Objection 3: Further, every sin is a voluntary act, because, as
Augustine states (De Lib.
Augustine states (De Lib.
Summa Theologica
" Now it is evident that a sin is caused by a defect in
some circumstance: because the fact that a man departs from the order
of reason is due to his not observing the due circumstances in his
action. Wherefore it is evident that it is natural for a sin to be
aggravated by reason of its circumstances. This happens in three ways.
First, in so far as a circumstance draws a sin from one kind to
another: thus fornication is the intercourse of a man with one who is
not his wife: but if to this be added the circumstance that the latter
is the wife of another, the sin is drawn to another kind of sin, viz.
injustice, in so far as he usurps another's property; and in this
respect adultery is a more grievous sin than fornication. Secondly, a
circumstance aggravates a sin, not by drawing it into another genus,
but only by multiplying the ratio of sin: thus if a wasteful man gives
both when he ought not, and to whom he ought not to give, he commits
the same kind of sin in more ways than if he were to merely to give to
whom he ought not, and for that very reason his sin is more grievous;
even as that sickness is the graver which affects more parts of the
body. Hence Cicero says (Paradox. iii) that "in taking his father's
life a man commits many sins; for he outrages one who begot him, who
fed him, who educated him, to whom he owes his lands, his house, his
position in the republic. " Thirdly, a circumstance aggravates a sin by
adding to the deformity which the sin derives from another
circumstance: thus, taking another's property constitutes the sin of
theft; but if to this be added the circumstance that much is taken of
another's property, the sin will be more grievous; although in itself,
to take more or less has not the character of a good or of an evil act.
Reply to Objection 1: Some circumstances do specify a moral act, as
stated above ([1735]Q[18], A[10]). Nevertheless a circumstance which
does not give the species, may aggravate a sin; because, even as the
goodness of a thing is weighed, not only in reference to its species,
but also in reference to an accident, so the malice of an act is
measured, not only according to the species of that act, but also
according to a circumstance.
Reply to Objection 2: A circumstance may aggravate a sin either way.
For if it is evil, it does not follow that it constitutes the sin's
species; because it may multiply the ratio of evil within the same
species, as stated above. And if it be not evil, it may aggravate a sin
in relation to the malice of another circumstance.
Reply to Objection 3: Reason should direct the action not only as
regards the object, but also as regards every circumstance. Therefore
one may turn aside from the rule of reason through corruption of any
single circumstance; for instance, by doing something when one ought
not or where one ought not; and to depart thus from the rule of reason
suffices to make the act evil. This turning aside from the rule of
reason results from man's turning away from God, to Whom man ought to
be united by right reason.
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Whether sin is aggravated by reason of its causing more harm?
Objection 1: It would seem that a sin is not aggravated by reason of
its causing more harm. Because the harm done is an issue consequent to
the sinful act. But the issue of an act does not add to its goodness or
malice, as stated above ([1736]Q[20], A[5]). Therefore a sin is not
aggravated on account of its causing more harm.
Objection 2: Further, harm is inflicted by sins against our neighbor.
Because no one wishes to harm himself: and no one can harm God,
according to Job 35:6, 8: "If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt
thou do against Him? . . . Thy wickedness may hurt a man that is like
thee. " If, therefore, sins were aggravated through causing more harm,
it would follow that sins against our neighbor are more grievous than
sins against God or oneself.
Objection 3: Further, greater harm is inflicted on a man by depriving
him of the life of grace, than by taking away his natural life; because
the life of grace is better than the life of nature, so far that man
ought to despise his natural life lest he lose the life of grace. Now,
speaking absolutely, a man who leads a woman to commit fornication
deprives her of the life of grace by leading her into mortal sin. If
therefore a sin were more grievous on account of its causing a greater
harm, it would follow that fornication, absolutely speaking, is a more
grievous sin than murder, which is evidently untrue. Therefore a sin is
not more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14): "Since vice is
contrary to nature, a vice is the more grievous according as it
diminishes the integrity of nature. " Now the diminution of the
integrity of nature is a harm. Therefore a sin is graver according as
it does more harm.
I answer that, Harm may bear a threefold relation to sin. Because
sometimes the harm resulting from a sin is foreseen and intended, as
when a man does something with a mind to harm another, e. g. a murderer
or a thief. In this case the quantity of harm aggravates the sin
directly, because then the harm is the direct object of the sin.
Sometimes the harm is foreseen, but not intended; for instance, when a
man takes a short cut through a field, the result being that he
knowingly injures the growing crops, although his intention is not to
do this harm, but to commit fornication. In this case again the
quantity of the harm done aggravates the sin; indirectly, however, in
so far, to wit, as it is owing to his will being strongly inclined to
sin, that a man does not forbear from doing, to himself or to another,
a harm which he would not wish simply. Sometimes, however, the harm is
neither foreseen nor intended: and then if this harm is connected with
the sin accidentally, it does not aggravate the sin directly; but, on
account of his neglecting to consider the harm that might ensue, a man
is deemed punishable for the evil results of his action if it be
unlawful. If, on the other hand, the harm follow directly from the
sinful act, although it be neither foreseen nor intended, it aggravates
the sin directly, because whatever is directly consequent to a sin,
belongs, in a manner, to the very species of that sin: for instance, if
a man is a notorious fornicator, the result is that many are
scandalized; and although such was not his intention, nor was it
perhaps foreseen by him, yet it aggravates his sin directly.
But this does not seem to apply to penal harm, which the sinner himself
incurs. Such like harm, if accidentally connected with the sinful act,
and if neither foreseen nor intended, does not aggravate a sin, nor
does it correspond with the gravity of the sin: for instance, if a man
in running to slay, slips and hurts his foot. If, on the other hand,
this harm is directly consequent to the sinful act, although perhaps it
be neither foreseen nor intended, then greater harm does not make
greater sin, but, on the contrary, a graver sin calls for the
infliction of a greater harm. Thus, an unbeliever who has heard nothing
about the pains of hell, would suffer greater pain in hell for a sin of
murder than for a sin of theft: but his sin is not aggravated on
account of his neither intending nor foreseeing this, as it would be in
the case of a believer, who, seemingly, sins more grievously in the
very fact that he despises a greater punishment, that he may satisfy
his desire to sin; but the gravity of this harm is caused by the sole
gravity of sin.
Reply to Objection 1: As we have already stated ([1737]Q[20], A[5]), in
treating of the goodness and malice of external actions, the result of
an action if foreseen and intended adds to the goodness and malice of
an act.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the harm done aggravates a sin, it does
not follow that this alone renders a sin more grievous: in fact, it is
inordinateness which of itself aggravates a sin. Wherefore the harm
itself that ensues aggravates a sin, in so far only as it renders the
act more inordinate. Hence it does not follow, supposing harm to be
inflicted chiefly by sins against our neighbor, that such sins are the
most grievous, since a much greater inordinateness is to be found
against which man commits against God, and in some which he commits
against himself. Moreover we might say that although no man can do God
any harm in His substance, yet he can endeavor to do so in things
concerning Him, e. g. by destroying faith, by outraging holy things,
which are most grievous sins. Again, a man sometimes knowingly and
freely inflicts harm on himself, as in the case of suicide, though this
be referred finally to some apparent good, for example, delivery from
some anxiety.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument does not prove, for two reasons:
first, because the murderer intends directly to do harm to his
neighbors; whereas the fornicator who solicits the woman intends not to
harm but pleasure; secondly, because murder is the direct and
sufficient cause of bodily death; whereas no man can of himself be the
sufficient cause of another's spiritual death, because no man dies
spiritually except by sinning of his own will.
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Whether a sin is aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against
whom it is committed?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin is not aggravated by reason of the
condition of the person against whom it is committed. For if this were
the case a sin would be aggravated chiefly by being committed against a
just and holy man. But this does not aggravate a sin: because a
virtuous man who bears a wrong with equanimity is less harmed by the
wrong done him, than others, who, through being scandalized, are also
hurt inwardly. Therefore the condition of the person against whom a sin
is committed does not aggravate the sin.
Objection 2: Further, if the condition of the person aggravated the
sin, this would be still more the case if the person be near of kin,
because, as Cicero says (Paradox. iii): "The man who kills his slave
sins once: he that takes his father's life sins many times. " But the
kinship of a person sinned against does not apparently aggravate a sin,
because every man is most akin to himself; and yet it is less grievous
to harm oneself than another, e. g. to kill one's own, than another's
horse, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore kinship of
the person sinned against does not aggravate the sin.
Objection 3: Further, the condition of the person who sins aggravates a
sin chiefly on account of his position or knowledge, according to Wis.
6:7: "The mighty shall be mightily tormented," and Lk. 12:47: "The
servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . . shall
be beaten with many stripes. " Therefore, in like manner, on the part of
the person sinned against, the sin is made more grievous by reason of
his position and knowledge. But, apparently, it is not a more grievous
sin to inflict an injury on a rich and powerful person than on a poor
man, since "there is no respect of persons with God" (Col. 3:25),
according to Whose judgment the gravity of a sin is measured. Therefore
the condition of the person sinned against does not aggravate the sin.
On the contrary, Holy Writ censures especially those sins that are
committed against the servants of God. Thus it is written (3 Kings
19:14): "They have destroyed Thy altars, they have slain Thy prophets
with the sword. " Moreover much blame is attached to the sin committed
by a man against those who are akin to him, according to Micah 7:6:
"the son dishonoreth the father, and the daughter riseth up against her
mother. " Furthermore sins committed against persons of rank are
expressly condemned: thus it is written (Job 34:18): "Who saith to the
king: 'Thou art an apostate'; who calleth rulers ungodly. " Therefore
the condition of the person sinned against aggravates the sin.
I answer that, The person sinned against is, in a manner, the object of
the sin. Now it has been stated above [1738](A[3]) that the primary
gravity of a sin is derived from its object; so that a sin is deemed to
be so much the more grave, as its object is a more principal end. But
the principal ends of human acts are God, man himself, and his
neighbor: for whatever we do, it is on account of one of these that we
do it; although one of them is subordinate to the other. Therefore the
greater or lesser gravity of a sin, in respect of the person sinned
against, may be considered on the part of these three.
First, on the part of God, to Whom man is the more closely united, as
he is more virtuous or more sacred to God: so that an injury inflicted
on such a person redounds on to God according to Zech. 2:8: "He that
toucheth you, toucheth the apple of My eye. " Wherefore a sin is the
more grievous, according as it is committed against a person more
closely united to God by reason of personal sanctity, or official
station. On the part of man himself, it is evident that he sins all the
more grievously, according as the person against whom he sins, is more
united to him, either through natural affinity or kindness received or
any other bond; because he seems to sin against himself rather than the
other, and, for this very reason, sins all the more grievously,
according to Ecclus. 14:5: "He that is evil to himself, to whom will he
be good? " On the part of his neighbor, a man sins the more grievously,
according as his sin affects more persons: so that a sin committed
against a public personage, e. g. a sovereign prince who stands in the
place of the whole people, is more grievous than a sin committed
against a private person; hence it is expressly prohibited (Ex. 22:28):
"The prince of thy people thou shalt not curse. " In like manner it
would seem that an injury done to a person of prominence, is all the
more grave, on account of the scandal and the disturbance it would
cause among many people.
Reply to Objection 1: He who inflicts an injury on a virtuous person,
so far as he is concerned, disturbs him internally and externally; but
that the latter is not disturbed internally is due to his goodness,
which does not extenuate the sin of the injurer.
Reply to Objection 2: The injury which a man inflicts on himself in
those things which are subject to the dominion of his will, for
instance his possessions, is less sinful than if it were inflicted on
another, because he does it of his own will; but in those things that
are not subject to the dominion of his will, such as natural and
spiritual goods, it is a graver sin to inflict an injury on oneself:
for it is more grievous for a man to kill himself than another. Since,
however, things belonging to our neighbor are not subject to the
dominion of our will, the argument fails to prove, in respect of
injuries done to such like things, that it is less grievous to sin in
their regard, unless indeed our neighbor be willing, or give his
approval.
Reply to Objection 3: There is no respect for persons if God punishes
more severely those who sin against a person of higher rank; for this
is done because such an injury redounds to the harm of many.
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Whether the excellence of the person sinning aggravates the sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the excellence of the person sinning
does not aggravate the sin. For man becomes great chiefly by cleaving
to God, according to Ecclus. 25:13: "How great is he that findeth
wisdom and knowledge! but there is none above him that feareth the
Lord. " Now the more a man cleaves to God, the less is a sin imputed to
him: for it is written (2 Paral. 30: 18,19): "The Lord Who is good will
show mercy to all them, who with their whole heart seek the Lord the
God of their fathers; and will not impute it to them that they are not
sanctified. " Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the
person sinning.
Objection 2: Further, "there is no respect of persons with God" (Rom.
2:11). Therefore He does not punish one man more than another, for one
and the same sin. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence
of the person sinning.
Objection 3: Further, no one should reap disadvantage from good. But he
would, if his action were the more blameworthy on account of his
goodness. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by reason of the excellence
of the person sinning.
On the contrary, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 18): "A sin is deemed
so much the more grievous as the sinner is held to be a more excellent
person. "
I answer that, Sin is twofold. There is a sin which takes us unawares
on account of the weakness of human nature: and such like sins are less
imputable to one who is more virtuous, because he is less negligent in
checking those sins, which nevertheless human weakness does not allow
us to escape altogether. But there are other sins which proceed from
deliberation: and these sins are all the more imputed to man according
as he is more excellent. Four reasons may be assigned for this. First,
because a more excellent person, e. g. one who excels in knowledge and
virtue, can more easily resist sin; hence Our Lord said (Lk. 12:47)
that the "servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not .
. . shall be beaten with many stripes. " Secondly, on account of
ingratitude, because every good in which a man excels, is a gift of
God, to Whom man is ungrateful when he sins: and in this respect any
excellence, even in temporal goods, aggravates a sin, according to Wis.
6:7: "The mighty shall be mightily tormented. " Thirdly, on account of
the sinful act being specially inconsistent with the excellence of the
person sinning: for instance, if a prince were to violate justice,
whereas he is set up as the guardian of justice, or if a priest were to
be a fornicator, whereas he has taken the vow of chastity. Fourthly, on
account of the example or scandal; because, as Gregory says (Pastor. i,
2): "Sin becomes much more scandalous, when the sinner is honored for
his position": and the sins of the great are much more notorious and
men are wont to bear them with more indignation.
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted alludes to those things which
are done negligently when we are taken unawares through human weakness.
Reply to Objection 2: God does not respect persons in punishing the
great more severely, because their excellence conduces to the gravity
of their sin, as stated.
Reply to Objection 3: The man who excels in anything reaps
disadvantage, not from the good which he has, but from his abuse
thereof.
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OF THE SUBJECT OF SIN (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the subject of vice or sin: under which head there
are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will can be the subject of sin?
(2) Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?
(3) Whether the sensuality can be the subject of sin?
(4) Whether it can be the subject of mortal sin?
(5) Whether the reason can be the subject of sin?
(6) Whether morose delectation or non-morose delectation be subjected
in the higher reason?
(7) Whether the sin of consent in the act of sin is subjected in the
higher reason?
(8) Whether the lower reason can be the subject of mortal sin?
(9) Whether the higher reason can be the subject of venial sin?
(10) Whether there can be in the higher reason a venial sin directed to
its proper object?
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Whether the will is a subject of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will cannot be a subject of sin.
For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the will and
the intention. " But sin has the character of evil. Therefore sin cannot
be in the will.
Objection 2: Further, the will is directed either to the good or to
what seems good. Now from the fact that will wishes the good, it does
not sin: and that it wishes what seems good but is not truly good,
points to a defect in the apprehensive power rather than in the will.
Therefore sin is nowise in the will.
Objection 3: Further, the same thing cannot be both subject and
efficient cause of sin: because "the efficient and the material cause
do not coincide" (Phys. 2, text. 70). Now the will is the efficient
cause of sin: because the first cause of sinning is the will, as
Augustine states (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11). Therefore it is not the
subject of sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is by the will
that we sin, and live righteously. "
I answer that, Sin is an act, as stated above ([1739]Q[71], AA[1],6).
Now some acts pass into external matter, e. g. "to cut" and "to burn":
and such acts have for their matter and subject, the thing into which
the action passes: thus the Philosopher states (Phys. iii, text. 18)
that "movement is the act of the thing moved, caused by a mover. " On
the other hand, there are acts which do not pass into external matter,
but remain in the agent, e. g. "to desire" and "to know": and such are
all moral acts, whether virtuous or sinful. Consequently the proper
subject of sin must needs be the power which is the principle of the
act. Now since it is proper to moral acts that they are voluntary, as
stated above ([1740]Q[1], A[1] ;[1741] Q[18], A[6]), it follows that
the will, which is the principle of voluntary acts, both of good acts,
and of evil acts or sins, is the principle of sins. Therefore it
follows that sin is in the will as its subject.
Reply to Objection 1: Evil is said to be outside the will, because the
will does not tend to it under the aspect of evil. But since some evil
is an apparent good, the will sometimes desires an evil, and in this
sense is in the will.
Reply to Objection 2: If the defect in the apprehensive power were
nowise subject to the will, there would be no sin, either in the will,
or in the apprehensive power, as in the case of those whose ignorance
is invincible. It remains therefore that when there is in the
apprehensive power a defect that is subject to the will, this defect
also is deemed a sin.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument applies to those efficient causes
whose actions pass into external matter, and which do not move
themselves, but move other things; the contrary of which is to be
observed in the will; hence the argument does not prove.
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Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will alone is the subject of sin.
For Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10) that "no one sins except by
the will. " Now the subject of sin is the power by which we sin.
Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin.
Objection 2: Further, sin is an evil contrary to reason. Now good and
evil pertaining to reason are the object of the will alone. Therefore
the will alone is the subject of sin.
Objection 3: Further, every sin is a voluntary act, because, as
Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv. ], "so
true is it that every sin is voluntary, that unless it be voluntary, it
is no sin at all. " Now the acts of the other powers are not voluntary,
except in so far as those powers are moved by the will; nor does this
suffice for them to be the subject of sin, because then even the
external members of the body, which are moved by the will, would be a
subject of sin; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the will alone is
the subject of sin.
On the contrary, Sin is contrary to virtue: and contraries are about
one same thing. But the other powers of the soul, besides the will, are
the subject of virtues, as stated above ([1742]Q[56]). Therefore the
will is not the only subject of sin.
I answer that, As was shown above [1743](A[1]), whatever is the a
principle of a voluntary act is a subject of sin. Now voluntary acts
are not only those which are elicited by the will, but also those which
are commanded by the will, as we stated above (Q[6], A[4]) in treating
of voluntariness. Therefore not only the will can be a subject of sin,
but also all those powers which can be moved to their acts, or
restrained from their acts, by the will; and these same powers are the
subjects of good and evil moral habits, because act and habit belong to
the same subject.
Reply to Objection 1: We do not sin except by the will as first mover;
but we sin by the other powers as moved by the will.
Reply to Objection 2: Good and evil pertain to the will as its proper
objects; but the other powers have certain determinate goods and evils,
by reason of which they can be the subject of virtue, vice, and sin, in
so far as they partake of will and reason.
Reply to Objection 3: The members of the body are not principles but
merely organs of action: wherefore they are compared to the soul which
moves them, as a slave who is moved but moves no other. On the other
hand, the internal appetitive powers are compared to reason as free
agents, because they both act and are acted upon, as is made clear in
Polit. i, 3. Moreover, the acts of the external members are actions
that pass into external matter, as may be seen in the blow that is
inflicted in the sin of murder. Consequently there is no comparison.
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Whether there can be sin in the sensuality?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be sin in the sensuality.
For sin is proper to man who is praised or blamed for his actions. Now
sensuality is common to us and irrational animals. Therefore sin cannot
be in the sensuality.
Objection 2: Further, "no man sins in what he cannot avoid," as
Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18). But man cannot prevent the
movement of the sensuality from being inordinate, since "the sensuality
ever remains corrupt, so long as we abide in this mortal life;
wherefore it is signified by the serpent," as Augustine declares (De
Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the inordinate movement of the sensuality
is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, that which man himself does not do is not imputed
to him as a sin. Now "that alone do we seem to do ourselves, which we
do with the deliberation of reason," as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
ix, 8). Therefore the movement of the sensuality, which is without the
deliberation of reason, is not imputed to a man as a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 7:19): "The good which I will I do
not; but the evil which I will not, that I do": which words Augustine
explains (Contra Julian. iii, 26; De Verb. Apost. xii, 2,3), as
referring to the evil of concupiscence, which is clearly a movement of
the sensuality. Therefore there can be sin in the sensuality.
I answer that, As stated above ([1744]AA[2],3), sin may be found in any
power whose act can be voluntary and inordinate, wherein consists the
nature of sin. Now it is evident that the act of the sensuality, or
sensitive appetite, is naturally inclined to be moved by the will.
Wherefore it follows that sin can be in the sensuality.
Reply to Objection 1: Although some of the powers of the sensitive part
are common to us and irrational animals, nevertheless, in us, they have
a certain excellence through being united to the reason; thus we
surpass other animals in the sensitive part for as much as we have the
powers of cogitation and reminiscence, as stated in the [1745]FP,
Q[78], A[4]. In the same way our sensitive appetite surpasses that of
other animals by reason of a certain excellence consisting in its
natural aptitude to obey the reason; and in this respect it can be the
principle of a voluntary action, and, consequently, the subject of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: The continual corruption of the sensuality is to
be understood as referring to the "fomes," which is never completely
destroyed in this life, since, though the stain of original sin passes,
its effect remains. However, this corruption of the "fomes" does not
hinder man from using his rational will to check individual inordinate
movements, if he be presentient to them, for instance by turning his
thoughts to other things. Yet while he is turning his thoughts to
something else, an inordinate movement may arise about this also: thus
when a man, in order to avoid the movements of concupiscence, turns his
thoughts away from carnal pleasures, to the considerations of science,
sometimes an unpremeditated movement of vainglory will arise.
Consequently, a man cannot avoid all such movements, on account of the
aforesaid corruption: but it is enough, for the conditions of a
voluntary sin, that he be able to avoid each single one.
Reply to Objection 3: Man does not do perfectly himself what he does
without the deliberation of reason, since the principal part of man
does nothing therein: wherefore such is not perfectly a human act; and
consequently it cannot be a perfect act of virtue or of sin, but is
something imperfect of that kind. Therefore such movement of the
sensuality as forestalls the reason, is a venial sin, which is
something imperfect in the genus of sin.
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Whether mortal sin can be in the sensuality?
Objection 1: It would seem that mortal sin can be in the sensuality.
Because an act is discerned by its object. Now it is possible to commit
a mortal sin about the objects of the sensuality, e. g. about carnal
pleasures. Therefore the act of the sensuality can be a mortal sin, so
that mortal sin can be found in the sensuality.
Objection 2: Further, mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But virtue can
be in the sensuality; for temperance and fortitude are virtues of the
irrational parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 10).
Therefore, since it is natural to contraries to be about the same
subject, sensuality can be the subject of mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Now
disposition and habit are in the same subject. Since therefore venial
sin may be in the sensuality, as stated above (A[3], ad 3), mortal sin
can be there also.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 23): "The inordinate
movement of concupiscence, which is the sin of the sensuality, can even
be in those who are in a state of grace," in whom, however, mortal sin
is not to be found. Therefore the inordinate movement of the sensuality
is not a mortal sin.
I answer that, Just as a disorder which destroys the principle of the
body's life causes the body's death, so too a disorder which destroys
the principle of spiritual life, viz. the last end, causes spiritual
death, which is mortal sin, as stated above ([1746]Q[72], A[5]). Now it
belongs to the reason alone, and not to the sensuality, to order
anything to the end: and disorder in respect of the end can only belong
to the power whose function it is to order others to the end. Wherefore
mortal sin cannot be in the sensuality, but only in the reason.
Reply to Objection 1: The act of the sensuality can concur towards a
mortal sin: yet the fact of its being a mortal sin is due, not to its
being an act of the sensuality, but to its being an act of reason, to
whom the ordering to the end belongs. Consequently mortal sin is
imputed, not to the sensuality, but to reason.
Reply to Objection 2: An act of virtue is perfected not only in that it
is an act of the sensuality, but still more in the fact of its being an
act of reason and will, whose function it is to choose: for the act of
moral virtue is not without the exercise of choice: wherefore the act
of moral virtue, which perfects the appetitive power, is always
accompanied by an act of prudence, which perfects the rational power;
and the same applies to mortal sin, as stated (ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: A disposition may be related in three ways to
that to which it disposes: for sometimes it is the same thing and is in
the same subject; thus inchoate science is a disposition to perfect
science: sometimes it is in the same subject, but is not the same
thing; thus heat is a disposition to the form of fire: sometimes it is
neither the same thing, nor in the same subject, as in those things
which are subordinate to one another in such a way that we can arrive
at one through the other, e. g. goodness of the imagination is a
disposition to science which is in the intellect. In this way the
venial sin that is in the sensuality, may be a disposition to mortal
sin, which is in the reason.
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Whether sin can be in the reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin cannot be in the reason. For the
sin of any power is a defect thereof. But the fault of the reason is
not a sin, on the contrary, it excuses sin: for a man is excused from
sin on account of ignorance. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason.
Objection 2: Further, the primary object of sin is the will, as stated
above [1747](A[1]). Now reason precedes the will, since it directs it.
Therefore sin cannot be in the reason.
Objection 3: Further, there can be no sin except about things which are
under our control. Now perfection and defect of reason are not among
those things which are under our control: since by nature some are
mentally deficient, and some shrewd-minded. Therefore no sin is in the
reason.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that sin is in the
lower and in the higher reason.
I answer that, The sin of any power is an act of that power, as we have
clearly shown ([1748]AA[1],2,3). Now reason has a twofold act: one is
its proper act in respect of its proper object, and this is the act of
knowing the truth; the other is the act of reason as directing the
other powers. Now in both of these ways there may be sin in the reason.
First, in so far as it errs in the knowledge of truth, which error is
imputed to the reason as a sin, when it is in ignorance or error about
what it is able and ought to know: secondly, when it either commands
the inordinate movements of the lower powers, or deliberately fails to
check them.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the defect in the proper
act of the reason in respect of its proper object, and with regard to
the case when it is a defect of knowledge about something which one is
unable to know: for then this defect of reason is not a sin, and
excuses from sin, as is evident with regard to the actions of madmen.
If, however, the defect of reason be about something which a man is
able and ought to know, he is not altogether excused from sin, and the
defect is imputed to him as a sin. The defect which belongs only to the
act of directing the other powers, is always imputed to reason as a
sin, because it can always obviate this defect by means of its proper
act.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([1749]Q[17], A[1]), when we were
treating of the acts of the will and reason, the will moves and
precedes the reason, in one way, and the reason moves and precedes the
will in another: so that both the movement of the will can be called
rational, and the act of the reason, voluntary. Accordingly sin is
found in the reason, either through being a voluntary defect of the
reason, or through the reason being the principle of the will's act.
The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said (ad
1).
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Whether the sin of morose delectation is in the reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of morose delectation is not in
the reason. For delectation denotes a movement of the appetitive power,
as stated above ([1750]Q[31], A[1]). But the appetitive power is
distinct from the reason, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore
morose delectation is not in the reason.
Objection 2: Further, the object shows to which power an act belongs,
since it is through the act that the power is directed to its object.
Now a morose delectation is sometimes about sensible goods, and not
about the goods of the reason. Therefore the sin of morose delectation
is not in the reason.
Objection 3: Further, a thing is said to be morose [*From the Latin
'mora'---delay] through taking a length of time. But length of time is
no reason why an act should belong to a particular power. Therefore
morose delectation does not belong to the reason.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "if the consent
to a sensual delectation goes no further than the mere thought of the
pleasure, I deem this to be like as though the woman alone had partaken
of the forbidden fruit. " Now "the woman" denotes the lower reason, as
he himself explains (De Trin. xii, 12). Therefore the sin of morose
delectation is in the reason.
I answer that, As stated [1751](A[5]), sin may be in the reason, not
only in respect of reason's proper act, but sometimes in respect of its
directing human actions. Now it is evident that reason directs not only
external acts, but also internal passions. Consequently when the reason
fails in directing the internal passions, sin is said to be in the
reason, as also when it fails in directing external actions. Now it
fails, in two ways, in directing internal passions: first, when it
commands unlawful passions; for instance, when a man deliberately
provokes himself to a movement of anger, or of lust: secondly, when it
fails to check the unlawful movement of a passion; for instance, when a
man, having deliberately considered that a rising movement of passion
is inordinate, continues, notwithstanding, to dwell [immoratur] upon
it, and fails to drive it away. And in this sense the sin of morose
delectation is said to be in the reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Delectation is indeed in the appetitive power as
its proximate principle; but it is in the reason as its first mover, in
accordance with what has been stated above [1752](A[1]), viz. that
actions which do not pass into external matter are subjected in their
principles.
Reply to Objection 2: Reason has its proper elicited act about its
proper object; but it exercises the direction of all the objects of
those lower powers that can be directed by the reason: and accordingly
delectation about sensible objects comes also under the direction of
reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Delectation is said to be morose not from a delay
of time, but because the reason in deliberating dwells [immoratur]
thereon, and fails to drive it away, "deliberately holding and turning
over what should have been cast aside as soon as it touched the mind,"
as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12).
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Whether the sin of consent to the act is in the higher reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not in
the higher reason. For consent is an act of the appetitive power, as
stated above ([1753]Q[15], A[1]): whereas the reason is an apprehensive
power. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher
reason.
Objection 2: Further, "the higher reason is intent on contemplating and
consulting the eternal law," as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7).
[*'Rationes aeternae,' cf. [1754]FP, Q[15], AA[2],[3] where as in
similar passages 'ratio' has been rendered by the English 'type,'
because St. Thomas was speaking of the Divine 'idea' as the archetype
of the creature. Hence the type or idea is a rule of conduct, and is
identified with the eternal law, (cf. A[8], OBJ[1]; A[9])]. But
sometimes consent is given to an act, without consulting the eternal
law: since man does not always think about Divine things, whenever he
consents to an act. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not
always in the higher reason.
Objection 3: Further, just as man can regulate his external actions
according to the eternal law, so can he regulate his internal pleasures
or other passions. But "consent to a pleasure without deciding to
fulfil it by deed, belongs to the lower reason," as Augustine states
(De Trin. xii, 2). Therefore the consent to a sinful act should also be
sometimes ascribed to the lower reason.
Objection 4: Further, just as the higher reason excels the lower, so
does the reason excel the imagination. Now sometimes man proceeds to
act through the apprehension of the power of imagination, without any
deliberation of his reason, as when, without premeditation, he moves
his hand, or foot. Therefore sometimes also the lower reason may
consent to a sinful act, independently of the higher reason.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "If the consent to
the evil use of things that can be perceived by the bodily senses, so
far approves of any sin, as to point, if possible, to its consummation
by deed, we are to understand that the woman has offered the forbidden
fruit to her husband. "
I answer that, Consent implies a judgment about the thing to which
consent is given. For just as the speculative reason judges and
delivers its sentence about intelligible matters, so the practical
reason judges and pronounces sentence on matters of action. Now we must
observe that in every case brought up for judgment, the final sentence
belongs to the supreme court, even as we see that in speculative
matters the final sentence touching any proposition is delivered by
referring it to the first principles; since, so long as there remains a
yet higher principle, the question can yet be submitted to it:
wherefore the judgment is still in suspense, the final sentence not
being as yet pronounced. But it is evident that human acts can be
regulated by the rule of human reason, which rule is derived from the
created things that man knows naturally; and further still, from the
rule of the Divine law, as stated above ([1755]Q[19], A[4]).
Consequently, since the rule of the Divine law is the higher rule, it
follows that the ultimate sentence, whereby the judgment is finally
pronounced, belongs to the higher reason which is intent on the eternal
types. Now when judgment has to be pronounced on several points, the
final judgment deals with that which comes last; and, in human acts,
the action itself comes last, and the delectation which is the
inducement to the action is a preamble thereto. Therefore the consent
to an action belongs properly to the higher reason, while the
preliminary judgment which is about the delectation belongs to the
lower reason, which delivers judgment in a lower court: although the
higher reason can also judge of the delectation, since whatever is
subject to the judgment of the lower court, is subject also to the
judgment of the higher court, but not conversely.
Reply to Objection 1: Consent is an act of the appetitive power, not
absolutely, but in consequence of an act of reason deliberating and
judging, as stated above ([1756]Q[15], A[3]). Because the fact that the
consent is finally given to a thing is due to the fact that the will
tends to that upon which the reason has already passed its judgment.
Hence consent may be ascribed both to the will and to the reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The higher reason is said to consent, from the
very fact that it fails to direct the human act according to the Divine
law, whether or not it advert to the eternal law. For if it thinks of
God's law, it holds it in actual contempt: and if not, it neglects it
by a kind of omission. Therefore the consent to a sinful act always
proceeds from the higher reason: because, as Augustine says (De Trin.
xii, 12), "the mind cannot effectively decide on the commission of a
sin, unless by its consent, whereby it wields its sovereign power of
moving the members to action, or of restraining them from action, it
become the servant or slave of the evil deed. "
Reply to Objection 3: The higher reason, by considering the eternal
law, can direct or restrain the internal delectation, even as it can
direct or restrain the external action: nevertheless, before the
judgment of the higher reason is pronounced the lower reason, while
deliberating the matter in reference to temporal principles, sometimes
approves of this delectation: and then the consent to the delectation
belongs to the lower reason. If, however, after considering the eternal
law, man persists in giving the same consent, such consent will then
belong to the higher reason.
Reply to Objection 4: The apprehension of the power of imagination is
sudden and indeliberate: wherefore it can cause an act before the
higher or lower reason has time to deliberate. But the judgment of the
lower reason is deliberate, and so requires time, during which the
higher reason can also deliberate; consequently, if by its deliberation
it does not check the sinful act, this will deservedly by imputed to
it.
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Whether consent to delectation is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that consent to delectation is not a mortal
sin, for consent to delectation belongs to the lower reason, which does
not consider the eternal types, i. e. the eternal law, and consequently
does not turn away from them. Now every mortal sin consists in turning
away from Augustine's definition of mortal sin, which was quoted above
([1757]Q[71], A[6]). Therefore consent to delectation is not a mortal
sin.
Objection 2: Further, consent to a thing is not evil, unless the thing
to which consent is given be evil. Now "the cause of anything being
such is yet more so," or at any rate not less. Consequently the thing
to which a man consents cannot be a lesser evil than his consent. But
delectation without deed is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin.
Therefore neither is the consent to the delectation a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, delectations differ in goodness and malice,
according to the difference of the deeds, as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. x, 3,5). Now the inward thought is one thing, and the outward
deed, e. g. fornication, is another. Therefore the delectation
consequent to the act of inward thought, differs in goodness and malice
from the pleasure of fornication, as much as the inward thought differs
from the outward deed; and consequently there is a like difference of
consent on either hand. But the inward thought is not a mortal sin, nor
is the consent to that thought: and therefore neither is the consent to
the delectation.
Objection 4: Further, the external act of fornication or adultery is a
mortal sin, not by reason of the delectation, since this is found also
in the marriage act, but by reason of an inordinateness in the act
itself. Now he that consents to the delectation does not, for this
reason, consent to the inordinateness of the act. Therefore he seems
not to sin mortally.
Objection 5: Further, the sin of murder is more grievous than simple
fornication. Now it is not a mortal sin to consent to the delectation
resulting from the thought of murder. Much less therefore is it a
mortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from the thought of
fornication.
Objection 6: Further, the Lord's prayer is recited every day for the
remission of venial sins, as Augustine asserts (Enchiridion lxxviii).
Now Augustine teaches that consent to delectation may be driven away by
means of the Lord's Prayer: for he says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "this
sin is much less grievous than if it be decided to fulfil it by deed:
wherefore we ought to ask pardon for such thoughts also, and we should
strike our breasts and say: 'Forgive us our trespasses. '" Therefore
consent to delectation is a venial sin.
On the contrary, Augustine adds after a few words: "Man will be
altogether lost unless, through the grace of the Mediator, he be
forgiven those things which are deemed mere sins of thought, since
without the will to do them, he desires nevertheless to enjoy them. "
But no man is lost except through mortal sin. Therefore consent to
delectation is a mortal sin.
some circumstance: because the fact that a man departs from the order
of reason is due to his not observing the due circumstances in his
action. Wherefore it is evident that it is natural for a sin to be
aggravated by reason of its circumstances. This happens in three ways.
First, in so far as a circumstance draws a sin from one kind to
another: thus fornication is the intercourse of a man with one who is
not his wife: but if to this be added the circumstance that the latter
is the wife of another, the sin is drawn to another kind of sin, viz.
injustice, in so far as he usurps another's property; and in this
respect adultery is a more grievous sin than fornication. Secondly, a
circumstance aggravates a sin, not by drawing it into another genus,
but only by multiplying the ratio of sin: thus if a wasteful man gives
both when he ought not, and to whom he ought not to give, he commits
the same kind of sin in more ways than if he were to merely to give to
whom he ought not, and for that very reason his sin is more grievous;
even as that sickness is the graver which affects more parts of the
body. Hence Cicero says (Paradox. iii) that "in taking his father's
life a man commits many sins; for he outrages one who begot him, who
fed him, who educated him, to whom he owes his lands, his house, his
position in the republic. " Thirdly, a circumstance aggravates a sin by
adding to the deformity which the sin derives from another
circumstance: thus, taking another's property constitutes the sin of
theft; but if to this be added the circumstance that much is taken of
another's property, the sin will be more grievous; although in itself,
to take more or less has not the character of a good or of an evil act.
Reply to Objection 1: Some circumstances do specify a moral act, as
stated above ([1735]Q[18], A[10]). Nevertheless a circumstance which
does not give the species, may aggravate a sin; because, even as the
goodness of a thing is weighed, not only in reference to its species,
but also in reference to an accident, so the malice of an act is
measured, not only according to the species of that act, but also
according to a circumstance.
Reply to Objection 2: A circumstance may aggravate a sin either way.
For if it is evil, it does not follow that it constitutes the sin's
species; because it may multiply the ratio of evil within the same
species, as stated above. And if it be not evil, it may aggravate a sin
in relation to the malice of another circumstance.
Reply to Objection 3: Reason should direct the action not only as
regards the object, but also as regards every circumstance. Therefore
one may turn aside from the rule of reason through corruption of any
single circumstance; for instance, by doing something when one ought
not or where one ought not; and to depart thus from the rule of reason
suffices to make the act evil. This turning aside from the rule of
reason results from man's turning away from God, to Whom man ought to
be united by right reason.
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Whether sin is aggravated by reason of its causing more harm?
Objection 1: It would seem that a sin is not aggravated by reason of
its causing more harm. Because the harm done is an issue consequent to
the sinful act. But the issue of an act does not add to its goodness or
malice, as stated above ([1736]Q[20], A[5]). Therefore a sin is not
aggravated on account of its causing more harm.
Objection 2: Further, harm is inflicted by sins against our neighbor.
Because no one wishes to harm himself: and no one can harm God,
according to Job 35:6, 8: "If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt
thou do against Him? . . . Thy wickedness may hurt a man that is like
thee. " If, therefore, sins were aggravated through causing more harm,
it would follow that sins against our neighbor are more grievous than
sins against God or oneself.
Objection 3: Further, greater harm is inflicted on a man by depriving
him of the life of grace, than by taking away his natural life; because
the life of grace is better than the life of nature, so far that man
ought to despise his natural life lest he lose the life of grace. Now,
speaking absolutely, a man who leads a woman to commit fornication
deprives her of the life of grace by leading her into mortal sin. If
therefore a sin were more grievous on account of its causing a greater
harm, it would follow that fornication, absolutely speaking, is a more
grievous sin than murder, which is evidently untrue. Therefore a sin is
not more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14): "Since vice is
contrary to nature, a vice is the more grievous according as it
diminishes the integrity of nature. " Now the diminution of the
integrity of nature is a harm. Therefore a sin is graver according as
it does more harm.
I answer that, Harm may bear a threefold relation to sin. Because
sometimes the harm resulting from a sin is foreseen and intended, as
when a man does something with a mind to harm another, e. g. a murderer
or a thief. In this case the quantity of harm aggravates the sin
directly, because then the harm is the direct object of the sin.
Sometimes the harm is foreseen, but not intended; for instance, when a
man takes a short cut through a field, the result being that he
knowingly injures the growing crops, although his intention is not to
do this harm, but to commit fornication. In this case again the
quantity of the harm done aggravates the sin; indirectly, however, in
so far, to wit, as it is owing to his will being strongly inclined to
sin, that a man does not forbear from doing, to himself or to another,
a harm which he would not wish simply. Sometimes, however, the harm is
neither foreseen nor intended: and then if this harm is connected with
the sin accidentally, it does not aggravate the sin directly; but, on
account of his neglecting to consider the harm that might ensue, a man
is deemed punishable for the evil results of his action if it be
unlawful. If, on the other hand, the harm follow directly from the
sinful act, although it be neither foreseen nor intended, it aggravates
the sin directly, because whatever is directly consequent to a sin,
belongs, in a manner, to the very species of that sin: for instance, if
a man is a notorious fornicator, the result is that many are
scandalized; and although such was not his intention, nor was it
perhaps foreseen by him, yet it aggravates his sin directly.
But this does not seem to apply to penal harm, which the sinner himself
incurs. Such like harm, if accidentally connected with the sinful act,
and if neither foreseen nor intended, does not aggravate a sin, nor
does it correspond with the gravity of the sin: for instance, if a man
in running to slay, slips and hurts his foot. If, on the other hand,
this harm is directly consequent to the sinful act, although perhaps it
be neither foreseen nor intended, then greater harm does not make
greater sin, but, on the contrary, a graver sin calls for the
infliction of a greater harm. Thus, an unbeliever who has heard nothing
about the pains of hell, would suffer greater pain in hell for a sin of
murder than for a sin of theft: but his sin is not aggravated on
account of his neither intending nor foreseeing this, as it would be in
the case of a believer, who, seemingly, sins more grievously in the
very fact that he despises a greater punishment, that he may satisfy
his desire to sin; but the gravity of this harm is caused by the sole
gravity of sin.
Reply to Objection 1: As we have already stated ([1737]Q[20], A[5]), in
treating of the goodness and malice of external actions, the result of
an action if foreseen and intended adds to the goodness and malice of
an act.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the harm done aggravates a sin, it does
not follow that this alone renders a sin more grievous: in fact, it is
inordinateness which of itself aggravates a sin. Wherefore the harm
itself that ensues aggravates a sin, in so far only as it renders the
act more inordinate. Hence it does not follow, supposing harm to be
inflicted chiefly by sins against our neighbor, that such sins are the
most grievous, since a much greater inordinateness is to be found
against which man commits against God, and in some which he commits
against himself. Moreover we might say that although no man can do God
any harm in His substance, yet he can endeavor to do so in things
concerning Him, e. g. by destroying faith, by outraging holy things,
which are most grievous sins. Again, a man sometimes knowingly and
freely inflicts harm on himself, as in the case of suicide, though this
be referred finally to some apparent good, for example, delivery from
some anxiety.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument does not prove, for two reasons:
first, because the murderer intends directly to do harm to his
neighbors; whereas the fornicator who solicits the woman intends not to
harm but pleasure; secondly, because murder is the direct and
sufficient cause of bodily death; whereas no man can of himself be the
sufficient cause of another's spiritual death, because no man dies
spiritually except by sinning of his own will.
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Whether a sin is aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against
whom it is committed?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin is not aggravated by reason of the
condition of the person against whom it is committed. For if this were
the case a sin would be aggravated chiefly by being committed against a
just and holy man. But this does not aggravate a sin: because a
virtuous man who bears a wrong with equanimity is less harmed by the
wrong done him, than others, who, through being scandalized, are also
hurt inwardly. Therefore the condition of the person against whom a sin
is committed does not aggravate the sin.
Objection 2: Further, if the condition of the person aggravated the
sin, this would be still more the case if the person be near of kin,
because, as Cicero says (Paradox. iii): "The man who kills his slave
sins once: he that takes his father's life sins many times. " But the
kinship of a person sinned against does not apparently aggravate a sin,
because every man is most akin to himself; and yet it is less grievous
to harm oneself than another, e. g. to kill one's own, than another's
horse, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore kinship of
the person sinned against does not aggravate the sin.
Objection 3: Further, the condition of the person who sins aggravates a
sin chiefly on account of his position or knowledge, according to Wis.
6:7: "The mighty shall be mightily tormented," and Lk. 12:47: "The
servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . . shall
be beaten with many stripes. " Therefore, in like manner, on the part of
the person sinned against, the sin is made more grievous by reason of
his position and knowledge. But, apparently, it is not a more grievous
sin to inflict an injury on a rich and powerful person than on a poor
man, since "there is no respect of persons with God" (Col. 3:25),
according to Whose judgment the gravity of a sin is measured. Therefore
the condition of the person sinned against does not aggravate the sin.
On the contrary, Holy Writ censures especially those sins that are
committed against the servants of God. Thus it is written (3 Kings
19:14): "They have destroyed Thy altars, they have slain Thy prophets
with the sword. " Moreover much blame is attached to the sin committed
by a man against those who are akin to him, according to Micah 7:6:
"the son dishonoreth the father, and the daughter riseth up against her
mother. " Furthermore sins committed against persons of rank are
expressly condemned: thus it is written (Job 34:18): "Who saith to the
king: 'Thou art an apostate'; who calleth rulers ungodly. " Therefore
the condition of the person sinned against aggravates the sin.
I answer that, The person sinned against is, in a manner, the object of
the sin. Now it has been stated above [1738](A[3]) that the primary
gravity of a sin is derived from its object; so that a sin is deemed to
be so much the more grave, as its object is a more principal end. But
the principal ends of human acts are God, man himself, and his
neighbor: for whatever we do, it is on account of one of these that we
do it; although one of them is subordinate to the other. Therefore the
greater or lesser gravity of a sin, in respect of the person sinned
against, may be considered on the part of these three.
First, on the part of God, to Whom man is the more closely united, as
he is more virtuous or more sacred to God: so that an injury inflicted
on such a person redounds on to God according to Zech. 2:8: "He that
toucheth you, toucheth the apple of My eye. " Wherefore a sin is the
more grievous, according as it is committed against a person more
closely united to God by reason of personal sanctity, or official
station. On the part of man himself, it is evident that he sins all the
more grievously, according as the person against whom he sins, is more
united to him, either through natural affinity or kindness received or
any other bond; because he seems to sin against himself rather than the
other, and, for this very reason, sins all the more grievously,
according to Ecclus. 14:5: "He that is evil to himself, to whom will he
be good? " On the part of his neighbor, a man sins the more grievously,
according as his sin affects more persons: so that a sin committed
against a public personage, e. g. a sovereign prince who stands in the
place of the whole people, is more grievous than a sin committed
against a private person; hence it is expressly prohibited (Ex. 22:28):
"The prince of thy people thou shalt not curse. " In like manner it
would seem that an injury done to a person of prominence, is all the
more grave, on account of the scandal and the disturbance it would
cause among many people.
Reply to Objection 1: He who inflicts an injury on a virtuous person,
so far as he is concerned, disturbs him internally and externally; but
that the latter is not disturbed internally is due to his goodness,
which does not extenuate the sin of the injurer.
Reply to Objection 2: The injury which a man inflicts on himself in
those things which are subject to the dominion of his will, for
instance his possessions, is less sinful than if it were inflicted on
another, because he does it of his own will; but in those things that
are not subject to the dominion of his will, such as natural and
spiritual goods, it is a graver sin to inflict an injury on oneself:
for it is more grievous for a man to kill himself than another. Since,
however, things belonging to our neighbor are not subject to the
dominion of our will, the argument fails to prove, in respect of
injuries done to such like things, that it is less grievous to sin in
their regard, unless indeed our neighbor be willing, or give his
approval.
Reply to Objection 3: There is no respect for persons if God punishes
more severely those who sin against a person of higher rank; for this
is done because such an injury redounds to the harm of many.
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Whether the excellence of the person sinning aggravates the sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the excellence of the person sinning
does not aggravate the sin. For man becomes great chiefly by cleaving
to God, according to Ecclus. 25:13: "How great is he that findeth
wisdom and knowledge! but there is none above him that feareth the
Lord. " Now the more a man cleaves to God, the less is a sin imputed to
him: for it is written (2 Paral. 30: 18,19): "The Lord Who is good will
show mercy to all them, who with their whole heart seek the Lord the
God of their fathers; and will not impute it to them that they are not
sanctified. " Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the
person sinning.
Objection 2: Further, "there is no respect of persons with God" (Rom.
2:11). Therefore He does not punish one man more than another, for one
and the same sin. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence
of the person sinning.
Objection 3: Further, no one should reap disadvantage from good. But he
would, if his action were the more blameworthy on account of his
goodness. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by reason of the excellence
of the person sinning.
On the contrary, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 18): "A sin is deemed
so much the more grievous as the sinner is held to be a more excellent
person. "
I answer that, Sin is twofold. There is a sin which takes us unawares
on account of the weakness of human nature: and such like sins are less
imputable to one who is more virtuous, because he is less negligent in
checking those sins, which nevertheless human weakness does not allow
us to escape altogether. But there are other sins which proceed from
deliberation: and these sins are all the more imputed to man according
as he is more excellent. Four reasons may be assigned for this. First,
because a more excellent person, e. g. one who excels in knowledge and
virtue, can more easily resist sin; hence Our Lord said (Lk. 12:47)
that the "servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not .
. . shall be beaten with many stripes. " Secondly, on account of
ingratitude, because every good in which a man excels, is a gift of
God, to Whom man is ungrateful when he sins: and in this respect any
excellence, even in temporal goods, aggravates a sin, according to Wis.
6:7: "The mighty shall be mightily tormented. " Thirdly, on account of
the sinful act being specially inconsistent with the excellence of the
person sinning: for instance, if a prince were to violate justice,
whereas he is set up as the guardian of justice, or if a priest were to
be a fornicator, whereas he has taken the vow of chastity. Fourthly, on
account of the example or scandal; because, as Gregory says (Pastor. i,
2): "Sin becomes much more scandalous, when the sinner is honored for
his position": and the sins of the great are much more notorious and
men are wont to bear them with more indignation.
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted alludes to those things which
are done negligently when we are taken unawares through human weakness.
Reply to Objection 2: God does not respect persons in punishing the
great more severely, because their excellence conduces to the gravity
of their sin, as stated.
Reply to Objection 3: The man who excels in anything reaps
disadvantage, not from the good which he has, but from his abuse
thereof.
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OF THE SUBJECT OF SIN (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the subject of vice or sin: under which head there
are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will can be the subject of sin?
(2) Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?
(3) Whether the sensuality can be the subject of sin?
(4) Whether it can be the subject of mortal sin?
(5) Whether the reason can be the subject of sin?
(6) Whether morose delectation or non-morose delectation be subjected
in the higher reason?
(7) Whether the sin of consent in the act of sin is subjected in the
higher reason?
(8) Whether the lower reason can be the subject of mortal sin?
(9) Whether the higher reason can be the subject of venial sin?
(10) Whether there can be in the higher reason a venial sin directed to
its proper object?
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Whether the will is a subject of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will cannot be a subject of sin.
For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the will and
the intention. " But sin has the character of evil. Therefore sin cannot
be in the will.
Objection 2: Further, the will is directed either to the good or to
what seems good. Now from the fact that will wishes the good, it does
not sin: and that it wishes what seems good but is not truly good,
points to a defect in the apprehensive power rather than in the will.
Therefore sin is nowise in the will.
Objection 3: Further, the same thing cannot be both subject and
efficient cause of sin: because "the efficient and the material cause
do not coincide" (Phys. 2, text. 70). Now the will is the efficient
cause of sin: because the first cause of sinning is the will, as
Augustine states (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11). Therefore it is not the
subject of sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is by the will
that we sin, and live righteously. "
I answer that, Sin is an act, as stated above ([1739]Q[71], AA[1],6).
Now some acts pass into external matter, e. g. "to cut" and "to burn":
and such acts have for their matter and subject, the thing into which
the action passes: thus the Philosopher states (Phys. iii, text. 18)
that "movement is the act of the thing moved, caused by a mover. " On
the other hand, there are acts which do not pass into external matter,
but remain in the agent, e. g. "to desire" and "to know": and such are
all moral acts, whether virtuous or sinful. Consequently the proper
subject of sin must needs be the power which is the principle of the
act. Now since it is proper to moral acts that they are voluntary, as
stated above ([1740]Q[1], A[1] ;[1741] Q[18], A[6]), it follows that
the will, which is the principle of voluntary acts, both of good acts,
and of evil acts or sins, is the principle of sins. Therefore it
follows that sin is in the will as its subject.
Reply to Objection 1: Evil is said to be outside the will, because the
will does not tend to it under the aspect of evil. But since some evil
is an apparent good, the will sometimes desires an evil, and in this
sense is in the will.
Reply to Objection 2: If the defect in the apprehensive power were
nowise subject to the will, there would be no sin, either in the will,
or in the apprehensive power, as in the case of those whose ignorance
is invincible. It remains therefore that when there is in the
apprehensive power a defect that is subject to the will, this defect
also is deemed a sin.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument applies to those efficient causes
whose actions pass into external matter, and which do not move
themselves, but move other things; the contrary of which is to be
observed in the will; hence the argument does not prove.
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Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will alone is the subject of sin.
For Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10) that "no one sins except by
the will. " Now the subject of sin is the power by which we sin.
Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin.
Objection 2: Further, sin is an evil contrary to reason. Now good and
evil pertaining to reason are the object of the will alone. Therefore
the will alone is the subject of sin.
Objection 3: Further, every sin is a voluntary act, because, as
Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv. ], "so
true is it that every sin is voluntary, that unless it be voluntary, it
is no sin at all. " Now the acts of the other powers are not voluntary,
except in so far as those powers are moved by the will; nor does this
suffice for them to be the subject of sin, because then even the
external members of the body, which are moved by the will, would be a
subject of sin; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the will alone is
the subject of sin.
On the contrary, Sin is contrary to virtue: and contraries are about
one same thing. But the other powers of the soul, besides the will, are
the subject of virtues, as stated above ([1742]Q[56]). Therefore the
will is not the only subject of sin.
I answer that, As was shown above [1743](A[1]), whatever is the a
principle of a voluntary act is a subject of sin. Now voluntary acts
are not only those which are elicited by the will, but also those which
are commanded by the will, as we stated above (Q[6], A[4]) in treating
of voluntariness. Therefore not only the will can be a subject of sin,
but also all those powers which can be moved to their acts, or
restrained from their acts, by the will; and these same powers are the
subjects of good and evil moral habits, because act and habit belong to
the same subject.
Reply to Objection 1: We do not sin except by the will as first mover;
but we sin by the other powers as moved by the will.
Reply to Objection 2: Good and evil pertain to the will as its proper
objects; but the other powers have certain determinate goods and evils,
by reason of which they can be the subject of virtue, vice, and sin, in
so far as they partake of will and reason.
Reply to Objection 3: The members of the body are not principles but
merely organs of action: wherefore they are compared to the soul which
moves them, as a slave who is moved but moves no other. On the other
hand, the internal appetitive powers are compared to reason as free
agents, because they both act and are acted upon, as is made clear in
Polit. i, 3. Moreover, the acts of the external members are actions
that pass into external matter, as may be seen in the blow that is
inflicted in the sin of murder. Consequently there is no comparison.
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Whether there can be sin in the sensuality?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be sin in the sensuality.
For sin is proper to man who is praised or blamed for his actions. Now
sensuality is common to us and irrational animals. Therefore sin cannot
be in the sensuality.
Objection 2: Further, "no man sins in what he cannot avoid," as
Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18). But man cannot prevent the
movement of the sensuality from being inordinate, since "the sensuality
ever remains corrupt, so long as we abide in this mortal life;
wherefore it is signified by the serpent," as Augustine declares (De
Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the inordinate movement of the sensuality
is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, that which man himself does not do is not imputed
to him as a sin. Now "that alone do we seem to do ourselves, which we
do with the deliberation of reason," as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
ix, 8). Therefore the movement of the sensuality, which is without the
deliberation of reason, is not imputed to a man as a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 7:19): "The good which I will I do
not; but the evil which I will not, that I do": which words Augustine
explains (Contra Julian. iii, 26; De Verb. Apost. xii, 2,3), as
referring to the evil of concupiscence, which is clearly a movement of
the sensuality. Therefore there can be sin in the sensuality.
I answer that, As stated above ([1744]AA[2],3), sin may be found in any
power whose act can be voluntary and inordinate, wherein consists the
nature of sin. Now it is evident that the act of the sensuality, or
sensitive appetite, is naturally inclined to be moved by the will.
Wherefore it follows that sin can be in the sensuality.
Reply to Objection 1: Although some of the powers of the sensitive part
are common to us and irrational animals, nevertheless, in us, they have
a certain excellence through being united to the reason; thus we
surpass other animals in the sensitive part for as much as we have the
powers of cogitation and reminiscence, as stated in the [1745]FP,
Q[78], A[4]. In the same way our sensitive appetite surpasses that of
other animals by reason of a certain excellence consisting in its
natural aptitude to obey the reason; and in this respect it can be the
principle of a voluntary action, and, consequently, the subject of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: The continual corruption of the sensuality is to
be understood as referring to the "fomes," which is never completely
destroyed in this life, since, though the stain of original sin passes,
its effect remains. However, this corruption of the "fomes" does not
hinder man from using his rational will to check individual inordinate
movements, if he be presentient to them, for instance by turning his
thoughts to other things. Yet while he is turning his thoughts to
something else, an inordinate movement may arise about this also: thus
when a man, in order to avoid the movements of concupiscence, turns his
thoughts away from carnal pleasures, to the considerations of science,
sometimes an unpremeditated movement of vainglory will arise.
Consequently, a man cannot avoid all such movements, on account of the
aforesaid corruption: but it is enough, for the conditions of a
voluntary sin, that he be able to avoid each single one.
Reply to Objection 3: Man does not do perfectly himself what he does
without the deliberation of reason, since the principal part of man
does nothing therein: wherefore such is not perfectly a human act; and
consequently it cannot be a perfect act of virtue or of sin, but is
something imperfect of that kind. Therefore such movement of the
sensuality as forestalls the reason, is a venial sin, which is
something imperfect in the genus of sin.
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Whether mortal sin can be in the sensuality?
Objection 1: It would seem that mortal sin can be in the sensuality.
Because an act is discerned by its object. Now it is possible to commit
a mortal sin about the objects of the sensuality, e. g. about carnal
pleasures. Therefore the act of the sensuality can be a mortal sin, so
that mortal sin can be found in the sensuality.
Objection 2: Further, mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But virtue can
be in the sensuality; for temperance and fortitude are virtues of the
irrational parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 10).
Therefore, since it is natural to contraries to be about the same
subject, sensuality can be the subject of mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Now
disposition and habit are in the same subject. Since therefore venial
sin may be in the sensuality, as stated above (A[3], ad 3), mortal sin
can be there also.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 23): "The inordinate
movement of concupiscence, which is the sin of the sensuality, can even
be in those who are in a state of grace," in whom, however, mortal sin
is not to be found. Therefore the inordinate movement of the sensuality
is not a mortal sin.
I answer that, Just as a disorder which destroys the principle of the
body's life causes the body's death, so too a disorder which destroys
the principle of spiritual life, viz. the last end, causes spiritual
death, which is mortal sin, as stated above ([1746]Q[72], A[5]). Now it
belongs to the reason alone, and not to the sensuality, to order
anything to the end: and disorder in respect of the end can only belong
to the power whose function it is to order others to the end. Wherefore
mortal sin cannot be in the sensuality, but only in the reason.
Reply to Objection 1: The act of the sensuality can concur towards a
mortal sin: yet the fact of its being a mortal sin is due, not to its
being an act of the sensuality, but to its being an act of reason, to
whom the ordering to the end belongs. Consequently mortal sin is
imputed, not to the sensuality, but to reason.
Reply to Objection 2: An act of virtue is perfected not only in that it
is an act of the sensuality, but still more in the fact of its being an
act of reason and will, whose function it is to choose: for the act of
moral virtue is not without the exercise of choice: wherefore the act
of moral virtue, which perfects the appetitive power, is always
accompanied by an act of prudence, which perfects the rational power;
and the same applies to mortal sin, as stated (ad 1).
Reply to Objection 3: A disposition may be related in three ways to
that to which it disposes: for sometimes it is the same thing and is in
the same subject; thus inchoate science is a disposition to perfect
science: sometimes it is in the same subject, but is not the same
thing; thus heat is a disposition to the form of fire: sometimes it is
neither the same thing, nor in the same subject, as in those things
which are subordinate to one another in such a way that we can arrive
at one through the other, e. g. goodness of the imagination is a
disposition to science which is in the intellect. In this way the
venial sin that is in the sensuality, may be a disposition to mortal
sin, which is in the reason.
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Whether sin can be in the reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin cannot be in the reason. For the
sin of any power is a defect thereof. But the fault of the reason is
not a sin, on the contrary, it excuses sin: for a man is excused from
sin on account of ignorance. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason.
Objection 2: Further, the primary object of sin is the will, as stated
above [1747](A[1]). Now reason precedes the will, since it directs it.
Therefore sin cannot be in the reason.
Objection 3: Further, there can be no sin except about things which are
under our control. Now perfection and defect of reason are not among
those things which are under our control: since by nature some are
mentally deficient, and some shrewd-minded. Therefore no sin is in the
reason.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that sin is in the
lower and in the higher reason.
I answer that, The sin of any power is an act of that power, as we have
clearly shown ([1748]AA[1],2,3). Now reason has a twofold act: one is
its proper act in respect of its proper object, and this is the act of
knowing the truth; the other is the act of reason as directing the
other powers. Now in both of these ways there may be sin in the reason.
First, in so far as it errs in the knowledge of truth, which error is
imputed to the reason as a sin, when it is in ignorance or error about
what it is able and ought to know: secondly, when it either commands
the inordinate movements of the lower powers, or deliberately fails to
check them.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the defect in the proper
act of the reason in respect of its proper object, and with regard to
the case when it is a defect of knowledge about something which one is
unable to know: for then this defect of reason is not a sin, and
excuses from sin, as is evident with regard to the actions of madmen.
If, however, the defect of reason be about something which a man is
able and ought to know, he is not altogether excused from sin, and the
defect is imputed to him as a sin. The defect which belongs only to the
act of directing the other powers, is always imputed to reason as a
sin, because it can always obviate this defect by means of its proper
act.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([1749]Q[17], A[1]), when we were
treating of the acts of the will and reason, the will moves and
precedes the reason, in one way, and the reason moves and precedes the
will in another: so that both the movement of the will can be called
rational, and the act of the reason, voluntary. Accordingly sin is
found in the reason, either through being a voluntary defect of the
reason, or through the reason being the principle of the will's act.
The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said (ad
1).
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Whether the sin of morose delectation is in the reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of morose delectation is not in
the reason. For delectation denotes a movement of the appetitive power,
as stated above ([1750]Q[31], A[1]). But the appetitive power is
distinct from the reason, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore
morose delectation is not in the reason.
Objection 2: Further, the object shows to which power an act belongs,
since it is through the act that the power is directed to its object.
Now a morose delectation is sometimes about sensible goods, and not
about the goods of the reason. Therefore the sin of morose delectation
is not in the reason.
Objection 3: Further, a thing is said to be morose [*From the Latin
'mora'---delay] through taking a length of time. But length of time is
no reason why an act should belong to a particular power. Therefore
morose delectation does not belong to the reason.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "if the consent
to a sensual delectation goes no further than the mere thought of the
pleasure, I deem this to be like as though the woman alone had partaken
of the forbidden fruit. " Now "the woman" denotes the lower reason, as
he himself explains (De Trin. xii, 12). Therefore the sin of morose
delectation is in the reason.
I answer that, As stated [1751](A[5]), sin may be in the reason, not
only in respect of reason's proper act, but sometimes in respect of its
directing human actions. Now it is evident that reason directs not only
external acts, but also internal passions. Consequently when the reason
fails in directing the internal passions, sin is said to be in the
reason, as also when it fails in directing external actions. Now it
fails, in two ways, in directing internal passions: first, when it
commands unlawful passions; for instance, when a man deliberately
provokes himself to a movement of anger, or of lust: secondly, when it
fails to check the unlawful movement of a passion; for instance, when a
man, having deliberately considered that a rising movement of passion
is inordinate, continues, notwithstanding, to dwell [immoratur] upon
it, and fails to drive it away. And in this sense the sin of morose
delectation is said to be in the reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Delectation is indeed in the appetitive power as
its proximate principle; but it is in the reason as its first mover, in
accordance with what has been stated above [1752](A[1]), viz. that
actions which do not pass into external matter are subjected in their
principles.
Reply to Objection 2: Reason has its proper elicited act about its
proper object; but it exercises the direction of all the objects of
those lower powers that can be directed by the reason: and accordingly
delectation about sensible objects comes also under the direction of
reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Delectation is said to be morose not from a delay
of time, but because the reason in deliberating dwells [immoratur]
thereon, and fails to drive it away, "deliberately holding and turning
over what should have been cast aside as soon as it touched the mind,"
as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the sin of consent to the act is in the higher reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not in
the higher reason. For consent is an act of the appetitive power, as
stated above ([1753]Q[15], A[1]): whereas the reason is an apprehensive
power. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher
reason.
Objection 2: Further, "the higher reason is intent on contemplating and
consulting the eternal law," as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7).
[*'Rationes aeternae,' cf. [1754]FP, Q[15], AA[2],[3] where as in
similar passages 'ratio' has been rendered by the English 'type,'
because St. Thomas was speaking of the Divine 'idea' as the archetype
of the creature. Hence the type or idea is a rule of conduct, and is
identified with the eternal law, (cf. A[8], OBJ[1]; A[9])]. But
sometimes consent is given to an act, without consulting the eternal
law: since man does not always think about Divine things, whenever he
consents to an act. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not
always in the higher reason.
Objection 3: Further, just as man can regulate his external actions
according to the eternal law, so can he regulate his internal pleasures
or other passions. But "consent to a pleasure without deciding to
fulfil it by deed, belongs to the lower reason," as Augustine states
(De Trin. xii, 2). Therefore the consent to a sinful act should also be
sometimes ascribed to the lower reason.
Objection 4: Further, just as the higher reason excels the lower, so
does the reason excel the imagination. Now sometimes man proceeds to
act through the apprehension of the power of imagination, without any
deliberation of his reason, as when, without premeditation, he moves
his hand, or foot. Therefore sometimes also the lower reason may
consent to a sinful act, independently of the higher reason.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "If the consent to
the evil use of things that can be perceived by the bodily senses, so
far approves of any sin, as to point, if possible, to its consummation
by deed, we are to understand that the woman has offered the forbidden
fruit to her husband. "
I answer that, Consent implies a judgment about the thing to which
consent is given. For just as the speculative reason judges and
delivers its sentence about intelligible matters, so the practical
reason judges and pronounces sentence on matters of action. Now we must
observe that in every case brought up for judgment, the final sentence
belongs to the supreme court, even as we see that in speculative
matters the final sentence touching any proposition is delivered by
referring it to the first principles; since, so long as there remains a
yet higher principle, the question can yet be submitted to it:
wherefore the judgment is still in suspense, the final sentence not
being as yet pronounced. But it is evident that human acts can be
regulated by the rule of human reason, which rule is derived from the
created things that man knows naturally; and further still, from the
rule of the Divine law, as stated above ([1755]Q[19], A[4]).
Consequently, since the rule of the Divine law is the higher rule, it
follows that the ultimate sentence, whereby the judgment is finally
pronounced, belongs to the higher reason which is intent on the eternal
types. Now when judgment has to be pronounced on several points, the
final judgment deals with that which comes last; and, in human acts,
the action itself comes last, and the delectation which is the
inducement to the action is a preamble thereto. Therefore the consent
to an action belongs properly to the higher reason, while the
preliminary judgment which is about the delectation belongs to the
lower reason, which delivers judgment in a lower court: although the
higher reason can also judge of the delectation, since whatever is
subject to the judgment of the lower court, is subject also to the
judgment of the higher court, but not conversely.
Reply to Objection 1: Consent is an act of the appetitive power, not
absolutely, but in consequence of an act of reason deliberating and
judging, as stated above ([1756]Q[15], A[3]). Because the fact that the
consent is finally given to a thing is due to the fact that the will
tends to that upon which the reason has already passed its judgment.
Hence consent may be ascribed both to the will and to the reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The higher reason is said to consent, from the
very fact that it fails to direct the human act according to the Divine
law, whether or not it advert to the eternal law. For if it thinks of
God's law, it holds it in actual contempt: and if not, it neglects it
by a kind of omission. Therefore the consent to a sinful act always
proceeds from the higher reason: because, as Augustine says (De Trin.
xii, 12), "the mind cannot effectively decide on the commission of a
sin, unless by its consent, whereby it wields its sovereign power of
moving the members to action, or of restraining them from action, it
become the servant or slave of the evil deed. "
Reply to Objection 3: The higher reason, by considering the eternal
law, can direct or restrain the internal delectation, even as it can
direct or restrain the external action: nevertheless, before the
judgment of the higher reason is pronounced the lower reason, while
deliberating the matter in reference to temporal principles, sometimes
approves of this delectation: and then the consent to the delectation
belongs to the lower reason. If, however, after considering the eternal
law, man persists in giving the same consent, such consent will then
belong to the higher reason.
Reply to Objection 4: The apprehension of the power of imagination is
sudden and indeliberate: wherefore it can cause an act before the
higher or lower reason has time to deliberate. But the judgment of the
lower reason is deliberate, and so requires time, during which the
higher reason can also deliberate; consequently, if by its deliberation
it does not check the sinful act, this will deservedly by imputed to
it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether consent to delectation is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that consent to delectation is not a mortal
sin, for consent to delectation belongs to the lower reason, which does
not consider the eternal types, i. e. the eternal law, and consequently
does not turn away from them. Now every mortal sin consists in turning
away from Augustine's definition of mortal sin, which was quoted above
([1757]Q[71], A[6]). Therefore consent to delectation is not a mortal
sin.
Objection 2: Further, consent to a thing is not evil, unless the thing
to which consent is given be evil. Now "the cause of anything being
such is yet more so," or at any rate not less. Consequently the thing
to which a man consents cannot be a lesser evil than his consent. But
delectation without deed is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin.
Therefore neither is the consent to the delectation a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, delectations differ in goodness and malice,
according to the difference of the deeds, as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. x, 3,5). Now the inward thought is one thing, and the outward
deed, e. g. fornication, is another. Therefore the delectation
consequent to the act of inward thought, differs in goodness and malice
from the pleasure of fornication, as much as the inward thought differs
from the outward deed; and consequently there is a like difference of
consent on either hand. But the inward thought is not a mortal sin, nor
is the consent to that thought: and therefore neither is the consent to
the delectation.
Objection 4: Further, the external act of fornication or adultery is a
mortal sin, not by reason of the delectation, since this is found also
in the marriage act, but by reason of an inordinateness in the act
itself. Now he that consents to the delectation does not, for this
reason, consent to the inordinateness of the act. Therefore he seems
not to sin mortally.
Objection 5: Further, the sin of murder is more grievous than simple
fornication. Now it is not a mortal sin to consent to the delectation
resulting from the thought of murder. Much less therefore is it a
mortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from the thought of
fornication.
Objection 6: Further, the Lord's prayer is recited every day for the
remission of venial sins, as Augustine asserts (Enchiridion lxxviii).
Now Augustine teaches that consent to delectation may be driven away by
means of the Lord's Prayer: for he says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "this
sin is much less grievous than if it be decided to fulfil it by deed:
wherefore we ought to ask pardon for such thoughts also, and we should
strike our breasts and say: 'Forgive us our trespasses. '" Therefore
consent to delectation is a venial sin.
On the contrary, Augustine adds after a few words: "Man will be
altogether lost unless, through the grace of the Mediator, he be
forgiven those things which are deemed mere sins of thought, since
without the will to do them, he desires nevertheless to enjoy them. "
But no man is lost except through mortal sin. Therefore consent to
delectation is a mortal sin.
