"In general, full economic
security
is harmful; most men would not work if they didn't need the money for eating and living" (Item 6r).
Adorno-T-Authoritarian-Personality-Harper-Bros-1950
This interpretation is supported by the interview material, as will be shown later.
It is interesting that both subjects show inconsistency in the case of Item 54? Although this statement was intended to be strongly ethnocentric, the prejudiced subject disagrees with it while the unprejudiced subject agrees. This is in keeping with the fact that the item has one of the lowest D. P. 's of any in the scale. The reason might well be that some low scorers interpret the statement not in a cynical, antihuman way, imputing the incapability to
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outgroups (the high scorers show clearly, in their responses to other E items, who they think are the incapable people), but rather in the sense that there are too many people in all groups who have not, because of social conditions, developed sufficiently. This explanation probably holds for Larry.
F. CONCLUSIONS: THE STRUCTURE OF ETHNOCENTRIC IDEOLOGY
On the basis of the various scale results presented above and of supporting evidence from interviews, we can now attempt to formulate a more detailed theory of ethnocentric ideology. Such a theory should indicate the generality of the ethnocentric frame of mind, should permit various patterns of sur- face opinions and attitudes to be viewed as alternative expressions of the same underlying point of view, and should show how the ethnocentric ap- proach to groups and group relations differs from other approaches.
A word may first be said regarding the implications of the data presented above for such a theory. To what extent can ethnocentrism be considered a consistent, organized system of ideas? From the scale statistics the following points can be made. On an item-by-item basis most people are not entirely consistent in their agreement or disagreement with ethnocentric ideas. This is indicated by the correlations, about ? 4 on the average, between individual items. Also, inspection of the scale responses of individuals in the high and low quartiles shows that even extreme scorers vary somewhat around a generally ethnocentric or anti-ethnocentric position. Thus, to know that a person is ethnocentric in terms of total E-scale score permits only fair pre- diction of his stand on any single item in the scale (correlations between single items and total E scale averaging about . 6).
On the other hand, there is much greater consistency on a subscale-by- subscale basis. The high reliability of the initial E scale and of its relatively short subscales indicates that, whatever the item-by-item fluctuation, each subscale measures a rather consistent trend. Furthermore, the correlations among the initial Negro, Minorities, Patriotism, and Anti-Semitism scales indicate that these trends are closely related, that people are notably con- sistent in their acceptance or rejection of gene1"al ethnocentrism. To attempt to measure this ideology as a totality, however, is not to deny that it has components with respect to which individuals may vary. Indeed, the assump- tion that each trend is complex underlies the formulation of subscales and the attempt to make each subscale as complex and inclusive as possible.
A person is considered ethnocentric when his total score (average agree- ment with items) is high enough to indicate that he has accepted most of the ideas expressed in the scale. Whenever in the text a reference is made to "generality" or "consistency," it is always on a subscale or scale basis and with a recognition of item-by-item variability. And whenever there is a reference to any specific idea in ethnocentric ideology it is understood that
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most, though usually not all, ethnocentrists have this idea; that is to say,
each facet of ethnocentric ideology as heTe conceived is accepted by most high scorers, rejected by most low scorers. 20 Ethnocentric ideology is held in its entirety by only the most extreme high scorers on the E scale. The less extreme members of the high quartile have accepted most, though not all, of the ethnocentric ideas described below. It would be erroneous, then, to regard high scorers as "all alike"; they have in common a general way of thinking about groups, but there are wide individual differences in the im- agery and attitudes regarding various groups. Similar reasoning applies to the low scorers. 21
We may now return to a considet:ation of the preliminary definition of ethnocentrism as an ideology concerning ingroups and outgroups and their interaction.
The term "group~' is used in the widesf sense to mean any set of people who constitute a psychological entity for any individual. If we regard the individual's conception of the social world as a sort of map containing various differentiated regions, then each region can be considered a group. This sociopsychological definition includes sociological groups such as nations, classes, ethnic groups, political parties, and so on. But it also includes numbers- of-people who have one or more common characteristics but who are not formal groups in the sense of showing organization and regulation of ways. Thus, it is legitimate in a sociopsychological sense to consider as groups such sets of people as criminals, intellectuals, artists, politicians, eccentrics, and so on. Psychologically, they are groups in so far as they are social categories or regions in an individual's social outlook-objects of opinions, attitudes, affect, and striving.
"lngroup" and "outgroup" are sociopsychological rather than purely sociological concepts, since they refer to identification and, so to speak, contraidentification, rather than to formal membership in the group. A per- son may be identified with groups to which he does not formally belong. This is exemplified by the type of socially upward mobile person who is identified with groups of higher status and power (class, profession, political faction) than those to which he now belongs; also by the person with moti- vated downward mobility22 who identifies with lower status and power groups such as Negroes, Jews, "the proletariat," "the weak and suffering. "
20 The difference between high and low scorers is shown statistically for each item by the Discriminatory Power and the item-total scale correlations; for the subscales it is shown by the subscale-subscale and the subscale-total scale correlations.
21 Various patterns of "high" and "low" ideology, as found in the interview material, will be considered later, in Chapter XIX.
22 The word "motivated" is used to distinguish this type of downward mobility-which is psychologically desired and sought-from a loss of status which is externally imposed by depression or economic failure (and in which the individual usually remains identified with the higher status group). Similarly, a person may want to rise in economic status primarily because of the desire for comfort, leisure, and so on; this is psychologically different from that upward mobility in which the desire for status and power, and identification with powerful groups, are primary motivating forces.
? THE STUDY OF ETHNOCENTRIC IDEOLOGY 147
An individual may, of course, be concerned with many groups which are neither ingroups nor outgroups for him. One may feel sympathetic towards Negroes or the Catholic Church without actually identifying with them. Conversely, one may be opposed to many groups in the sense of feeling a difference in interest or values, or merely of feeling that their aims and existence are irrelevant to him; but these are not outgroups if there is not the sense of contraidentification, of basic conflict, of mutual exclusiveness, of violation of primary values.
A primary characteristic of ethnocentric ideology is the generality of outgroup rejection. It is as if the ethnocentric individual feels threatened by most of the groups to which he does not have a sense of belonging; if he cannot identify, he must oppose; if a group is not "acceptable," it is "alien. " The ingroup-outgroup distinction thus becomes the basis for most of his social thinking, and people are categorized primarily according to the groups to which they belong. The outgroups are usually entirely subordinate (Negroes, Mexicans), or groups with relatively low status and power who
. are struggling to better their position in society. The major outgroups in America today appear to be Jews, Negroes, the lower socioeconomic class, labor unions, and political radicals, especially Communists. Other groups whose outgroup status varies somewhat are Catholics, artists, intellectuals; Oklahomans and Japanese (in the West); pacifists, Filipinos, Mexicans, homo- sexuals. Most other nations, especially the industrially backward, the social- istic, and those most different from the "Anglo-Saxon," tend to be considered outgroups. While there are probably considerable sectional, class, and indi- vidual differences regarding which groups are regarded as outgroups, it would appear that an individual who regards a few of these groups as out- groups will tend to reject most of them. An ethnocentric individual may have a particular dislike for one group, but he is likely nonetheless to have ethnocentric opinions and attitudes regarding many other groups.
Another general characteristic of ethnocentric ideology is the shifting of the outgroup among various levels of social organization. Once the social context for discussion has been set, ethnocentrists are likely to find an outgroup-ingroup distinction. Thus, in a context of international relations ethnocentrism takes the form of pseudopatriotism; "we" are the best people and the best country in the world, and we should either keep out of world affairs altogether (isolationism) or we should participate-but without losing our full sovereignty, power, and economic advantage (imperialism). And in either case we should have the biggest army and navy in the world, and atom bomb monopoly.
However, the superior American "we" breaks down when the context shifts to intranational affairs. In a religious context the ingroup-outgroup distinction may shift in various ways: religious-nonreligious, Christian- Jewish, Protestant-Catholic, among Protestant sects. Similar outgroup- ingroup distinctions can be found in various other phases of American life.
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It seems, then, that the individual who has a pseudopatriotic conception of America in relation to other nations actually regards most of America as an outgroup: various religions, non-whites, "the masses," too-educated people and too-uneducated people, criminals, radicals, and so on, tend largely to fall in the outgroup category. This is not to say that nonethnocentrists regard all these groups as ingroups; rather, the nonethnocentrist can take a supportive attitude without necessarily identifying, and he can be critical without a sense of alien-ness and of categorical difference.
The social world as most ethnocentrists see it is arranged like a series of concentric circles around a bull's-eye. Each circle represents an ingroup- outgroup distinction; each line serves as a barrier to exclude all outside groups from the center, and each group is in turn excluded by a slightly narrower one. A sample "map" illustrating the ever-narrowing ingroup would be the following: Whites, Americans, native-born Americans, Chris- tians, Protestants, Californians, my family, and finally-1.
The ethnocentric "need for an outgroup" prevents that identification with humanity as a whole which is found in anti-ethnocentrism. (This lack in identification is related to the ethnocentrists' inability to approach indi- viduals as individuals, and to their tendency to see and "prejudge" each individual only as a sample specimen of the reified group. Their experience of interpersonal relations involves, so to speak, the same stereotypy as their opinions regarding groups generally. ) The inability to identify with human- ity takes the political form of nationalism and cynicism about world govern- ment and permanent peace. It takes other forms, all based on ideas concerning the intrinsic evil (aggressiveness, laziness, power-seeking, etc. ) of human nature; the idea that this evil is unchangeable is rationalized by pseudo- scientific hereditarian theor~es of human nature. The evil, since it is un- changeable, must be attacked, stamped out, or segregated wherever it is found, lest it contaminate the good. The democratic alternative-humani- tarianism-is not a vague and abstract "love for everybody" but the ability to like and dislike, to value and oppose, individuals on the basis of concrete specific experience; it necessarily involves the elimination of the stereotypical ingroup-outgroup distinction and all that goes with it.
What is the content of ethnocentric ideology regarding outgroups? There are, of course, individual differences here, and the same individual has dif- ferent conceptions of, and attitudes toward, different outgroups. Neverthe- less, certain common trends seem to exist, and these are generally the same as those found in anti-Semitic ideology. Most essentially, outgroups are seen as threatening and power-seeking. Accusations against them tend to be moralistic and, often, mutually contradictory. One of the main characteris- tics of most outgroups is that they are objectively weaker than the groups whom they supposedly threaten. Sometimes this weakness is perceived by the ethnocentrist, but this does not seem to lessen his sense of being threat- ened. The conflict as he sees it is between an ingroup trying to maintain or
? THE STUDY OF ETHNOCENTRIC IDEOLOGY 149
recapture its justly superior position, and an outgroup, resentful of past hurts, trying to do to others what they have done to it. But the conflict is seen as permanent and unresolvable; the only alternatives are dominance and submission; justice requires dominance by the superior ingroup, and the subordinate group will always remain resentful and rebellious. Because he considers hierarchy and power conflict "natural" he has difficulty in grasping a conception of group relations in which power considerations are largely eliminated and in which no group can control the lives of other groups.
The moralistic accusations against outgroups are similar to those that were seen in the case of anti-Semitism; again we find stereotypy, an absence of theories-save simple hereditarian ones-to explain why groups are as they are, and a readiness to place all the blame for group conflict upon outgroups.
The general outlook just described must, it would seem, have to do pri- marily with psychological trends within the ethnocentrist rather than with the actual characteristics of the outgroups. For one thing, many people who have had bad experiences with members of minority groups-and most of
us have had unhappy experiences with members of most groups including ingroups-or who have heard derogatory remarks about these groups, do not have ethnocentric imagery and attitudes. It is not the experience as such that counts, but the way in which it is assimilated psychologically. Also, the prejudiced individual is prepared to reject groups with which,he has never had contact; his approach to a new and strange person or culture is not one
of curiosity, interest, and receptivity but rather one of doubt and rejection. ~ The feeling of difference is transformed into a sense of threat and an attitude
of hostility. The new group easily becomes an outgroup. The stereotypy, the illogicality, the large number of outgroups, the consistency of outgroup imagery-all these point to things in the psychological functioning of ethno- centrists which differentiate them from anti-ethnocentrists.
Ethnocentric ideology regarding ingroups shows similar trends, though often in an opposite direction, to that regarding outgroups. The ingroups are conceived of as superior in morality, ability, and general development; they ought also to be superior in power and status, and when their status is lowered or threatened the ethnocentrist tends to feel persecuted and victim- ized. Attempts by subordinate groups to improve their status are regarded as threats; he cannot imagine that they are struggling for equality and mutual interaction because he does not think in these terms. The ingroup is idealized and blindly submitted to. Obedience and loyalty are the first requirements of the ingroup member. What is called power-seeking and clannishness in the outgroup is transformed into moral righteousness, self-defense, and loyalty in the ingroup. In all other respects the ingroup is regarded as the opposite of the outgroup: clean, unaggressive, hard-working and ambitious, honest, disciplined, well-mannered. The same values, then, are applied to both ingroups and outgroups, and in the same stereotyped way.
The interaction of ingroups and outgroups, and indeed all social inter-
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action, is conceived in hierarchical and authoritarian terms. Groups as well as individuals must "find their level," and the greatest danger is that certain groups will attempt to rise above their natural position. The same concep- tions are applied to ingroup structure and functioning. As in the army, there should be a series of levels, and individuals on a given level should submit to those above and dominate those below. The conception of the ideal family situation for the child is similar: uncritical obedience to the father and elders, pressures directed unilaterally from above to below, inhi- bition of spontaneity and emphasis on conformity to externally imposed values.
We can now consider the ethnocentric solution to problems of group conflict. The ingroup must be kept pure and strong. The only methods of doing this are to liquidate the outgroups altogether, to keep them entirely subordinate, or to segregate them in such a way as to minimize contact with the ingroups. The first method represents politicalized ethnocentrism- fascisll'l. and the dissolution of democratic values. This method so obviously violates traditional American values of nonviolence, fairness, and equal op- portunity that it has found relatively little support in this country. The second and third methods are supported, however, by large numbers of ordinary citizens.
Attitudes that the main outgroups should be subordinated and segregated are characteristic of American ethnocentrism because, it would seem, they combine so well ethnocentric imagery and sense of threat on the one hand, and certain democratic values which still prevail even in ethnocentrists, on the other. The democratic values often prevent more drastic action, but they may also serve to permit discrimination and oppression behind a pseudo- democratic front.
From these considerations the following general statement emerges.
Ethnocentrism is based on a pervasive and rigid ingroup-outgroup distinc- tion; it involves stereotyped negative imagery and hostile attitudes regarding outgroups, stereotyped positive imagery and submissive attitudes regarding ingroups, and a hierarchical, authoritarian view of group interaction if! which ingroups are rightly dominant, outgroups subordinate.
? CHAPTER V
POLITICO-ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY AND GROUP MEMBERSHIPS IN RELATION TO ETHNOCENTRISM Daniel f. Levinson
A. INTRODUCTION
That political and economic forces play a vital role in the development of ethnocentrism, in both its institutional and individual psychological forms, is no longer questioned by social scientists or even by most laymen. In mod- ern industrial societies ethnocentric ideology has been utilized by a great variety of sociopolitical movements which can be broadly characterized as fascist, prefascist, reactionary, imperialistic, chauvinistic. It is not within the scope of the present research to investigate directly the social movements and structures-monopoly, the concentration of power and wealth, labor
. unions, changing government functions, the declining middle class, and so on-which are crucial for the elimination of ethnocentrism or for its further development in such forms as war and rigid socioeconomic stratification. We are concerned, however, with the ideologies of these social groupings, with the organization of ideologies in the individual, and with some of the factors responsible for these broad ideological patterns. 1
What patterns of politico-economic ideology a~~related to ethnocentric and anti-ethnocentric "group relations" ideology? jThere is good reason to believe that the "right-left" dimension politically'is correlated with ethno- centrism. Fascism, which represents the most extreme right-wing political and economic structure and ideology, is also the most virulent antidemocratic form of ethnocentrism. The emphasis in ethnocentrism on a static, rigid stratification of groups finds its politico-economic analogue in the fascist
1 Since the term "ideology" has acquired many negative connotations, particularly in the realm of political thought, we wish again to emphasize that this concept is used here in a purely descriptive sense: "ideology" refers to an "organized system of opinions, values, and attitudes. " Any body of social thought may, in this sense, be called an ideology, whether it is true or false, beneficial or harmful, democratic or undemocratic.
151
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corporate state. Conversely, left-wing, socialistic ideology stresses the elim- ination of economic classes (that is, of social stratification based on unequal distribution of economic power) as a condition for the complete removal of stratification and outgroup exploitation~
While fascist and socialist-communist (Marxist) ideologies represent the extreme right and left, respectively, with regard to political economy and group relations, neither point of view has as yet found much active, open support on the American political scene. The focus of the present study was, therefore, on liberalism and conservatism, the currently prevalent left- and right-wing political ideologies-with an eye, to be sure, on their potential polarization to the more extreme left and right.
There is considerable evidence suggesting a ps"ychological affinity between conservatism and ethnocentrism, liberalism and anti-ethnocentrism. In a preliminary study by Levinson and Sanford (7I) anti-Semitism correlated significantly with opposition to labor unions and socialistic institutions (socialized medicine, government ownership of utilities, etc. ). Also, Repub- licans were, on the average, more anti-Semitic than Democrats. The re- searches of Newcomb (91), Lenz (67, 68), Murphy and Likert (84), Ed- wards, Stagner, and others (63) have yielded similar results. Unpublished data from the present study indicate that both conservatism and ethnocen- trism are significantly correlated with support of the un-American Activities Committee, Hearst, the American Legion, and militarization (postwar in-
creases in our army and navy).
The right-left dimension (reactionary-fascist, conservative, liberal, social-
ist-communist) is, of course, an extremely complex one. Crucial qualitative. differences can be found not only among various degrees of left-ness or right-ness, but also among various ideological camps falling at approximately the same point on the right or left. Furthermore, there exists today a great deal of ideological heterodoxy, not to speak of simple confusion, so that a cutting across of formal political categories may be expected in many individuals.
Despite these complicating factors an attempt was made, by means of an opinion-attitude scale similar to those discussed previously, to measure politico-economic ideology along a liberalism-conservatism dimension. We shall be concerned, in the sections which follow, with the construction of this scale and the results obtained; with the relation of ethnocentric ideology to politico-economic ideology, and with the relation of ethnocentrism to membership in various political and economic groupings. In addition to these quantified group results, systematic but nonquantified observations on the political views of ethnocentric and nonethnocentric subjects, as expressed in the interviews, will be presented later (Chapter XVII).
? POLITICO-ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY AND GROUP MEMBERSHIPS 153
B. CONSTRUCTION OF THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC CONSERV A TISM (PEC) SCALE
Quantitative study began with the construction of a politico-economic conservatism (PEC) scale, on which a high score would represent extreme conservatism, a low score, extreme liberalism. The procedure followed was similar to that used in constructing the Anti-Semitism and Ethnocentrism scales (Chapters III, IV). The PEC scale differs from the others in having positive as well as negative items and in lacking formal subscales. The same method of scaling was used and similar rules of item formulation were fol- lowed. As in the case of the other scales, a preliminary analysis of major trends within this ideological area was made. This analysis was intended to provide the basis both for the formulation of widely inclusive scale items and for the interpretation of individual patterns of response.
1. SOME MAJOR TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM AND CONSERVATISl\12
No attempt was made, in the construction of the PEC scale, to cover all the forms in which conservatism and liberalism are currently expressed. The main focus was, rather, on some of the more underlying-and therefore more stable-ideological trends which appear to characterize conservatism and liberalism as contrasting approaches to politico-economic problems. While specific issues such as the OPA, rent control, Dumbarton Oaks, the TVA are always changing, most issues as they arise find liberals and conservatives taking opposing stands. The problem was to get behind the specific issues, to move, so to speak, from a purely political to a more psychological level, as a means of differentiating these two broad patterns of social thought.
Conservatism and liberalism appeared to differ markedly with regard to the following ideological trends. (These trends are conceived as interrelated and as separable only for the purposes of analysis; indeed, one principle of item formulation was that each item should, whenever possible, express more than one underlying trend. )
a. SuPPORT OF THE AMERICAN Status Quo. Perhaps the definitive com- ponent of conservatism is an attachment, on the surface at least, to "things as they are," to the prevailing social organization and ways. Related to the idea that "what is, is right," is a tendency to idealize existing authority and to regard the "American W ay" as working very well. Social problems tend either to be ignored or to be attributed to extraneous influences rather than to defects intrinsic in the existing social structure. One way of rationalizing
2 It is symptomatic of the present political situation that terms like "liberalism" and "con- servatism" are given numerous definitions and are used as shibboleths rather than as aids in description or analysis. We have therefore tried to make our meanings as explicit as possible.
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chronic problems is to make them "natural"; for example, "Depressions are like occasional headaches and stomach aches; it's natural for even the healthi- est society to have them once in a while" (Item 5). Or, as a prominent ultra- conservative radio commentator observed recently: "There is nothing wrong with our American system. It is as good as it ever was, but we must do all we can in the New Year to get rid of the charlatans, fakers and agitators who are responsible for so many problems. " It is clear from the other speeches of this commentator that his "charlatans" are for the most part leaders of the labor movement or of liberal political groupings-men who, in his eyes, threaten the existing order. The following scale item expresses a similar idea, namely, that personal maturity requires conformity and the overcoming of "rebellious" tendencies: "Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down" (Item 2 7).
To be "liberal," on the other hand, one must be able actively to criticize existing authority. The criticisms may take various forms, ranging from mild reforms (e. g. , extension of government controls over business) to com- plete overthrow of the status quo. As noted above, the scale attempts mainly to distinguish the political right and left rather than to identify the numerous varieties of left- and right-wing ideology.
b. REsiSTANCE To SociAL CHANGE. Another aspect of traditionalism is the tendency to oppose innovations or alterations of existing politico-economic forms. If things are basically good now, then any change is likely to be for the worse. Underlying resistance to change is sometimes expressed in the form of an emphasis on caution and an antipathy to being "extreme. " For example: "The best way to solve social problems is to stick close to the middle of the road, to move slowly and to avoid extremes" (Item r 5).
The opposition to change is often rationalized by an elaborate mythology of human nature according to which psychological man and capitalist social order are ideally suited to each other. According to this view, liberals are "utopian dreamers" who do not see man as he really is. Man is conceived as governed by economic self-interest and the profit motive.
"In general, full economic security is harmful; most men would not work if they didn't need the money for eating and living" (Item 6r). Major social problems such as war and depression are regarded primarily as expressions of human nature rather than as products of the existing social structure. The person who wants to change the social structure is, therefore, either an impractical ideal- ist or an agitator making trouble in order to gain his own selfish ends. In short, basic improvement of our politico-economic forms is not possible, man being what he is, and social change is therefore undesirable.
c. SuPPORT OF CoNSERVATIVE VALUEs. As in the other areas of ideology, values play a central role in organizing and giving meaning to the total pat- tern of politico-economic ideology. One of the primary value systems under- lying conservative ideology is concerned with practicality, ambition, and
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upward class mobility. Success tends to be measured in financial terms, and business is accorded very high prestige as an occupation. These values are reflected in the raising and indoctrination of children, who "should learn early in life the value of a dollar" (Item I). They are also expressed in the selection of men who represent models of success: "Whether one likes them or not, one has to admire men like Henry Ford or J. P. Morgan, who over- came all competition on the road to success" (Item 7I).
The values for practicality and rugged competitiveness stand in rather marked contrast to other, psychologically related, values for charity and community service. On the one hand, it is assumed that "most people get pretty much what they deserve" (Item 78), that ability will find its socio- economic rewards, and that those who end up on the low end of the social ladder-since they did not have what it takes-are hardly to be pitied. On the other hand, our religious tradition is one of charity and tolerance; if one cannot excuse the poor, one can at least soften their plight-with Christmas parties, Thanksgiving bazaars, orphanages, and the like. Industrialists like Carnegie and Rockefeller are examples of this combination of weekday toughness and Sunday charity, which Item 8 was intended to measure: "Every adult should find time or money for some worthy service organiza- tion (charity, medical aid, etc. ) as the best way of aiding his fellow man. "
From the "liberal" point of view charity is mainly a soothing of conscience and a means of maintaining an unjust state of affairs. The causes of poverty are seen, not in the innate stupidity of the poor, but in the politico-economic organization which, by virtue of its concentration of economic power, creates poverty as a symptom. And the answer is seen, not in ineffectual though often well-intentioned charity, but in the elimination of poverty through modification of its societal causes.
It would appear, then, that liberals tend to view social problems as symp- toms of the underlying social structure, while conservatives view them as results of individual incompetence or immorality. This difference is ex- pressed also in the evaluation of political candidates. Conservative politicians tend to base their election campaigns largely on qualities of personal character and moral standing. To be a good family man and a leading figure in the community are judged more important than to know social science or to understand the actual politico-economic problems of the community. A district attorney or a businessman has a great initial advantage over a college professor or a labor leader. In short, political problems tend to be seen in moral rather than sociological terms. Item 22 was intended to measure this trend. "A political candidate, to be worth voting for, must first and foremost have a good character, one that will fight inefficiency, graft and vice. " The liberal alternative is not to reject "good character," but to make it secondary, in political affairs, to the understanding of issues and the desire to do what is best for the most people.
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d. IDEAS REGARDING THE BALANCE oF PowER AMoNG BusiNEss, LABOR, AND GovERNMENT. This is the most technical and the most confused aspect of contemporary political thought. The confusion has multiple causes: the fact that most Americans are, politically, relatively uneducated and uninformed; the very technicality and abstractness of the basic issues involved; the fac- tionalism in both major political parties as well as in the minority left- and right-wing groups; American antipolitical, anti-intellectual tradition; and so on. The semantic confusion is especially great. Thus, "laissez-faire," orig- inally a characteristic of liberalism, is nowadays called "conservatism. " Because of this confusion, it is necessary to make explicit the conception of conservatism used here, and to contrast it with other viewpoints.
Conservatism is taken to mean traditional economic laissez-faire individual- ism, according to which our economic life is conceived in terms of the free (unregulated) competition of individual entrepreneurs. Business, accorded such great prestige by conservative values, is regarded as deserving great social power in relation to labor and government. Unions are regarded as threatening, power-seeking, interfering with the traditional functions of management, and promoting radical changes. Unions are likely to be ac- cepted only when their actual power is less than that of business: this means virtual elimination of the right to strike, of a voice in determining company policy, and of political functions-in short, of the possibility of changing to any significant degree the existing balance of politico-economic power. A lib- eral viewpoint regarding unions is expressed in Item 68: "Labor unions should become stronger by being politically active and by publishing labor
newspapers to be read by the general public. "
Conservative ideology has traditionally urged that the economic func-
tions of government be minimized. Fear of government power (like union power) is emphasized, and great concern is expressed for the freedom of the individual, particularly the individual businessman. (The issue here is greatly complicated by the fact that our economy has changed from a large number of competing entrepreneurs to a small number of powerful eco- nomic units; more about this will be said in Subsection 5. ) For example, "It is a fundamental American tradition that the individual must remain free of government interference, free to make money and spend it as he likes" (Item 63). This way of thinking assumes that the individual has "freedom" economically to the extent that there are no government restrictions on him; it overlooks the fact that economic freedom for most people today is limited to the greatest degree by economic forces originating in business monopoly. The attempt to minimize government functioning extends also to the sphere of social security, socialized medicine, and various other programs designed to help the "common man. "
There are numerous patterns of left-wing ideology regarding these issues. What characterizes the left and distinguishes it from the right is the desire
? POLITICO-ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY AND GROUP MEMBERSHIPS I 57
for a change, slight or great, in the balance of power. Support for slight change is exemplified by New Deal liberalism, which would increase the functions of government so as to reduce the power of business, increase the power of labor, and diminish somewhat the extreme class differences that now exist. The more extreme left-wing ("radical") ideologies support more basic changes in the politico-economic structure; their thesis is that capital- ism, no matter how it is modified by reforms, must necessarily produce social problems such as depression, war, and mass poverty. What they want is not merely controls on business, but nationalization of industry, planned pro- duction, and production for use rather than for profit. Only when the process of production is organized on a socialist basis, they argue, can there be true economic democracy, equality of management and labor, and a high na- tional standard of living.
This is not the place to consider in detail the differences among the various left-wing or the various right-wing ideologies. The PEC scale at- tempted to measure only a general right-left dimension (with the hope that the individual's pattern of response might reveal more precisely the nature of his liberalism or conservatism). It was intended that a high score should indicate a high degree of the above-mentioned trends: support of the status quo and particularly of business; support of conservative values; desire to maintain a balance of power in which business is dominant, labor subordinate, and the economic functions of government minimized; and resistance to social change. Conversely, a low score was intended to reflect support of trends common to most left-of-center viewpoints: opposition to the status quo; a tendency to think in sociological rather than moral-hereditarian terms; a tendency to identify with labor and the "common man" and to oppose the power of business; support for extension of the political and economic functions of government. Further differentiation of various lib- eral and conservative patterns can be attempted after the empirical findings have been presented.
2. THE INITIAL PEC SCALE (FORM 78)
The Form 78 PEC Scale is presented in Table I(V). Eleven of the I6 items took the "conservative" position, so that agreement was given a high score ( + 3 = 7 points, - 3 = I point); on the five "liberal" items the scor- ing was reversed. The items were, as can be seen from the numbering, dis- tributed randomly throughout the 78-item series. The questionnaire was ad- ministered in the spring of I945 to three groups at the University of Cali- fornia: Public Speaking Class Women (N = I4o) and Men (N = p), and Adult Extension Psychology Class Women (N = 40); and to a group of 63 Professional Women (teachers, nurses, social workers). 3
3 For a more detailed discussion of the groups and the sampling problems involved in Form 78 as well as in the later forms, see Chapter IV (Ethnocentrism).
? r.
5?
8. I 3? IS. 22. 2 7?
THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY TABLE I (V)
THE INITIAL PoLITico-EcoNoMIC CoNSERVATISM SCALE (FoRM 78)
A child should learn early in life the value of a dollar and the importance of ambition, efficiency, and determination.
Depressions are like occasional headaches and stomach aches; it's natural for even the healthiest society to have them once in awhile.
Every adult should find time or money for some worthy service organization (charity, medical aid, etc. ) as the best way of aiding his fellow man.
The businessman, the manufacturer, the practical man-these are of much greater value to society than the intellectual, the artist, the theorist.
The best way to solve social problems is to stick close to the middle of the road, to move slowly and to avoid extremes.
A political candidate, to be worth voting for, must first and foremost have a good character, one that will fight inefficiency, graft, and vice.
Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought
to get over them and settle down.
36. " It is the responsibility of the entire society, through its government, to guar-
antee everyone adequate housing, income, and leisure.
44? " The only way to provide adequate medical care for the entire population is
through some program of socialized medicine.
52. " It is essential after the war to maintain or increase the income taxes on cor-
porations and wealthy individuals.
6I. In general, full economic security is harmful; most men wouldn't work if
they didn't need the money for eating and living.
63. It is a fundamental American tradition that the individual must remain free
of government interference, free to make money and spend it as he likes.
68. " Labor unions should become stronger by being politically active and by pub-
lishing labor newspapers to be read by the general public.
7I. Whether one likes them or not, one has to admire men like Henry Ford or
]. P. Morgan, who overcame all competition on the road to success.
76. " The government must play an even greater part in the economic and business
life of the nation after the war than it has before.
78. Character, honesty, and ability will tell in the long run; most people get
pretty much what they deserve.
a These five items are "liberal," the others are "conservative. " A high score is given for agreement with the conservative items, disagreement with the liberal items.
The reliability data for the PEC scale are given in Table 2 (V). The aver- age reliability of ? 73 is considerably lower than those of the Anti-Semitism and Ethnocentrism scales (. 8-. 9); while inadequate for the precise measure- ment of the individual, this reliability is sufficient for the present purposes of group comparison and correlation with other measures. There are prob- ably several major reasons for the relatively low reliability values. Several items may not have worked out as planned, because of either poor formula- tion or erroneous guiding hypotheses; this possibility is investigated in the item analysis below. It is also possible that the absence of extreme scorers is due in part to a real constriction in the "range of talent"-something that would tend to lower the obtained reliability-rather than to the intrinsic un-
reliability of the scale. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the
? POLITICO-ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY AND GROUP MEMBERSHIPS 159
TABLE 2 (V)
RELIABILITY OF THE PEC SCAlE (FORM 78)
Property A B c D Over-allb
Reliability . 74
Mean (total) 4. 30 Mean (odd half) 4. 39 Mean (even half) 4. 24
S. D. (total . 81
. 64
4. 18 4. 23 4. 12
. 75 . 88 . 84
2. 3-6. 0
. 72
4. 29 4. 34 4. 26
. 83 . 86 . 96
1. 6-5. 6
. 81
3. 91 3. 96 3. 85
1. 10 1. 28 1. 09
1. 5-6. 4
. 73
4. 17 4. 23 4. 11
. 87 1. 00 . 94
1. 5-6. 4
S. D. (odd half) S. D. (even half)
Range
. 96 . 86
1. 5-5. 9
aThe four groups are:
Group A: U. C. Public Speaking Class Women (N = 140) Group B: U. C. Public Speaking Class Men (N =52)
Group C: U. C. Extension Psychology Class Women (N =40) Group D: Professional Women (N = 63)
brn obtaining the over-all means, the individual group means were not weighted by N.
Professional _Women, probably the most heterogeneous of the four groups, had the highest reliability (. 81) as well as the largest Standard Deviation and range. Finally, and most basic, is the likelihood that American political think:. ing shows an actual lack of consistency and pattern. The lack of extreme scorers may thus reflect an ideological reality, namely the absence of a well- developed and articulate political left and political right in contemporary America. T o the extent that this is true, it is doubtful that any scale, measur- ing diverse trends in politico-economic ideology could obtain an average reliability of much over . So.
It is interesting that for all groups the PEC means were almost a point higher than the A-S and E means, and that once again the Professional Women were significantly lower than the others. Thus, while the rank order of conservatism is similar to that of ethnocentrism, the general level of con- servatism is considerably higher. People are, so to speak, more conservative than ethnocentric, at least as measured by these scales. The relation of con- servatism to ethnocentrism will be considered more fully below (Section C).
An item analysis was made according to the procedure described in Chap- ter III. Table 3(V) presents the item means and Discriminatory Powers for the Form 78 PEC scale. The average D. P. of 2. 14 is, like the reliability, lower than the corresponding values obtained from the previous scales. The low
? No.
1. 5. 8.
13. 15. 22. 27. 36. 44.
It is interesting that both subjects show inconsistency in the case of Item 54? Although this statement was intended to be strongly ethnocentric, the prejudiced subject disagrees with it while the unprejudiced subject agrees. This is in keeping with the fact that the item has one of the lowest D. P. 's of any in the scale. The reason might well be that some low scorers interpret the statement not in a cynical, antihuman way, imputing the incapability to
? THE STUDY OF ETHNOCENTRIC IDEOLOGY 145
outgroups (the high scorers show clearly, in their responses to other E items, who they think are the incapable people), but rather in the sense that there are too many people in all groups who have not, because of social conditions, developed sufficiently. This explanation probably holds for Larry.
F. CONCLUSIONS: THE STRUCTURE OF ETHNOCENTRIC IDEOLOGY
On the basis of the various scale results presented above and of supporting evidence from interviews, we can now attempt to formulate a more detailed theory of ethnocentric ideology. Such a theory should indicate the generality of the ethnocentric frame of mind, should permit various patterns of sur- face opinions and attitudes to be viewed as alternative expressions of the same underlying point of view, and should show how the ethnocentric ap- proach to groups and group relations differs from other approaches.
A word may first be said regarding the implications of the data presented above for such a theory. To what extent can ethnocentrism be considered a consistent, organized system of ideas? From the scale statistics the following points can be made. On an item-by-item basis most people are not entirely consistent in their agreement or disagreement with ethnocentric ideas. This is indicated by the correlations, about ? 4 on the average, between individual items. Also, inspection of the scale responses of individuals in the high and low quartiles shows that even extreme scorers vary somewhat around a generally ethnocentric or anti-ethnocentric position. Thus, to know that a person is ethnocentric in terms of total E-scale score permits only fair pre- diction of his stand on any single item in the scale (correlations between single items and total E scale averaging about . 6).
On the other hand, there is much greater consistency on a subscale-by- subscale basis. The high reliability of the initial E scale and of its relatively short subscales indicates that, whatever the item-by-item fluctuation, each subscale measures a rather consistent trend. Furthermore, the correlations among the initial Negro, Minorities, Patriotism, and Anti-Semitism scales indicate that these trends are closely related, that people are notably con- sistent in their acceptance or rejection of gene1"al ethnocentrism. To attempt to measure this ideology as a totality, however, is not to deny that it has components with respect to which individuals may vary. Indeed, the assump- tion that each trend is complex underlies the formulation of subscales and the attempt to make each subscale as complex and inclusive as possible.
A person is considered ethnocentric when his total score (average agree- ment with items) is high enough to indicate that he has accepted most of the ideas expressed in the scale. Whenever in the text a reference is made to "generality" or "consistency," it is always on a subscale or scale basis and with a recognition of item-by-item variability. And whenever there is a reference to any specific idea in ethnocentric ideology it is understood that
? THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY
most, though usually not all, ethnocentrists have this idea; that is to say,
each facet of ethnocentric ideology as heTe conceived is accepted by most high scorers, rejected by most low scorers. 20 Ethnocentric ideology is held in its entirety by only the most extreme high scorers on the E scale. The less extreme members of the high quartile have accepted most, though not all, of the ethnocentric ideas described below. It would be erroneous, then, to regard high scorers as "all alike"; they have in common a general way of thinking about groups, but there are wide individual differences in the im- agery and attitudes regarding various groups. Similar reasoning applies to the low scorers. 21
We may now return to a considet:ation of the preliminary definition of ethnocentrism as an ideology concerning ingroups and outgroups and their interaction.
The term "group~' is used in the widesf sense to mean any set of people who constitute a psychological entity for any individual. If we regard the individual's conception of the social world as a sort of map containing various differentiated regions, then each region can be considered a group. This sociopsychological definition includes sociological groups such as nations, classes, ethnic groups, political parties, and so on. But it also includes numbers- of-people who have one or more common characteristics but who are not formal groups in the sense of showing organization and regulation of ways. Thus, it is legitimate in a sociopsychological sense to consider as groups such sets of people as criminals, intellectuals, artists, politicians, eccentrics, and so on. Psychologically, they are groups in so far as they are social categories or regions in an individual's social outlook-objects of opinions, attitudes, affect, and striving.
"lngroup" and "outgroup" are sociopsychological rather than purely sociological concepts, since they refer to identification and, so to speak, contraidentification, rather than to formal membership in the group. A per- son may be identified with groups to which he does not formally belong. This is exemplified by the type of socially upward mobile person who is identified with groups of higher status and power (class, profession, political faction) than those to which he now belongs; also by the person with moti- vated downward mobility22 who identifies with lower status and power groups such as Negroes, Jews, "the proletariat," "the weak and suffering. "
20 The difference between high and low scorers is shown statistically for each item by the Discriminatory Power and the item-total scale correlations; for the subscales it is shown by the subscale-subscale and the subscale-total scale correlations.
21 Various patterns of "high" and "low" ideology, as found in the interview material, will be considered later, in Chapter XIX.
22 The word "motivated" is used to distinguish this type of downward mobility-which is psychologically desired and sought-from a loss of status which is externally imposed by depression or economic failure (and in which the individual usually remains identified with the higher status group). Similarly, a person may want to rise in economic status primarily because of the desire for comfort, leisure, and so on; this is psychologically different from that upward mobility in which the desire for status and power, and identification with powerful groups, are primary motivating forces.
? THE STUDY OF ETHNOCENTRIC IDEOLOGY 147
An individual may, of course, be concerned with many groups which are neither ingroups nor outgroups for him. One may feel sympathetic towards Negroes or the Catholic Church without actually identifying with them. Conversely, one may be opposed to many groups in the sense of feeling a difference in interest or values, or merely of feeling that their aims and existence are irrelevant to him; but these are not outgroups if there is not the sense of contraidentification, of basic conflict, of mutual exclusiveness, of violation of primary values.
A primary characteristic of ethnocentric ideology is the generality of outgroup rejection. It is as if the ethnocentric individual feels threatened by most of the groups to which he does not have a sense of belonging; if he cannot identify, he must oppose; if a group is not "acceptable," it is "alien. " The ingroup-outgroup distinction thus becomes the basis for most of his social thinking, and people are categorized primarily according to the groups to which they belong. The outgroups are usually entirely subordinate (Negroes, Mexicans), or groups with relatively low status and power who
. are struggling to better their position in society. The major outgroups in America today appear to be Jews, Negroes, the lower socioeconomic class, labor unions, and political radicals, especially Communists. Other groups whose outgroup status varies somewhat are Catholics, artists, intellectuals; Oklahomans and Japanese (in the West); pacifists, Filipinos, Mexicans, homo- sexuals. Most other nations, especially the industrially backward, the social- istic, and those most different from the "Anglo-Saxon," tend to be considered outgroups. While there are probably considerable sectional, class, and indi- vidual differences regarding which groups are regarded as outgroups, it would appear that an individual who regards a few of these groups as out- groups will tend to reject most of them. An ethnocentric individual may have a particular dislike for one group, but he is likely nonetheless to have ethnocentric opinions and attitudes regarding many other groups.
Another general characteristic of ethnocentric ideology is the shifting of the outgroup among various levels of social organization. Once the social context for discussion has been set, ethnocentrists are likely to find an outgroup-ingroup distinction. Thus, in a context of international relations ethnocentrism takes the form of pseudopatriotism; "we" are the best people and the best country in the world, and we should either keep out of world affairs altogether (isolationism) or we should participate-but without losing our full sovereignty, power, and economic advantage (imperialism). And in either case we should have the biggest army and navy in the world, and atom bomb monopoly.
However, the superior American "we" breaks down when the context shifts to intranational affairs. In a religious context the ingroup-outgroup distinction may shift in various ways: religious-nonreligious, Christian- Jewish, Protestant-Catholic, among Protestant sects. Similar outgroup- ingroup distinctions can be found in various other phases of American life.
? THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY
It seems, then, that the individual who has a pseudopatriotic conception of America in relation to other nations actually regards most of America as an outgroup: various religions, non-whites, "the masses," too-educated people and too-uneducated people, criminals, radicals, and so on, tend largely to fall in the outgroup category. This is not to say that nonethnocentrists regard all these groups as ingroups; rather, the nonethnocentrist can take a supportive attitude without necessarily identifying, and he can be critical without a sense of alien-ness and of categorical difference.
The social world as most ethnocentrists see it is arranged like a series of concentric circles around a bull's-eye. Each circle represents an ingroup- outgroup distinction; each line serves as a barrier to exclude all outside groups from the center, and each group is in turn excluded by a slightly narrower one. A sample "map" illustrating the ever-narrowing ingroup would be the following: Whites, Americans, native-born Americans, Chris- tians, Protestants, Californians, my family, and finally-1.
The ethnocentric "need for an outgroup" prevents that identification with humanity as a whole which is found in anti-ethnocentrism. (This lack in identification is related to the ethnocentrists' inability to approach indi- viduals as individuals, and to their tendency to see and "prejudge" each individual only as a sample specimen of the reified group. Their experience of interpersonal relations involves, so to speak, the same stereotypy as their opinions regarding groups generally. ) The inability to identify with human- ity takes the political form of nationalism and cynicism about world govern- ment and permanent peace. It takes other forms, all based on ideas concerning the intrinsic evil (aggressiveness, laziness, power-seeking, etc. ) of human nature; the idea that this evil is unchangeable is rationalized by pseudo- scientific hereditarian theor~es of human nature. The evil, since it is un- changeable, must be attacked, stamped out, or segregated wherever it is found, lest it contaminate the good. The democratic alternative-humani- tarianism-is not a vague and abstract "love for everybody" but the ability to like and dislike, to value and oppose, individuals on the basis of concrete specific experience; it necessarily involves the elimination of the stereotypical ingroup-outgroup distinction and all that goes with it.
What is the content of ethnocentric ideology regarding outgroups? There are, of course, individual differences here, and the same individual has dif- ferent conceptions of, and attitudes toward, different outgroups. Neverthe- less, certain common trends seem to exist, and these are generally the same as those found in anti-Semitic ideology. Most essentially, outgroups are seen as threatening and power-seeking. Accusations against them tend to be moralistic and, often, mutually contradictory. One of the main characteris- tics of most outgroups is that they are objectively weaker than the groups whom they supposedly threaten. Sometimes this weakness is perceived by the ethnocentrist, but this does not seem to lessen his sense of being threat- ened. The conflict as he sees it is between an ingroup trying to maintain or
? THE STUDY OF ETHNOCENTRIC IDEOLOGY 149
recapture its justly superior position, and an outgroup, resentful of past hurts, trying to do to others what they have done to it. But the conflict is seen as permanent and unresolvable; the only alternatives are dominance and submission; justice requires dominance by the superior ingroup, and the subordinate group will always remain resentful and rebellious. Because he considers hierarchy and power conflict "natural" he has difficulty in grasping a conception of group relations in which power considerations are largely eliminated and in which no group can control the lives of other groups.
The moralistic accusations against outgroups are similar to those that were seen in the case of anti-Semitism; again we find stereotypy, an absence of theories-save simple hereditarian ones-to explain why groups are as they are, and a readiness to place all the blame for group conflict upon outgroups.
The general outlook just described must, it would seem, have to do pri- marily with psychological trends within the ethnocentrist rather than with the actual characteristics of the outgroups. For one thing, many people who have had bad experiences with members of minority groups-and most of
us have had unhappy experiences with members of most groups including ingroups-or who have heard derogatory remarks about these groups, do not have ethnocentric imagery and attitudes. It is not the experience as such that counts, but the way in which it is assimilated psychologically. Also, the prejudiced individual is prepared to reject groups with which,he has never had contact; his approach to a new and strange person or culture is not one
of curiosity, interest, and receptivity but rather one of doubt and rejection. ~ The feeling of difference is transformed into a sense of threat and an attitude
of hostility. The new group easily becomes an outgroup. The stereotypy, the illogicality, the large number of outgroups, the consistency of outgroup imagery-all these point to things in the psychological functioning of ethno- centrists which differentiate them from anti-ethnocentrists.
Ethnocentric ideology regarding ingroups shows similar trends, though often in an opposite direction, to that regarding outgroups. The ingroups are conceived of as superior in morality, ability, and general development; they ought also to be superior in power and status, and when their status is lowered or threatened the ethnocentrist tends to feel persecuted and victim- ized. Attempts by subordinate groups to improve their status are regarded as threats; he cannot imagine that they are struggling for equality and mutual interaction because he does not think in these terms. The ingroup is idealized and blindly submitted to. Obedience and loyalty are the first requirements of the ingroup member. What is called power-seeking and clannishness in the outgroup is transformed into moral righteousness, self-defense, and loyalty in the ingroup. In all other respects the ingroup is regarded as the opposite of the outgroup: clean, unaggressive, hard-working and ambitious, honest, disciplined, well-mannered. The same values, then, are applied to both ingroups and outgroups, and in the same stereotyped way.
The interaction of ingroups and outgroups, and indeed all social inter-
? THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY
action, is conceived in hierarchical and authoritarian terms. Groups as well as individuals must "find their level," and the greatest danger is that certain groups will attempt to rise above their natural position. The same concep- tions are applied to ingroup structure and functioning. As in the army, there should be a series of levels, and individuals on a given level should submit to those above and dominate those below. The conception of the ideal family situation for the child is similar: uncritical obedience to the father and elders, pressures directed unilaterally from above to below, inhi- bition of spontaneity and emphasis on conformity to externally imposed values.
We can now consider the ethnocentric solution to problems of group conflict. The ingroup must be kept pure and strong. The only methods of doing this are to liquidate the outgroups altogether, to keep them entirely subordinate, or to segregate them in such a way as to minimize contact with the ingroups. The first method represents politicalized ethnocentrism- fascisll'l. and the dissolution of democratic values. This method so obviously violates traditional American values of nonviolence, fairness, and equal op- portunity that it has found relatively little support in this country. The second and third methods are supported, however, by large numbers of ordinary citizens.
Attitudes that the main outgroups should be subordinated and segregated are characteristic of American ethnocentrism because, it would seem, they combine so well ethnocentric imagery and sense of threat on the one hand, and certain democratic values which still prevail even in ethnocentrists, on the other. The democratic values often prevent more drastic action, but they may also serve to permit discrimination and oppression behind a pseudo- democratic front.
From these considerations the following general statement emerges.
Ethnocentrism is based on a pervasive and rigid ingroup-outgroup distinc- tion; it involves stereotyped negative imagery and hostile attitudes regarding outgroups, stereotyped positive imagery and submissive attitudes regarding ingroups, and a hierarchical, authoritarian view of group interaction if! which ingroups are rightly dominant, outgroups subordinate.
? CHAPTER V
POLITICO-ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY AND GROUP MEMBERSHIPS IN RELATION TO ETHNOCENTRISM Daniel f. Levinson
A. INTRODUCTION
That political and economic forces play a vital role in the development of ethnocentrism, in both its institutional and individual psychological forms, is no longer questioned by social scientists or even by most laymen. In mod- ern industrial societies ethnocentric ideology has been utilized by a great variety of sociopolitical movements which can be broadly characterized as fascist, prefascist, reactionary, imperialistic, chauvinistic. It is not within the scope of the present research to investigate directly the social movements and structures-monopoly, the concentration of power and wealth, labor
. unions, changing government functions, the declining middle class, and so on-which are crucial for the elimination of ethnocentrism or for its further development in such forms as war and rigid socioeconomic stratification. We are concerned, however, with the ideologies of these social groupings, with the organization of ideologies in the individual, and with some of the factors responsible for these broad ideological patterns. 1
What patterns of politico-economic ideology a~~related to ethnocentric and anti-ethnocentric "group relations" ideology? jThere is good reason to believe that the "right-left" dimension politically'is correlated with ethno- centrism. Fascism, which represents the most extreme right-wing political and economic structure and ideology, is also the most virulent antidemocratic form of ethnocentrism. The emphasis in ethnocentrism on a static, rigid stratification of groups finds its politico-economic analogue in the fascist
1 Since the term "ideology" has acquired many negative connotations, particularly in the realm of political thought, we wish again to emphasize that this concept is used here in a purely descriptive sense: "ideology" refers to an "organized system of opinions, values, and attitudes. " Any body of social thought may, in this sense, be called an ideology, whether it is true or false, beneficial or harmful, democratic or undemocratic.
151
? THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY
corporate state. Conversely, left-wing, socialistic ideology stresses the elim- ination of economic classes (that is, of social stratification based on unequal distribution of economic power) as a condition for the complete removal of stratification and outgroup exploitation~
While fascist and socialist-communist (Marxist) ideologies represent the extreme right and left, respectively, with regard to political economy and group relations, neither point of view has as yet found much active, open support on the American political scene. The focus of the present study was, therefore, on liberalism and conservatism, the currently prevalent left- and right-wing political ideologies-with an eye, to be sure, on their potential polarization to the more extreme left and right.
There is considerable evidence suggesting a ps"ychological affinity between conservatism and ethnocentrism, liberalism and anti-ethnocentrism. In a preliminary study by Levinson and Sanford (7I) anti-Semitism correlated significantly with opposition to labor unions and socialistic institutions (socialized medicine, government ownership of utilities, etc. ). Also, Repub- licans were, on the average, more anti-Semitic than Democrats. The re- searches of Newcomb (91), Lenz (67, 68), Murphy and Likert (84), Ed- wards, Stagner, and others (63) have yielded similar results. Unpublished data from the present study indicate that both conservatism and ethnocen- trism are significantly correlated with support of the un-American Activities Committee, Hearst, the American Legion, and militarization (postwar in-
creases in our army and navy).
The right-left dimension (reactionary-fascist, conservative, liberal, social-
ist-communist) is, of course, an extremely complex one. Crucial qualitative. differences can be found not only among various degrees of left-ness or right-ness, but also among various ideological camps falling at approximately the same point on the right or left. Furthermore, there exists today a great deal of ideological heterodoxy, not to speak of simple confusion, so that a cutting across of formal political categories may be expected in many individuals.
Despite these complicating factors an attempt was made, by means of an opinion-attitude scale similar to those discussed previously, to measure politico-economic ideology along a liberalism-conservatism dimension. We shall be concerned, in the sections which follow, with the construction of this scale and the results obtained; with the relation of ethnocentric ideology to politico-economic ideology, and with the relation of ethnocentrism to membership in various political and economic groupings. In addition to these quantified group results, systematic but nonquantified observations on the political views of ethnocentric and nonethnocentric subjects, as expressed in the interviews, will be presented later (Chapter XVII).
? POLITICO-ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY AND GROUP MEMBERSHIPS 153
B. CONSTRUCTION OF THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC CONSERV A TISM (PEC) SCALE
Quantitative study began with the construction of a politico-economic conservatism (PEC) scale, on which a high score would represent extreme conservatism, a low score, extreme liberalism. The procedure followed was similar to that used in constructing the Anti-Semitism and Ethnocentrism scales (Chapters III, IV). The PEC scale differs from the others in having positive as well as negative items and in lacking formal subscales. The same method of scaling was used and similar rules of item formulation were fol- lowed. As in the case of the other scales, a preliminary analysis of major trends within this ideological area was made. This analysis was intended to provide the basis both for the formulation of widely inclusive scale items and for the interpretation of individual patterns of response.
1. SOME MAJOR TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM AND CONSERVATISl\12
No attempt was made, in the construction of the PEC scale, to cover all the forms in which conservatism and liberalism are currently expressed. The main focus was, rather, on some of the more underlying-and therefore more stable-ideological trends which appear to characterize conservatism and liberalism as contrasting approaches to politico-economic problems. While specific issues such as the OPA, rent control, Dumbarton Oaks, the TVA are always changing, most issues as they arise find liberals and conservatives taking opposing stands. The problem was to get behind the specific issues, to move, so to speak, from a purely political to a more psychological level, as a means of differentiating these two broad patterns of social thought.
Conservatism and liberalism appeared to differ markedly with regard to the following ideological trends. (These trends are conceived as interrelated and as separable only for the purposes of analysis; indeed, one principle of item formulation was that each item should, whenever possible, express more than one underlying trend. )
a. SuPPORT OF THE AMERICAN Status Quo. Perhaps the definitive com- ponent of conservatism is an attachment, on the surface at least, to "things as they are," to the prevailing social organization and ways. Related to the idea that "what is, is right," is a tendency to idealize existing authority and to regard the "American W ay" as working very well. Social problems tend either to be ignored or to be attributed to extraneous influences rather than to defects intrinsic in the existing social structure. One way of rationalizing
2 It is symptomatic of the present political situation that terms like "liberalism" and "con- servatism" are given numerous definitions and are used as shibboleths rather than as aids in description or analysis. We have therefore tried to make our meanings as explicit as possible.
? I 54 THE AUTHORIT ARIAN PERSONALITY
chronic problems is to make them "natural"; for example, "Depressions are like occasional headaches and stomach aches; it's natural for even the healthi- est society to have them once in a while" (Item 5). Or, as a prominent ultra- conservative radio commentator observed recently: "There is nothing wrong with our American system. It is as good as it ever was, but we must do all we can in the New Year to get rid of the charlatans, fakers and agitators who are responsible for so many problems. " It is clear from the other speeches of this commentator that his "charlatans" are for the most part leaders of the labor movement or of liberal political groupings-men who, in his eyes, threaten the existing order. The following scale item expresses a similar idea, namely, that personal maturity requires conformity and the overcoming of "rebellious" tendencies: "Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down" (Item 2 7).
To be "liberal," on the other hand, one must be able actively to criticize existing authority. The criticisms may take various forms, ranging from mild reforms (e. g. , extension of government controls over business) to com- plete overthrow of the status quo. As noted above, the scale attempts mainly to distinguish the political right and left rather than to identify the numerous varieties of left- and right-wing ideology.
b. REsiSTANCE To SociAL CHANGE. Another aspect of traditionalism is the tendency to oppose innovations or alterations of existing politico-economic forms. If things are basically good now, then any change is likely to be for the worse. Underlying resistance to change is sometimes expressed in the form of an emphasis on caution and an antipathy to being "extreme. " For example: "The best way to solve social problems is to stick close to the middle of the road, to move slowly and to avoid extremes" (Item r 5).
The opposition to change is often rationalized by an elaborate mythology of human nature according to which psychological man and capitalist social order are ideally suited to each other. According to this view, liberals are "utopian dreamers" who do not see man as he really is. Man is conceived as governed by economic self-interest and the profit motive.
"In general, full economic security is harmful; most men would not work if they didn't need the money for eating and living" (Item 6r). Major social problems such as war and depression are regarded primarily as expressions of human nature rather than as products of the existing social structure. The person who wants to change the social structure is, therefore, either an impractical ideal- ist or an agitator making trouble in order to gain his own selfish ends. In short, basic improvement of our politico-economic forms is not possible, man being what he is, and social change is therefore undesirable.
c. SuPPORT OF CoNSERVATIVE VALUEs. As in the other areas of ideology, values play a central role in organizing and giving meaning to the total pat- tern of politico-economic ideology. One of the primary value systems under- lying conservative ideology is concerned with practicality, ambition, and
? POLITICO-ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY AND GROUP MEMBERSHIPS I 55
upward class mobility. Success tends to be measured in financial terms, and business is accorded very high prestige as an occupation. These values are reflected in the raising and indoctrination of children, who "should learn early in life the value of a dollar" (Item I). They are also expressed in the selection of men who represent models of success: "Whether one likes them or not, one has to admire men like Henry Ford or J. P. Morgan, who over- came all competition on the road to success" (Item 7I).
The values for practicality and rugged competitiveness stand in rather marked contrast to other, psychologically related, values for charity and community service. On the one hand, it is assumed that "most people get pretty much what they deserve" (Item 78), that ability will find its socio- economic rewards, and that those who end up on the low end of the social ladder-since they did not have what it takes-are hardly to be pitied. On the other hand, our religious tradition is one of charity and tolerance; if one cannot excuse the poor, one can at least soften their plight-with Christmas parties, Thanksgiving bazaars, orphanages, and the like. Industrialists like Carnegie and Rockefeller are examples of this combination of weekday toughness and Sunday charity, which Item 8 was intended to measure: "Every adult should find time or money for some worthy service organiza- tion (charity, medical aid, etc. ) as the best way of aiding his fellow man. "
From the "liberal" point of view charity is mainly a soothing of conscience and a means of maintaining an unjust state of affairs. The causes of poverty are seen, not in the innate stupidity of the poor, but in the politico-economic organization which, by virtue of its concentration of economic power, creates poverty as a symptom. And the answer is seen, not in ineffectual though often well-intentioned charity, but in the elimination of poverty through modification of its societal causes.
It would appear, then, that liberals tend to view social problems as symp- toms of the underlying social structure, while conservatives view them as results of individual incompetence or immorality. This difference is ex- pressed also in the evaluation of political candidates. Conservative politicians tend to base their election campaigns largely on qualities of personal character and moral standing. To be a good family man and a leading figure in the community are judged more important than to know social science or to understand the actual politico-economic problems of the community. A district attorney or a businessman has a great initial advantage over a college professor or a labor leader. In short, political problems tend to be seen in moral rather than sociological terms. Item 22 was intended to measure this trend. "A political candidate, to be worth voting for, must first and foremost have a good character, one that will fight inefficiency, graft and vice. " The liberal alternative is not to reject "good character," but to make it secondary, in political affairs, to the understanding of issues and the desire to do what is best for the most people.
? I 56 THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY
d. IDEAS REGARDING THE BALANCE oF PowER AMoNG BusiNEss, LABOR, AND GovERNMENT. This is the most technical and the most confused aspect of contemporary political thought. The confusion has multiple causes: the fact that most Americans are, politically, relatively uneducated and uninformed; the very technicality and abstractness of the basic issues involved; the fac- tionalism in both major political parties as well as in the minority left- and right-wing groups; American antipolitical, anti-intellectual tradition; and so on. The semantic confusion is especially great. Thus, "laissez-faire," orig- inally a characteristic of liberalism, is nowadays called "conservatism. " Because of this confusion, it is necessary to make explicit the conception of conservatism used here, and to contrast it with other viewpoints.
Conservatism is taken to mean traditional economic laissez-faire individual- ism, according to which our economic life is conceived in terms of the free (unregulated) competition of individual entrepreneurs. Business, accorded such great prestige by conservative values, is regarded as deserving great social power in relation to labor and government. Unions are regarded as threatening, power-seeking, interfering with the traditional functions of management, and promoting radical changes. Unions are likely to be ac- cepted only when their actual power is less than that of business: this means virtual elimination of the right to strike, of a voice in determining company policy, and of political functions-in short, of the possibility of changing to any significant degree the existing balance of politico-economic power. A lib- eral viewpoint regarding unions is expressed in Item 68: "Labor unions should become stronger by being politically active and by publishing labor
newspapers to be read by the general public. "
Conservative ideology has traditionally urged that the economic func-
tions of government be minimized. Fear of government power (like union power) is emphasized, and great concern is expressed for the freedom of the individual, particularly the individual businessman. (The issue here is greatly complicated by the fact that our economy has changed from a large number of competing entrepreneurs to a small number of powerful eco- nomic units; more about this will be said in Subsection 5. ) For example, "It is a fundamental American tradition that the individual must remain free of government interference, free to make money and spend it as he likes" (Item 63). This way of thinking assumes that the individual has "freedom" economically to the extent that there are no government restrictions on him; it overlooks the fact that economic freedom for most people today is limited to the greatest degree by economic forces originating in business monopoly. The attempt to minimize government functioning extends also to the sphere of social security, socialized medicine, and various other programs designed to help the "common man. "
There are numerous patterns of left-wing ideology regarding these issues. What characterizes the left and distinguishes it from the right is the desire
? POLITICO-ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY AND GROUP MEMBERSHIPS I 57
for a change, slight or great, in the balance of power. Support for slight change is exemplified by New Deal liberalism, which would increase the functions of government so as to reduce the power of business, increase the power of labor, and diminish somewhat the extreme class differences that now exist. The more extreme left-wing ("radical") ideologies support more basic changes in the politico-economic structure; their thesis is that capital- ism, no matter how it is modified by reforms, must necessarily produce social problems such as depression, war, and mass poverty. What they want is not merely controls on business, but nationalization of industry, planned pro- duction, and production for use rather than for profit. Only when the process of production is organized on a socialist basis, they argue, can there be true economic democracy, equality of management and labor, and a high na- tional standard of living.
This is not the place to consider in detail the differences among the various left-wing or the various right-wing ideologies. The PEC scale at- tempted to measure only a general right-left dimension (with the hope that the individual's pattern of response might reveal more precisely the nature of his liberalism or conservatism). It was intended that a high score should indicate a high degree of the above-mentioned trends: support of the status quo and particularly of business; support of conservative values; desire to maintain a balance of power in which business is dominant, labor subordinate, and the economic functions of government minimized; and resistance to social change. Conversely, a low score was intended to reflect support of trends common to most left-of-center viewpoints: opposition to the status quo; a tendency to think in sociological rather than moral-hereditarian terms; a tendency to identify with labor and the "common man" and to oppose the power of business; support for extension of the political and economic functions of government. Further differentiation of various lib- eral and conservative patterns can be attempted after the empirical findings have been presented.
2. THE INITIAL PEC SCALE (FORM 78)
The Form 78 PEC Scale is presented in Table I(V). Eleven of the I6 items took the "conservative" position, so that agreement was given a high score ( + 3 = 7 points, - 3 = I point); on the five "liberal" items the scor- ing was reversed. The items were, as can be seen from the numbering, dis- tributed randomly throughout the 78-item series. The questionnaire was ad- ministered in the spring of I945 to three groups at the University of Cali- fornia: Public Speaking Class Women (N = I4o) and Men (N = p), and Adult Extension Psychology Class Women (N = 40); and to a group of 63 Professional Women (teachers, nurses, social workers). 3
3 For a more detailed discussion of the groups and the sampling problems involved in Form 78 as well as in the later forms, see Chapter IV (Ethnocentrism).
? r.
5?
8. I 3? IS. 22. 2 7?
THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY TABLE I (V)
THE INITIAL PoLITico-EcoNoMIC CoNSERVATISM SCALE (FoRM 78)
A child should learn early in life the value of a dollar and the importance of ambition, efficiency, and determination.
Depressions are like occasional headaches and stomach aches; it's natural for even the healthiest society to have them once in awhile.
Every adult should find time or money for some worthy service organization (charity, medical aid, etc. ) as the best way of aiding his fellow man.
The businessman, the manufacturer, the practical man-these are of much greater value to society than the intellectual, the artist, the theorist.
The best way to solve social problems is to stick close to the middle of the road, to move slowly and to avoid extremes.
A political candidate, to be worth voting for, must first and foremost have a good character, one that will fight inefficiency, graft, and vice.
Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought
to get over them and settle down.
36. " It is the responsibility of the entire society, through its government, to guar-
antee everyone adequate housing, income, and leisure.
44? " The only way to provide adequate medical care for the entire population is
through some program of socialized medicine.
52. " It is essential after the war to maintain or increase the income taxes on cor-
porations and wealthy individuals.
6I. In general, full economic security is harmful; most men wouldn't work if
they didn't need the money for eating and living.
63. It is a fundamental American tradition that the individual must remain free
of government interference, free to make money and spend it as he likes.
68. " Labor unions should become stronger by being politically active and by pub-
lishing labor newspapers to be read by the general public.
7I. Whether one likes them or not, one has to admire men like Henry Ford or
]. P. Morgan, who overcame all competition on the road to success.
76. " The government must play an even greater part in the economic and business
life of the nation after the war than it has before.
78. Character, honesty, and ability will tell in the long run; most people get
pretty much what they deserve.
a These five items are "liberal," the others are "conservative. " A high score is given for agreement with the conservative items, disagreement with the liberal items.
The reliability data for the PEC scale are given in Table 2 (V). The aver- age reliability of ? 73 is considerably lower than those of the Anti-Semitism and Ethnocentrism scales (. 8-. 9); while inadequate for the precise measure- ment of the individual, this reliability is sufficient for the present purposes of group comparison and correlation with other measures. There are prob- ably several major reasons for the relatively low reliability values. Several items may not have worked out as planned, because of either poor formula- tion or erroneous guiding hypotheses; this possibility is investigated in the item analysis below. It is also possible that the absence of extreme scorers is due in part to a real constriction in the "range of talent"-something that would tend to lower the obtained reliability-rather than to the intrinsic un-
reliability of the scale. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the
? POLITICO-ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY AND GROUP MEMBERSHIPS 159
TABLE 2 (V)
RELIABILITY OF THE PEC SCAlE (FORM 78)
Property A B c D Over-allb
Reliability . 74
Mean (total) 4. 30 Mean (odd half) 4. 39 Mean (even half) 4. 24
S. D. (total . 81
. 64
4. 18 4. 23 4. 12
. 75 . 88 . 84
2. 3-6. 0
. 72
4. 29 4. 34 4. 26
. 83 . 86 . 96
1. 6-5. 6
. 81
3. 91 3. 96 3. 85
1. 10 1. 28 1. 09
1. 5-6. 4
. 73
4. 17 4. 23 4. 11
. 87 1. 00 . 94
1. 5-6. 4
S. D. (odd half) S. D. (even half)
Range
. 96 . 86
1. 5-5. 9
aThe four groups are:
Group A: U. C. Public Speaking Class Women (N = 140) Group B: U. C. Public Speaking Class Men (N =52)
Group C: U. C. Extension Psychology Class Women (N =40) Group D: Professional Women (N = 63)
brn obtaining the over-all means, the individual group means were not weighted by N.
Professional _Women, probably the most heterogeneous of the four groups, had the highest reliability (. 81) as well as the largest Standard Deviation and range. Finally, and most basic, is the likelihood that American political think:. ing shows an actual lack of consistency and pattern. The lack of extreme scorers may thus reflect an ideological reality, namely the absence of a well- developed and articulate political left and political right in contemporary America. T o the extent that this is true, it is doubtful that any scale, measur- ing diverse trends in politico-economic ideology could obtain an average reliability of much over . So.
It is interesting that for all groups the PEC means were almost a point higher than the A-S and E means, and that once again the Professional Women were significantly lower than the others. Thus, while the rank order of conservatism is similar to that of ethnocentrism, the general level of con- servatism is considerably higher. People are, so to speak, more conservative than ethnocentric, at least as measured by these scales. The relation of con- servatism to ethnocentrism will be considered more fully below (Section C).
An item analysis was made according to the procedure described in Chap- ter III. Table 3(V) presents the item means and Discriminatory Powers for the Form 78 PEC scale. The average D. P. of 2. 14 is, like the reliability, lower than the corresponding values obtained from the previous scales. The low
? No.
1. 5. 8.
13. 15. 22. 27. 36. 44.
