kukkurapaksisrgdlasisumdrasarpamarkafdh sat prdnakdh kena cid baddhd madhye granthim krtvotsrstdh / te svakarh svakarh gocaravisayam
dkdhksante
/ grdmakafasmasdnodakavalmikavand kdnksandd evam sad imdnindrtydni.
AbhidharmakosabhasyamVol-4VasubandhuPoussinPruden1991
42 (p.
85 of the Petrograd edition).
The Sutra says: caksusa rilpani drstvd na nimittagrahi'.
.
.
"Having seen visibles by the eye, he does not conceive any affection.
.
.
" As the eye sees, so too the pudgala sees by the eye {yasmdc caksuh paiyati tasmdt pudgala/ caksusa paiyati; see below note 38).
The Vydkhyd for iii. 43a admits the two hypotheses that Vasubandhu attributes death (cyuti) to the mind (citta), or to the pudgala.
Buddhaghosa, in his Manorathapurani, i. 95, explains in terms of which Vasubandhu would approve, why the Bhagavat speaks of a pudgala, even though a pudgala does not exist.
***
? 1. Vyakhyd: kirn khalv ato'nyatra mokso ndstiti / na pramddyam mumuksubhir iti vacandd ayam eva moksopdyo nasty ato'nyo moksopdyas tad atra moktukdmaih pramddo na kartavya ity arthad uktam dcdryena / codakah pfcchati kim khalv ata iti vistaral? .
Vasubandhu said, "Those who desire deliverance should apply themselves without weakness to this doctrine. " That is to say, "There is no deliverance outside of this doctrine. " The opponent answers, "Is there then no deliverance . . . "
2. On this subject, see the stanza of the Stotrakara (=Matrceta, Takakusu, l-tsing, p. 156): sdhamkdre manasi na samam ydti janmaprabandho
ndhamkdras calati hrdaydd dtmadrstau ca satydm /
anyah iditdjagati cayat? ndsti nairdtmyavddi
ndnyas tasmdd upasamavidhes tvanmatdd asti mdrgah //
"As long as the mind {manas- citta) is accompanied by the idea of "I," the series of rebirths cannot be stopped; the idea of "I" is not removed from the heart as long as there exists the view that there is a soul {dtman). Now there is not in the world any master who teaches the non-existence of the soul (nairdtmya-vddin), except you. Thus, there is not, outside of your doctrine, any other path of deliverance. "
Compare the stanzas attributed to the Acarya, Bodhicarydvatdrapanjikd, 492: yah pa/yaty dtmdnam tasydham iti sas vat ah snehah / snehdt sukhesu trsyati trsnddosdms tiraskurute. . .
The same for Candraklrti, Madhyamakdvatdra, vi. 120 (quoting the Madhyamakavrtti, p. 340), "Seeing through, prajfid that all defilements and all evil {kleia, doso) comes from the idea of self (satkayadrstt), and taking into consideration that the object of this idea is the soul {dtman), the ascetic (yogin) denies the soul. "
3. Saeki cites a commentary on the Vijfiaptimatra, 2,4: a. the asamskrtas do not exist; b. that which exists {asti-dharma- bhdva) is of three types: things known through direct perception, matter (color), the mind; things like pots and clothes {hsien shouyung fa ? 9? ? ? )'>> things like the organs (yu tso yungfa 'ft'fF^fc'fe ); ? three concep- tions of the self: identical to the skandhas, different from the skandhas, neither identical or different.
4. Agama, the proof from authority, is not mentioned because it is included within anumdna, inference.
5. Entity = bhdva; Hsuan-tsang translates this asyu-fa ^$? which calls to mind the atthidhamma of Buddhaghosa.
6. Vyakhyd: pratyaksam upalabdhir iti pratyaksam ity upalabdhivihsanam / pratyaksam tad upalabdhih pratyaksata upalabdhir ity arthah / athavd pratyaksam pramdnam upalabdhir upalabhyate'naya ity upalabdhih /
On upalabdhi, i. English trans, p. 74, ii. p. 205 , Sutralamkdra, p. 155.
The object of the mental consciousness is defined by YaSomitra: {upalabdhir) dharmdyatanasya vedanddilaksanasya yogivisayasya ca = the perception of the dharmdyatana (that is to say, vedand, etc. ) and of things which the Yogins perceive. (In fact the mental consciousness of the Yogins knows the minds and mental states of others, vii. ll).
But how can perception {upalabdhi) by the manas be pratyaksam, immediate or direct perception? In fact the manas which has just arisen is known by the manas which immediately follows (i. 17): manasas ca kim pratyaksam upalabdhih / samanantaranirud- dharh hi mano'nantarotpannena manovijnanena vijn~ayate. There is a difficulty here. Some other masters (the Sautrantikas) think that the mind knows itself: the subject and the object of the consciousness are both directly perceived: raktam vd dvistam vd sukhasamprayuktam va duhkhasamprayuktam vd (iv. 49) ity evamadi svasamvedyatayd (pratyaksam) ity apare / tad etad dvividham pratyaksam grdhyagatam grahakagatam vd.
7. Vyakhyd: maharsipranidhijndnaparicchinnatvdd asty eva caksurddikam indriyam
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? 1360 Chapter Nine
caksurvijnanddikdranam iti / sarvesdm avivdddc ca.
See i. 9c (Vyakhyd, p. 25), 44a. On pranidhijnana, see vii. 37.
8. Vyakhyd: Vdtsiputriyd Aryasammatiyah / anena vitathdtmadrstinivistatvalaksano hetur anaikdntika iti darsayati / na hi vdtsiputriydndm mokso nesyate bauddhatvdt / atha vd prdkpaksavirodhah / sdpaksdlo'yam pakso nasty dtmd ity anena darfayati.
From two things, one. The Vatslputriyas believe in a certain type of real self: now they are Buddhists, and one cannot deny that they can obtain deliverance: thus the author is wrong in saying that a false conception of the self creates an obstacle to deliverance. Or rather the thesis which denies the self is false.
On the avaktavyatd of the pudgala, see, for example, Madhyamakavrtti, 283.
9. Color, sound, etc. , are distinct things (bhinnalaksana); milk, a house, and an army are complexes of colors, tastes, odors, and tangibles, of straw and wood, of elephants, horses, and chariots, not of separate things, bhdvdntara: milk is nothing other than color, etc.
Compare Sutrdlamkdra, xviii. 92: prajfiaptyastitayd vdcyah pudgalo dravyato na tu.
10. YaSomitra quotes this stanza of Dharmaklrti:
varsdtapabhydm kirn vyomnas carmany asti tayol? phalam /
carmopamas cet so'nityah khatulyas ced asatphalah //
Sarvadariana, p. 10 (1858); Nyayavdrttika, ii. l, 5, Tatparya, 164; in Slokavdrttika:
khatulyas ced asatsamah; Naiskarmyasiddhi, ii. 60, etc.
If the pudgala is unconditioned (asamskrta), eternal, unmodifiable, it is like space, it is
like not existing. There exists only that which is "capable of action" (arthakriyd), that which is momentary (yat sat tat ksanikam): a thesis of the Sautrantikas; for the Vaibhasikas, the asamskrtas (space and the two nirodhas, i. 5c) exist.
11. For the Vatslputriya, as for Vasubandhu, the skandhas of the past and of the future do not exist. The meaning of the expressions ddhydtmika (or abhyantara) and upatta is explained in Kosa, i. 34d, 39a-b.
12. The Vyakhyd attributes this paragraph to the author, not to the Vatslputriyas. 13. For certain commentators, idhyate and dahyate are equivalent.
14. Astagravyaka (ii. 22): the four mahdbhutas or primary substances, and the four updddyarupas, from rupa (the visible) to the tangible.
15. The thing on fire (pradipta) is a complex; it is at one and the same time burner (fire) and the thing burning (indhana): in fact this thing is constituted of four elementary substances (above note 13), and one of these substances which is "heat" is the fire.
16. Earth and water are different, for their laksanas differ; the same holds for the burner and the thing burned.
17. Vyakhyd: updddyarthas tu vaktavya iti/ ananyatvdd ity abhiprdyah. We must give the word updddya an explanantion that justifies the thesis that fire and fuel are not different.
18. The fuel is made up of three mahdbhutas, and fire is its usmalaksana, the fourth mahdbhuta. They arise at the same time, like two horns.
19. One should understand: indhanam updddya - indhanam dsritya: the fire takes it support from the fuel. Or rather the meaning is that of sahabhdva, co-existence, or sahotpada, co-arising.
20. Paramartha: If he says, "that which is hot by its nature (the fire) is called hot. The object in question (fuel), although different from fire which is hot by nature, becomes hot through its association with that which is hot by its nature," we conclude that it is not incorrect to say that fire and fuel differ.
? 21. See below note 32. See the Sdrhmitiyanikdyaidstra. 22. Stcherbatski, p. 832, differs.
23. This is perhaps better translated, "is ascertained. "
24. The Chinese fen-pieh kuan ^}*g|| ? maintains the version "to discern. " "By reason of physical matter, etc. , which the eye perceives (as its own object), the visual consciousness "indirectly knows," "knows in second rank" the pudgala, because physical matter is the support (updddna) of the pudgala. And one cannot say that the pudgala is physical matter.
25. In this hypothesis physical matter is not the cause of the perception of the pudgala: there is perception of the pudgala "through relationship" with physical matter.
26. Compare Samyutta, iv. 166. 27. Not by reason of three.
28. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 57cl8. The Vydkhyd quotes the first words, caksur bhikso hetur (caksurvijndnotpdddya / ruparh bhikso pratyayah . . . ).
Vydkhyd: hetur asannah pratyayah / viprakrstas tu pratyaya eva / / janako hetuh pratyayas tv dlambanamdtram ity apare / parydydv etdv ity apare. See ii. 61c, vii. 13a, p.
1112, 1113.
29. Saeki has a note (fol. 14a) on the Darstantika theory of the six vijfidnas. 30. Thus none of them "perceive" a pudgala.
31. Madhyama, TD 1, p. 791bll-17: svakarh gocaravisayarh pratyanubhavanti / ? ? ? ? ad anyasya gocaravisayarh pratyanubhavati / manas caisdrh pratisaranam.
Samyutta, v. 218: pancimdni brdhmana indriydni ndndvisaydni ndndgocardni ndnnaman- nassa gocaravisayarh paccanubhonti / katamdni pan ? a . . . / imesarh kho pancannam indriydnam ndndvisaydnam ndndgocardnarh na annamannassa gocaravisayarh paccanubhon- tdnarh mano patisaranam mano ca nesarh gocaravisayarh paccanubhoti.
On the formula manai caisdrh pratisaranam, the Vydkhyd says: anusangenedam uktam / nedam uddharanam / tathdpi tu manai catsdm indriydnam pratisaranam iti tadapeksdnin- driydni vijndnotpatta vijndnotpattau kdranam bhavantity arthah.
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 449al6. The Darstantikas say, "The objects of the six vijndnakdyas, caksurvijndna, etc. , are distinct. " They say, "The manovijndna has a distinct object; it does not bear on the objects of the five vijfidnas, caksurvijndna, etc. " They say, "The six vijridnas bear solely on external objects; they do not bear on the internal (ddhydtmika, see p. 1313) organs, nor on the vijndna. " In order to refute this opinion, it is explained that the first five vijfidnas have distinct objects, bearing solely on external objects, not bearing on the organs and the vijndna; but that the manovijndna has an object common to the five vijfidnas and also a different object, which bears on the internal organs and also on the vijndna. It has been explained, Koia, i. 48a, that among the eighteen dhdtuS, thirteen are the object of a single manovijndna with the exclusion of visible things, of sounds, etc. , which are also the object of the caksurvijndna, etc.
32. The words in parentheses are according to Hsuan-tsang.
Bhdsya and Vydkhyd: na vd pudgalo visaya iti (yadi sutram pramdnikriyate) / na ced
visayah (yadi na kasya cid vijfidnasya visayah) na tarhi vijneyah (tatas ca pancavidham jneyam iti svasiddhdnto bddhyate) (above note 21).
Paramartha: Or rather the pudgala is not an object. If it is not an object, it is not discerned by the six consciousnesses.
33. In spite of the Sutra, you affirm that the object of the mental consciousness is general; so too, in spite of the Sutra, you affirm that the pudgala is discernible by the visual consciousness.
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34. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 313al5, Ekottara, TD 2, p. 723cl8; Samyutta, iv. 198. sad imdmndriydni ndndgocardni . . .
kukkurapaksisrgdlasisumdrasarpamarkafdh sat prdnakdh kena cid baddhd madhye granthim krtvotsrstdh / te svakarh svakarh gocaravisayam dkdhksante / grdmakafasmasdnodakavalmikavand kdnksandd evam sad imdnindrtydni. . .
35. The desire (dkdnksana) to see, to understand, etc, is certainly foreign to the organs of sight, hearing, etc. , which are material (rupasvabhdvatvdt), and also to the visual consciousness, the auditory consciousness, etc. , which are non-imaginative (nirvikalpakat- vdt). This refers, under the name of the organ of the eye (caksurindriya), to the mental consciousness led by the predominating, specifying action of this organ, tadddhipatydd- hydhrta.
36. Samyutta, iv. 29: sabbath bhikkhave abhinhdpariHneyyam / kim ca bhikkhave abhinudparinneyyam / rupam bhikkhave abhinh~dparih"neyyam cakkhuvirindnam . . .
37. Compare Vasumitra, Sectes, on jneya, vijneya, and abhijh~eya.
38. This according to Hsiian-tsang. Paramartha: "The master who believes in a self says, 'I see the pudgala through ( & yu by means of) the eye'; as he sees that there is a self in ( ? ? ? ? ) that which is not a self, he falls . . . "
The Bhdsyam has the word anatmana which the Vydkhyd glosses as caksusd caksurvijnanenety arthah. Thus one should understand the^<< of Paramartha in the sense of the instrumental, "As he sees, through that which is not a self--that is to say through the eye, through the visual consciousness . . . "
Stcherbatski: "This idea of yours that there is an existing self who through the opening of his eyes contemplates other selves, this idea it is which is called Wrong Personalism. "
One can draw the conclusion from the formula caksusd rupdni drspvd that the pudgala sees through the eyes; Vydkhyd ad i. 42, p. 117 (Petrograd ed. ). Cullaniddesa 234 has: cakkhuna puriso dlokati rupagatdni. See below n. 67.
39. According to Paramartha and Hsiian-tsang. Stcherbatski, "In the Ajita-sermon. "
40. Version of Paramartha. This is the well-known text: caksuh pratitya rupdni cotpadyate caksurvijndnam / traydndm samnipdtah spars'ah / sahajdtd vedand sarhjna cetand. . . See iii. 32a-b.
41. Paramurtha transcribes; Hsiian-tsang: nara-na ramate, mdnava-ju-t'ung ? ? - scholar-kumdra, jantu, "who is born".
A YogacSrin commentary quoted by Saeki says: sattva, because all the Aryans truly see that only the dharmas exist, no other thing; or rather because there is affection therein (sattva from sakta, as in Buddhaghosa? ); manoja (i-sheng ? ? )> because it is constituted by the manas. . . pudgala, because it goes frequently taking up realms of rebirth without the power to be disgusted with t\\em\jiva, because it presently lives through union with the dyus (Kosa, ii. 45); jantu (sheng ^ ), because all the dharma which exist are endowed with arising.
Other lists contain thirteen names. Among them, yaksa, Suttanipdta, 875.
On sattva, see Ledi Sadaw, JPTS, 1914, 133, Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhist Psychology, 1914, 83. We have seen that sattva signifies "that which perishes," v. n. 27 and above p. 1319.
42. See below note 71.
43. The Sutra of the four "authorities," "supports," is quoted in the Vydkhyd ad ii. 46, English trans, p. 241: catvdrtmdni bhiksavah pratisarandni / katamdni catvdri / dharmah pratisaranam na pudgalah / arthah pratisaranam na vyanjanam / nttdrtham sutrarh pratisaranam na neydrthdm / jfldnam pratisaranam na vijfldnam.
Mahdvyutpatti, 74, where the order differs: arthapratisaranena bhavitavyam na
? vyanjanapratisaranena, dharma. . . jndna. . . nitarthasutrapratisaranena. . . (Extracted from the Hsien-yang, TD 31, Tokyo, xviii. 7,10a).
Dharmasamgraba, 53; Sutrdlamkdra, xviii. 31-33; J. As. 1902, ii. 269, Madhyamakavrtti, 268, 598.
Pratisarana, pratiiarana (Divya, 427. 22, 176. 26, where the editor translates the word as "confidence") is translated ? ? ? pa (confidence) and rten-pa (support), i 0c (support), and Hang It (authority).
i. Bodhisattvabhumi, I. xvii.
katharh bodhisattvas catursu pratisaranesu prayujyate.
iha bodhisattvah arthart hi par at? dharmam srnoti na vyanjandbhisamskdrdrthi /
arthart hi dharmam irnvan na vyanjandrthi prakrtaydpi vdcd dharmam desyamdnam arthapratisarano bodhisattvah satkrtya srnoti.
punar bodhisattvah kdldpadesam mahdpadesam ca (Digha, ii. 124, etc. ) yathdbhutam prajdndti / prajdnan yuktipratisarano bhavati na sthavirendbhijndnena vd pudgalena tathdgatena vd samghena vd ime dharma bhdsitd iti pudgalapratisarano bhavati / sa evam yuktipratisarano na pudgalapratisaranas tattvdrthdn na vicalati aparapratyayas ca bhavati dharmesu. (aparapratyaya- gzhan las ses mayin, Madhyamakavrtti, xxiv. 8).
punar bodhisattvas tathdgate nivistasraddho nivtstaprasdda aikdntiko vacasy abhiprasannas tathdgatanitdrthasutram pratisarati na neydrtham / nitdrtham sutram pratisarann asarhhdryo bhavaty asmdd dharmavinaydt / tatra hi neydrthasya sutrasya ndndmukhaprakrtdrthavibhdgo 'niscitah samdehakaro bhavati / sacet punar bodhisattvo nitdrthe'pi sutre'naikdntikah sydd evam asau samhdryah sydd asmdd dharmavinaydt.
punar bodhisattvah) adhigamajndne sddarsi (? ) bhavati na ca srutacintddharmdrthavijnd- namdtrake / sayad bhdvandmayena jndnena jndtavyam na tac chakyam srutacintdvijndnamd- trakena vijndtum iti viditvd paramagambhirdn api tathdgatabhdsitdn dharmdn irutvd na pratiksipati napavadati /
evam . . . caturndm prdmdnyam prakd/itam bhdsitasydrthasya yukteh iastur bhdvand- mayasya cddhigamajndnasya.
ii. arthah pratisaranam . . . A notion expressed in the Mahdvagga, i. 23, 4, Majjhima, ii. 240;developedintheLanka:arthapratisaranenabhavitavyam. . . andagainarthdnusdrind bhavitavyam na deiandbhildpdbhinivistena. A "word" is like a finger which touches the object that one should see; one must remove the finger in order to see the object (Lanka quoted in the Subhdsitasamgraha, ed. Bendall, fol. 34).
On the relation between the attha and the vyanjanas, see Digha, iii. 127-129, Nettippakarana, 21.
iii. dharmah pratisaranam na pudgalah. Variant: yuktipratisarano bhavati na pudgalapratisaranah.
The refuge is the truth itself, not authority whatever it may be, even the Buddha. This is the teaching of the Majjhima, i. 265. He who says, "These dharmas are taught by a Sthavira, a person possessing the abhijnds, the Tathagata, or the Sarhgha," is pudgalapratisarana.
Do not lose sight of the teaching of the mahdpadesds, below note 56.
iv. A nitartha Sutra is a vibhaktdrtha Sutra, "of explicit meaning"; a neydrtha Sutra is of undetermined meaning, of meaning yet to be determined (Vydkhyd ad iii. 28). iv. 30, English trans, p. 614, calls for a Sutra of explicit meaning. Vasumitra, Sectes.
It appears that the sole canonical text of interest here is Anguttara, i. 60: to attribute to the Tathagata that which has not been said; to not recognize as said by him that which he has said; to consider as neyyattha a nitattha Suttanta, and vice versa. (The theory of the Sutra exact in its words but badly understood, Digha, iii. 127-128, can lead to the distinction between nitattha and neyyattha Sutras).
Nitattha and neyyattha in the Nettippakarana (where the meaning conforms to the letter, yathdrutavasena ndtabbattham, where the meaning should be determined through reflection, niddhdretvdgahetabbattham); and in the Dipavamsa (Oldenberg, ed. , p. 36) quoted in the Introduction to the Commentary on the Kathdvatthu (JPTS, 1889, p. 3). "To
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confuse pariydyabhdsita and nippariyayabhasita (compare Visuddhimagga, 473, 499: that which should not be understood literally, and that which should be understood literally, nitattha and neyyattha; to attribute another meaning (other than the true meaning) to what has been said with a certain intention (samdhaya bhanita): thus, respecting the letter destroysthemeaning;tocreatepseudo-Sutras . . . "
Atthasalini, 91, "We shall weigh the sense of the Sutra that you allege . . . "
Samghabhadra, iii. 25 (Tokyo xxiii. 4, ? ? ? 6). According to the Sthavira, all dryd defand promulgated by the Buddha himself {tathdgatabhdsita- ahaccavacana of the Nettippaka- rana, 21) is nitdrthasutra; the other Sutras are anitdrtba. Samghabhadra observes initially that this definition is not found in Scripture; then it is bad reasoning: for there are Sutras not promulgated by the Buddha which are nitartha, and vice versa. Examples follow. It is said, "It is impossible to say, if not through abhimdna (or "presumption"): I shall enter into the animitta without supporting myself on the void" (These words are not by the Buddha himself, yet the Sutra is nitdrtha) . . .
The Schools, as we see in Wassiliev, 329, and in the Madhyamakdvatdra, vi. 94, are not in agreement in placing Sutras in these two categories.
v. We have seen that, according to the Bodhisattvabhumi, adhigamajnana is absorption consciousness (bhdvandmaya), whereas vijndna is consciousness obtained through hearing and reflection (frutacinta).
According to the Vibhajyavadins,/<<i<<d is good in and of itself; vijndna is good when it is associated with jnana (? ? fa, iv. 8b, note 46): it can be understood that jndna is "supermundane knowledge," and that the vijndna, worldly knowledge, is good when it is consecutive to supermundane knowledge.
According to iv. 75, an opinion of the "ancient masters," adhigata (what one knows by absorption) forms part of the vijfidta: but this refers to a worldly consciousness, a worldly absorption.
(In the Sutra of the Four Pratisaranas, jndna primarily designates the knowledge of the Aryans, andfravajfiana, exacdy as prajnd is, among all the prajuds--which can be avyakrta, klista, or kusala,--the pure prajfid). See above notes 36 and 37.
Some notes in the Madhyamakavrtti, xxv, 16, p. 65, 74. Jndna is distinguished from vijndna in the Gita, iii. 4l, vL8, vii. 2, ix. 1, xviii. 42.
44. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 91a27, "All, that is to say, the twelve dyatanas, the eye, etc. "; Kofa, v. trans, p. 819, Mahdniddesa, 133, Samyutta, iv. 15: sabbath vuccati dvddasayatandni.
On sarva, sabba, see ? ? fa, v. 27c, Warren, p. 158, Mrs. Rhys Davids' Points of Controversy, 85, Stcherbatski, Central Conception, 5; Nirvana (1925), p.
The Vydkhyd for iii. 43a admits the two hypotheses that Vasubandhu attributes death (cyuti) to the mind (citta), or to the pudgala.
Buddhaghosa, in his Manorathapurani, i. 95, explains in terms of which Vasubandhu would approve, why the Bhagavat speaks of a pudgala, even though a pudgala does not exist.
***
? 1. Vyakhyd: kirn khalv ato'nyatra mokso ndstiti / na pramddyam mumuksubhir iti vacandd ayam eva moksopdyo nasty ato'nyo moksopdyas tad atra moktukdmaih pramddo na kartavya ity arthad uktam dcdryena / codakah pfcchati kim khalv ata iti vistaral? .
Vasubandhu said, "Those who desire deliverance should apply themselves without weakness to this doctrine. " That is to say, "There is no deliverance outside of this doctrine. " The opponent answers, "Is there then no deliverance . . . "
2. On this subject, see the stanza of the Stotrakara (=Matrceta, Takakusu, l-tsing, p. 156): sdhamkdre manasi na samam ydti janmaprabandho
ndhamkdras calati hrdaydd dtmadrstau ca satydm /
anyah iditdjagati cayat? ndsti nairdtmyavddi
ndnyas tasmdd upasamavidhes tvanmatdd asti mdrgah //
"As long as the mind {manas- citta) is accompanied by the idea of "I," the series of rebirths cannot be stopped; the idea of "I" is not removed from the heart as long as there exists the view that there is a soul {dtman). Now there is not in the world any master who teaches the non-existence of the soul (nairdtmya-vddin), except you. Thus, there is not, outside of your doctrine, any other path of deliverance. "
Compare the stanzas attributed to the Acarya, Bodhicarydvatdrapanjikd, 492: yah pa/yaty dtmdnam tasydham iti sas vat ah snehah / snehdt sukhesu trsyati trsnddosdms tiraskurute. . .
The same for Candraklrti, Madhyamakdvatdra, vi. 120 (quoting the Madhyamakavrtti, p. 340), "Seeing through, prajfid that all defilements and all evil {kleia, doso) comes from the idea of self (satkayadrstt), and taking into consideration that the object of this idea is the soul {dtman), the ascetic (yogin) denies the soul. "
3. Saeki cites a commentary on the Vijfiaptimatra, 2,4: a. the asamskrtas do not exist; b. that which exists {asti-dharma- bhdva) is of three types: things known through direct perception, matter (color), the mind; things like pots and clothes {hsien shouyung fa ? 9? ? ? )'>> things like the organs (yu tso yungfa 'ft'fF^fc'fe ); ? three concep- tions of the self: identical to the skandhas, different from the skandhas, neither identical or different.
4. Agama, the proof from authority, is not mentioned because it is included within anumdna, inference.
5. Entity = bhdva; Hsuan-tsang translates this asyu-fa ^$? which calls to mind the atthidhamma of Buddhaghosa.
6. Vyakhyd: pratyaksam upalabdhir iti pratyaksam ity upalabdhivihsanam / pratyaksam tad upalabdhih pratyaksata upalabdhir ity arthah / athavd pratyaksam pramdnam upalabdhir upalabhyate'naya ity upalabdhih /
On upalabdhi, i. English trans, p. 74, ii. p. 205 , Sutralamkdra, p. 155.
The object of the mental consciousness is defined by YaSomitra: {upalabdhir) dharmdyatanasya vedanddilaksanasya yogivisayasya ca = the perception of the dharmdyatana (that is to say, vedand, etc. ) and of things which the Yogins perceive. (In fact the mental consciousness of the Yogins knows the minds and mental states of others, vii. ll).
But how can perception {upalabdhi) by the manas be pratyaksam, immediate or direct perception? In fact the manas which has just arisen is known by the manas which immediately follows (i. 17): manasas ca kim pratyaksam upalabdhih / samanantaranirud- dharh hi mano'nantarotpannena manovijnanena vijn~ayate. There is a difficulty here. Some other masters (the Sautrantikas) think that the mind knows itself: the subject and the object of the consciousness are both directly perceived: raktam vd dvistam vd sukhasamprayuktam va duhkhasamprayuktam vd (iv. 49) ity evamadi svasamvedyatayd (pratyaksam) ity apare / tad etad dvividham pratyaksam grdhyagatam grahakagatam vd.
7. Vyakhyd: maharsipranidhijndnaparicchinnatvdd asty eva caksurddikam indriyam
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caksurvijnanddikdranam iti / sarvesdm avivdddc ca.
See i. 9c (Vyakhyd, p. 25), 44a. On pranidhijnana, see vii. 37.
8. Vyakhyd: Vdtsiputriyd Aryasammatiyah / anena vitathdtmadrstinivistatvalaksano hetur anaikdntika iti darsayati / na hi vdtsiputriydndm mokso nesyate bauddhatvdt / atha vd prdkpaksavirodhah / sdpaksdlo'yam pakso nasty dtmd ity anena darfayati.
From two things, one. The Vatslputriyas believe in a certain type of real self: now they are Buddhists, and one cannot deny that they can obtain deliverance: thus the author is wrong in saying that a false conception of the self creates an obstacle to deliverance. Or rather the thesis which denies the self is false.
On the avaktavyatd of the pudgala, see, for example, Madhyamakavrtti, 283.
9. Color, sound, etc. , are distinct things (bhinnalaksana); milk, a house, and an army are complexes of colors, tastes, odors, and tangibles, of straw and wood, of elephants, horses, and chariots, not of separate things, bhdvdntara: milk is nothing other than color, etc.
Compare Sutrdlamkdra, xviii. 92: prajfiaptyastitayd vdcyah pudgalo dravyato na tu.
10. YaSomitra quotes this stanza of Dharmaklrti:
varsdtapabhydm kirn vyomnas carmany asti tayol? phalam /
carmopamas cet so'nityah khatulyas ced asatphalah //
Sarvadariana, p. 10 (1858); Nyayavdrttika, ii. l, 5, Tatparya, 164; in Slokavdrttika:
khatulyas ced asatsamah; Naiskarmyasiddhi, ii. 60, etc.
If the pudgala is unconditioned (asamskrta), eternal, unmodifiable, it is like space, it is
like not existing. There exists only that which is "capable of action" (arthakriyd), that which is momentary (yat sat tat ksanikam): a thesis of the Sautrantikas; for the Vaibhasikas, the asamskrtas (space and the two nirodhas, i. 5c) exist.
11. For the Vatslputriya, as for Vasubandhu, the skandhas of the past and of the future do not exist. The meaning of the expressions ddhydtmika (or abhyantara) and upatta is explained in Kosa, i. 34d, 39a-b.
12. The Vyakhyd attributes this paragraph to the author, not to the Vatslputriyas. 13. For certain commentators, idhyate and dahyate are equivalent.
14. Astagravyaka (ii. 22): the four mahdbhutas or primary substances, and the four updddyarupas, from rupa (the visible) to the tangible.
15. The thing on fire (pradipta) is a complex; it is at one and the same time burner (fire) and the thing burning (indhana): in fact this thing is constituted of four elementary substances (above note 13), and one of these substances which is "heat" is the fire.
16. Earth and water are different, for their laksanas differ; the same holds for the burner and the thing burned.
17. Vyakhyd: updddyarthas tu vaktavya iti/ ananyatvdd ity abhiprdyah. We must give the word updddya an explanantion that justifies the thesis that fire and fuel are not different.
18. The fuel is made up of three mahdbhutas, and fire is its usmalaksana, the fourth mahdbhuta. They arise at the same time, like two horns.
19. One should understand: indhanam updddya - indhanam dsritya: the fire takes it support from the fuel. Or rather the meaning is that of sahabhdva, co-existence, or sahotpada, co-arising.
20. Paramartha: If he says, "that which is hot by its nature (the fire) is called hot. The object in question (fuel), although different from fire which is hot by nature, becomes hot through its association with that which is hot by its nature," we conclude that it is not incorrect to say that fire and fuel differ.
? 21. See below note 32. See the Sdrhmitiyanikdyaidstra. 22. Stcherbatski, p. 832, differs.
23. This is perhaps better translated, "is ascertained. "
24. The Chinese fen-pieh kuan ^}*g|| ? maintains the version "to discern. " "By reason of physical matter, etc. , which the eye perceives (as its own object), the visual consciousness "indirectly knows," "knows in second rank" the pudgala, because physical matter is the support (updddna) of the pudgala. And one cannot say that the pudgala is physical matter.
25. In this hypothesis physical matter is not the cause of the perception of the pudgala: there is perception of the pudgala "through relationship" with physical matter.
26. Compare Samyutta, iv. 166. 27. Not by reason of three.
28. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 57cl8. The Vydkhyd quotes the first words, caksur bhikso hetur (caksurvijndnotpdddya / ruparh bhikso pratyayah . . . ).
Vydkhyd: hetur asannah pratyayah / viprakrstas tu pratyaya eva / / janako hetuh pratyayas tv dlambanamdtram ity apare / parydydv etdv ity apare. See ii. 61c, vii. 13a, p.
1112, 1113.
29. Saeki has a note (fol. 14a) on the Darstantika theory of the six vijfidnas. 30. Thus none of them "perceive" a pudgala.
31. Madhyama, TD 1, p. 791bll-17: svakarh gocaravisayarh pratyanubhavanti / ? ? ? ? ad anyasya gocaravisayarh pratyanubhavati / manas caisdrh pratisaranam.
Samyutta, v. 218: pancimdni brdhmana indriydni ndndvisaydni ndndgocardni ndnnaman- nassa gocaravisayarh paccanubhonti / katamdni pan ? a . . . / imesarh kho pancannam indriydnam ndndvisaydnam ndndgocardnarh na annamannassa gocaravisayarh paccanubhon- tdnarh mano patisaranam mano ca nesarh gocaravisayarh paccanubhoti.
On the formula manai caisdrh pratisaranam, the Vydkhyd says: anusangenedam uktam / nedam uddharanam / tathdpi tu manai catsdm indriydnam pratisaranam iti tadapeksdnin- driydni vijndnotpatta vijndnotpattau kdranam bhavantity arthah.
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 449al6. The Darstantikas say, "The objects of the six vijndnakdyas, caksurvijndna, etc. , are distinct. " They say, "The manovijndna has a distinct object; it does not bear on the objects of the five vijfidnas, caksurvijndna, etc. " They say, "The six vijridnas bear solely on external objects; they do not bear on the internal (ddhydtmika, see p. 1313) organs, nor on the vijndna. " In order to refute this opinion, it is explained that the first five vijfidnas have distinct objects, bearing solely on external objects, not bearing on the organs and the vijndna; but that the manovijndna has an object common to the five vijfidnas and also a different object, which bears on the internal organs and also on the vijndna. It has been explained, Koia, i. 48a, that among the eighteen dhdtuS, thirteen are the object of a single manovijndna with the exclusion of visible things, of sounds, etc. , which are also the object of the caksurvijndna, etc.
32. The words in parentheses are according to Hsuan-tsang.
Bhdsya and Vydkhyd: na vd pudgalo visaya iti (yadi sutram pramdnikriyate) / na ced
visayah (yadi na kasya cid vijfidnasya visayah) na tarhi vijneyah (tatas ca pancavidham jneyam iti svasiddhdnto bddhyate) (above note 21).
Paramartha: Or rather the pudgala is not an object. If it is not an object, it is not discerned by the six consciousnesses.
33. In spite of the Sutra, you affirm that the object of the mental consciousness is general; so too, in spite of the Sutra, you affirm that the pudgala is discernible by the visual consciousness.
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34. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 313al5, Ekottara, TD 2, p. 723cl8; Samyutta, iv. 198. sad imdmndriydni ndndgocardni . . .
kukkurapaksisrgdlasisumdrasarpamarkafdh sat prdnakdh kena cid baddhd madhye granthim krtvotsrstdh / te svakarh svakarh gocaravisayam dkdhksante / grdmakafasmasdnodakavalmikavand kdnksandd evam sad imdnindrtydni. . .
35. The desire (dkdnksana) to see, to understand, etc, is certainly foreign to the organs of sight, hearing, etc. , which are material (rupasvabhdvatvdt), and also to the visual consciousness, the auditory consciousness, etc. , which are non-imaginative (nirvikalpakat- vdt). This refers, under the name of the organ of the eye (caksurindriya), to the mental consciousness led by the predominating, specifying action of this organ, tadddhipatydd- hydhrta.
36. Samyutta, iv. 29: sabbath bhikkhave abhinhdpariHneyyam / kim ca bhikkhave abhinudparinneyyam / rupam bhikkhave abhinh~dparih"neyyam cakkhuvirindnam . . .
37. Compare Vasumitra, Sectes, on jneya, vijneya, and abhijh~eya.
38. This according to Hsiian-tsang. Paramartha: "The master who believes in a self says, 'I see the pudgala through ( & yu by means of) the eye'; as he sees that there is a self in ( ? ? ? ? ) that which is not a self, he falls . . . "
The Bhdsyam has the word anatmana which the Vydkhyd glosses as caksusd caksurvijnanenety arthah. Thus one should understand the^<< of Paramartha in the sense of the instrumental, "As he sees, through that which is not a self--that is to say through the eye, through the visual consciousness . . . "
Stcherbatski: "This idea of yours that there is an existing self who through the opening of his eyes contemplates other selves, this idea it is which is called Wrong Personalism. "
One can draw the conclusion from the formula caksusd rupdni drspvd that the pudgala sees through the eyes; Vydkhyd ad i. 42, p. 117 (Petrograd ed. ). Cullaniddesa 234 has: cakkhuna puriso dlokati rupagatdni. See below n. 67.
39. According to Paramartha and Hsiian-tsang. Stcherbatski, "In the Ajita-sermon. "
40. Version of Paramartha. This is the well-known text: caksuh pratitya rupdni cotpadyate caksurvijndnam / traydndm samnipdtah spars'ah / sahajdtd vedand sarhjna cetand. . . See iii. 32a-b.
41. Paramurtha transcribes; Hsiian-tsang: nara-na ramate, mdnava-ju-t'ung ? ? - scholar-kumdra, jantu, "who is born".
A YogacSrin commentary quoted by Saeki says: sattva, because all the Aryans truly see that only the dharmas exist, no other thing; or rather because there is affection therein (sattva from sakta, as in Buddhaghosa? ); manoja (i-sheng ? ? )> because it is constituted by the manas. . . pudgala, because it goes frequently taking up realms of rebirth without the power to be disgusted with t\\em\jiva, because it presently lives through union with the dyus (Kosa, ii. 45); jantu (sheng ^ ), because all the dharma which exist are endowed with arising.
Other lists contain thirteen names. Among them, yaksa, Suttanipdta, 875.
On sattva, see Ledi Sadaw, JPTS, 1914, 133, Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhist Psychology, 1914, 83. We have seen that sattva signifies "that which perishes," v. n. 27 and above p. 1319.
42. See below note 71.
43. The Sutra of the four "authorities," "supports," is quoted in the Vydkhyd ad ii. 46, English trans, p. 241: catvdrtmdni bhiksavah pratisarandni / katamdni catvdri / dharmah pratisaranam na pudgalah / arthah pratisaranam na vyanjanam / nttdrtham sutrarh pratisaranam na neydrthdm / jfldnam pratisaranam na vijfldnam.
Mahdvyutpatti, 74, where the order differs: arthapratisaranena bhavitavyam na
? vyanjanapratisaranena, dharma. . . jndna. . . nitarthasutrapratisaranena. . . (Extracted from the Hsien-yang, TD 31, Tokyo, xviii. 7,10a).
Dharmasamgraba, 53; Sutrdlamkdra, xviii. 31-33; J. As. 1902, ii. 269, Madhyamakavrtti, 268, 598.
Pratisarana, pratiiarana (Divya, 427. 22, 176. 26, where the editor translates the word as "confidence") is translated ? ? ? pa (confidence) and rten-pa (support), i 0c (support), and Hang It (authority).
i. Bodhisattvabhumi, I. xvii.
katharh bodhisattvas catursu pratisaranesu prayujyate.
iha bodhisattvah arthart hi par at? dharmam srnoti na vyanjandbhisamskdrdrthi /
arthart hi dharmam irnvan na vyanjandrthi prakrtaydpi vdcd dharmam desyamdnam arthapratisarano bodhisattvah satkrtya srnoti.
punar bodhisattvah kdldpadesam mahdpadesam ca (Digha, ii. 124, etc. ) yathdbhutam prajdndti / prajdnan yuktipratisarano bhavati na sthavirendbhijndnena vd pudgalena tathdgatena vd samghena vd ime dharma bhdsitd iti pudgalapratisarano bhavati / sa evam yuktipratisarano na pudgalapratisaranas tattvdrthdn na vicalati aparapratyayas ca bhavati dharmesu. (aparapratyaya- gzhan las ses mayin, Madhyamakavrtti, xxiv. 8).
punar bodhisattvas tathdgate nivistasraddho nivtstaprasdda aikdntiko vacasy abhiprasannas tathdgatanitdrthasutram pratisarati na neydrtham / nitdrtham sutram pratisarann asarhhdryo bhavaty asmdd dharmavinaydt / tatra hi neydrthasya sutrasya ndndmukhaprakrtdrthavibhdgo 'niscitah samdehakaro bhavati / sacet punar bodhisattvo nitdrthe'pi sutre'naikdntikah sydd evam asau samhdryah sydd asmdd dharmavinaydt.
punar bodhisattvah) adhigamajndne sddarsi (? ) bhavati na ca srutacintddharmdrthavijnd- namdtrake / sayad bhdvandmayena jndnena jndtavyam na tac chakyam srutacintdvijndnamd- trakena vijndtum iti viditvd paramagambhirdn api tathdgatabhdsitdn dharmdn irutvd na pratiksipati napavadati /
evam . . . caturndm prdmdnyam prakd/itam bhdsitasydrthasya yukteh iastur bhdvand- mayasya cddhigamajndnasya.
ii. arthah pratisaranam . . . A notion expressed in the Mahdvagga, i. 23, 4, Majjhima, ii. 240;developedintheLanka:arthapratisaranenabhavitavyam. . . andagainarthdnusdrind bhavitavyam na deiandbhildpdbhinivistena. A "word" is like a finger which touches the object that one should see; one must remove the finger in order to see the object (Lanka quoted in the Subhdsitasamgraha, ed. Bendall, fol. 34).
On the relation between the attha and the vyanjanas, see Digha, iii. 127-129, Nettippakarana, 21.
iii. dharmah pratisaranam na pudgalah. Variant: yuktipratisarano bhavati na pudgalapratisaranah.
The refuge is the truth itself, not authority whatever it may be, even the Buddha. This is the teaching of the Majjhima, i. 265. He who says, "These dharmas are taught by a Sthavira, a person possessing the abhijnds, the Tathagata, or the Sarhgha," is pudgalapratisarana.
Do not lose sight of the teaching of the mahdpadesds, below note 56.
iv. A nitartha Sutra is a vibhaktdrtha Sutra, "of explicit meaning"; a neydrtha Sutra is of undetermined meaning, of meaning yet to be determined (Vydkhyd ad iii. 28). iv. 30, English trans, p. 614, calls for a Sutra of explicit meaning. Vasumitra, Sectes.
It appears that the sole canonical text of interest here is Anguttara, i. 60: to attribute to the Tathagata that which has not been said; to not recognize as said by him that which he has said; to consider as neyyattha a nitattha Suttanta, and vice versa. (The theory of the Sutra exact in its words but badly understood, Digha, iii. 127-128, can lead to the distinction between nitattha and neyyattha Sutras).
Nitattha and neyyattha in the Nettippakarana (where the meaning conforms to the letter, yathdrutavasena ndtabbattham, where the meaning should be determined through reflection, niddhdretvdgahetabbattham); and in the Dipavamsa (Oldenberg, ed. , p. 36) quoted in the Introduction to the Commentary on the Kathdvatthu (JPTS, 1889, p. 3). "To
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confuse pariydyabhdsita and nippariyayabhasita (compare Visuddhimagga, 473, 499: that which should not be understood literally, and that which should be understood literally, nitattha and neyyattha; to attribute another meaning (other than the true meaning) to what has been said with a certain intention (samdhaya bhanita): thus, respecting the letter destroysthemeaning;tocreatepseudo-Sutras . . . "
Atthasalini, 91, "We shall weigh the sense of the Sutra that you allege . . . "
Samghabhadra, iii. 25 (Tokyo xxiii. 4, ? ? ? 6). According to the Sthavira, all dryd defand promulgated by the Buddha himself {tathdgatabhdsita- ahaccavacana of the Nettippaka- rana, 21) is nitdrthasutra; the other Sutras are anitdrtba. Samghabhadra observes initially that this definition is not found in Scripture; then it is bad reasoning: for there are Sutras not promulgated by the Buddha which are nitartha, and vice versa. Examples follow. It is said, "It is impossible to say, if not through abhimdna (or "presumption"): I shall enter into the animitta without supporting myself on the void" (These words are not by the Buddha himself, yet the Sutra is nitdrtha) . . .
The Schools, as we see in Wassiliev, 329, and in the Madhyamakdvatdra, vi. 94, are not in agreement in placing Sutras in these two categories.
v. We have seen that, according to the Bodhisattvabhumi, adhigamajnana is absorption consciousness (bhdvandmaya), whereas vijndna is consciousness obtained through hearing and reflection (frutacinta).
According to the Vibhajyavadins,/<<i<<d is good in and of itself; vijndna is good when it is associated with jnana (? ? fa, iv. 8b, note 46): it can be understood that jndna is "supermundane knowledge," and that the vijndna, worldly knowledge, is good when it is consecutive to supermundane knowledge.
According to iv. 75, an opinion of the "ancient masters," adhigata (what one knows by absorption) forms part of the vijfidta: but this refers to a worldly consciousness, a worldly absorption.
(In the Sutra of the Four Pratisaranas, jndna primarily designates the knowledge of the Aryans, andfravajfiana, exacdy as prajnd is, among all the prajuds--which can be avyakrta, klista, or kusala,--the pure prajfid). See above notes 36 and 37.
Some notes in the Madhyamakavrtti, xxv, 16, p. 65, 74. Jndna is distinguished from vijndna in the Gita, iii. 4l, vL8, vii. 2, ix. 1, xviii. 42.
44. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 91a27, "All, that is to say, the twelve dyatanas, the eye, etc. "; Kofa, v. trans, p. 819, Mahdniddesa, 133, Samyutta, iv. 15: sabbath vuccati dvddasayatandni.
On sarva, sabba, see ? ? fa, v. 27c, Warren, p. 158, Mrs. Rhys Davids' Points of Controversy, 85, Stcherbatski, Central Conception, 5; Nirvana (1925), p.
