Wherefore also the parts
of a definition are reduced to the genus of formal cause, as is stated
in Phys.
of a definition are reduced to the genus of formal cause, as is stated
in Phys.
Summa Theologica
Consequently the action done is a deficient
good, which is good in a certain respect, but simply evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders a thing from being in act in a
certain respect, so that it can act; and in a certain respect deficient
in act, so as to cause a deficient act. Thus a blind man has in act the
power of walking, whereby he is able to walk; but inasmuch as he is
deprived of sight he suffers a defect in walking by stumbling when he
walks.
Reply to Objection 3: An evil action can have a proper effect,
according to the goodness and being that it has. Thus adultery is the
cause of human generation, inasmuch as it implies union of male and
female, but not inasmuch as it lacks the order of reason.
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Whether the good or evil of a man's action is derived from its object?
Objection 1: It would seem that the good or evil of an action is not
derived from its object. For the object of any action is a thing. But
"evil is not in things, but in the sinner's use of them," as Augustine
says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12). Therefore the good or evil of a human
action is not derived from their object.
Objection 2: Further, the object is compared to the action as its
matter. But the goodness of a thing is not from its matter, but rather
from the form, which is an act. Therefore good and evil in actions is
not derived from their object.
Objection 3: Further, the object of an active power is compared to the
action as effect to cause. But the goodness of a cause does not depend
on its effect; rather is it the reverse. Therefore good or evil in
actions is not derived from their object.
On the contrary, It is written (Osee 9:10): "They became abominable as
those things which they loved. " Now man becomes abominable to God on
account of the malice of his action. Therefore the malice of his action
is according to the evil objects that man loves. And the same applies
to the goodness of his action.
I answer that, as stated above [1136](A[1]) the good or evil of an
action, as of other things, depends on its fulness of being or its lack
of that fulness. Now the first thing that belongs to the fulness of
being seems to be that which gives a thing its species. And just as a
natural thing has its species from its form, so an action has its
species from its object, as movement from its term. And therefore just
as the primary goodness of a natural thing is derived from its form,
which gives it its species, so the primary goodness of a moral action
is derived from its suitable object: hence some call such an action
"good in its genus"; for instance, "to make use of what is one's own. "
And just as, in natural things, the primary evil is when a generated
thing does not realize its specific form (for instance, if instead of a
man, something else be generated); so the primary evil in moral actions
is that which is from the object, for instance, "to take what belongs
to another. " And this action is said to be "evil in its genus," genus
here standing for species, just as we apply the term "mankind" to the
whole human species.
Reply to Objection 1: Although external things are good in themselves,
nevertheless they have not always a due proportion to this or that
action. And so, inasmuch as they are considered as objects of such
actions, they have not the quality of goodness.
Reply to Objection 2: The object is not the matter "of which" (a thing
is made), but the matter "about which" (something is done); and stands
in relation to the act as its form, as it were, through giving it its
species.
Reply to Objection 3: The object of the human action is not always the
object of an active power. For the appetitive power is, in a way,
passive; in so far as it is moved by the appetible object; and yet it
is a principle of human actions. Nor again have the objects of the
active powers always the nature of an effect, but only when they are
already transformed: thus food when transformed is the effect of the
nutritive power; whereas food before being transformed stands in
relation to the nutritive power as the matter about which it exercises
its operation. Now since the object is in some way the effect of the
active power, it follows that it is the term of its action, and
consequently that it gives it its form and species, since movement
derives its species from its term. Moreover, although the goodness of
an action is not caused by the goodness of its effect, yet an action is
said to be good from the fact that it can produce a good effect.
Consequently the very proportion of an action to its effect is the
measure of its goodness.
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Whether man's action is good or evil from a circumstance?
Objection 1: It would seem that an action is not good or evil from a
circumstance. For circumstances stand around [circumstant] an action,
as being outside it, as stated above ([1137]Q[7], A[1]). But "good and
evil are in things themselves," as is stated in Metaph. vi, 4.
Therefore an action does not derive goodness or malice from a
circumstance.
Objection 2: Further, the goodness or malice of an action is considered
principally in the doctrine of morals. But since circumstances are
accidents of actions, it seems that they are outside the scope of art:
because "no art takes notice of what is accidental" (Metaph. vi, 2).
Therefore the goodness or malice of an action is not taken from a
circumstance.
Objection 3: Further, that which belongs to a thing, in respect of its
substance, is not ascribed to it in respect of an accident. But good
and evil belong to an action in respect of its substance; because an
action can be good or evil in its genus as stated above [1138](A[2]).
Therefore an action is not good or bad from a circumstance.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that a virtuous
man acts as he should, and when he should, and so on in respect of the
other circumstances. Therefore, on the other hand, the vicious man, in
the matter of each vice, acts when he should not, or where he should
not, and so on with the other circumstances. Therefore human actions
are good or evil according to circumstances.
I answer that, In natural things, it is to be noted that the whole
fulness of perfection due to a thing, is not from the mere substantial
form, that gives it its species; since a thing derives much from
supervening accidents, as man does from shape, color, and the like; and
if any one of these accidents be out of due proportion, evil is the
result. So it is with action. For the plenitude of its goodness does
not consist wholly in its species, but also in certain additions which
accrue to it by reason of certain accidents: and such are its due
circumstances. Wherefore if something be wanting that is requisite as a
due circumstance the action will be evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Circumstances are outside an action, inasmuch as
they are not part of its essence; but they are in an action as
accidents thereof. Thus, too, accidents in natural substances are
outside the essence.
Reply to Objection 2: Every accident is not accidentally in its
subject; for some are proper accidents; and of these every art takes
notice. And thus it is that the circumstances of actions are considered
in the doctrine of morals.
Reply to Objection 3: Since good and being are convertible; according
as being is predicated of substance and of accident, so is good
predicated of a thing both in respect of its essential being, and in
respect of its accidental being; and this, both in natural things and
in moral actions.
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Whether a human action is good or evil from its end?
Objection 1: It would seem that the good and evil in human actions are
not from the end. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "nothing acts
with a view to evil. " If therefore an action were good or evil from its
end, no action would be evil. Which is clearly false.
Objection 2: Further, the goodness of an action is something in the
action. But the end is an extrinsic cause. Therefore an action is not
said to be good or bad according to its end.
Objection 3: Further, a good action may happen to be ordained to an
evil end, as when a man gives an alms from vainglory; and conversely,
an evil action may happen to be ordained to a good end, as a theft
committed in order to give something to the poor. Therefore an action
is not good or evil from its end.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Differ. Topic. ii) that "if the end
is good, the thing is good, and if the end be evil, the thing also is
evil. "
I answer that, The disposition of things as to goodness is the same as
their disposition as to being. Now in some things the being does not
depend on another, and in these it suffices to consider their being
absolutely. But there are things the being of which depends on
something else, and hence in their regard we must consider their being
in its relation to the cause on which it depends. Now just as the being
of a thing depends on the agent, and the form, so the goodness of a
thing depends on its end. Hence in the Divine Persons, Whose goodness
does not depend on another, the measure of goodness is not taken from
the end. Whereas human actions, and other things, the goodness of which
depends on something else, have a measure of goodness from the end on
which they depend, besides that goodness which is in them absolutely.
Accordingly a fourfold goodness may be considered in a human action.
First, that which, as an action, it derives from its genus; because as
much as it has of action and being so much has it of goodness, as
stated above [1139](A[1]). Secondly, it has goodness according to its
species; which is derived from its suitable object. Thirdly, it has
goodness from its circumstances, in respect, as it were, of its
accidents. Fourthly, it has goodness from its end, to which it is
compared as to the cause of its goodness.
Reply to Objection 1: The good in view of which one acts is not always
a true good; but sometimes it is a true good, sometimes an apparent
good. And in the latter event, an evil action results from the end in
view.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the end is an extrinsic cause,
nevertheless due proportion to the end, and relation to the end, are
inherent to the action.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing hinders an action that is good in one of
the way mentioned above, from lacking goodness in another way. And thus
it may happen that an action which is good in its species or in its
circumstances is ordained to an evil end, or vice versa. However, an
action is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways: since
"evil results from any single defect, but good from the complete
cause," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
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Whether a human action is good or evil in its species?
Objection 1: It would seem that good and evil in moral actions do not
make a difference of species. For the existence of good and evil in
actions is in conformity with their existence in things, as stated
above [1140](A[1]). But good and evil do not make a specific difference
in things; for a good man is specifically the same as a bad man.
Therefore neither do they make a specific difference in actions.
Objection 2: Further, since evil is a privation, it is a non-being. But
non-being cannot be a difference, according to the Philosopher (Metaph.
iii, 3). Since therefore the difference constitutes the species, it
seems that an action is not constituted in a species through being
evil. Consequently good and evil do not diversify the species of human
actions.
Objection 3: Further, acts that differ in species produce different
effects. But the same specific effect results from a good and from an
evil action: thus a man is born of adulterous or of lawful wedlock.
Therefore good and evil actions do not differ in species.
Objection 4: Further, actions are sometimes said to be good or bad from
a circumstance, as stated above [1141](A[3]). But since a circumstance
is an accident, it does not give an action its species. Therefore human
actions do not differ in species on account of their goodness or
malice.
On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Ethic ii. 1) "like
habits produce like actions. " But a good and a bad habit differ in
species, as liberality and prodigality. Therefore also good and bad
actions differ in species.
I answer that, Every action derives its species from its object, as
stated above [1142](A[2]). Hence it follows that a difference of object
causes a difference of species in actions. Now, it must be observed
that a difference of objects causes a difference of species in actions,
according as the latter are referred to one active principle, which
does not cause a difference in actions, according as they are referred
to another active principle. Because nothing accidental constitutes a
species, but only that which is essential; and a difference of object
may be essential in reference to one active principle, and accidental
in reference to another. Thus to know color and to know sound, differ
essentially in reference to sense, but not in reference to the
intellect.
Now in human actions, good and evil are predicated in reference to the
reason; because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "the good of man is
to be in accordance with reason," and evil is "to be against reason. "
For that is good for a thing which suits it in regard to its form; and
evil, that which is against the order of its form. It is therefore
evident that the difference of good and evil considered in reference to
the object is an essential difference in relation to reason; that is to
say, according as the object is suitable or unsuitable to reason. Now
certain actions are called human or moral, inasmuch as they proceed
from the reason. Consequently it is evident that good and evil
diversify the species in human actions; since essential differences
cause a difference of species.
Reply to Objection 1: Even in natural things, good and evil, inasmuch
as something is according to nature, and something against nature,
diversify the natural species; for a dead body and a living body are
not of the same species. In like manner, good, inasmuch as it is in
accord with reason, and evil, inasmuch as it is against reason,
diversify the moral species.
Reply to Objection 2: Evil implies privation, not absolute, but
affecting some potentiality. For an action is said to be evil in its
species, not because it has no object at all; but because it has an
object in disaccord with reason, for instance, to appropriate another's
property. Wherefore in so far as the object is something positive, it
can constitute the species of an evil act.
Reply to Objection 3: The conjugal act and adultery, as compared to
reason, differ specifically and have effects specifically different;
because the other deserves praise and reward, the other, blame and
punishment. But as compared to the generative power, they do not differ
in species; and thus they have one specific effect.
Reply to Objection 4: A circumstance is sometimes taken as the
essential difference of the object, as compared to reason; and then it
can specify a moral act. And it must needs be so whenever a
circumstance transforms an action from good to evil; for a circumstance
would not make an action evil, except through being repugnant to
reason.
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Whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end?
Objection 1: It would seem that the good and evil which are from the
end do not diversify the species of actions. For actions derive their
species from the object. But the end is altogether apart from the
object. Therefore the good and evil which are from the end do not
diversify the species of an action.
Objection 2: Further, that which is accidental does not constitute the
species, as stated above [1143](A[5]). But it is accidental to an
action to be ordained to some particular end; for instance, to give
alms from vainglory. Therefore actions are not diversified as to
species, according to the good and evil which are from the end.
Objection 3: Further, acts that differ in species, can be ordained to
the same end: thus to the end of vainglory, actions of various virtues
and vices can be ordained. Therefore the good and evil which are taken
from the end, do not diversify the species of action.
On the contrary, It has been shown above ([1144]Q[1], A[3]) that human
actions derive their species from the end. Therefore good and evil in
respect of the end diversify the species of actions.
I answer that, Certain actions are called human, inasmuch as they are
voluntary, as stated above ([1145]Q[1], A[1]). Now, in a voluntary
action, there is a twofold action, viz. the interior action of the
will, and the external action: and each of these actions has its
object. The end is properly the object of the interior act of the will:
while the object of the external action, is that on which the action is
brought to bear. Therefore just as the external action takes its
species from the object on which it bears; so the interior act of the
will takes its species from the end, as from its own proper object.
Now that which is on the part of the will is formal in regard to that
which is on the part of the external action: because the will uses the
limbs to act as instruments; nor have external actions any measure of
morality, save in so far as they are voluntary. Consequently the
species of a human act is considered formally with regard to the end,
but materially with regard to the object of the external action. Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who steals that he may
commit adultery, is strictly speaking, more adulterer than thief. "
Reply to Objection 1: The end also has the character of an object, as
stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although it is accidental to the external action
to be ordained to some particular end, it is not accidental to the
interior act of the will, which act is compared to the external act, as
form to matter.
Reply to Objection 3: When many actions, differing in species, are
ordained to the same end, there is indeed a diversity of species on the
part of the external actions; but unity of species on the part of the
internal action.
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Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the species
derived from the object, as under its genus, or conversely?
Objection 1: It would seem that the species of goodness derived from
the end is contained under the species of goodness derived from the
object, as a species is contained under its genus; for instance, when a
man commits a theft in order to give alms. For an action takes its
species from its object, as stated above ([1146]AA[2],6). But it is
impossible for a thing to be contained under another species, if this
species be not contained under the proper species of that thing;
because the same thing cannot be contained in different species that
are not subordinate to one another. Therefore the species which is
taken from the end, is contained under the species which is taken from
the object.
Objection 2: Further, the last difference always constitutes the most
specific species. But the difference derived from the end seems to come
after the difference derived from the object: because the end is
something last. Therefore the species derived from the end, is
contained under the species derived from the object, as its most
specific species.
Objection 3: Further, the more formal a difference is compared to
genus, as form to matter. But the species derived from the end, is more
formal than that which is derived from the object, as stated above
[1147](A[6]). Therefore the species derived from the end is contained
under the species derived from the object, as the most specific species
is contained under the subaltern genus.
On the contrary, Each genus has its determinate differences. But an
action of one same species on the part of its object, can be ordained
to an infinite number of ends: for instance, theft can be ordained to
an infinite number of good and bad ends. Therefore the species derived
from the end is not contained under the species derived from the
object, as under its genus.
I answer that, The object of the external act can stand in a twofold
relation to the end of the will: first, as being of itself ordained
thereto; thus to fight well is of itself ordained to victory; secondly,
as being ordained thereto accidentally; thus to take what belongs to
another is ordained accidentally to the giving of alms. Now the
differences that divide a genus, and constitute the species of that
genus, must, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii, 12), divide that
genus essentially: and if they divide it accidentally, the division is
incorrect: as, if one were to say: "Animals are divided into rational
and irrational; and the irrational into animals with wings, and animals
without wings"; for "winged" and "wingless" are not essential
determinations of the irrational being. But the following division
would be correct: "Some animals have feet, some have no feet: and of
those that have feet, some have two feet, some four, some many":
because the latter division is an essential determination of the
former. Accordingly when the object is not of itself ordained to the
end, the specific difference derived from the object is not an
essential determination of the species derived from the end, nor is the
reverse the case. Wherefore one of these species is not under the
other; but then the moral action is contained under two species that
are disparate, as it were. Consequently we say that he that commits
theft for the sake of adultery, is guilty of a twofold malice in one
action. On the other hand, if the object be of itself ordained to the
end, one of these differences is an essential determination of the
other. Wherefore one of these species will be contained under the
other.
It remains to be considered which of the two is contained under the
other. In order to make this clear, we must first of all observe that
the more particular the form is from which a difference is taken, the
more specific is the difference. Secondly, that the more universal an
agent is, the more universal a form does it cause. Thirdly, that the
more remote an end is, the more universal the agent to which it
corresponds; thus victory, which is the last end of the army, is the
end intended by the commander in chief; while the right ordering of
this or that regiment is the end intended by one of the lower officers.
From all this it follows that the specific difference derived from the
end, is more general; and that the difference derived from an object
which of itself is ordained to that end, is a specific difference in
relation to the former. For the will, the proper object of which is the
end, is the universal mover in respect of all the powers of the soul,
the proper objects of which are the objects of their particular acts.
Reply to Objection 1: One and the same thing, considered in its
substance, cannot be in two species, one of which is not subordinate to
the other. But in respect of those things which are superadded to the
substance, one thing can be contained under different species. Thus one
and the same fruit, as to its color, is contained under one species,
i. e. a white thing: and, as to its perfume, under the species of
sweet-smelling things. In like manner an action which, as to its
substance, is in one natural species, considered in respect to the
moral conditions that are added to it, can belong to two species, as
stated above ([1148]Q[1], A[3], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 2: The end is last in execution; but first in the
intention of the reason, in regard to which moral actions receive their
species.
Reply to Objection 3: Difference is compared to genus as form to
matter, inasmuch as it actualizes the genus. On the other hand, the
genus is considered as more formal than the species, inasmuch as it is
something more absolute and less contracted.
Wherefore also the parts
of a definition are reduced to the genus of formal cause, as is stated
in Phys. ii, 3. And in this sense the genus is the formal cause of the
species; and so much the more formal, as it is more universal.
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Whether any action is indifferent in its species?
Objection 1: It would seem that no action is indifferent in its
species. For evil is the privation of good, according to Augustine
(Enchiridion xi). But privation and habit are immediate contraries,
according to the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Therefore there is not
such thing as an action that is indifferent in its species, as though
it were between good and evil.
Objection 2: Further, human actions derive their species from their end
or object, as stated above [1149](A[6]; Q[1], A[3]). But every end and
every object is either good or bad. Therefore every human action is
good or evil according to its species. None, therefore, is indifferent
in its species.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above [1150](A[1]), an action is said
to be good, when it has its due complement of goodness; and evil, when
it lacks that complement. But every action must needs either have the
entire plenitude of its goodness, or lack it in some respect. Therefore
every action must needs be either good or bad in its species, and none
is indifferent.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18) that
"there are certain deeds of a middle kind, which can be done with a
good or evil mind, of which it is rash to form a judgment. " Therefore
some actions are indifferent according to their species.
I answer that, As stated above ([1151]AA[2],5), every action takes its
species from its object; while human action, which is called moral,
takes its species from the object, in relation to the principle of
human actions, which is the reason. Wherefore if the object of an
action includes something in accord with the order of reason, it will
be a good action according to its species; for instance, to give alms
to a person in want. On the other hand, if it includes something
repugnant to the order of reason, it will be an evil act according to
its species; for instance, to steal, which is to appropriate what
belongs to another. But it may happen that the object of an action does
not include something pertaining to the order of reason; for instance,
to pick up a straw from the ground, to walk in the fields, and the
like: and such actions are indifferent according to their species.
Reply to Objection 1: Privation is twofold. One is privation "as a
result" [privatum esse], and this leaves nothing, but takes all away:
thus blindness takes away sight altogether; darkness, light; and death,
life. Between this privation and the contrary habit, there can be no
medium in respect of the proper subject. The other is privation "in
process" [privari]: thus sickness is privation of health; not that it
takes health away altogether, but that it is a kind of road to the
entire loss of health, occasioned by death. And since this sort of
privation leaves something, it is not always the immediate contrary of
the opposite habit. In this way evil is a privation of good, as
Simplicius says in his commentary on the Categories: because it does
not take away all good, but leaves some. Consequently there can be
something between good and evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Every object or end has some goodness or malice,
at least natural to it: but this does not imply moral goodness or
malice, which is considered in relation to the reason, as stated above.
And it is of this that we are here treating.
Reply to Objection 3: Not everything belonging to an action belongs
also to its species. Wherefore although an action's specific nature may
not contain all that belongs to the full complement of its goodness, it
is not therefore an action specifically bad; nor is it specifically
good. Thus a man in regard to his species is neither virtuous nor
wicked.
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Whether an individual action can be indifferent?
Objection 1: It would seem that an individual action can be
indifferent. For there is no species that does not, cannot, contain an
individual. But an action can be indifferent in its species, as stated
above [1152](A[8]). Therefore an individual action can be indifferent.
Objection 2: Further, individual actions cause like habits, as stated
in Ethic. ii, 1. But a habit can be indifferent: for the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iv, 1) that those who are of an even temper and prodigal
disposition are not evil; and yet it is evident that they are not good,
since they depart from virtue; and thus they are indifferent in respect
of a habit. Therefore some individual actions are indifferent.
Objection 3: Further, moral good belongs to virtue, while moral evil
belongs to vice. But it happens sometimes that a man fails to ordain a
specifically indifferent action to a vicious or virtuous end. Therefore
an individual action may happen to be indifferent.
On the contrary, Gregory says in a homily (vi in Evang. ): "An idle word
is one that lacks either the usefulness of rectitude or the motive of
just necessity or pious utility. " But an idle word is an evil, because
"men . . . shall render an account of it in the day of judgment" (Mat.
12:36): while if it does not lack the motive of just necessity or pious
utility, it is good. Therefore every word is either good or bad. For
the same reason every other action is either good or bad. Therefore no
individual action is indifferent.
I answer that, It sometimes happens that an action is indifferent in
its species, but considered in the individual it is good or evil. And
the reason of this is because a moral action, as stated above
[1153](A[3]), derives its goodness not only from its object, whence it
takes its species; but also from the circumstances, which are its
accidents, as it were; just as something belongs to a man by reason of
his individual accidents, which does not belong to him by reason of his
species. And every individual action must needs have some circumstance
that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the intention of the
end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct; if an action that
proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is,
by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character of evil.
But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with reason;
wherefore it has the character of good. Now it must needs be either
directed or not directed to a due end. Consequently every human action
that proceeds from deliberate reason, if it be considered in the
individual, must be good or bad.
If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate reason, but from some
act of the imagination, as when a man strokes his beard, or moves his
hand or foot; such an action, properly speaking, is not moral or human;
since this depends on the reason. Hence it will be indifferent, as
standing apart from the genus of moral actions.
Reply to Objection 1: For an action to be indifferent in its species
can be understood in several ways. First in such a way that its species
demands that it remain indifferent; and the objection proceeds along
this line. But no action can be specifically indifferent thus: since no
object of human action is such that it cannot be directed to good or
evil, either through its end or through a circumstance. Secondly,
specific indifference of an action may be due to the fact that as far
as its species is concerned, it is neither good nor bad. Wherefore it
can be made good or bad by something else. Thus man, as far as his
species is concerned, is neither white nor black; nor is it a condition
of his species that he should not be black or white; but blackness or
whiteness is superadded to man by other principles than those of his
species.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher states that a man is evil,
properly speaking, if he be hurtful to others. And accordingly, because
he hurts none save himself. And the same applies to all others who are
not hurtful to other men. But we say here that evil, in general, is all
that is repugnant to right reason. And in this sense every individual
action is either good or bad, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Whenever an end is intended by deliberate reason,
it belongs either to the good of some virtue, or to the evil of some
vice. Thus, if a man's action is directed to the support or repose of
his body, it is also directed to the good of virtue, provided he direct
his body itself to the good of virtue. The same clearly applies to
other actions.
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Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of good or evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance cannot place a moral
action in the species of good or evil. For the species of an action is
taken from its object. But circumstances differ from the object.
Therefore circumstances do not give an action its species.
Objection 2: Further, circumstances are as accidents in relation to the
moral action, as stated above ([1154]Q[7], A[1]). But an accident does
not constitute the species. Therefore a circumstance does not
constitute a species of good or evil.
Objection 3: Further, one thing is not in several species. But one
action has several circumstances. Therefore a circumstance does not
place a moral action in a species of good or evil.
On the contrary, Place is a circumstance. But place makes a moral
action to be in a certain species of evil; for theft of a thing from a
holy place is a sacrilege. Therefore a circumstance makes a moral
action to be specifically good or bad.
I answer that, Just as the species of natural things are constituted by
their natural forms, so the species of moral actions are constituted by
forms as conceived by the reason, as is evident from what was said
above [1155](A[5]). But since nature is determinate to one thing, nor
can a process of nature go on to infinity, there must needs be some
ultimate form, giving a specific difference, after which no further
specific difference is possible. Hence it is that in natural things,
that which is accidental to a thing, cannot be taken as a difference
constituting the species. But the process of reason is not fixed to one
particular term, for at any point it can still proceed further. And
consequently that which, in one action, is taken as a circumstance
added to the object that specifies the action, can again be taken by
the directing reason, as the principal condition of the object that
determines the action's species. Thus to appropriate another's property
is specified by reason of the property being "another's," and in this
respect it is placed in the species of theft; and if we consider that
action also in its bearing on place or time, then this will be an
additional circumstance. But since the reason can direct as to place,
time, and the like, it may happen that the condition as to place, in
relation to the object, is considered as being in disaccord with
reason: for instance, reason forbids damage to be done to a holy place.
Consequently to steal from a holy place has an additional repugnance to
the order of reason. And thus place, which was first of all considered
as a circumstance, is considered here as the principal condition of the
object, and as itself repugnant to reason. And in this way, whenever a
circumstance has a special relation to reason, either for or against,
it must needs specify the moral action whether good or bad.
Reply to Objection 1: A circumstance, in so far as it specifies an
action, is considered as a condition of the object, as stated above,
and as being, as it were, a specific difference thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: A circumstance, so long as it is but a
circumstance, does not specify an action, since thus it is a mere
accident: but when it becomes a principal condition of the object, then
it does specify the action.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not every circumstance that places the
moral action in the species of good or evil; since not every
circumstance implies accord or disaccord with reason. Consequently,
although one action may have many circumstances, it does not follow
that it is in many species. Nevertheless there is no reason why one
action should not be in several, even disparate, moral species, as said
above (A[7], ad 1;[1156] Q[1], A[3], ad 3).
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Whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, places a
moral action in a species of good or evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that every circumstance relating to good or
evil, specifies an action. For good and evil are specific differences
of moral actions. Therefore that which causes a difference in the
goodness or malice of a moral action, causes a specific difference,
which is the same as to make it differ in species. Now that which makes
an action better or worse, makes it differ in goodness and malice.
Therefore it causes it to differ in species. Therefore every
circumstance that makes an action better or worse, constitutes a
species.
Objection 2: Further, an additional circumstance either has in itself
the character of goodness or malice, or it has not. If not, it cannot
make the action better or worse; because what is not good, cannot make
a greater good; and what is not evil, cannot make a greater evil. But
if it has in itself the character of good or evil, for this very reason
it has a certain species of good or evil. Therefore every circumstance
that makes an action better or worse, constitutes a new species of good
or evil.
Objection 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "evil is
caused by each single defect. " Now every circumstance that increases
malice, has a special defect. Therefore every such circumstance adds a
new species of sin. And for the same reason, every circumstance that
increases goodness, seems to add a new species of goodness: just as
every unity added to a number makes a new species of number; since the
good consists in "number, weight, and measure" ([1157]FP, Q[5], A[5]).
On the contrary, More and less do not change a species. But more and
less is a circumstance of additional goodness or malice. Therefore not
every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse, places it
in a species of good or evil.
I answer that, As stated above [1158](A[10]), a circumstance gives the
species of good or evil to a moral action, in so far as it regards a
special order of reason. Now it happens sometimes that a circumstance
does not regard a special order of reason in respect of good or evil,
except on the supposition of another previous circumstance, from which
the moral action takes its species of good or evil. Thus to take
something in a large or small quantity, does not regard the order of
reason in respect of good or evil, except a certain other condition be
presupposed, from which the action takes its malice or goodness; for
instance, if what is taken belongs to another, which makes the action
to be discordant with reason. Wherefore to take what belongs to another
in a large or small quantity, does not change the species of the sin.
Nevertheless it can aggravate or diminish the sin. The same applies to
other evil or good actions. Consequently not every circumstance that
makes a moral action better or worse, changes its species.
Reply to Objection 1: In things which can be more or less intense, the
difference of more or less does not change the species: thus by
differing in whiteness through being more or less white a thing is not
changed in regard to its species of color. In like manner that which
makes an action to be more or less good or evil, does not make the
action differ in species.
Reply to Objection 2: A circumstance that aggravates a sin, or adds to
the goodness of an action, sometimes has no goodness or malice in
itself, but in regard to some other condition of the action, as stated
above. Consequently it does not add a new species, but adds to the
goodness or malice derived from this other condition of the action.
Reply to Objection 3: A circumstance does not always involve a distinct
defect of its own; sometimes it causes a defect in reference to
something else. In like manner a circumstance does not always add
further perfection, except in reference to something else. And, for as
much as it does, although it may add to the goodness or malice, it does
not always change the species of good or evil.
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OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE INTERIOR ACT OF THE WILL (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the goodness of the interior act of the will;
under which head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the goodness of the will depends on the subject?
(2) Whether it depends on the object alone?
(3) Whether it depends on reason?
(4) Whether it depends on the eternal law?
(5) Whether erring reason binds?
(6) Whether the will is evil if it follows the erring reason against
the law of God?
(7) Whether the goodness of the will in regard to the means, depends on
the intention of the end?
(8) Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the
degree of good or evil in the intention?
(9) Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the
Divine Will?
(10) Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good,
to be conformed to the Divine Will, as regards the thing willed?
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Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object?
Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not
depend on the object. For the will cannot be directed otherwise than to
what is good: since "evil is outside the scope of the will," as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). If therefore the goodness of the will
depended on the object, it would follow that every act of the will is
good, and none bad.
Objection 2: Further, good is first of all in the end: wherefore the
goodness of the end, as such, does not depend on any other. But,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), "goodness of action is the
end, but goodness of making is never the end": because the latter is
always ordained to the thing made, as to its end. Therefore the
goodness of the act of the will does not depend on any object.
Objection 3: Further, such as a thing is, such does it make a thing to
be. But the object of the will is good, by reason of the goodness of
nature. Therefore it cannot give moral goodness to the will. Therefore
the moral goodness of the will does not depend on the object.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is
that habit "from which men wish for just things": and accordingly,
virtue is a habit from which men wish for good things. But a good will
is one which is in accordance with virtue. Therefore the goodness of
the will is from the fact that a man wills that which is good.
I answer that, Good and evil are essential differences of the act of
the will. Because good and evil of themselves regard the will; just as
truth and falsehood regard reason; the act of which is divided
essentially by the difference of truth and falsehood, for as much as an
opinion is said to be true or false. Consequently good and evil will
are acts differing in species. Now the specific difference in acts is
according to objects, as stated above ([1159]Q[18], A[5]). Therefore
good and evil in the acts of the will is derived properly from the
objects.
Reply to Objection 1: The will is not always directed to what is truly
good, but sometimes to the apparent good; which has indeed some measure
of good, but not of a good that is simply suitable to be desired. Hence
it is that the act of the will is not always good, but sometimes evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Although an action can, in a certain way, be
man's last end; nevertheless such action is not an act of the will, as
stated above ([1160]Q[1], A[1], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 3: Good is presented to the will as its object by
the reason: and in so far as it is in accord with reason, it enters the
moral order, and causes moral goodness in the act of the will: because
the reason is the principle of human and moral acts, as stated above
([1161]Q[18], A[5]).
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Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object alone?
Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not
depend on the object alone. For the end has a closer relationship to
the will than to any other power. But the acts of the other powers
derive goodness not only from the object but also from the end, as we
have shown above ([1162]Q[18] , A[4]). Therefore the act also of the
will derives goodness not only from the object but also from the end.
Objection 2: Further, the goodness of an action is derived not only
from the object but also from the circumstances, as stated above
([1163]Q[18], A[3]). But according to the diversity of circumstances
there may be diversity of goodness and malice in the act of the will:
for instance, if a man will, when he ought, where he ought, as much as
he ought, and how he ought, or if he will as he ought not. Therefore
the goodness of the will depends not only on the object, but also on
the circumstances.
Objection 3: Further, ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the
will, as stated above ([1164]Q[6], A[8]). But it would not be so,
unless the goodness or malice of the will depended on the
circumstances. Therefore the goodness and malice of the will depend on
the circumstances, and not only on the object.
On the contrary, An action does not take its species from the
circumstances as such, as stated above (Q[18], A[10], ad 2). But good
and evil are specific differences of the act of the will, as stated
above [1165](A[1]). Therefore the goodness and malice of the will
depend, not on the circumstances, but on the object alone.
I answer that, In every genus, the more a thing is first, the more
simple it is, and the fewer the principles of which it consists: thus
primary bodies are simple. Hence it is to be observed that the first
things in every genus, are, in some way, simple and consist of one
principle. Now the principle of the goodness and malice of human
actions is taken from the act of the will. Consequently the goodness
and malice of the act of the will depend on some one thing; while the
goodness and malice of other acts may depend on several things.
Now that one thing which is the principle in each genus, is not
something accidental to that genus, but something essential thereto:
because whatever is accidental is reduced to something essential, as to
its principle.
good, which is good in a certain respect, but simply evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders a thing from being in act in a
certain respect, so that it can act; and in a certain respect deficient
in act, so as to cause a deficient act. Thus a blind man has in act the
power of walking, whereby he is able to walk; but inasmuch as he is
deprived of sight he suffers a defect in walking by stumbling when he
walks.
Reply to Objection 3: An evil action can have a proper effect,
according to the goodness and being that it has. Thus adultery is the
cause of human generation, inasmuch as it implies union of male and
female, but not inasmuch as it lacks the order of reason.
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Whether the good or evil of a man's action is derived from its object?
Objection 1: It would seem that the good or evil of an action is not
derived from its object. For the object of any action is a thing. But
"evil is not in things, but in the sinner's use of them," as Augustine
says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12). Therefore the good or evil of a human
action is not derived from their object.
Objection 2: Further, the object is compared to the action as its
matter. But the goodness of a thing is not from its matter, but rather
from the form, which is an act. Therefore good and evil in actions is
not derived from their object.
Objection 3: Further, the object of an active power is compared to the
action as effect to cause. But the goodness of a cause does not depend
on its effect; rather is it the reverse. Therefore good or evil in
actions is not derived from their object.
On the contrary, It is written (Osee 9:10): "They became abominable as
those things which they loved. " Now man becomes abominable to God on
account of the malice of his action. Therefore the malice of his action
is according to the evil objects that man loves. And the same applies
to the goodness of his action.
I answer that, as stated above [1136](A[1]) the good or evil of an
action, as of other things, depends on its fulness of being or its lack
of that fulness. Now the first thing that belongs to the fulness of
being seems to be that which gives a thing its species. And just as a
natural thing has its species from its form, so an action has its
species from its object, as movement from its term. And therefore just
as the primary goodness of a natural thing is derived from its form,
which gives it its species, so the primary goodness of a moral action
is derived from its suitable object: hence some call such an action
"good in its genus"; for instance, "to make use of what is one's own. "
And just as, in natural things, the primary evil is when a generated
thing does not realize its specific form (for instance, if instead of a
man, something else be generated); so the primary evil in moral actions
is that which is from the object, for instance, "to take what belongs
to another. " And this action is said to be "evil in its genus," genus
here standing for species, just as we apply the term "mankind" to the
whole human species.
Reply to Objection 1: Although external things are good in themselves,
nevertheless they have not always a due proportion to this or that
action. And so, inasmuch as they are considered as objects of such
actions, they have not the quality of goodness.
Reply to Objection 2: The object is not the matter "of which" (a thing
is made), but the matter "about which" (something is done); and stands
in relation to the act as its form, as it were, through giving it its
species.
Reply to Objection 3: The object of the human action is not always the
object of an active power. For the appetitive power is, in a way,
passive; in so far as it is moved by the appetible object; and yet it
is a principle of human actions. Nor again have the objects of the
active powers always the nature of an effect, but only when they are
already transformed: thus food when transformed is the effect of the
nutritive power; whereas food before being transformed stands in
relation to the nutritive power as the matter about which it exercises
its operation. Now since the object is in some way the effect of the
active power, it follows that it is the term of its action, and
consequently that it gives it its form and species, since movement
derives its species from its term. Moreover, although the goodness of
an action is not caused by the goodness of its effect, yet an action is
said to be good from the fact that it can produce a good effect.
Consequently the very proportion of an action to its effect is the
measure of its goodness.
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Whether man's action is good or evil from a circumstance?
Objection 1: It would seem that an action is not good or evil from a
circumstance. For circumstances stand around [circumstant] an action,
as being outside it, as stated above ([1137]Q[7], A[1]). But "good and
evil are in things themselves," as is stated in Metaph. vi, 4.
Therefore an action does not derive goodness or malice from a
circumstance.
Objection 2: Further, the goodness or malice of an action is considered
principally in the doctrine of morals. But since circumstances are
accidents of actions, it seems that they are outside the scope of art:
because "no art takes notice of what is accidental" (Metaph. vi, 2).
Therefore the goodness or malice of an action is not taken from a
circumstance.
Objection 3: Further, that which belongs to a thing, in respect of its
substance, is not ascribed to it in respect of an accident. But good
and evil belong to an action in respect of its substance; because an
action can be good or evil in its genus as stated above [1138](A[2]).
Therefore an action is not good or bad from a circumstance.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that a virtuous
man acts as he should, and when he should, and so on in respect of the
other circumstances. Therefore, on the other hand, the vicious man, in
the matter of each vice, acts when he should not, or where he should
not, and so on with the other circumstances. Therefore human actions
are good or evil according to circumstances.
I answer that, In natural things, it is to be noted that the whole
fulness of perfection due to a thing, is not from the mere substantial
form, that gives it its species; since a thing derives much from
supervening accidents, as man does from shape, color, and the like; and
if any one of these accidents be out of due proportion, evil is the
result. So it is with action. For the plenitude of its goodness does
not consist wholly in its species, but also in certain additions which
accrue to it by reason of certain accidents: and such are its due
circumstances. Wherefore if something be wanting that is requisite as a
due circumstance the action will be evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Circumstances are outside an action, inasmuch as
they are not part of its essence; but they are in an action as
accidents thereof. Thus, too, accidents in natural substances are
outside the essence.
Reply to Objection 2: Every accident is not accidentally in its
subject; for some are proper accidents; and of these every art takes
notice. And thus it is that the circumstances of actions are considered
in the doctrine of morals.
Reply to Objection 3: Since good and being are convertible; according
as being is predicated of substance and of accident, so is good
predicated of a thing both in respect of its essential being, and in
respect of its accidental being; and this, both in natural things and
in moral actions.
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Whether a human action is good or evil from its end?
Objection 1: It would seem that the good and evil in human actions are
not from the end. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "nothing acts
with a view to evil. " If therefore an action were good or evil from its
end, no action would be evil. Which is clearly false.
Objection 2: Further, the goodness of an action is something in the
action. But the end is an extrinsic cause. Therefore an action is not
said to be good or bad according to its end.
Objection 3: Further, a good action may happen to be ordained to an
evil end, as when a man gives an alms from vainglory; and conversely,
an evil action may happen to be ordained to a good end, as a theft
committed in order to give something to the poor. Therefore an action
is not good or evil from its end.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Differ. Topic. ii) that "if the end
is good, the thing is good, and if the end be evil, the thing also is
evil. "
I answer that, The disposition of things as to goodness is the same as
their disposition as to being. Now in some things the being does not
depend on another, and in these it suffices to consider their being
absolutely. But there are things the being of which depends on
something else, and hence in their regard we must consider their being
in its relation to the cause on which it depends. Now just as the being
of a thing depends on the agent, and the form, so the goodness of a
thing depends on its end. Hence in the Divine Persons, Whose goodness
does not depend on another, the measure of goodness is not taken from
the end. Whereas human actions, and other things, the goodness of which
depends on something else, have a measure of goodness from the end on
which they depend, besides that goodness which is in them absolutely.
Accordingly a fourfold goodness may be considered in a human action.
First, that which, as an action, it derives from its genus; because as
much as it has of action and being so much has it of goodness, as
stated above [1139](A[1]). Secondly, it has goodness according to its
species; which is derived from its suitable object. Thirdly, it has
goodness from its circumstances, in respect, as it were, of its
accidents. Fourthly, it has goodness from its end, to which it is
compared as to the cause of its goodness.
Reply to Objection 1: The good in view of which one acts is not always
a true good; but sometimes it is a true good, sometimes an apparent
good. And in the latter event, an evil action results from the end in
view.
Reply to Objection 2: Although the end is an extrinsic cause,
nevertheless due proportion to the end, and relation to the end, are
inherent to the action.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing hinders an action that is good in one of
the way mentioned above, from lacking goodness in another way. And thus
it may happen that an action which is good in its species or in its
circumstances is ordained to an evil end, or vice versa. However, an
action is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways: since
"evil results from any single defect, but good from the complete
cause," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
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Whether a human action is good or evil in its species?
Objection 1: It would seem that good and evil in moral actions do not
make a difference of species. For the existence of good and evil in
actions is in conformity with their existence in things, as stated
above [1140](A[1]). But good and evil do not make a specific difference
in things; for a good man is specifically the same as a bad man.
Therefore neither do they make a specific difference in actions.
Objection 2: Further, since evil is a privation, it is a non-being. But
non-being cannot be a difference, according to the Philosopher (Metaph.
iii, 3). Since therefore the difference constitutes the species, it
seems that an action is not constituted in a species through being
evil. Consequently good and evil do not diversify the species of human
actions.
Objection 3: Further, acts that differ in species produce different
effects. But the same specific effect results from a good and from an
evil action: thus a man is born of adulterous or of lawful wedlock.
Therefore good and evil actions do not differ in species.
Objection 4: Further, actions are sometimes said to be good or bad from
a circumstance, as stated above [1141](A[3]). But since a circumstance
is an accident, it does not give an action its species. Therefore human
actions do not differ in species on account of their goodness or
malice.
On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Ethic ii. 1) "like
habits produce like actions. " But a good and a bad habit differ in
species, as liberality and prodigality. Therefore also good and bad
actions differ in species.
I answer that, Every action derives its species from its object, as
stated above [1142](A[2]). Hence it follows that a difference of object
causes a difference of species in actions. Now, it must be observed
that a difference of objects causes a difference of species in actions,
according as the latter are referred to one active principle, which
does not cause a difference in actions, according as they are referred
to another active principle. Because nothing accidental constitutes a
species, but only that which is essential; and a difference of object
may be essential in reference to one active principle, and accidental
in reference to another. Thus to know color and to know sound, differ
essentially in reference to sense, but not in reference to the
intellect.
Now in human actions, good and evil are predicated in reference to the
reason; because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "the good of man is
to be in accordance with reason," and evil is "to be against reason. "
For that is good for a thing which suits it in regard to its form; and
evil, that which is against the order of its form. It is therefore
evident that the difference of good and evil considered in reference to
the object is an essential difference in relation to reason; that is to
say, according as the object is suitable or unsuitable to reason. Now
certain actions are called human or moral, inasmuch as they proceed
from the reason. Consequently it is evident that good and evil
diversify the species in human actions; since essential differences
cause a difference of species.
Reply to Objection 1: Even in natural things, good and evil, inasmuch
as something is according to nature, and something against nature,
diversify the natural species; for a dead body and a living body are
not of the same species. In like manner, good, inasmuch as it is in
accord with reason, and evil, inasmuch as it is against reason,
diversify the moral species.
Reply to Objection 2: Evil implies privation, not absolute, but
affecting some potentiality. For an action is said to be evil in its
species, not because it has no object at all; but because it has an
object in disaccord with reason, for instance, to appropriate another's
property. Wherefore in so far as the object is something positive, it
can constitute the species of an evil act.
Reply to Objection 3: The conjugal act and adultery, as compared to
reason, differ specifically and have effects specifically different;
because the other deserves praise and reward, the other, blame and
punishment. But as compared to the generative power, they do not differ
in species; and thus they have one specific effect.
Reply to Objection 4: A circumstance is sometimes taken as the
essential difference of the object, as compared to reason; and then it
can specify a moral act. And it must needs be so whenever a
circumstance transforms an action from good to evil; for a circumstance
would not make an action evil, except through being repugnant to
reason.
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Whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end?
Objection 1: It would seem that the good and evil which are from the
end do not diversify the species of actions. For actions derive their
species from the object. But the end is altogether apart from the
object. Therefore the good and evil which are from the end do not
diversify the species of an action.
Objection 2: Further, that which is accidental does not constitute the
species, as stated above [1143](A[5]). But it is accidental to an
action to be ordained to some particular end; for instance, to give
alms from vainglory. Therefore actions are not diversified as to
species, according to the good and evil which are from the end.
Objection 3: Further, acts that differ in species, can be ordained to
the same end: thus to the end of vainglory, actions of various virtues
and vices can be ordained. Therefore the good and evil which are taken
from the end, do not diversify the species of action.
On the contrary, It has been shown above ([1144]Q[1], A[3]) that human
actions derive their species from the end. Therefore good and evil in
respect of the end diversify the species of actions.
I answer that, Certain actions are called human, inasmuch as they are
voluntary, as stated above ([1145]Q[1], A[1]). Now, in a voluntary
action, there is a twofold action, viz. the interior action of the
will, and the external action: and each of these actions has its
object. The end is properly the object of the interior act of the will:
while the object of the external action, is that on which the action is
brought to bear. Therefore just as the external action takes its
species from the object on which it bears; so the interior act of the
will takes its species from the end, as from its own proper object.
Now that which is on the part of the will is formal in regard to that
which is on the part of the external action: because the will uses the
limbs to act as instruments; nor have external actions any measure of
morality, save in so far as they are voluntary. Consequently the
species of a human act is considered formally with regard to the end,
but materially with regard to the object of the external action. Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who steals that he may
commit adultery, is strictly speaking, more adulterer than thief. "
Reply to Objection 1: The end also has the character of an object, as
stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although it is accidental to the external action
to be ordained to some particular end, it is not accidental to the
interior act of the will, which act is compared to the external act, as
form to matter.
Reply to Objection 3: When many actions, differing in species, are
ordained to the same end, there is indeed a diversity of species on the
part of the external actions; but unity of species on the part of the
internal action.
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Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the species
derived from the object, as under its genus, or conversely?
Objection 1: It would seem that the species of goodness derived from
the end is contained under the species of goodness derived from the
object, as a species is contained under its genus; for instance, when a
man commits a theft in order to give alms. For an action takes its
species from its object, as stated above ([1146]AA[2],6). But it is
impossible for a thing to be contained under another species, if this
species be not contained under the proper species of that thing;
because the same thing cannot be contained in different species that
are not subordinate to one another. Therefore the species which is
taken from the end, is contained under the species which is taken from
the object.
Objection 2: Further, the last difference always constitutes the most
specific species. But the difference derived from the end seems to come
after the difference derived from the object: because the end is
something last. Therefore the species derived from the end, is
contained under the species derived from the object, as its most
specific species.
Objection 3: Further, the more formal a difference is compared to
genus, as form to matter. But the species derived from the end, is more
formal than that which is derived from the object, as stated above
[1147](A[6]). Therefore the species derived from the end is contained
under the species derived from the object, as the most specific species
is contained under the subaltern genus.
On the contrary, Each genus has its determinate differences. But an
action of one same species on the part of its object, can be ordained
to an infinite number of ends: for instance, theft can be ordained to
an infinite number of good and bad ends. Therefore the species derived
from the end is not contained under the species derived from the
object, as under its genus.
I answer that, The object of the external act can stand in a twofold
relation to the end of the will: first, as being of itself ordained
thereto; thus to fight well is of itself ordained to victory; secondly,
as being ordained thereto accidentally; thus to take what belongs to
another is ordained accidentally to the giving of alms. Now the
differences that divide a genus, and constitute the species of that
genus, must, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii, 12), divide that
genus essentially: and if they divide it accidentally, the division is
incorrect: as, if one were to say: "Animals are divided into rational
and irrational; and the irrational into animals with wings, and animals
without wings"; for "winged" and "wingless" are not essential
determinations of the irrational being. But the following division
would be correct: "Some animals have feet, some have no feet: and of
those that have feet, some have two feet, some four, some many":
because the latter division is an essential determination of the
former. Accordingly when the object is not of itself ordained to the
end, the specific difference derived from the object is not an
essential determination of the species derived from the end, nor is the
reverse the case. Wherefore one of these species is not under the
other; but then the moral action is contained under two species that
are disparate, as it were. Consequently we say that he that commits
theft for the sake of adultery, is guilty of a twofold malice in one
action. On the other hand, if the object be of itself ordained to the
end, one of these differences is an essential determination of the
other. Wherefore one of these species will be contained under the
other.
It remains to be considered which of the two is contained under the
other. In order to make this clear, we must first of all observe that
the more particular the form is from which a difference is taken, the
more specific is the difference. Secondly, that the more universal an
agent is, the more universal a form does it cause. Thirdly, that the
more remote an end is, the more universal the agent to which it
corresponds; thus victory, which is the last end of the army, is the
end intended by the commander in chief; while the right ordering of
this or that regiment is the end intended by one of the lower officers.
From all this it follows that the specific difference derived from the
end, is more general; and that the difference derived from an object
which of itself is ordained to that end, is a specific difference in
relation to the former. For the will, the proper object of which is the
end, is the universal mover in respect of all the powers of the soul,
the proper objects of which are the objects of their particular acts.
Reply to Objection 1: One and the same thing, considered in its
substance, cannot be in two species, one of which is not subordinate to
the other. But in respect of those things which are superadded to the
substance, one thing can be contained under different species. Thus one
and the same fruit, as to its color, is contained under one species,
i. e. a white thing: and, as to its perfume, under the species of
sweet-smelling things. In like manner an action which, as to its
substance, is in one natural species, considered in respect to the
moral conditions that are added to it, can belong to two species, as
stated above ([1148]Q[1], A[3], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 2: The end is last in execution; but first in the
intention of the reason, in regard to which moral actions receive their
species.
Reply to Objection 3: Difference is compared to genus as form to
matter, inasmuch as it actualizes the genus. On the other hand, the
genus is considered as more formal than the species, inasmuch as it is
something more absolute and less contracted.
Wherefore also the parts
of a definition are reduced to the genus of formal cause, as is stated
in Phys. ii, 3. And in this sense the genus is the formal cause of the
species; and so much the more formal, as it is more universal.
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Whether any action is indifferent in its species?
Objection 1: It would seem that no action is indifferent in its
species. For evil is the privation of good, according to Augustine
(Enchiridion xi). But privation and habit are immediate contraries,
according to the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Therefore there is not
such thing as an action that is indifferent in its species, as though
it were between good and evil.
Objection 2: Further, human actions derive their species from their end
or object, as stated above [1149](A[6]; Q[1], A[3]). But every end and
every object is either good or bad. Therefore every human action is
good or evil according to its species. None, therefore, is indifferent
in its species.
Objection 3: Further, as stated above [1150](A[1]), an action is said
to be good, when it has its due complement of goodness; and evil, when
it lacks that complement. But every action must needs either have the
entire plenitude of its goodness, or lack it in some respect. Therefore
every action must needs be either good or bad in its species, and none
is indifferent.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18) that
"there are certain deeds of a middle kind, which can be done with a
good or evil mind, of which it is rash to form a judgment. " Therefore
some actions are indifferent according to their species.
I answer that, As stated above ([1151]AA[2],5), every action takes its
species from its object; while human action, which is called moral,
takes its species from the object, in relation to the principle of
human actions, which is the reason. Wherefore if the object of an
action includes something in accord with the order of reason, it will
be a good action according to its species; for instance, to give alms
to a person in want. On the other hand, if it includes something
repugnant to the order of reason, it will be an evil act according to
its species; for instance, to steal, which is to appropriate what
belongs to another. But it may happen that the object of an action does
not include something pertaining to the order of reason; for instance,
to pick up a straw from the ground, to walk in the fields, and the
like: and such actions are indifferent according to their species.
Reply to Objection 1: Privation is twofold. One is privation "as a
result" [privatum esse], and this leaves nothing, but takes all away:
thus blindness takes away sight altogether; darkness, light; and death,
life. Between this privation and the contrary habit, there can be no
medium in respect of the proper subject. The other is privation "in
process" [privari]: thus sickness is privation of health; not that it
takes health away altogether, but that it is a kind of road to the
entire loss of health, occasioned by death. And since this sort of
privation leaves something, it is not always the immediate contrary of
the opposite habit. In this way evil is a privation of good, as
Simplicius says in his commentary on the Categories: because it does
not take away all good, but leaves some. Consequently there can be
something between good and evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Every object or end has some goodness or malice,
at least natural to it: but this does not imply moral goodness or
malice, which is considered in relation to the reason, as stated above.
And it is of this that we are here treating.
Reply to Objection 3: Not everything belonging to an action belongs
also to its species. Wherefore although an action's specific nature may
not contain all that belongs to the full complement of its goodness, it
is not therefore an action specifically bad; nor is it specifically
good. Thus a man in regard to his species is neither virtuous nor
wicked.
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Whether an individual action can be indifferent?
Objection 1: It would seem that an individual action can be
indifferent. For there is no species that does not, cannot, contain an
individual. But an action can be indifferent in its species, as stated
above [1152](A[8]). Therefore an individual action can be indifferent.
Objection 2: Further, individual actions cause like habits, as stated
in Ethic. ii, 1. But a habit can be indifferent: for the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iv, 1) that those who are of an even temper and prodigal
disposition are not evil; and yet it is evident that they are not good,
since they depart from virtue; and thus they are indifferent in respect
of a habit. Therefore some individual actions are indifferent.
Objection 3: Further, moral good belongs to virtue, while moral evil
belongs to vice. But it happens sometimes that a man fails to ordain a
specifically indifferent action to a vicious or virtuous end. Therefore
an individual action may happen to be indifferent.
On the contrary, Gregory says in a homily (vi in Evang. ): "An idle word
is one that lacks either the usefulness of rectitude or the motive of
just necessity or pious utility. " But an idle word is an evil, because
"men . . . shall render an account of it in the day of judgment" (Mat.
12:36): while if it does not lack the motive of just necessity or pious
utility, it is good. Therefore every word is either good or bad. For
the same reason every other action is either good or bad. Therefore no
individual action is indifferent.
I answer that, It sometimes happens that an action is indifferent in
its species, but considered in the individual it is good or evil. And
the reason of this is because a moral action, as stated above
[1153](A[3]), derives its goodness not only from its object, whence it
takes its species; but also from the circumstances, which are its
accidents, as it were; just as something belongs to a man by reason of
his individual accidents, which does not belong to him by reason of his
species. And every individual action must needs have some circumstance
that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the intention of the
end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct; if an action that
proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is,
by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character of evil.
But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with reason;
wherefore it has the character of good. Now it must needs be either
directed or not directed to a due end. Consequently every human action
that proceeds from deliberate reason, if it be considered in the
individual, must be good or bad.
If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate reason, but from some
act of the imagination, as when a man strokes his beard, or moves his
hand or foot; such an action, properly speaking, is not moral or human;
since this depends on the reason. Hence it will be indifferent, as
standing apart from the genus of moral actions.
Reply to Objection 1: For an action to be indifferent in its species
can be understood in several ways. First in such a way that its species
demands that it remain indifferent; and the objection proceeds along
this line. But no action can be specifically indifferent thus: since no
object of human action is such that it cannot be directed to good or
evil, either through its end or through a circumstance. Secondly,
specific indifference of an action may be due to the fact that as far
as its species is concerned, it is neither good nor bad. Wherefore it
can be made good or bad by something else. Thus man, as far as his
species is concerned, is neither white nor black; nor is it a condition
of his species that he should not be black or white; but blackness or
whiteness is superadded to man by other principles than those of his
species.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher states that a man is evil,
properly speaking, if he be hurtful to others. And accordingly, because
he hurts none save himself. And the same applies to all others who are
not hurtful to other men. But we say here that evil, in general, is all
that is repugnant to right reason. And in this sense every individual
action is either good or bad, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Whenever an end is intended by deliberate reason,
it belongs either to the good of some virtue, or to the evil of some
vice. Thus, if a man's action is directed to the support or repose of
his body, it is also directed to the good of virtue, provided he direct
his body itself to the good of virtue. The same clearly applies to
other actions.
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Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of good or evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance cannot place a moral
action in the species of good or evil. For the species of an action is
taken from its object. But circumstances differ from the object.
Therefore circumstances do not give an action its species.
Objection 2: Further, circumstances are as accidents in relation to the
moral action, as stated above ([1154]Q[7], A[1]). But an accident does
not constitute the species. Therefore a circumstance does not
constitute a species of good or evil.
Objection 3: Further, one thing is not in several species. But one
action has several circumstances. Therefore a circumstance does not
place a moral action in a species of good or evil.
On the contrary, Place is a circumstance. But place makes a moral
action to be in a certain species of evil; for theft of a thing from a
holy place is a sacrilege. Therefore a circumstance makes a moral
action to be specifically good or bad.
I answer that, Just as the species of natural things are constituted by
their natural forms, so the species of moral actions are constituted by
forms as conceived by the reason, as is evident from what was said
above [1155](A[5]). But since nature is determinate to one thing, nor
can a process of nature go on to infinity, there must needs be some
ultimate form, giving a specific difference, after which no further
specific difference is possible. Hence it is that in natural things,
that which is accidental to a thing, cannot be taken as a difference
constituting the species. But the process of reason is not fixed to one
particular term, for at any point it can still proceed further. And
consequently that which, in one action, is taken as a circumstance
added to the object that specifies the action, can again be taken by
the directing reason, as the principal condition of the object that
determines the action's species. Thus to appropriate another's property
is specified by reason of the property being "another's," and in this
respect it is placed in the species of theft; and if we consider that
action also in its bearing on place or time, then this will be an
additional circumstance. But since the reason can direct as to place,
time, and the like, it may happen that the condition as to place, in
relation to the object, is considered as being in disaccord with
reason: for instance, reason forbids damage to be done to a holy place.
Consequently to steal from a holy place has an additional repugnance to
the order of reason. And thus place, which was first of all considered
as a circumstance, is considered here as the principal condition of the
object, and as itself repugnant to reason. And in this way, whenever a
circumstance has a special relation to reason, either for or against,
it must needs specify the moral action whether good or bad.
Reply to Objection 1: A circumstance, in so far as it specifies an
action, is considered as a condition of the object, as stated above,
and as being, as it were, a specific difference thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: A circumstance, so long as it is but a
circumstance, does not specify an action, since thus it is a mere
accident: but when it becomes a principal condition of the object, then
it does specify the action.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not every circumstance that places the
moral action in the species of good or evil; since not every
circumstance implies accord or disaccord with reason. Consequently,
although one action may have many circumstances, it does not follow
that it is in many species. Nevertheless there is no reason why one
action should not be in several, even disparate, moral species, as said
above (A[7], ad 1;[1156] Q[1], A[3], ad 3).
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Whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, places a
moral action in a species of good or evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that every circumstance relating to good or
evil, specifies an action. For good and evil are specific differences
of moral actions. Therefore that which causes a difference in the
goodness or malice of a moral action, causes a specific difference,
which is the same as to make it differ in species. Now that which makes
an action better or worse, makes it differ in goodness and malice.
Therefore it causes it to differ in species. Therefore every
circumstance that makes an action better or worse, constitutes a
species.
Objection 2: Further, an additional circumstance either has in itself
the character of goodness or malice, or it has not. If not, it cannot
make the action better or worse; because what is not good, cannot make
a greater good; and what is not evil, cannot make a greater evil. But
if it has in itself the character of good or evil, for this very reason
it has a certain species of good or evil. Therefore every circumstance
that makes an action better or worse, constitutes a new species of good
or evil.
Objection 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "evil is
caused by each single defect. " Now every circumstance that increases
malice, has a special defect. Therefore every such circumstance adds a
new species of sin. And for the same reason, every circumstance that
increases goodness, seems to add a new species of goodness: just as
every unity added to a number makes a new species of number; since the
good consists in "number, weight, and measure" ([1157]FP, Q[5], A[5]).
On the contrary, More and less do not change a species. But more and
less is a circumstance of additional goodness or malice. Therefore not
every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse, places it
in a species of good or evil.
I answer that, As stated above [1158](A[10]), a circumstance gives the
species of good or evil to a moral action, in so far as it regards a
special order of reason. Now it happens sometimes that a circumstance
does not regard a special order of reason in respect of good or evil,
except on the supposition of another previous circumstance, from which
the moral action takes its species of good or evil. Thus to take
something in a large or small quantity, does not regard the order of
reason in respect of good or evil, except a certain other condition be
presupposed, from which the action takes its malice or goodness; for
instance, if what is taken belongs to another, which makes the action
to be discordant with reason. Wherefore to take what belongs to another
in a large or small quantity, does not change the species of the sin.
Nevertheless it can aggravate or diminish the sin. The same applies to
other evil or good actions. Consequently not every circumstance that
makes a moral action better or worse, changes its species.
Reply to Objection 1: In things which can be more or less intense, the
difference of more or less does not change the species: thus by
differing in whiteness through being more or less white a thing is not
changed in regard to its species of color. In like manner that which
makes an action to be more or less good or evil, does not make the
action differ in species.
Reply to Objection 2: A circumstance that aggravates a sin, or adds to
the goodness of an action, sometimes has no goodness or malice in
itself, but in regard to some other condition of the action, as stated
above. Consequently it does not add a new species, but adds to the
goodness or malice derived from this other condition of the action.
Reply to Objection 3: A circumstance does not always involve a distinct
defect of its own; sometimes it causes a defect in reference to
something else. In like manner a circumstance does not always add
further perfection, except in reference to something else. And, for as
much as it does, although it may add to the goodness or malice, it does
not always change the species of good or evil.
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OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE INTERIOR ACT OF THE WILL (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the goodness of the interior act of the will;
under which head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the goodness of the will depends on the subject?
(2) Whether it depends on the object alone?
(3) Whether it depends on reason?
(4) Whether it depends on the eternal law?
(5) Whether erring reason binds?
(6) Whether the will is evil if it follows the erring reason against
the law of God?
(7) Whether the goodness of the will in regard to the means, depends on
the intention of the end?
(8) Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the
degree of good or evil in the intention?
(9) Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the
Divine Will?
(10) Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good,
to be conformed to the Divine Will, as regards the thing willed?
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Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object?
Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not
depend on the object. For the will cannot be directed otherwise than to
what is good: since "evil is outside the scope of the will," as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). If therefore the goodness of the will
depended on the object, it would follow that every act of the will is
good, and none bad.
Objection 2: Further, good is first of all in the end: wherefore the
goodness of the end, as such, does not depend on any other. But,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), "goodness of action is the
end, but goodness of making is never the end": because the latter is
always ordained to the thing made, as to its end. Therefore the
goodness of the act of the will does not depend on any object.
Objection 3: Further, such as a thing is, such does it make a thing to
be. But the object of the will is good, by reason of the goodness of
nature. Therefore it cannot give moral goodness to the will. Therefore
the moral goodness of the will does not depend on the object.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is
that habit "from which men wish for just things": and accordingly,
virtue is a habit from which men wish for good things. But a good will
is one which is in accordance with virtue. Therefore the goodness of
the will is from the fact that a man wills that which is good.
I answer that, Good and evil are essential differences of the act of
the will. Because good and evil of themselves regard the will; just as
truth and falsehood regard reason; the act of which is divided
essentially by the difference of truth and falsehood, for as much as an
opinion is said to be true or false. Consequently good and evil will
are acts differing in species. Now the specific difference in acts is
according to objects, as stated above ([1159]Q[18], A[5]). Therefore
good and evil in the acts of the will is derived properly from the
objects.
Reply to Objection 1: The will is not always directed to what is truly
good, but sometimes to the apparent good; which has indeed some measure
of good, but not of a good that is simply suitable to be desired. Hence
it is that the act of the will is not always good, but sometimes evil.
Reply to Objection 2: Although an action can, in a certain way, be
man's last end; nevertheless such action is not an act of the will, as
stated above ([1160]Q[1], A[1], ad 2).
Reply to Objection 3: Good is presented to the will as its object by
the reason: and in so far as it is in accord with reason, it enters the
moral order, and causes moral goodness in the act of the will: because
the reason is the principle of human and moral acts, as stated above
([1161]Q[18], A[5]).
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Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object alone?
Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not
depend on the object alone. For the end has a closer relationship to
the will than to any other power. But the acts of the other powers
derive goodness not only from the object but also from the end, as we
have shown above ([1162]Q[18] , A[4]). Therefore the act also of the
will derives goodness not only from the object but also from the end.
Objection 2: Further, the goodness of an action is derived not only
from the object but also from the circumstances, as stated above
([1163]Q[18], A[3]). But according to the diversity of circumstances
there may be diversity of goodness and malice in the act of the will:
for instance, if a man will, when he ought, where he ought, as much as
he ought, and how he ought, or if he will as he ought not. Therefore
the goodness of the will depends not only on the object, but also on
the circumstances.
Objection 3: Further, ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the
will, as stated above ([1164]Q[6], A[8]). But it would not be so,
unless the goodness or malice of the will depended on the
circumstances. Therefore the goodness and malice of the will depend on
the circumstances, and not only on the object.
On the contrary, An action does not take its species from the
circumstances as such, as stated above (Q[18], A[10], ad 2). But good
and evil are specific differences of the act of the will, as stated
above [1165](A[1]). Therefore the goodness and malice of the will
depend, not on the circumstances, but on the object alone.
I answer that, In every genus, the more a thing is first, the more
simple it is, and the fewer the principles of which it consists: thus
primary bodies are simple. Hence it is to be observed that the first
things in every genus, are, in some way, simple and consist of one
principle. Now the principle of the goodness and malice of human
actions is taken from the act of the will. Consequently the goodness
and malice of the act of the will depend on some one thing; while the
goodness and malice of other acts may depend on several things.
Now that one thing which is the principle in each genus, is not
something accidental to that genus, but something essential thereto:
because whatever is accidental is reduced to something essential, as to
its principle.
