One should consider the entire stanza as a pada:
anityd vata samskdrd utpddavyayadharminah / utpadya hi nirudhyante tesdm vyupas'amah sukhah //
that can be explained in different ways:
a.
anityd vata samskdrd utpddavyayadharminah / utpadya hi nirudhyante tesdm vyupas'amah sukhah //
that can be explained in different ways:
a.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-1-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
6a).
"
280. Tibetan: gan ga len. The Qiinese transcriptions give Gaiijila; see the unsuccessful suicide attempts of Garigika, Avaddnafataka, 98.
281. The fact that the word tadyathd is lacking in the response of the Blessed One does not prove that this response should be understood literally.
282. Paramartha: "Further, there are the laksanas of the samskrtas . . . "
Hsiian-tsang: "The laksanas, are namely the arising, duration, change, and destruction of the
samskrtas. "
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 198a8 and following; Dharmottara's Abhidharmahrdaya, TD 28, p.
? 811bl7.
A provisional definition of samskrta has been given i. 7a-b.
283. But cannot one say that duration is a characteristic of an unconditioned thing? No. Characteristics are things in and of themselves (dravydntararupa) distinct from the dharmas characterized, which causes arising, duration, decline and the perishing of this same dharma. An unconditioned thing lasts but does not possess the characteristic "duration," see below p. 239 line
11.
284. This is Trilaksanasutra (see below p. 242 line 9). Samyuktdgama, TD 2, p. 85bl0; Anguttaray i. 152: tin'imdni bhikkhave samkhatassa samkhatalakkhandni /katamdni tint / uppddo panndyati vayo panndyati thitassa anndthattam panndyati. The Sanskrit redaction has: sthityanya- thdtva (Madhyamakavrtti, p. 145); Kathdvatthu, trans, p. 55: thitdnam anfldthatta.
On anyathdbhdva, Samyutta, ii. 274. The Abhidhamma only admits three characteristics: certain masters omit even sthiti (Kathdvatthuy trans. , note p. 374).
The four laksanas of the Vijnanavada, Bodhisattvabhumi, I, xvii. Para. 15. {Madhyamakavrtti^ p. 546).
285. The same comparison, with a different moral, Atthasdlini, 655. 286. Compare Burnouf, Introduction, p. 255.
287. The theory of the laksanas and anulaksanas is refuted by Nagarjuna, Madhyamaka, vii. l and following. See Madhyamakavrtti, p. 148, on the theory of the Sarhmltiyas who admit seven laksanas and seven anulaksanas: utpdda, utpddotpdda, etc.
288. Space is a pure negative, a pure absence of any matter susceptible of resistance. It cannot be analyzed {vipapyate, vibhidyate).
289. See note 293.
290. See the sources quoted in Madhyamakavrtti, 268, 5%.
291. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 73b23. pravdhagatd hi vedands tasya viditd evotpadyante /viditd avatisthante / viditd astam pariksayam parydddnam gacchanti /na ksanagatdh ksanasya durava- dharatvdt (Vydkhyd).
Tibetan: The kulaputra Nanda (Comp. Angutiara, iv. 166).
Compare Samyutta, vi. 180; Majjhima, iii. 25 (where the Blessed One says to Sariputra what he says here to Nanda): dhammd viditd uppajjanti viditd upatthahanti viditdabbhattham gacchanti.
292. Majjhima, iii. 25 contains the formula evam kila me dhammd ahutvd sambhonti which becomes the thesis of the Sautrantikas: abhutvdbhdva utpddah (p. 243 line 17), which we read in Milinda, p. 51: ahutvd sambhoti, and which is contradicted by the Sarvastivadins and by Milinda, p. 52: natthi keci samkhdrdye abhavantd jdyanti. Nagasena is a Vibhajyavadin, p. 50.
293. If one says, "It is by reason of its duration (sthitisadbhdvdt) that a dharma^ once arisen, does not perish for a moment; lacking duration, even this moment itself would not exist," such'isnot the case, for the moment exists by reason of the cause which produces it.
If one says, "It is duration which causes, which embraces (upagrhndti) a dharma engendered
by causes," we would ask, "If duration does not accomplish this task, what will happen? " "The
1 dharmawouldnotexist(dtmasattddharmasyanabhavet)! "Thensaythatdurationengenders,
not that it cause something to endure. "
If one says, "Duration causes the series to continue (avastbdpayati)" then the name of
duration should be reserved for its causes.
294. Smoke is momentary; when it "reproduces itself in a place higher than that which it first
Footnotes 349
? 350 Chapter Two
occupied, persons say that it rises (urdhvagamandkhydm labhate) and they conceive of the rising (urdhvagamanatvam) as distinct from the smoke (see iv. 2b).
295. If, grasping the unique self nature of a visible thing, I were to grasp it as being conditioned (samskrtam its) before knowing of its former non-existence, one could say that "conditioned" is a mark of a conditioned thing, that a conditioned thing is characterized by a conditioned thing {tenaive tal laksitam sydt). But such is not the case.
296. The Vaibhasikas are "followers of momentariness" (ksanikavddin): dharmas last only a moment and perish of themselves. See iv. 2b; Wassilief, p. 325. But the difficulty is: what does ksana mean?
297. Some other definitions, iii. 86a.
298. The Sarhmitlyas (see iv. 2c).
299. In the Introduction we have studied the different theories relative to impermanence
(anityatva) and momentariness (ksanikatva).
300. See above p. 245. A conditioned dharma is engenderd by its characteristic "arising. " "Arising" arises at the same time as the dharma which it engenders; being "future" it engenders it before arising itself.
301. Causes (hetu) and conditions (pratyaya) are defined ii. 49,61c.
302. The Vydkhyd quotes the response made by the Bhadanta Anantavarman to this objection: "The eye does not produce the visible consciousness without the coming together of clearness, etc. ; it is no less a cause of the visual consciousness. " Response: "We state that the blind do not see, that the non-blind do see: thus we state the efficacy of the eye. The same does not hold for arising. "
Anantavarman is quoted in the Vydkhyd ad ii. 71b-72, iii. 35d and vii. 32.
303. The nature of the mental states, sparsa, etc. is subtle and difficult to distinguish. Without doubt, reply the Sautrantikas, but the Blessed One explained the efficacy of spar/a, etc. : "All that which is vedand, samjnd, and samskdras, exists by reason of sparsa . . . ;" but he did not explain the efficacy of "arising. "
304. The idea of "color" has for its object specific characteristics (svalaksana) of the "color. " But the idea of "arisen," as "the color has arisen," does not bear on the color, since I have the same idea of arising when it refers to sensation: "sensation has arisen. " Thus the idea of "arisen" bears on the action produced by a certain dharma, independent of its color, its sensation, and its "arising. "
305. The Buddhists (baudhasiddhdnta) believe that sandalwood is only a certain collection of odors, etc. {gandhddisamuha). The Vaibhasikas believe that sandalwood exists in and of itself; this is why the author gives the example of the bust, an example admitted by the Vaibhasikas. See Madhyamakavrtti, p. 66; Sdmkhyapravacanabhdsya, p. 84, 148, etc.
306. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 198al5: Some maintain that the samsknalaksanas are not real things, namely the Darstantikas who say: "The samsknalaksanas are included within the viprayuk- tasamskdraskandha; the viprayuktasamskdraskandha is not real; thus the samsknalaksanas are not real. " In order to refute their" opinion . . .
307. Hsiian-tsang: "This theory is best. Why? "
308. Namely the Abhidharmasastras.
309. We have four proverbs which have the same meaning, that is, one should not renounce a
? thing in and of itself because of the defects that it presents, or because of the risks that it entails. a. Na hi bhiksukdh santiti sthdlyo nddhisriyante.
b. Na ca mfgdh santiti yavd (var. sdlayo) nopyante.
These two proverbs, which often go together, have been studies by Col. Jacob, in his Second
Handful of Popular Maxims (Bombay, Nirnayasagar, 1909, p. 42, index sub voc. na hi bhiksikdh), with the references which follow: Mahdbhdsya, i. 99, ii. 194, iii. 23 (Kielhorn), in the same context (nahidosdhsantitipraibhdsanakartavydlaksanamvdnapraneyam/ nahibhiksukdh. . . ); Vdcasapatimisra, Nydyavdrtikatdtparyatikd, pp. 62,441; BhamatI, p. 54; Sarvadarsanasamgraha, p. 3 of Cowell's translation. We should add the Kdmasutra (see Cat. Oxford, 216b), where the two proverbs are attributed to Vatsyayana (mentioned by Weber, Indische Studien, XIII, p. 326).
c. Ato'jirnabhaydn ndhdraparitydgo bhiksukabhaydn na sthMyd anadhisrayanam dosesu prativsdhdtavyam iti nydyah.
Col. Jacob quotes, for this third proverb, Pancapddikd, p. 63 (of which the final dosesu pratividhdtavyam is found in Vasubandhu), Jivanmuktiviveka, p. 8 (which attributes the proverb to Anandabodhacarya), and Hitopadesa, ii. 50, dosabhiter andrambhah . . .
d Na maksikdh patantiti modakd na bhaksyante.
A proverb for which we do not have any other references than Vasubandhu. It appears that the Buddhists, being bhiksus, have substituted mendicant (bhiksuka) and sthdli in the proverb, making it a proverb less biting than one containing flies and cakes.
310. Surendranath Dasgupta, in his Study ofPatanjali (Calcutta, 1920), give in brief (p. 192-201) the various theories concerning sphota.
311. The word Mmjfidkarana belongs to popular language (lokabhdsd); it is the equivalent of ndmadheya, name or appellation, for one says " 'Devadatta' is a samjfidkarana sound. " But here it means "That which makes an idea arise. " In fact samjnd is a mental dharma, "idea," "notion," or "concept" (i. l4c-d); ndman is what "creates" or engenders this dharma.
312. This does not refer to pada as a declined or conjugated form (Panini, i. 4. 14).
313.
One should consider the entire stanza as a pada:
anityd vata samskdrd utpddavyayadharminah / utpadya hi nirudhyante tesdm vyupas'amah sukhah //
that can be explained in different ways:
a. Thesis {pratijnd): "The samskdras are impermanent. " Argument (hetu): "because their
nature is to arise and to perish. " Example (drspdnta): "those things which, born, then die, are impermanent. "
b. The argument: "Their nature is to arise and to perish," is proven by the remark: "In fact, being born, they die. "
c. "The samskdras are impermanent, in other words, their nature is to be born and to perish;" "because, being born, they perish'" "being impermanent, they are suffering, thus the arresting of them is happiness:" this is what the Buddha intended to teach to his followers.
This is the stanza that Sakra uttered at the death of the Blessed One, Digha, TD 1, p. 26c21; Samyutta, i. 158; Dialogues, ii. 176; Jdtaka, 94; Madhyamakavrtti, p. 39; Manuscript Dutreuil de Rhins, /. As. 1898, ii. 300 (quoted in part, p. 108); Uddnavarga, 11; Mdo, 26, Anityatdsutra;]. Przyluski, Funerailles, p. 9.
314. A type of "nominal phrase. "
315. Ndman manifests (dyotaka) unique self characteristics (svalaksana)\ pada manifests the diverse relationships in which the thing whose self characteristic is known is to be found.
316. Compare Amarasirhha, iii. Nandrthavarga, 25.
317. That is to say: "given a voice, a word--a dharma disassociated from the mind--arises" (vdci
Footnotes 351
? 352 Chapter Two
satydm sa cittaviprayukta utpadyate).
318. This means that "a word--a dharma disassociated from the mind--arises with its vocal sound in the process of arising: the vocal sound manifests it with a view to designating an object" (ghosenotpadyamdnena sa cittaviprayukto dharma utpadyate / sa tarn prakdiayaty arthadyo- tanaya).
319. Samyuktdgama, TD 2, p. 266b9. Samyutta, i. 38: ndmasamni/ritd gdthd. Gdthd is a "phrase" (vdkya); it depends on words, since it exists when sounds have arisen. Consequently, wprd and phrase exist in and of themselves.
320. Mahavyutpatti, 245. 319, has the word krtdvadhi.
321. Panktivat, "like a line of ants;" but the different ants which form the line exist at the same
time; we shall give a new example, cittanupurvyavat, "like a succession of thoughts. "
322. The dharmas which are of the sphere of consciousness of the Tathagatas (tathdgata-
jfidnagocarapatita) are tarkagamya.
323. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 71c25-72a29.
324. Phonemes, etc. are not "voice" by their nature. Nothing prevents their existing in Arupyadhatu, but, as the voice is missing in this sphere of existence, they cannot be pronounced there. The Vaibhasikas: But how can you say that they exist where they are not pronounced?
325. The words that designate good dharmas are not themselves good, for when a person who has cut off the roots of good speaks of the good dharmas, he then possesses (prdpti) the words which designate these dharmas.
326. Hsiian-tsang corrects: The prdptis are of three types, ksanika (i. 38), outflowing, and retribution.
327. The Vydkhyd makes the following remarks: a. There is no difference between hetu and pratyaya- for the Blessed One said: dvau hetu dvau pratyayau samyagdrster utpdddya / katamau dvau / paratas ca ghoso'dhydtamam cayoniio manasikdrah. (Anguttara, i. 87: dve'me bhikkhave paccayd sammdditthiya uppdddya . . . parato ca ghoso yoniso ca manasikdro).
b. Hetu, pratyaya, niddna, karana, nimitta, linga, and upanisad are synonyms.
c. Why is a separate exposition of the hetus and the pratyayas given? Because the exposition of the hetus includes an examination of its cause as "non-obstructing cause," "mutual cause," "parallel cause," etc. (ii. 49); an exposition of the pratyayas includes an examination of its cause as hetu, immediately antecedent cause, etc. (ii. 62).
328. See Abhidharmahrdaya, TD 28, p. 811cl7.
329. In what Sutra are the six types of hetu taught? In fact the Abhidharma only explains, appreciates, and comments on the Sutra (sarvo hy abhidharmah siUrarthah sutranikasah sMravydkhydnam).
The Vaibhasikas say that the Sutra which treats of this point has disappeared (antarhita). The Ekottaragama enumerates the dharmas up to the categories of one hundred dharmas; it does not contain any more than ten categories up to ten (ddaiakdt) (See Introduction).
But there are some Sutras which characterize each type of hetu, and the Vydkhyd furnishes some examples borrowed, it would appear, from Samghabhadra (TD, 29, p. 79bl6).
(a) kdranahetu: "The visual consciousness arises by reason of the organ of the eye and visible things" (Samyutta, iv. 87, etc).
(b) sahabhuhetu: "These three parts of the path accompany (anuvart) Right Views. " "Contact is the coming together of the three; then there arises together sensation, ideas, and volition. "
? (c) sabhdgahetu: "This person (pudgala) is endowed with good dharmasy and with bad dharmas; his good dharmas may perish, his bad dharmas may develop, but an anusahagata root of good is not cut off (asti cdsydnusahagatam kusalamulam asamucchinnam), from whence there arises another root of good: this person, in the future, will become pure" (visuddhidharmd bhavisyatit cp. Aiiguttara, iii. 315).
In a similar context, Sarhyutta, iii. 131 (compare Kathdvatthu, p. 215) has anusahagata which tn
Samghabhadra here translates exactly (sui chU hsing ^fflrfr )l *s refers to a strong root of good, indentified (Samghabhadra, TD 29, p. 99bl9) with the purana-anu-dhatu (? ) (chiu sui chieh X H ^ ) of the school of the Sthaviras.
But the MSS of the Vydkhyd have anusahagata and we see that, in the Bhdsyam of iv. 79d, the Chinese translation of the Jtianaprasthana gives the exact equivalent: wei chil hsing jgfcfjlfx . In this passage anusahagata is the equivalent of mrdu-mrdu: "What are the roots of good termed anusahagata} Those which are abandoned last of all when the roots of good have been broken; those through the absence of which the roots of good are said to hav. e been broken. (We have seen above, p. 210, that, properly speaking, the roots of good are never broken off. )
(d) samprayuktakahetw. "Faith (sraddha) has Seeing (dariana) for its root, and is associated with avetyajndna (vi. 74): what this person knows (vijdndti), he penetrates to through prajnd (jrrajdndtt). "
(e) sarvatragahetw. "The bodily actions, the vocal actions, the volition, the resolution, and the samskdras which follow the actions of a person who has false views (mithyddrspi, v. 7), etc,--all these dharmas have for their consequence unhappiness and hideousness. Why? Because he has a transgressed (pdpikd) view, namely false views. " (Anguttara, v. 212).
(f) vipdkahetu: "He shall savor the retribution of action done here . . . "
330. Since the consciousness of the Truths has taken place, the causes of the defilements are not
completed, because the prdpti of the defilements is cut off by this consciousness.
331. Montaigne, iii. 9: The princes give me much, if they show me nothing; and it is good enough
for me if they do not do me ill
332. According to the text: dhdrasamudaydt kdyasya samudayah. Compare Samyutta, iii. 62. 333. All cause should be an effect: karane sati kdryena bhavitavyam.
334. The suffix vat in the sense of tadyathd.
335. One does not say that all the coexistent (sahabhu) dharmas are sahabhuhetu. For example, derived (bhautika) r&pa, blue, etc. , coexist with the primary elements: but it is not sahabhuhetu with them. (See p. 259-260).
336. See i. 24, ii. 22,65.
337. A conditioned dharma and its characteristics are sahabhuhetu among themselves; a dharma
is not sahabhuhetu with the characteristics of another dharma.
338. Vydkhyd: Vpasaihkhydnakaranam ca rnahds'dstratdpradars'andrtham sopasamkhydnam h
vydkaranddi mahasdstram dr/yate.
339. The first part of this paragraph is based on the Vydkhyd.
340. The ten reasons are not always joined together. For example, in the case of the neutral mind not destined to arise, its companions are companions for four reasons: (l)same time period, (2) same result (purusakdra)t (3) same nisyanda, and (4) same quality of being neutral.
341. Namely the undefiled-neutral (anivrtdvydkrta) mind after the second dhydna; vitarka, vicdra, the kusalamahdbhumikas are missing from it.
Footnotes 353
i
? 354 Chapter Two
342. The mind reigns (rdjayate) over its anulaksanas: these have no action (vydpdra) over the mind, as we have seen ii. 46.
343. The Japanese editor refers to the Prakarana, TD 26, p. 745a25. See below p. 265 and p. 273 where the same text is refered to.
The Prakarana examines the relationship between the Four Truths and the belief in a self {satkdyadrsti). The Vydkhyd gives the following extract:
A. There are Four Truths. Among the Truths, how many have satkdyadrsti for their cause without being a cause of satkdyadrsti; how many are a cause of satkdyadrsti without having satkdyadrsti for their cause; how many have satkdyadrsti for their cause and are at the same time are a cause of satkdyadrsti', and how many do not have satkdyadrsti for their cause and are not a cause of satkdyadrsti? Answer: Two Truths do not have satkdyadrsti for their cause and are not a cause of satkayddrsti, namely the Truth of Extinction and the Truth of the Path; one must distinguish the two other Truths.
B. The Truth of Suffering can (1) have satkdyadrsti for its cause without in turn being a cause of satkdyadrsti; (2) have satkdyadrsti for its cause and not be a cause of satkdyadrsti; and (3) not have satkdyadrsti for its cause and not be a cause of satkdyadrsti'. there are only three alternatives; the second (to be a cause of satkdyadrsti without having satkdyadrstti for its cause) is missing.
1. To have satkdyadrspi for its cause without being a cause of satkayadrspi are all the Truths of defiled Suffering (that is to say, all the dharmas which are suffering and which are klistd) with the exception of (a) the past and present defilements (anu/aya) which can be abandoned by the Seeing of Suffering, and by the Truth of Suffering associated with these defilements (for example the sensation associated with satkdyadrsti which is abandoned by the Seeing of Suffering); (b) the future Truths of Suffering which are associated with satkdyadrsti (see p. 265 line 22); and (c) the arising-old age-duration-impermanence of satkdyadrsti and of the dharmas associated with this belief {tatsamprayuktdnddm ca dharmdndm: these last words are omitted in certain recensions).
2. The Truth of Suffering which has been excluded in the preceeding paragraph has satkdyadrsti for its cause and is a cause of satkdyadrsti.
3. The Truth of undefiled Suffering, (that is, the dharmas which are suffering but which are good) do not have satkdyadrsti for their cause and are not a cause of satkdyadrsti.
The Chinese versions, TD 26, number 1541 (p. 673b20) and TD 26, number 1542 (p. 745a), correspond to the preceeding texts. Some omissions (the phrases: "To this question, it answers," iti prasne visarjanam karoti, and "There are only three alternatives; the second is missing," ttikotikam, dvitiyd kotir ndsti are missing). There are some sensible enough variations in the definition of the dharmas which have satkdyadrsti for their cause and which are a cause of satkdyadrsti: (a) past and present defilements which can be abandoned by the Seeing of Suffering, and the Truth of the Suffering associated with these defilements {TD 26, number 1542: and the Truth of Suffering associated, coexistent, etc. , with these defilements), (b) past and present universal {sarvatraga) defilements which can be abandoned by the Seeing of Arising, and the Truth of Suffering which is associated with it {TD 27, number 1542: associated causes, mutually coexistent causes, etc. ), and (c) future Truth of Suffering which is associated with satkdyadrsti and of the dharmas associated with it.
344. Where a mahdbhUta is found, the other mahdbhutas are found also, etc
245. 1 understand: "One moment {ksana) of the caksurindriya is a cause of simultaneous visual
consciousness. " 346. See ii. 59.
347. According to the samavisistayoh rule, ii. 52d. The four non-material skandhas are "best" or vihsta, whereas rupa is "less good," nyilna.
? 348. According Paramartha. Missing in Hsiian-tsang.
349. According to the opponent of the Vaibhasikas, the Prakarana teaches that future satkayadrsti and the dharmas which are associated with it are at one and the same time the effect and the cause of satkayadrsti. Now future satkayadrsti is neither a mutually coexistent cause (sahabhu), nor an associated cause (samprayuktaka), nor retribution {vipdka)\ the rest, excluding kdranahetu, are similar (sabhdga) and universal (sarvaga) causes.
For the Vaibhasikas, the Prakarana speaks here, not of future satkayadrsti, but of the dharmas (sensation, etc. ) associated with this satkayadrsti as coexistent and associated cause, and the effect of satkayadrsti is considered as coexistent and associated causes.
280. Tibetan: gan ga len. The Qiinese transcriptions give Gaiijila; see the unsuccessful suicide attempts of Garigika, Avaddnafataka, 98.
281. The fact that the word tadyathd is lacking in the response of the Blessed One does not prove that this response should be understood literally.
282. Paramartha: "Further, there are the laksanas of the samskrtas . . . "
Hsiian-tsang: "The laksanas, are namely the arising, duration, change, and destruction of the
samskrtas. "
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 198a8 and following; Dharmottara's Abhidharmahrdaya, TD 28, p.
? 811bl7.
A provisional definition of samskrta has been given i. 7a-b.
283. But cannot one say that duration is a characteristic of an unconditioned thing? No. Characteristics are things in and of themselves (dravydntararupa) distinct from the dharmas characterized, which causes arising, duration, decline and the perishing of this same dharma. An unconditioned thing lasts but does not possess the characteristic "duration," see below p. 239 line
11.
284. This is Trilaksanasutra (see below p. 242 line 9). Samyuktdgama, TD 2, p. 85bl0; Anguttaray i. 152: tin'imdni bhikkhave samkhatassa samkhatalakkhandni /katamdni tint / uppddo panndyati vayo panndyati thitassa anndthattam panndyati. The Sanskrit redaction has: sthityanya- thdtva (Madhyamakavrtti, p. 145); Kathdvatthu, trans, p. 55: thitdnam anfldthatta.
On anyathdbhdva, Samyutta, ii. 274. The Abhidhamma only admits three characteristics: certain masters omit even sthiti (Kathdvatthuy trans. , note p. 374).
The four laksanas of the Vijnanavada, Bodhisattvabhumi, I, xvii. Para. 15. {Madhyamakavrtti^ p. 546).
285. The same comparison, with a different moral, Atthasdlini, 655. 286. Compare Burnouf, Introduction, p. 255.
287. The theory of the laksanas and anulaksanas is refuted by Nagarjuna, Madhyamaka, vii. l and following. See Madhyamakavrtti, p. 148, on the theory of the Sarhmltiyas who admit seven laksanas and seven anulaksanas: utpdda, utpddotpdda, etc.
288. Space is a pure negative, a pure absence of any matter susceptible of resistance. It cannot be analyzed {vipapyate, vibhidyate).
289. See note 293.
290. See the sources quoted in Madhyamakavrtti, 268, 5%.
291. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 73b23. pravdhagatd hi vedands tasya viditd evotpadyante /viditd avatisthante / viditd astam pariksayam parydddnam gacchanti /na ksanagatdh ksanasya durava- dharatvdt (Vydkhyd).
Tibetan: The kulaputra Nanda (Comp. Angutiara, iv. 166).
Compare Samyutta, vi. 180; Majjhima, iii. 25 (where the Blessed One says to Sariputra what he says here to Nanda): dhammd viditd uppajjanti viditd upatthahanti viditdabbhattham gacchanti.
292. Majjhima, iii. 25 contains the formula evam kila me dhammd ahutvd sambhonti which becomes the thesis of the Sautrantikas: abhutvdbhdva utpddah (p. 243 line 17), which we read in Milinda, p. 51: ahutvd sambhoti, and which is contradicted by the Sarvastivadins and by Milinda, p. 52: natthi keci samkhdrdye abhavantd jdyanti. Nagasena is a Vibhajyavadin, p. 50.
293. If one says, "It is by reason of its duration (sthitisadbhdvdt) that a dharma^ once arisen, does not perish for a moment; lacking duration, even this moment itself would not exist," such'isnot the case, for the moment exists by reason of the cause which produces it.
If one says, "It is duration which causes, which embraces (upagrhndti) a dharma engendered
by causes," we would ask, "If duration does not accomplish this task, what will happen? " "The
1 dharmawouldnotexist(dtmasattddharmasyanabhavet)! "Thensaythatdurationengenders,
not that it cause something to endure. "
If one says, "Duration causes the series to continue (avastbdpayati)" then the name of
duration should be reserved for its causes.
294. Smoke is momentary; when it "reproduces itself in a place higher than that which it first
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occupied, persons say that it rises (urdhvagamandkhydm labhate) and they conceive of the rising (urdhvagamanatvam) as distinct from the smoke (see iv. 2b).
295. If, grasping the unique self nature of a visible thing, I were to grasp it as being conditioned (samskrtam its) before knowing of its former non-existence, one could say that "conditioned" is a mark of a conditioned thing, that a conditioned thing is characterized by a conditioned thing {tenaive tal laksitam sydt). But such is not the case.
296. The Vaibhasikas are "followers of momentariness" (ksanikavddin): dharmas last only a moment and perish of themselves. See iv. 2b; Wassilief, p. 325. But the difficulty is: what does ksana mean?
297. Some other definitions, iii. 86a.
298. The Sarhmitlyas (see iv. 2c).
299. In the Introduction we have studied the different theories relative to impermanence
(anityatva) and momentariness (ksanikatva).
300. See above p. 245. A conditioned dharma is engenderd by its characteristic "arising. " "Arising" arises at the same time as the dharma which it engenders; being "future" it engenders it before arising itself.
301. Causes (hetu) and conditions (pratyaya) are defined ii. 49,61c.
302. The Vydkhyd quotes the response made by the Bhadanta Anantavarman to this objection: "The eye does not produce the visible consciousness without the coming together of clearness, etc. ; it is no less a cause of the visual consciousness. " Response: "We state that the blind do not see, that the non-blind do see: thus we state the efficacy of the eye. The same does not hold for arising. "
Anantavarman is quoted in the Vydkhyd ad ii. 71b-72, iii. 35d and vii. 32.
303. The nature of the mental states, sparsa, etc. is subtle and difficult to distinguish. Without doubt, reply the Sautrantikas, but the Blessed One explained the efficacy of spar/a, etc. : "All that which is vedand, samjnd, and samskdras, exists by reason of sparsa . . . ;" but he did not explain the efficacy of "arising. "
304. The idea of "color" has for its object specific characteristics (svalaksana) of the "color. " But the idea of "arisen," as "the color has arisen," does not bear on the color, since I have the same idea of arising when it refers to sensation: "sensation has arisen. " Thus the idea of "arisen" bears on the action produced by a certain dharma, independent of its color, its sensation, and its "arising. "
305. The Buddhists (baudhasiddhdnta) believe that sandalwood is only a certain collection of odors, etc. {gandhddisamuha). The Vaibhasikas believe that sandalwood exists in and of itself; this is why the author gives the example of the bust, an example admitted by the Vaibhasikas. See Madhyamakavrtti, p. 66; Sdmkhyapravacanabhdsya, p. 84, 148, etc.
306. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 198al5: Some maintain that the samsknalaksanas are not real things, namely the Darstantikas who say: "The samsknalaksanas are included within the viprayuk- tasamskdraskandha; the viprayuktasamskdraskandha is not real; thus the samsknalaksanas are not real. " In order to refute their" opinion . . .
307. Hsiian-tsang: "This theory is best. Why? "
308. Namely the Abhidharmasastras.
309. We have four proverbs which have the same meaning, that is, one should not renounce a
? thing in and of itself because of the defects that it presents, or because of the risks that it entails. a. Na hi bhiksukdh santiti sthdlyo nddhisriyante.
b. Na ca mfgdh santiti yavd (var. sdlayo) nopyante.
These two proverbs, which often go together, have been studies by Col. Jacob, in his Second
Handful of Popular Maxims (Bombay, Nirnayasagar, 1909, p. 42, index sub voc. na hi bhiksikdh), with the references which follow: Mahdbhdsya, i. 99, ii. 194, iii. 23 (Kielhorn), in the same context (nahidosdhsantitipraibhdsanakartavydlaksanamvdnapraneyam/ nahibhiksukdh. . . ); Vdcasapatimisra, Nydyavdrtikatdtparyatikd, pp. 62,441; BhamatI, p. 54; Sarvadarsanasamgraha, p. 3 of Cowell's translation. We should add the Kdmasutra (see Cat. Oxford, 216b), where the two proverbs are attributed to Vatsyayana (mentioned by Weber, Indische Studien, XIII, p. 326).
c. Ato'jirnabhaydn ndhdraparitydgo bhiksukabhaydn na sthMyd anadhisrayanam dosesu prativsdhdtavyam iti nydyah.
Col. Jacob quotes, for this third proverb, Pancapddikd, p. 63 (of which the final dosesu pratividhdtavyam is found in Vasubandhu), Jivanmuktiviveka, p. 8 (which attributes the proverb to Anandabodhacarya), and Hitopadesa, ii. 50, dosabhiter andrambhah . . .
d Na maksikdh patantiti modakd na bhaksyante.
A proverb for which we do not have any other references than Vasubandhu. It appears that the Buddhists, being bhiksus, have substituted mendicant (bhiksuka) and sthdli in the proverb, making it a proverb less biting than one containing flies and cakes.
310. Surendranath Dasgupta, in his Study ofPatanjali (Calcutta, 1920), give in brief (p. 192-201) the various theories concerning sphota.
311. The word Mmjfidkarana belongs to popular language (lokabhdsd); it is the equivalent of ndmadheya, name or appellation, for one says " 'Devadatta' is a samjfidkarana sound. " But here it means "That which makes an idea arise. " In fact samjnd is a mental dharma, "idea," "notion," or "concept" (i. l4c-d); ndman is what "creates" or engenders this dharma.
312. This does not refer to pada as a declined or conjugated form (Panini, i. 4. 14).
313.
One should consider the entire stanza as a pada:
anityd vata samskdrd utpddavyayadharminah / utpadya hi nirudhyante tesdm vyupas'amah sukhah //
that can be explained in different ways:
a. Thesis {pratijnd): "The samskdras are impermanent. " Argument (hetu): "because their
nature is to arise and to perish. " Example (drspdnta): "those things which, born, then die, are impermanent. "
b. The argument: "Their nature is to arise and to perish," is proven by the remark: "In fact, being born, they die. "
c. "The samskdras are impermanent, in other words, their nature is to be born and to perish;" "because, being born, they perish'" "being impermanent, they are suffering, thus the arresting of them is happiness:" this is what the Buddha intended to teach to his followers.
This is the stanza that Sakra uttered at the death of the Blessed One, Digha, TD 1, p. 26c21; Samyutta, i. 158; Dialogues, ii. 176; Jdtaka, 94; Madhyamakavrtti, p. 39; Manuscript Dutreuil de Rhins, /. As. 1898, ii. 300 (quoted in part, p. 108); Uddnavarga, 11; Mdo, 26, Anityatdsutra;]. Przyluski, Funerailles, p. 9.
314. A type of "nominal phrase. "
315. Ndman manifests (dyotaka) unique self characteristics (svalaksana)\ pada manifests the diverse relationships in which the thing whose self characteristic is known is to be found.
316. Compare Amarasirhha, iii. Nandrthavarga, 25.
317. That is to say: "given a voice, a word--a dharma disassociated from the mind--arises" (vdci
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satydm sa cittaviprayukta utpadyate).
318. This means that "a word--a dharma disassociated from the mind--arises with its vocal sound in the process of arising: the vocal sound manifests it with a view to designating an object" (ghosenotpadyamdnena sa cittaviprayukto dharma utpadyate / sa tarn prakdiayaty arthadyo- tanaya).
319. Samyuktdgama, TD 2, p. 266b9. Samyutta, i. 38: ndmasamni/ritd gdthd. Gdthd is a "phrase" (vdkya); it depends on words, since it exists when sounds have arisen. Consequently, wprd and phrase exist in and of themselves.
320. Mahavyutpatti, 245. 319, has the word krtdvadhi.
321. Panktivat, "like a line of ants;" but the different ants which form the line exist at the same
time; we shall give a new example, cittanupurvyavat, "like a succession of thoughts. "
322. The dharmas which are of the sphere of consciousness of the Tathagatas (tathdgata-
jfidnagocarapatita) are tarkagamya.
323. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 71c25-72a29.
324. Phonemes, etc. are not "voice" by their nature. Nothing prevents their existing in Arupyadhatu, but, as the voice is missing in this sphere of existence, they cannot be pronounced there. The Vaibhasikas: But how can you say that they exist where they are not pronounced?
325. The words that designate good dharmas are not themselves good, for when a person who has cut off the roots of good speaks of the good dharmas, he then possesses (prdpti) the words which designate these dharmas.
326. Hsiian-tsang corrects: The prdptis are of three types, ksanika (i. 38), outflowing, and retribution.
327. The Vydkhyd makes the following remarks: a. There is no difference between hetu and pratyaya- for the Blessed One said: dvau hetu dvau pratyayau samyagdrster utpdddya / katamau dvau / paratas ca ghoso'dhydtamam cayoniio manasikdrah. (Anguttara, i. 87: dve'me bhikkhave paccayd sammdditthiya uppdddya . . . parato ca ghoso yoniso ca manasikdro).
b. Hetu, pratyaya, niddna, karana, nimitta, linga, and upanisad are synonyms.
c. Why is a separate exposition of the hetus and the pratyayas given? Because the exposition of the hetus includes an examination of its cause as "non-obstructing cause," "mutual cause," "parallel cause," etc. (ii. 49); an exposition of the pratyayas includes an examination of its cause as hetu, immediately antecedent cause, etc. (ii. 62).
328. See Abhidharmahrdaya, TD 28, p. 811cl7.
329. In what Sutra are the six types of hetu taught? In fact the Abhidharma only explains, appreciates, and comments on the Sutra (sarvo hy abhidharmah siUrarthah sutranikasah sMravydkhydnam).
The Vaibhasikas say that the Sutra which treats of this point has disappeared (antarhita). The Ekottaragama enumerates the dharmas up to the categories of one hundred dharmas; it does not contain any more than ten categories up to ten (ddaiakdt) (See Introduction).
But there are some Sutras which characterize each type of hetu, and the Vydkhyd furnishes some examples borrowed, it would appear, from Samghabhadra (TD, 29, p. 79bl6).
(a) kdranahetu: "The visual consciousness arises by reason of the organ of the eye and visible things" (Samyutta, iv. 87, etc).
(b) sahabhuhetu: "These three parts of the path accompany (anuvart) Right Views. " "Contact is the coming together of the three; then there arises together sensation, ideas, and volition. "
? (c) sabhdgahetu: "This person (pudgala) is endowed with good dharmasy and with bad dharmas; his good dharmas may perish, his bad dharmas may develop, but an anusahagata root of good is not cut off (asti cdsydnusahagatam kusalamulam asamucchinnam), from whence there arises another root of good: this person, in the future, will become pure" (visuddhidharmd bhavisyatit cp. Aiiguttara, iii. 315).
In a similar context, Sarhyutta, iii. 131 (compare Kathdvatthu, p. 215) has anusahagata which tn
Samghabhadra here translates exactly (sui chU hsing ^fflrfr )l *s refers to a strong root of good, indentified (Samghabhadra, TD 29, p. 99bl9) with the purana-anu-dhatu (? ) (chiu sui chieh X H ^ ) of the school of the Sthaviras.
But the MSS of the Vydkhyd have anusahagata and we see that, in the Bhdsyam of iv. 79d, the Chinese translation of the Jtianaprasthana gives the exact equivalent: wei chil hsing jgfcfjlfx . In this passage anusahagata is the equivalent of mrdu-mrdu: "What are the roots of good termed anusahagata} Those which are abandoned last of all when the roots of good have been broken; those through the absence of which the roots of good are said to hav. e been broken. (We have seen above, p. 210, that, properly speaking, the roots of good are never broken off. )
(d) samprayuktakahetw. "Faith (sraddha) has Seeing (dariana) for its root, and is associated with avetyajndna (vi. 74): what this person knows (vijdndti), he penetrates to through prajnd (jrrajdndtt). "
(e) sarvatragahetw. "The bodily actions, the vocal actions, the volition, the resolution, and the samskdras which follow the actions of a person who has false views (mithyddrspi, v. 7), etc,--all these dharmas have for their consequence unhappiness and hideousness. Why? Because he has a transgressed (pdpikd) view, namely false views. " (Anguttara, v. 212).
(f) vipdkahetu: "He shall savor the retribution of action done here . . . "
330. Since the consciousness of the Truths has taken place, the causes of the defilements are not
completed, because the prdpti of the defilements is cut off by this consciousness.
331. Montaigne, iii. 9: The princes give me much, if they show me nothing; and it is good enough
for me if they do not do me ill
332. According to the text: dhdrasamudaydt kdyasya samudayah. Compare Samyutta, iii. 62. 333. All cause should be an effect: karane sati kdryena bhavitavyam.
334. The suffix vat in the sense of tadyathd.
335. One does not say that all the coexistent (sahabhu) dharmas are sahabhuhetu. For example, derived (bhautika) r&pa, blue, etc. , coexist with the primary elements: but it is not sahabhuhetu with them. (See p. 259-260).
336. See i. 24, ii. 22,65.
337. A conditioned dharma and its characteristics are sahabhuhetu among themselves; a dharma
is not sahabhuhetu with the characteristics of another dharma.
338. Vydkhyd: Vpasaihkhydnakaranam ca rnahds'dstratdpradars'andrtham sopasamkhydnam h
vydkaranddi mahasdstram dr/yate.
339. The first part of this paragraph is based on the Vydkhyd.
340. The ten reasons are not always joined together. For example, in the case of the neutral mind not destined to arise, its companions are companions for four reasons: (l)same time period, (2) same result (purusakdra)t (3) same nisyanda, and (4) same quality of being neutral.
341. Namely the undefiled-neutral (anivrtdvydkrta) mind after the second dhydna; vitarka, vicdra, the kusalamahdbhumikas are missing from it.
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342. The mind reigns (rdjayate) over its anulaksanas: these have no action (vydpdra) over the mind, as we have seen ii. 46.
343. The Japanese editor refers to the Prakarana, TD 26, p. 745a25. See below p. 265 and p. 273 where the same text is refered to.
The Prakarana examines the relationship between the Four Truths and the belief in a self {satkdyadrsti). The Vydkhyd gives the following extract:
A. There are Four Truths. Among the Truths, how many have satkdyadrsti for their cause without being a cause of satkdyadrsti; how many are a cause of satkdyadrsti without having satkdyadrsti for their cause; how many have satkdyadrsti for their cause and are at the same time are a cause of satkdyadrsti', and how many do not have satkdyadrsti for their cause and are not a cause of satkdyadrsti? Answer: Two Truths do not have satkdyadrsti for their cause and are not a cause of satkayddrsti, namely the Truth of Extinction and the Truth of the Path; one must distinguish the two other Truths.
B. The Truth of Suffering can (1) have satkdyadrsti for its cause without in turn being a cause of satkdyadrsti; (2) have satkdyadrsti for its cause and not be a cause of satkdyadrsti; and (3) not have satkdyadrsti for its cause and not be a cause of satkdyadrsti'. there are only three alternatives; the second (to be a cause of satkdyadrsti without having satkdyadrstti for its cause) is missing.
1. To have satkdyadrspi for its cause without being a cause of satkayadrspi are all the Truths of defiled Suffering (that is to say, all the dharmas which are suffering and which are klistd) with the exception of (a) the past and present defilements (anu/aya) which can be abandoned by the Seeing of Suffering, and by the Truth of Suffering associated with these defilements (for example the sensation associated with satkdyadrsti which is abandoned by the Seeing of Suffering); (b) the future Truths of Suffering which are associated with satkdyadrsti (see p. 265 line 22); and (c) the arising-old age-duration-impermanence of satkdyadrsti and of the dharmas associated with this belief {tatsamprayuktdnddm ca dharmdndm: these last words are omitted in certain recensions).
2. The Truth of Suffering which has been excluded in the preceeding paragraph has satkdyadrsti for its cause and is a cause of satkdyadrsti.
3. The Truth of undefiled Suffering, (that is, the dharmas which are suffering but which are good) do not have satkdyadrsti for their cause and are not a cause of satkdyadrsti.
The Chinese versions, TD 26, number 1541 (p. 673b20) and TD 26, number 1542 (p. 745a), correspond to the preceeding texts. Some omissions (the phrases: "To this question, it answers," iti prasne visarjanam karoti, and "There are only three alternatives; the second is missing," ttikotikam, dvitiyd kotir ndsti are missing). There are some sensible enough variations in the definition of the dharmas which have satkdyadrsti for their cause and which are a cause of satkdyadrsti: (a) past and present defilements which can be abandoned by the Seeing of Suffering, and the Truth of the Suffering associated with these defilements {TD 26, number 1542: and the Truth of Suffering associated, coexistent, etc. , with these defilements), (b) past and present universal {sarvatraga) defilements which can be abandoned by the Seeing of Arising, and the Truth of Suffering which is associated with it {TD 27, number 1542: associated causes, mutually coexistent causes, etc. ), and (c) future Truth of Suffering which is associated with satkdyadrsti and of the dharmas associated with it.
344. Where a mahdbhUta is found, the other mahdbhutas are found also, etc
245. 1 understand: "One moment {ksana) of the caksurindriya is a cause of simultaneous visual
consciousness. " 346. See ii. 59.
347. According to the samavisistayoh rule, ii. 52d. The four non-material skandhas are "best" or vihsta, whereas rupa is "less good," nyilna.
? 348. According Paramartha. Missing in Hsiian-tsang.
349. According to the opponent of the Vaibhasikas, the Prakarana teaches that future satkayadrsti and the dharmas which are associated with it are at one and the same time the effect and the cause of satkayadrsti. Now future satkayadrsti is neither a mutually coexistent cause (sahabhu), nor an associated cause (samprayuktaka), nor retribution {vipdka)\ the rest, excluding kdranahetu, are similar (sabhdga) and universal (sarvaga) causes.
For the Vaibhasikas, the Prakarana speaks here, not of future satkayadrsti, but of the dharmas (sensation, etc. ) associated with this satkayadrsti as coexistent and associated cause, and the effect of satkayadrsti is considered as coexistent and associated causes.
