No More Learning

But our ships; how are they to be appointed 1 Let
their whole number be fixed to three hundred, divided
by fifteenth parts into twenty portions. Of the first
hundred, let five such parts, of the second hundred,
five parts; and of the third hundred, five be ap-
1 Those who by their condition, Ac. ]--These are particularly specified
In the original, eirutXriaiav, maiden-heiresses; opQavwv, orphans of the
other sex ; kKtipovxikuiVj men appointed to form a colony; and Kotviavr
kwv, men incorporated into certain societies which were exempted from
contributing. From whence it seems evident that the duty and honour
of composing the twelve hundred, who were to supply the exigences of
the state, must have been annexed to certain families, and con inued to
them when time and various circumstances might have produced altera-
tions of fortune in many. The inconveniences which arose from hence
were partly removed by the avritioaus, or exchanges of fortunes (of
which see note 2, p. 53), and by allowing exemptions to persons in certain
circumstances: yet both these expedients must have occasioned delays,
and retarded the business of the public. Hence the orator recommends
the appointment of the additional eight hundred.
2 Of the first hundred,let five such parts, &cl--It should seem, from
this passage, that each century of the three hundred ships were to be of
a different rate and order, by this minute specification of " five of tha . -
first hundred, five of the second," 4c.
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? 240
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
pointed to each class. Thus shall a fifteenth of the
whole be allotted to every class; three ships to each
subdivision.
When these establishments are made, I propose,1
as the revenue arising from our lands amounts to
six thousand talents, that in order to have our funds
duly regulated, this sum may be divided into a hun-
dred parts of sixty talents each: that five of these
parts may be assigned to each of the twenty great
classes; which may thus give severally to each of
their divisions a single part of sixty talents. So
that, if we should have occasion for a hundred ships,*
l When and tn what manner this estimate of the lands was made, we
lean; from Polybius, lib. ii. , whose words shall" be quoted immediately.
That the barren lands of Attica should produce such a revenue (amount-
ing, according to Arbuthnot's computation, to 1,162,500/. ) seems wonder-
ful; especially as the lower ranks of citizens held their lands free from
all taxation. The soil of Athens itself was. celebrated by Homer for its
fertility. But this is of little moment when the barrenness of the Attic
territory in general is considered. But what says Polybius? Tij yap
hwcp AurivaiDv ovx loTopriiu diort Kad' ovs Kaipovs nera Qiifiaiuiv us TOV
Kpos rouf AaKcSaiiioviovi; avcfiaivov iroXtiiov, Kai iivpiovs utv-. c%cirtinrov
CTpartiiiTasi ikutov 6e cirXiipovV Tptiipcis, Irt ToTc kpivavres airo Ttis a? iaff
irotciodut ras us TOViroXtiiOV us 0opaf, CTiuricavro ttiv tc xwpais Kai Tt)V
XTrtKr}v, &naaav, Kai ras otKias, buoaas 6e Kai Tiiv Xoiirriv ovctav. AM'
biiuis to aviiirav rtixriiia rris a\ias tveXt-ire rwv t\aKia%iXitiiv SiaKoctots Kai
Ktvr^Kovra raXavrots; " What historian hath not informed us that the
Athenians, at the time when they engaged in war, on the part of Thebes
against the Lacedaemonians sent ten thousand men to the field, and
manned a hundred ships; that the Athenians, I say, in order to make a
just estimate of the subsidy they might properly grant for this war, then
proceeded to a general valuation of their lands, of ihe whole territory
of Attica, their houses, and all their effects? And yet the whole
valuation fell short of six thousand talents by two hundred and fifty. *
Which agrees pretty exactly with this passage of Demosthenes. --
Lucckesini.
2 One hundred ships seem to have been the ordinary marine establish-
ment at Athens; and to this the ordinary revenues seem to have been
proportioned. When it was necessary' to fit out an extraordinary number
the additicnal charge was answered by ah extraordinary taxation on the
richer members of the state. The passage before us is indeed concisely
expressed, as became a speaker who addressed himself to persons to
whom the least hint was sufficient. But the full meaning of it I take
to be this: "If we have occasion but for a hundred ships, the charge of
furnishing each may be divided among twelve trierarchs, who are to be
supplied for the expense of this and other preparations with sixty
talents. If for two hundred, these twelve trierarchs must provide two
ships; if for three hundred, three. In every case the revenues of the
otate are to be equally divided among them. But the greater the force
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? ORATION ON THE CLASSES.
241
? ixty talents may be granted to each, and twelve
trierarchs ; if for two hundred, there may be thirty
talents assigned, and six trierarchs to each; if for
three hundred, twenty talents may be supplied for
each, and four trierarchs.
In like manner, my fellow-citizens, on a due esti-
mate of the stores necessary for our ships, I propose
that, agreeably to the present scheme, they should
be divided into twenty parts: that one good and
effectual part should be assigned to each of the great
classes, to be distributed among the small divisions
in the just proportion. Let the twelve, in every such
division, demand their respective shares; and let
them have those ships which it is their lot to provide
thoroughly and expeditiously equipped. Thus may
our supplies, our ships, our trierarehs, our stores, be
best provided and supplied. --And now I am to lay
before you a plain and easy method of completing
this scheme.
I say, then, that your generals should proceed to
mark out ten dock-yards, as contiguous as may be
to each other, and capable of containing thirty ves-
sels each. When this is done, they should assign
two Masses, and thirty ships to each of these docks.
Among these also they should divide the tribes and
the respective trierarehs; so that two classes, thirty
ships, and one tribe may be assigned to each. Let
then each tribe divide its allotted station into three
parts, and the ships in like manner. Let these third
required, the greater mast be the burden on the trierarehs, who are to be
taxed for the additional expense, if any such may be required for fitting
out the fleet, and completing the other parts of the intended armament. "
This iatter part, indeed, is not expressed, or insinuated; but I take it to
be understood. But, if my explanation should not be entirely consonant
to the sentiments of the learned reader, who may have the curiosity to
examine this part of the oration with accuracy, I must endeavour to
screen myself from the severity of his censure by subscribing to the
following ingenious declaration of Wolfius: " Whatever is here said of
fleets, stores, armaments, and supplies must, to us, who never saw a
fleet, or war, and never were conversant in affairs of state, be attended
with considerable obscurity. " *
De-m. Vol. I. --X
-
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? 242 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
parts be distributed by lot. Thus shall one tribe
preside over one entire division of your shipping,
and each third of a tribe take care of one-third of
such division; and thus shall you know at all times,
first, where each tribe is stationed; then, wheie each;
Nurd; then, who are the trierarchs; and, lastly, the
number of your ships. Let affairs be once set in
motion after this manner; and if any thing hath
been omitted (as it is by no means easy to provide
accurately for every circumstance), the execution
will itself discover it: and thus may your whole
marine and all its several parts be uniformly and
exactly regulated.
And now, as to money, as to any immediate sup-
plies ; sensible as I am that the opinion I am now to
declare must appear extraordinary, yet I will declare
it; for I trust, that when duly weighed it will be
found the only one which reason can recommend,
and which must be approved by the event. I say,
then, that at this time we should not speak at all of
money: we have a fund, if occasions call for it,--a
great, and honourable, and an equitable fund. Should
you attempt to raise it now, far from succeeding in
such an attempt, you could not depend on gaining it
when really wanted; but suspend your inquiries, and
you will secure it. What fund is this which now
hath no being, yet will be found hereafter 1 This ap-
pears a kind of mystery; but I shall explain it. Cast
your eyes round through all this city. Within these
walls, Athenians, there are treasures--I had almost
said, equal to those of all other states. But such is
the disposition of their possessors, that if all our
speakers were to rise with the most alarming decla-
rations, " that the king was marching against us; that
he was at our gates; that the danger did not admit of
any possibility of doubt--if with these speakers as *
many ministers of heaven were to rise, and pronounce
the same declarations as the warning of the gods; so
far would these men be from contributing, that they
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? ORATION ON THE CLASSES.
24J
would not even discover their riches; they would not
acknowledge the possession of them. But should it
once appear that all those dangers denounced with
so much terror were really and in fact impending,
where is the wretch that would not give freely, that
would not urge to be admitted to contribute ? For
who would choose to abandon his life and fortune to
the fury of an enemy rather than give up a small por-
tion of his abundance for the safety of himself and all
the rest of his possessions ? Thus shall we find trea-
sures when occasions really demand them, but not
till then. Let us not, therefore, inquire for them
now. Suppose that we were now strictly to exact
the subsidies from all our citizens, the utmost we
should raise would be more contemptible than none.
Imagine the experiment made: it is proposed to exact
a hundredth part of the revenue arising from our
lands. Well, then, this makes just sixty talents.
" Nay, but we will raise a fiftieth part. " This doubles
the sum: we have then one hundred and twenty
talents. But what is this to those hundreds or those
thousands of camels which, they assure us, are em-
ployed to carry the king's money ? But suppose it
were agreed to raise a twelfth part, amounting to five
hundred talents. This, in the first place, would be too
great a burden, and, if imposed, still the fund pro-
duced would be insufficient for the war. Let, then,
all our other preparations be completed; but as to
money, let the possessors keep it, and never can they
keep it for a nobler public service. When their coun-
try calls for it, then shall they freely and zealously
contribute. ,
This, my fellow-citizens, is a practicable scheme--
a scheme highly honourable and advantageous, wor-
thy of this state to be reported to the king, and which
must strike him with no small terror. He knows,
that by three hundred vessels, of which one hundred
only were supplied by us, his ancestors lost a thou-
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? 244 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
sand ships. 1 He will hear, that now we have our-
selves equipped three hundred. He cannot, then. --if
he hath not lost all reason,--he cannot deem it a
trivial matter to make this state his enemy. If from
a dependence on his treasures he is tempted to enter-
tain proud thoughts, he will find this but a vain
dependence when compared with your resources. "
They tell us he is coming with heaps of gold; but
when these are once dispersed he must look for new
supplies. Not the richest streams, not the deepest
sources but must at length be totally exhausted when
we copiously and constantly drain away their waters.
But we, he will be told, have a perpetual resource in
our lands--a fund of six thousand talents. And with
what spirit we defend these lands against invaders
his ancestors who fought at Marathon could best
inform him. Let us continue to conquer, and our
treasures cannot ever fail.
Nor yet do I think their terrors justly founded who
apprehend that he may employ his gold in raising a
large army of mercenaries. I do indeed believe, that
in an expedition against Egypt, against Orontes,3 or
1 Whoever consults Herodotus will find that Demosthenes is by no
means exact in his account either of the Athenian or Persian fleets ; but
we are not to expect historical precision from the orator. His repre-
sentations are suited to delight and animate his hearers ; and probably
his success was too great to give them leisure to attend to any inaccuracy
in his account.
? It is just now the orator has represented the wealth of Athens as
contemptible, that of Persia as magnificent and great. Now, en the
contrary, the resources of Persia are neither solid nor permanent; the
riches of Athens great and inexhaustible. Various aie the instances of
this artifice in Demosthenes, which the judicious reader cannot fail to
observe without the direction of the annotator.
3 Two of this name are mentioned in history. The first was put te
death by the younger Cyrus on account of a conspiracy. The other,
whom Demosthenes points out, was a satrap of Mysia, and served in the
army which Artaxerxes sent against Cyprus, under the command of
Terinazus. On this occasion he attempted to ruin the reputation of his
general, was detected and disgraced, and, in revenge, joined with the
rebels of Egypt, Caria, and Phrygia, and headed the army they had raised
against the king. But, in hopes of recovering his credit at the Persian
court, and of gaining the command of some maritime towns, he betrayed
the forces, &c. of the rebels into the hands of the king's lieutenants
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? ORATION ON THE CLASSES. 245
any of the other Barbarians, there are many of the
Greeks that would gladly receive his pay, not from
any zeal for aggrandizing him, but each in order to
obtain such a supply as might relieve their present
necessities. But I never can persuade myself that
any one Greek would assist him to conquer Greece.
Whither should he turn after such an event 1 Would
he go and be a slave in Phrygia ? He must know
that when we take up arms against the Barbarian, we
take them up for our country, for our lives, for our
customs, for our liberty, and all such sacred rights.
Who, then, could be so base as to sacrifice himself,
his parents, the sepulchres of his ancestors, his coun-
try, to a trifling pittance ? Surely, no man. 1
Nor is it the interest of the Persian that his mer-
cenaries should subdue the Greeks; for they who can
conquer us must first prove superior to him. And it
is by no means his scheme, by destroying us, to lose
his own empire. His wishes are to command all; if
this cannot be obtained, at least he would secure his
power over his own slaves.
If, then, it be imagined that the Thebanswill unite
with him,2 it is a hard part to speak of Thebes in this
assembly; for such is your aversion to this people,
History speaks no farther of this Orontes ; but as in this year (the eighth
from the time of his revolt) Demosthenes mentions him as an enemy to
the Persian, we may conjecture that his last services bad been disre-
garded, and that he iiad again taken up arms. --Lvcchesini.
t I cannot persuade myself that there is occasion to point out to the
reader the three and pertinency of this argument, although it be ellipti-
ettlly expressed. To be assured of the true signification of the phrase
rpoi Tov PapfSaoav, we need but cast our eyes to a sentence a little far-
ther on--ck ptv ye ruiv IIP02 rovs iavrov irpoyovous iroXeirnv--from the
weTs waged against his ancestors.
* The history of both nations accounts for the detestation With which
the Athenians are supposed to hear the name of the Thebans ; and per-
haps it were impossible that two nations so different in genius and man-
ners ever should entertain any sentiments of friendship and esteem for
each other. Our orator, however, was far superior to vulgar national
prejudices. He considered without partiality the real interests of his
country, whose welfare should be a statesman's passion. Yet his regard
for the people of Thebes was numbered by ^Dschines among his crimes.
The error which, he says, they would if possible redeem, was their
joining with Xerxes in his invasion of Greece. --Francis
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? ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
that you will not hear the voice of truth itself if it
seems at all to favour them. However, it is the duty
of those who debate on great affairs by no means, and
on no pretence whatever, to suppress any argument
which may prove of use. I say, then, that so far are
the Thebans from ever at any time uniting with the
king against the Greeks, that they would freely give
the greatest treasures, were they possessed of them,
to purchase a fair occasion of atoning for their an-
cient errors with respect to Greece. But let the
Thebans be ever so unhappily disposed, still we must
all be sensible, that if they unite with him, their ene-
mies must necessarily unite with the Greeks. And I
trust that the cause of justice and the friends to this
cause will ever prove superior to traitors and to all
the force of the Barbarian. Let us not, then, yield to
these extravagant alarms, nor rashly brave all conse-
quences by being first to take up arms.
Nor do I think that any other of the Grecian states
should look on this war with terror. ' Is there a man
among them who is not sensible, that while they
regarded the Persian as their common enemy and
maintained a firm union with each other, their fortune
was completely happy; but when, by a fatal reliance
on his friendship, they were betrayed into contests
and dissensions among themselves, their calamities
were so great as to exceed all the imprecations which
the most inveterate malice could invent* And shall
that man, whom fortune, whom Heaven itself pro-
nounces as a friend unprofitable, as an enemy of ad-
vantage,--shall he, I say, be feared ? By no means.
Yet let us have the due regard to ourselves; let us
have the due attention to the disorders and suspicions
of the rest of Greece; and let us not incur the charge
1 The well-known and great events described in the taistory of Greece
confirm these observations of the orator fully with respect to all the
Grecian states. Yet we may concur with the Italian commentator in
supposing that they had the Lacedaemonians particularly In view; to
whom they are, indeed, eminently applicable. '
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? ORATION ON THE CLASSES. 247
of injustice. Could we, indeed, with all the Greeks
united firmly on our side, attack him single and un-
supported, I would not then suppose that you could
be charged with injustice.
But, as this is not to be
expected, let us be cautious; let us afford him no pre-
tence of appearing to assert the rights of the other
Greeks. If we continue quiet, his applications to
them will be suspicious; if we are the first to take up
arms, he will seem justified by our hostilities in his
attempts to gain their friendship.
Do not, then, discover to the world the melancholy
state of Greece, by inviting those to an alliance whom
you cannot gain, and by engaging in a war which you
cannot support. Be quiet; be resolute; be prepared.
Let not the emissaries of Persia report to their king
that Greece and Athens are distracted in their coun-
cils, are confounded by their fears, are torn by dissen-
sions. No; let them rather tell him, that if it were
not equally shameful for the Greeks to violate their
honour and their oaths as it is to him matter of tri-
umph, they would have long since marched against
him, and that if you now do not march, you are re-
strained solely by a regard to your own dignity; that
it is your prayer to all the gods that he may be seized
with the infatuation which once possessed his ances-
tors, and then he would find no defect of vigour in
your measures. He knows that by our wars with
his ancestors this state became happy and powerful;
that by our peaceful demeanour before these wars we
acquired a superiority over the other Grecian states
never more observable than at present. He knows
that the affairs of Greece require some power to be
either voluntarily or accidentally the instrument of a
general peace. He knows that he himself must prove
that instrument if he once attempts to raise a war;
and, therefore, these informations will have their due
weight and credit.
That I may not longer abuse your patience, I shall
repeat the sum of my advice, and then descend.
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? 248 ORATIONS OV DEMOSTHENES.
You should prepare your force against your pres-
ent enemies; you should use this force against the
king, against any power that may attempt to injure
you; but never be the first to break through the
bounds of justice either in council or in action. You
should be solicitous, not that our speeches, but tha
our conduct may be worthy of our illustrious descent.
Act thus, and you will serve, not yourselves only, but
the men who oppose these measures; for they will
not feel your resentment hereafter if they be not
suffered to mislead you now. 1
l What effect this oration had on the people we may learn from a pas-
sage in the oration for the Rhodians, of which the following is a transla-
tion :--"There are some among you who may remember,'that at the
time when the affairs of Persia were the subject of our consultations, I
was the first, the only, or (Jmost the only, one to recommend it as the
wisest measure not to assign your enmity to the king as the motive of
your armament; to make your preparations against your avowed adver-
saries, and to employ them even against him should he attempt to injure
you. Nor did I urge these things without your full concurrence: the*
were received with applause. "
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? ORATION FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS:
PRONOUNCED IN THE ARCHONSHIP OF EUDEMUS, TUX FOURTH YEAR OF
THE HUNDRED AND SIXTH OLYMPIAD.
INTRODUCTION.
In order to prepare the reader for the perusal of the following oration,
it is necessary to recall to his view some of the late important transac-
tions in Greece. He is not to be informed of the flourishing condition of
Sparta after the famous Peloponnesian war, the immoderate ambition of
that state, and the war in which the Spartans were consequently involved
with Thebes. The conduct and vigour of Eparninondas the Theban
proved fatal to Sparta, and the battle of Leuctra put an end to the tyran
nical dominion which this state had long exercised in Peloponnesus.
Immediately after this battle, several of the Peloponnesian states re-
volted from the Lacedemonians. The Messenians, their ancient rivals,
. were restored to their original settlement by the Theban arms, after
many ages of dispersion. The Arcadians and Argives asserted their
independence, and, assisted by the Thebans, took up arms against their
former sovereigns. The Spartans now seemed on the point of having
their ruin completed. They were reduced to fortify their city, whose
defenceless condition had been so long their boast; they armed six hun-
dred of their slaves, and sent a deputation to Athens humbly to solicit
the assistance of their old rivals in this their state of extremity.
The Athenians, who began to conceive a jealousy of the rising power
. of Thebes, readily consented to join with Ihe Lacedaemonians. Iphi-
crates was sent with twelve thousand men to their relief; and on advice
received that Eparninondas was marching against Lacedasmon at the
bead of the Thebans, Argives, and Arcadians, Chabrias was despatched
with another reinforcement to join the Spartans and thetr confederates.
It is not to the present purpose to mention particularly the several
events in the course of this war. It is only necessary to observe, that
the Arcadians, in order the better to secure that liberty for which they
now contended, determined to collect all their force into one body, brought
the detached settlements of their countrymen to a union, and fixed their
common residence in a city built by the advice and assistance of Eparni-
nondas (if we may believe Pausanias), and called Megalopolis, or the
Great City. This was one considerable barrier against the Lacedceino-
nian power in Peloponnesus, which still subsisted, together with the
other equitable regulations of Eparninondas for securing the liberty of
the Peloponnesians.
i
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? 250
INTRODUCTION.
These were considered by the LacedGemonians as so many memorials
of their disgrace. And the least respite from the calamities of an unsuc-
cessful war was sufficient to inspire them with an earnest desire of
recovering their ancient power and superiority. Greece was now
harassed by the sacred war. Several cities of inferior note had changed
their masters in the course of this quarrel. The re-establishment of
peace, and a settlement of the whole nation of Greece, were universally
urged as objects highly worthy of the general attention. And now
Archidamus, the King of Sparta, a subtle and designing prince, proposed
a plan for this purpose, in appearance advantageous to the whole body,
but, in effect, only calculated to restore the superiority of Sparta. He
proposed, that in order to restore the general tranquillity, the several
cities should be re-established in the same condition as before the late
wars.
This was a scheme which promised some advantage to all the leading
states. Oropus, a city on the confines of Breotia, once commanded by
the Athenians, and still claimed as their right, but now possessed by the
Thebans, must have returned to its ancient masters. Thespia and
Platcea, two eminent cities in Bosotia, that had felt the jealousy and
revenge of Thebes, and now lay subverted and depopulated, were by the
same plan to be restored and fortified. The Phocians were to give up
two important acquisitions gained in the . course of the sacred war, the
cities of Orchomenus and Coronea. But these and the other Boeotian
cities were only to acknowledge Thebes as the principal and leading city
1 in Bceotia, without any ahsolute submission or dependence, and without
any obedience to that jurisdiction which the Thebans claimed and had
exercised over them. On the other hand, Peloponnesus was to be reduced
to its former state of dependence; the cities of Messene and Megalopolis
were to be destroyed, and their inhabitants dispersed; so as to restore
the Spartans to the power of resuming that tyrannical dominion which
they had formerly exercised over their neighbours.
Archidamus began with endeavouring to regain that authority in
Peloponnesus to which the Spartans aspired. A dispute was soon raised
between Sparta and Argos about the boundaries of their dominions;
and the King of Sparta, having in vain attempted'to succeed by practising
secretly with Nicostratus, the principal citizen of Argos, determined to
have recourse to arms.
The people of Megalopolis were equally concerned in this quarrel. A
war was on the point of breaking out in Peloponnesus; each side was
assiduous to gain over the other states of Greece: and on this occasion
both the Megalopolitans and Lacedaemonians sent their ambassadors
to Athens; the one to solicit for assistance and support, the other to
prevail on the Athenians to continue neuter.
On this occasion was the assembly convened, in which the following
oration was delivered. Each state had its partisans in this assembly,
and the speakers on both sides seem to have delivered their sentiments
with the utmost heat and animosity. The orators who opposed the
demands of Megalopolis urged the connexions of Athens with the Lacedte-
monians in the Theban war, and the dishonour and inconsistency of
arming against their old fellow-soldiers. They represented the old
attachment of the Megalopolitans to Thebes in the most odious and sus-
Eicious colours; and declared, that by sup1iorting them and depressing
acedasmon, they would in effect render the Theban power highly
formidable, if not irresistible: nor did they forget to urge that by ae
qutescing in the attempts of Lacedasmon to re-establish its power is
Pe'oponnesus, they themselves would be entitled to the assistance of
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? INTRODUCTION.
that state, in order to recover the dominions which had been wrested
from them. Through this whole debate the Athenians seemed to have
been entirely influenced by motives of policy and convenience; and ihe
reader will And these urged by Demosthenes, with the utmost address
and artifice, in favour of the people of Megalopolis, in the following
oration.
That this oration was pronounced in the archonship of Theodemus or
Eudemus, we are informed by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (in F. pist. ad
Ammse. ): and this Eudemus was arch on, according to Diodorus, in the
fourth year of the hundred <<ml sixth Olympiad. In the beginning of the
next year the Lacedaemonians made their irruption into Arcadia. So
that it is probable that the ambassadors we're received at Athens about
the latter end ofthe year (i. e. a little before the summer solstice), whea
the Lacedaemonians were just preparing to take the field, and the Area-
? tans threatened with immediate danger.
Vol. I. --U
?
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? ORATION FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS.
The speakers on both sides seem to me, ye men
of Athens, equally to blame--the partisans of the
Arcadians and the advocates for Lacedaemon. Like
the deputies of these communities, not like youi
citizens, to whom their deputations are addressed,
they excuse, they inveigh against each other. ' This,
I say, is to act like deputies: but to speak with a
true patriot spirit, to attend entirely to the interest of
the state, free from all factious principles, these are
their duties who assume the character of our coun-
sellors. But now, were not their persons known,
did they not speak bur language, I should have taken
many of them for two distinct people: the one of
Arcadia, the other of Lacedaemon.
How hazardous a part it is to urge your real
interests is to me apparent: for in this violence of
opposition, where you are all alike deceived, as well
the favourers of this as the supporters of the opposite
opinion, should a man attempt to point out the just
I This heat and acrimony did not always proceed from conviction and
zeal for the public interest. Every city or community that solicited any
matter in the Athenian assembly first took care to secure managers and
advocates among the popular speakers. If the interposition of these
pleaders proved successful, they were sometimes rewarded with a
statue erected in the city whose interests they had supported; some-
times, and indeed more frequently, with a sum of money. Agreements
were formally made, and, in some cases, securities given for the payment
of this fee. In the oration of JEsehines against Ctesiphon we have one
instance of a transaction of this nature between the city of Oreum and
Demosthenes himself, where the stipulation was so notorious as to
appear on the public records of this city; and so firm and binding, as to
oblige the people of Oreum, in a time of their distress, to mortgage their
revenues to the orator as a security for the sum agreed on, and to pay
kiterost, monthly, until the principal could be discharged.
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? ORATION FOR THE MEGALOPOL1TANS. 253
mean between them, and should you prove impatient
of direction, he would gratify neither party; he
would be calumniated by both. Yet still, I freely
choose, if such must be my fate, rather to be thought
weakly impertinent than to suffer any men to mis-
lead you from what I deem most advantageous to
the state. There are other points of which, if I have
your permission, I shall hereafter speak. I now
proceed, from principles acknowledged equally by
all, to deduce such truths as I think of greatest
moment.
There is not a man1 who can deny that it is for the
interest of Athens that both the Lacedaemonians and
the Thebans also should be weak; but such is the
present state of things ^if any conjecture may be
formed from the discourses we so often hear), that
if Orchomenus2 and Thespia and Plataea be re-
1 There is not a man, &c. ]--On this principle it is that the orator
founds all his reasoning. The wars which these three leading states
carried on against each other were either for acquiring, or supporting,
or recovering the sovereignty in Greece. A passion for this pre-emi-
nence constituted the principal part of national virtue and merit. They
talked, indeed, of the interest of the whole body of Greece, of an exten-
sive regard and affection to this body, and of the necessity of a just
batance of power; yet, in these days of degeneracy, at least, the duly
of aggrandizing their own community was frequently made the great
law of the morality of statesmen. And this contributed no less to the
final ruin of the Grecian states than their luxury and corruption.
"Graecia e civitates, dum imperare singulae cnpiunt, imperium omnes
perdiderunt," says Justin. A strict union with each other was neces-
sary, even to the being and support of each. But for extensive dominion,
the constitution and circumstances even of the most eminent of their
communities were by no means calculated.
2 There were two cities in Greece of this name; the one in Arcadia,
the other, of which the orator here speaks, in Bceotia, an ancient and
illustrious city, to which Thebes was tributary, in the heroic times,
until Hercules enabled it to assert its independence. After the battle of
! ,euctra the Thebans determined to reduce this rival city to their obedi-
ence, but were restrained by the moderation of Epaminondas, who pre-
vailed on his countrymen to admit the people of Orchomenus to their
alliance, instead of reducing them to slavery. However, after the battle
of Maritinea, in which this general fell, the Thebans found a pretence
for executing their former severe purposes against Orchomenus. Three
hundred Orchomenian cavalry, had joined with certain Theban exiles in
a conspiracy to overturn the aristocratical constitution of Thebes, and
were betrayed by those whom they had agreed to assist. The Thebans,
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? 254 orations or Demosthenes.
peopled, the Thebans must be weak; that the
Lacedemonians,1 if Arcadia be reduced to their
obedience, and the Great City be possessed by them,
must once more become powerful. We are, there-
fore, to be careful not to suffer these to be great and
formidable before the others are reduced; nor to
betray ourselves into greater inconveniences by the
strength of Lacedsemon than can possibly be com-
pensated by the weakness of Thebes. Not that we
assert that it is more eligible to have the Lacedae-
monians our enemies than the Thebans. This is not
the point we would support; but that neither of them
should have the power of injuring us in any instance:
for thus only can our fears be removed and our
security established.
' But it will be said, " Yes! this is, indeed, a point
of utmost moment: yet it is grievous to make those
our allies against whom we fought at Mantinea, to
unite with them against the very men with whom
we then shared the dangers of the field. " Grievous,
I confess, it is; but let such delicacy gain some
attention among others: let the parlies once agree
to live in peace, and we shall not, we need not, send
not contented with confining their vengeance to the guilty, seized the
city of Orchomenus, put the citizens to the sword, and made slaves of
their wives and children. --Lucckesini.
Of Thespia and Platasa, the reader will find some short account In the
oration on the Peace, note 2, p. 102. The vicinity of these three cities to
Thebes, and their hatred to the Thebans, inspired by the temembrance
of injuries never to be forgotten, sufficiently explain the assertion of
Demosthenes.
1 The subversion of the Lacedaemonian power seems to have been not
so much the effect of tue defeat at Leuctra as of the revolt of their allies
In Peloponnesus, and particularly of the Arcadians. It was not difficult
for a warlike nation to have reassembled and reinforced its troops after
such an engagement. Nor could the Thebans have ventured to pursue
their victory so far as even to threaten Sparta with slavery, unless they
had been assisted by the Arcadians. Hence both the Thebans and
Athenians ever courted the alliance of the Peloponnesiaos,and cultivated
their friendship with the greatest assiduity. And hence the orator is
justly warranted to observe that the power of Lacedremon must rise to
a formidable pitch by the reduction of the Arcadians, who, by the extent
of their territory, and the strength of their towns, were, next to Sparta,
evidently the most considerable of the Feloponnesian states ~Lu#-
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? ORATION FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS. 25S
support to the Megalopolitans; our swords shall not
then be drawn against our old fellow-soldiers. One
party (as they profess) are already in alliance with
us, the other are now soliciting our alliance. What
have we farther to desire? But what if justice
should be violated? if war should be resolved on?
If it be the sole object of debate whether we should
give up the Great City to the dominion of Laeedasmon
or no, let us give it up: I do not contend against it,
though it be not just: let us not arm against those
who once shared with us the dangers of the field.
But as we are all convinced, that if once masters of
this city, they will instantly attack Messene; let
any one of those who have been so severe on the
Megalopolitans rise and say what conduct he would
recommend to us on such an emergency. They are
silent: but you are not to be informed that whether
they should urge us or dissuade us, we should be
obliged to send succours, both by those sacred oaths
which engage us to Messene, and by our interest,
which requires that this city should subsist. 1 Con-
sider, therefore, with yourselves which would be the
noblest and most benevolent procedure, to begin
your opposition to the encroachments of Lacedaemon
by the defence of the Megalopolitans, or that of the
Messenians. In the one case, you will appear atten-
tive only to the safety of the Arcadians, and to the
solid establishment of that tranquillity for which you
have exposed yourselves to the dangers and the toils
of war: in the other, all mankind must see that in
defending Messene, you act not so much from prin-
ciples of equity as from your fears of Lacedaemon.
1 The Lacedemonians, mortified and incensed at the re-establishment
at Messene, refused to include this state in the general peace which was
made after the battle of Mantinea; and when the Thebans were once
Involved in the Phocian war, determined to seize the opportunity of
oppressing those Peloponnesians who had united with their rivals.
Hostilities were declared against the Messenians: this people applied for
succour to the Athenians, who engaged to defend them against inva
sions, though they refused to assist them in any offensive measures.
This seems to have been the engagement to which the orator reters.
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