No More Learning

the imagination.
? anything at
? ? by
it
it is
is is
it
:
it
it
is is
is
I,
is
a isisbyit
is
? is, is is
/
a ais ;
a
is
is,
is,
is, is
a
It
? BKFUTAHON OF IDEALISM.
lion, but a merely intellectual representation produced by tLe
Ianeous activity of a thinking subject. It follows, that spont
Remark III. From the fact that the existence of external things is a necessary condition of the possibility of a deter mined consciousness of ourselves, it does not follow that every intuitive representation of external things involves the exist ence of these things, for their representations may very well be the mere products of the imagination (in dreams as well as in madness) ; though, indeed, these are themselves created by the reproduction of previous external perceptions, which, as has been shown, are possible only through the reality of ex ternal objects. The eole aim of our remarks has, however, been to prove that internal experience in general is possible only through external experience in general. Whether this or that supposed experience be purely imaginary, must be dis covered from its particular determinations, and by comparing
these with the criteria of all real experience.
Finally, as regards the third postulate, it applies to material necessity in existence, and not to merely formal and logical necessity in the connection of conceptions. Now as we cannot cognize completely a priori the existence of any object of sense, though we can do so comparatively h priori, that relatively to some other previously given existence, -- cognition, however, which can only be of such an existence as must be contained in the complex of experience, of which the previously given perception part, -- the necessity of existence can never be cognised from conceptions, but always, on the contrary, from its connection with that which an object of perception. But the only existence cognized, nnder the condition of other given phenomena, as necessary, the existence of effects from given causes in conformity with the laws of causality.
consequently not the necessity of the existence of things (as substances), but the necessity of the state of things that we cognise, and that not immediately, but by means of the existence of ether states given perception, according to
has not of intuition, which, in its cha any predicate
this
racter of permanence, could serve as correlate to the deter mination of time in the internal sense --in the same way as impenetrability is the correlate of matter as an empirical intuition.
169
? ? ? in
is
is
It is
is a
a
is,
? 170 TBANSCENDENTAL DOCTBIKB.
empirical laws of causality. Hence it follows, that tbe crite>> rion of necessity is to be found only in the law of a possible experience, --that every thing which happens is determined ii priori in the phenomenon by its cause. Thus we cognise only the necessity of effects in nature, the causes of which are given us. Moreover, the criterion of necessity in exist ence possesses no application beyond the field of possible ex perience, and even in this it is not valid of the existence of things as substances, because these can never be considered as empirical effects, or as something that happens a>d has a beginning. Necessity, therefore, regards only the relations of phenomena according to the dynamical law of causality, and the possibility grounded thereon, of reasoning from some given existence (of a cause) a priori to another existence (of an effect) . Every thing that happens is hypothetically necessary, is a principle which subjects the changes that take place in the world to a law, that is, to a rule of necessary existence, without which nature herself could not possibly exist. Hence the proposition, Nothing happens by blind chance (in mundo non datur casus), is an h priori law "of nature. The case is the same with the proposition, Necessity in nature is not blind, that conditioned,
? consequently intelligible necessity (non datur fatum). Both laws subject the play of change to nature things (as phenomena), or, which the same
thing, to the unity of the understanding, and through the un derstanding alone can changes belong to an experience, as the synthetical unity of phenomena. Both belong to the class of dynamical principles. The former properly conse quence of the principle of causality -- one of the analogies of experience. The latter belongs to the principles of modality, which to the determination of causality adds the conception of necessity, which itself, however, subject to rule of the understanding. The principle of continuity forbids any leap in the series of phenomena regarded as changes (in mundo non datur saltus) and likewise, in the complex of all empirical intuitions in space, any break or hiatus between two pheno mena (non datur hiatus), --for we can so express the principle,
that experience can admit nothing which proves the existence of vacuum, or which even admits as part of an empirical synthesis. For, as regards vacuum or void, which we may cogitate as out and beyond of the field of possible experience
? ? a
a
;
it
a is
is
a
a
is
a
of
is, it is
? REFUTATION OT IDEALISM.
171
(the world), such a question cannot come before tbe tribunal of mere understanding, which decides only upon questions that concern the employment of given phenomena for the construction of empirical cognition. It is rather a problem for ideal reason, which passes beyond the sphere of a pos sible experience, and aims at forming a judgment of that which surrounds and circumscribes and the proper place for the consideration of the transcendental dialectic. These four propositions, In mundo non datur hiatus, non datur sullus, non datur casus, non datur fatum, as well as all principles of transcendental origin, we could very easily exhibit in their proper order, that is, in conformity with the order of the cate gories, and assign to each its proper place. But the already practised reader will do this for himself, or discover the clue to such an arrangement. But the combined result of all simply this, to admit into the empirical synthesis nothing which might cause a break in or be foreign to the under
standing and the continuous connection of all phenomena, that the unity of the conceptions of the understanding. For in the understanding alone the unity of experience, in which all perceptions must have their assigned place, possible.
Whether the field of possibility be greater than that ot reality, and whether the field of the latter be itself greater than that of necessity, are interesting enough questions, and
? of synthetical solution, questions, however, which come under the jurisdiction of reason alone. For they are tantamount to asking, whether all things as phenomena do without exception belong to the complex and connected
whole of single experience, of which every given perception part, part which therefore cannot be conjoined with any other phenomena -- or, whether my perceptions can belong to more than one possible experience? The understanding gives
to experience, according to the subjective and formal condi tions, of sensibility as well as of apperception, the rules which alone make this experience possible. Other forms of ntui tion, besides those of space and time, other forms of under standing besides the discursive forms of thought, or of cog nition means of conceptions, we can neither imagine nor make intelligible to ourselves and even we could, they would still not belong to experience, which the only mode of cognition which objects are presented to us. Whcthei
quite capable
? ? by by
aa
is if
;
it is
is a
is
is,
is
it,
? 172 TKAJfSCENDENTAX DOCTRINE.
other perceptions besides those which belong to the total of our possible experience, and consequently whether some other sphere of matter exists, the understanding has no power to decide, its proper occupation bring with the synthesis of that which is given. Moreover, the poverty of the usual argu ments which go to prove the existence of a vast sphere of pos
sibility, of which all that is real (every object of experience)
is but a small part, is very remarkable. " All real is possible ;"
from this follows naturally, according to the logical laws of
conversion, the particular proposition, " " Some possible is
real. " Now this seems to be equivalent to Much is possible
that is not real. " No doubt it does seem as if we ought to
consider the sum of the possible to be gr? ater than that of
the real, from the fact that something must be added to the
former to constitute the latter. But this notion of adding to
the possible is absurd. For that which is not in the sum of
the possible, and consequently requires to be added to
manifestly impossible. In addition to accordance with the
formal conditions of experience, the understanding requires connection with some perception but that which connected
with this perception, real, even although not immediately perceived. But that another series of phenomena, in com plete coherence with that which given in perception, con sequently more than one all-embracing experience possible,
an inference which cannot be concluded from the data given us by experience, and still less without any data at all. That which possible only under conditions which are them selves merely possible, not possible in any respect. And vet we can find no more certain ground on which to base the dis cussion of the question whether the sphere of possibility wider than that of experience.
have merely mentioned these questions, that in treating of the conception of the understanding, there might be no omission of anything that, in the common opinion, belongs to them. In reality, however, the notion of absolute possibility (possibility which valid in every respect) not mere con ception of the understanding, which can be employed empi rically, but belongs to reason alone, which passes the bounds of nll empirical use of the understanding. We have, therefore, contented ourselves with merely critical remark, leaving the sulijpc! to be explained t|ie sequel.
? ? ? is in a
is
I
is
is
is
a isis
is
it, is ais
is
;
it is
? ttEftrtATiolr or idealism.
I7d
Before concluding this fourth section, and at the same time the system of all principles of the pure understanding, it seems proper to mention the reasons which induced me to term the principles of modality postulates. This expression I do not here use in the sense which some more recent philoso phers, contrary to its meaning with mathematicians, to whom the word properly belongs, attach to it--that of a proposition, namely, immediately certain, requiring neither deduction nor proof. For in the case of synthetical propositions, however evident they may be, we accord to them without deduction, and merely on the strength of their own pretensions, unqualified belief, all critique of the understanding entirely lost and, as there no want of bold pretensions, which the common belief (though for the philosopher this no credential) does not reject, the understanding lies exposed to every delusion and conceit, without the power of refusing its assent to those as sertions, which, though illegitimate, demand acceptance as veritable axioms. When, therefore, to the conception of thing an a priori determination synthetically added, such proposition must obtain, not proof, at least deduction of the legitimacy of its assertion.
The principles of modality are, however, not objectively synthetical, for the predicates of possibility, reality, and ne cessity do not the least augment the conception of that of which they are affirmed, inasmuch as they contribute nothing to the representation of the object. But as they are, never theless, always synthetical, they are so merely subjectively. That to say, they have reflective power, and apply to the conception of thing, of which, in other respects, they affirm nothing, the faculty of cognition in which the conception originates and has its seat. So that the conception merely agree with the formal conditions of experience, its object called possible; ifitisin connection with perception, and deter mined thereby, the object real determined according to conceptions means of the connection of perceptions, the object called necessary. The principles of modality therefore predicate of conception nothing more than the pro cedure of the faculty of cognition which generated it. Now postulate in mathematics practical proposition which con tains nothing but the synthesis by which we present an object t"o ourselves, and produce the conception of for example--
With given line, to describe circle upon plane, froir
? ? ? a
is
if,
a
;if it is
a is
it, a
is a
is a if
is
by a
if
a
in
is
n is aa
a
is
is
;
? 174 VUS. S SUESDENTAL DOCTlitNE.
a given point ; and such a proposition does not admit of proof, because the procedure, which it requires, is exactly that by which alone it is possible to generate the conception of such a figure. With the same right, accordingly, can we postulate the principles of modality, because they do not aug ment* the conception of a thing, but merely indicate the manner in which it is connected with the faculty of cognition.
GENEBAL EEMAKK ON TUE SYSTEM OF PRINCIPLES.
It is very remarkable that we cannot perceive the possibility of a thing from the category alone, but must always have an intuition, by which to make evident the objective reality of the pure conception of the understanding. Take, for ex ample, the categories of relation. How (1) a thing can exist only as a subject, and not as a mere determination of other things, that is, can be substance ,. or how (2), because something exists, some other thing must exist, consequently how a thing can be a cause ; or (3) how, when several tilings exist, from the fact that one of these things exists, some consequence to the others follows, and reciprocally, and in this way a community of substances can be possible --are questions whose solution cannot be obtained from mere con ceptions. The very same is the case with the other cate gories; for example, how a thing can be of the same sort with many others, that can be quantity, and so on. So long as we have not intuition we cannot know, whether we do
really think an object by the categories, and where an object can anywhere be found to cohere with them, and thus the truth established, that the categories are not in themselves cognitions, but mere forms of thought for the construction of cognitions from given intuitions. For the same reason
true that from categories alone no synthetical proposition can be made. For example, " In every existence there sub stance," that something that can exist only as subject and not as mere predicate or, "everything quantity," -- to construct propositions such as these, we require something
? When think the reality of thing, do really think more than the possibility, but not in the thing for that can never contain more in rea lity than was contained in its complete possibility. But while the notion of possibility merely the notion of position of thing in relation to the understanding (its empirical use), reality the conjunction of tha thins Vfith perception.
? ? ? is
a
is a
I is
a
I
;
; a
a
is,
a
is
is . it
is
is,
? OlT THE BTBTEtt OF PRtKCtPLES.
176
to enable ua to go out beyond the given conception and con nect another with it. For the same reason the attempt to prove a synthetical proposition by means of mere conceptions
for example, " Everything that exists contingently has a cause,' has never succeeded. We could never get further than prov ing that, without this relation to conceptions, we could not conceive the existence of the contingent, that could not priori through the understanding cognize the existence of such
thing but does not hence follow that this also the
condition of the possibility of the thing itself that said to be
contingent. If, accordingly, we look back to our proof of the principle of causality, we shall find that we were able to
as valid only of objects of possible experience, and, indeed, only as itself the principle of the possibility of expe rience, consequently of the cognition of an object given empirical intuition, and not from mere conceptions. That, however, the proposition, " Everything that contingent must have cause," evident to every one merely from con ceptions, not to be denied. But in this case the conception of the contingent cogitated as involving not the category of modality (as that the non-existence of which can be conceived), but that of relation (as that which can exist only as the con sequence of something else), and so really an identical proposition, '* That which can exist only as consequence, has cause. " In fact, when we have to give examples of con tingent existence, we always refer to changes, and not merely to the possibility of conceiving the opposite. * But change
an event, which, as such, possible only through cause, and considered per te its non-existence therefore possible, and we become cognizant of its contingency from the fact
? We can easily conceive the non-existence of matter but the ancients did not thence infer its contingency. But even the alternation of the existence and non-existence of given state in thing, in which all change consists, by no means proves the contingency of that state --the ground of proof being the reality of its opposite. For example, body in state of rest after motion, but we cannot infer the contingency of the mo tion from the fact that the former the opposite of the latter. For this opposite merely logical and not real opposite to the other. If we wish to demonstrate the contingency of the motion, what we ought to prove is, that, instead of the motion which took place in the preceding point of time, was possible for the botSy to hive been then in iest, not.
case, both opposites are perfectly
? prove
that a/towards in rest for, in It. consistent witk each other.
? ? it a
a it ;
is
is
;
it
a
is a
a a is
is
a
is
it is
;a
a is
is, is is
a
a is in o
is
is
is
it
? I7G THAKSCENDEKTAL DOCTK15E.
that it can exist only as the effect of a cause. Hence, if a
thing is assumed to be contingent, it is an analytical proposi tion to say, it has a cause.
But it is still more remarkable that, to understand the pos sibility of things according to the categories, and thus to de monstrate the objective reality of the latter, we require not merely intuitions, but external intuitions. If, for example, we take the pure conceptions of relation, we find that (1) for
the purpose of presenting to the conception of substance some- ihing permanent in intuition corresponding thereto, and thus of demonstrating the objective reality of this conception, we require an intuition (of matter) in space, because space alone is permanent and determines things as such, while time, and with it all that is in the internal sense, is in a state of con tinual flow ; (2) in order to represent change as the intuition corresponding to the conception of causality, we require the representation of motion as change in space ; in fact, it is through it alone that changes, the possibility of which no pure understanding can perceive, are capable of being intuited, Change is the connection of determinations contradictorily opposed to each other in the existence of one and the same thing. Now, how it is possible that out of a given state one quite opposite to it in the same thing should follow, reason without an example can not only not conceive, but cannot even make intelligible without intuition ; and this intuition is the motion of a point in space ; the existence of which in different spaces (as a consequence of opposite determinations) alone makes the intuition of change possible. For, in order to make even internal change cogitable, we require to repre sent time, as the form of the internal sense, figuratively by a line, and the internal change by the drawing of that line (motion), and consequently are obliged to empioy external intuition to be able to represent the successive existence of ourselves in different states. The proper ground of this hvt
that all change to be perceived as change prc-supposes something permanent in intuition, while in the internal sense no permanent intuition to be found. Lastly, the objective possibility of the category of community cannot be conceived by mere reason, and consequently its objective reality cannot be demonstrated without an intuition, and that external in tpnee. For how ca. i we conceive the possibility of coramu
? ? ? is
is,
? ON THE 8TSTEM OF. PRINCIl'IJtB.
177
nity, that when several substances exist, that surne cfiFect on the existence of the one follows from the existence of the other, and reciprocally, and therefore that, because something exists in the latter, something else must exist in the former, which could not be understood from its own existence alone For this the very essence of community -- which incon ceivable as property of things which are perfectly isolated. Hence, Leibnitz, in attributing to the substances of the world --as cogitated the understanding alone -- community, re quired the mediating aid of divinity for, from their ex istence, such property seemed to him with justice incon ceivable. But we can very easily conceive the possibility of community (of substances as phsenomena) we represent them to ourselves as in space, consequently in external intui tion. For external intuition contains in itself priori formal external relations, as the conditions of the possibility of the real relations of action and reaction, and therefore of the pos sibility of comnmnity. With the same ease can be demon strated, that the possibility of things as quantities, and conse quently the objective reality of the category of quantity, cau be grounded only in external intuition, and that its means alone the notion of quantity appropriated by the internal
sense. But must avoid prolixity, and leave the task of lustrating this by examples to the reader's own reflection.
The above remarks are of the greatest importance, not only for the confirmation of our previous confutation of idealism, but still more, when the subject of self-cognition mere internal consciousness and the determination of our own na ture without the aid of external empirical intuitions under discussion, for the indication of the grounds of the possibility of such cognition.
The result of the whole of this part of the Analytic of Principles is, therefore --All principles of the pure understand ing are nothing more than a priori principles of the possibi lity of experience, and to experience alone do all priori syn thetical propositions apply and relate--indeed, their possibility itself rests entirely on this relation.
Ill II "gt
? ? ? n
is
by
il
is
?
h
by it
a
is I
is by
?
if
;
a
a
a
a
is,
? derstanding,
TKAN8CENDENTAL DOCTRINB.
178
01? THE GBOUND OF THE DIVISION OF ALL OBJECTS INTO PHENOMENA AND NOUMENA.
We have now not only traversed the region of the pure un
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE FACULTY OF JUDGMENT,
ob Analytic of Princifles.
CHAPTER III.
? and carefully surveyed every part of but we have also measured and assigned to everything therein its
But this land an island, and enclosed
proper place.
nature herself within unchangeable limits.
truth (an attractive word), surrounded
ocean, the region of illusion, where many
an iceberg, seems to the mariner, on his voyage of discovery,
new country, and while constantly deluding him with vain hopes, engages him in dangerous adventures, from which lie never can desist, and which yet he never can bring to ter mination. But before venturing upon this sea, in order to explore its whole extent, and to arrive at certainty whether anything to be discovered there, will not be with out advantage we cast our eyes upon the chart of the land that we are about to leave, and to ask ourselves, firstly, whether we cannot rest perfectly contented with what con tains, or whether we must not of necessity be contented with
we can find nowhere else solid foundation to build upon and, secondly, what title we possess this land itself, and how we hold secure against all hostile claims? Although, in the course of our analytic, we have already given sufficient answers to these questions, yet summary recapitulation of these solutions may be useful in strengthening our conviction,
uniting in one poi. it the momenta of the arguments.
We have seen that everything which the understanding
draws from itself, without borrowing from experience, never theless possesses only for the behoof and use of experience. The principles of the pure understanding, whether constitu tive priori (as the mathematical principles), or merely regu lative (as the dynamical), contain nothing but the pure schema,
? h
ww, of uossible experience. For experience possesses
the land of wide and stormy fog-bank, many
? ? it &
it
a
by
it, ; if
a
a
is
it
by
is
it,
a
in if
a it
it,
it
a a It is
it
by
by
? OF PHJEKOMENA AND NOUMEXA.
17V
. ts unity from the synthetical unity which the understanding, originally and from itself, imparts to the synthesis of the ima gination in relation to apperception, and in d priori relation to and agreement with which phenomena, as data for a pos sible cognition, must stand. But although these rules of the understanding are not only & priori true, but the very source of all truth, that of the accordance of our cognition with objects, and on this ground, that they contain the basis of the
possibility of experience, as the ensemble* of all cognition, seems to us not enough to propound what true -- we desire also to be told what we want to know. If, then, we leari> nothing more this critical examination, than what we shoult. have practised in the merely empirical use of the understand ing, without any such subtle enquiry, the presumption is, that the advantage we reap from not worth the labour be stowed upon it. It may certainly be answered, that no rash curiosity more prejudicial to the enlargement of our know ledge than that which must know beforehand the utility of this or that piece of information which we seek, before we have entered on the needful investigations, and before one could form the least conception of its utility, even though were placed before our eyes. But there one advantage in such transcendental enquiries which can he made comprehen sible to the dullest and most reluctant learner --this, namely, that the understanding which occupied merely with empiri cal exercise, and does not reflect on the sources of its own cognition, may exercise its functions very well and very suc
cessfully, but quite unable to do one thing, and that of very great importance, to determine, namely, the bounds that limit its employment, and to know what lies within or without its own sphere. This purpose can be obtained only by such profound investigations as we have instituted. But cannot distinguish whether certain questions lie within its horizon or not, can never be sure either as to its claims or possessions, but must lay its account with many humiliating corrections, when transgresses, as unavoidably will, the limits of its own territory, and loses itself in fanciful opinions and blinding illusions.
? * Inbegriff. The word continent, in the sense of tt at which oonUini the content (inkalt), might be allowed to use an old word in new
? ease, would exactly hit the meaning. -- TV.
S
? ? 2
a
if it
if I
is,
it it
is
by
it
is
it is
is
is
it
it
is
? 18C TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTB1XE.
That Ine understanding, therefore, cannot make of its & priori principles, or even of its conceptions other than an empirical use, is a proposition which leads to the most impor tant results. A transcendental use is made of a conception in a fundamental proposition or principle, when it is referred to things in general and considered as things in themselves ; an empirical use, when it is referred merely to phenomena, that to objects of possible experience. That the latter use of conception the only admissible one, evident from the reasons followiug. For every conception are requisite,
firstly, the logical form of conception (of thought) in general and, secondly, the possibility of presenting to this an object to which may apply. Failing this latter, has no sense, and
utterly void of content, although may contain the logical function for constructing conception from certain data.
Now object cannot be given to conception otherwise than by in tuition, and, even pure intuition antecedent to the object
? priori possible, this pure intuition can itself obtain objec tive validity only from empirical intuition, of which itself but the form. All conceptions, therefore, and with them all principles, however high the degree of their a priori possibi lity, relate to empirical intuitions, that to data towards possible experience. Withr,ut this they possess no objective validity, but are mere play of imagination or of understand ing with images or notions. Let us take, for example, the conceptions of mathematics, and first in its pure intuitions.
" Space has three dimensions" -- " Between two points there can be only one straight line," &c. Although all these prin ciples, and the representation of the object with which this science occupies itself are generated the mind entirely priori, they would nevertheless have no significance, we were not always able to exhibit their significance in and means of pbsenomena (empirical objects). Hence requi site that an abstract conception be made sensuous, that that an object corresponding to in intuition be forthcoming, otherwise the conception remains, as we say, without sense, that without meaning. Mathematics fulfils this require ment by the construction of the figure, which phenome- non evident to the senses. The same science finds support and significance in number this in its turn finds in the finger* or in counters, or in lines and points. The conception
? ? ;
it
it
it is
is a
is
is,
it
a is,
it
in
it
it
is is,
if
bya a ;
a
if aa
is,
is h
is
aa
a
is
? OF PHANOUEKA. anb KOTTMEKA. 181
itself is always produced ct priori, together with the synthetical principles or formulas from such conceptions ; but the proper employment of them, and their application to objects, can exist nowhere but in experience, the possibility of which, as regards its form, they contain i priori.
That this is also the case with all of the categories and the
principles based upon them, is evident from the fact, that we
cannot render intelligible the possibility of an object corre sponding to them, without having recourse to the conditions ot
sensibility, consequently, to the form of phsenomena, to which, as their only proper objects, their use must therefore be con fined, inasmuch as, if this condition is removed, all signifi cance, that is, all relation to an object disappears, and no example can be found to make it comprehensible what sort of things we ought to think under such conceptions.
The conception of quantity cannot be explained except by saying that it is the determination of a thing whereby it can be cogitated how many times one is placed in it. * But this " how many times" is based upon successive repetition, con sequently upon time and the synthesis of the homogeneous therein. Reality, in contradistinction to negation, can be ex plained only by cogitating a time which is either filled there with or is void. If I leave out the notion of permanence (which is existence in all time), there remains in the concep tion of substance nothing but the logical notion of subject, a notion of which I endeavour to realise by representing to myself something that can exist only as a subject. But not only am I perfectly ignorant of any conditions under which this logical prerogative can belong to a thing, I can make no thing out of the notion, and draw no inference from because no object to which to apply the conception determined, and we consequently do not know whether has any meaning at all. In like manner, leave out the notion of time, in which something follows upon some other thing in conformity with rule, can find nothing in the pure category, except that there something of such sort that from con clusion may be drawn as to the existence of some other thing.
Kant's meaning is, that we cannot have any conception of tha size, quantity, 4c. , of thing, without cogitating or constructing arbitrarily unit, which shall be the standard of measurement. This observable weights, measures, &c. Number the schema of quantity. -- Tr.
? ? ? is
is
hi a
?
a
a a
is I
a
it a
it,
if I
it
is
? TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE.
But in this case it would not only be impossible to distinguish between a cause and an effect, but, as this power to draw con clusions requires conditions of which I am quite ignorant, the conception is not determined as to the mode in which it ought to apply to an object. The so-called principle, Everything that is contingent has a cause, comes with a gravity and sell- nssumed authority that seems to require no support from without. But, I ask, what is meant by contingent? The answer that the non-existence of which possible. But should like very well to know, by what means this possibility of non-existence to be cognized, we do not represent to ourselves succession in the series of phenomena, and in this Succession an existence which follows non-existence, or conversely, consequently, change. For to say, that the non existence of thing not self-contradictory, lame appeal to logical condition, which no doubt necessary condition of the existence of the conception, but far from being sufficient for the real objective possibility of non-existence.
? can annihilate in thought every existing substance without self-contradiction, but cannot infer from this their objective contingency existence, that to say, the possibility of their non-existence in itself. As regards the category of commu nity, may easily be inferred that, as the pure categories of snbstance and causality are incapable of definition and ex planation sufficient to determine their object without the aid of intuition, the category of reciprocal causality in the relation of substances to each other (commercium) just as little sus ceptible thereof. Possibility, Existence, and Necessity nobody has ever yet been able to explain without being guilty of mani fest tautology, when the definition has been drawn entirely from the pure understanding. For the substitution of the
logical possibility of the conception --the condition of which that be not self-contradictory, for the transcendental pos sibility of things -- the condition of which that there be an object corresponding to the conception, trick which can only deceive the inexperienced. *
? In one word, to none of these conceptions belongs corresponding object, and consequently their real possibility cannot be demonstrated, we take away sensuous intuition --the only intuition which we possess, and there then remains nothing but the logical possibility, that is, the fact that the conception or thought possible -- which, howe'er, not the question what we want to know being, whether relates to an bject
uid thus Jtossesbes anv meaning.
? ? if ;
a
is
it
it
in
it is isa aa a is, is
is
is ?
is aa
is
is II
I
is
is is
a a
is,
if
? O. 1? PHENOMENA A>>D KOUilENA. Ih3
It follows incontestably, that the purr conception* of the understanding are incapable of transcendental, and must always ie of empirical use alone, and that the principles of the pure understanding relate only to the general conditions of a pos sible experience, to objects of the senses, and never to things in general, apart from the mode in which we intuite them.
Transcendental Analytic has accordingly this important re mit, to wit, thai the understanding is competent to effect nothing cL priori, except the anticipation of the form of a pos sible experience in general, and, that, as that which is not phe nomenon cannot be an object of experience, it can never overstep the limits of sensibility, within which alone objects are presented to us. Its principles are merely principles of the exposition of phenomena, and the proud name of an Ontology, which professes to present synthetical cognitions & priori of things in general in a systematic doctrine, must give place to the modest title of analytic of the pure understanding.
Thought is the act of referring a given intuition to an object. If the mode of this intuition is unknown to us, the object is
an object, but merely expresses the thought of an object in general, according to different modes. Now, to employ conception, the function of judgment required, by which au object subsumed under the conception, consequently the at least formal condition, under which something can be given in intuition. Failing this condition of judgment (schema), sub- sumption impossible for there in such case nothing given, which may be subsumed under the conception. The merely transcendental use of the categories therefore, in fact, no use at all, and has no determined, or even, as regards its form, determinable object. Hence follows, that the pure
? merelytranscendental. and the conception
is employed only transcendentally, that
in the thought of manifold in general. Now pure cate gory, in which all conditions of sensuous intuition --as the only intuition we possess -- are abstracted, does not determine
to establish synthetical a priori principle, and that the principles of the pure understanding are only of empirical and never of tcanscendentai use, and that beyond the sphere of -possible experience no synthetical
priori principles are possible.
may be advisable, therefore, to express ourselves thus.
The pure categories, apart from the formal conditions of sen
category incompetent
of the understanding to produce unity
? ? & It
is
is is
a it
is
is
is
;
a
is, a
a
a
? 184 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTKINt.
tibility, have a merely transcendental meaning, but are never- thel ess not of transcendental use, because this is in itself im possible, inasmuch as nll the conditions of any employment of use of them (in judgments) are nbsent, to wit, the formal con ditions of the subsumption of an object under these concep tions. As, therefore, in the character of pure categories, they must be employed empirically, and cannot be employed transcendentally, they are of no use at all, when separated from sensibility, that they cannot be applied to an object. They are merely the pure form of the employment of the under standing in respect of objects in general and of thought, with out its being at the same time possible to think or to deter
mine any object by their means.
But there lurks at the foundation of this subject an illusion
which very difficult to avoid. The categories are not
based, as regards their origin, upon sensibility, like the forms intuition, space and time they seem, therefore, to be capa
ble of an application beyond the sphere of sensuous objects. But this not the case. They are nothing but mere forms
thought, which contain only the logical faculty of uniting priori in consciousness the manifold given in intuition. Apart, then, from the only intuition possible for us, they
have still less meaning than the pure sensuous forms, space and time, for through them an object at least given, while mode of connection of the manifold, when the intuition which alone gives the manifold wanting, has no meaning at all. At the sflme time, when we designate certain objects as phsenomena or sensuous existences, thus distinguishing our mode of intuiting them from their own nature as things in
themselves, evident that this very distinction we as were place the latter, considered this their own nature, although we do not so intuite them, in opposition to the former, or, on the other hand, we do so place other possible things, which are not objects of our senses, but are cogitated
the understanding alone, and call them intelligible exist
ences (noumena). Now the question arises, whether the pure
conceptions of our understanding do possess significance
respect of these latter, and may possibly be mode of cog
nising them.
But we are met at the very commencement with an am
biguity, which may easily occasion great misapprehension.
? ? ? a
by
a it
of
by in
is
is
it is
is,
in it of
is
it is
;
? 0? PHENOMENA AKD KOUMEHA
The understanding, when it terms an object in a certain rela tion phenomenon, at the same time forms out of this relation a representation or notion of an object in itself, and hence be lieves that it can form also conceptions of such objects. Now as the understanding possesses no other fundamental concep tions besides the categories, it takes for granted that an object considered as a thing in itself must be capable of being thought by means of these pure conceptions, and is thereby led to hold the perfectly undetermined conception of an intel ligible existence, a something out of the sphere of our sen
sibility, for a determinate conception of an existence which
we can cognize in some way or other by means of the under
standing.
If, by the term noumenon, we understand a thing so far as
it is not an object of our sensuous intuition, thus making ab straction of our mode of intuiting this noumenon in the negative sense of the word. But we understand by an object non-sensuous intuition, we in this case assume peculiar mode of intuition, an intellectual intuition, to wit, which does not, however, belong to us, of the very possibility of which we have no notion --and this noumenon the positive sense.
? The doctrine of sensibility also the doctrine of noumena in the negative sense, that of things which the under standing obliged to cogitate apart from any relation to our mode of intuition, cousequently not as mere phenomena, but as things in themselves.
time comprehends that
consideration of things
significance only in relation to the unity of intuitions in space and time, and that they are competent to determine this unity by means of general priori connecting conceptions only on account of the pure ideality of space and time. Where this
unity of time not to be met with, as the case with nou mena, the whole use, indeed the whole meaning of the cate gories entirely lost, for even the possibility of things to correspond to the categories, in this case incomprehensible. On this point, need only refer the reader to what have said at the commencement of the General Remark appended
to the foregoing chapter. Now, the possibility of thing can never be proved from the fact that the conception of
But the understanding at the same cannot employ its categories for the themselves, because these possess
? ? it is
a
I
in
a it
I
is
is, is
is
is
is
of a
is
is a
it, if
<)
in it
is a
? 186 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTUINB.
not self-contradictory, but only by means of an intuition cor responding to the conception. If, therefore, we wish to apply
the categories to objects which cannot be regarded as pheno* mena, we must have an intuition different fnm the sensuous, and in this case the objects would be a noumena in the positive sense of the word. Now, as such an intuition, that an in tellectual intuition, no part of our faculty of cognition, absolutely impossible for the categories to possess any appli cation beyond the limits of experience. may be true that there are intelligible existences to which our faculty of sen suous intuition has no relation, and cannot be applied, but our conceptions of the understanding, as mere forms of thought for our sensuous intuition, do not extend to these. What, therefore, we call noumenon, must be understood us as such in negative sense.
If take away from an empirical intuition all thought (by means of the categories), there remains no cognition of any
for means of mere intuition nothing cogitated, and from the existence of such or such an affection of sensi bility in me, does not follow that this affection or repre sentation has any relation to an object without me. But takeaway all intuition, there still remains the form of thought, that the mode of determining an object for the manifold of possible intuition. Thus the categories do in some mea sure really extend further than sensuous intuition, inasmuch as they think objects in general, without regard to the mode 'of sensibility) in which these objects are given. But they do not for this reason apply to and determine wider sphere of objects, because we cannot assume that such can be given, without presupposing the possibility of another than the sen suous mode of intuition, supposition we are not justified in making.
call conception problematical which contains itself no contradiction, and which connected with other cogni tions as limitation of given conceptions, but whose ob jective reality cannot be cognised in any manner. The con ception of noumenon, that is, of thing which must be co gitated not as an object of sense, but as thing in itself (solely through the pure understanding) not self-contra dictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility the only possible mode of intuit'on. Nay, further, this con
? object
? ? is a
a
It
a a
is a
a
I
a
I
a
in
is,
a
by
is I is
is,
;
if
it
it
by
is
is
? OF PHENOMENA iND SOUMKNA.
187
jeptioE. is necessary to restrain sensuous intuition within the
bounds of phsenomena, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensuous cognition ; for things in themselves, which lie beyond its province, are calleu noumena, for the very purpose of indicating that this cognition does not extend its applica tion to all that the understanding thinks. But, after all, the possibility of such noumena is quite incomprehensible, and beyond the sphere of phenomena, all is for us a mere void ; that is to say, we possess an understanding whose province does problematically extend beyond this sphere, but we do not possess an intuition, indeed, not even th<< conception of a possi ble intuition, by means of which objects beyond the region of sensibility could be given us, and in reference to which the understanding might be employed assertorically. The concep tion of a noumenon is therefore merely a limitative conception, and therefore only of negative use. But it is not an arbitrary or fictitious notion, but is connected with the limitation of sensibility, without, however, being capable of presenting us with any positive datum beyond this sphere.
The division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and
of the world into a mundus sensibilis aud intelligibilis is there
fore quite inadmissible in a positive' sense, although conceptions do certainly admit of such a division ; for the class of nou mena have no determinate object corresponding to them, and cannot therefore possess objective validity. If we abandon the senses, how can it be made conceivable that the catego ries (which are the only conceptions that could serve as concep tions for noumena) have any sense or meaning at all, inasmuch as something more than the mere unity of thought, namely, a possible intuition, <is requisite for their application to an object. The conception of a noumenon, considered as merely problematical, however, not only admissible, but, as limitative conception of sensibility, absolutely necessary. But, in this case, noumenon not
? particular intelligible object for our understanding on the contrary, the kind of under
standing to which could belong itself problem, for we cannot form the most distant conception of the possibility of an understanding which should cognize an object, not discur sively by means of categories, but intuitively in non-sensuooa intuition. Our understanding attains in this way sort of negative extension. That to say, not limited by, but mtber limits, sensibility, giving the name of noumena to
? ? Ity is
;
is
is it
is
a
a a
a
is, it
a
a
? TllAKSClSirDENTAI,
DOCTXOf*.
things, not considered as phenomena, but as things in them selves. But it at the same time prescribes limits to itself, foi it confesses itself unable to cognize these by means of the categories, and hence is compelled to cogitate them merely aa an unknown something.
I find, however, in the writings of modern authors, an en. tirely different use of the expressions, mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis* which quite departs from the meaning of the ancients --an acceptation in which, indeed, there is to be found no difficulty, but which at the same time depends on mere verbal quibbling. According to this meaning, some have chosen to call the complex of phenomena, in so far as it is intuited, mundus sensibilis, butin so far as the connection thereof is cogitated according to general laws of thought, mundus in telligibilis. Astronomy, in so far as we mean by the word the mere observation of the starry heaven, may represent the former ; a system of astronomy, such as the Copernican or Newtonian, the latter. But such twisting of words is a mere sophistical subterfuge, to avoid a difficult question, by modifying its meaning to suit our own convenience. To be sure, understanding and reason are employed in the cognition of phenomena ; but the question whether these can be ap plied, when the object not phenomenon --and in this sense we regard cogitated as given to the under standing alone, and not to the senses. The question therefore
whether over and above the empirical use of the under standing, transcendental use possible, which applies to the noumenon as an object. This question we have answered
the negative.
When therefore we say, the senses represent objects as they
appear, the understanding as they are, the latter statement must not be understood in transcendental, but only in an empirical signification, that as they must be represented in the complete connexion of phenomena, and not according to what they may be, apart from their relation to possible expe
rience, consequently not as objects of the pure understanding. For this must ever remain unknown to us. Nay, also quite unknown to us, whether any such transcendental or extraordi-
We mu>>t not translate this expression by intellectual, as com. monly done in German works; for cognition* alone that are intel- ectual or sensuous. Objects of the one or the other mode of intuition ought
he called, however harshly may sound intelligible or untitle. --
? ? ? o
<<
in is,
it
it is is
it is
is, a
is
it is
a
is
a
is,
it if
? OF PHENOMENA AND KOUMENA. 189
nary cognition is possible under any circumstances, at leant, whether it is possible by means of our categories. Under standing and sensibility, with us, can determine objects only in conjunction. If we separate them, we have intuitions without
or conceptions without intuitions ; in both cases, representations, which we cannot apply to any determinate object.
If, after all our inquiries and explanations, any one still hesitates to abandon the mere transcendental use of the cate gories, let him attempt to construct with them a synthetical proposition. It would, of course, be unnecessary for this pur pose to construct an analytical proposition, for that does not extend the sphere of the understanding, but, being concerned only about what is cogitated in the conception itself, it leaves it quite undecided whether the conception has any relation to objects, or merely indicates the unity of thought--complete
abstraction being made of the modi in which an object may be given : in such a proposition, it is sufficient for the under standing to know what lies in the conception --to what it ap plies, is to it indifferent. The attempt must therefore be made with a synthetical and so-called transcendental principle, for example, Everything that exists, exists as substance, or, Every thing that is contingent exists as an effect of some other thing, viz. , of its cause. Now I ask, whence can the understanding draw these synthetical propositions, when the conceptions contained therein do not relate to possible experience but to things in themselves (noumena) ? Where is to be found the third term, which is always requisite in a synthetical propo sition, which may connect in the same proposition conceptions which have no logical (analytical) connection with each other ? The preposition never will be demonstrated, nay, more, the possibility of any such pure assertion never can be shown, without making reference to the empirical use of the under standing, and thus, ipso facto, completely renouncing pure and non-sensuous judgment. Thus the conception of pure and merely intelligible objects is completely void of all principles
of its application, because we cannot imagine any mode in which they might be given, and the problematical thought which leaves a place open for them serves enly, like a void
space, to limit the use of empirical principles, without con taining at the same time any other object of cognitioi beyond their sphere.
conceptions,
? ? ? ? 190 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE.
APPENDIX.
OF THE EQUIVOCAL NATURE OB AMPHIBOLY OF THE CON CEPTIONS OF REFLECTION FROM THE CONFUSION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL WITH THE EMPIRICAL USE OF THE UNDER STANDING.
Reflection (reflcxio) is not occupied about objects them selves, for the purpose of directly obtaining conceptions of them, but is that state of the mind in which we set ourselves to discover the subjective conditions under which we obtain conceptions. It is the consciousness of the relation of given
? to the different sources or faculties of cogni tion, by which alone their relation to each other can be rightly
determined. The first question which occurs in considering our representations to what faculty of cognition do they belong To the understanding or to the senses Many judgments are admitted to be true from mere habit or inclina tion but, because reflection neither precedes nor follows, held to be judgment that has its origin in the understand ing. All judgments do not require examination, that investi gation into the grounds of their truth. For, when they are immediately certain (for example, Between two points there can be only one straight line), no better or less mediate test of their truth can be found than that which they themselves contain and express. But all judgment, nay, all comparisons require reflection, that distinction of the faculty of cog nition to which the given conceptions belong. The act where by compare my representations with the faculty of cognition which originates them, and whereby distinguish whether they are compared with each other as belonging to the pure understanding or to sensuous intuition, term transcendental re flection. Now, the relations in which conceptions can stand to each other are those of identity and difference, agreement and opposition, of the internal and external, finally, of the deter minable and the determining (matter and form). The proper determination of these relations rests on the question, to what faculty of cognition they subjectively belong, whether to sensi bility or understanding For, on the manner in which we solve this question depends the manner in which we must
cojj'tate thc*o relations.
representations
? ? 1
is, a
1
I
I
;
?
is,
?
a
it is
is,
? OF THE EQUTVOCAL NATUBE OV THE OOKCEPTIOKB. 191
Before constructing ar. y objective judgment, we compare the conceptions that are to be placed in the judgment, and observe whether there exists identity (of many representations in one conception), if a general judgment is to be constructed, or difference, if a particular ; whether there is agreement when affirmative, and opposition when negative judgments are to be constructed, and so on. For this reason we ought to call these conceptions, conceptions of comparison (concept us com-
paralionis). But m, when the question is not as to the logical form, but as to the content of conceptions, that is to say, whether the things themselves are identical or different, in agreement or opposition, and so on, the things can have a twofold relation to our faculty of cognition, to wit, a relation either to sensibility or to the understanding, and as on this relation depends their relation to each other, transcendental reflection, that the relation of given representations to one or the other faculty of cognition, can alone determine this latter relation. Thus we shall not be able to discover whether the things are identical or different, in agreement or opposi tion, &c. , from the mere conception of the things means of comparison (comparatio), but only by distinguishing the mode of cognition to which they belong, in other words, by means of transcendental reflection. We may, therefore, with justice say, that logical reflection mere comparison, for in no ac count taken of the faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions belong, and they are consequently, as far as re gards their origin, to be treated as homogeneous while tran- icendental reflection (which applies to the objects themselves) contains the ground of the possibility of objective comparison of representations with each other, and therefore very different from the former, because the faculties of cognition to which they belong are not even the same. Transcendenta. reflection duty which no one can neglect who wishes to establish an priori judgment upon things. We shall now proceed to fulfil this duty, and thereby throw not little light on the question as to the determination of the proper business of the understanding. --
? When an object presented to
. Identity and Difference.
us several times, but always with the same internal determin ations (quulitas et quantitas), an object of pure under standing, always the same, not several things, but only one
? ? is
is aa
it, if
1
is
a
is
;
is
is
it
by
is,
?