No More Learning

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels do not know material things.
For the object understood is the perfection of him who understands it.
But material things cannot be the perfections of angels, since they are
beneath them. Therefore the angels do not know material things.

Objection 2: Further, intellectual vision is only of such things as
exist within the soul by their essence, as is said in the gloss [*On 2
Cor. 12:2, taken from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii. 28)]. But the
material things cannot enter by their essence into man's soul, nor into
the angel's mind. Therefore they cannot be known by intellectual
vision, but only by imaginary vision, whereby the images of bodies are
apprehended, and by sensible vision, which regards bodies in
themselves. Now there is neither imaginary nor sensible vision in the
angels, but only intellectual. Therefore the angels cannot know
material things.

Objection 3: Further, material things are not actually intelligible,
but are knowable by apprehension of sense and of imagination, which
does not exist in angels. Therefore angels do not know material things.

On the contrary, Whatever the lower power can do, the higher can do
likewise. But man's intellect, which in the order of nature is inferior
to the angel's, can know material things. Therefore much more can the
mind of an angel.

I answer that, The established order of things is for the higher beings
to be more perfect than the lower; and for whatever is contained
deficiently, partially, and in manifold manner in the lower beings, to
be contained in the higher eminently, and in a certain degree of
fulness and simplicity. Therefore, in God, as in the highest source of
things, all things pre-exist supersubstantially in respect of His
simple Being itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1). But among other
creatures the angels are nearest to God, and resemble Him most; hence
they share more fully and more perfectly in the Divine goodness, as
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Consequently, all material things
pre-exist in the angels more simply and less materially even than in
themselves, yet in a more manifold manner and less perfectly than in
God.

Now whatever exists in any subject, is contained in it after the manner
of such subject. But the angels are intellectual beings of their own
nature. Therefore, as God knows material things by His essence, so do
the angels know them, forasmuch as they are in the angels by their
intelligible species.

Reply to Objection 1: The thing understood is the perfection of the one
who understands, by reason of the intelligible species which he has in
his intellect. And thus the intelligible species which are in the
intellect of an angel are perfections and acts in regard to that
intellect.

Reply to Objection 2: Sense does not apprehend the essences of things,
but only their outward accidents. In like manner neither does the
imagination; for it apprehends only the images of bodies. The intellect
alone apprehends the essences of things. Hence it is said (De Anima
iii, text. 26) that the object of the intellect is "what a thing is,"
regarding which it does not err; as neither does sense regarding its
proper sensible object. So therefore the essences of material things
are in the intellect of man and angels, as the thing understood is in
him who understands, and not according to their real natures. But some
things are in an intellect or in the soul according to both natures;
and in either case there is intellectual vision.

Reply to Objection 3: If an angel were to draw his knowledge of
material things from the material things themselves, he would require
to make them actually intelligible by a process of abstraction. But he
does not derive his knowledge of them from the material things
themselves; he has knowledge of material things by actually
intelligible species of things, which species are connatural to him;
just as our intellect has, by species which it makes intelligible by
abstraction.
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Whether an angel knows singulars?

Objection 1: It would seem that angels do not know singulars. For the
Philosopher says (Poster. i, text. 22): "The sense has for its object
singulars, but the intellect, universals. " Now, in the angels there is
no power of understanding save the intellectual power, as is evident
from what was said above ([502]Q[54], A[5]). Consequently they do not
know singulars.

Objection 2: Further, all knowledge comes about by some assimilation of
the knower to the object known. But it is not possible for any
assimilation to exist between an angel and a singular object, in so far
as it is singular; because, as was observed above ([503]Q[50], A[2]),
an angel is immaterial, while matter is the principle of singularity.
Therefore the angel cannot know singulars.

Objection 3: Further, if an angel does know singulars, it is either by
singular or by universal species. It is not by singular species;
because in this way he would require to have an infinite number of
species. Nor is it by universal species; since the universal is not the
sufficient principle for knowing the singular as such, because singular
things are not known in the universal except potentially. Therefore the
angel does not know singulars.

On the contrary, No one can guard what he does not know. But angels
guard individual men, according to Ps. 90:11: "He hath given His angels
charge over Thee. " Consequently the angels know singulars.

I answer that, Some have denied to the angels all knowledge of
singulars. In the first place this derogates from the Catholic faith,
which asserts that these lower things are administered by angels,
according to Heb. 1:14: "They are all ministering spirits. " Now, if
they had no knowledge of singulars, they could exercise no provision
over what is going on in this world; since acts belong to individuals:
and this is against the text of Eccles. 5:5: "Say not before the angel:
There is no providence. " Secondly, it is also contrary to the teachings
of philosophy, according to which the angels are stated to be the
movers of the heavenly spheres, and to move them according to their
knowledge and will.

Consequently others have said that the angel possesses knowledge of
singulars, but in their universal causes, to which all particular
effects are reduced; as if the astronomer were to foretell a coming
eclipse from the dispositions of the movements of the heavens. This
opinion does not escape the aforesaid implications; because, to know a
singular, merely in its universal causes, is not to know it as
singular, that is, as it exists here and now. The astronomer, knowing
from computation of the heavenly movements that an eclipse is about to
happen, knows it in the universal; yet he does not know it as taking
place now, except by the senses. But administration, providence and
movement are of singulars, as they are here and now existing.

Therefore, it must be said differently, that, as man by his various
powers of knowledge knows all classes of things, apprehending
universals and immaterial things by his intellect, and things singular
and corporeal by the senses, so an angel knows both by his one mental
power. For the order of things runs in this way, that the higher a
thing is, so much the more is its power united and far-reaching: thus
in man himself it is manifest that the common sense which is higher
than the proper sense, although it is but one faculty, knows everything
apprehended by the five outward senses, and some other things which no
outer sense knows; for example, the difference between white and sweet.
The same is to be observed in other cases. Accordingly, since an angel
is above man in the order of nature, it is unreasonable to say that a
man knows by any one of his powers something which an angel by his one
faculty of knowledge, namely, the intellect, does not know. Hence
Aristotle pronounces it ridiculous to say that a discord, which is
known to us, should be unknown to God (De Anima i, text. 80; Metaph.
text. 15).

The manner in which an angel knows singular things can be considered
from this, that, as things proceed from God in order that they may
subsist in their own natures, so likewise they proceed in order that
they may exist in the angelic mind. Now it is clear that there comes
forth from God not only whatever belongs to their universal nature, but
likewise all that goes to make up their principles of individuation;
since He is the cause of the entire substance of the thing, as to both
its matter and its form. And for as much as He causes, does He know;
for His knowledge is the cause of a thing, as was shown above
([504]Q[14], A[8]). Therefore as by His essence, by which He causes all
things, God is the likeness of all things, and knows all things, not
only as to their universal natures, but also as to their singularity;
so through the species imparted to them do the angels know things, not
only as to their universal nature, but likewise in their individual
conditions, in so far as they are the manifold representations of that
one simple essence.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of our intellect,
which apprehends only by a process of abstraction; and by such
abstraction from material conditions the thing abstracted becomes a
universal. Such a manner of understanding is not in keeping with the
nature of the angels, as was said above ([505]Q[55], A[2], A[3] ad 1),
and consequently there is no comparison.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not according to their nature that the
angels are likened to material things, as one thing resembles another
by agreement in genus, species, or accident; but as the higher bears
resemblance to the lower, as the sun does to fire. Even in this way
there is in God a resemblance of all things, as to both matter and
form, in so far as there pre-exists in Him as in its cause whatever is
to be found in things. For the same reason, the species in the angel's
intellect, which are images drawn from the Divine essence, are the
images of things not only as to their form, but also as to their
matter.

Reply to Objection 3: Angels know singulars by universal forms, which
nevertheless are the images of things both as to their universal, and
as to their individuating principles. How many things can be known by
the same species, has been already stated above ([506]Q[55], A[3], ad
3).
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Whether angels know the future?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know future events. For
angels are mightier in knowledge than men. But some men know many
future events. Therefore much more do the angels.

Objection 2: Further, the present and the future are differences of
time. But the angel's intellect is above time; because, as is said in
De Causis, "an intelligence keeps pace with eternity," that is,
aeviternity. Therefore, to the angel's mind, past and future are not
different, but he knows each indifferently.

Objection 3: Further, the angel does not understand by species derived
from things, but by innate universal species. But universal species
refer equally to present, past, and future. Therefore it appears that
the angels know indifferently things past, present, and future.

Objection 4: Further, as a thing is spoken of as distant by reason of
time, so is it by reason of place. But angels know things which are
distant according to place. Therefore they likewise know things distant
according to future time.

On the contrary, Whatever is the exclusive sign of the Divinity, does
not belong to the angels. But to know future events is the exclusive
sign of the Divinity, according to Is. 41:23: "Show the things that are
to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods. " Therefore the
angels do not know future events.

I answer that, The future can be known in two ways. First, it can be
known in its cause. And thus, future events which proceed necessarily
from their causes, are known with sure knowledge; as that the sun will
rise tomorrow. But events which proceed from their causes in the
majority of cases, are not known for certain, but conjecturally; thus
the doctor knows beforehand the health of the patient. This manner of
knowing future events exists in the angels, and by so much the more
than it does in us, as they understand the causes of things both more
universally and more perfectly; thus doctors who penetrate more deeply
into the causes of an ailment can pronounce a surer verdict on the
future issue thereof. But events which proceed from their causes in the
minority of cases are quite unknown; such as casual and chance events.

In another way future events are known in themselves. To know the
future in this way belongs to God alone; and not merely to know those
events which happen of necessity, or in the majority of cases, but even
casual and chance events; for God sees all things in His eternity,
which, being simple, is present to all time, and embraces all time. And
therefore God's one glance is cast over all things which happen in all
time as present before Him; and He beholds all things as they are in
themselves, as was said before when dealing with God's knowledge
([507]Q[14], A[13]). But the mind of an angel, and every created
intellect, fall far short of God's eternity; hence the future as it is
in itself cannot be known by any created intellect.

Reply to Objection 1: Men cannot know future things except in their
causes, or by God's revelation. The angels know the future in the same
way, but much more distinctly.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the angel's intellect is above that time
according to which corporeal movements are reckoned, yet there is a
time in his mind according to the succession of intelligible concepts;
of which Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii) that "God moves the
spiritual creature according to time. " And thus, since there is
succession in the angel's intellect, not all things that happen through
all time, are present to the angelic mind.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the species in the intellect of an
angel, in so far as they are species, refer equally to things present,
past, and future; nevertheless the present, past, and future;
nevertheless the present, past, and future do not bear the same
relations to the species. Present things have a nature according to
which they resemble the species in the mind of an angel: and so they
can be known thereby. Things which are yet to come have not yet a
nature whereby they are likened to such species; consequently, they
cannot be known by those species.

Reply to Objection 4: Things distant according to place are already
existing in nature; and share in some species, whose image is in the
angel; whereas this is not true of future things, as has been stated.
Consequently there is no comparison.
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Whether angels know secret thoughts?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know secret thoughts. For
Gregory (Moral. xviii), explaining Job 28:17: "Gold or crystal cannot
equal it," says that "then," namely in the bliss of those rising from
the dead, "one shall be as evident to another as he is to himself, and
when once the mind of each is seen, his conscience will at the same
time be penetrated. " But those who rise shall be like the angels, as is
stated (Mat. 22:30). Therefore an angel can see what is in another's
conscience.

Objection 2: Further, intelligible species bear the same relation to
the intellect as shapes do to bodies. But when the body is seen its
shape is seen. Therefore, when an intellectual substance is seen, the
intelligible species within it is also seen. Consequently, when one
angel beholds another, or even a soul, it seems that he can see the
thoughts of both.

Objection 3: Further, the ideas of our intellect resemble the angel
more than do the images in our imagination; because the former are
actually understood, while the latter are understood only potentially.
But the images in our imagination can be known by an angel as corporeal
things are known: because the imagination is a corporeal faculty.
Therefore it seems that an angel can know the thoughts of the
intellect.

On the contrary, What is proper to God does not belong to the angels.
But it is proper to God to read the secrets of hearts, according to
Jer. 17:9: "The heart is perverse above all things, and unsearchable;
who can know it? I am the Lord, Who search the heart. " Therefore angels
do not know the secrets of hearts.

I answer that, A secret thought can be known in two ways: first, in its
effect. In this way it can be known not only by an angel, but also by
man; and with so much the greater subtlety according as the effect is
the more hidden. For thought is sometimes discovered not merely by
outward act, but also by change of countenance; and doctors can tell
some passions of the soul by the mere pulse. Much more then can angels,
or even demons, the more deeply they penetrate those occult bodily
modifications. Hence Augustine says (De divin. daemon. ) that demons
"sometimes with the greatest faculty learn man's dispositions, not only
when expressed by speech, but even when conceived in thought, when the
soul expresses them by certain signs in the body"; although (Retract.
ii, 30) he says "it cannot be asserted how this is done. "

In another way thoughts can be known as they are in the mind, and
affections as they are in the will: and thus God alone can know the
thoughts of hearts and affections of wills. The reason of this is,
because the rational creature is subject to God only, and He alone can
work in it Who is its principal object and last end: this will be
developed later ([508]Q[63], A[1]; [509]Q[105], A[5]). Consequently all
that is in the will, and all things that depend only on the will, are
known to God alone. Now it is evident that it depends entirely on the
will for anyone actually to consider anything; because a man who has a
habit of knowledge, or any intelligible species, uses them at will.
Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:11): "For what man knoweth the things
of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him? "

Reply to Objection 1: In the present life one man's thought is not
known by another owing to a twofold hindrance; namely, on account of
the grossness of the body, and because the will shuts up its secrets.
The first obstacle will be removed at the Resurrection, and does not
exist at all in the angels; while the second will remain, and is in the
angels now. Nevertheless the brightness of the body will show forth the
quality of the soul; as to its amount of grace and of glory. In this
way one will be able to see the mind of another.

Reply to Objection 2: Although one angel sees the intelligible species
of another, by the fact that the species are proportioned to the rank
of these substances according to greater or lesser universality, yet it
does not follow that one knows how far another makes use of them by
actual consideration.

Reply to Objection 3: The appetite of the brute does not control its
act, but follows the impression of some other corporeal or spiritual
cause. Since, therefore, the angels know corporeal things and their
dispositions, they can thereby know what is passing in the appetite or
in the imaginative apprehension of the brute beasts, and even of man,
in so far as the sensitive appetite sometimes, through following some
bodily impression, influences his conduct, as always happens in brutes.
Yet the angels do not necessarily know the movement of the sensitive
appetite and the imaginative apprehension of man in so far as these are
moved by the will and reason; because, even the lower part of the soul
has some share of reason, as obeying its ruler, as is said in Ethics
iii, 12. But it does not follow that, if the angel knows what is
passing through man's sensitive appetite or imagination, he knows what
is in the thought or will: because the intellect or will is not subject
to the sensitive appetite or the imagination, but can make various uses
of them.
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Whether the angels know the mysteries of grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know mysteries of grace.
For, the mystery of the Incarnation is the most excellent of all
mysteries. But the angels knew of it from the beginning; for Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19): "This mystery was hidden in God through the
ages, yet so that it was known to the princes and powers in heavenly
places. " And the Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:16): "That great mystery of
godliness appeared unto angels*. " [*Vulg. : 'Great is the mystery of
godliness, which . . . appeared unto angels. '] Therefore the angels
know the mysteries of grace.

Objection 2: Further, the reasons of all mysteries of grace are
contained in the Divine wisdom. But the angels behold God's wisdom,
which is His essence. Therefore they know the mysteries of grace.

Objection 3: Further, the prophets are enlightened by the angels, as is
clear from Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv). But the prophets knew mysteries
of grace; for it is said (Amos 3:7): "For the Lord God doth nothing
without revealing His secret to His servants the prophets. " Therefore
angels know the mysteries of grace.

On the contrary, No one learns what he knows already. Yet even the
highest angels seek out and learn mysteries of grace. For it is stated
(Coel. Hier. vii) that "Sacred Scripture describes some heavenly
essences as questioning Jesus, and learning from Him the knowledge of
His Divine work for us; and Jesus as teaching them directly": as is
evident in Is. 63:1, where, on the angels asking, "Who is he who cometh
up from Edom? " Jesus answered, "It is I, Who speak justice. " Therefore
the angels do not know mysteries of grace.

I answer that, There is a twofold knowledge in the angel. The first is
his natural knowledge, according to which he knows things both by his
essence, and by innate species.
By such knowledge the angels cannot
know mysteries of grace. For these mysteries depend upon the pure will
of God: and if an angel cannot learn the thoughts of another angel,
which depend upon the will of such angel, much less can he ascertain
what depends entirely upon God's will. The Apostle reasons in this
fashion (1 Cor. 2:11): "No one knoweth the things of a man [*Vulg. :
'What man knoweth the things of a man, but . . . ? '], but the spirit of
a man that is in him. " So, "the things also that are of God no man
knoweth but the Spirit of God. "

There is another knowledge of the angels, which renders them happy; it
is the knowledge whereby they see the Word, and things in the Word. By
such vision they know mysteries of grace, but not all mysteries: nor do
they all know them equally; but just as God wills them to learn by
revelation; as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:10): "But to us God hath
revealed them through His Spirit"; yet so that the higher angels
beholding the Divine wisdom more clearly, learn more and deeper
mysteries in the vision of God, which mysteries they communicate to the
lower angels by enlightening them. Some of these mysteries they knew
from the very beginning of their creation; others they are taught
afterwards, as befits their ministrations.

Reply to Objection 1: One can speak in two ways of the mystery of the
Incarnation. First of all, in general; and in this way it was revealed
to all from the commencement of their beatitude. The reason of this is,
that this is a kind of general principle to which all their duties are
ordered. For "all are [*Vulg. : 'Are they not all. '] ministering
spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of
salvation (Heb. 1:14)"; and this is brought by the mystery of the
Incarnation. Hence it was necessary for all of them to be instructed in
this mystery from the very beginning.

We can speak of the mystery of the Incarnation in another way, as to
its special conditions. Thus not all the angels were instructed on all
points from the beginning; even the higher angels learned these
afterwards, as appears from the passage of Dionysius already quoted.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the angels in bliss behold the Divine
wisdom, yet they do not comprehend it. So it is not necessary for them
to know everything hidden in it.

Reply to Objection 3: Whatever the prophets knew by revelation of the
mysteries of grace, was revealed in a more excellent way to the angels.
And although God revealed in general to the prophets what He was one
day to do regarding the salvation of the human race, still the apostles
knew some particulars of the same, which the prophets did not know.
Thus we read (Eph. 3:4,5): "As you reading, may understand my knowledge
in the mystery of Christ, which in other generations was not known to
the sons of men, as it is now revealed to His holy apostles. " Among the
prophets also, the later ones knew what the former did not know;
according to Ps. 118:100: "I have had understanding above ancients,"
and Gregory says: "The knowledge of Divine things increased as time
went on" (Hom. xvi in Ezech. ).
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OF THE MODE OF ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE (SEVEN ARTICLES)

After the foregoing we have now to treat of the mode of the angelic
knowledge, concerning which there are seven points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the angel's intellect be sometimes in potentiality, and
sometimes in act?

(2) Whether the angel can understand many things at the same time?

(3) Whether the angel's knowledge is discursive?

(4) Whether he understands by composing and dividing?

(5) Whether there can be error in the angel's intellect?

(6) Whether his knowledge can be styled as morning and evening?

(7) Whether the morning and evening knowledge are the same, or do they
differ?
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Whether the angel's intellect is sometimes in potentiality, sometimes in
act?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel's intellect is sometimes in
potentiality and sometimes in act. For movement is the act of what is
in potentiality, as stated in Phys. iii, 6. But the angels' minds are
moved by understanding, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore the
angelic minds are sometimes in potentiality.

Objection 2: Further, since desire is of a thing not possessed but
possible to have, whoever desires to know anything is in potentiality
thereto. But it is said (1 Pet. 1:12): "On Whom the angels desire to
look. " Therefore the angel's intellect is sometimes in potentiality.

Objection 3: Further, in the book De Causis it is stated that "an
intelligence understands according to the mode of its substance. " But
the angel's intelligence has some admixture of potentiality. Therefore
it sometimes understands potentially.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii): "Since the angels
were created, in the eternity of the Word, they enjoy holy and devout
contemplation. " Now a contemplating intellect is not in potentiality,
but in act. Therefore the intellect of an angel is not in potentiality.

I answer that, As the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, text. 8; Phys.
viii, 32), the intellect is in potentiality in two ways; first, "as
before learning or discovering," that is, before it has the habit of
knowledge; secondly, as "when it possesses the habit of knowledge, but
does not actually consider. " In the first way an angel's intellect is
never in potentiality with regard to the things to which his natural
knowledge extends. For, as the higher, namely, the heavenly, bodies
have no potentiality to existence, which is not fully actuated, in the
same way the heavenly intellects, the angels, have no intelligible
potentiality which is not fully completed by connatural intelligible
species. But with regard to things divinely revealed to them, there is
nothing to hinder them from being in potentiality: because even the
heavenly bodies are at times in potentiality to being enlightened by
the sun.

In the second way an angel's intellect can be in potentiality with
regard to things learnt by natural knowledge; for he is not always
actually considering everything that he knows by natural knowledge. But
as to the knowledge of the Word, and of the things he beholds in the
Word, he is never in this way in potentiality; because he is always
actually beholding the Word, and the things he sees in the Word. For
the bliss of the angels consists in such vision; and beatitude does not
consist in habit, but in act, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8).

Reply to Objection 1: Movement is taken there not as the act of
something imperfect, that is, of something existing in potentiality,
but as the act of something perfect, that is, of one actually existing.
In this way understanding and feeling are termed movements, as stated
in De Anima iii, text. 28.

Reply to Objection 2: Such desire on the part of the angels does not
exclude the object desired, but weariness thereof. Or they are said to
desire the vision of God with regard to fresh revelations, which they
receive from God to fit them for the tasks which they have to perform.

Reply to Objection 3: In the angel's substance there is no potentiality
divested of act. In the same way, the angel's intellect is never so in
potentiality as to be without act.
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Whether an angel can understand many things at the same time?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot understand many things
at the same time. For the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 4) that "it may
happen that we know many things, but understand only one. "

Objection 2: Further, nothing is understood unless the intellect be
informed by an intelligible species; just at the body is formed by
shape. But one body cannot be formed into many shapes. Therefore
neither can one intellect simultaneously understand various
intelligible things.

Objection 3: Further, to understand is a kind of movement. But no
movement terminates in various terms. Therefore many things cannot be
understood altogether.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 32): "The spiritual
faculty of the angelic mind comprehends most easily at the same time
all things that it wills. "

I answer that, As unity of term is requisite for unity of movement, so
is unity of object required for unity of operation. Now it happens that
several things may be taken as several or as one; like the parts of a
continuous whole. For if each of the parts be considered severally they
are many: consequently neither by sense nor by intellect are they
grasped by one operation, nor all at once. In another way they are
taken as forming one in the whole; and so they are grasped both by
sense and intellect all at once and by one operation; as long as the
entire continuous whole is considered, as is stated in De Anima iii,
text. 23. In this way our intellect understands together both the
subject and the predicate, as forming parts of one proposition; and
also two things compared together, according as they agree in one point
of comparison. From this it is evident that many things, in so far as
they are distinct, cannot be understood at once; but in so far as they
are comprised under one intelligible concept, they can be understood
together. Now everything is actually intelligible according as its
image is in the intellect. All things, then, which can be known by one
intelligible species, are known as one intelligible object, and
therefore are understood simultaneously. But things known by various
intelligible species, are apprehended as different intelligible
objects.

Consequently, by such knowledge as the angels have of things through
the Word, they know all things under one intelligible species, which is
the Divine essence. Therefore, as regards such knowledge, they know all
things at once: just as in heaven "our thoughts will not be fleeting,
going and returning from one thing to another, but we shall survey all
our knowledge at the same time by one glance," as Augustine says (De
Trin. xv, 16). But by that knowledge wherewith the angels know things
by innate species, they can at one time know all things which can be
comprised under one species; but not such as are under various species.

Reply to Objection 1: To understand many things as one, is, so to
speak, to understand one thing.

Reply to Objection 2: The intellect is informed by the intelligible
species which it has within it. So it can behold at the same time many
intelligible objects under one species; as one body can by one shape be
likened to many bodies.

To the third objection the answer is the same as the first.
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Whether an angel's knowledge is discursive?

Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge of an angel is
discursive. For the discursive movement of the mind comes from one
thing being known through another. But the angels know one thing
through another; for they know creatures through the Word. Therefore
the intellect of an angel knows by discursive method.

Objection 2: Further, whatever a lower power can do, the higher can do.
But the human intellect can syllogize, and know causes in effects; all
of which is the discursive method. Therefore the intellect of the
angel, which is higher in the order of nature, can with greater reason
do this.

Objection 3: Further, Isidore (De sum. bono i, 10) says that "demons
learn more things by experience. " But experimental knowledge is
discursive: for, "one experience comes of many remembrances, and one
universal from many experiences," as Aristotle observes (Poster. ii;
Metaph. vii). Therefore an angel's knowledge is discursive.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the "angels do not
acquire Divine knowledge from separate discourses, nor are they led to
something particular from something common. "

I answer that, As has often been stated [510](A[1]; [511]Q[55], A[1]),
the angels hold that grade among spiritual substances which the
heavenly bodies hold among corporeal substances: for Dionysius calls
them "heavenly minds" [512](A[1]; [513]Q[55], A[1]). Now, the
difference between heavenly and earthly bodies is this, that earthly
bodies obtain their last perfection by chance and movement: while the
heavenly bodies have their last perfection at once from their very
nature. So, likewise, the lower, namely, the human, intellects obtain
their perfection in the knowledge of truth by a kind of movement and
discursive intellectual operation; that is to say, as they advance from
one known thing to another. But, if from the knowledge of a known
principle they were straightway to perceive as known all its consequent
conclusions, then there would be no discursive process at all. Such is
the condition of the angels, because in the truths which they know
naturally, they at once behold all things whatsoever that can be known
in them.

Therefore they are called "intellectual beings": because even with
ourselves the things which are instantly grasped by the mind are said
to be understood [intelligi]; hence "intellect" is defined as the habit
of first principles. But human souls which acquire knowledge of truth
by the discursive method are called "rational"; and this comes of the
feebleness of their intellectual light. For if they possessed the
fulness of intellectual light, like the angels, then in the first
aspect of principles they would at once comprehend their whole range,
by perceiving whatever could be reasoned out from them.

Reply to Objection 1: Discursion expresses movement of a kind. Now all
movement is from something before to something after. Hence discursive
knowledge comes about according as from something previously known one
attains to the knowledge of what is afterwards known, and which was
previously unknown. But if in the thing perceived something else be
seen at the same time, as an object and its image are seen
simultaneously in a mirror, it is not discursive knowledge. And in this
way the angels know things in the Word.

Reply to Objection 2: The angels can syllogize, in the sense of knowing
a syllogism; and they see effects in causes, and causes in effects: yet
they do not acquire knowledge of an unknown truth in this way, by
syllogizing from causes to effect, or from effect to cause.

Reply to Objection 3: Experience is affirmed of angels and demons
simply by way of similitude, forasmuch as they know sensible things
which are present, yet without any discursion withal.
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Whether the angels understand by composing and dividing?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels understand by composing and
dividing. For, where there is multiplicity of things understood, there
is composition of the same, as is said in De Anima iii, text. 21. But
there is a multitude of things understood in the angelic mind; because
angels apprehend different things by various species, and not all at
one time. Therefore there is composition and division in the angel's
mind.

Objection 2: Further, negation is far more remote from affirmation than
any two opposite natures are; because the first of distinctions is that
of affirmation and negation. But the angel knows certain distant
natures not by one, but by diverse species, as is evident from what was
said [514](A[2]). Therefore he must know affirmation and negation by
diverse species. And so it seems that he understands by composing and
dividing.

Objection 3: Further, speech is a sign of the intellect. But in
speaking to men, angels use affirmative and negative expressions, which
are signs of composition and of division in the intellect; as is
manifest from many passages of Sacred Scripture. Therefore it seems
that the angel understands by composing and dividing.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "the intellectual
power of the angel shines forth with the clear simplicity of divine
concepts. " But a simple intelligence is without composition and
division. Therefore the angel understands without composition or
division.

I answer that, As in the intellect, when reasoning, the conclusion is
compared with the principle, so in the intellect composing and
dividing, the predicate is compared with the subject. For if our
intellect were to see at once the truth of the conclusion in the
principle, it would never understand by discursion and reasoning. In
like manner, if the intellect in apprehending the quiddity of the
subject were at once to have knowledge of all that can be attributed
to, or removed from, the subject, it would never understand by
composing and dividing, but only by understanding the essence. Thus it
is evident that for the self-same reason our intellect understands by
discursion, and by composing and dividing, namely, that in the first
apprehension of anything newly apprehended it does not at once grasp
all that is virtually contained in it. And this comes from the weakness
of the intellectual light within us, as has been said [515](A[3]).
Hence, since the intellectual light is perfect in the angel, for he is
a pure and most clear mirror, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), it
follows that as the angel does not understand by reasoning, so neither
does he by composing and dividing.

Nevertheless, he understands the composition and the division of
enunciations, just as he apprehends the reasoning of syllogisms: for he
understands simply, such things as are composite, things movable
immovably, and material things immaterially.

Reply to Objection 1: Not every multitude of things understood causes
composition, but a multitude of such things understood that one of them
is attributed to, or denied of, another. When an angel apprehends the
nature of anything, he at the same time understands whatever can be
either attributed to it, or denied of it. Hence, in apprehending a
nature, he by one simple perception grasps all that we can learn by
composing and dividing.

Reply to Objection 2: The various natures of things differ less as to
their mode of existing than do affirmation and negation. Yet, as to the
way in which they are known, affirmation and negation have something
more in common; because directly the truth of an affirmation is known,
the falsehood of the opposite negation is known also.

Reply to Objection 3: The fact that angels use affirmative and negative
forms of speech, shows that they know both composition and division:
yet not that they know by composing and dividing, but by knowing simply
the nature of a thing.
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Whether there can be falsehood in the intellect of an angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be falsehood in the angel's
intellect. For perversity appertains to falsehood. But, as Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. iv), there is "a perverted fancy" in the demons.
Therefore it seems that there can be falsehood in the intellect of the
angels.

Objection 2: Further, nescience is the cause of estimating falsely.
But, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi), there can be nescience in the
angels. Therefore it seems there can be falsehood in them.

Objection 3: Further, everything which falls short of the truth of
wisdom, and which has a depraved reason, has falsehood or error in its
intellect. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) affirms this of the demons.
Therefore it seems that there can be error in the minds of the angels.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 41) that
"the intelligence is always true. " Augustine likewise says (QQ. 83, qu.
32) that "nothing but what is true can be the object of intelligence"
Therefore there can be neither deception nor falsehood in the angel's
knowledge.

I answer that, The truth of this question depends partly upon what has
gone before. For it has been said [516](A[4]) that an angel understands
not by composing and dividing, but by understanding what a thing is.
Now the intellect is always true as regards what a thing is, just as
the sense regarding its proper object, as is said in De Anima iii,
text. 26. But by accident, deception and falsehood creep in, when we
understand the essence of a thing by some kind of composition, and this
happens either when we take the definition of one thing for another, or
when the parts of a definition do not hang together, as if we were to
accept as the definition of some creature, "a four-footed flying
beast," for there is no such animal.