it is written in condemnation of certain people (Is.
3:9): "They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have
not hid it. " Therefore truth is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or
intellectual, or moral. Now truth is not a theological virtue, because
its object is not God but temporal things. For Tully says (De Invent.
Rhet. ii) that by "truth we faithfully represent things as they are
were, or will be. " Likewise it is not one of the intellectual virtues,
but their end. Nor again is it a moral virtue, since it is not a mean
between excess and deficiency, for the more one tells the truth, the
better it is. Therefore truth is not a virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher both in the Second and in the Fourth
Book of Ethics places truth among the other virtues.
I answer that, Truth can be taken in two ways. First, for that by
reason of which a thing is said to be true, and thus truth is not a
virtue, but the object or end of a virtue: because, taken in this way,
truth is not a habit, which is the genus containing virtue, but a
certain equality between the understanding or sign and the thing
understood or signified, or again between a thing and its rule, as
stated in the [3201]FP, Q[16], A[1]; [3202]FP, Q[21], A[2]. Secondly,
truth may stand for that by which a person says what is true, in which
sense one is said to be truthful. This truth or truthfulness must needs
be a virtue, because to say what is true is a good act: and virtue is
"that which makes its possessor good, and renders his action good. "
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes truth in the first sense.
Reply to Objection 2: To state that which concerns oneself, in so far
as it is a statement of what is true, is good generically. Yet this
does not suffice for it to be an act of virtue, since it is requisite
for that purpose that it should also be clothed with the due
circumstances, and if these be not observed, the act will be sinful.
Accordingly it is sinful to praise oneself without due cause even for
that which is true: and it is also sinful to publish one's sin, by
praising oneself on that account, or in any way proclaiming it
uselessly.
Reply to Objection 3: A person who says what is true, utters certain
signs which are in conformity with things; and such signs are either
words, or external actions, or any external thing. Now such kinds of
things are the subject-matter of the moral virtues alone, for the
latter are concerned with the use of the external members, in so far as
this use is put into effect at the command of the will. Wherefore truth
is neither a theological, nor an intellectual, but a moral virtue. And
it is a mean between excess and deficiency in two ways. First, on the
part of the object, secondly, on the part of the act. On the part of
the object, because the true essentially denotes a kind of equality,
and equal is a mean between more and less. Hence for the very reason
that a man says what is true about himself, he observes the mean
between one that says more than the truth about himself, and one that
says less than the truth. On the part of the act, to observe the mean
is to tell the truth, when one ought, and as one ought. Excess consists
in making known one's own affairs out of season, and deficiency in
hiding them when one ought to make them known.
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Whether truth is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a special virtue.
indefinite removes the nature of good" (Metaph. ii, text. 8). Therefore
repayment of gratitude should not surpass the favor received.
Objection 3: Further, justice consists in equality. But "more" is
excess of equality. Since therefore excess is sinful in every virtue,
it seems that to repay more than the favor received is sinful and
opposed to justice.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5): "We should repay
those who are gracious to us, by being gracious to them return," and
this is done by repaying more than we have received. Therefore
gratitude should incline to do something greater.
I answer that, As stated above [3190](A[5]), gratitude regards the
favor received according the intention of the benefactor; who seems be
deserving of praise, chiefly for having conferred the favor gratis
without being bound to do so. Wherefore the beneficiary is under a
moral obligation to bestow something gratis in return. Now he does not
seem to bestow something gratis, unless he exceeds the quantity of the
favor received: because so long as he repays less or an equivalent, he
would seem to do nothing gratis, but only to return what he has
received. Therefore gratitude always inclines, as far as possible, to
pay back something more.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[3], ad 5; A[5]), in repaying
favors we must consider the disposition rather than the deed.
Accordingly, if we consider the effect of beneficence, which a son
receives from his parents namely, to be and to live, the son cannot
make an equal repayment, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14).
But if we consider the will of the giver and of the repayer, then it is
possible for the son to pay back something greater to his father, as
Seneca declares (De Benef. iii). If, however, he were unable to do so,
the will to pay back would be sufficient for gratitude.
Reply to Objection 2: The debt of gratitude flows from charity, which
the more it is paid the more it is due, according to Rom. 13:8, "Owe no
man anything, but to love one another. " Wherefore it is not
unreasonable if the obligation of gratitude has no limit.
Reply to Objection 3: As in injustice, which is a cardinal virtue, we
consider equality of things, so in gratitude we consider equality of
wills. For while on the one hand the benefactor of his own free-will
gave something he was not bound to give, so on the other hand the
beneficiary repays something over and above what he has received.
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OF INGRATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider ingratitude, under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether ingratitude is always a sin?
(2) Whether ingratitude is a special sin?
(3) Whether every act of ingratitude is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether favors should be withdrawn from the ungrateful?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether ingratitude is always a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is not always a sin. For Seneca
says (De Benef. iii) that "he who does not repay a favor is
ungrateful. " But sometimes it is impossible to repay a favor without
sinning, for instance if one man has helped another to commit a sin.
Therefore, since it is not a sin to refrain from sinning, it seems that
ingratitude is not always a sin.
Objection 2: Further, every sin is in the power of the person who
commits it: because, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract.
i), "no man sins in what he cannot avoid. " Now sometimes it is not in
the power of the sinner to avoid ingratitude, for instance when he has
not the means of repaying. Again forgetfulness is not in our power, and
yet Seneca declares (De Benef. iii) that "to forget a kindness is the
height of ingratitude. " Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.
Objection 3: Further, there would seem to be no repayment in being
unwilling to owe anything, according to the Apostle (Rom. 13:8), "Owe
no man anything. " Yet "an unwilling debtor is ungrateful," as Seneca
declares (De Benef. iv). Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.
On the contrary, Ingratitude is reckoned among other sins (2 Tim. 3:2),
where it is written: "Disobedient to parents, ungrateful, wicked. " etc.
I answer that, As stated above ([3191]Q[106], A[4], ad 1, A[6]) a debt
of gratitude is a moral debt required by virtue. Now a thing is a sin
from the fact of its being contrary to virtue. Wherefore it is evident
that every ingratitude is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Gratitude regards a favor received: and he that
helps another to commit a sin does him not a favor but an injury: and
so no thanks are due to him, except perhaps on account of his good
will, supposing him to have been deceived, and to have thought to help
him in doing good, whereas he helped him to sin. In such a case the
repayment due to him is not that he should be helped to commit a sin,
because this would be repaying not good but evil, and this is contrary
to gratitude.
Reply to Objection 2: No man is excused from ingratitude through
inability to repay, for the very reason that the mere will suffices for
the repayment of the debt of gratitude, as stated above ([3192]Q[106],
A[6], ad 1).
Forgetfulness of a favor received amounts to ingratitude, not indeed
the forgetfulness that arises from a natural defect, that is not
subject to the will, but that which arises from negligence. For, as
Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), "when forgetfulness of favors lays
hold of a man, he has apparently given little thought to their
repayment. "
Reply to Objection 3: The debt of gratitude flows from the debt of
love, and from the latter no man should wish to be free. Hence that
anyone should owe this debt unwillingly seems to arise from lack of
love for his benefactor.
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Whether ingratitude is a special sin?
Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is not a special sin. For
whoever sins acts against God his sovereign benefactor. But this
pertains to ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.
Objection 2: Further, no special sin is contained under different kinds
of sin. But one can be ungrateful by committing different kinds of sin,
for instance by calumny, theft, or something similar committed against
a benefactor. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.
Objection 3: Further, Seneca writes (De Benef. iii): "It is ungrateful
to take no notice of a kindness, it is ungrateful not to repay one, but
it is the height of ingratitude to forget it. " Now these do not seem to
belong to the same species of sin. Therefore ingratitude is not a
special sin.
On the contrary, Ingratitude is opposed to gratitude or thankfulness,
which is a special virtue. Therefore it is a special sin.
I answer that, Every vice is denominated from a deficiency of virtue,
because deficiency is more opposed to virtue: thus illiberality is more
opposed to liberality than prodigality is. Now a vice may be opposed to
the virtue of gratitude by way of excess, for instance if one were to
show gratitude for things for which gratitude is not due, or sooner
than it is due, as stated above ([3193]Q[106], A[4]). But still more
opposed to gratitude is the vice denoting deficiency of gratitude,
because the virtue of gratitude, as stated above ([3194]Q[106], A[6]),
inclines to return something more. Wherefore ingratitude is properly
denominated from being a deficiency of gratitude. Now every deficiency
or privation takes its species from the opposite habit: for blindness
and deafness differ according to the difference of sight and hearing.
Therefore just as gratitude or thankfulness is one special virtue, so
also is ingratitude one special sin.
It has, however, various degrees corresponding in their order to the
things required for gratitude. The first of these is to recognize the
favor received, the second to express one's appreciation and thanks,
and the third to repay the favor at a suitable place and time according
to one's means. And since what is last in the order of generation is
first in the order of destruction, it follows that the first degree of
ingratitude is when a man fails to repay a favor, the second when he
declines to notice or indicate that he has received a favor, while the
third and supreme degree is when a man fails to recognize the reception
of a favor, whether by forgetting it or in any other way. Moreover,
since opposite affirmation includes negation, it follows that it
belongs to the first degree of ingratitude to return evil for good, to
the second to find fault with a favor received, and to the third to
esteem kindness as though it were unkindness.
Reply to Objection 1: In every sin there is material ingratitude to
God, inasmuch as a man does something that may pertain to ingratitude.
But formal ingratitude is when a favor is actually contemned, and this
is a special sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders the formal aspect of some special
sin from being found materially in several kinds of sin, and in this
way the aspect of ingratitude is to be found in many kinds of sin.
Reply to Objection 3: These three are not different species but
different degrees of one special sin.
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Whether ingratitude is always a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is always a mortal sin. For one
ought to be grateful to God above all. But one is not ungrateful to God
by committing a venial sin: else every man would be guilty of
ingratitude. Therefore no ingratitude is a venial sin.
Objection 2: Further, a sin is mortal through being contrary to
charity, as stated above ([3195]Q[24], A[12]). But ingratitude is
contrary to charity, since the debt of gratitude proceeds from that
virtue, as stated above ([3196]Q[106], A[1], ad 3; A[6], ad 2).
Therefore ingratitude is always a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Between the giver
and the receiver of a favor there is this law, that the former should
forthwith forget having given, and the latter should never forget
having received. " Now, seemingly, the reason why the giver should
forget is that he may be unaware of the sin of the recipient, should
the latter prove ungrateful; and there would be no necessity for that
if ingratitude were a slight sin. Therefore ingratitude is always a
mortal sin.
Objection 4: On the contrary, No one should be put in the way of
committing a mortal sin. Yet, according to Seneca (De Benef. ii),
"sometimes it is necessary to deceive the person who receives
assistance, in order that he may receive without knowing from whom he
has received. " But this would seem to put the recipient in the way of
ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not always a mortal sin.
I answer that, As appears from what we have said above [3197](A[2]), a
man may be ungrateful in two ways: first, by mere omission, for
instance by failing to recognize the favor received, or to express his
appreciation of it or to pay something in return, and this is not
always a mortal sin, because, as stated above (Q[106], A[6]), the debt
of gratitude requires a man to make a liberal return, which, however,
he is not bound to do; wherefore if he fail to do so, he does not sin
mortally. It is nevertheless a venial sin, because it arises either
from some kind of negligence or from some disinclination to virtue in
him. And yet ingratitude of this kind may happen to be a mortal sin, by
reason either of inward contempt, or of the kind of thing withheld,
this being needful to the benefactor, either simply, or in some case of
necessity.
Secondly, a man may be ungrateful, because he not only omits to pay the
debt of gratitude, but does the contrary. This again is sometimes
mortal and sometimes a venial sin, according to the kind of thing that
is done.
It must be observed, however, that when ingratitude arises from a
mortal sin, it has the perfect character of ingratitude, and when it
arises from venial sin, it has the imperfect character.
Reply to Objection 1: By committing a venial sin one is not ungrateful
to God to the extent of incurring the guilt of perfect ingratitude: but
there is something of ingratitude in a venial sin, in so far as it
removes a virtuous act of obedience to God.
Reply to Objection 2: When ingratitude is a venial sin it is not
contrary to, but beside charity: since it does not destroy the habit of
charity, but excludes some act thereof.
Reply to Objection 3: Seneca also says (De Benef. vii): "When we say
that a man after conferring a favor should forget about it, it is a
mistake to suppose that we mean him to shake off the recollection of a
thing so very praiseworthy. When we say: He must not remember it, we
mean that he must not publish it abroad and boast about it. "
Reply to Objection 4: He that is unaware of a favor conferred on him is
not ungrateful, if he fails to repay it, provided he be prepared to do
so if he knew. It is nevertheless commendable at times that the object
of a favor should remain in ignorance of it, both in order to avoid
vainglory, as when Blessed Nicolas threw gold into a house secretly,
wishing to avoid popularity: and because the kindness is all the
greater through the benefactor wishing not to shame the person on whom
he is conferring the favor.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether favors should be withheld from the ungrateful?
Objection 1: It seems that favors should withheld from the ungrateful.
For it is written (Wis. 16:29): "The hope of the unthankful shall melt
away as the winter's ice. " But this hope would not melt away unless
favors were withheld from him. Therefore favors should be withheld from
the ungrateful.
Objection 2: Further, no one should afford another an occasion of
committing sin. But the ungrateful in receiving a favor is given an
occasion of ingratitude. Therefore favors should not be bestowed on the
ungrateful.
Objection 3: Further, "By what things a man sinneth, by the same also
he is tormented" (Wis. 11:17). Now he that is ungrateful when he
receives a favor sins against the favor. Therefore he should be
deprived of the favor.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 6:35) that "the Highest . . . is
kind to the unthankful, and to the evil. " Now we should prove ourselves
His children by imitating Him (Lk. 6:36). Therefore we should not
withhold favors from the ungrateful.
I answer that, There are two points to be considered with regard to an
ungrateful person. The first is what he deserves to suffer and thus it
is certain that he deserves to be deprived of our favor. The second is,
what ought his benefactor to do? For in the first place he should not
easily judge him to be ungrateful, since, as Seneca remarks (De Benef.
iii), "a man is often grateful although he repays not," because perhaps
he has not the means or the opportunity of repaying. Secondly, he
should be inclined to turn his ungratefulness into gratitude, and if he
does not achieve this by being kind to him once, he may by being so a
second time. If, however, the more he repeats his favors, the more
ungrateful and evil the other becomes, he should cease from bestowing
his favors upon him.
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted speaks of what the ungrateful
man deserves to suffer.
Reply to Objection 2: He that bestows a favor on an ungrateful person
affords him an occasion not of sin but of gratitude and love. And if
the recipient takes therefrom an occasion of ingratitude, this is not
to be imputed to the bestower.
Reply to Objection 3: He that bestows a favor must not at once act the
part of a punisher of ingratitude, but rather that of a kindly
physician, by healing the ingratitude with repeated favors.
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OF VENGEANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider vengeance, under which head there are four points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether vengeance is lawful?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Of the manner of taking vengeance;
(4) On whom should vengeance be taken?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether vengeance is lawful?
Objection 1: It seems that vengeance is not lawful. For whoever usurps
what is God's sins. But vengeance belongs to God, for it is written
(Dt. 32:35, Rom. 12:19): "Revenge to Me, and I will repay. " Therefore
all vengeance is unlawful.
Objection 2: Further, he that takes vengeance on a man does not bear
with him. But we ought to bear with the wicked, for a gloss on Cant
2:2, "As the lily among the thorns," says: "He is not a good man that
cannot bear with a wicked one. " Therefore we should not take vengeance
on the wicked.
Objection 3: Further, vengeance is taken by inflicting punishment,
which is the cause of servile fear. But the New Law is not a law of
fear, but of love, as Augustine states (Contra Adamant. xvii).
Therefore at least in the New Testament all vengeance is unlawful.
Objection 4: Further, a man is said to avenge himself when he takes
revenge for wrongs inflicted on himself. But, seemingly, it is unlawful
even for a judge to punish those who have wronged him: for Chrysostom
[*Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth. , falsely ascribed to St.
Chrysostom] says: "Let us learn after Christ's example to bear our own
wrongs with magnanimity, yet not to suffer God's wrongs, not even by
listening to them. " Therefore vengeance seems to be unlawful.
Objection 5: Further, the sin of a multitude is more harmful than the
sin of only one: for it is written (Ecclus. 26:5-7): "Of three things
my heart hath been afraid . . . the accusation of a city, and the
gathering together of the people, and a false calumny. " But vengeance
should not be taken on the sin of a multitude, for a gloss on Mat.
13:29,30, "Lest perhaps . . . you root up the wheat . . . suffer both
to grow," says that "a multitude should not be excommunicated, nor
should the sovereign. " Neither therefore is any other vengeance lawful.
On the contrary, We should look to God for nothing save what is good
and lawful. But we are to look to God for vengeance on His enemies: for
it is written (Lk. 18:7): "Will not God revenge His elect who cry to
Him day and night? " as if to say: "He will indeed. " Therefore vengeance
is not essentially evil and unlawful.
I answer that, Vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil on
one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we must
consider the mind of the avenger. For if his intention is directed
chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance and rests
there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because to take
pleasure in another's evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary to the
charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor is it an excuse that
he intends the evil of one who has unjustly inflicted evil on him, as
neither is a man excused for hating one that hates him: for a man may
not sin against another just because the latter has already sinned
against him, since this is to be overcome by evil, which was forbidden
by the Apostle, who says (Rom. 12:21): "Be not overcome by evil, but
overcome evil by good.
"
If, however, the avenger's intention be directed chiefly to some good,
to be obtained by means of the punishment of the person who has sinned
(for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may be
restrained and others be not disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and
God honored), then vengeance may be lawful, provided other due
circumstances be observed.
Reply to Objection 1: He who takes vengeance on the wicked in keeping
with his rank and position does not usurp what belongs to God but makes
use of the power granted him by God. For it is written (Rom. 13:4) of
the earthly prince that "he is God's minister, an avenger to execute
wrath upon him that doeth evil. " If, however, a man takes vengeance
outside the order of divine appointment, he usurps what is God's and
therefore sins.
Reply to Objection 2: The good bear with the wicked by enduring
patiently, and in due manner, the wrongs they themselves receive from
them: but they do not bear with them as to endure the wrongs they
inflict on God and their neighbor. For Chrysostom [*Cf. Opus
Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth. , falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom]
says: "It is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to
overlook God's wrongs is most wicked. "
Reply to Objection 3: The law of the Gospel is the law of love, and
therefore those who do good out of love, and who alone properly belong
to the Gospel, ought not to be terrorized by means of punishment, but
only those who are not moved by love to do good, and who, though they
belong to the Church outwardly, do not belong to it in merit.
Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes a wrong done to a person reflects on
God and the Church: and then it is the duty of that person to avenge
the wrong. For example, Elias made fire descend on those who were come
to seize him (4 Kings 1); likewise Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked
him (4 Kings 2); and Pope Sylverius excommunicated those who sent him
into exile (XXIII, Q. iv, Cap. Guilisarius). But in so far as the wrong
inflicted on a man affects his person, he should bear it patiently if
this be expedient. For these precepts of patience are to be understood
as referring to preparedness of the mind, as Augustine states (De Serm.
Dom. in Monte i).
Reply to Objection 5: When the whole multitude sins, vengeance must be
taken on them, either in respect of the whole multitude---thus the
Egyptians were drowned in the Red Sea while they were pursuing the
children of Israel (Ex. 14), and the people of Sodom were entirely
destroyed (Gn. 19)---or as regards part of the multitude, as may be
seen in the punishment of those who worshipped the calf.
Sometimes, however, if there is hope of many making amends, the
severity of vengeance should be brought to bear on a few of the
principals, whose punishment fills the rest with fear; thus the Lord
(Num 25) commanded the princes of the people to be hanged for the sin
of the multitude.
On the other hand, if it is not the whole but only a part of the
multitude that has sinned, then if the guilty can be separated from the
innocent, vengeance should be wrought on them: provided, however, that
this can be done without scandal to others; else the multitude should
be spared and severity foregone. The same applies to the sovereign,
whom the multitude follow. For his sin should be borne with, if it
cannot be punished without scandal to the multitude: unless indeed his
sin were such, that it would do more harm to the multitude, either
spiritually or temporally, than would the scandal that was feared to
arise from his punishment.
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Whether vengeance is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that vengeance is not a special and distinct
virtue. For just as the good are rewarded for their good deeds, so are
the wicked punished for their evil deeds. Now the rewarding of the good
does not belong to a special virtue, but is an act of commutative
justice. Therefore in the same way vengeance should not be accounted a
special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, there is no need to appoint a special virtue for
an act to which a man is sufficiently disposed by the other virtues.
Now man is sufficiently disposed by the virtues of fortitude or zeal to
avenge evil. Therefore vengeance should not be reckoned a special
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, there is a special vice opposed to every special
virtue. But seemingly no special vice is opposed to vengeance.
Therefore it is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of
justice.
I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1), aptitude to
virtue is in us by nature, but the complement of virtue is in us
through habituation or some other cause. Hence it is evident that
virtues perfect us so that we follow in due manner our natural
inclinations, which belong to the natural right. Wherefore to every
definite natural inclination there corresponds a special virtue. Now
there is a special inclination of nature to remove harm, for which
reason animals have the irascible power distinct from the
concupiscible. Man resists harm by defending himself against wrongs,
lest they be inflicted on him, or he avenges those which have already
been inflicted on him, with the intention, not of harming, but of
removing the harm done. And this belongs to vengeance, for Tully says
(De Invent. Rhet. ii) that by "vengeance we resist force, or wrong, and
in general whatever is obscure" [*'Obscurum' Cicero wrote 'obfuturum'
but the sense is the same as St. Thomas gives in the parenthesis]
"(i. e. derogatory), either by self-defense or by avenging it. "
Therefore vengeance is a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as repayment of a legal debt belongs to
commutative justice, and as repayment of a moral debt, arising from the
bestowal of a particular favor, belongs to the virtue of gratitude, so
too the punishment of sins, so far as it is the concern of public
justice, is an act of commutative justice; while so far as it is
concerned in defending the rights of the individual by whom a wrong is
resisted, it belongs to the virtue of revenge.
Reply to Objection 2: Fortitude disposes to vengeance by removing an
obstacle thereto, namely, fear of an imminent danger. Zeal, as denoting
the fervor of love, signifies the primary root of vengeance, in so far
as a man avenges the wrong done to God and his neighbor, because
charity makes him regard them as his own. Now every act of virtue
proceeds from charity as its root, since, according to Gregory (Hom.
xxvii in Ev. ), "there are no green leaves on the bough of good works,
unless charity be the root. "
Reply to Objection 3: Two vices are opposed to vengeance: one by way of
excess, namely, the sin of cruelty or brutality, which exceeds the
measure in punishing: while the other is a vice by way of deficiency
and consists in being remiss in punishing, wherefore it is written
(Prov. 13:24): "He that spareth the rod hateth his son. " But the virtue
of vengeance consists in observing the due measure of vengeance with
regard to all the circumstances.
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Whether vengeance should be wrought by means of punishments customary among
men?
Objection 1: It seems that vengeance should not be wrought by means of
punishments customary among men. For to put a man to death is to uproot
him. But our Lord forbade (Mat. 13:29) the uprooting of the cockle,
whereby the children of the wicked one are signified. Therefore sinners
should not be put to death.
Objection 2: Further, all who sin mortally seem to be deserving of the
same punishment. Therefore if some who sin mortally are punished with
death, it seems that all such persons should be punished with death:
and this is evidently false.
Objection 3: Further, to punish a man publicly for his sin seems to
publish his sin: and this would seem to have a harmful effect on the
multitude, since the example of sin is taken by them as an occasion for
sin. Therefore it seems that the punishment of death should not be
inflicted for a sin.
On the contrary, These punishments are fixed by the divine law as
appears from what we have said above ([3198]FS, Q[105], A[2]).
I answer that, Vengeance is lawful and virtuous so far as it tends to
the prevention of evil. Now some who are not influenced by motive of
virtue are prevented from committing sin, through fear of losing those
things which they love more than those they obtain by sinning, else
fear would be no restraint to sin. Consequently vengeance for sin
should be taken by depriving a man of what he loves most. Now the
things which man loves most are life, bodily safety, his own freedom,
and external goods such as riches, his country and his good name.
Wherefore, according to Augustine's reckoning (De Civ. Dei xxi), "Tully
writes that the laws recognize eight kinds of punishment": namely,
"death," whereby man is deprived of life; "stripes," "retaliation," or
the loss of eye for eye, whereby man forfeits his bodily safety;
"slavery," and "imprisonment," whereby he is deprived of freedom;
"exile" whereby he is banished from his country; "fines," whereby he is
mulcted in his riches; "ignominy," whereby he loses his good name.
Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord forbids the uprooting of the cockle,
when there is fear lest the wheat be uprooted together with it. But
sometimes the wicked can be uprooted by death, not only without danger,
but even with great profit, to the good. Wherefore in such a case the
punishment of death may be inflicted on sinners.
Reply to Objection 2: All who sin mortally are deserving of eternal
death, as regards future retribution, which is in accordance with the
truth of the divine judgment. But the punishments of this life are more
of a medicinal character; wherefore the punishment of death is
inflicted on those sins alone which conduce to the grave undoing of
others.
Reply to Objection 3: The very fact that the punishment, whether of
death or of any kind that is fearsome to man, is made known at the same
time as the sin, makes man's will avers to sin: because the fear of
punishment is greater than the enticement of the example of sin.
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Whether vengeance should be taken on those who have sinned involuntarily?
Objection 1: It seems that vengeance should be taken on those who have
sinned involuntarily. For the will of one man does not follow from the
will of another. Yet one man is punished for another, according to Ex.
20:5, "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the
fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation. " Thus
for the sin of Cham, his son Chanaan was curse (Gn. 9:25) and for the
sin of Giezi, his descendants were struck with leprosy (4 Kings 5).
Again the blood of Christ lays the descendants of the Jews under the
ban of punishment, for they said (Mat. 27:25): "His blood be upon us
and upon our children. " Moreover we read (Josue 7) that the people of
Israel were delivered into the hands of their enemies for the sin of
Achan, and that the same people were overthrown by the Philistines on
account of the sin of the sons of Heli (1 Kings 4). Therefore a person
is to be punished without having deserved it voluntarily.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is voluntary except what is in a man's
power. But sometimes a man is punished for what is not in his power;
thus a man is removed from the administration of the Church on account
of being infected with leprosy; and a Church ceases to be an episcopal
see on account of the depravity or evil of the people. Therefore
vengeance is taken not only for voluntary sins.
Objection 3: Further, ignorance makes an act involuntary. Now vengeance
is sometimes taken on the ignorant. Thus the children of the people of
Sodom, though they were in invincible ignorance, perished with their
parents (Gn. 19). Again, for the sin of Dathan and Abiron their
children were swallowed up together with them (Num 16). Moreover, dumb
animals, which are devoid of reason, were commanded to be slain on
account of the sin of the Amalekites (1 Kings 15). Therefore vengeance
is sometimes taken on those who have deserved it involuntarily.
Objection 4: Further, compulsion is most opposed to voluntariness. But
a man does not escape the debt of punishment through being compelled by
fear to commit a sin. Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those
who have deserved it involuntarily.
Objection 5: Further Ambrose says on Lk. 5 that "the ship in which
Judas was, was in distress"; wherefore "Peter, who was calm in the
security of his own merits, was in distress about those of others. " But
Peter did not will the sin of Judas. Therefore a person is sometimes
punished without having voluntarily deserved it.
On the contrary, Punishment is due to sin. But every sin is voluntary
according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i). Therefore
vengeance should be taken only on those who have deserved it
voluntarily.
I answer that, Punishment may be considered in two ways. First, under
the aspect of punishment, and in this way punishment is not due save
for sin, because by means of punishment the equality of justice is
restored, in so far as he who by sinning has exceeded in following his
own will suffers something that is contrary to this will. Wherefore,
since every sin is voluntary, not excluding original sin, as stated
above ([3199]FS, Q[81], A[1]), it follows that no one is punished in
this way, except for something done voluntarily. Secondly, punishment
may be considered as a medicine, not only healing the past sin, but
also preserving from future sin, or conducing to some good, and in this
way a person is sometimes punished without any fault of his own, yet
not without cause.
It must, however, be observed that a medicine never removes a greater
good in order to promote a lesser; thus the medicine of the body never
blinds the eye, in order to repair the heel: yet sometimes it is
harmful in lesser things that it may be helpful in things of greater
consequence. And since spiritual goods are of the greatest consequence,
while temporal goods are least important, sometimes a person is
punished in his temporal goods without any fault of his own. Such are
many of the punishments inflicted by God in this present life for our
humiliation or probation. But no one is punished in spiritual goods
without any fault on his part, neither in this nor in the future life,
because in the latter punishment is not medicinal, but a result of
spiritual condemnation.
Reply to Objection 1: A man is never condemned to a spiritual
punishment for another man's sin, because spiritual punishment affects
the soul, in respect of which each man is master of himself. But
sometimes a man is condemned to punishment in temporal matters for the
sin of another, and this for three reasons. First, because one man may
be the temporal goods of another, and so he may be punished in
punishment of the latter: thus children, as to the body, are a
belonging of their father, and slaves are a possession of their master.
Secondly, when one person's sin is transmitted to another, either by
"imitation," as children copy the sins of their parents, and slaves the
sins of their masters, so as to sin with greater daring; or by way of
"merit," as the sinful subjects merit a sinful superior, according to
Job 34:30, "Who maketh a man that is a hypocrite to reign for the sins
of the people? " Hence the people of Israel were punished for David's
sin in numbering the people (2 Kings 24). This may also happen through
some kind of "consent" or "connivance": thus sometimes even the good
are punished in temporal matters together with the wicked, for not
having condemned their sins, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9).
Thirdly, in order to mark the unity of human fellowship, whereby one
man is bound to be solicitous for another, lest he sin; and in order to
inculcate horror of sin, seeing that the punishment of one affects all,
as though all were one body, as Augustine says in speaking of the sin
of Achan (QQ. sup. Josue viii). The saying of the Lord, "Visiting the
iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth
generation," seems to belong to mercy rather than to severity, since He
does not take vengeance forthwith, but waits for some future time, in
order that the descendants at least may mend their ways; yet should the
wickedness of the descendants increase, it becomes almost necessary to
take vengeance on them.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine states (QQ. sup. Josue viii), human
judgment should conform to the divine judgment, when this is manifest,
and God condemns men spiritually for their own sins. But human judgment
cannot be conformed to God's hidden judgments, whereby He punishes
certain persons in temporal matters without any fault of theirs, since
man is unable to grasp the reasons of these judgments so as to know
what is expedient for each individual. Wherefore according to human
judgment a man should never be condemned without fault of his own to an
inflictive punishment, such as death, mutilation or flogging. But a man
may be condemned, even according to human judgment, to a punishment of
forfeiture, even without any fault on his part, but not without cause:
and this in three ways.
First, through a person becoming, without any fault of his,
disqualified for having or acquiring a certain good: thus for being
infected with leprosy a man is removed from the administration of the
Church: and for bigamy, or through pronouncing a death sentence a man
is hindered from receiving sacred orders.
Secondly, because the particular good that he forfeits is not his own
but common property: thus that an episcopal see be attached to a
certain church belongs to the good of the whole city, and not only to
the good of the clerics.
Thirdly, because the good of one person may depend on the good of
another: thus in the crime of high treason a son loses his inheritance
through the sin of his parent.
Reply to Objection 3: By the judgment of God children are punished in
temporal matters together with their parents, both because they are a
possession of their parents, so that their parents are punished also in
their person, and because this is for their good lest, should they be
spared, they might imitate the sins of their parents, and thus deserve
to be punished still more severely. Vengeance is wrought on dumb
animals and any other irrational creatures, because in this way their
owners are punished; and also in horror of sin.
Reply to Objection 4: An act done through compulsion of fear is not
involuntary simply, but has an admixture of voluntariness, as stated
above ([3200]FS, Q[6], AA[5],6).
Reply to Objection 5: The other apostles were distressed about the sin
of Judas, in the same way as the multitude is punished for the sin of
one, in commendation of unity, as state above (Reply OBJ[1],2).
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OF TRUTH (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider truth and the vices opposed thereto. Concerning
truth there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether truth is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Whether it is a part of justice?
(4) Whether it inclines to that which is less?
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Whether truth is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a virtue. For the first of
virtues is faith, whose object is truth. Since then the object precedes
the habit and the act, it seems that truth is not a virtue, but
something prior to virtue.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), it
belongs to truth that a man should state things concerning himself to
be neither more nor less than they are. But this is not always
praiseworthy---neither in good things, since according to Prov. 27:2,
"Let another praise thee, and not thy own mouth"---nor even in evil
things, because it is written in condemnation of certain people (Is.
3:9): "They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have
not hid it. " Therefore truth is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or
intellectual, or moral. Now truth is not a theological virtue, because
its object is not God but temporal things. For Tully says (De Invent.
Rhet. ii) that by "truth we faithfully represent things as they are
were, or will be. " Likewise it is not one of the intellectual virtues,
but their end. Nor again is it a moral virtue, since it is not a mean
between excess and deficiency, for the more one tells the truth, the
better it is. Therefore truth is not a virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher both in the Second and in the Fourth
Book of Ethics places truth among the other virtues.
I answer that, Truth can be taken in two ways. First, for that by
reason of which a thing is said to be true, and thus truth is not a
virtue, but the object or end of a virtue: because, taken in this way,
truth is not a habit, which is the genus containing virtue, but a
certain equality between the understanding or sign and the thing
understood or signified, or again between a thing and its rule, as
stated in the [3201]FP, Q[16], A[1]; [3202]FP, Q[21], A[2]. Secondly,
truth may stand for that by which a person says what is true, in which
sense one is said to be truthful. This truth or truthfulness must needs
be a virtue, because to say what is true is a good act: and virtue is
"that which makes its possessor good, and renders his action good. "
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes truth in the first sense.
Reply to Objection 2: To state that which concerns oneself, in so far
as it is a statement of what is true, is good generically. Yet this
does not suffice for it to be an act of virtue, since it is requisite
for that purpose that it should also be clothed with the due
circumstances, and if these be not observed, the act will be sinful.
Accordingly it is sinful to praise oneself without due cause even for
that which is true: and it is also sinful to publish one's sin, by
praising oneself on that account, or in any way proclaiming it
uselessly.
Reply to Objection 3: A person who says what is true, utters certain
signs which are in conformity with things; and such signs are either
words, or external actions, or any external thing. Now such kinds of
things are the subject-matter of the moral virtues alone, for the
latter are concerned with the use of the external members, in so far as
this use is put into effect at the command of the will. Wherefore truth
is neither a theological, nor an intellectual, but a moral virtue. And
it is a mean between excess and deficiency in two ways. First, on the
part of the object, secondly, on the part of the act. On the part of
the object, because the true essentially denotes a kind of equality,
and equal is a mean between more and less. Hence for the very reason
that a man says what is true about himself, he observes the mean
between one that says more than the truth about himself, and one that
says less than the truth. On the part of the act, to observe the mean
is to tell the truth, when one ought, and as one ought. Excess consists
in making known one's own affairs out of season, and deficiency in
hiding them when one ought to make them known.
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Whether truth is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a special virtue.
