No More Learning

Wherefore since at the resurrection it behooves human nature to be
restored to its perfection, nor does the natural heat tend to destroy
the natural humor, there will be no need for anything resulting from
food to rise again in man, but that alone will rise again which
belonged to the truth of the human nature of the individual, and this
reaches the aforesaid perfection in number and quantity by being
detached and multiplied.

The second opinion, since it maintains that what is produced from food
is needed for the perfection of quantity in the individual and for the
multiplication that results from generation, must needs admit that
something of this product from food shall rise again: not all, however,
but only so much as is required for the perfect restoration of human
nature in all its individuals. Hence this opinion asserts that all that
was in the substance of the seed will rise again in this man who was
begotten of this seed; because this belongs chiefly to the truth of
human nature in him: while of that which afterwards he derives from
nourishment, only so much will rise again in him as is needed for the
perfection of his quantity; and not all, because this does not belong
to the perfection of human nature, except in so far as nature requires
it for the perfection of quantity. Since however this nutrimental humor
is subject to ebb and flow the restoration will be effected in this
order, that what first belonged to the substance of a man's body, will
all be restored, and of that which was added secondly, thirdly, and so
on, as much as is required to restore quantity. This is proved by two
reasons. First, because that which was added was intended to restore
what was wasted at first, and thus it does not belong principally to
the truth of human nature to the same extent as that which came first.
Secondly, because the addition of extraneous humor to the first radical
humors results in the whole mixture not sharing the truth of the
specific nature as perfectly as the first did: and the Philosopher
instances as an example (De Gener. i) the mixing of water with wine,
which always weakens the strength of the wine, so that in the end the
wine becomes watery: so that although the second water be drawn into
the species of wine, it does not share the species of wine as perfectly
as the first water added to the wine. Even so that which is secondly
changed from food into flesh does not so perfectly attain to the
species of flesh as that which was changed first, and consequently does
not belong in the same degree to the truth of human nature nor to the
resurrection. Accordingly it is clear that this opinion maintains that
the whole of what belongs to the truth of human nature principally will
rise again, but not the whole of what belongs to the truth of human
nature secondarily.

The third opinion differs somewhat from the second and in some respects
agrees with it. It differs in that it maintains that whatever is under
the form of flesh and bone all belongs to the truth of human nature,
because this opinion does not distinguish as remaining in man during
his whole lifetime any signate matter that belongs essentially and
primarily to the truth of human nature, besides something ebbing and
flowing, that belongs. to the truth of human nature merely on account
of the perfection of quantity, and not on account of the primary being
of the species, as the second opinion asserted. But it states that all
the parts that are not beside the intention of the nature generated
belong to the truth of human nature, as regards what they have of the
species, since thus they remain; but not as regards what they have of
matter, since thus they are indifferent to ebb and flow: so that we are
to understand that the same thing happens in the parts of one man as in
the whole population of a city, for each individual is cut off from the
population by death, while others take their place: wherefore the parts
of the people flow back and forth materially, but remain formally,
since these others occupy the very same offices and positions from
which the former were withdrawn, so that the commonwealth is said to
remain the selfsame. In like manner, while certain parts are on the ebb
and others are being restored to the same shape and position, all the
parts flow back and forth as to their matter, but remain as to their
species; and nevertheless the selfsame man remains.

On the other hand, The third opinion agrees with the second, because it
holds that the parts which come secondly do not reach the perfection of
the species so perfectly as those which come first: and consequently
the third opinion asserts that the same thing rises again in man as the
second opinion maintains, but not for quite the same reason. For it
holds that the whole of what is produced from the seed will rise again,
not because it belongs to the truth of human nature otherwise than that
which comes after, but because it shares the truth of human nature more
perfectly: which same order the second opinion applied to those things
that are produced afterwards from food, in which point also these two
opinions agree.

Reply to Objection 1: A natural thing is what it is, not from its
matter but from its form; wherefore, although that part of matter which
at one time was under the form of bovine flesh rises again in man under
the form of human flesh, it does not follow that the flesh of an ox
rises again, but the flesh of a man: else one might conclude that the
clay from which Adam's body was fashioned shall rise again. The second
opinion, however, grants this argument.

Reply to Objection 2: That rib did not belong to the perfection of the
individual in Adam, but was directed to the multiplication of the
species. Hence it will rise again not in Adam but in Eve, just as the
seed will rise again, not in the begetter, but in the begotten.

Reply to Objection 3: According to the first opinion it is easy to
reply to this argument, because the flesh that is eaten never belonged
to the truth of human nature in the eater, but it did belong to the
truth of human nature in him whose flesh was eaten: and thus it will
rise again in the latter but not in the former. according to the second
and third opinions, each one will rise again in that wherein he
approached nearest to the perfect participation of the virtue of the
species, and if he approached equally in both, he will rise again in
that wherein he was first, because in that he first was directed to the
resurrection by union with the rational soul of that man. Hence if
there were any surplus in the flesh eaten, not belonging to the truth
of human nature in the first man, it will be possible for it to rise
again in the second: otherwise what belonged to the resurrection in the
first will rise again in him and not in the second; but in the second
its place is taken either by something of that which was the product
from other food, or if he never partook of any other food than human
flesh, the substitution is made by Divine power so far as the
perfection of quantity requires, as it does in those who die before the
perfect age. Nor does this derogate from numerical identity, as neither
does the ebb and flow of parts.

Reply to Objection 4: According to the first opinion this argument is
easily answered. For that opinion asserts that the seed is not from the
surplus food: so that the flesh eaten is not changed into the seed
whereof the child is begotten. But according to the other two opinions
we must reply that it is impossible for the whole of the flesh eaten to
be changed into seed, because it is after much separation that the seed
is distilled from the food, since seed is the ultimate surplus of food.
That part of the eaten flesh which is changed into seed belongs to the
truth of human nature in the one born of the seed more than in the one
of whose flesh the seed was the product. Hence according to the rule
already laid down (ad 3), whatever was changed into the seed will rise
again in the person born of the seed; while the remaining matter will
rise again in him of whose flesh the seed was the product.

Reply to Objection 5: The embryo is not concerned with the resurrection
before it is animated by a rational soul, in which state much has been
added to the seminal substance from the substance of food, since the
child is nourished in the mother's womb. Consequently on the
supposition that a man partook of such food, and that some one were
begotten of the surplus thereof, that which was in the seminal
substance will indeed rise again in the one begotten of that seed;
unless it contain something that would have belonged to the seminal
substance in those from whose flesh being eaten the seed was produced,
for this would rise again in the first but not in the second. The
remainder of the eaten flesh, not being changed into seed, will clearly
rise again in the first the Divine power supplying deficiencies in
both. The first opinion is not troubled by this objection, since it
does not hold the seed to be from the surplus food: but there are many
other reasons against it as may be seen in the Second Book (Sent. ii,
D, 30; [5071]FP, Q[119], A[2]).
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Whether whatever was materially in a man's members will all rise again?

Objection 1: It would seem that whatever was materially in a man's
members will all rise again. For the hair, seemingly, is less concerned
in the resurrection than the other members. Yet whatever was in the
hair will all rise again, if not in the hair, at least in other parts
of the body, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii) quoted in the text
(Sent. iv, D, 44). Much more therefore whatever was materially in the
other members will all rise again.

Objection 2: Further, just as the parts of the flesh are perfected as
to species by the rational soul, so are the parts as to matter. But the
human body is directed to the resurrection through being perfected by a
rational soul. Therefore not only the parts of species but also the
parts of matter will all rise again.

Objection 3: Further, the body derives its totality from the same cause
as it derives its divisibility into parts. But division into parts
belongs to a body in respect of matter the disposition of which is
quantity in respect of which it is divided. Therefore totality is
ascribed to the body in respect of its parts of matter. If then all the
parts of matter rise not again, neither will the whole body rise again:
which is inadmissible.

On the contrary, The parts of matter are not permanent in the body but
ebb and flow, as stated in De Gener. i. If, therefore, all the parts of
matter, which remain not but ebb and flow, rise again, either the body
of one who rises again will be very dense, or it will be immoderate in
quantity.

Further, whatever belongs to the truth of human nature in one man can
all be a part of matter in another man, if the latter were to partake
of his flesh. Therefore if all the parts of matter in one man were to
rise again it follows that in one man there will rise again that which
belongs to the truth of human nature in another: which is absurd.

I answer that, What is in man materially, is not directed to the
resurrection, except in so far as it belongs to the truth of human
nature; because it is in this respect that it bears a relation to the
human souls. Now all that is in man materially belongs indeed to the
truth of human nature in so far as it has something of the species, but
not all, if we consider the totality of matter; because all the matter
that was in a man from the beginning of his life to the end would
surpass the quantity due to his species, as the third opinion states,
which opinion seems to me more probable than the others. Wherefore the
whole of what is in man will rise again, if we speak of the totality of
the species which is dependent on quantity, shape, position and order
of parts, but the whole will not rise again if we speak of the totality
of matter. The second and first opinions, however, do not make this
distinction, but distinguish between parts both of which have the
species and matter. But these two opinions agree in that they both
state what is produced from the seed will all rise again even if we
speak of totality of matter: while they differ in this that the first
opinion maintains that nothing will rise again of that which was
engendered from food, whereas the second holds that something but not
all, thereof will rise again, as stated above [5072](A[4]).

Reply to Objection 1: Just as all that is in the other parts of the
body will rise again, if we speak of the totality of the species, but
not if we speak of material totality, so is it with the hair. In the
other parts something accrues from nourishment which causes growth, and
this is reckoned as another part, if we speak of totality of species,
since it occupies another place and position in the body, and is under
other parts of dimension: and there accrues something which does not
cause growth, but serves to make up for waste by nourishing. and this
is not reckoned as another part of the whole considered in relation to
the species, since it does not occupy another place or position in the
body than that which was occupied by the part that has passed away:
although it may be reckoned another part if we consider the totality of
matter. The same applies to the hair. Augustine, however, is speaking
of the cutting of hair that was a part causing growth of the body;
wherefore it must needs rise again, not however as regards the quantity
of hair, lest it should be immoderate, but it will rise again in other
parts as deemed expedient by Divine providence. Or else he refers to
the case when something will be lacking to the other parts, for then it
will be possible for this to be supplied from the surplus of hair.

Reply to Objection 2: According to the third opinion parts of species
are the same as parts of matter: for the Philosopher does not make this
distinction (De Gener. i) in order to distinguish different parts, but
in order to show that the same parts may be considered both in respect
of species, as to what belongs to the form and species in them, and in
respect of matter, as to that which is under the form and species. Now
it is clear that the matter of the flesh has no relation to the
rational soul except in so far as it is under such a form, and
consequently by reason thereof it is directed to the resurrection. But
the first and second opinions which draw a distinction between parts of
species and parts of matter say that although the rational soul
perfects both parts, it does not perfect parts of matter except by
means of the parts of species, wherefore they are not equally directed
to the resurrection.

Reply to Objection 3: In the matter of things subject to generation and
corruption it is necessary to presuppose indefinite dimensions before
the reception of the substantial form. Consequently division which is
made according to these dimensions belongs properly to matter. But
complete and definite quantity comes to matter after the substantial
form; wherefore division that is made in reference to definite quantity
regards the species especially when definite position of parts belongs
to the essence of the species, as in the human body.
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OF THE QUALITY OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the quality of those who rise again. Under this
head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether all will rise again in the youthful age?

(2) Whether they will be of equal stature?

(3) Whether all will be of the same sex?

(4) Whether they will rise again to the animal life?
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Whether all will rise again of the same age?

Objection 1: It would seem that all will not rise again of the same,
namely the youthful age. Because God will take nothing pertaining to
man's perfection from those who rise again, especially from the
blessed. Now age pertains to the perfection of man, since old age is
the age that demands reverence. Therefore the old will not rise again
of a youthful age.

Objection 2: Further, age is reckoned according to the length of past
time. Now it is impossible for past time not to have passed. Therefore
it is impossible for those who were of greater age to be brought back
to a youthful age.

Objection 3: Further, that which belonged most to the truth of human
nature in each individual will especially rise again in him. Now the
sooner a thing was in man the more would it seem to have belonged to
the truth of human nature, because in the end, through the strength of
the species being weakened the human body is likened to watery wine
according to the Philosopher (De Gener. i). Therefore if all are to
rise again of the same age, it is more fitting that they should rise
again in the age of childhood.

On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:13): "Until we all meet . . .
unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fulness of
Christ. "

Now Christ rose again of youthful age, which begins about the age of
thirty years, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii). Therefore others
also will rise again of a youthful age.

Further, man will rise again at the most perfect stage of nature. Now
human nature is at the most perfect stage in the age of youth.
Therefore all will rise again of that age.

I answer that, Man will rise again without any defect of human nature,
because as God founded human nature without a defect, even so will He
restore it without defect. Now human nature has a twofold defect.
First, because it has not yet attained to its ultimate perfection.
Secondly, because it has already gone back from its ultimate
perfection. The first defect is found in children, the second in the
aged: and consequently in each of these human nature will be brought by
the resurrection to the state of its ultimate perfection which is in
the youthful age, at which the movement of growth terminates, and from
which the movement of decrease begins.

Reply to Objection 1: Old age calls for reverence, not on account of
the state of the body which is at fault; but on account of the soul's
wisdom which is taken for granted on account of its being advanced in
years. Wherefore in the elect there will remain the reverence due to
old age on account of the fulness of Divine wisdom which will be in
them, but the defect of old age will not be in them.

Reply to Objection 2: We speak of age not as regards the number of
years, but as regards the state which the human body acquires from
years. Hence Adam is said to have been formed in the youthful age on
account of the particular condition of body which he had at the first
day of his formation. Thus the argument is not to the point.

Reply to Objection 3: The strength of the species is said to be more
perfect in a child than in a young man, as regards the ability to
transform nourishment in a certain way, even as it is more perfect in
the seed than in the mature man. In youth, however, it is more perfect
as regards the term of completion. Wherefore that which belonged
principally to the truth of human nature will be brought to that
perfection which it has in the age of youth, and not to that perfection
which it has in the age of a child, wherein the humors have not yet
reached their ultimate disposition.
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Whether all will rise again of the same stature?

Objection 1: It would seem that all will rise again of the same
stature. For just as man is measured by dimensive quantity, so is he by
the quantity of time. Now the quantity of time will be reduced to the
same measure in all, since all will rise again of the same age.
Therefore the dimensive quantity will also be reduced to the same
measure in all, so that all will rise again of the same stature.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "all
things in nature have a certain limit end measure of size and growth. "
Now this limitation can only arise by virtue of the form, with which
the quantity as well as all the other accidents ought to agree.
Therefore since all men have the same specific form, there should be
the same measure of quantity in respect of matter in all, unless an
error should occur. But the error of nature will be set right at the
resurrection. Therefore all will rise again of the same stature.

Objection 3: Further, it will be impossible for man in rising again to
be of a quantity proportionate to the natural power which first formed
his body; for otherwise those who could not be brought to a greater
quantity by the power of nature will never rise again of a greater
quantity, which is false. Therefore that quantity must needs be
proportionate to the power which will restore the human body by the
resurrection, and to the matter from which it is restored. Now the
selfsame, namely the Divine, power will restore all bodies; and all the
ashes from which the human bodies will be restored are equally disposed
to receive the action of that power. Therefore the resurrection of all
men will bring them to the same quantity: and so the same conclusion
follows.

On the contrary, Natural quantity results from each individual's
nature. Now the nature of the individual will not be altered at the
resurrection. Therefore neither will its natural quantity. But all are
not of the same natural quantity. Therefore all will not rise again of
the same stature.

Further, human nature will be restored by resurrection unto glory or
unto punishment. But there will not be the same quantity of glory or
punishment in all those who rise again. Neither therefore will there be
the same quantity of stature.

I answer that, At the resurrection human nature will be restored not
only in the self-same species but also in the selfsame individual: and
consequently we must observe in the resurrection what is requisite not
only to the specific but also to the individual nature. Now the
specific nature has a certain quantity which it neither exceeds nor
fails without error, and yet this quantity has certain degrees of
latitude and is not to be attached to one fixed measure; and each
individual in the human species aims at some degree of quantity
befitting his individual nature within the bounds of that latitude, and
reaches it at the end of his growth, if there has been no error in the
working of nature, resulting in the addition of something to or the
subtraction of something from the aforesaid quantity: the measure
whereof is gauged according to the proportion of heat as expanding, and
of humidity as expansive, in point of which all are not of the same
power. Therefore all will not rise again of the same quantity, but each
one will rise again of that quantity which would have been his at the
end of his growth if nature had not erred or failed: and the Divine
power will subtract or supply what was excessive or lacking in man.

Reply to Objection 1: It has already been explained (A[1], ad 2) that
all are said to rise again of the same age, not as though the same
length of time were befitting to each one, but because the same state
of perfection will be in all, which state is indifferent to a great or
small quantity.

Reply to Objection 2: The quantity of a particular individual
corresponds not only to the form of the species, but also to the nature
or matter of the individual: wherefore the conclusion does not follow.

Reply to Objection 3: The quantity of those who will be raised from the
dead is not proportionate to the restoring power, because the latter
does not belong to the power of the body---nor to the ashes, as to the
state in which they are before the resurrection---but to nature which
the individual had at first. Nevertheless if the formative power on
account of some defect was unable to effect the due quantity that is
befitting to the species, the Divine power will supply the defect at
the resurrection, as in dwarfs, and in like manner in those who by
immoderate size have exceeded the due bounds of nature.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether all will rise again of the male sex?

Objection 1: It would seem that all will rise again of the male sex.
For it is written (Eph. 4:13) that we shall all meet "unto a perfect
man," etc. Therefore there will be none but the male sex.

Objection 2: Further, in the world to come all pre-eminence will cease,
as a gloss observes on 1 Cor. 15:24. Now woman is subject to man in the
natural order. Therefore women will rise again not in the female but in
the male sex.

Objection 3: Further, that which is produced incidentally and beside
the intention of nature will not rise again, since all error will be
removed at the resurrection. Now the female sex is produced beside the
intention of nature, through a fault in the formative power of the
seed, which is unable to bring the matter of the fetus to the male
form: wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima xvi, i. e. De Generat.
Animal. ii) that "the female is a misbegotten male. " Therefore the
female sex will not rise again.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii): "Those are wiser,
seemingly, who doubt not that both sexes will rise again. "

Further, at the resurrection God will restore man to what He made him
at the creation. Now He made woman from the man's rib (Gn. 2:22).
Therefore He will also restore the female sex at the resurrection.

I answer that, Just as, considering the nature of the individual, a
different quantity is due to different men, so also, considering the
nature of the individual, a different sex is due to different men.
Moreover, this same diversity is becoming to the perfection of the
species, the different degrees whereof are filled by this very
difference of sex and quantity. Wherefore just as men will rise again
of various stature, so will they rise again of different sex. And
though there be difference of sex there will be no shame in seeing one
another, since there will no lust to invite them to shameful deeds
which are the cause of shame.

Reply to Objection 1: When it is said: We shall all meet "Christ unto a
perfect man," this refers not to the male sex but to the strength of
soul which will be in all, both men and women.

Reply to Objection 2: Woman is subject to man on account of the frailty
of nature, as regards both vigor of soul and strength of body. After
the resurrection, however, the difference in those points will be not
on account of the difference of sex, but by reason of the difference of
merits. Hence the conclusion does not follow.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the begetting of a woman is beside the
intention of a particular nature, it is in the intention of universal
nature, which requires both sexes for the perfection of the human
species. Nor will any defect result from sex as stated above (ad 2).
__________________________________________________________________

Whether all will rise again to animal life so as to exercise the functions
of nutrition and generation?

Objection 1: It would seem that they will rise again to the animal
life, or in other words that they will make use of the acts of the
nutritive and generative powers. For our resurrection will be conformed
to Christ's. But Christ is said to have ate after His resurrection (Jn.
21; Lk. 24). Therefore, after the resurrection men will eat, and in
like manner beget.

Objection 2: Further, the distinction of sexes is directed to
generation; and in like manner the instruments which serve the
nutritive power are directed to eating. Now man will rise again with
all these. Therefore he will exercise the acts of the generative and
nutritive powers.

Objection 3: Further, the whole man will be beatified both in soul and
in body. Now beatitude or happiness, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. i, 7), consists in a perfect operation. Therefore it must needs
be that all the powers of the soul and all the members should have
their respective acts after the resurrection. And so the same
conclusion follows as above.

Objection 4: Further, after the resurrection there will be perfect joy
in the blessed. Now such a joy includes all pleasures, since
"happiness" according to Boethius is "a state rendered perfect by the
accumulation of all goods" (De Consol. iii), and the perfect is that
which lacks nothing. Since then there is much pleasure in the act of
the generative and nutritive powers it would seem that such acts
belonging to animal life will be in the blessed, and much more in
others, who will have less spiritual bodies.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 22:30): "In the resurrection they
shall neither marry nor be married. "

Further, generation is directed to supply the defect resulting from
death, and to the multiplication of the human race: and eating is
directed to make up for waste, and to increase quantity. But in the
state of the resurrection the human race will already have the number
of individuals preordained by God, since generation will continue up to
that point. In like manner each man will rise again in due quantity;
neither will death be any more, nor any waste affect the parts of man.
Therefore the acts of the generative and nutritive powers would be void
of purpose.

I answer that, The resurrection will not be necessary to man on account
of his primary perfection, which consists in the integrity of those
things that belong to his nature, since man can attain to this in his
present state of life by the action of natural causes; but the
necessity of the resurrection regards the attainment of his ultimate
perfection, which consists in his reaching his ultimate end.
Consequently those natural operations which are directed to cause or
preserve the primary perfection of human nature will not be in the
resurrection: such are the actions of the animal life in man, the
action of the elements on one another, and the movement of the heavens;
wherefore all these will cease at the resurrection. And since to eat,
drink, sleep, beget, pertain to the animal life, being directed to the
primary perfection of nature, it follows that they will not be in the
resurrection.

Reply to Objection 1: When Christ partook of that meal, His eating was
an act, not of necessity as though human nature needed food after the
resurrection, but of power, so as to prove that He had resumed the true
human nature which He had in that state wherein He ate and drank with
His disciples. There will be no need of such proof at the general
resurrection, since it will be evident to all. Hence Christ is said to
have ate by dispensation in the sense in which lawyers say that a
"dispensation is a relaxation of the general law": because Christ made
an exception to that which is common to those who rise again (namely
not to partake of food) for the aforesaid motive. Hence the argument
does not prove.

Reply to Objection 2: The distinction of sexes and the difference of
members will be for the restoration of the perfection of human nature
both in the species and in the individual. Hence it does not follow
that they are without purpose, although they lack their animal
operations.

Reply to Objection 3: The aforesaid operations do not belong to man as
man, as also the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7), wherefore the
happiness of the human body does not consist therein. But the human
body will be glorified by an overflow from the reason whereby man is
man, inasmuch as the body will be subject to reason.

Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12, x, 5),
the pleasures of the body are medicinal, because they are applied to
man for the removal of weariness; or again, they are unhealthy, in so
far as man indulges in those pleasures inordinately, as though they
were real pleasures: just as a man whose taste is vitiated delights in
things which are not delightful to the healthy. Consequently it does
not follow that such pleasures as these belong to the perfection of
beatitude, as the Jews and Turks maintain, and certain heretics known
as the Chiliasts asserted; who, moreover, according to the
Philosopher's teaching, would seem to have an unhealthy appetite, since
according to him none but spiritual pleasures are pleasures simply, and
to be sought for their own sake: wherefore these alone are requisite
for beatitude.
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OF THE IMPASSIBILITY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED AFTER THEIR RESURRECTION
(FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the conditions under which the blessed rise again,
and (1) the impassibility of their bodies; (2) their subtlety; (3)
their agility; (4) their clarity. Under the first head there are four
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the bodies of the saints will be impassible after the
resurrection?

(2) Whether all will be equally impassible?

(3) Whether this impassibility renders the glorious bodies?

(4) Whether in them all the senses are in act?
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Whether the bodies of the saints will be impassible after the resurrection?

Objection 1: It seems that the bodies of the saints will not be
impassible after the resurrection. For everything mortal is passible.
But man, after the resurrection, will be "a mortal rational animal,"
for such is the definition of man, which will never be dissociated from
him. Therefore the body will be passible.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is in potentiality to have the form of
another thing is passible in relation to something else; for this is
what is meant by being passive to another thing (De Gener. i). Now the
bodies of the saints will be in potentiality to the form of another
thing after the resurrection; since matter, according as it is under
one form, does not lose its potentiality to another form. But the
bodies of the saints after the resurrection will have matter in common
with the elements, because they will be restored out of the same matter
of which they are now composed. Therefore they will be in potentiality
to another form, and thus will be passible.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. i),
contraries have a natural inclination to be active and passive towards
one another. Now the bodies of the saints will be composed of
contraries after the resurrection, even as now. Therefore they will be
passible.

Objection 4: Further, in the human body the blood and humors will rise
again, as stated above ([5073]Q[80], AA[3],4). Now, sickness and such
like passions arise in the body through the antipathy of the humors.
Therefore the bodies of the saints will be passible after the
resurrection.

Objection 5: Further, actual defect is more inconsistent with
perfection than potential defect. But passibility denotes merely
potential defect. Since then there will be certain actual defects in
the bodies of the blessed, such as the scars of the wounds in the
martyrs, even as they were in Christ, it would seem that their
perfections will not suffer, if we grant their bodies to be passible.

On the contrary, Everything passible is corruptible, because "increase
of passion results in loss of substance" [*Aristotle, Topic. vi, 1].
Now the bodies of the saints will be incorruptible after the
resurrection, according to 1 Cor. 15:42, "It is sown in corruption, it
shall rise in incorruption. " Therefore they will be impassible.

Further, the stronger is not passive to the weaker. But no body will be
stronger than the bodies of the saints, of which it is written (1 Cor.
15:43): "It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power. " Therefore
they will be impassible.

I answer that, We speak of a thing being "passive" in two ways [*Cf.
[5074]FS, Q[22], A[1]]. First in a broad sense, and thus every
reception is called a passion, whether the thing received be fitting to
the receiver and perfect it, or contrary to it and corrupt it. The
glorious bodies are not said to be impassible by the removal of this
kind of passion, since nothing pertaining to perfection is to be
removed from them. In another way we use the word "passive" properly,
and thus the Damascene defines passion (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) as being
"a movement contrary to nature. " Hence an immoderate movement of the
heart is called its passion, but a moderate movement is called its
operation. The reason of this is that whatever is patient is drawn to
the bounds of the agent, since the agent assimilates the patient to
itself, so that, therefore, the patient as such is drawn beyond its own
bounds within which it was confined. Accordingly taking passion in its
proper sense there will be no potentiality to passion in the bodies of
the saints after resurrection; wherefore they are said to be
impassible.

The reason however of this impassibility is assigned differently by
different persons. Some ascribe it to the condition of the elements,
which will be different then from what it is now. For they say that the
elements will remain, then, as to substance, yet that they will be
deprived of their active and passive qualities. But this does not seem
to be true: because the active and passive qualities belong to the
perfection of the elements, so that if the elements were restored
without them in the body of the man that rises again, they would be
less perfect than now. Moreover since these qualities are the proper
accidents of the elements, being caused by their form and matter, it
would seem most absurd for the cause to remain and the effect to be
removed. Wherefore others say that the qualities will remain, but
deprived of their proper activities, the Divine power so doing for the
preservation of the human body. This however would seem to be
untenable, since the action and passion of the active and passive
qualities is necessary for the mixture (of the elements), and according
as one or the other preponderates the mixed (bodies) differ in their
respective complexions, and this must apply to the bodies of those who
rise again, for they will contain flesh and bones and like parts, all
of which demand different complexions. Moreover, according to this,
impassibility could not be one of their gifts, because it would not
imply a disposition in the impassible substance, but merely an external
preventive to passion, namely the power of God, which might produce the
same effect in a human body even in this state of life. Consequently
others say that in the body itself there will be something preventing
the passion of a glorified body, namely the nature of a fifth [*The
other four being the elements; this fifth element was known to the
peripatetic philosophers as the quintessence, of which they held
heavenly bodies to be formed]: or heavenly body, which they maintain
enters into the composition of a human body, to the effect of blending
the elements together in harmony so as to be fitting matter for the
rational soul; but that in this state of life, on account of the
preponderance of the elemental nature, the human body is passible like
other elements, whereas in the resurrection the nature of the fifth
body will predominate, so that the human body will be made impassible
in likeness to the heavenly body. But this cannot stand, because the
fifth body does not enter materially into the composition of a human
body, as was proved above (Sent. ii, D, 12, Q. 1, A[1]). Moreover it is
absurd to say that a natural power, such as the power of a heavenly
body, should endow the human body with a property of glory, such as the
impassibility of a glorified body, since the Apostle ascribes to
Christ's power the transformation of the human body, because "such as
is the heavenly, such also are they that are heavenly" (1 Cor. 15:48),
and "He will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of
His glory, according to the operation whereby also He is able to subdue
all things unto Himself" (Phil. 3:21). And again, a heavenly nature
cannot exercise such power over the human body as to take from it its
elemental nature which is passible by reason of its essential
constituents. Consequently we must say otherwise that all passion
results from the agent overcoming the patient, else it would not draw
it to its own bounds. Now it is impossible for agent to overcome
patient except through the weakening of the hold which the form of the
patient has over its matter, if we speak of the passion which is
against nature, for it is of passion in this sense that we are speaking
now: for matter is not subject to one of two contraries, except through
the cessation or at least the diminution of the hold which the other
contrary has on it. Now the human body and all that it contains will be
perfectly subject to the rational soul, even as the soul will be
perfectly subject to God. Wherefore it will be impossible for the
glorified body to be subject to any change contrary to the disposition
whereby it is perfected by the soul; and consequently those bodies will
be impassible.

Reply to Objection 1: According to Anselm (Cur Deus Homo ii, 11),
"mortal is included in the philosophers' definition of man, because
they did not believe that the whole man could be ever immortal, for
they had no experience of man otherwise than in this state of
mortality. " Or we may say that since, according to the Philosopher
(Metaph. vi, 12), essential differences are unknown to us, we sometimes
employ accidental differences in order to signify essential differences
from which the accidental differences result. Hence "mortal" is put in
the definition of man, not as though mortality were essential to man,
but because that which causes passibility and mortality in the present
state of life, namely composition of contraries, is essential to man,
but it will not cause it then, on account of the triumph of the soul
over the body.

Reply to Objection 2: Potentiality is twofold, tied and free: and this
is true not only of active but also of passive potentiality. For the
form ties the potentiality of matter, by determining it to one thing,
and it is thus that it overcomes it. And since in corruptible things
form does not perfectly overcome matter, it cannot tie it completely so
as to prevent it from sometimes receiving a disposition contrary to the
form through some passion. But in the saints after the resurrection,
the soul will have complete dominion over the body, and it will be
altogether impossible for it to lose this dominion, because it will be
immutably subject to God, which was not the case in the state of
innocence. Consequently those bodies will retain substantially the same
potentiality as they have now to another form; yet that potentiality
will remain tied by the triumph of the soul over the body, so that it
will never be realized by actual passion.

Reply to Objection 3: The elemental qualities are the instruments of
the soul, as stated in De Anima ii, text. 38, seqq. , for the heat of
fire in an animal's body is directed in the act of nutrition by the
soul's power. When, however, the principal agent is perfect, and there
is no defect in the instrument, no action proceeds from the instrument,
except in accordance with the disposition of the principal agent.
Consequently in the bodies of the saints after the resurrection, no
action or passion will result from the elemental qualities that is
contrary to the disposition of the soul which has the preservation of
the body in view.

Reply to Objection 4: According to Augustine (Ep. ad Consent. cxlvi)
"the Divine power is able to remove" whatever qualities He will "from
this visible and tangible body, other qualities remaining. " Hence even
as in a certain respect "He deprived the flames of the Chaldees'
furnace of the power to burn, since the bodies of the children were
preserved without hurt, while in another respect that power remained,
since those flames consumed the wood, so will He remove passibility
from the humors while leaving their nature unchanged. " It has been
explained in the Article how this is brought about.

Reply to Objection 5: The scars of wounds will not be in the saints,
nor were they in Christ, in so far as they imply a defect, but as signs
of the most steadfast virtue whereby the saints suffered for the sake
of justice and faith: so that this will increase their own and others'
joy (Cf. [5075]TP, Q[54], A[4], ad 3). Hence Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xxii, 19): "We feel an undescribable love for the blessed martyrs
so as to desire to see in that kingdom the scars of the wounds in their
bodies, which they bore for Christ's name. Perchance indeed we shall
see them for this will not make them less comely but more glorious. A
certain beauty will shine in them, a beauty though in the body, yet not
of the body but of virtue. " Nevertheless those martyrs who have been
maimed and deprived of their limbs will not be without those limbs in
the resurrection of the dead, for to them it is said (Lk. 21:18): "A
hair of your head shall not perish. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether all will be equally impassible?

Objection 1: It would seem that all will be equally impassible. For a
gloss on 1 Cor. 15:42, "It is sown in corruption," says that "all have
equal immunity from suffering. " Now the gift of impassibility consists
in immunity from suffering. Therefore all will be equally impassible.

Objection 2: Further, negations are not subject to be more or less. Now
impassibility is a negation or privation of passibility. Therefore it
cannot be greater in one subject than in another.

Objection 3: Further, a thing is more white if it have less admixture
of black. But there will be no admixture of passibility in any of the
saints' bodies. Therefore they will all be equally impassible.

On the contrary, Reward should be proportionate to merit. Now some of
the saints were greater in merit than others. Therefore, since
impassibility is a reward, it would seem to be greater in some than in
others.

Further, impassibility is condivided with the gift of clarity. Now the
latter will not be equal in all, according to 1 Cor. 15:41. Therefore
neither will impassibility be equal in all.

I answer that, Impassibility may be considered in two ways, either in
itself, or in respect of its cause. If it be considered in itself,
since it denotes a mere negation or privation, it is not subject to be
more or less, but will be equal in all the blessed. on the other hand,
if we consider it in relation to its cause, thus it will be greater in
one person than in another. Now its cause is the dominion of the soul
over the body, and this dominion is caused by the soul's unchangeable
enjoyment of God. Consequently in one who enjoys God more perfectly,
there is a greater cause of impassibility.

Reply to Objection 1: This gloss is speaking of impassibility in itself
and not in relation to its cause.

Reply to Objection 2: Although negations and privations considered in
themselves are not increased nor diminished, yet they are subject to
increase and diminution in relation to their causes. Thus a place is
said to be more darksome from having more and greater obstacles to
light.

Reply to Objection 3: Some things increase not only by receding from
their contrary, but also by approach to a term: thus light increases.
Consequently impassibility also is greater in one subject than in
another, although there is no passibility remaining in any one.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether impassibility excludes actual sensation from glorified bodies?

Objection 1: It would seem that impassibility excludes actual sensation
from glorified bodies. For according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii,
11), "sensation is a kind of passion. " But the glorified bodies will be
impassible. Therefore they will not have actual sensation.

Objection 2: Further, natural alteration precedes spiritual*
alteration, just as natural being precedes intentional being. Now
glorified bodies, by reason of their impassibility, will not be subject
to natural alteration. [*"Animalem," as though it were derived from
"animus"---the mind. Cf. [5076]FS, Q[50], A[1],3m; [5077]FS, Q[52],
A[1],3m. ] Therefore they will not be subject to spiritual alteration
which is requisite for sensation.

Objection 3: Further, whenever actual sensation is due to a new
perception, there is a new judgment. But in that state there will be no
new judgment, because "our thoughts will not then be unchangeable," as
Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16). Therefore there will be no actual
sensation.

Objection 4: Further, when the act of one of the soul's powers is
intense, the acts of the other powers are remiss. Now the soul will be
supremely intent on the act of the contemplative power in contemplating
God. Therefore the soul will have no actual sensation whatever.

On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 1:7): "Every eye shall see Him. "
Therefore there will be actual sensation.

Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima i, 2) "the animate is
distinct from the inanimate by sensation and movement. " Now there will
be actual movement since they "shall run to and fro like sparks among
the reeds" (Wis. 3:7). Therefore there will also be actual sensation.

I answer that, All are agreed that there is some sensation in the
bodies of the blessed: else the bodily life of the saints after the
resurrection would be likened to sleep rather than to vigilance. Now
this is not befitting that perfection, because in sleep a sensible body
is not in the ultimate act of life, for which reason sleep is described
as half-life. [*This is what Aristotle says: "The good and the bad are
in sleep least distinguishable: hence men say that for half their lives
there is no difference between the happy and the unhappy" (Ethic. i,
13)] But there is a difference of opinion as to the mode of sensation.

For some say that the glorified bodies will be impassible, and
consequently "not susceptible to impressions from without" [*Cf. [5078]
Q[74], A[4], On the contrary] and much less so than the heavenly
bodies, because they will have actual sensations, not by receiving
species from sensibles, but by emission of species. But this is
impossible, since in the resurrection the specific nature will remain
the same in man and in all his parts. Now the nature of sense is to be
a passive power as the Philosopher proves (De Anima ii, text. 51,54).
Wherefore if the saints, in the resurrection, were to have sensations
by emitting and not by receiving species, sense in them would be not a
passive but an active power, and thus it would not be the same
specifically with sense as it is now, but would be some other power
bestowed on them; for just as matter never becomes form, so a passive
power never becomes active. Consequently others say that the senses
will be actualized by receiving species, not indeed from external
sensibles, but by an outflow from the higher powers, so that as now the
higher powers receive from the lower, so on the contrary the lower
powers will then receive from the higher. But this mode of reception
does not result in real sensation, because every passive power,
according to its specific nature, is determined to some special active
principle, since a power as such bears relation to that with respect to
which it is said to be the power. Wherefore since the proper active
principle in external sensation is a thing existing outside the soul
and not an intention thereof existing in the imagination or reason, if
the organ of sense be not moved by external things, but by the
imagination or other higher powers, there will be no true sensation.
Hence we do not say that madmen or other witless persons (in whom there
is this kind of outflow of species towards the organs of sense, on
account of the powerful influence of the imagination) have real
sensations, but that it seems to them that they have sensations.
Consequently we must say with others that sensation in glorified bodies
will result from the reception of things outside the soul. It must,
however, be observed that the organs of sense are transmuted by things
outside the soul in two ways. First by a natural transmutation, when
namely the organ is disposed by the same natural quality as the thing
outside the soul which acts on that organ: for instance, when the hand
is heated by touching a hot object, or becomes fragrant through contact
with a fragrant object. Secondly, by a spiritual transmutation, as when
a sensible quality is received in an instrument, according to a
spiritual mode of being, when, namely, the species or the intention of
a quality, and not the quality itself is received: thus the pupil
receives the species of whiteness and yet does not itself become white.
Accordingly the first reception does not cause sensation, properly
speaking, because the senses are receptive of species in matter but
without matter. that is to say without the material "being" which the
species had outside the soul (De Anima ii, text. 121). This reception
transmutes the nature of the recipient, because in this way the quality
is received according to its material "being. " Consequently this kind
of reception will not be in the glorified bodies, but the second, which
of itself causes actual sensation, without changing the nature of the
recipient.

Reply to Objection 1: As already explained, by this passion that takes
place in actual sensation and is no other than the aforesaid reception
of species, the body is not drawn away from natural quality, but is
perfected by a spiritual change. Wherefore the impassibility of
glorified bodies does not exclude this kind of passion.

Reply to Objection 2: Every subject of passion receives the action of
the agent according to its mode. Accordingly if there be a thing that
is naturally adapted to be altered by an active principle, with a
natural and a spiritual alteration, the natural alteration precedes the
spiritual alteration, just as natural precedes intentional being. If
however a thing be naturally adapted to be altered only with a
spiritual alteration it does not follow that it is altered naturally.
For instance the air is not receptive of color, according to its
natural being, but only according to its spiritual being, wherefore in
this way alone is it altered: whereas, on the contrary, inanimate
bodies are altered by sensible qualities only naturally and not
spiritually. But in the glorified bodies there cannot be any natural
alteration, and consequently there will be only spiritual alteration.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as there will be new reception of species in
the organs of sensation, so there will be new judgment in the common
sense: but there will be no new judgment on the point in the intellect;
such is the case with one who sees what he knew before. The saying of
Augustine, that "there our thoughts will not be changeable," refers to
the thoughts of the intellectual part: therefore it is not to the
point.

Reply to Objection 4: When one of two things is the type of the other,
the attention of the soul to the one does not hinder or lessen its
attention to the other: thus a physician while considering urine is not
less but more able to bear in mind the rules of his art concerning the
colors of urine. And since God is apprehended by the saints as the type
of all things that will be done or known by them, their attention to
perceiving sensibles, or to contemplating or doing anything else will
nowise hinder their contemplation of God, nor conversely. Or we may say
that the reason why one power is hindered in its act when another power
is intensely engaged is because one power does not alone suffice for
such an intense operation, unless it be assisted by receiving from the
principle of life the inflow that the other powers or members should
receive. And since in the saints all the powers will be most perfect,
one will be able to operate intensely without thereby hindering the
operation of another power even as it was with Christ.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether in the blessed, after the resurrection, all the senses will be in
act?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the senses are not in act there.
For touch is the first of all the senses (De Anima ii, 2). But the
glorified body will lack the actual sense of touch, since the sense of
touch becomes actual by the alteration of an animal body by some
external body preponderating in some one of the active or passive
qualities which touch is capable of discerning: and such an alteration
will then be impossible. Therefore all the senses will not be in act
there.

Objection 2: Further, the sense of taste assists the action of the
nutritive power. Now after the resurrection there will be no such
action, as stated above ([5079]Q[81], A[4]).