Stoicism encountered difficulties which were no less great, in
carrying
out its teleology.
Windelband - History of Philosophy
p.
34.
188 Hellenistic-Roman Thought ; Ethical Period. [Pari II.
as whose seat the heart was assumed, was regarded as extending its particular ramifications throughout the whole body, like the "arms of a polyp. " Of such particular "pneuraata" the Stoa assumed seven, — the five senses, the faculty of speech, and the reproductive power. As the unity of the divine Primitive Being dwells in the universe, so the individual personality lives in the body.
It is characteristic that the Epicureans could entirely -adopt this external apparatus of psychological views. For them, too, the soul — which according to Democritus consists of the finest atoms — is a fiery, atmospheric breath (they apply likewise the term "pneuma"); but they see in this breath something that is intro duced into the body from without, something held fast by the body and mechanically connected with which in death forthwith scattered. They also distinguish between the rational and the irrational part of the soul, without, however, being able to attribute to the former the metaphysical dignity which acquired in the Stoic theory. Here, too, their doctrine on the whole, insufficient and dependent.
In accordance with the pantheistic presupposition of the system, the metaphysics and physics of the Stoics form also theology, system of natural religion based on scientific demonstra tion, and this found also poetic presentations in the school, such as the hymn of Cleanthes. Epicureanism, on the contrary, is in its whole nature anti-religious. It takes throughout the standpoint of " Enlightenment," that religion has been overcome by science, and that the task and triumph of wisdom to put aside the phantoms of superstition which have grown out of fear and ignorance. The poet of this school depicts in grotesque outlines the evils which religion brought on man, and sings the glory of their conquest by scientific knowledge. 1 It all the more amusing that the Epicurean theory itself fell to depicting mythology of its own which re garded as harmless. It believed that certain degree of truth must attach to the universal faith in gods,1 but found that this correct idea was disfigured by false assumptions. These sought in the myths which feigned participation of the gods in human life, and an interference on their part in the course of things even the Stoics' belief in Providence appeared to them in this respect as but a refined illusion. Epicurus, therefore, — following Democritus in his doctrine of the eidola, or images 10, 4), — saw in the gods giant forms resembling men, who lead blessed life of contemplation and spiritual intercourse in the intermediate spaces between the
Lucret. De Rer. Nat. 62 ff. Diog. Laert. X. 123 U§. 60
»
7. a
I. a
f. ;
it ;
it
is
p f.
it
*
is,
it,
a (§
a
it
is a
it is
a
Ckap. 1, { Id. ] Mechanism and Teleology : Epicureans, Stoics. 189
worlds (intermundia), undisturbed by the change of events, and unconcerned as to the destiny of lower beings ; and thus this doc trine, also, is fundamentally only the attempt of Epicureanism to put in mythological form its ideal of aesthetic self-enjoyment.
8. It was in an entirely different way that the ideas of the popular religion were fitted into the Stoic metaphysics. Whereas,
up to this time in the development of Greek thought philosoph ical theology had separated itself farther and farther from the indigenous mythology, we meet here, for the first time, the systematic attempt to bring natural and positive religion into harmony. Accordingly, when the Stoics, also, yielded to the need of recognising the warrant of ideas universally present throughout the human race (cf. § 17, 4), their pneuma doctrine offered them not only a welcome instrument, but suggestions that were determinative.
For consideration of the universe must teach them that the divine World-power has evidently taken on mightier forms and those of more vigorous life than individual human souls; and so, beside the one deity without beginning and end, which for the most part they
designated as Zeus, a great number of "gods that had come into exist- t*re," made their appearance. To these the Stoics, as Plato and Aristotle had already done, reckoned first of all the stars, which
they too honoured as higher intelligences and especially pure for mations of the primitive fire, and further, the personifications of other natural forces in which the power of Providence, benevolent to man, reveals itself. From this point of view we can understand bow an extensive interpretation of myths was the order of the day in the Stoic school, seeking to incorporate the popular figures in its Metaphysical system by all kinds of allegories. In addition to this there was an equally welcome use of the Euemeristic theory, which not only explained and justified the deification of prominent men, but taught also to consider the demons sacred, as the guardian iflints of individual men.
Thus the Stoic world became peopled with a whole host of higher tad lower gods, bnt they all appeared as ultimately but emanations of the one highest World-power, — as the subordinate powers or forces
which, themselves determined by the universal Pneuma, were con ceived of as the ruling spirits of the world's life. They formed, therefore, for the faith of the Stoics, the mediating organs, which
represent, each in its realm, the vital force and Providence of the World-reason, and to them the piety of the Stoics turned in the forms of worship of positive religion. The polytheism of the popular faith was thus philosophically re-established, and taken up as an lolegraat constituent into metaphysical pantheism.
190 Hellenistic- Roman Thought : Ethical Period. [Part II.
In connection with this scientific reconstruction of positive re ligion stands the theoretical justification of divination in the Stoic system where it awakened great interest, except in the case of a few men like Panaetius, who thought more coolly. The interconnection and providentially governed unity of the world's processes was held to show itself — as one form of manifestation — in the possibility that different things and processes which stand in no direct causal rela tion to one another, may yet point to one another by delicate rela tions, and therefore be able to serve as signs for one another. The human soul is capable of understanding these by virtue of its rela tionship with the all-ruling Pneuma, but for the full interpretation of such ecstatic revelations the art and science of divination, resting upon experience, must be added. On this basis Stoicism regarded itself as strong enough to elaborate philosophically all the divination of the ancient world. This was especially true of its younger repre sentatives, and in particular, as it seems, of Posidonius.
§ 16. The Freedom of the Will and the Perfection of the World.
The sharp definition of the contrasted mechanical and teleological views of the world, and especially the difference in the conceptional forms in which the thought, common to a certain extent, of Nature's universal conformity to law had been developed, led, in connection with the ethical postulates and presuppositions which controlled the thought of the time, to two new problems, which from the beginning had various complications. These were the problems of the freedom of the human will and of the goodness and perfection of the world. Both problems grew out of contradictions which made their appearance between moral needs and just those meta physical theories which had been formed to satisfy those needs.
1. The proper home for the formation of these new problems was the Stoic system, and they may be understood as the necessary consequence of a deep and ultimately irreconcilable antagonism be tween the fundamental principles of the system. These principles are metaphysical monism and ethical dualism. The fundamental moral doctrine of the Stoics, according to which man should overcome the world in his own impulses by virtue, presupposes an anthropological duality, an opposition in human nature in accordance with which reason stands over against a sensuous nature contrary to reason. Without this antithesis the whole Stoic ethics is ready to fall. The metaphysical doctrine, however, by which the command of reason in man is to be explained, postulates such an unrestricted and all
Chaf. 1, J 1<J. ] Freedom of the Will : Socrates, Aristotle. 191
controlling reality of the World-reason that the reality of what is contrary to reason, either in man or in the course of the world, cannot be united therewith. From this source grew the two ques tions which since then have never ceased to employ man's critical investigation, although all essential points of view that can come into consideration in the case were more or less clearly illumined at that time.
2. The conceptions which form the presuppositions for the prob lem offreedom lie ready at hand in the ethical reflections ou the voluntary nature of wrongdoing, which were begun by Socrates and brought to a preliminary conclusion by Aristotle in a brilliant investigation. 1 The motives of these thoughts are ethical through out, and the domain in which they move is exclusively psychologi cal. The question at issue is hence essentially that of freedom of choice, and while the reality of this is doubtless affirmed upon the
basis of immediate feeling, and with reference to man's conscious ness of his responsibility, difficulty arises only in consequence of the intellectualistic conception of Socrates, who brought the will into complete dependence upon insight. This difficulty develops primarily in the double meaning of " freedom," or, as it is here still called, " voluntariness " (Uownov), an ambiguity which has since been repeated again and again in the most variously shifted forms. According to Socrates, all ethically wrong action proceeds from a wrong view — a view clouded by desires. He who thus acts does not " know," therefore, what he is doing, and in this sense he acts
involuntarily. ' That is, only the wise man is free ; the wicked is n»t free. 1 From this ethical conception of freedom, however, the /tfchological conception of freedom —i. e. the conception of freedom of choice as the ability to decide between different motives — must be carefully separated. Whether Socrates did this is a question ; ' at all events, it was done by Plato. The latter expressly affirmed man's freedom of choice,' appealing to his responsibility, — a psycho logical decision on essentially ethical grounds, — and, at the same time, he held fast to the Soc ratio doctrine that the wicked man acts involuntarily, i. e. is ethically not free. He even connects the two directly when he develops the thought * that man may sink into the
' BtK . Vfc. III. 1-8.
< Xen Mem. III. 9, 4 ; Cyrop. HI. 1, 38.
• Ct Art*. Etk. Sic. III. 7, 113 b 14.
* According to a remark in the Peripatetic Magna Moralia (I. 9, 1187 a 7)
Vicrate*. indeed, had expressly said, " it is not in our power" to be good or bad According to thla, therefore, he had denied pgycholoKical freedom.
* Flat. Hep. X. 617 ff. • Pfau. Ftued. 81 B.
i92 Hellenistic-Roman Thought: Ethical Period. [Part IL
condition of ethical non-freedom by his own fault, and, therefore,
with psychological freedom.
With Aristotle, who separated himself farther from the Socratic
intellectualism, the psychological conception of freedom comes out more clearly and independently. He proceeds from the position that ethical qualification in general is applicable only in the case of " voluntary " actions, and discusses in the first place the prejudices which this voluntariness sustains, partly from external force (/? »? ) and psychical compulsion, and partly from ignorance of the matter. That action only is completely voluntary which has its origin in the personality itself, and of which the relations are fully known. 1 The whole investigation ' is maintained from the standpoint of responsi bility, and the discovered conception of voluntariness is designed to lead to the conception of accountability. It contains within itself the characteristics of external freedom of action, and of a conception of the situation unclouded by any deception. But, on this account, it must be still further restricted, for among his voluntary acts a man can be held accountable for those only that proceed from a choice (wpoaiptfris). 3 Freedom of choice, therefore, which proceeds by reflecting upon ends as well as upon means, is the condition of ethical accountability.
Aristotle avoided a farther entrance upon the psychology of motivation and upon the determining causes of this choice ; he con tents himself with establishing the position that the personality itself is the sufficient reason for the actions * which are ascribed to it ; and to this maintenance of the freedom of choice his school, and
especially Theophrastus, freedom, held fast.
who composed a treatise of his own on
3. On this same basis we find also the Stoics, in so far as purely ethical considerations are concerned. Precisely that lively feeling of responsibility which characterises their morals demanded of them the recognition of this free choice on the part of the individual, and they sought therefore to maintain this in every way.
Their position became critical, however, by reason of the fact that their metaphysics, with its doctrine of fate and providence, drove them beyond this attitude. For since this theory of fate made man, like all other creatures, determined in all his external and internal formation and in all that he does and suffers, by the
1 Kth. Nic. III. 3, 1111 a 73 : oS * tpXh *» *{'Tv 'liir* T* *«*" '««"» '» •*« *
rp&iis.
■ Aa the reference at the beginning to the right of punishment clearly ahowi
>Stk. Nic. 1109 b 34).
« lb. 4, 1112 a 1.
• lb. 6, 1112 b 31 : torn Si] . . . trtpurot rtrat ipx*l rwr r/tdfcwy. -
Chat. 1, $ 18. ] Freedom of the Will : Stoics, Epicurus. 19?
all-animating World-power, personality ceased to be the true ground (<L>X*i) of his actions, and these appeared to be, like all else that occurs, but the predetermined and unavoidably necessary operations of the God-Nature. In fact, the Stoa did not shrink from this extreme consequence of determinism; on the contrary, Ghrysippus heaped up proof on proof for this doctrine. He based it upon the principle of sufficient reason (cf. above, § 15, 2) ; he showed that
only by presupposing this could the correctness of judgments con cerning the future be maintained, since a criterion for their truth or falsity is given only if the matter is already determined ; ' he also gave to this argument the changed form, that since only the necessary can be known, and not that which is still undecided, the
foreknowledge of the gods makes necessary the assumption of deter minism; he even did not scorn to adduce the fulfilment of predic Dona as a welcome argument.
In this doctrine, which, from the standpoint of the Stoic doctrine of the logos, was completely consistent, the opponents of the system saw of course a decided denial of freedom of the will, and of the criticisms which the system experienced this was perhaps the most frequent and at the same time the most incisive. Among the numerous attacks the best known is the so-called ignava ratio, or *- lazy reason " (apyos A. dyot), which from the claim of the unavoid able necessity of future events draws the fatalistic conclusion that one should await them inactively, — an attack which Ghrysippus did not know how to avoid except by the aid of very forced distinc tions. ' The Stoics, on the contrary, concerned themselves to show that in spite of this determinism, and rather exactly by virtue of man remains the cause of his actions in the sense that he to be made responsible for them. On the basis of distinction between main and accessory causes (which, moreover, reminds us throughout of the Platonic oTtiov and (womov) Ghrysippus showed that every decision of the will does indeed necessarily follow from the co-opera tion of man with his environment, but that just here the outer circumstances are only the accessory causes, while the assent pro ceeding from the personality the main cause, and to this account ability applies. While, however, this voluntarily acting ijycftovucoV, or ruling faculty of man, determined from the universal Pneuma, this Pneuma takes on in every separate being self-subsistent
Cfc. Dt Palo, 10, 20. So far as concerns disjunctive propositions Epicurus also lor this reason gave up the truth of disjunction Cic. Dt Nat. Dtor. H. 70.
•Cic Dt Fato, U, 28 ft Che. Dt Fato, 10, 30 fl.
•1
:
a
L
it,
is
is
a
'
is
194 Hellenistic-Roman Thought : Ethical Period. [1*aht II.
nature, different from that of others, and this is to be regarded as a proper aprf-1 ^n particular, the Stoics make prominent the point that responsibility, as a judgment pronounced on the ethical quality of actions and characters, is quite independent of the question whether the persons or deeds might, in the course of events, have been other than they were, or not. 1
4. The problem of the freedom of the will, which had been already complicated ethically and psychologically, experienced in this way still further a metaphysical and (in the Stoic sense) theo logical complication, and the consequence was that the indeterminists who were opponents of the Stoa gave a new turn to the conception of freedom which they regarded as threatened by the Stoic doctrine, and brought it into sharp definition. The assumption of the excep tionless causal nexus to which even the functions of the will were to be subordinated, seemed to exclude the capacity of free decision ; but this freedom of choice had, since Aristotle, been regarded in all schools as the indispensable presupposition of ethical accountability. On this account the opponents thought — and this gave the contro versy its especial violence — that they were defending an ethical good when they combated the Stoic doctrine of fate, and with that the Democritic principle of natural necessity. And if Chrysippus had appealed to the principle of sufficient reason to establish this, Carneades, to whom the freedom of the will was an incontestable fact, did not fear to draw in question the universal and invariable validity of this principle. *
Epicurus went still farther. He found the Stoic determinism so irreconcilable with the wise man's self-determination which formed the essential feature of his ethical ideal, that he would rather still assume the illusory ideas of religion than believe in such a slavery of the soul. 4 Therefore he, too, denied the universal validity of the causal law and subsumed freedom together with chance under the conception of uncaused occurrence. Thus in opposition to Stoic determinism, the metaphysical conception of freedom arose, by means of which Epicurus put the uncaused function of the will in man upon a parallel with the causeless deviation of the atoms from their line of fall (cf. § 15, 4). The freedom of indeterminism means, accordingly, a choice between different possibilities that is deter mined by no causes, aud Epicurus thought thereby to rescue moral responsibility.
This metaphysical conception of freedom as causelessness is not at
«Alex. Aphr. DeFato,p. 112. »Cic. DeFato,6,9; 11,23; 14,31. * lb. p. IOC. * Diog. Laert. X. 138 f. ; Us. p. 66.
Chap. 1, § 16. ] Phytico-Theology : Epicurus, Stoics. 195
all isolated in the scientific thought of antiquity. Only the Stoa held fast inviolably to the principle of causality. Even Aristotle had not followed into details the application of his general principles (ef. p. 143); he had contented himself with the eVi to iroXu, " for the most part," and had based his renunciation of the attempt fully to comprehend the particular upon the assumption of the contingent in Nature, i. e. of the lawless and causeless. In this respect the Stoics alone are to be regarded as forerunners of the modern study of Nature.
Stoicism encountered difficulties which were no less great, in carrying out its teleology. The pantheistic system which regarded the whole world as the living product of divine Reason acting according to ends, and found in this its sole ground of explanation, must of course maintain also the purposiveness, goodness, and perfec tion of this universe and conversely the Stoics were accustomed to prove the existence of the gods and of Providence by pointing to the purposiveness, beauty, and perfection of the world that by the so-called physico-theological method. 1
Tbe attacks which this line of thought experienced in antiquity were directed not so much against the correctness of the reasoning (though Carneades applied his criticism at this point also) as against the premises and conversely, the easy exhibition of the many defects and maladaptations, of the evils and the ethical harm in the world was employed as counter-reason against the assump tion of a rational, purposeful World-cause and of Providence. This was done first and with full energy, naturally, by Epicurus, who asked whether God would remove the evil in the world but could not, or could remove but would not, or whether perhaps neither of these was true,* — and who also pointed to the instances of injustice in which the course of life so often makes the good miserable and the wicked happy. 3
These objections, intensified and carried out with especial care, were brought into the field by Carneades. * But to the reference to tbe evil and injustice of the course of events he added the objec tion to which the Stoics were most sensitive " Whence then in this world which has been created by Reason comes that which void of reason and contrary to reason, whence in this world ani mated by the divine Spirit come sin and folly, the greatest of all
Clc. Dt Sat. Denr. II. 13 IT.
Lactam. Dt Ira Dti, 13. 19 Us. Fr. 374. Id. Intt. Div. III. 17, Us. Fr. 370.
Cic. Acad. II. 38, 120 Dt Sat. Deor. III. 32, 80 B. •Clc. Dt Sat. Deor. III. 25-31.
••«>
;8 ;
it
a
6, ;
is
:i
a
;
;
;
is,
a
. "».
196 Hellenistic- Roman Thought : Ethical Period. [Part II.
evils? " And if the Stoics, as perhaps occurred in spite of their determinism,1 wished to make free will responsible for these things, the further question arose, why the almighty World-reason should have given man a freedom which was thus to be abused, and why it should permit this abuse.
6. In the presence of such questions the Stoics with their monis tic metaphysics were in a much worse case than Plato and Aristotle, who had been able to trace the maladaptations and evil back to the resistance of the "Not-being," or of matter respectively. In spite of this the Stoics came forward boldly to master these diffi culties, and brought to light, not without acute thought, most of those arguments in which at later periods theodicy has moved again and again.
The teleological doctrine of the perfection of the universe can be protected against such attacks either by denying the dys-teleological facts, or by justifying them as the indispensable means or attend ant result in the purposefully connected whole. Both methods were pursued by the Stoa.
Their psychological and ethical theories permitted the claim that what is called a physical evil is not such in itself, but becomes such by man's assent, that hence, if diseases and the like are brought about by the necessity of the natural course of events, it is only man's fault that makes an evil out of them ; just as it is frequently only the wrong use which the foolish man makes of things that makes these injurious,* while in themselves they are either indif ferent or even beneficial. So the objection based on the injustice of the course of the world is rebutted by the claim that in truth for the good man and the wise man physical evils are no evils at all, and that for the bad man, on the other hand, only a sensuous illu sory satisfaction is possible, which does not make him truly happy, but rather only aggravates and strengthens the moral disease which has laid hold of him. 3
On the other hand, physical evils may also be defended on the ground that they are the inevitable consequences of arrangements of Nature which are in themselves adapted to their ends and do not fail of their purpose, — as Chrysippus, for example, attempted to show in the case of diseases. 4 In particular, however, they have the moral significance of serving partly as reformatory punishments of Providence ; 5 partly, also, as a useful stimulus for the exercise of our moral powers. 6
1 Cleanth. Hymn. v. 17.
1 Seneca, Oti. JVoi. V. 18, 4. » Seneca, Ep. 87, 11 S.
* Gell. iV. A. VII. 1, 7 ft. » Plut. Stoic. Bep. 35, 1. • Marc. Aurel. VIII. 36.
Chaf. 1, J 17. ] Criteria of Truth: Peripatetic*. 197
While external evils were thus justified principally by pointing oat their ethical purposiveness, it appeared for the Stoics an all the more argent problem, though one which proved also the more diffi cult, to make moral evil or sin comprehensible. Here the negative way of escape was quite impossible, for the reality of baseness in the case of the great majority of men was the favourite subject of declamation in the Stoic discourses on morals. Here, then, was the centre of the whole theodicy, namely, to show how in this world which is the product of divine Reason, that which is contrary to reason in the impulses, dispositions, and actions of rationally endowed beings is possible. Here, therefore, the Stoics resorted to universal considerations. They showed how the perfection of the whole not only does not include that of all the individual parts, but even excludes it,1 and in this way substantiated their claim that God must necessarily allow even the imperfection and baseness of
man. In particular, they emphasised the point that it is only through opposition to evil that good as such is brought about ; for were there no sin and folly, there would be no virtue and wisdom. ' And while vice is thus deduced as the necessary foil for the good, the Stoics give as a final consideration,1 that the eternal Providence ultimately turns even the evil to good, and has in it but an appar ently refractory means for the fulfilment of its own highest ends. 4
§ 17. The Criteria of Truth.
The philosophical achievements of the post-Aristotelian time were least important in the department of logic. Such a powerful creation as the Analytic* of the Stagirite, which brought the prin ciples of Greek science in so masterly a fashion to the consciousness of all in a conclusive form, must naturally rule logical thought for a long time, and, in fact, did this until the close of the Middle Ages, and even beyond. The foundations of this system were so firmly laid that at first nothing there was shaken, and there re mained for the activity of the schools but to build up individual parts, — an activity in connection with which, even at that time, much of the artificial adornment characteristic of a degenerate age displayed itself.
L The Peripatetic* had already attempted to develop the Aristote lian Analytic* systematically in this direction by a more detailed treat ment, by partially new proofs, by farther subdivision, and by more
> Plut. Stoic. Rep. 44, 0. » lb. 36, 3.
« lb. 38, 1. * Cleaiith. Hymn. vr. 18 f.
198 Hellenistic-Roman Thought : Ethical Period. [Part IX.
methodical formulation. In particular, Eudemus and Theophrastus undertook investigations concerning the hypothetical and disjunc tive judgments, and the extension of the theory of the syllogism occasioned by the appearance of these judgments and premises. The Stoics continued these efforts; they set these new forms of judgment (d&'w/m) as composite over against the simple ' categorical forms, developed into all their details the resulting forms of the syllogism, emphasised also especially the quality ? of judgments, and deduced the laws of thought in altered forms. In general, however, they spun out the logical rules into a dry schematism and genuine scholastic formalism which thereby became farther and farther removed from the significant fundamental thoughts of the Aristotelian Analytics, and became a dead mass of formulae. The unfruitful subtlety of this process took special delight in the solu
tion of sophistical catches, in which the real meaning was inextri cably involved in the contradiction of forms.
It was in these elaborations by the schools that the science of logic created by Aristotle first took on the purely formal character that it retained up to the time of Kant. The more pedantic the form taken in the development of the particular features, the more the consciousness of the living thought, to which Aristotle had aspired, was replaced by a schoolmaster-like network of rules, — essentially designed to catch thoughts and examine their formal legitimacy, but incapable of doing justice to the creative power of scientific activity. While, even with Aristotle, regard for proof and refutation had occupied the foreground, here it occupies the whole field. Antiquity did not attain a theory of investigation ; for the weak beginnings which we find toward this end in the inves tigations of a younger Epicurean,* Philodemus,4 concerning conclu sions from induction and analogy, are relatively isolated, and have no result worthy of mention.
2. In the doctrine of the Categories, of the elaboration of which the Stoics made much account, more that was real was to be expected. Here it was indeed quite correct, and yet not very fruitful, to call attention to the fact that the supreme category, of which the rest
» Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. VIII. 93.
• Diog. Laert. VII. 66.
s Epicurus himself, and his school also, as a whole, did not trouble themselves
as to the principles of formal logic. One might regard this as an evidence of taste and intelligence, but it was in truth only indifference toward all that did not promise directly practical advantages.
* On his treatise repl cruuiav ko! arnuiibetuir, discovered in Herculaneum, cf. Th. Gompertz, Herculanentisehe Studien, Heft 1 (Leips. 1866) ; Fr. Bahusch (Lyck, 1879); K. Philippson (Berlin, 1881).
Chap. 1, § 17. ] Criteria of Truth : Stoic*. 199
represent only special determinations, is that of Being
Something (ti); and the co-ordination of the categories which, at least as regards the method of their enumeration, was Aristotle's plan, was replaced by an expressly systematic succession, according to which each category was to be more exactly determined by the following one. " What is," or Being, as abiding substrate of all possible relations, is substance (iiroKiipivoi) ; this is the supporter
(Trdger) of fixed qualities (voiov), and only in this aspect is it involved in changing states (to ttuk «x°0> ;,nd, in consequence of these latter, in relations to other substances (to npo\ ri ww fyov).
Out of the doctrine of the categories grows thus an ontology, that is, a metaphysical theory as to the most general formal relations of reality, and this theory in the system of the Stoics, agreeably to their general tendency (cf. § 15, 5), takes on a thoroughly materi alistic character. As substance, the existent is matter which is in itself destitute of properties (vAr/), and the qualities and forces which are inherent in matter as a whole, as well as in a particular part (roiorifTK — Swo/uif ), are likewise kinds of matter (atmospheric
which are commingled with it (xpao-i? St' o-W). In this connection both substance and attributes are regarded, as well from the point of view of the general conception as from that of the indi vidual thing, and in the latter aspect it is emphasised that every individual thing is essentially and definitely distinguished from all others. *
Besides these categories of Being, we find making their appear ance among the Stoics those conceptions! forms by which the rela tion of thought to Being is expressed, and in these the separation of ike subjective from the objective, for which a preparation had been growing more and more complete in the development of Greek thought, now attains definite expression. For while the Stoics regarded all objects to which thought relates as corporeal, while they regarded the activity of thought itself, and no less its expres sion in language * as corporeal functions, they were still obliged to confess that the content of consciousness as such (to Xiktov) is of in
• That the Peripatetic* also busied themselves with this category is proved by the definition preserved by Strato: ri it im ri rijt tiaitoriii alrior (l'roclus I* rim. 'iti K).
1 In contrasting the first two with the last two categories, the language rela tion of noun and verb appears here also (in Stoic terminology rriivn and *ar>i-
* The Stoics laid great weight upon the discriminative comparison of thought and of speech, of the inner activity of reason (X4>o» iriiitmn), and of its ex pression through the voice (Xfryot wpefopucit). Hence, too, the assumption (cf. ) IS, n) of the faculty of speech as a proper part of the soul ; hence their thor- uojh treatment of rhetoric and grammar side by »de with logic.
(Toov)'or
currents)
200 Hellenistic- Roman Thought : Hthical Period. [Part IL
nature. But since the distinction was thus sharply drawn between Being and content of consciousness, the fundamental epistemological problem came forward, how the relations by which the ideational content refers to Being and agrees with are to be thought.
This question was, moreover, also brought home by the vigor ous development which Scepticism had meanwhile undergone, and by the relatively strong position which occupied as compared with the dogmatic systems.
Whether by Pyrrho or Timon matters not, was at all events at about the same time at which the great school-systems became dogmatically developed and fortified, that all those arguments were systematised into complete whole, by which the Sophistic period had shaken the naive trust in man's capacity for knowledge. Al though the ethical end of making man independent of fate by with holding judgment was ultimately decisive (cf. 14, 2), this Scepticism still forms a carefully carried out theoretical doctrine.
It doubts the possibility of knowledge in both its forms, the form of perception as truly as that of judging thought, and after has destructively analysed each of these two factors singly, adds expressly that just on this account their union can have no certain result. 1
As regards perception, the Sceptics availed themselves of the Protagorean relativism, and in the so-called ten Tropes in which
jEnesidemus
corporeal
sets forth the sceptical theory with very defective arrangement, this tendency still occupies the broadest space. Per ceptions change not only with the different species of animate beings (1), not only with different men (2), according to their cus toms (9) and their whole development (10), but even in the case of the same individual at different times (3), in dependence upon bodily conditions (4), and upon the different relations in which the individual finds himself with regard to his object spatially They alter, also, because of the difference in the states of the object
(7), and have, therefore, no claim to the value of an immediate report of things, because their origination conditioned by inter mediate states in media such as the air, the co-operating elements furnished by which we are not able to deduct (6). Man there-
From two deceivers combined only right to expect no truth. Diog. Laert. IX. 114.
Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 38 ff.
It was said by the ancient writers that JEnesidemus was attached, not only to Scepticism, but also to the metaphysics of Heraclitus. The question whether this was actually so, or whether such relation was only ascribed to him by mis take, has solely antiquarian significance. For had the former been the case, would have been but another manifestation of real relationship in thought, to which Plato had already directed attention. Thrift. 152 ff. cf. 92, note
(5).
E ;
it,
p.
*
a
it it
2.
it
a
it is
it
'a1
3.
I.
is,
it it
is
3
§
a
Ihap. 1, § 17. ] Criteria of Truth : Sceptics. 201
fore, in all ways, not in a condition to know things purely (8), and in the face of the multiplicity of impressions so full of contradic tions he has no means of distinguishing a true from a false impres sion. One is no more (ov /toAAov) valid than another.
Equally relative with man's perceptions are also his opinions
In this aspect the influences of the Eleatic dialectic assert themselves in Pyrrhonism. It is shown that to every opinion the opposite can be opposed with equally good reasons, and this equilibrium of reasons (iaovdivtw. tu>v \oymv) does not permit us, therefore, to distinguish true and false : in the case of such a con tradiction (itmXoyia) the one holds no more than the other. All opinions accordingly stand — according to the phrase of the Sophists, adopted by the Sceptics — only by convention and cus tom {vofuf re «u i6ti), not by their essential right and title (ipwm).
More energetically still did the later Scepticism attack the possi bility of scientific knowledge, by disclosing the difficulties of the syllogistic procedure, and of the methods which Aristotle had built up upon this. 1 In this Curneades seems to have led the way, show ing that every proof, since it presupposes other proofs for the valid ity of its premises, makes necessary a regressus in infinitum — an argument that was completely in place for the Sceptic who did not, as did Aristotle, recognise anything as immediately certain (Sfuaov ; ef. f 12, 4). The same argument was carried further by Agrippa, who formulated Scepticism in five Tropes * much more clearly and comprehensively than . ACnesidemus. He called attention again to the relativity of perceptions (3) and of opinions (1); he showed how every proof pushes on into infinity (2 : 6 u'« tbrupw UfiiLWuv), and how unjustifiable it is in the process of proof to proceed from premises that are only hypothetically to be assumed (4), and finally, how often it occurs, even in science, that that must be [Kwtulated as ground of the premises which is only to be proved by means of the syllogism in question (5: 6 SuiAAtjAos). In the latter aspect atten tion was also called to the fact that in the syllogistic deduction of a particular proposition from a general one, the general would yet from the outset be justified only on condition that the particular were valid. '
Since the essential nature of things is thus inaccessible to human
> Bert. Emp. Adv. Math. VIII.
188 Hellenistic-Roman Thought ; Ethical Period. [Pari II.
as whose seat the heart was assumed, was regarded as extending its particular ramifications throughout the whole body, like the "arms of a polyp. " Of such particular "pneuraata" the Stoa assumed seven, — the five senses, the faculty of speech, and the reproductive power. As the unity of the divine Primitive Being dwells in the universe, so the individual personality lives in the body.
It is characteristic that the Epicureans could entirely -adopt this external apparatus of psychological views. For them, too, the soul — which according to Democritus consists of the finest atoms — is a fiery, atmospheric breath (they apply likewise the term "pneuma"); but they see in this breath something that is intro duced into the body from without, something held fast by the body and mechanically connected with which in death forthwith scattered. They also distinguish between the rational and the irrational part of the soul, without, however, being able to attribute to the former the metaphysical dignity which acquired in the Stoic theory. Here, too, their doctrine on the whole, insufficient and dependent.
In accordance with the pantheistic presupposition of the system, the metaphysics and physics of the Stoics form also theology, system of natural religion based on scientific demonstra tion, and this found also poetic presentations in the school, such as the hymn of Cleanthes. Epicureanism, on the contrary, is in its whole nature anti-religious. It takes throughout the standpoint of " Enlightenment," that religion has been overcome by science, and that the task and triumph of wisdom to put aside the phantoms of superstition which have grown out of fear and ignorance. The poet of this school depicts in grotesque outlines the evils which religion brought on man, and sings the glory of their conquest by scientific knowledge. 1 It all the more amusing that the Epicurean theory itself fell to depicting mythology of its own which re garded as harmless. It believed that certain degree of truth must attach to the universal faith in gods,1 but found that this correct idea was disfigured by false assumptions. These sought in the myths which feigned participation of the gods in human life, and an interference on their part in the course of things even the Stoics' belief in Providence appeared to them in this respect as but a refined illusion. Epicurus, therefore, — following Democritus in his doctrine of the eidola, or images 10, 4), — saw in the gods giant forms resembling men, who lead blessed life of contemplation and spiritual intercourse in the intermediate spaces between the
Lucret. De Rer. Nat. 62 ff. Diog. Laert. X. 123 U§. 60
»
7. a
I. a
f. ;
it ;
it
is
p f.
it
*
is,
it,
a (§
a
it
is a
it is
a
Ckap. 1, { Id. ] Mechanism and Teleology : Epicureans, Stoics. 189
worlds (intermundia), undisturbed by the change of events, and unconcerned as to the destiny of lower beings ; and thus this doc trine, also, is fundamentally only the attempt of Epicureanism to put in mythological form its ideal of aesthetic self-enjoyment.
8. It was in an entirely different way that the ideas of the popular religion were fitted into the Stoic metaphysics. Whereas,
up to this time in the development of Greek thought philosoph ical theology had separated itself farther and farther from the indigenous mythology, we meet here, for the first time, the systematic attempt to bring natural and positive religion into harmony. Accordingly, when the Stoics, also, yielded to the need of recognising the warrant of ideas universally present throughout the human race (cf. § 17, 4), their pneuma doctrine offered them not only a welcome instrument, but suggestions that were determinative.
For consideration of the universe must teach them that the divine World-power has evidently taken on mightier forms and those of more vigorous life than individual human souls; and so, beside the one deity without beginning and end, which for the most part they
designated as Zeus, a great number of "gods that had come into exist- t*re," made their appearance. To these the Stoics, as Plato and Aristotle had already done, reckoned first of all the stars, which
they too honoured as higher intelligences and especially pure for mations of the primitive fire, and further, the personifications of other natural forces in which the power of Providence, benevolent to man, reveals itself. From this point of view we can understand bow an extensive interpretation of myths was the order of the day in the Stoic school, seeking to incorporate the popular figures in its Metaphysical system by all kinds of allegories. In addition to this there was an equally welcome use of the Euemeristic theory, which not only explained and justified the deification of prominent men, but taught also to consider the demons sacred, as the guardian iflints of individual men.
Thus the Stoic world became peopled with a whole host of higher tad lower gods, bnt they all appeared as ultimately but emanations of the one highest World-power, — as the subordinate powers or forces
which, themselves determined by the universal Pneuma, were con ceived of as the ruling spirits of the world's life. They formed, therefore, for the faith of the Stoics, the mediating organs, which
represent, each in its realm, the vital force and Providence of the World-reason, and to them the piety of the Stoics turned in the forms of worship of positive religion. The polytheism of the popular faith was thus philosophically re-established, and taken up as an lolegraat constituent into metaphysical pantheism.
190 Hellenistic- Roman Thought : Ethical Period. [Part II.
In connection with this scientific reconstruction of positive re ligion stands the theoretical justification of divination in the Stoic system where it awakened great interest, except in the case of a few men like Panaetius, who thought more coolly. The interconnection and providentially governed unity of the world's processes was held to show itself — as one form of manifestation — in the possibility that different things and processes which stand in no direct causal rela tion to one another, may yet point to one another by delicate rela tions, and therefore be able to serve as signs for one another. The human soul is capable of understanding these by virtue of its rela tionship with the all-ruling Pneuma, but for the full interpretation of such ecstatic revelations the art and science of divination, resting upon experience, must be added. On this basis Stoicism regarded itself as strong enough to elaborate philosophically all the divination of the ancient world. This was especially true of its younger repre sentatives, and in particular, as it seems, of Posidonius.
§ 16. The Freedom of the Will and the Perfection of the World.
The sharp definition of the contrasted mechanical and teleological views of the world, and especially the difference in the conceptional forms in which the thought, common to a certain extent, of Nature's universal conformity to law had been developed, led, in connection with the ethical postulates and presuppositions which controlled the thought of the time, to two new problems, which from the beginning had various complications. These were the problems of the freedom of the human will and of the goodness and perfection of the world. Both problems grew out of contradictions which made their appearance between moral needs and just those meta physical theories which had been formed to satisfy those needs.
1. The proper home for the formation of these new problems was the Stoic system, and they may be understood as the necessary consequence of a deep and ultimately irreconcilable antagonism be tween the fundamental principles of the system. These principles are metaphysical monism and ethical dualism. The fundamental moral doctrine of the Stoics, according to which man should overcome the world in his own impulses by virtue, presupposes an anthropological duality, an opposition in human nature in accordance with which reason stands over against a sensuous nature contrary to reason. Without this antithesis the whole Stoic ethics is ready to fall. The metaphysical doctrine, however, by which the command of reason in man is to be explained, postulates such an unrestricted and all
Chaf. 1, J 1<J. ] Freedom of the Will : Socrates, Aristotle. 191
controlling reality of the World-reason that the reality of what is contrary to reason, either in man or in the course of the world, cannot be united therewith. From this source grew the two ques tions which since then have never ceased to employ man's critical investigation, although all essential points of view that can come into consideration in the case were more or less clearly illumined at that time.
2. The conceptions which form the presuppositions for the prob lem offreedom lie ready at hand in the ethical reflections ou the voluntary nature of wrongdoing, which were begun by Socrates and brought to a preliminary conclusion by Aristotle in a brilliant investigation. 1 The motives of these thoughts are ethical through out, and the domain in which they move is exclusively psychologi cal. The question at issue is hence essentially that of freedom of choice, and while the reality of this is doubtless affirmed upon the
basis of immediate feeling, and with reference to man's conscious ness of his responsibility, difficulty arises only in consequence of the intellectualistic conception of Socrates, who brought the will into complete dependence upon insight. This difficulty develops primarily in the double meaning of " freedom," or, as it is here still called, " voluntariness " (Uownov), an ambiguity which has since been repeated again and again in the most variously shifted forms. According to Socrates, all ethically wrong action proceeds from a wrong view — a view clouded by desires. He who thus acts does not " know," therefore, what he is doing, and in this sense he acts
involuntarily. ' That is, only the wise man is free ; the wicked is n»t free. 1 From this ethical conception of freedom, however, the /tfchological conception of freedom —i. e. the conception of freedom of choice as the ability to decide between different motives — must be carefully separated. Whether Socrates did this is a question ; ' at all events, it was done by Plato. The latter expressly affirmed man's freedom of choice,' appealing to his responsibility, — a psycho logical decision on essentially ethical grounds, — and, at the same time, he held fast to the Soc ratio doctrine that the wicked man acts involuntarily, i. e. is ethically not free. He even connects the two directly when he develops the thought * that man may sink into the
' BtK . Vfc. III. 1-8.
< Xen Mem. III. 9, 4 ; Cyrop. HI. 1, 38.
• Ct Art*. Etk. Sic. III. 7, 113 b 14.
* According to a remark in the Peripatetic Magna Moralia (I. 9, 1187 a 7)
Vicrate*. indeed, had expressly said, " it is not in our power" to be good or bad According to thla, therefore, he had denied pgycholoKical freedom.
* Flat. Hep. X. 617 ff. • Pfau. Ftued. 81 B.
i92 Hellenistic-Roman Thought: Ethical Period. [Part IL
condition of ethical non-freedom by his own fault, and, therefore,
with psychological freedom.
With Aristotle, who separated himself farther from the Socratic
intellectualism, the psychological conception of freedom comes out more clearly and independently. He proceeds from the position that ethical qualification in general is applicable only in the case of " voluntary " actions, and discusses in the first place the prejudices which this voluntariness sustains, partly from external force (/? »? ) and psychical compulsion, and partly from ignorance of the matter. That action only is completely voluntary which has its origin in the personality itself, and of which the relations are fully known. 1 The whole investigation ' is maintained from the standpoint of responsi bility, and the discovered conception of voluntariness is designed to lead to the conception of accountability. It contains within itself the characteristics of external freedom of action, and of a conception of the situation unclouded by any deception. But, on this account, it must be still further restricted, for among his voluntary acts a man can be held accountable for those only that proceed from a choice (wpoaiptfris). 3 Freedom of choice, therefore, which proceeds by reflecting upon ends as well as upon means, is the condition of ethical accountability.
Aristotle avoided a farther entrance upon the psychology of motivation and upon the determining causes of this choice ; he con tents himself with establishing the position that the personality itself is the sufficient reason for the actions * which are ascribed to it ; and to this maintenance of the freedom of choice his school, and
especially Theophrastus, freedom, held fast.
who composed a treatise of his own on
3. On this same basis we find also the Stoics, in so far as purely ethical considerations are concerned. Precisely that lively feeling of responsibility which characterises their morals demanded of them the recognition of this free choice on the part of the individual, and they sought therefore to maintain this in every way.
Their position became critical, however, by reason of the fact that their metaphysics, with its doctrine of fate and providence, drove them beyond this attitude. For since this theory of fate made man, like all other creatures, determined in all his external and internal formation and in all that he does and suffers, by the
1 Kth. Nic. III. 3, 1111 a 73 : oS * tpXh *» *{'Tv 'liir* T* *«*" '««"» '» •*« *
rp&iis.
■ Aa the reference at the beginning to the right of punishment clearly ahowi
>Stk. Nic. 1109 b 34).
« lb. 4, 1112 a 1.
• lb. 6, 1112 b 31 : torn Si] . . . trtpurot rtrat ipx*l rwr r/tdfcwy. -
Chat. 1, $ 18. ] Freedom of the Will : Stoics, Epicurus. 19?
all-animating World-power, personality ceased to be the true ground (<L>X*i) of his actions, and these appeared to be, like all else that occurs, but the predetermined and unavoidably necessary operations of the God-Nature. In fact, the Stoa did not shrink from this extreme consequence of determinism; on the contrary, Ghrysippus heaped up proof on proof for this doctrine. He based it upon the principle of sufficient reason (cf. above, § 15, 2) ; he showed that
only by presupposing this could the correctness of judgments con cerning the future be maintained, since a criterion for their truth or falsity is given only if the matter is already determined ; ' he also gave to this argument the changed form, that since only the necessary can be known, and not that which is still undecided, the
foreknowledge of the gods makes necessary the assumption of deter minism; he even did not scorn to adduce the fulfilment of predic Dona as a welcome argument.
In this doctrine, which, from the standpoint of the Stoic doctrine of the logos, was completely consistent, the opponents of the system saw of course a decided denial of freedom of the will, and of the criticisms which the system experienced this was perhaps the most frequent and at the same time the most incisive. Among the numerous attacks the best known is the so-called ignava ratio, or *- lazy reason " (apyos A. dyot), which from the claim of the unavoid able necessity of future events draws the fatalistic conclusion that one should await them inactively, — an attack which Ghrysippus did not know how to avoid except by the aid of very forced distinc tions. ' The Stoics, on the contrary, concerned themselves to show that in spite of this determinism, and rather exactly by virtue of man remains the cause of his actions in the sense that he to be made responsible for them. On the basis of distinction between main and accessory causes (which, moreover, reminds us throughout of the Platonic oTtiov and (womov) Ghrysippus showed that every decision of the will does indeed necessarily follow from the co-opera tion of man with his environment, but that just here the outer circumstances are only the accessory causes, while the assent pro ceeding from the personality the main cause, and to this account ability applies. While, however, this voluntarily acting ijycftovucoV, or ruling faculty of man, determined from the universal Pneuma, this Pneuma takes on in every separate being self-subsistent
Cfc. Dt Palo, 10, 20. So far as concerns disjunctive propositions Epicurus also lor this reason gave up the truth of disjunction Cic. Dt Nat. Dtor. H. 70.
•Cic Dt Fato, U, 28 ft Che. Dt Fato, 10, 30 fl.
•1
:
a
L
it,
is
is
a
'
is
194 Hellenistic-Roman Thought : Ethical Period. [1*aht II.
nature, different from that of others, and this is to be regarded as a proper aprf-1 ^n particular, the Stoics make prominent the point that responsibility, as a judgment pronounced on the ethical quality of actions and characters, is quite independent of the question whether the persons or deeds might, in the course of events, have been other than they were, or not. 1
4. The problem of the freedom of the will, which had been already complicated ethically and psychologically, experienced in this way still further a metaphysical and (in the Stoic sense) theo logical complication, and the consequence was that the indeterminists who were opponents of the Stoa gave a new turn to the conception of freedom which they regarded as threatened by the Stoic doctrine, and brought it into sharp definition. The assumption of the excep tionless causal nexus to which even the functions of the will were to be subordinated, seemed to exclude the capacity of free decision ; but this freedom of choice had, since Aristotle, been regarded in all schools as the indispensable presupposition of ethical accountability. On this account the opponents thought — and this gave the contro versy its especial violence — that they were defending an ethical good when they combated the Stoic doctrine of fate, and with that the Democritic principle of natural necessity. And if Chrysippus had appealed to the principle of sufficient reason to establish this, Carneades, to whom the freedom of the will was an incontestable fact, did not fear to draw in question the universal and invariable validity of this principle. *
Epicurus went still farther. He found the Stoic determinism so irreconcilable with the wise man's self-determination which formed the essential feature of his ethical ideal, that he would rather still assume the illusory ideas of religion than believe in such a slavery of the soul. 4 Therefore he, too, denied the universal validity of the causal law and subsumed freedom together with chance under the conception of uncaused occurrence. Thus in opposition to Stoic determinism, the metaphysical conception of freedom arose, by means of which Epicurus put the uncaused function of the will in man upon a parallel with the causeless deviation of the atoms from their line of fall (cf. § 15, 4). The freedom of indeterminism means, accordingly, a choice between different possibilities that is deter mined by no causes, aud Epicurus thought thereby to rescue moral responsibility.
This metaphysical conception of freedom as causelessness is not at
«Alex. Aphr. DeFato,p. 112. »Cic. DeFato,6,9; 11,23; 14,31. * lb. p. IOC. * Diog. Laert. X. 138 f. ; Us. p. 66.
Chap. 1, § 16. ] Phytico-Theology : Epicurus, Stoics. 195
all isolated in the scientific thought of antiquity. Only the Stoa held fast inviolably to the principle of causality. Even Aristotle had not followed into details the application of his general principles (ef. p. 143); he had contented himself with the eVi to iroXu, " for the most part," and had based his renunciation of the attempt fully to comprehend the particular upon the assumption of the contingent in Nature, i. e. of the lawless and causeless. In this respect the Stoics alone are to be regarded as forerunners of the modern study of Nature.
Stoicism encountered difficulties which were no less great, in carrying out its teleology. The pantheistic system which regarded the whole world as the living product of divine Reason acting according to ends, and found in this its sole ground of explanation, must of course maintain also the purposiveness, goodness, and perfec tion of this universe and conversely the Stoics were accustomed to prove the existence of the gods and of Providence by pointing to the purposiveness, beauty, and perfection of the world that by the so-called physico-theological method. 1
Tbe attacks which this line of thought experienced in antiquity were directed not so much against the correctness of the reasoning (though Carneades applied his criticism at this point also) as against the premises and conversely, the easy exhibition of the many defects and maladaptations, of the evils and the ethical harm in the world was employed as counter-reason against the assump tion of a rational, purposeful World-cause and of Providence. This was done first and with full energy, naturally, by Epicurus, who asked whether God would remove the evil in the world but could not, or could remove but would not, or whether perhaps neither of these was true,* — and who also pointed to the instances of injustice in which the course of life so often makes the good miserable and the wicked happy. 3
These objections, intensified and carried out with especial care, were brought into the field by Carneades. * But to the reference to tbe evil and injustice of the course of events he added the objec tion to which the Stoics were most sensitive " Whence then in this world which has been created by Reason comes that which void of reason and contrary to reason, whence in this world ani mated by the divine Spirit come sin and folly, the greatest of all
Clc. Dt Sat. Denr. II. 13 IT.
Lactam. Dt Ira Dti, 13. 19 Us. Fr. 374. Id. Intt. Div. III. 17, Us. Fr. 370.
Cic. Acad. II. 38, 120 Dt Sat. Deor. III. 32, 80 B. •Clc. Dt Sat. Deor. III. 25-31.
••«>
;8 ;
it
a
6, ;
is
:i
a
;
;
;
is,
a
. "».
196 Hellenistic- Roman Thought : Ethical Period. [Part II.
evils? " And if the Stoics, as perhaps occurred in spite of their determinism,1 wished to make free will responsible for these things, the further question arose, why the almighty World-reason should have given man a freedom which was thus to be abused, and why it should permit this abuse.
6. In the presence of such questions the Stoics with their monis tic metaphysics were in a much worse case than Plato and Aristotle, who had been able to trace the maladaptations and evil back to the resistance of the "Not-being," or of matter respectively. In spite of this the Stoics came forward boldly to master these diffi culties, and brought to light, not without acute thought, most of those arguments in which at later periods theodicy has moved again and again.
The teleological doctrine of the perfection of the universe can be protected against such attacks either by denying the dys-teleological facts, or by justifying them as the indispensable means or attend ant result in the purposefully connected whole. Both methods were pursued by the Stoa.
Their psychological and ethical theories permitted the claim that what is called a physical evil is not such in itself, but becomes such by man's assent, that hence, if diseases and the like are brought about by the necessity of the natural course of events, it is only man's fault that makes an evil out of them ; just as it is frequently only the wrong use which the foolish man makes of things that makes these injurious,* while in themselves they are either indif ferent or even beneficial. So the objection based on the injustice of the course of the world is rebutted by the claim that in truth for the good man and the wise man physical evils are no evils at all, and that for the bad man, on the other hand, only a sensuous illu sory satisfaction is possible, which does not make him truly happy, but rather only aggravates and strengthens the moral disease which has laid hold of him. 3
On the other hand, physical evils may also be defended on the ground that they are the inevitable consequences of arrangements of Nature which are in themselves adapted to their ends and do not fail of their purpose, — as Chrysippus, for example, attempted to show in the case of diseases. 4 In particular, however, they have the moral significance of serving partly as reformatory punishments of Providence ; 5 partly, also, as a useful stimulus for the exercise of our moral powers. 6
1 Cleanth. Hymn. v. 17.
1 Seneca, Oti. JVoi. V. 18, 4. » Seneca, Ep. 87, 11 S.
* Gell. iV. A. VII. 1, 7 ft. » Plut. Stoic. Bep. 35, 1. • Marc. Aurel. VIII. 36.
Chaf. 1, J 17. ] Criteria of Truth: Peripatetic*. 197
While external evils were thus justified principally by pointing oat their ethical purposiveness, it appeared for the Stoics an all the more argent problem, though one which proved also the more diffi cult, to make moral evil or sin comprehensible. Here the negative way of escape was quite impossible, for the reality of baseness in the case of the great majority of men was the favourite subject of declamation in the Stoic discourses on morals. Here, then, was the centre of the whole theodicy, namely, to show how in this world which is the product of divine Reason, that which is contrary to reason in the impulses, dispositions, and actions of rationally endowed beings is possible. Here, therefore, the Stoics resorted to universal considerations. They showed how the perfection of the whole not only does not include that of all the individual parts, but even excludes it,1 and in this way substantiated their claim that God must necessarily allow even the imperfection and baseness of
man. In particular, they emphasised the point that it is only through opposition to evil that good as such is brought about ; for were there no sin and folly, there would be no virtue and wisdom. ' And while vice is thus deduced as the necessary foil for the good, the Stoics give as a final consideration,1 that the eternal Providence ultimately turns even the evil to good, and has in it but an appar ently refractory means for the fulfilment of its own highest ends. 4
§ 17. The Criteria of Truth.
The philosophical achievements of the post-Aristotelian time were least important in the department of logic. Such a powerful creation as the Analytic* of the Stagirite, which brought the prin ciples of Greek science in so masterly a fashion to the consciousness of all in a conclusive form, must naturally rule logical thought for a long time, and, in fact, did this until the close of the Middle Ages, and even beyond. The foundations of this system were so firmly laid that at first nothing there was shaken, and there re mained for the activity of the schools but to build up individual parts, — an activity in connection with which, even at that time, much of the artificial adornment characteristic of a degenerate age displayed itself.
L The Peripatetic* had already attempted to develop the Aristote lian Analytic* systematically in this direction by a more detailed treat ment, by partially new proofs, by farther subdivision, and by more
> Plut. Stoic. Rep. 44, 0. » lb. 36, 3.
« lb. 38, 1. * Cleaiith. Hymn. vr. 18 f.
198 Hellenistic-Roman Thought : Ethical Period. [Part IX.
methodical formulation. In particular, Eudemus and Theophrastus undertook investigations concerning the hypothetical and disjunc tive judgments, and the extension of the theory of the syllogism occasioned by the appearance of these judgments and premises. The Stoics continued these efforts; they set these new forms of judgment (d&'w/m) as composite over against the simple ' categorical forms, developed into all their details the resulting forms of the syllogism, emphasised also especially the quality ? of judgments, and deduced the laws of thought in altered forms. In general, however, they spun out the logical rules into a dry schematism and genuine scholastic formalism which thereby became farther and farther removed from the significant fundamental thoughts of the Aristotelian Analytics, and became a dead mass of formulae. The unfruitful subtlety of this process took special delight in the solu
tion of sophistical catches, in which the real meaning was inextri cably involved in the contradiction of forms.
It was in these elaborations by the schools that the science of logic created by Aristotle first took on the purely formal character that it retained up to the time of Kant. The more pedantic the form taken in the development of the particular features, the more the consciousness of the living thought, to which Aristotle had aspired, was replaced by a schoolmaster-like network of rules, — essentially designed to catch thoughts and examine their formal legitimacy, but incapable of doing justice to the creative power of scientific activity. While, even with Aristotle, regard for proof and refutation had occupied the foreground, here it occupies the whole field. Antiquity did not attain a theory of investigation ; for the weak beginnings which we find toward this end in the inves tigations of a younger Epicurean,* Philodemus,4 concerning conclu sions from induction and analogy, are relatively isolated, and have no result worthy of mention.
2. In the doctrine of the Categories, of the elaboration of which the Stoics made much account, more that was real was to be expected. Here it was indeed quite correct, and yet not very fruitful, to call attention to the fact that the supreme category, of which the rest
» Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. VIII. 93.
• Diog. Laert. VII. 66.
s Epicurus himself, and his school also, as a whole, did not trouble themselves
as to the principles of formal logic. One might regard this as an evidence of taste and intelligence, but it was in truth only indifference toward all that did not promise directly practical advantages.
* On his treatise repl cruuiav ko! arnuiibetuir, discovered in Herculaneum, cf. Th. Gompertz, Herculanentisehe Studien, Heft 1 (Leips. 1866) ; Fr. Bahusch (Lyck, 1879); K. Philippson (Berlin, 1881).
Chap. 1, § 17. ] Criteria of Truth : Stoic*. 199
represent only special determinations, is that of Being
Something (ti); and the co-ordination of the categories which, at least as regards the method of their enumeration, was Aristotle's plan, was replaced by an expressly systematic succession, according to which each category was to be more exactly determined by the following one. " What is," or Being, as abiding substrate of all possible relations, is substance (iiroKiipivoi) ; this is the supporter
(Trdger) of fixed qualities (voiov), and only in this aspect is it involved in changing states (to ttuk «x°0> ;,nd, in consequence of these latter, in relations to other substances (to npo\ ri ww fyov).
Out of the doctrine of the categories grows thus an ontology, that is, a metaphysical theory as to the most general formal relations of reality, and this theory in the system of the Stoics, agreeably to their general tendency (cf. § 15, 5), takes on a thoroughly materi alistic character. As substance, the existent is matter which is in itself destitute of properties (vAr/), and the qualities and forces which are inherent in matter as a whole, as well as in a particular part (roiorifTK — Swo/uif ), are likewise kinds of matter (atmospheric
which are commingled with it (xpao-i? St' o-W). In this connection both substance and attributes are regarded, as well from the point of view of the general conception as from that of the indi vidual thing, and in the latter aspect it is emphasised that every individual thing is essentially and definitely distinguished from all others. *
Besides these categories of Being, we find making their appear ance among the Stoics those conceptions! forms by which the rela tion of thought to Being is expressed, and in these the separation of ike subjective from the objective, for which a preparation had been growing more and more complete in the development of Greek thought, now attains definite expression. For while the Stoics regarded all objects to which thought relates as corporeal, while they regarded the activity of thought itself, and no less its expres sion in language * as corporeal functions, they were still obliged to confess that the content of consciousness as such (to Xiktov) is of in
• That the Peripatetic* also busied themselves with this category is proved by the definition preserved by Strato: ri it im ri rijt tiaitoriii alrior (l'roclus I* rim. 'iti K).
1 In contrasting the first two with the last two categories, the language rela tion of noun and verb appears here also (in Stoic terminology rriivn and *ar>i-
* The Stoics laid great weight upon the discriminative comparison of thought and of speech, of the inner activity of reason (X4>o» iriiitmn), and of its ex pression through the voice (Xfryot wpefopucit). Hence, too, the assumption (cf. ) IS, n) of the faculty of speech as a proper part of the soul ; hence their thor- uojh treatment of rhetoric and grammar side by »de with logic.
(Toov)'or
currents)
200 Hellenistic- Roman Thought : Hthical Period. [Part IL
nature. But since the distinction was thus sharply drawn between Being and content of consciousness, the fundamental epistemological problem came forward, how the relations by which the ideational content refers to Being and agrees with are to be thought.
This question was, moreover, also brought home by the vigor ous development which Scepticism had meanwhile undergone, and by the relatively strong position which occupied as compared with the dogmatic systems.
Whether by Pyrrho or Timon matters not, was at all events at about the same time at which the great school-systems became dogmatically developed and fortified, that all those arguments were systematised into complete whole, by which the Sophistic period had shaken the naive trust in man's capacity for knowledge. Al though the ethical end of making man independent of fate by with holding judgment was ultimately decisive (cf. 14, 2), this Scepticism still forms a carefully carried out theoretical doctrine.
It doubts the possibility of knowledge in both its forms, the form of perception as truly as that of judging thought, and after has destructively analysed each of these two factors singly, adds expressly that just on this account their union can have no certain result. 1
As regards perception, the Sceptics availed themselves of the Protagorean relativism, and in the so-called ten Tropes in which
jEnesidemus
corporeal
sets forth the sceptical theory with very defective arrangement, this tendency still occupies the broadest space. Per ceptions change not only with the different species of animate beings (1), not only with different men (2), according to their cus toms (9) and their whole development (10), but even in the case of the same individual at different times (3), in dependence upon bodily conditions (4), and upon the different relations in which the individual finds himself with regard to his object spatially They alter, also, because of the difference in the states of the object
(7), and have, therefore, no claim to the value of an immediate report of things, because their origination conditioned by inter mediate states in media such as the air, the co-operating elements furnished by which we are not able to deduct (6). Man there-
From two deceivers combined only right to expect no truth. Diog. Laert. IX. 114.
Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 38 ff.
It was said by the ancient writers that JEnesidemus was attached, not only to Scepticism, but also to the metaphysics of Heraclitus. The question whether this was actually so, or whether such relation was only ascribed to him by mis take, has solely antiquarian significance. For had the former been the case, would have been but another manifestation of real relationship in thought, to which Plato had already directed attention. Thrift. 152 ff. cf. 92, note
(5).
E ;
it,
p.
*
a
it it
2.
it
a
it is
it
'a1
3.
I.
is,
it it
is
3
§
a
Ihap. 1, § 17. ] Criteria of Truth : Sceptics. 201
fore, in all ways, not in a condition to know things purely (8), and in the face of the multiplicity of impressions so full of contradic tions he has no means of distinguishing a true from a false impres sion. One is no more (ov /toAAov) valid than another.
Equally relative with man's perceptions are also his opinions
In this aspect the influences of the Eleatic dialectic assert themselves in Pyrrhonism. It is shown that to every opinion the opposite can be opposed with equally good reasons, and this equilibrium of reasons (iaovdivtw. tu>v \oymv) does not permit us, therefore, to distinguish true and false : in the case of such a con tradiction (itmXoyia) the one holds no more than the other. All opinions accordingly stand — according to the phrase of the Sophists, adopted by the Sceptics — only by convention and cus tom {vofuf re «u i6ti), not by their essential right and title (ipwm).
More energetically still did the later Scepticism attack the possi bility of scientific knowledge, by disclosing the difficulties of the syllogistic procedure, and of the methods which Aristotle had built up upon this. 1 In this Curneades seems to have led the way, show ing that every proof, since it presupposes other proofs for the valid ity of its premises, makes necessary a regressus in infinitum — an argument that was completely in place for the Sceptic who did not, as did Aristotle, recognise anything as immediately certain (Sfuaov ; ef. f 12, 4). The same argument was carried further by Agrippa, who formulated Scepticism in five Tropes * much more clearly and comprehensively than . ACnesidemus. He called attention again to the relativity of perceptions (3) and of opinions (1); he showed how every proof pushes on into infinity (2 : 6 u'« tbrupw UfiiLWuv), and how unjustifiable it is in the process of proof to proceed from premises that are only hypothetically to be assumed (4), and finally, how often it occurs, even in science, that that must be [Kwtulated as ground of the premises which is only to be proved by means of the syllogism in question (5: 6 SuiAAtjAos). In the latter aspect atten tion was also called to the fact that in the syllogistic deduction of a particular proposition from a general one, the general would yet from the outset be justified only on condition that the particular were valid. '
Since the essential nature of things is thus inaccessible to human
> Bert. Emp. Adv. Math. VIII.
