For Plotinus and the
other Platonists held that qualities and habits themselves were
susceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material and
so had a certain want of definiteness, on account of the infinity of
matter.
other Platonists held that qualities and habits themselves were
susceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material and
so had a certain want of definiteness, on account of the infinity of
matter.
Summa Theologica
And this
seems to have been the reasoning of Maximus, who in the same passage
adds: "For if this were the case, surely their essence would not remain
in itself, nor could it have been as far as possible deified of
itself. "
Objection 3: Further, habit is a disposition (Metaph. v, text. 25). But
disposition, as is said in the same book, is "the order of that which
has parts. " Since, therefore, angels are simple substances, it seems
that there are no dispositions and habits in them.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the angels are
of the first hierarchy are called: "Fire-bearers and Thrones and
Outpouring of Wisdom, by which is indicated the godlike nature of their
habits. "
I answer that, Some have thought that there are no habits in the
angels, and that whatever is said of them, is said essentially. Whence
Maximus, after the words which we have quoted, says: "Their
dispositions, and the powers which are in them, are essential, through
the absence of matter in them. " And Simplicius says the same in his
Commentary on the Predicaments: "Wisdom which is in the soul is its
habit: but that which is in the intellect, is its substance. For
everything divine is sufficient of itself, and exists in itself. "
Now this opinion contains some truth, and some error. For it is
manifest from what we have said ([1461]Q[49], A[4]) that only a being
in potentiality is the subject of habit. So the above-mentioned
commentators considered that angels are immaterial substances, and that
there is no material potentiality in them, and on that account,
excluded from them habit and any kind of accident. Yet since though
there is no material potentiality in angels, there is still some
potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to God alone),
therefore, as far as potentiality is found to be in them, so far may
habits be found in them. But because the potentiality of matter and the
potentiality of intellectual substance are not of the same kind.
Whence, Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments that:
"The habits of the intellectual substance are not like the habits here
below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial images which it
contains in itself. "
However, the angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with
regard to this habit. For the human intellect, being the lowest in the
intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all intelligible
things, just as primal matter is in respect of all sensible forms; and
therefore for the understanding of all things, it needs some habit. But
the angelic intellect is not as a pure potentiality in the order of
intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act (for this
belongs to God alone), but with an admixture of some potentiality: and
the higher it is, the less potentiality it has. And therefore, as we
said in the [1462]FP, Q[55], A[1], so far as it is in potentiality, so
far is it in need of habitual perfection by means of intelligible
species in regard to its proper operation: but so far as it is in act,
through its own essence it can understand some things, at least itself,
and other things according to the mode of its substance, as stated in
De Causis: and the more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it
understand.
But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are
infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order to attain to
God Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits,
being as it were in potentiality in regard to that Pure Act. Wherefore
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are "godlike," that
is to say, that by them they are made like to God.
But those habits that are dispositions to the natural being are not in
angels, since they are immaterial.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Maximus must be understood of
material habits and accidents.
Reply to Objection 2: As to that which belongs to angels by their
essence, they do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of
themselves, as not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness, therefore,
so far as they need to partake of something from without, so far do
they need to have habits.
Reply to Objection 3: In angels there are no essential parts: but there
are potential parts, in so far as their intellect is perfected by
several species, and in so far as their will has a relation to several
things.
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OF THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider the cause of habits: and firstly, as to their
formation; secondly, as to their increase; thirdly, as to their
diminution and corruption. Under the first head there are four points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether any habit is from nature?
(2) Whether any habit is caused by acts?
(3) Whether any habit can be caused by one act?
(4) Whether any habits are infused in man by God?
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Whether any habit is from nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is from nature. For the use of
those things which are from nature does not depend on the will. But
habit "is that which we use when we will," as the Commentator says on
De Anima iii. Therefore habit is not from nature.
Objection 2: Further, nature does not employ two where one is
sufficient. But the powers of the soul are from nature. If therefore
the habits of the powers were from nature, habit and power would be
one.
Objection 3: Further, nature does not fail in necessaries. But habits
are necessary in order to act well, as we have stated above
([1463]Q[49], A[4]). If therefore any habits were from nature, it seems
that nature would not fail to cause all necessary habits: but this is
clearly false. Therefore habits are not from nature.
On the contrary, In Ethic. vi, 6, among other habits, place is given to
understanding of first principles, which habit is from nature:
wherefore also first principles are said to be known naturally.
I answer that, One thing can be natural to another in two ways. First
in respect of the specific nature, as the faculty of laughing is
natural to man, and it is natural to fire to have an upward tendency.
Secondly, in respect of the individual nature, as it is natural to
Socrates or Plato to be prone to sickness or inclined to health, in
accordance with their respective temperaments. Again, in respect of
both natures, something may be called natural in two ways: first,
because it entirely is from the nature; secondly, because it is partly
from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle. For instance, when
a man is healed by himself, his health is entirely from nature; but
when a man is healed by means of medicine, health is partly from
nature, partly from an extrinsic principle.
Thus, then, if we speak of habit as a disposition of the subject in
relation to form or nature, it may be natural in either of the
foregoing ways. For there is a certain natural disposition demanded by
the human species, so that no man can be without it. And this
disposition is natural in respect of the specific nature. But since
such a disposition has a certain latitude, it happens that different
grades of this disposition are becoming to different men in respect of
the individual nature. And this disposition may be either entirely from
nature, or partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle,
as we have said of those who are healed by means of art.
But the habit which is a disposition to operation, and whose subject is
a power of the soul, as stated above (Q[50], A[2]), may be natural
whether in respect of the specific nature or in respect of the
individual nature: in respect of the specific nature, on the part of
the soul itself, which, since it is the form of the body, is the
specific principle; but in respect of the individual nature, on the
part of the body, which is the material principle. Yet in neither way
does it happen that there are natural habits in man, so that they be
entirely from nature. In the angels, indeed, this does happen, since
they have intelligible species naturally impressed on them, which
cannot be said of the human soul, as we have said in the [1464]FP,
Q[55], A[2]; [1465]FP, Q[84], A[3].
There are, therefore, in man certain natural habits, owing their
existence, partly to nature, and partly to some extrinsic principle: in
one way, indeed, in the apprehensive powers; in another way, in the
appetitive powers. For in the apprehensive powers there may be a
natural habit by way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific
nature, and in respect of the individual nature. This happens with
regard to the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself: thus the
understanding of first principles is called a natural habit. For it is
owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul that man, having once
grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at once perceive
that every whole is larger than its part: and in like manner with
regard to other such principles. Yet what is a whole, and what is a
part---this he cannot know except through the intelligible species
which he has received from phantasms: and for this reason, the
Philosopher at the end of the Posterior Analytics shows that knowledge
of principles comes to us from the senses.
But in respect of the individual nature, a habit of knowledge is
natural as to its beginning, in so far as one man, from the disposition
of his organs of sense, is more apt than another to understand well,
since we need the sensitive powers for the operation of the intellect.
In the appetitive powers, however, no habit is natural in its
beginning, on the part of the soul itself, as to the substance of the
habit; but only as to certain principles thereof, as, for instance, the
principles of common law are called the "nurseries of virtue. " The
reason of this is because the inclination to its proper objects, which
seems to be the beginning of a habit, does not belong to the habit, but
rather to the very nature of the powers.
But on the part of the body, in respect of the individual nature, there
are some appetitive habits by way of natural beginnings. For some are
disposed from their own bodily temperament to chastity or meekness or
such like.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection takes nature as divided against
reason and will; whereas reason itself and will belong to the nature of
man.
Reply to Objection 2: Something may be added even naturally to the
nature of a power, while it cannot belong to the power itself. For
instance, with regard to the angels, it cannot belong to the
intellective power itself capable of knowing all things: for thus it
would have to be the act of all things, which belongs to God alone.
Because that by which something is known, must needs be the actual
likeness of the thing known: whence it would follow, if the power of
the angel knew all things by itself, that it was the likeness and act
of all things. Wherefore there must needs be added to the angels'
intellective power, some intelligible species, which are likenesses of
things understood: for it is by participation of the Divine wisdom and
not by their own essence, that their intellect can be actually those
things which they understand. And so it is clear that not everything
belonging to a natural habit can belong to the power.
Reply to Objection 3: Nature is not equally inclined to cause all the
various kinds of habits: since some can be caused by nature, and some
not, as we have said above. And so it does not follow that because some
habits are natural, therefore all are natural.
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Whether any habit is caused by acts?
Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is caused by acts. For habit
is a quality, as we have said above ([1466]Q[49], A[1]). Now every
quality is caused in a subject, according to the latter's receptivity.
Since then the agent, inasmuch as it acts, does not receive but rather
gives: it seems impossible for a habit to be caused in an agent by its
own acts.
Objection 2: Further, the thing wherein a quality is caused is moved to
that quality, as may be clearly seen in that which is heated or cooled:
whereas that which produces the act that causes the quality, moves, as
may be seen in that which heats or cools. If therefore habits were
caused in anything by its own act, it would follow that the same would
be mover and moved, active and passive: which is impossible, as stated
in Physics iii, 8.
Objection 3: Further, the effect cannot be more noble than its cause.
But habit is more noble than the act which precedes the habit; as is
clear from the fact that the latter produces more noble acts. Therefore
habit cannot be caused by an act which precedes the habit.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1,2) teaches that habits
of virtue and vice are caused by acts.
I answer that, In the agent there is sometimes only the active
principle of its act: for instance in fire there is only the active
principle of heating. And in such an agent a habit cannot be caused by
its own act: for which reason natural things cannot become accustomed
or unaccustomed, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But a certain agent is
to be found, in which there is both the active and the passive
principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For the acts of the
appetitive power proceed from that same power according as it is moved
by the apprehensive power presenting the object: and further, the
intellective power, according as it reasons about conclusions, has, as
it were, an active principle in a self-evident proposition. Wherefore
by such acts habits can be caused in their agents; not indeed with
regard to the first active principle, but with regard to that principle
of the act, which principle is a mover moved. For everything that is
passive and moved by another, is disposed by the action of the agent;
wherefore if the acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed in the
power which is passive and moved, which quality is called a habit: just
as the habits of moral virtue are caused in the appetitive powers,
according as they are moved by the reason, and as the habits of science
are caused in the intellect, according as it is moved by first
propositions.
Reply to Objection 1: The agent, as agent, does not receive anything.
But in so far as it moves through being moved by another, it receives
something from that which moves it: and thus is a habit caused.
Reply to Objection 2: The same thing, and in the same respect, cannot
be mover and moved; but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by
itself as to different respects, as is proved in Physics viii, text.
28,29.
Reply to Objection 3: The act which precedes the habit, in so far as it
comes from an active principle, proceeds from a more excellent
principle than is the habit caused thereby: just as the reason is a
more excellent principle than the habit of moral virtue produced in the
appetitive power by repeated acts, and as the understanding of first
principles is a more excellent principle than the science of
conclusions.
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Whether a habit can be caused by one act?
Objection 1: It would seem that a habit can be caused by one act. For
demonstration is an act of reason. But science, which is the habit of
one conclusion, is caused by one demonstration. Therefore habit can be
caused by one act.
Objection 2: Further, as acts happen to increase by multiplication so
do they happen to increase by intensity. But a habit is caused by
multiplication of acts. Therefore also if an act be very intense, it
can be the generating cause of a habit.
Objection 3: Further, health and sickness are habits. But it happens
that a man is healed or becomes ill, by one act. Therefore one act can
cause a habit.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7): "As neither does one
swallow nor one day make spring: so neither does one day nor a short
time make a man blessed and happy. " But "happiness is an operation in
respect of a habit of perfect virtue" (Ethic. i, 7,10,13). Therefore a
habit of virtue, and for the same reason, other habits, is not caused
by one act.
I answer that, As we have said already [1467](A[2]), habit is caused by
act, because a passive power is moved by an active principle. But in
order that some quality be caused in that which is passive the active
principle must entirely overcome the passive. Whence we see that
because fire cannot at once overcome the combustible, it does not
enkindle at once; but it gradually expels contrary dispositions, so
that by overcoming it entirely, it may impress its likeness on it. Now
it is clear that the active principle which is reason, cannot entirely
overcome the appetitive power in one act: because the appetitive power
is inclined variously, and to many things; while the reason judges in a
single act, what should be willed in regard to various aspects and
circumstances. Wherefore the appetitive power is not thereby entirely
overcome, so as to be inclined like nature to the same thing, in the
majority of cases; which inclination belongs to the habit of virtue.
Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act, but only by
many.
But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two
passive principles: one is the "possible" [*See [1468]FP, Q[79], A[2]
ad 2] intellect itself; the other is the intellect which Aristotle (De
Anima iii, text. 20) calls "passive," and is the "particular reason,"
that is the cogitative power, with memory and imagination. With regard
then to the former passive principle, it is possible for a certain
active principle to entirely overcome, by one act, the power of its
passive principle: thus one self-evident proposition convinces the
intellect, so that it gives a firm assent to the conclusion, but a
probable proposition cannot do this. Wherefore a habit of opinion needs
to be caused by many acts of the reason, even on the part of the
"possible" intellect: whereas a habit of science can be caused by a
single act of the reason, so far as the "possible" intellect is
concerned. But with regard to the lower apprehensive powers, the same
acts need to be repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed
on the memory. And so the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. 1) that
"meditation strengthens memory. " Bodily habits, however, can be caused
by one act, if the active principle is of great power: sometimes, for
instance, a strong dose of medicine restores health at once.
Hence the solutions to the objections are clear.
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Whether any habits are infused in man by God?
Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is infused in man by God. For
God treats all equally. If therefore He infuses habits into some, He
would infuse them into all: which is clearly untrue.
Objection 2: Further, God works in all things according to the mode
which is suitable to their nature: for "it belongs to Divine providence
to preserve nature," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But habits are
naturally caused in man by acts, as we have said above [1469](A[2]).
Therefore God does not cause habits to be in man except by acts.
Objection 3: Further, if any habit be infused into man by God, man can
by that habit perform many acts. But "from those acts a like habit is
caused" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Consequently there will be two habits of the
same species in the same man, one acquired, the other infused. Now this
seems impossible: for the two forms of the same species cannot be in
the same subject. Therefore a habit is not infused into man by God.
On the contrary, it is written (Ecclus. 15:5): "God filled him with the
spirit of wisdom and understanding. " Now wisdom and understanding are
habits. Therefore some habits are infused into man by God.
I answer that, Some habits are infused by God into man, for two
reasons.
The first reason is because there are some habits by which man is
disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human nature,
namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man, as stated above
([1470]Q[5], A[5]). And since habits need to be in proportion with that
to which man is disposed by them, therefore is it necessary that those
habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the proportion of human
nature. Wherefore such habits can never be in man except by Divine
infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous virtues.
The other reason is, because God can produce the effects of second
causes, without these second causes, as we have said in the [1471]FP,
Q[105], A[6]. Just as, therefore, sometimes, in order to show His
power, He causes health, without its natural cause, but which nature
could have caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of His
power, He infuses into man even those habits which can be caused by a
natural power. Thus He gave to the apostles the science of the
Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by
custom, but not so perfectly.
Reply to Objection 1: God, in respect of His Nature, is the same to
all, but in respect of the order of His Wisdom, for some fixed motive,
gives certain things to some, which He does not give to others.
Reply to Objection 2: That God works in all according to their mode,
does not hinder God from doing what nature cannot do: but it follows
from this that He does nothing contrary to that which is suitable to
nature.
Reply to Objection 3: Acts produced by an infused habit, do not cause a
habit, but strengthen the already existing habit; just as the remedies
of medicine given to a man who is naturally health, do not cause a kind
of health, but give new strength to the health he had before.
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OF THE INCREASE OF HABITS (THREE ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the increase of habits; under which head there
are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether habits increase?
(2) Whether they increase by addition?
(3) Whether each act increases the habit?
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Whether habits increase?
Objection 1: It would seem that habits cannot increase. For increase
concerns quantity (Phys. v, text. 18). But habits are not in the genus
quantity, but in that of quality. Therefore there can be no increase of
habits.
Objection 2: Further, habit is a perfection (Phys. vii, text. 17,18).
But since perfection conveys a notion of end and term, it seems that it
cannot be more or less. Therefore a habit cannot increase.
Objection 3: Further, those things which can be more or less are
subject to alteration: for that which from being less hot becomes more
hot, is said to be altered. But in habits there is no alteration, as is
proved in Phys. vii, text. 15,17. Therefore habits cannot increase.
On the contrary, Faith is a habit, and yet it increases: wherefore the
disciples said to our Lord (Lk. 17:5): "Lord, increase our faith. "
Therefore habits increase.
I answer that, Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity, is
transferred from bodily quantities to intelligible spiritual things, on
account of the natural connection of the intellect with corporeal
things, which come under the imagination. Now in corporeal quantities,
a thing is said to be great, according as it reaches the perfection of
quantity due to it; wherefore a certain quantity is reputed great in
man, which is not reputed great in an elephant. And so also in forms,
we say a thing is great because it is perfect. And since good has the
nature of perfection, therefore "in things which are great, but not in
quantity, to be greater is the same as to be better," as Augustine says
(De Trin. vi, 8).
Now the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways: first, in
respect of the form itself: secondly, in respect of the participation
of the form by its subject. In so far as we consider the perfections of
a form in respect of the form itself, thus the form is said to be
"little" or "great": for instance great or little health or science.
But in so far as we consider the perfection of a form in respect of the
participation thereof by the subject, it is said to be "more" or
"less": for instance more or less white or healthy. Now this
distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form has a
being outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to
consider the form according to its specific nature, and another to
consider it in respect of its participation by a subject.
In this way, then, there were four opinions among philosophers
concerning intensity and remission of habits and forms, as Simplicius
relates in his Commentary on the Predicaments.
For Plotinus and the
other Platonists held that qualities and habits themselves were
susceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material and
so had a certain want of definiteness, on account of the infinity of
matter. Others, on the contrary, held that qualities and habits of
themselves were not susceptible of more or less; but that the things
affected by them [qualia] are said to be more or less, in respect of
the participation of the subject: that, for instance, justice is not
more or less, but the just thing. Aristotle alludes to this opinion in
the Predicaments (Categor. vi). The third opinion was that of the
Stoics, and lies between the two preceding opinions. For they held that
some habits are of themselves susceptible of more and less, for
instance, the arts; and that some are not, as the virtues. The fourth
opinion was held by some who said that qualities and immaterial forms
are not susceptible of more or less, but that material forms are.
In order that the truth in this matter be made clear, we must observe
that, in respect of which a thing receives its species, must be
something fixed and stationary, and as it were indivisible: for
whatever attains to that thing, is contained under the species, and
whatever recedes from it more or less, belongs to another species, more
or less perfect. Wherefore, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text.
10) that species of things are like numbers, in which addition or
subtraction changes the species. If, therefore, a form, or anything at
all, receives its specific nature in respect of itself, or in respect
of something belonging to it, it is necessary that, considered in
itself, it be something of a definite nature, which can be neither more
nor less. Such are heat, whiteness or other like qualities which are
not denominated from a relation to something else: and much more so,
substance, which is "per se" being. But those things which receive
their species from something to which they are related, can be
diversified, in respect of themselves, according to more or less: and
nonetheless they remain in the same species, on account of the oneness
of that to which they are related, and from which they receive their
species. For example, movement is in itself more intense or more
remiss: and yet it remains in the same species, on account of the
oneness of the term by which it is specified. We may observe the same
thing in health; for a body attains to the nature of health, according
as it has a disposition suitable to an animal's nature, to which
various dispositions may be suitable; which disposition is therefore
variable as regards more or less, and withal the nature of health
remains. Whence the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 2,3): "Health itself
may be more or less: for the measure is not the same in all, nor is it
always the same in one individual; but down to a certain point it may
decrease and still remain health. "
Now these various dispositions and measures of health are by way of
excess and defect: wherefore if the name of health were given to the
most perfect measure, then we should not speak of health as greater or
less. Thus therefore it is clear how a quality or form may increase or
decrease of itself, and how it cannot.
But if we consider a quality or form in respect of its participation by
the subject, thus again we find that some qualities and forms are
susceptible of more or less, and some not. Now Simplicius assigns the
cause of this diversity to the fact that substance in itself cannot be
susceptible of more or less, because it is "per se" being. And
therefore every form which is participated substantially by its
subject, cannot vary in intensity and remission: wherefore in the genus
of substance nothing is said to be more or less. And because quantity
is nigh to substance, and because shape follows on quantity, therefore
is it that neither in these can there be such a thing as more or less.
Whence the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 15) that when a thing
receives form and shape, it is not said to be altered, but to be made.
But other qualities which are further removed from quantity, and are
connected with passions and actions, are susceptible of more or less,
in respect of their participation by the subject.
Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason of this diversity.
For, as we have said, that from which a thing receives its species must
remain indivisibly fixed and constant in something indivisible.
Wherefore in two ways it may happen that a form cannot be participated
more or less. First because the participator has its species in respect
of that form. And for this reason no substantial form is participated
more or less. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 10)
that, "as a number cannot be more or less, so neither can that which is
in the species of substance," that is, in respect of its participation
of the specific form: "but in so far as substance may be with matter,"
i. e. in respect of material dispositions, "more or less are found in
substance. "
Secondly this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially
indivisible: wherefore if anything participate that form, it must needs
participate it in respect of its indivisibility. For this reason we do
not speak of the species of number as varying in respect of more or
less; because each species thereof is constituted by an indivisible
unity. The same is to be said of the species of continuous quantity,
which are denominated from numbers, as two-cubits-long,
three-cubits-long, and of relations of quantity, as double and treble,
and of figures of quantity, as triangle and tetragon.
This same explanation is given by Aristotle in the Predicaments
(Categor. vi), where in explaining why figures are not susceptible of
more or less, he says: "Things which are given the nature of a triangle
or a circle, are accordingly triangles and circles": to wit, because
indivisibility is essential to the motion of such, wherefore whatever
participates their nature must participate it in its indivisibility.
It is clear, therefore, since we speak of habits and dispositions in
respect of a relation to something (Phys. vii, text. 17), that in two
ways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and
dispositions. First, in respect of the habit itself: thus, for
instance, we speak of greater or less health; greater or less science,
which extends to more or fewer things. Secondly, in respect of
participation by the subject: in so far as equal science or health is
participated more in one than in another, according to a diverse
aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and
disposition do not give species to the subject: nor again do they
essentially imply indivisibility.
We shall say further on ([1472]Q[66], A[1]) how it is with the virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: As the word "great" is taken from corporeal
quantities and applied to the intelligible perfections of forms; so
also is the word "growth," the term of which is something great.
Reply to Objection 2: Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a
perfection which is the term of its subject; for instance, a term
giving the subject its specific being. Nor again does the nature of a
habit include the notion of term, as do the species of numbers.
Wherefore there is nothing to hinder it from being susceptible of more
or less.
Reply to Objection 3: Alteration is primarily indeed in the qualities
of the third species; but secondarily it may be in the qualities of the
first species: for, supposing an alteration as to hot and cold, there
follows in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness. In like
manner, if an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive
appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension, an alteration
follows as to science and virtue (Phys. viii, text. 20).
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Whether habits increases by addition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the increase of habits is by way of
addition. For the word "increase," as we have said, is transferred to
forms, from corporeal quantities. But in corporeal quantities there is
no increase without addition: wherefore (De Gener. i, text. 31) it is
said that "increase is an addition to a magnitude already existing. "
Therefore in habits also there is no increase without addition.
Objection 2: Further, habit is not increased except by means of some
agent. But every agent does something in the passive subject: for
instance, that which heats, causes heat in that which is heated.
Therefore there is no increase without addition.
Objection 3: Further, as that which is not white, is in potentiality to
be white: so that which is less white, is in potentiality to be more
white. But that which is not white, is not made white except by the
addition of whiteness. Therefore that which is less white, is not made
more white, except by an added whiteness.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 84): "That which
is hot is made hotter, without making, in the matter, something hot,
that was not hot, when the thing was less hot. " Therefore, in like
manner, neither is any addition made in other forms when they increase.
I answer that, The solution of this question depends on what we have
said above [1473](A[1]). For we said that increase and decrease in
forms which are capable of intensity and remissness, happen in one way
not on the part of the very form considered in itself, through the
diverse participation thereof by the subject. Wherefore such increase
of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of form to
form; but by the subject participating more or less perfectly, one and
the same form. And just as, by an agent which is in act, something is
made actually hot, beginning, as it were, to participate a form, not as
though the form itself were made, as is proved in Metaph. vii, text.
32, so, by an intense action of the agent, something is made more hot,
as it were participating the form more perfectly, not as though
something were added to the form.
For if this increase in forms were understood to be by way of addition,
this could only be either in the form itself or in the subject. If it
be understood of the form itself, it has already been stated
[1474](A[1]) that such an addition or subtraction would change the
species; even as the species of color is changed when a thing from
being pale becomes white. If, on the other hand, this addition be
understood as applying to the subject, this could only be either
because one part of the subject receives a form which it had not
previously (thus we may say cold increases in a man who, after being
cold in one part of his body, is cold in several parts), or because
some other subject is added sharing in the same form (as when a hot
thing is added to another, or one white thing to another). But in
either of these two ways we have not a more white or a more hot thing,
but a greater white or hot thing.
Since, however, as stated above [1475](A[1]), certain accidents are of
themselves susceptible of more or less, in some of these we may find
increase by addition. For movement increases by an addition either to
the time it lasts, or to the course it follows: and yet the species
remains the same on account of the oneness of the term. Yet movement
increases the intensity as to participation in its subject: i. e. in so
far as the same movement can be executed more or less speedily or
readily. In like manner, science can increase in itself by addition;
thus when anyone learns several conclusions of geometry, the same
specific habit of science increases in that man. Yet a man's science
increases, as to the subject's participation thereof, in intensity, in
so far as one man is quicker and readier than another in considering
the same conclusions.
As to bodily habits, it does not seem very probable that they receive
increase by way of addition. For an animal is not said to be simply
healthy or beautiful, unless it be such in all its parts. And if it be
brought to a more perfect measure, this is the result of a change in
the simple qualities, which are not susceptible of increase save in
intensity on the part of the subject partaking of them.
How this question affects virtues we shall state further on
([1476]Q[66], A[1] ).
Reply to Objection 1: Even in bodily bulk increase is twofold. First,
by addition of one subject to another; such is the increase of living
things. Secondly, by mere intensity, without any addition at all; such
is the case with things subject to rarefaction, as is stated in Phys.
iv, text. 63.
Reply to Objection 2: The cause that increases a habit, always effects
something in the subject, but not a new form. But it causes the subject
to partake more perfectly of a pre-existing form, or it makes the form
to extend further.
Reply to Objection 3: What is not already white, is potentially white,
as not yet possessing the form of whiteness: hence the agent causes a
new form in the subject. But that which is less hot or white, is not in
potentiality to those forms, since it has them already actually: but it
is in potentiality to a perfect mode of participation; and this it
receives through the agent's action.
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Whether every act increases its habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that every act increases its habit. For when
the cause is increased the effect is increased. Now acts are causes of
habits, as stated above ([1477]Q[51], A[2]). Therefore a habit
increases when its acts are multiplied.
Objection 2: Further, of like things a like judgment should be formed.
But all the acts proceeding from one and the same habit are alike
(Ethic. ii, 1,2). Therefore if some acts increase a habit, every act
should increase it.
Objection 3: Further, like is increased by like. But any act is like
the habit whence it proceeds. Therefore every act increases the habit.
On the contrary, Opposite effects do not result from the same cause.
But according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit whence they
proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly. Therefore it is not
every act that increases a habit.
I answer that, "Like acts cause like habits" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Now
things are like or unlike not only in respect of their qualities being
the same or various, but also in respect of the same or a different
mode of participation. For it is not only black that is unlike white,
but also less white is unlike more white, since there is movement from
less white to more white, even as from one opposite to another, as
stated in Phys. v, text. 52.
But since use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above
([1478]Q[50], A[5]); just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or
may act contrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing
an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit.
Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion to
the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either
increases the habit or disposes to an increase thereof, if we may speak
of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal. For
not every morsel of food actually increases the animal's size as
neither does every drop of water hollow out the stone: but the
multiplication of food results at last in an increase of the body. So,
too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow. If, however, the act falls
short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an
increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof.
From this it is clear how to solve the objections.
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HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider how habits are lost or weakened; and under this
head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a habit can be corrupted?
(2) Whether it can be diminished?
(3) How are habits corrupted or diminished?
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Whether a habit can be corrupted?
Objection 1: It would seem that a habit cannot be corrupted. For habit
is within its subject like a second nature; wherefore it is pleasant to
act from habit. Now so long as a thing is, its nature is not corrupted.
Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long as its subject
remains.
Objection 2: Further, whenever a form is corrupted, this is due either
to corruption of its subject, or to its contrary: thus sickness ceases
through corruption of the animal, or through the advent of health. Now
science, which is a habit, cannot be lost through corruption of its
subject: since "the intellect," which is its subject, "is a substance
that is incorruptible" (De Anima i, text. 65). In like manner, neither
can it be lost through the action of its contrary: since intelligible
species are not contrary to one another (Metaph. vii, text. 52).
Therefore the habit of science can nowise be lost.
Objection 3: Further, all corruption results from some movement. But
the habit of science, which is in the soul, cannot be corrupted by a
direct movement of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved
directly. It is, however, moved indirectly through the movement of the
body: and yet no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the
intelligible species residing in the intellect: since the intellect
independently of the body is the proper abode of the species; for which
reason it is held that habits are not lost either through old age or
through death. Therefore science cannot be corrupted. For the same
reason neither can habits of virtue be corrupted, since they also are
in the rational soul, and, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 10),
"virtue is more lasting than learning. "
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that
"forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of science. " Moreover,
by sinning a man loses a habit of virtue: and again, virtues are
engendered and corrupted by contrary acts (Ethic. ii, 2).
I answer that, A form is said to be corrupted directly by its contrary;
indirectly, through its subject being corrupted. When therefore a habit
has a corruptible subject, and a cause that has a contrary, it can be
corrupted both ways. This is clearly the case with bodily habits---for
instance, health and sickness. But those habits that have an
incorruptible subject, cannot be corrupted indirectly. There are,
however, some habits which, while residing chiefly in an incorruptible
subject, reside nevertheless secondarily in a corruptible subject; such
is the habit of science which is chiefly indeed in the "possible"
intellect, but secondarily in the sensitive powers of apprehension, as
stated above ([1479]Q[50], A[3], ad 3). Consequently the habit of
science cannot be corrupted indirectly, on the part of the "possible"
intellect, but only on the part of the lower sensitive powers.
We must therefore inquire whether habits of this kind can be corrupted
directly. If then there be a habit having a contrary, either on the
part of itself or on the part of its cause, it can be corrupted
directly: but if it has no contrary, it cannot be corrupted directly.
Now it is evident that an intelligible species residing in the
"possible" intellect, has no contrary; nor can the active intellect,
which is the cause of that species, have a contrary. Wherefore if in
the "possible" intellect there be a habit caused immediately by the
active intellect, such a habit is incorruptible both directly and
indirectly. Such are the habits of the first principles, both
speculative and practical, which cannot be corrupted by any
forgetfulness or deception whatever: even as the Philosopher says about
prudence (Ethic. vi, 5) that "it cannot be lost by being forgotten. "
There is, however, in the "possible" intellect a habit caused by the
reason, to wit, the habit of conclusions, which is called science, to
the cause of which something may be contrary in two ways. First, on the
part of those very propositions which are the starting point of the
reason: for the assertion "Good is not good" is contrary to the
assertion "Good is good" (Peri Herm. ii). Secondly, on the part of the
process of reasoning; forasmuch as a sophistical syllogism is contrary
to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism. Wherefore it is clear that a
false reason can corrupt the habit of a true opinion or even of
science. Hence the Philosopher, as stated above, says that "deception
is the corruption of science. " As to virtues, some of them are
intellectual, residing in reason itself, as stated in Ethic. vi, 1: and
to these applies what we have said of science and opinion. Some,
however, viz. the moral virtues, are in the appetitive part of the
soul; and the same may be said of the contrary vices. Now the habits of
the appetitive part are caused therein because it is natural to it to
be moved by the reason. Therefore a habit either of virtue or of vice,
may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever its motion is
contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion or
deliberate choice.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, a habit is like a
second nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while
the nature of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a
habit is removed, though with difficulty.
Reply to Objection 2: Although there is no contrary to intelligible
species, yet there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process
of reason, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Science is not taken away by movement of the
body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may
prove an obstacle to the act of science; in so far as the intellect, in
its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded by
corporal transmutation. But the intellectual movement of the reason can
corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the very root of the
habit. In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted. Nevertheless
when it is said that "virtue is more lasting than learning," this must
be understood in respect, not of the subject or cause, but of the act:
because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas
the use of learning does not.
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Whether a habit can diminish?
Objection 1: It would seem that a habit cannot diminish. Because a
habit is a simple quality and form. Now a simple thing is possessed
either wholly or not at all. Therefore although a habit can be lost it
cannot diminish.
Objection 2: Further, if a thing is befitting an accident, this is by
reason either of the accident or of its subject. Now a habit does not
become more or less intense by reason of itself; else it would follow
that a species might be predicated of its individuals more or less. And
if it can become less intense as to its participation by its subject,
it would follow that something is accidental to a habit, proper thereto
and not common to the habit and its subject. Now whenever a form has
something proper to it besides its subject, that form can be separate,
as stated in De Anima i, text. 13.
seems to have been the reasoning of Maximus, who in the same passage
adds: "For if this were the case, surely their essence would not remain
in itself, nor could it have been as far as possible deified of
itself. "
Objection 3: Further, habit is a disposition (Metaph. v, text. 25). But
disposition, as is said in the same book, is "the order of that which
has parts. " Since, therefore, angels are simple substances, it seems
that there are no dispositions and habits in them.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the angels are
of the first hierarchy are called: "Fire-bearers and Thrones and
Outpouring of Wisdom, by which is indicated the godlike nature of their
habits. "
I answer that, Some have thought that there are no habits in the
angels, and that whatever is said of them, is said essentially. Whence
Maximus, after the words which we have quoted, says: "Their
dispositions, and the powers which are in them, are essential, through
the absence of matter in them. " And Simplicius says the same in his
Commentary on the Predicaments: "Wisdom which is in the soul is its
habit: but that which is in the intellect, is its substance. For
everything divine is sufficient of itself, and exists in itself. "
Now this opinion contains some truth, and some error. For it is
manifest from what we have said ([1461]Q[49], A[4]) that only a being
in potentiality is the subject of habit. So the above-mentioned
commentators considered that angels are immaterial substances, and that
there is no material potentiality in them, and on that account,
excluded from them habit and any kind of accident. Yet since though
there is no material potentiality in angels, there is still some
potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to God alone),
therefore, as far as potentiality is found to be in them, so far may
habits be found in them. But because the potentiality of matter and the
potentiality of intellectual substance are not of the same kind.
Whence, Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments that:
"The habits of the intellectual substance are not like the habits here
below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial images which it
contains in itself. "
However, the angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with
regard to this habit. For the human intellect, being the lowest in the
intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all intelligible
things, just as primal matter is in respect of all sensible forms; and
therefore for the understanding of all things, it needs some habit. But
the angelic intellect is not as a pure potentiality in the order of
intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act (for this
belongs to God alone), but with an admixture of some potentiality: and
the higher it is, the less potentiality it has. And therefore, as we
said in the [1462]FP, Q[55], A[1], so far as it is in potentiality, so
far is it in need of habitual perfection by means of intelligible
species in regard to its proper operation: but so far as it is in act,
through its own essence it can understand some things, at least itself,
and other things according to the mode of its substance, as stated in
De Causis: and the more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it
understand.
But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are
infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order to attain to
God Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits,
being as it were in potentiality in regard to that Pure Act. Wherefore
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are "godlike," that
is to say, that by them they are made like to God.
But those habits that are dispositions to the natural being are not in
angels, since they are immaterial.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Maximus must be understood of
material habits and accidents.
Reply to Objection 2: As to that which belongs to angels by their
essence, they do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of
themselves, as not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness, therefore,
so far as they need to partake of something from without, so far do
they need to have habits.
Reply to Objection 3: In angels there are no essential parts: but there
are potential parts, in so far as their intellect is perfected by
several species, and in so far as their will has a relation to several
things.
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OF THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider the cause of habits: and firstly, as to their
formation; secondly, as to their increase; thirdly, as to their
diminution and corruption. Under the first head there are four points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether any habit is from nature?
(2) Whether any habit is caused by acts?
(3) Whether any habit can be caused by one act?
(4) Whether any habits are infused in man by God?
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Whether any habit is from nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is from nature. For the use of
those things which are from nature does not depend on the will. But
habit "is that which we use when we will," as the Commentator says on
De Anima iii. Therefore habit is not from nature.
Objection 2: Further, nature does not employ two where one is
sufficient. But the powers of the soul are from nature. If therefore
the habits of the powers were from nature, habit and power would be
one.
Objection 3: Further, nature does not fail in necessaries. But habits
are necessary in order to act well, as we have stated above
([1463]Q[49], A[4]). If therefore any habits were from nature, it seems
that nature would not fail to cause all necessary habits: but this is
clearly false. Therefore habits are not from nature.
On the contrary, In Ethic. vi, 6, among other habits, place is given to
understanding of first principles, which habit is from nature:
wherefore also first principles are said to be known naturally.
I answer that, One thing can be natural to another in two ways. First
in respect of the specific nature, as the faculty of laughing is
natural to man, and it is natural to fire to have an upward tendency.
Secondly, in respect of the individual nature, as it is natural to
Socrates or Plato to be prone to sickness or inclined to health, in
accordance with their respective temperaments. Again, in respect of
both natures, something may be called natural in two ways: first,
because it entirely is from the nature; secondly, because it is partly
from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle. For instance, when
a man is healed by himself, his health is entirely from nature; but
when a man is healed by means of medicine, health is partly from
nature, partly from an extrinsic principle.
Thus, then, if we speak of habit as a disposition of the subject in
relation to form or nature, it may be natural in either of the
foregoing ways. For there is a certain natural disposition demanded by
the human species, so that no man can be without it. And this
disposition is natural in respect of the specific nature. But since
such a disposition has a certain latitude, it happens that different
grades of this disposition are becoming to different men in respect of
the individual nature. And this disposition may be either entirely from
nature, or partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle,
as we have said of those who are healed by means of art.
But the habit which is a disposition to operation, and whose subject is
a power of the soul, as stated above (Q[50], A[2]), may be natural
whether in respect of the specific nature or in respect of the
individual nature: in respect of the specific nature, on the part of
the soul itself, which, since it is the form of the body, is the
specific principle; but in respect of the individual nature, on the
part of the body, which is the material principle. Yet in neither way
does it happen that there are natural habits in man, so that they be
entirely from nature. In the angels, indeed, this does happen, since
they have intelligible species naturally impressed on them, which
cannot be said of the human soul, as we have said in the [1464]FP,
Q[55], A[2]; [1465]FP, Q[84], A[3].
There are, therefore, in man certain natural habits, owing their
existence, partly to nature, and partly to some extrinsic principle: in
one way, indeed, in the apprehensive powers; in another way, in the
appetitive powers. For in the apprehensive powers there may be a
natural habit by way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific
nature, and in respect of the individual nature. This happens with
regard to the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself: thus the
understanding of first principles is called a natural habit. For it is
owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul that man, having once
grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at once perceive
that every whole is larger than its part: and in like manner with
regard to other such principles. Yet what is a whole, and what is a
part---this he cannot know except through the intelligible species
which he has received from phantasms: and for this reason, the
Philosopher at the end of the Posterior Analytics shows that knowledge
of principles comes to us from the senses.
But in respect of the individual nature, a habit of knowledge is
natural as to its beginning, in so far as one man, from the disposition
of his organs of sense, is more apt than another to understand well,
since we need the sensitive powers for the operation of the intellect.
In the appetitive powers, however, no habit is natural in its
beginning, on the part of the soul itself, as to the substance of the
habit; but only as to certain principles thereof, as, for instance, the
principles of common law are called the "nurseries of virtue. " The
reason of this is because the inclination to its proper objects, which
seems to be the beginning of a habit, does not belong to the habit, but
rather to the very nature of the powers.
But on the part of the body, in respect of the individual nature, there
are some appetitive habits by way of natural beginnings. For some are
disposed from their own bodily temperament to chastity or meekness or
such like.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection takes nature as divided against
reason and will; whereas reason itself and will belong to the nature of
man.
Reply to Objection 2: Something may be added even naturally to the
nature of a power, while it cannot belong to the power itself. For
instance, with regard to the angels, it cannot belong to the
intellective power itself capable of knowing all things: for thus it
would have to be the act of all things, which belongs to God alone.
Because that by which something is known, must needs be the actual
likeness of the thing known: whence it would follow, if the power of
the angel knew all things by itself, that it was the likeness and act
of all things. Wherefore there must needs be added to the angels'
intellective power, some intelligible species, which are likenesses of
things understood: for it is by participation of the Divine wisdom and
not by their own essence, that their intellect can be actually those
things which they understand. And so it is clear that not everything
belonging to a natural habit can belong to the power.
Reply to Objection 3: Nature is not equally inclined to cause all the
various kinds of habits: since some can be caused by nature, and some
not, as we have said above. And so it does not follow that because some
habits are natural, therefore all are natural.
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Whether any habit is caused by acts?
Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is caused by acts. For habit
is a quality, as we have said above ([1466]Q[49], A[1]). Now every
quality is caused in a subject, according to the latter's receptivity.
Since then the agent, inasmuch as it acts, does not receive but rather
gives: it seems impossible for a habit to be caused in an agent by its
own acts.
Objection 2: Further, the thing wherein a quality is caused is moved to
that quality, as may be clearly seen in that which is heated or cooled:
whereas that which produces the act that causes the quality, moves, as
may be seen in that which heats or cools. If therefore habits were
caused in anything by its own act, it would follow that the same would
be mover and moved, active and passive: which is impossible, as stated
in Physics iii, 8.
Objection 3: Further, the effect cannot be more noble than its cause.
But habit is more noble than the act which precedes the habit; as is
clear from the fact that the latter produces more noble acts. Therefore
habit cannot be caused by an act which precedes the habit.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1,2) teaches that habits
of virtue and vice are caused by acts.
I answer that, In the agent there is sometimes only the active
principle of its act: for instance in fire there is only the active
principle of heating. And in such an agent a habit cannot be caused by
its own act: for which reason natural things cannot become accustomed
or unaccustomed, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But a certain agent is
to be found, in which there is both the active and the passive
principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For the acts of the
appetitive power proceed from that same power according as it is moved
by the apprehensive power presenting the object: and further, the
intellective power, according as it reasons about conclusions, has, as
it were, an active principle in a self-evident proposition. Wherefore
by such acts habits can be caused in their agents; not indeed with
regard to the first active principle, but with regard to that principle
of the act, which principle is a mover moved. For everything that is
passive and moved by another, is disposed by the action of the agent;
wherefore if the acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed in the
power which is passive and moved, which quality is called a habit: just
as the habits of moral virtue are caused in the appetitive powers,
according as they are moved by the reason, and as the habits of science
are caused in the intellect, according as it is moved by first
propositions.
Reply to Objection 1: The agent, as agent, does not receive anything.
But in so far as it moves through being moved by another, it receives
something from that which moves it: and thus is a habit caused.
Reply to Objection 2: The same thing, and in the same respect, cannot
be mover and moved; but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by
itself as to different respects, as is proved in Physics viii, text.
28,29.
Reply to Objection 3: The act which precedes the habit, in so far as it
comes from an active principle, proceeds from a more excellent
principle than is the habit caused thereby: just as the reason is a
more excellent principle than the habit of moral virtue produced in the
appetitive power by repeated acts, and as the understanding of first
principles is a more excellent principle than the science of
conclusions.
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Whether a habit can be caused by one act?
Objection 1: It would seem that a habit can be caused by one act. For
demonstration is an act of reason. But science, which is the habit of
one conclusion, is caused by one demonstration. Therefore habit can be
caused by one act.
Objection 2: Further, as acts happen to increase by multiplication so
do they happen to increase by intensity. But a habit is caused by
multiplication of acts. Therefore also if an act be very intense, it
can be the generating cause of a habit.
Objection 3: Further, health and sickness are habits. But it happens
that a man is healed or becomes ill, by one act. Therefore one act can
cause a habit.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7): "As neither does one
swallow nor one day make spring: so neither does one day nor a short
time make a man blessed and happy. " But "happiness is an operation in
respect of a habit of perfect virtue" (Ethic. i, 7,10,13). Therefore a
habit of virtue, and for the same reason, other habits, is not caused
by one act.
I answer that, As we have said already [1467](A[2]), habit is caused by
act, because a passive power is moved by an active principle. But in
order that some quality be caused in that which is passive the active
principle must entirely overcome the passive. Whence we see that
because fire cannot at once overcome the combustible, it does not
enkindle at once; but it gradually expels contrary dispositions, so
that by overcoming it entirely, it may impress its likeness on it. Now
it is clear that the active principle which is reason, cannot entirely
overcome the appetitive power in one act: because the appetitive power
is inclined variously, and to many things; while the reason judges in a
single act, what should be willed in regard to various aspects and
circumstances. Wherefore the appetitive power is not thereby entirely
overcome, so as to be inclined like nature to the same thing, in the
majority of cases; which inclination belongs to the habit of virtue.
Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act, but only by
many.
But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two
passive principles: one is the "possible" [*See [1468]FP, Q[79], A[2]
ad 2] intellect itself; the other is the intellect which Aristotle (De
Anima iii, text. 20) calls "passive," and is the "particular reason,"
that is the cogitative power, with memory and imagination. With regard
then to the former passive principle, it is possible for a certain
active principle to entirely overcome, by one act, the power of its
passive principle: thus one self-evident proposition convinces the
intellect, so that it gives a firm assent to the conclusion, but a
probable proposition cannot do this. Wherefore a habit of opinion needs
to be caused by many acts of the reason, even on the part of the
"possible" intellect: whereas a habit of science can be caused by a
single act of the reason, so far as the "possible" intellect is
concerned. But with regard to the lower apprehensive powers, the same
acts need to be repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed
on the memory. And so the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. 1) that
"meditation strengthens memory. " Bodily habits, however, can be caused
by one act, if the active principle is of great power: sometimes, for
instance, a strong dose of medicine restores health at once.
Hence the solutions to the objections are clear.
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Whether any habits are infused in man by God?
Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is infused in man by God. For
God treats all equally. If therefore He infuses habits into some, He
would infuse them into all: which is clearly untrue.
Objection 2: Further, God works in all things according to the mode
which is suitable to their nature: for "it belongs to Divine providence
to preserve nature," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But habits are
naturally caused in man by acts, as we have said above [1469](A[2]).
Therefore God does not cause habits to be in man except by acts.
Objection 3: Further, if any habit be infused into man by God, man can
by that habit perform many acts. But "from those acts a like habit is
caused" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Consequently there will be two habits of the
same species in the same man, one acquired, the other infused. Now this
seems impossible: for the two forms of the same species cannot be in
the same subject. Therefore a habit is not infused into man by God.
On the contrary, it is written (Ecclus. 15:5): "God filled him with the
spirit of wisdom and understanding. " Now wisdom and understanding are
habits. Therefore some habits are infused into man by God.
I answer that, Some habits are infused by God into man, for two
reasons.
The first reason is because there are some habits by which man is
disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human nature,
namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man, as stated above
([1470]Q[5], A[5]). And since habits need to be in proportion with that
to which man is disposed by them, therefore is it necessary that those
habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the proportion of human
nature. Wherefore such habits can never be in man except by Divine
infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous virtues.
The other reason is, because God can produce the effects of second
causes, without these second causes, as we have said in the [1471]FP,
Q[105], A[6]. Just as, therefore, sometimes, in order to show His
power, He causes health, without its natural cause, but which nature
could have caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of His
power, He infuses into man even those habits which can be caused by a
natural power. Thus He gave to the apostles the science of the
Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by
custom, but not so perfectly.
Reply to Objection 1: God, in respect of His Nature, is the same to
all, but in respect of the order of His Wisdom, for some fixed motive,
gives certain things to some, which He does not give to others.
Reply to Objection 2: That God works in all according to their mode,
does not hinder God from doing what nature cannot do: but it follows
from this that He does nothing contrary to that which is suitable to
nature.
Reply to Objection 3: Acts produced by an infused habit, do not cause a
habit, but strengthen the already existing habit; just as the remedies
of medicine given to a man who is naturally health, do not cause a kind
of health, but give new strength to the health he had before.
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OF THE INCREASE OF HABITS (THREE ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the increase of habits; under which head there
are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether habits increase?
(2) Whether they increase by addition?
(3) Whether each act increases the habit?
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Whether habits increase?
Objection 1: It would seem that habits cannot increase. For increase
concerns quantity (Phys. v, text. 18). But habits are not in the genus
quantity, but in that of quality. Therefore there can be no increase of
habits.
Objection 2: Further, habit is a perfection (Phys. vii, text. 17,18).
But since perfection conveys a notion of end and term, it seems that it
cannot be more or less. Therefore a habit cannot increase.
Objection 3: Further, those things which can be more or less are
subject to alteration: for that which from being less hot becomes more
hot, is said to be altered. But in habits there is no alteration, as is
proved in Phys. vii, text. 15,17. Therefore habits cannot increase.
On the contrary, Faith is a habit, and yet it increases: wherefore the
disciples said to our Lord (Lk. 17:5): "Lord, increase our faith. "
Therefore habits increase.
I answer that, Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity, is
transferred from bodily quantities to intelligible spiritual things, on
account of the natural connection of the intellect with corporeal
things, which come under the imagination. Now in corporeal quantities,
a thing is said to be great, according as it reaches the perfection of
quantity due to it; wherefore a certain quantity is reputed great in
man, which is not reputed great in an elephant. And so also in forms,
we say a thing is great because it is perfect. And since good has the
nature of perfection, therefore "in things which are great, but not in
quantity, to be greater is the same as to be better," as Augustine says
(De Trin. vi, 8).
Now the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways: first, in
respect of the form itself: secondly, in respect of the participation
of the form by its subject. In so far as we consider the perfections of
a form in respect of the form itself, thus the form is said to be
"little" or "great": for instance great or little health or science.
But in so far as we consider the perfection of a form in respect of the
participation thereof by the subject, it is said to be "more" or
"less": for instance more or less white or healthy. Now this
distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form has a
being outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to
consider the form according to its specific nature, and another to
consider it in respect of its participation by a subject.
In this way, then, there were four opinions among philosophers
concerning intensity and remission of habits and forms, as Simplicius
relates in his Commentary on the Predicaments.
For Plotinus and the
other Platonists held that qualities and habits themselves were
susceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material and
so had a certain want of definiteness, on account of the infinity of
matter. Others, on the contrary, held that qualities and habits of
themselves were not susceptible of more or less; but that the things
affected by them [qualia] are said to be more or less, in respect of
the participation of the subject: that, for instance, justice is not
more or less, but the just thing. Aristotle alludes to this opinion in
the Predicaments (Categor. vi). The third opinion was that of the
Stoics, and lies between the two preceding opinions. For they held that
some habits are of themselves susceptible of more and less, for
instance, the arts; and that some are not, as the virtues. The fourth
opinion was held by some who said that qualities and immaterial forms
are not susceptible of more or less, but that material forms are.
In order that the truth in this matter be made clear, we must observe
that, in respect of which a thing receives its species, must be
something fixed and stationary, and as it were indivisible: for
whatever attains to that thing, is contained under the species, and
whatever recedes from it more or less, belongs to another species, more
or less perfect. Wherefore, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text.
10) that species of things are like numbers, in which addition or
subtraction changes the species. If, therefore, a form, or anything at
all, receives its specific nature in respect of itself, or in respect
of something belonging to it, it is necessary that, considered in
itself, it be something of a definite nature, which can be neither more
nor less. Such are heat, whiteness or other like qualities which are
not denominated from a relation to something else: and much more so,
substance, which is "per se" being. But those things which receive
their species from something to which they are related, can be
diversified, in respect of themselves, according to more or less: and
nonetheless they remain in the same species, on account of the oneness
of that to which they are related, and from which they receive their
species. For example, movement is in itself more intense or more
remiss: and yet it remains in the same species, on account of the
oneness of the term by which it is specified. We may observe the same
thing in health; for a body attains to the nature of health, according
as it has a disposition suitable to an animal's nature, to which
various dispositions may be suitable; which disposition is therefore
variable as regards more or less, and withal the nature of health
remains. Whence the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 2,3): "Health itself
may be more or less: for the measure is not the same in all, nor is it
always the same in one individual; but down to a certain point it may
decrease and still remain health. "
Now these various dispositions and measures of health are by way of
excess and defect: wherefore if the name of health were given to the
most perfect measure, then we should not speak of health as greater or
less. Thus therefore it is clear how a quality or form may increase or
decrease of itself, and how it cannot.
But if we consider a quality or form in respect of its participation by
the subject, thus again we find that some qualities and forms are
susceptible of more or less, and some not. Now Simplicius assigns the
cause of this diversity to the fact that substance in itself cannot be
susceptible of more or less, because it is "per se" being. And
therefore every form which is participated substantially by its
subject, cannot vary in intensity and remission: wherefore in the genus
of substance nothing is said to be more or less. And because quantity
is nigh to substance, and because shape follows on quantity, therefore
is it that neither in these can there be such a thing as more or less.
Whence the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 15) that when a thing
receives form and shape, it is not said to be altered, but to be made.
But other qualities which are further removed from quantity, and are
connected with passions and actions, are susceptible of more or less,
in respect of their participation by the subject.
Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason of this diversity.
For, as we have said, that from which a thing receives its species must
remain indivisibly fixed and constant in something indivisible.
Wherefore in two ways it may happen that a form cannot be participated
more or less. First because the participator has its species in respect
of that form. And for this reason no substantial form is participated
more or less. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 10)
that, "as a number cannot be more or less, so neither can that which is
in the species of substance," that is, in respect of its participation
of the specific form: "but in so far as substance may be with matter,"
i. e. in respect of material dispositions, "more or less are found in
substance. "
Secondly this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially
indivisible: wherefore if anything participate that form, it must needs
participate it in respect of its indivisibility. For this reason we do
not speak of the species of number as varying in respect of more or
less; because each species thereof is constituted by an indivisible
unity. The same is to be said of the species of continuous quantity,
which are denominated from numbers, as two-cubits-long,
three-cubits-long, and of relations of quantity, as double and treble,
and of figures of quantity, as triangle and tetragon.
This same explanation is given by Aristotle in the Predicaments
(Categor. vi), where in explaining why figures are not susceptible of
more or less, he says: "Things which are given the nature of a triangle
or a circle, are accordingly triangles and circles": to wit, because
indivisibility is essential to the motion of such, wherefore whatever
participates their nature must participate it in its indivisibility.
It is clear, therefore, since we speak of habits and dispositions in
respect of a relation to something (Phys. vii, text. 17), that in two
ways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and
dispositions. First, in respect of the habit itself: thus, for
instance, we speak of greater or less health; greater or less science,
which extends to more or fewer things. Secondly, in respect of
participation by the subject: in so far as equal science or health is
participated more in one than in another, according to a diverse
aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and
disposition do not give species to the subject: nor again do they
essentially imply indivisibility.
We shall say further on ([1472]Q[66], A[1]) how it is with the virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: As the word "great" is taken from corporeal
quantities and applied to the intelligible perfections of forms; so
also is the word "growth," the term of which is something great.
Reply to Objection 2: Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a
perfection which is the term of its subject; for instance, a term
giving the subject its specific being. Nor again does the nature of a
habit include the notion of term, as do the species of numbers.
Wherefore there is nothing to hinder it from being susceptible of more
or less.
Reply to Objection 3: Alteration is primarily indeed in the qualities
of the third species; but secondarily it may be in the qualities of the
first species: for, supposing an alteration as to hot and cold, there
follows in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness. In like
manner, if an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive
appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension, an alteration
follows as to science and virtue (Phys. viii, text. 20).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether habits increases by addition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the increase of habits is by way of
addition. For the word "increase," as we have said, is transferred to
forms, from corporeal quantities. But in corporeal quantities there is
no increase without addition: wherefore (De Gener. i, text. 31) it is
said that "increase is an addition to a magnitude already existing. "
Therefore in habits also there is no increase without addition.
Objection 2: Further, habit is not increased except by means of some
agent. But every agent does something in the passive subject: for
instance, that which heats, causes heat in that which is heated.
Therefore there is no increase without addition.
Objection 3: Further, as that which is not white, is in potentiality to
be white: so that which is less white, is in potentiality to be more
white. But that which is not white, is not made white except by the
addition of whiteness. Therefore that which is less white, is not made
more white, except by an added whiteness.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 84): "That which
is hot is made hotter, without making, in the matter, something hot,
that was not hot, when the thing was less hot. " Therefore, in like
manner, neither is any addition made in other forms when they increase.
I answer that, The solution of this question depends on what we have
said above [1473](A[1]). For we said that increase and decrease in
forms which are capable of intensity and remissness, happen in one way
not on the part of the very form considered in itself, through the
diverse participation thereof by the subject. Wherefore such increase
of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of form to
form; but by the subject participating more or less perfectly, one and
the same form. And just as, by an agent which is in act, something is
made actually hot, beginning, as it were, to participate a form, not as
though the form itself were made, as is proved in Metaph. vii, text.
32, so, by an intense action of the agent, something is made more hot,
as it were participating the form more perfectly, not as though
something were added to the form.
For if this increase in forms were understood to be by way of addition,
this could only be either in the form itself or in the subject. If it
be understood of the form itself, it has already been stated
[1474](A[1]) that such an addition or subtraction would change the
species; even as the species of color is changed when a thing from
being pale becomes white. If, on the other hand, this addition be
understood as applying to the subject, this could only be either
because one part of the subject receives a form which it had not
previously (thus we may say cold increases in a man who, after being
cold in one part of his body, is cold in several parts), or because
some other subject is added sharing in the same form (as when a hot
thing is added to another, or one white thing to another). But in
either of these two ways we have not a more white or a more hot thing,
but a greater white or hot thing.
Since, however, as stated above [1475](A[1]), certain accidents are of
themselves susceptible of more or less, in some of these we may find
increase by addition. For movement increases by an addition either to
the time it lasts, or to the course it follows: and yet the species
remains the same on account of the oneness of the term. Yet movement
increases the intensity as to participation in its subject: i. e. in so
far as the same movement can be executed more or less speedily or
readily. In like manner, science can increase in itself by addition;
thus when anyone learns several conclusions of geometry, the same
specific habit of science increases in that man. Yet a man's science
increases, as to the subject's participation thereof, in intensity, in
so far as one man is quicker and readier than another in considering
the same conclusions.
As to bodily habits, it does not seem very probable that they receive
increase by way of addition. For an animal is not said to be simply
healthy or beautiful, unless it be such in all its parts. And if it be
brought to a more perfect measure, this is the result of a change in
the simple qualities, which are not susceptible of increase save in
intensity on the part of the subject partaking of them.
How this question affects virtues we shall state further on
([1476]Q[66], A[1] ).
Reply to Objection 1: Even in bodily bulk increase is twofold. First,
by addition of one subject to another; such is the increase of living
things. Secondly, by mere intensity, without any addition at all; such
is the case with things subject to rarefaction, as is stated in Phys.
iv, text. 63.
Reply to Objection 2: The cause that increases a habit, always effects
something in the subject, but not a new form. But it causes the subject
to partake more perfectly of a pre-existing form, or it makes the form
to extend further.
Reply to Objection 3: What is not already white, is potentially white,
as not yet possessing the form of whiteness: hence the agent causes a
new form in the subject. But that which is less hot or white, is not in
potentiality to those forms, since it has them already actually: but it
is in potentiality to a perfect mode of participation; and this it
receives through the agent's action.
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Whether every act increases its habit?
Objection 1: It would seem that every act increases its habit. For when
the cause is increased the effect is increased. Now acts are causes of
habits, as stated above ([1477]Q[51], A[2]). Therefore a habit
increases when its acts are multiplied.
Objection 2: Further, of like things a like judgment should be formed.
But all the acts proceeding from one and the same habit are alike
(Ethic. ii, 1,2). Therefore if some acts increase a habit, every act
should increase it.
Objection 3: Further, like is increased by like. But any act is like
the habit whence it proceeds. Therefore every act increases the habit.
On the contrary, Opposite effects do not result from the same cause.
But according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit whence they
proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly. Therefore it is not
every act that increases a habit.
I answer that, "Like acts cause like habits" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Now
things are like or unlike not only in respect of their qualities being
the same or various, but also in respect of the same or a different
mode of participation. For it is not only black that is unlike white,
but also less white is unlike more white, since there is movement from
less white to more white, even as from one opposite to another, as
stated in Phys. v, text. 52.
But since use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above
([1478]Q[50], A[5]); just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or
may act contrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing
an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit.
Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion to
the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either
increases the habit or disposes to an increase thereof, if we may speak
of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal. For
not every morsel of food actually increases the animal's size as
neither does every drop of water hollow out the stone: but the
multiplication of food results at last in an increase of the body. So,
too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow. If, however, the act falls
short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an
increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof.
From this it is clear how to solve the objections.
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HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider how habits are lost or weakened; and under this
head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a habit can be corrupted?
(2) Whether it can be diminished?
(3) How are habits corrupted or diminished?
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Whether a habit can be corrupted?
Objection 1: It would seem that a habit cannot be corrupted. For habit
is within its subject like a second nature; wherefore it is pleasant to
act from habit. Now so long as a thing is, its nature is not corrupted.
Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long as its subject
remains.
Objection 2: Further, whenever a form is corrupted, this is due either
to corruption of its subject, or to its contrary: thus sickness ceases
through corruption of the animal, or through the advent of health. Now
science, which is a habit, cannot be lost through corruption of its
subject: since "the intellect," which is its subject, "is a substance
that is incorruptible" (De Anima i, text. 65). In like manner, neither
can it be lost through the action of its contrary: since intelligible
species are not contrary to one another (Metaph. vii, text. 52).
Therefore the habit of science can nowise be lost.
Objection 3: Further, all corruption results from some movement. But
the habit of science, which is in the soul, cannot be corrupted by a
direct movement of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved
directly. It is, however, moved indirectly through the movement of the
body: and yet no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the
intelligible species residing in the intellect: since the intellect
independently of the body is the proper abode of the species; for which
reason it is held that habits are not lost either through old age or
through death. Therefore science cannot be corrupted. For the same
reason neither can habits of virtue be corrupted, since they also are
in the rational soul, and, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 10),
"virtue is more lasting than learning. "
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that
"forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of science. " Moreover,
by sinning a man loses a habit of virtue: and again, virtues are
engendered and corrupted by contrary acts (Ethic. ii, 2).
I answer that, A form is said to be corrupted directly by its contrary;
indirectly, through its subject being corrupted. When therefore a habit
has a corruptible subject, and a cause that has a contrary, it can be
corrupted both ways. This is clearly the case with bodily habits---for
instance, health and sickness. But those habits that have an
incorruptible subject, cannot be corrupted indirectly. There are,
however, some habits which, while residing chiefly in an incorruptible
subject, reside nevertheless secondarily in a corruptible subject; such
is the habit of science which is chiefly indeed in the "possible"
intellect, but secondarily in the sensitive powers of apprehension, as
stated above ([1479]Q[50], A[3], ad 3). Consequently the habit of
science cannot be corrupted indirectly, on the part of the "possible"
intellect, but only on the part of the lower sensitive powers.
We must therefore inquire whether habits of this kind can be corrupted
directly. If then there be a habit having a contrary, either on the
part of itself or on the part of its cause, it can be corrupted
directly: but if it has no contrary, it cannot be corrupted directly.
Now it is evident that an intelligible species residing in the
"possible" intellect, has no contrary; nor can the active intellect,
which is the cause of that species, have a contrary. Wherefore if in
the "possible" intellect there be a habit caused immediately by the
active intellect, such a habit is incorruptible both directly and
indirectly. Such are the habits of the first principles, both
speculative and practical, which cannot be corrupted by any
forgetfulness or deception whatever: even as the Philosopher says about
prudence (Ethic. vi, 5) that "it cannot be lost by being forgotten. "
There is, however, in the "possible" intellect a habit caused by the
reason, to wit, the habit of conclusions, which is called science, to
the cause of which something may be contrary in two ways. First, on the
part of those very propositions which are the starting point of the
reason: for the assertion "Good is not good" is contrary to the
assertion "Good is good" (Peri Herm. ii). Secondly, on the part of the
process of reasoning; forasmuch as a sophistical syllogism is contrary
to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism. Wherefore it is clear that a
false reason can corrupt the habit of a true opinion or even of
science. Hence the Philosopher, as stated above, says that "deception
is the corruption of science. " As to virtues, some of them are
intellectual, residing in reason itself, as stated in Ethic. vi, 1: and
to these applies what we have said of science and opinion. Some,
however, viz. the moral virtues, are in the appetitive part of the
soul; and the same may be said of the contrary vices. Now the habits of
the appetitive part are caused therein because it is natural to it to
be moved by the reason. Therefore a habit either of virtue or of vice,
may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever its motion is
contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion or
deliberate choice.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, a habit is like a
second nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while
the nature of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a
habit is removed, though with difficulty.
Reply to Objection 2: Although there is no contrary to intelligible
species, yet there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process
of reason, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Science is not taken away by movement of the
body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may
prove an obstacle to the act of science; in so far as the intellect, in
its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded by
corporal transmutation. But the intellectual movement of the reason can
corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the very root of the
habit. In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted. Nevertheless
when it is said that "virtue is more lasting than learning," this must
be understood in respect, not of the subject or cause, but of the act:
because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas
the use of learning does not.
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Whether a habit can diminish?
Objection 1: It would seem that a habit cannot diminish. Because a
habit is a simple quality and form. Now a simple thing is possessed
either wholly or not at all. Therefore although a habit can be lost it
cannot diminish.
Objection 2: Further, if a thing is befitting an accident, this is by
reason either of the accident or of its subject. Now a habit does not
become more or less intense by reason of itself; else it would follow
that a species might be predicated of its individuals more or less. And
if it can become less intense as to its participation by its subject,
it would follow that something is accidental to a habit, proper thereto
and not common to the habit and its subject. Now whenever a form has
something proper to it besides its subject, that form can be separate,
as stated in De Anima i, text. 13.
