Objection 2: Further,
gratuitous
grace is distinguished from
sanctifying grace.
sanctifying grace.
Summa Theologica
"form" which is the "abiding figure
of things," since it does not belong to bodies. Nor is it in the
"third," since it is not a "passion nor a passion-like quality," which
is in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in Physic. viii; and
grace is principally in the mind. Nor is it in the "second" species,
which is "natural power" or "impotence"; since grace is above nature
and does not regard good and evil, as does natural power. Therefore it
must be in the "first" species which is "habit" or "disposition. " Now
habits of the mind are virtues; since even knowledge itself is a virtue
after a manner, as stated above ([2191]Q[57], AA[1],2). Therefore grace
is the same as virtue.
On the contrary, If grace is a virtue, it would seem before all to be
one of the three theological virtues. But grace is neither faith nor
hope, for these can be without sanctifying grace. Nor is it charity,
since "grace foreruns charity," as Augustine says in his book on the
Predestination of the Saints (De Dono Persev. xvi). Therefore grace is
not virtue.
I answer that, Some held that grace and virtue were identical in
essence, and differed only logically---in the sense that we speak of
grace inasmuch as it makes man pleasing to God, or is given
gratuitously---and of virtue inasmuch as it empowers us to act rightly.
And the Master seems to have thought this (Sent. ii, D 27).
But if anyone rightly considers the nature of virtue, this cannot hold,
since, as the Philosopher says (Physic. vii, text. 17), "virtue is
disposition of what is perfect---and I call perfect what is disposed
according to its nature. " Now from this it is clear that the virtue of
a thing has reference to some pre-existing nature, from the fact that
everything is disposed with reference to what befits its nature. But it
is manifest that the virtues acquired by human acts of which we spoke
above (Q[55], seqq. ) are dispositions, whereby a man is fittingly
disposed with reference to the nature whereby he is a man; whereas
infused virtues dispose man in a higher manner and towards a higher
end, and consequently in relation to some higher nature, i. e. in
relation to a participation of the Divine Nature, according to 2 Pet.
1:4: "He hath given us most great and most precious promises; that by
these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature. " And it is in
respect of receiving this nature that we are said to be born again sons
of God.
And thus, even as the natural light of reason is something besides the
acquired virtues, which are ordained to this natural light, so also the
light of grace which is a participation of the Divine Nature is
something besides the infused virtues which are derived from and are
ordained to this light, hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:8): "For you
were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord. Walk then as
children of the light. " For as the acquired virtues enable a man to
walk, in accordance with the natural light of reason, so do the infused
virtues enable a man to walk as befits the light of grace.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine calls "faith that worketh by charity"
grace, since the act of faith of him that worketh by charity is the
first act by which sanctifying grace is manifested.
Reply to Objection 2: Good is placed in the definition of virtue with
reference to its fitness with some pre-existing nature essential or
participated. Now good is not attributed to grace in this manner, but
as to the root of goodness in man, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Grace is reduced to the first species of quality;
and yet it is not the same as virtue, but is a certain disposition
which is presupposed to the infused virtues, as their principle and
root.
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Whether grace is in the essence of the soul as in a subject, or in one of
the powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not in the essence of the
soul, as in a subject, but in one of the powers. For Augustine says
(Hypognosticon iii [*Among the spurious works of St. Augustine]) that
grace is related to the will or to the free will "as a rider to his
horse. " Now the will or the free will is a power, as stated above
([2192]FP, Q[83], A[2]). Hence grace is in a power of the soul, as in a
subject.
Objection 2: Further, "Man's merit springs from grace" as Augustine
says (De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. vi). Now merit consists in acts, which
proceed from a power. Hence it seems that grace is a perfection of a
power of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, if the essence of the soul is the proper subject
of grace, the soul, inasmuch as it has an essence, must be capable of
grace. But this is false; since it would follow that every soul would
be capable of grace. Therefore the essence of the soul is not the
proper subject of grace.
Objection 4: Further, the essence of the soul is prior to its powers.
Now what is prior may be understood without what is posterior. Hence it
follows that grace may be taken to be in the soul, although we suppose
no part or power of the soul---viz. neither the will, nor the
intellect, nor anything else; which is impossible.
On the contrary, By grace we are born again sons of God. But generation
terminates at the essence prior to the powers. Therefore grace is in
the soul's essence prior to being in the powers.
I answer that, This question depends on the preceding. For if grace is
the same as virtue, it must necessarily be in the powers of the soul as
in a subject; since the soul's powers are the proper subject of virtue,
as stated above ([2193]Q[56], A[1]). But if grace differs from virtue,
it cannot be said that a power of the soul is the subject of grace,
since every perfection of the soul's powers has the nature of virtue,
as stated above ([2194]Q[55], A[1];[2195] Q[56], A[1]). Hence it
remains that grace, as it is prior to virtue, has a subject prior to
the powers of the soul, so that it is in the essence of the soul. For
as man in his intellective powers participates in the Divine knowledge
through the virtue of faith, and in his power of will participates in
the Divine love through the virtue of charity, so also in the nature of
the soul does he participate in the Divine Nature, after the manner of
a likeness, through a certain regeneration or re-creation.
Reply to Objection 1: As from the essence of the soul flows its powers,
which are the principles of deeds, so likewise the virtues, whereby the
powers are moved to act, flow into the powers of the soul from grace.
And thus grace is compared to the will as the mover to the moved, which
is the same comparison as that of a horseman to the horse---but not as
an accident to a subject.
And thereby is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection. For grace
is the principle of meritorious works through the medium of virtues, as
the essence of the soul is the principal of vital deeds through the
medium of the powers.
Reply to Objection 3: The soul is the subject of grace, as being in the
species of intellectual or rational nature. But the soul is not classed
in a species by any of its powers, since the powers are natural
properties of the soul following upon the species. Hence the soul
differs specifically in its essence from other souls, viz. of dumb
animals, and of plants. Consequently it does not follow that, if the
essence of the human soul is the subject of grace, every soul may be
the subject of grace; since it belongs to the essence of the soul,
inasmuch as it is of such a species.
Reply to Objection 4: Since the powers of the soul are natural
properties following upon the species, the soul cannot be without them.
Yet, granted that it was without them, the soul would still be called
intellectual or rational in its species, not that it would actually
have these powers, but on account of the essence of such a species,
from which these powers naturally flow.
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OF THE DIVISION OF GRACE (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the division of grace; under which head there are
five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether grace is fittingly divided into gratuitous grace and
sanctifying grace?
(2) Of the division into operating and cooperating grace;
(3) Of the division of it into prevenient and subsequent grace;
(4) Of the division of gratuitous grace;
(5) Of the comparison between sanctifying and gratuitous grace.
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Whether grace is fittingly divided into sanctifying grace and gratuitous
grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into
sanctifying grace and gratuitous grace. For grace is a gift of God, as
is clear from what has been already stated ([2196]Q[110], A[1]). But
man is not therefore pleasing to God because something is given him by
God, but rather on the contrary; since something is freely given by
God, because man is pleasing to Him. Hence there is no sanctifying
grace.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is not given on account of preceding
merits is given gratis. Now even natural good is given to man without
preceding merit, since nature is presupposed to merit. Therefore nature
itself is given gratuitously by God. But nature is condivided with
grace. Therefore to be gratuitously given is not fittingly set down as
a difference of grace, since it is found outside the genus of grace.
Objection 3: Further, members of a division are mutually opposed. But
even sanctifying grace, whereby we are justified, is given to us
gratuitously, according to Rom. 3:24: "Being justified freely [gratis]
by His grace. " Hence sanctifying grace ought not to be divided against
gratuitous grace.
On the contrary, The Apostle attributes both to grace, viz. to sanctify
and to be gratuitously given. For with regard to the first he says
(Eph. 1:6): "He hath graced us in His beloved son. " And with regard to
the second (Rom. 2:6): "And if by grace, it is not now by works,
otherwise grace is no more grace. " Therefore grace can be distinguished
by its having one only or both.
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1), "those things that are
of God are well ordered [Vulg. : 'those that are, are ordained by God]. "
Now the order of things consists in this, that things are led to God by
other things, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). And hence since grace
is ordained to lead men to God, this takes place in a certain order, so
that some are led to God by others.
And thus there is a twofold grace: one whereby man himself is united to
God, and this is called "sanctifying grace"; the other is that whereby
one man cooperates with another in leading him to God, and this gift is
called "gratuitous grace," since it is bestowed on a man beyond the
capability of nature, and beyond the merit of the person. But whereas
it is bestowed on a man, not to justify him, but rather that he may
cooperate in the justification of another, it is not called sanctifying
grace. And it is of this that the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:7): "And the
manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto utility," i. e.
of others.
Reply to Objection 1: Grace is said to make pleasing, not efficiently
but formally, i. e. because thereby a man is justified, and is made
worthy to be called pleasing to God, according to Col. 1:21: "He hath
made us worthy to be made partakers of the lot of the saints in light. "
Reply to Objection 2: Grace, inasmuch as it is gratuitously given,
excludes the notion of debt. Now debt may be taken in two ways: first,
as arising from merit; and this regards the person whose it is to do
meritorious works, according to Rom. 4:4: "Now to him that worketh, the
reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt. " The
second debt regards the condition of nature. Thus we say it is due to a
man to have reason, and whatever else belongs to human nature. Yet in
neither way is debt taken to mean that God is under an obligation to
His creature, but rather that the creature ought to be subject to God,
that the Divine ordination may be fulfilled in it, which is that a
certain nature should have certain conditions or properties, and that
by doing certain works it should attain to something further. And hence
natural endowments are not a debt in the first sense but in the second.
Hence they especially merit the name of grace.
Reply to Objection 3: Sanctifying grace adds to the notion of
gratuitous grace something pertaining to the nature of grace, since it
makes man pleasing to God. And hence gratuitous grace which does not do
this keeps the common name, as happens in many other cases; and thus
the two parts of the division are opposed as sanctifying and
non-sanctifying grace.
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Whether grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into
operating and cooperating grace. For grace is an accident, as stated
above ([2197]Q[110], A[2]). Now no accident can act upon its subject.
Therefore no grace can be called operating.
Objection 2: Further, if grace operates anything in us it assuredly
brings about justification. But not only grace works this. For
Augustine says, on Jn. 14:12, "the works that I do he also shall do,"
says (Serm. clxix): "He Who created thee without thyself, will not
justify thee without thyself. " Therefore no grace ought to be called
simply operating.
Objection 3: Further, to cooperate seems to pertain to the inferior
agent, and not to the principal agent. But grace works in us more than
free-will, according to Rom. 9:16: "It is not of him that willeth, nor
of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy. " Therefore no grace
ought to be called cooperating.
Objection 4: Further, division ought to rest on opposition. But to
operate and to cooperate are not opposed; for one and the same thing
can both operate and cooperate. Therefore grace is not fittingly
divided into operating and cooperating.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. xvii): "God
by cooperating with us, perfects what He began by operating in us,
since He who perfects by cooperation with such as are willing, beings
by operating that they may will. " But the operations of God whereby He
moves us to good pertain to grace. Therefore grace is fittingly divided
into operating and cooperating.
I answer that, As stated above ([2198]Q[110], A[2]) grace may be taken
in two ways; first, as a Divine help, whereby God moves us to will and
to act; secondly, as a habitual gift divinely bestowed on us.
Now in both these ways grace is fittingly divided into operating and
cooperating. For the operation of an effect is not attributed to the
thing moved but to the mover. Hence in that effect in which our mind is
moved and does not move, but in which God is the sole mover, the
operation is attributed to God, and it is with reference to this that
we speak of "operating grace. " But in that effect in which our mind
both moves and is moved, the operation is not only attributed to God,
but also to the soul; and it is with reference to this that we speak of
"cooperating grace. " Now there is a double act in us. First, there is
the interior act of the will, and with regard to this act the will is a
thing moved, and God is the mover; and especially when the will, which
hitherto willed evil, begins to will good. And hence, inasmuch as God
moves the human mind to this act, we speak of operating grace. But
there is another, exterior act; and since it is commanded by the will,
as was shown above ([2199]Q[17], A[9]) the operation of this act is
attributed to the will. And because God assists us in this act, both by
strengthening our will interiorly so as to attain to the act, and by
granting outwardly the capability of operating, it is with respect to
this that we speak of cooperating grace. Hence after the aforesaid
words Augustine subjoins: "He operates that we may will; and when we
will, He cooperates that we may perfect. " And thus if grace is taken
for God's gratuitous motion whereby He moves us to meritorious good, it
is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace.
But if grace is taken for the habitual gift, then again there is a
double effect of grace, even as of every other form; the first of which
is "being," and the second, "operation"; thus the work of heat is to
make its subject hot, and to give heat outwardly. And thus habitual
grace, inasmuch as it heals and justifies the soul, or makes it
pleasing to God, is called operating grace; but inasmuch as it is the
principle of meritorious works, which spring from the free-will, it is
called cooperating grace.
Reply to Objection 1: Inasmuch as grace is a certain accidental
quality, it does not act upon the soul efficiently, but formally, as
whiteness makes a surface white.
Reply to Objection 2: God does not justify us without ourselves,
because whilst we are being justified we consent to God's justification
[justitiae] by a movement of our free-will. Nevertheless this movement
is not the cause of grace, but the effect; hence the whole operation
pertains to grace.
Reply to Objection 3: One thing is said to cooperate with another not
merely when it is a secondary agent under a principal agent, but when
it helps to the end intended. Now man is helped by God to will the
good, through the means of operating grace. And hence, the end being
already intended, grace cooperates with us.
Reply to Objection 4: Operating and cooperating grace are the same
grace; but are distinguished by their different effects, as is plain
from what has been said.
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Whether grace is fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into
prevenient and subsequent. For grace is an effect of the Divine love.
But God's love is never subsequent, but always prevenient, according to
1 Jn. 4:10: "Not as though we had loved God, but because He hath first
loved us. " Therefore grace ought not to be divided into prevenient and
subsequent.
Objection 2: Further, there is but one sanctifying grace in man, since
it is sufficient, according to 2 Cor. 12:9: "My grace is sufficient for
thee. " But the same thing cannot be before and after. Therefore grace
is not fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent.
Objection 3: Further, grace is known by its effects. Now there are an
infinite number of effects---one preceding another. Hence it with
regard to these, grace must be divided into prevenient and subsequent,
it would seem that there are infinite species of grace. Now no art
takes note of the infinite in number. Hence grace is not fittingly
divided into prevenient and subsequent.
On the contrary, God's grace is the outcome of His mercy. Now both are
said in Ps. 58:11: "His mercy shall prevent me," and again, Ps. 22:6:
"Thy mercy will follow me. " Therefore grace is fittingly divided into
prevenient and subsequent.
I answer that, As grace is divided into operating and cooperating, with
regard to its diverse effects, so also is it divided into prevenient
and subsequent, howsoever we consider grace. Now there are five effects
of grace in us: of these, the first is, to heal the soul; the second,
to desire good; the third, to carry into effect the good proposed; the
fourth, to persevere in good; the fifth, to reach glory. And hence
grace, inasmuch as it causes the first effect in us, is called
prevenient with respect to the second, and inasmuch as it causes the
second, it is called subsequent with respect to the first effect. And
as one effect is posterior to this effect, and prior to that, so may
grace be called prevenient and subsequent on account of the same effect
viewed relatively to divers others. And this is what Augustine says (De
Natura et Gratia xxxi): "It is prevenient, inasmuch as it heals, and
subsequent, inasmuch as, being healed, we are strengthened; it is
prevenient, inasmuch as we are called, and subsequent, inasmuch as we
are glorified. "
Reply to Objection 1: God's love signifies something eternal; and hence
can never be called anything but prevenient. But grace signifies a
temporal effect, which can precede and follow another; and thus grace
may be both prevenient and subsequent.
Reply to Objection 2: The division into prevenient and subsequent grace
does not divide grace in its essence, but only in its effects, as was
already said of operating and cooperating grace. For subsequent grace,
inasmuch as it pertains to glory, is not numerically distinct from
prevenient grace whereby we are at present justified. For even as the
charity of the earth is not voided in heaven, so must the same be said
of the light of grace, since the notion of neither implies
imperfection.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the effects of grace may be infinite in
number, even as human acts are infinite, nevertheless all reduced to
some of a determinate species, and moreover all coincide in this---that
one precedes another.
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Whether gratuitous grace is rightly divided by the Apostle?
Objection 1: It would seem that gratuitous grace is not rightly divided
by the Apostle. For every gift vouchsafed to us by God, may be called a
gratuitous grace. Now there are an infinite number of gifts freely
bestowed on us by God as regards both the good of the soul and the good
of the body---and yet they do not make us pleasing to God. Hence
gratuitous graces cannot be contained under any certain division.
Objection 2: Further, gratuitous grace is distinguished from
sanctifying grace. But faith pertains to sanctifying grace, since we
are justified by it, according to Rom. 5:1: "Being justified therefore
by faith. " Hence it is not right to place faith amongst the gratuitous
graces, especially since the other virtues are not so placed, as hope
and charity.
Objection 3: Further, the operation of healing, and speaking divers
tongues are miracles. Again, the interpretation of speeches pertains
either to wisdom or to knowledge, according to Dan. 1:17: "And to these
children God gave knowledge and understanding in every book and
wisdom. " Hence it is not correct to divide the grace of healing and
kinds of tongues against the working of miracles; and the
interpretation of speeches against the word of wisdom and knowledge.
Objection 4: Further, as wisdom and knowledge are gifts of the Holy
Ghost, so also are understanding, counsel, piety, fortitude, and fear,
as stated above ([2200]Q[68], A[4]). Therefore these also ought to be
placed amongst the gratuitous gifts.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8, 9, 10): "To one indeed
by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom; and to another the word of
knowledge, according to the same Spirit; to another, the working of
miracles; to another, prophecy; to another, the discerning of spirits;
to another divers kinds of tongues; to another interpretation of
speeches. "
I answer that, As was said above [2201](A[1]), gratuitous grace is
ordained to this, viz. that a man may help another to be led to God.
Now no man can help in this by moving interiorly (for this belongs to
God alone), but only exteriorly by teaching or persuading. Hence
gratuitous grace embraces whatever a man needs in order to instruct
another in Divine things which are above reason. Now for this three
things are required: first, a man must possess the fullness of
knowledge of Divine things, so as to be capable of teaching others.
Secondly, he must be able to confirm or prove what he says, otherwise
his words would have no weight. Thirdly, he must be capable of
fittingly presenting to his hearers what he knows.
Now as regards the first, three things are necessary, as may be seen in
human teaching. For whoever would teach another in any science must
first be certain of the principles of the science, and with regard to
this there is "faith," which is certitude of invisible things, the
principles of Catholic doctrine. Secondly, it behooves the teacher to
know the principal conclusions of the science, and hence we have the
word of "wisdom," which is the knowledge of Divine things. Thirdly, he
ought to abound with examples and a knowledge of effects, whereby at
times he needs to manifest causes; and thus we have the word of
"knowledge," which is the knowledge of human things, since "the
invisible things of Him . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the
things that are made" (Rom. 1:20).
Now the confirmation of such things as are within reason rests upon
arguments; but the confirmation of what is above reason rests on what
is proper to the Divine power, and this in two ways: first, when the
teacher of sacred doctrine does what God alone can do, in miraculous
deeds, whether with respect to bodily health---and thus there is the
"grace of healing," or merely for the purpose of manifesting the Divine
power; for instance, that the sun should stand still or darken, or that
the sea should be divided---and thus there is the "working of
miracles. " Secondly, when he can manifest what God alone can know, and
these are either future contingents---and thus there is "prophecy," or
also the secrets of hearts---and thus there is the "discerning of
spirits. "
But the capability of speaking can regard either the idiom in which a
person can be understood, and thus there is "kinds of tongues"; or it
can regard the sense of what is said, and thus there is the
"interpretation of speeches. "
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [2202](A[1]), not all the
benefits divinely conferred upon us are called gratuitous graces, but
only those that surpass the power of nature---e. g. that a fisherman
should be replete with the word of wisdom and of knowledge and the
like; and such as these are here set down as gratuitous graces.
Reply to Objection 2: Faith is enumerated here under the gratuitous
graces, not as a virtue justifying man in himself, but as implying a
super-eminent certitude of faith, whereby a man is fitted for
instructing others concerning such things as belong to the faith. With
regard to hope and charity, they belong to the appetitive power,
according as man is ordained thereby to God.
Reply to Objection 3: The grace of healing is distinguished from the
general working of miracles because it has a special reason for
inducing one to the faith, since a man is all the more ready to believe
when he has received the gift of bodily health through the virtue of
faith. So, too, to speak with divers tongues and to interpret speeches
have special efficacy in bestowing faith. Hence they are set down as
special gratuitous graces.
Reply to Objection 4: Wisdom and knowledge are not numbered among the
gratuitous graces in the same way as they are reckoned among the gifts
of the Holy Ghost, i. e. inasmuch as man's mind is rendered easily
movable by the Holy Ghost to the things of wisdom and knowledge; for
thus they are gifts of the Holy Ghost, as stated above ([2203]Q[68],
AA[1],4). But they are numbered amongst the gratuitous graces, inasmuch
as they imply such a fullness of knowledge and wisdom that a man may
not merely think aright of Divine things, but may instruct others and
overpower adversaries. Hence it is significant that it is the "word" of
wisdom and the "word" of knowledge that are placed in the gratuitous
graces, since, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1), "It is one thing
merely to know what a man must believe in order to reach everlasting
life, and another thing to know how this may benefit the godly and may
be defended against the ungodly. "
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Whether gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that gratuitous grace is nobler than
sanctifying grace. For "the people's good is better than the individual
good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 2). Now sanctifying grace is
ordained to the good of one man alone, whereas gratuitous grace is
ordained to the common good of the whole Church, as stated above
([2204]AA[1],4). Hence gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying
grace.
Objection 2: Further, it is a greater power that is able to act upon
another, than that which is confined to itself, even as greater is the
brightness of the body that can illuminate other bodies, than of that
which can only shine but cannot illuminate; and hence the Philosopher
says (Ethic. v, 1) "that justice is the most excellent of the virtues,"
since by it a man bears himself rightly towards others. But by
sanctifying grace a man is perfected only in himself; whereas by
gratuitous grace a man works for the perfection of others. Hence
gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace.
Objection 3: Further, what is proper to the best is nobler than what is
common to all; thus to reason, which is proper to man is nobler than to
feel, which is common to all animals. Now sanctifying grace is common
to all members of the Church, but gratuitous grace is the proper gift
of the more exalted members of the Church. Hence gratuitous grace is
nobler than sanctifying grace.
On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor. 12:31), having enumerated the
gratuitous graces adds: "And I shew unto you yet a more excellent way";
and as the sequel proves he is speaking of charity, which pertains to
sanctifying grace. Hence sanctifying grace is more noble than
gratuitous grace.
I answer that, The higher the good to which a virtue is ordained, the
more excellent is the virtue. Now the end is always greater than the
means. But sanctifying grace ordains a man immediately to a union with
his last end, whereas gratuitous grace ordains a man to what is
preparatory to the end; i. e. by prophecy and miracles and so forth, men
are induced to unite themselves to their last end. And hence
sanctifying grace is nobler than gratuitous grace.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, text. 52),
a multitude, as an army, has a double good; the first is in the
multitude itself, viz. the order of the army; the second is separate
from the multitude, viz. the good of the leader---and this is better
good, since the other is ordained to it. Now gratuitous grace is
ordained to the common good of the Church, which is ecclesiastical
order, whereas sanctifying grace is ordained to the separate common
good, which is God. Hence sanctifying grace is the nobler.
Reply to Objection 2: If gratuitous grace could cause a man to have
sanctifying grace, it would follow that the gratuitous grace was the
nobler; even as the brightness of the sun that enlightens is more
excellent than that of an object that is lit up. But by gratuitous
grace a man cannot cause another to have union with God, which he
himself has by sanctifying grace; but he causes certain dispositions
towards it. Hence gratuitous grace needs not to be the more excellent,
even as in fire, the heat, which manifests its species whereby it
produces heat in other things, is not more noble than its substantial
form.
Reply to Objection 3: Feeling is ordained to reason, as to an end; and
thus, to reason is nobler. But here it is the contrary; for what is
proper is ordained to what is common as to an end. Hence there is no
comparison.
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OF THE CAUSE OF GRACE (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of grace; and under this head there are
five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God alone is the efficient cause of grace?
(2) Whether any disposition towards grace is needed on the part of the
recipient, by an act of free-will?
(3) Whether such a disposition can make grace follow of necessity?
(4) Whether grace is equal in all?
(5) Whether anyone may know that he has grace?
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Whether God alone is the cause of grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that God alone is not the cause of grace.
For it is written (Jn. 1:17): "Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ. "
Now, by the name of Jesus Christ is understood not merely the Divine
Nature assuming, but the created nature assumed. Therefore a creature
may be the cause of grace.
Objection 2: Further, there is this difference between the sacraments
of the New Law and those of the Old, that the sacraments of the New Law
cause grace, whereas the sacraments of the Old Law merely signify it.
Now the sacraments of the New Law are certain visible elements.
Therefore God is not the only cause of grace.
Objection 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iii, iv, vii,
viii), "Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect both lesser angels and
men. " Now the rational creature is cleansed, enlightened, and perfected
by grace. Therefore God is not the only cause of grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 83:12): "The Lord will give grace
and glory. "
I answer that, Nothing can act beyond its species, since the cause must
always be more powerful than its effect. Now the gift of grace
surpasses every capability of created nature, since it is nothing short
of a partaking of the Divine Nature, which exceeds every other nature.
And thus it is impossible that any creature should cause grace. For it
is as necessary that God alone should deify, bestowing a partaking of
the Divine Nature by a participated likeness, as it is impossible that
anything save fire should enkindle.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's humanity is an "organ of His Godhead,"
as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 19). Now an instrument does not
bring forth the action of the principal agent by its own power, but in
virtue of the principal agent. Hence Christ's humanity does not cause
grace by its own power, but by virtue of the Divine Nature joined to
it, whereby the actions of Christ's humanity are saving actions.
Reply to Objection 2: As in the person of Christ the humanity causes
our salvation by grace, the Divine power being the principal agent, so
likewise in the sacraments of the New Law, which are derived from
Christ, grace is instrumentally caused by the sacraments, and
principally by the power of the Holy Ghost working in the sacraments,
according to Jn. 3:5: "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy
Ghost he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. "
Reply to Objection 3: Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect angels or
men, by instruction, and not by justifying them through grace. Hence
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that "this cleansing and enlightenment
and perfecting is nothing else than the assumption of Divine
knowledge. "
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Whether any preparation and disposition for grace is required on man's part?
Objection 1: It would seem that no preparation or disposition for grace
is required on man's part, since, as the Apostle says (Rom. 4:4), "To
him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but
according to debt. " Now a man's preparation by free-will can only be
through some operation. Hence it would do away with the notion of
grace.
Objection 2: Further, whoever is going on sinning, is not preparing
himself to have grace. But to some who are going on sinning grace is
given, as is clear in the case of Paul, who received grace whilst he
was "breathing our threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of
the Lord" (Act 9:1). Hence no preparation for grace is required on
man's part.
Objection 3: Further, an agent of infinite power needs no disposition
in matter, since it does not even require matter, as appears in
creation, to which grace is compared, which is called "a new creature"
(Gal. 6:15). But only God, Who has infinite power, causes grace, as
stated above (A[1] ). Hence no preparation is required on man's part to
obtain grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Amos 4:12): "Be prepared to meet thy
God, O Israel," and (1 Kings 7:3): "Prepare your hearts unto the Lord. "
I answer that, As stated above ([2205]Q[111], A[2]), grace is taken in
two ways: first, as a habitual gift of God. Secondly, as a help from
God, Who moves the soul to good. Now taking grace in the first sense, a
certain preparation of grace is required for it, since a form can only
be in disposed matter. But if we speak of grace as it signifies a help
from God to move us to good, no preparation is required on man's part,
that, as it were, anticipates the Divine help, but rather, every
preparation in man must be by the help of God moving the soul to good.
And thus even the good movement of the free-will, whereby anyone is
prepared for receiving the gift of grace is an act of the free-will
moved by God. And thus man is said to prepare himself, according to
Prov. 16:1: "It is the part of man to prepare the soul"; yet it is
principally from God, Who moves the free-will. Hence it is said that
man's will is prepared by God, and that man's steps are guided by God.
Reply to Objection 1: A certain preparation of man for grace is
simultaneous with the infusion of grace; and this operation is
meritorious, not indeed of grace, which is already possessed---but of
glory which is not yet possessed. But there is another imperfect
preparation, which sometimes precedes the gift of sanctifying grace,
and yet it is from God's motion. But it does not suffice for merit,
since man is not yet justified by grace, and merit can only arise from
grace, as will be seen further on ([2206]Q[114], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: Since a man cannot prepare himself for grace
unless God prevent and move him to good, it is of no account whether
anyone arrive at perfect preparation instantaneously, or step by step.
For it is written (Ecclus. 11:23): "It is easy in the eyes of God on a
sudden to make the poor man rich. " Now it sometimes happens that God
moves a man to good, but not perfect good, and this preparation
precedes grace. But He sometimes moves him suddenly and perfectly to
good, and man receives grace suddenly, according to Jn. 6:45: "Every
one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me. " And
thus it happened to Paul, since, suddenly when he was in the midst of
sin, his heart was perfectly moved by God to hear, to learn, to come;
and hence he received grace suddenly.
Reply to Objection 3: An agent of infinite power needs no matter or
disposition of matter, brought about by the action of something else;
and yet, looking to the condition of the thing caused, it must cause,
in the thing caused, both the matter and the due disposition for the
form. So likewise, when God infuses grace into a soul, no preparation
is required which He Himself does not bring about.
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Whether grace is necessarily given to whoever prepares himself for it, or to
whoever does what he can?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is necessarily given to whoever
prepares himself for grace, or to whoever does what he can, because, on
Rom. 5:1, "Being justified . . . by faith, let us have peace," etc. the
gloss says: "God welcomes whoever flies to Him, otherwise there would
be injustice with Him. " But it is impossible for injustice to be with
God. Therefore it is impossible for God not to welcome whoever flies to
Him. Hence he receives grace of necessity.
Objection 2: Further, Anselm says (De Casu Diaboli. iii) that the
reason why God does not bestow grace on the devil, is that he did not
wish, nor was he prepared, to receive it. But if the cause be removed,
the effect must needs be removed also. Therefore, if anyone is willing
to receive grace it is bestowed on them of necessity.
Objection 3: Further, good is diffusive of itself, as appears from
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Now the good of grace is better than the good
of nature. Hence, since natural forms necessarily come to disposed
matter, much more does it seem that grace is necessarily bestowed on
whoever prepares himself for grace.
On the contrary, Man is compared to God as clay to the potter,
according to Jer. 18:6: "As clay is in the hand of the potter, so are
you in My hand. " But however much the clay is prepared, it does not
necessarily receive its shape from the potter. Hence, however much a
man prepares himself, he does not necessarily receive grace from God.
I answer that, As stated above [2207](A[2]), man's preparation for
grace is from God, as Mover, and from the free-will, as moved. Hence
the preparation may be looked at in two ways: first, as it is from
free-will, and thus there is no necessity that it should obtain grace,
since the gift of grace exceeds every preparation of human power. But
it may be considered, secondly, as it is from God the Mover, and thus
it has a necessity---not indeed of coercion, but of infallibility---as
regards what it is ordained to by God, since God's intention cannot
fail, according to the saying of Augustine in his book on the
Predestination of the Saints (De Dono Persev. xiv) that "by God's good
gifts whoever is liberated, is most certainly liberated. " Hence if God
intends, while moving, that the one whose heart He moves should attain
to grace, he will infallibly attain to it, according to Jn. 6:45:
"Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to
Me. "
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss is speaking of such as fly to God by a
meritorious act of their free-will, already "informed" with grace; for
if they did not receive grace, it would be against the justice which He
Himself established. Or if it refers to the movement of free-will
before grace, it is speaking in the sense that man's flight to God is
by a Divine motion, which ought not, in justice, to fail.
Reply to Objection 2: The first cause of the defect of grace is on our
part; but the first cause of the bestowal of grace is on God's
according to Osee 13:9: "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is
only in Me. "
Reply to Objection 3: Even in natural things, the form does not
necessarily ensue the disposition of the matter, except by the power of
the agent that causes the disposition.
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Whether grace is greater in one than in another?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not greater in one than in
another. For grace is caused in us by the Divine love, as stated above
([2208]Q[110], A[1]). Now it is written (Wis. 6:8): "He made the little
and the great and He hath equally care of all. " Therefore all obtain
grace from Him equally.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is the greatest possible, cannot be more
or less. But grace is the greatest possible, since it joins us with our
last end. Therefore there is no greater or less in it. Hence it is not
greater in one than in another.
Objection 3: Further, grace is the soul's life, as stated above
([2209]Q[110], A[1], ad 2). But there is no greater or less in life.
Hence, neither is there in grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:7): "But to every one of us is
given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ. " Now what
is given in measure, is not given to all equally. Hence all have not an
equal grace.
I answer that, As stated above ([2210]Q[52], AA[1],2;[2211] Q[56],
AA[1],2), habits can have a double magnitude: one, as regards the end
or object, as when a virtue is said to be more noble through being
ordained to a greater good; the other on the part of the subject, which
more or less participates in the habit inhering to it.
Now as regards the first magnitude, sanctifying grace cannot be greater
or less, since, of its nature, grace joins man to the Highest Good,
which is God. But as regards the subject, grace can receive more or
less, inasmuch as one may be more perfectly enlightened by grace than
another. And a certain reason for this is on the part of him who
prepares himself for grace; since he who is better prepared for grace,
receives more grace.
of things," since it does not belong to bodies. Nor is it in the
"third," since it is not a "passion nor a passion-like quality," which
is in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in Physic. viii; and
grace is principally in the mind. Nor is it in the "second" species,
which is "natural power" or "impotence"; since grace is above nature
and does not regard good and evil, as does natural power. Therefore it
must be in the "first" species which is "habit" or "disposition. " Now
habits of the mind are virtues; since even knowledge itself is a virtue
after a manner, as stated above ([2191]Q[57], AA[1],2). Therefore grace
is the same as virtue.
On the contrary, If grace is a virtue, it would seem before all to be
one of the three theological virtues. But grace is neither faith nor
hope, for these can be without sanctifying grace. Nor is it charity,
since "grace foreruns charity," as Augustine says in his book on the
Predestination of the Saints (De Dono Persev. xvi). Therefore grace is
not virtue.
I answer that, Some held that grace and virtue were identical in
essence, and differed only logically---in the sense that we speak of
grace inasmuch as it makes man pleasing to God, or is given
gratuitously---and of virtue inasmuch as it empowers us to act rightly.
And the Master seems to have thought this (Sent. ii, D 27).
But if anyone rightly considers the nature of virtue, this cannot hold,
since, as the Philosopher says (Physic. vii, text. 17), "virtue is
disposition of what is perfect---and I call perfect what is disposed
according to its nature. " Now from this it is clear that the virtue of
a thing has reference to some pre-existing nature, from the fact that
everything is disposed with reference to what befits its nature. But it
is manifest that the virtues acquired by human acts of which we spoke
above (Q[55], seqq. ) are dispositions, whereby a man is fittingly
disposed with reference to the nature whereby he is a man; whereas
infused virtues dispose man in a higher manner and towards a higher
end, and consequently in relation to some higher nature, i. e. in
relation to a participation of the Divine Nature, according to 2 Pet.
1:4: "He hath given us most great and most precious promises; that by
these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature. " And it is in
respect of receiving this nature that we are said to be born again sons
of God.
And thus, even as the natural light of reason is something besides the
acquired virtues, which are ordained to this natural light, so also the
light of grace which is a participation of the Divine Nature is
something besides the infused virtues which are derived from and are
ordained to this light, hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:8): "For you
were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord. Walk then as
children of the light. " For as the acquired virtues enable a man to
walk, in accordance with the natural light of reason, so do the infused
virtues enable a man to walk as befits the light of grace.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine calls "faith that worketh by charity"
grace, since the act of faith of him that worketh by charity is the
first act by which sanctifying grace is manifested.
Reply to Objection 2: Good is placed in the definition of virtue with
reference to its fitness with some pre-existing nature essential or
participated. Now good is not attributed to grace in this manner, but
as to the root of goodness in man, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Grace is reduced to the first species of quality;
and yet it is not the same as virtue, but is a certain disposition
which is presupposed to the infused virtues, as their principle and
root.
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Whether grace is in the essence of the soul as in a subject, or in one of
the powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not in the essence of the
soul, as in a subject, but in one of the powers. For Augustine says
(Hypognosticon iii [*Among the spurious works of St. Augustine]) that
grace is related to the will or to the free will "as a rider to his
horse. " Now the will or the free will is a power, as stated above
([2192]FP, Q[83], A[2]). Hence grace is in a power of the soul, as in a
subject.
Objection 2: Further, "Man's merit springs from grace" as Augustine
says (De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. vi). Now merit consists in acts, which
proceed from a power. Hence it seems that grace is a perfection of a
power of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, if the essence of the soul is the proper subject
of grace, the soul, inasmuch as it has an essence, must be capable of
grace. But this is false; since it would follow that every soul would
be capable of grace. Therefore the essence of the soul is not the
proper subject of grace.
Objection 4: Further, the essence of the soul is prior to its powers.
Now what is prior may be understood without what is posterior. Hence it
follows that grace may be taken to be in the soul, although we suppose
no part or power of the soul---viz. neither the will, nor the
intellect, nor anything else; which is impossible.
On the contrary, By grace we are born again sons of God. But generation
terminates at the essence prior to the powers. Therefore grace is in
the soul's essence prior to being in the powers.
I answer that, This question depends on the preceding. For if grace is
the same as virtue, it must necessarily be in the powers of the soul as
in a subject; since the soul's powers are the proper subject of virtue,
as stated above ([2193]Q[56], A[1]). But if grace differs from virtue,
it cannot be said that a power of the soul is the subject of grace,
since every perfection of the soul's powers has the nature of virtue,
as stated above ([2194]Q[55], A[1];[2195] Q[56], A[1]). Hence it
remains that grace, as it is prior to virtue, has a subject prior to
the powers of the soul, so that it is in the essence of the soul. For
as man in his intellective powers participates in the Divine knowledge
through the virtue of faith, and in his power of will participates in
the Divine love through the virtue of charity, so also in the nature of
the soul does he participate in the Divine Nature, after the manner of
a likeness, through a certain regeneration or re-creation.
Reply to Objection 1: As from the essence of the soul flows its powers,
which are the principles of deeds, so likewise the virtues, whereby the
powers are moved to act, flow into the powers of the soul from grace.
And thus grace is compared to the will as the mover to the moved, which
is the same comparison as that of a horseman to the horse---but not as
an accident to a subject.
And thereby is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection. For grace
is the principle of meritorious works through the medium of virtues, as
the essence of the soul is the principal of vital deeds through the
medium of the powers.
Reply to Objection 3: The soul is the subject of grace, as being in the
species of intellectual or rational nature. But the soul is not classed
in a species by any of its powers, since the powers are natural
properties of the soul following upon the species. Hence the soul
differs specifically in its essence from other souls, viz. of dumb
animals, and of plants. Consequently it does not follow that, if the
essence of the human soul is the subject of grace, every soul may be
the subject of grace; since it belongs to the essence of the soul,
inasmuch as it is of such a species.
Reply to Objection 4: Since the powers of the soul are natural
properties following upon the species, the soul cannot be without them.
Yet, granted that it was without them, the soul would still be called
intellectual or rational in its species, not that it would actually
have these powers, but on account of the essence of such a species,
from which these powers naturally flow.
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OF THE DIVISION OF GRACE (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the division of grace; under which head there are
five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether grace is fittingly divided into gratuitous grace and
sanctifying grace?
(2) Of the division into operating and cooperating grace;
(3) Of the division of it into prevenient and subsequent grace;
(4) Of the division of gratuitous grace;
(5) Of the comparison between sanctifying and gratuitous grace.
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Whether grace is fittingly divided into sanctifying grace and gratuitous
grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into
sanctifying grace and gratuitous grace. For grace is a gift of God, as
is clear from what has been already stated ([2196]Q[110], A[1]). But
man is not therefore pleasing to God because something is given him by
God, but rather on the contrary; since something is freely given by
God, because man is pleasing to Him. Hence there is no sanctifying
grace.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is not given on account of preceding
merits is given gratis. Now even natural good is given to man without
preceding merit, since nature is presupposed to merit. Therefore nature
itself is given gratuitously by God. But nature is condivided with
grace. Therefore to be gratuitously given is not fittingly set down as
a difference of grace, since it is found outside the genus of grace.
Objection 3: Further, members of a division are mutually opposed. But
even sanctifying grace, whereby we are justified, is given to us
gratuitously, according to Rom. 3:24: "Being justified freely [gratis]
by His grace. " Hence sanctifying grace ought not to be divided against
gratuitous grace.
On the contrary, The Apostle attributes both to grace, viz. to sanctify
and to be gratuitously given. For with regard to the first he says
(Eph. 1:6): "He hath graced us in His beloved son. " And with regard to
the second (Rom. 2:6): "And if by grace, it is not now by works,
otherwise grace is no more grace. " Therefore grace can be distinguished
by its having one only or both.
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1), "those things that are
of God are well ordered [Vulg. : 'those that are, are ordained by God]. "
Now the order of things consists in this, that things are led to God by
other things, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). And hence since grace
is ordained to lead men to God, this takes place in a certain order, so
that some are led to God by others.
And thus there is a twofold grace: one whereby man himself is united to
God, and this is called "sanctifying grace"; the other is that whereby
one man cooperates with another in leading him to God, and this gift is
called "gratuitous grace," since it is bestowed on a man beyond the
capability of nature, and beyond the merit of the person. But whereas
it is bestowed on a man, not to justify him, but rather that he may
cooperate in the justification of another, it is not called sanctifying
grace. And it is of this that the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:7): "And the
manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto utility," i. e.
of others.
Reply to Objection 1: Grace is said to make pleasing, not efficiently
but formally, i. e. because thereby a man is justified, and is made
worthy to be called pleasing to God, according to Col. 1:21: "He hath
made us worthy to be made partakers of the lot of the saints in light. "
Reply to Objection 2: Grace, inasmuch as it is gratuitously given,
excludes the notion of debt. Now debt may be taken in two ways: first,
as arising from merit; and this regards the person whose it is to do
meritorious works, according to Rom. 4:4: "Now to him that worketh, the
reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt. " The
second debt regards the condition of nature. Thus we say it is due to a
man to have reason, and whatever else belongs to human nature. Yet in
neither way is debt taken to mean that God is under an obligation to
His creature, but rather that the creature ought to be subject to God,
that the Divine ordination may be fulfilled in it, which is that a
certain nature should have certain conditions or properties, and that
by doing certain works it should attain to something further. And hence
natural endowments are not a debt in the first sense but in the second.
Hence they especially merit the name of grace.
Reply to Objection 3: Sanctifying grace adds to the notion of
gratuitous grace something pertaining to the nature of grace, since it
makes man pleasing to God. And hence gratuitous grace which does not do
this keeps the common name, as happens in many other cases; and thus
the two parts of the division are opposed as sanctifying and
non-sanctifying grace.
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Whether grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into
operating and cooperating grace. For grace is an accident, as stated
above ([2197]Q[110], A[2]). Now no accident can act upon its subject.
Therefore no grace can be called operating.
Objection 2: Further, if grace operates anything in us it assuredly
brings about justification. But not only grace works this. For
Augustine says, on Jn. 14:12, "the works that I do he also shall do,"
says (Serm. clxix): "He Who created thee without thyself, will not
justify thee without thyself. " Therefore no grace ought to be called
simply operating.
Objection 3: Further, to cooperate seems to pertain to the inferior
agent, and not to the principal agent. But grace works in us more than
free-will, according to Rom. 9:16: "It is not of him that willeth, nor
of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy. " Therefore no grace
ought to be called cooperating.
Objection 4: Further, division ought to rest on opposition. But to
operate and to cooperate are not opposed; for one and the same thing
can both operate and cooperate. Therefore grace is not fittingly
divided into operating and cooperating.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. xvii): "God
by cooperating with us, perfects what He began by operating in us,
since He who perfects by cooperation with such as are willing, beings
by operating that they may will. " But the operations of God whereby He
moves us to good pertain to grace. Therefore grace is fittingly divided
into operating and cooperating.
I answer that, As stated above ([2198]Q[110], A[2]) grace may be taken
in two ways; first, as a Divine help, whereby God moves us to will and
to act; secondly, as a habitual gift divinely bestowed on us.
Now in both these ways grace is fittingly divided into operating and
cooperating. For the operation of an effect is not attributed to the
thing moved but to the mover. Hence in that effect in which our mind is
moved and does not move, but in which God is the sole mover, the
operation is attributed to God, and it is with reference to this that
we speak of "operating grace. " But in that effect in which our mind
both moves and is moved, the operation is not only attributed to God,
but also to the soul; and it is with reference to this that we speak of
"cooperating grace. " Now there is a double act in us. First, there is
the interior act of the will, and with regard to this act the will is a
thing moved, and God is the mover; and especially when the will, which
hitherto willed evil, begins to will good. And hence, inasmuch as God
moves the human mind to this act, we speak of operating grace. But
there is another, exterior act; and since it is commanded by the will,
as was shown above ([2199]Q[17], A[9]) the operation of this act is
attributed to the will. And because God assists us in this act, both by
strengthening our will interiorly so as to attain to the act, and by
granting outwardly the capability of operating, it is with respect to
this that we speak of cooperating grace. Hence after the aforesaid
words Augustine subjoins: "He operates that we may will; and when we
will, He cooperates that we may perfect. " And thus if grace is taken
for God's gratuitous motion whereby He moves us to meritorious good, it
is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace.
But if grace is taken for the habitual gift, then again there is a
double effect of grace, even as of every other form; the first of which
is "being," and the second, "operation"; thus the work of heat is to
make its subject hot, and to give heat outwardly. And thus habitual
grace, inasmuch as it heals and justifies the soul, or makes it
pleasing to God, is called operating grace; but inasmuch as it is the
principle of meritorious works, which spring from the free-will, it is
called cooperating grace.
Reply to Objection 1: Inasmuch as grace is a certain accidental
quality, it does not act upon the soul efficiently, but formally, as
whiteness makes a surface white.
Reply to Objection 2: God does not justify us without ourselves,
because whilst we are being justified we consent to God's justification
[justitiae] by a movement of our free-will. Nevertheless this movement
is not the cause of grace, but the effect; hence the whole operation
pertains to grace.
Reply to Objection 3: One thing is said to cooperate with another not
merely when it is a secondary agent under a principal agent, but when
it helps to the end intended. Now man is helped by God to will the
good, through the means of operating grace. And hence, the end being
already intended, grace cooperates with us.
Reply to Objection 4: Operating and cooperating grace are the same
grace; but are distinguished by their different effects, as is plain
from what has been said.
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Whether grace is fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into
prevenient and subsequent. For grace is an effect of the Divine love.
But God's love is never subsequent, but always prevenient, according to
1 Jn. 4:10: "Not as though we had loved God, but because He hath first
loved us. " Therefore grace ought not to be divided into prevenient and
subsequent.
Objection 2: Further, there is but one sanctifying grace in man, since
it is sufficient, according to 2 Cor. 12:9: "My grace is sufficient for
thee. " But the same thing cannot be before and after. Therefore grace
is not fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent.
Objection 3: Further, grace is known by its effects. Now there are an
infinite number of effects---one preceding another. Hence it with
regard to these, grace must be divided into prevenient and subsequent,
it would seem that there are infinite species of grace. Now no art
takes note of the infinite in number. Hence grace is not fittingly
divided into prevenient and subsequent.
On the contrary, God's grace is the outcome of His mercy. Now both are
said in Ps. 58:11: "His mercy shall prevent me," and again, Ps. 22:6:
"Thy mercy will follow me. " Therefore grace is fittingly divided into
prevenient and subsequent.
I answer that, As grace is divided into operating and cooperating, with
regard to its diverse effects, so also is it divided into prevenient
and subsequent, howsoever we consider grace. Now there are five effects
of grace in us: of these, the first is, to heal the soul; the second,
to desire good; the third, to carry into effect the good proposed; the
fourth, to persevere in good; the fifth, to reach glory. And hence
grace, inasmuch as it causes the first effect in us, is called
prevenient with respect to the second, and inasmuch as it causes the
second, it is called subsequent with respect to the first effect. And
as one effect is posterior to this effect, and prior to that, so may
grace be called prevenient and subsequent on account of the same effect
viewed relatively to divers others. And this is what Augustine says (De
Natura et Gratia xxxi): "It is prevenient, inasmuch as it heals, and
subsequent, inasmuch as, being healed, we are strengthened; it is
prevenient, inasmuch as we are called, and subsequent, inasmuch as we
are glorified. "
Reply to Objection 1: God's love signifies something eternal; and hence
can never be called anything but prevenient. But grace signifies a
temporal effect, which can precede and follow another; and thus grace
may be both prevenient and subsequent.
Reply to Objection 2: The division into prevenient and subsequent grace
does not divide grace in its essence, but only in its effects, as was
already said of operating and cooperating grace. For subsequent grace,
inasmuch as it pertains to glory, is not numerically distinct from
prevenient grace whereby we are at present justified. For even as the
charity of the earth is not voided in heaven, so must the same be said
of the light of grace, since the notion of neither implies
imperfection.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the effects of grace may be infinite in
number, even as human acts are infinite, nevertheless all reduced to
some of a determinate species, and moreover all coincide in this---that
one precedes another.
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Whether gratuitous grace is rightly divided by the Apostle?
Objection 1: It would seem that gratuitous grace is not rightly divided
by the Apostle. For every gift vouchsafed to us by God, may be called a
gratuitous grace. Now there are an infinite number of gifts freely
bestowed on us by God as regards both the good of the soul and the good
of the body---and yet they do not make us pleasing to God. Hence
gratuitous graces cannot be contained under any certain division.
Objection 2: Further, gratuitous grace is distinguished from
sanctifying grace. But faith pertains to sanctifying grace, since we
are justified by it, according to Rom. 5:1: "Being justified therefore
by faith. " Hence it is not right to place faith amongst the gratuitous
graces, especially since the other virtues are not so placed, as hope
and charity.
Objection 3: Further, the operation of healing, and speaking divers
tongues are miracles. Again, the interpretation of speeches pertains
either to wisdom or to knowledge, according to Dan. 1:17: "And to these
children God gave knowledge and understanding in every book and
wisdom. " Hence it is not correct to divide the grace of healing and
kinds of tongues against the working of miracles; and the
interpretation of speeches against the word of wisdom and knowledge.
Objection 4: Further, as wisdom and knowledge are gifts of the Holy
Ghost, so also are understanding, counsel, piety, fortitude, and fear,
as stated above ([2200]Q[68], A[4]). Therefore these also ought to be
placed amongst the gratuitous gifts.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8, 9, 10): "To one indeed
by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom; and to another the word of
knowledge, according to the same Spirit; to another, the working of
miracles; to another, prophecy; to another, the discerning of spirits;
to another divers kinds of tongues; to another interpretation of
speeches. "
I answer that, As was said above [2201](A[1]), gratuitous grace is
ordained to this, viz. that a man may help another to be led to God.
Now no man can help in this by moving interiorly (for this belongs to
God alone), but only exteriorly by teaching or persuading. Hence
gratuitous grace embraces whatever a man needs in order to instruct
another in Divine things which are above reason. Now for this three
things are required: first, a man must possess the fullness of
knowledge of Divine things, so as to be capable of teaching others.
Secondly, he must be able to confirm or prove what he says, otherwise
his words would have no weight. Thirdly, he must be capable of
fittingly presenting to his hearers what he knows.
Now as regards the first, three things are necessary, as may be seen in
human teaching. For whoever would teach another in any science must
first be certain of the principles of the science, and with regard to
this there is "faith," which is certitude of invisible things, the
principles of Catholic doctrine. Secondly, it behooves the teacher to
know the principal conclusions of the science, and hence we have the
word of "wisdom," which is the knowledge of Divine things. Thirdly, he
ought to abound with examples and a knowledge of effects, whereby at
times he needs to manifest causes; and thus we have the word of
"knowledge," which is the knowledge of human things, since "the
invisible things of Him . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the
things that are made" (Rom. 1:20).
Now the confirmation of such things as are within reason rests upon
arguments; but the confirmation of what is above reason rests on what
is proper to the Divine power, and this in two ways: first, when the
teacher of sacred doctrine does what God alone can do, in miraculous
deeds, whether with respect to bodily health---and thus there is the
"grace of healing," or merely for the purpose of manifesting the Divine
power; for instance, that the sun should stand still or darken, or that
the sea should be divided---and thus there is the "working of
miracles. " Secondly, when he can manifest what God alone can know, and
these are either future contingents---and thus there is "prophecy," or
also the secrets of hearts---and thus there is the "discerning of
spirits. "
But the capability of speaking can regard either the idiom in which a
person can be understood, and thus there is "kinds of tongues"; or it
can regard the sense of what is said, and thus there is the
"interpretation of speeches. "
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [2202](A[1]), not all the
benefits divinely conferred upon us are called gratuitous graces, but
only those that surpass the power of nature---e. g. that a fisherman
should be replete with the word of wisdom and of knowledge and the
like; and such as these are here set down as gratuitous graces.
Reply to Objection 2: Faith is enumerated here under the gratuitous
graces, not as a virtue justifying man in himself, but as implying a
super-eminent certitude of faith, whereby a man is fitted for
instructing others concerning such things as belong to the faith. With
regard to hope and charity, they belong to the appetitive power,
according as man is ordained thereby to God.
Reply to Objection 3: The grace of healing is distinguished from the
general working of miracles because it has a special reason for
inducing one to the faith, since a man is all the more ready to believe
when he has received the gift of bodily health through the virtue of
faith. So, too, to speak with divers tongues and to interpret speeches
have special efficacy in bestowing faith. Hence they are set down as
special gratuitous graces.
Reply to Objection 4: Wisdom and knowledge are not numbered among the
gratuitous graces in the same way as they are reckoned among the gifts
of the Holy Ghost, i. e. inasmuch as man's mind is rendered easily
movable by the Holy Ghost to the things of wisdom and knowledge; for
thus they are gifts of the Holy Ghost, as stated above ([2203]Q[68],
AA[1],4). But they are numbered amongst the gratuitous graces, inasmuch
as they imply such a fullness of knowledge and wisdom that a man may
not merely think aright of Divine things, but may instruct others and
overpower adversaries. Hence it is significant that it is the "word" of
wisdom and the "word" of knowledge that are placed in the gratuitous
graces, since, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1), "It is one thing
merely to know what a man must believe in order to reach everlasting
life, and another thing to know how this may benefit the godly and may
be defended against the ungodly. "
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Whether gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that gratuitous grace is nobler than
sanctifying grace. For "the people's good is better than the individual
good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 2). Now sanctifying grace is
ordained to the good of one man alone, whereas gratuitous grace is
ordained to the common good of the whole Church, as stated above
([2204]AA[1],4). Hence gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying
grace.
Objection 2: Further, it is a greater power that is able to act upon
another, than that which is confined to itself, even as greater is the
brightness of the body that can illuminate other bodies, than of that
which can only shine but cannot illuminate; and hence the Philosopher
says (Ethic. v, 1) "that justice is the most excellent of the virtues,"
since by it a man bears himself rightly towards others. But by
sanctifying grace a man is perfected only in himself; whereas by
gratuitous grace a man works for the perfection of others. Hence
gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace.
Objection 3: Further, what is proper to the best is nobler than what is
common to all; thus to reason, which is proper to man is nobler than to
feel, which is common to all animals. Now sanctifying grace is common
to all members of the Church, but gratuitous grace is the proper gift
of the more exalted members of the Church. Hence gratuitous grace is
nobler than sanctifying grace.
On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor. 12:31), having enumerated the
gratuitous graces adds: "And I shew unto you yet a more excellent way";
and as the sequel proves he is speaking of charity, which pertains to
sanctifying grace. Hence sanctifying grace is more noble than
gratuitous grace.
I answer that, The higher the good to which a virtue is ordained, the
more excellent is the virtue. Now the end is always greater than the
means. But sanctifying grace ordains a man immediately to a union with
his last end, whereas gratuitous grace ordains a man to what is
preparatory to the end; i. e. by prophecy and miracles and so forth, men
are induced to unite themselves to their last end. And hence
sanctifying grace is nobler than gratuitous grace.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, text. 52),
a multitude, as an army, has a double good; the first is in the
multitude itself, viz. the order of the army; the second is separate
from the multitude, viz. the good of the leader---and this is better
good, since the other is ordained to it. Now gratuitous grace is
ordained to the common good of the Church, which is ecclesiastical
order, whereas sanctifying grace is ordained to the separate common
good, which is God. Hence sanctifying grace is the nobler.
Reply to Objection 2: If gratuitous grace could cause a man to have
sanctifying grace, it would follow that the gratuitous grace was the
nobler; even as the brightness of the sun that enlightens is more
excellent than that of an object that is lit up. But by gratuitous
grace a man cannot cause another to have union with God, which he
himself has by sanctifying grace; but he causes certain dispositions
towards it. Hence gratuitous grace needs not to be the more excellent,
even as in fire, the heat, which manifests its species whereby it
produces heat in other things, is not more noble than its substantial
form.
Reply to Objection 3: Feeling is ordained to reason, as to an end; and
thus, to reason is nobler. But here it is the contrary; for what is
proper is ordained to what is common as to an end. Hence there is no
comparison.
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OF THE CAUSE OF GRACE (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of grace; and under this head there are
five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God alone is the efficient cause of grace?
(2) Whether any disposition towards grace is needed on the part of the
recipient, by an act of free-will?
(3) Whether such a disposition can make grace follow of necessity?
(4) Whether grace is equal in all?
(5) Whether anyone may know that he has grace?
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Whether God alone is the cause of grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that God alone is not the cause of grace.
For it is written (Jn. 1:17): "Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ. "
Now, by the name of Jesus Christ is understood not merely the Divine
Nature assuming, but the created nature assumed. Therefore a creature
may be the cause of grace.
Objection 2: Further, there is this difference between the sacraments
of the New Law and those of the Old, that the sacraments of the New Law
cause grace, whereas the sacraments of the Old Law merely signify it.
Now the sacraments of the New Law are certain visible elements.
Therefore God is not the only cause of grace.
Objection 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iii, iv, vii,
viii), "Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect both lesser angels and
men. " Now the rational creature is cleansed, enlightened, and perfected
by grace. Therefore God is not the only cause of grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 83:12): "The Lord will give grace
and glory. "
I answer that, Nothing can act beyond its species, since the cause must
always be more powerful than its effect. Now the gift of grace
surpasses every capability of created nature, since it is nothing short
of a partaking of the Divine Nature, which exceeds every other nature.
And thus it is impossible that any creature should cause grace. For it
is as necessary that God alone should deify, bestowing a partaking of
the Divine Nature by a participated likeness, as it is impossible that
anything save fire should enkindle.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ's humanity is an "organ of His Godhead,"
as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 19). Now an instrument does not
bring forth the action of the principal agent by its own power, but in
virtue of the principal agent. Hence Christ's humanity does not cause
grace by its own power, but by virtue of the Divine Nature joined to
it, whereby the actions of Christ's humanity are saving actions.
Reply to Objection 2: As in the person of Christ the humanity causes
our salvation by grace, the Divine power being the principal agent, so
likewise in the sacraments of the New Law, which are derived from
Christ, grace is instrumentally caused by the sacraments, and
principally by the power of the Holy Ghost working in the sacraments,
according to Jn. 3:5: "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy
Ghost he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. "
Reply to Objection 3: Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect angels or
men, by instruction, and not by justifying them through grace. Hence
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that "this cleansing and enlightenment
and perfecting is nothing else than the assumption of Divine
knowledge. "
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Whether any preparation and disposition for grace is required on man's part?
Objection 1: It would seem that no preparation or disposition for grace
is required on man's part, since, as the Apostle says (Rom. 4:4), "To
him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but
according to debt. " Now a man's preparation by free-will can only be
through some operation. Hence it would do away with the notion of
grace.
Objection 2: Further, whoever is going on sinning, is not preparing
himself to have grace. But to some who are going on sinning grace is
given, as is clear in the case of Paul, who received grace whilst he
was "breathing our threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of
the Lord" (Act 9:1). Hence no preparation for grace is required on
man's part.
Objection 3: Further, an agent of infinite power needs no disposition
in matter, since it does not even require matter, as appears in
creation, to which grace is compared, which is called "a new creature"
(Gal. 6:15). But only God, Who has infinite power, causes grace, as
stated above (A[1] ). Hence no preparation is required on man's part to
obtain grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Amos 4:12): "Be prepared to meet thy
God, O Israel," and (1 Kings 7:3): "Prepare your hearts unto the Lord. "
I answer that, As stated above ([2205]Q[111], A[2]), grace is taken in
two ways: first, as a habitual gift of God. Secondly, as a help from
God, Who moves the soul to good. Now taking grace in the first sense, a
certain preparation of grace is required for it, since a form can only
be in disposed matter. But if we speak of grace as it signifies a help
from God to move us to good, no preparation is required on man's part,
that, as it were, anticipates the Divine help, but rather, every
preparation in man must be by the help of God moving the soul to good.
And thus even the good movement of the free-will, whereby anyone is
prepared for receiving the gift of grace is an act of the free-will
moved by God. And thus man is said to prepare himself, according to
Prov. 16:1: "It is the part of man to prepare the soul"; yet it is
principally from God, Who moves the free-will. Hence it is said that
man's will is prepared by God, and that man's steps are guided by God.
Reply to Objection 1: A certain preparation of man for grace is
simultaneous with the infusion of grace; and this operation is
meritorious, not indeed of grace, which is already possessed---but of
glory which is not yet possessed. But there is another imperfect
preparation, which sometimes precedes the gift of sanctifying grace,
and yet it is from God's motion. But it does not suffice for merit,
since man is not yet justified by grace, and merit can only arise from
grace, as will be seen further on ([2206]Q[114], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: Since a man cannot prepare himself for grace
unless God prevent and move him to good, it is of no account whether
anyone arrive at perfect preparation instantaneously, or step by step.
For it is written (Ecclus. 11:23): "It is easy in the eyes of God on a
sudden to make the poor man rich. " Now it sometimes happens that God
moves a man to good, but not perfect good, and this preparation
precedes grace. But He sometimes moves him suddenly and perfectly to
good, and man receives grace suddenly, according to Jn. 6:45: "Every
one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me. " And
thus it happened to Paul, since, suddenly when he was in the midst of
sin, his heart was perfectly moved by God to hear, to learn, to come;
and hence he received grace suddenly.
Reply to Objection 3: An agent of infinite power needs no matter or
disposition of matter, brought about by the action of something else;
and yet, looking to the condition of the thing caused, it must cause,
in the thing caused, both the matter and the due disposition for the
form. So likewise, when God infuses grace into a soul, no preparation
is required which He Himself does not bring about.
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Whether grace is necessarily given to whoever prepares himself for it, or to
whoever does what he can?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is necessarily given to whoever
prepares himself for grace, or to whoever does what he can, because, on
Rom. 5:1, "Being justified . . . by faith, let us have peace," etc. the
gloss says: "God welcomes whoever flies to Him, otherwise there would
be injustice with Him. " But it is impossible for injustice to be with
God. Therefore it is impossible for God not to welcome whoever flies to
Him. Hence he receives grace of necessity.
Objection 2: Further, Anselm says (De Casu Diaboli. iii) that the
reason why God does not bestow grace on the devil, is that he did not
wish, nor was he prepared, to receive it. But if the cause be removed,
the effect must needs be removed also. Therefore, if anyone is willing
to receive grace it is bestowed on them of necessity.
Objection 3: Further, good is diffusive of itself, as appears from
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Now the good of grace is better than the good
of nature. Hence, since natural forms necessarily come to disposed
matter, much more does it seem that grace is necessarily bestowed on
whoever prepares himself for grace.
On the contrary, Man is compared to God as clay to the potter,
according to Jer. 18:6: "As clay is in the hand of the potter, so are
you in My hand. " But however much the clay is prepared, it does not
necessarily receive its shape from the potter. Hence, however much a
man prepares himself, he does not necessarily receive grace from God.
I answer that, As stated above [2207](A[2]), man's preparation for
grace is from God, as Mover, and from the free-will, as moved. Hence
the preparation may be looked at in two ways: first, as it is from
free-will, and thus there is no necessity that it should obtain grace,
since the gift of grace exceeds every preparation of human power. But
it may be considered, secondly, as it is from God the Mover, and thus
it has a necessity---not indeed of coercion, but of infallibility---as
regards what it is ordained to by God, since God's intention cannot
fail, according to the saying of Augustine in his book on the
Predestination of the Saints (De Dono Persev. xiv) that "by God's good
gifts whoever is liberated, is most certainly liberated. " Hence if God
intends, while moving, that the one whose heart He moves should attain
to grace, he will infallibly attain to it, according to Jn. 6:45:
"Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to
Me. "
Reply to Objection 1: This gloss is speaking of such as fly to God by a
meritorious act of their free-will, already "informed" with grace; for
if they did not receive grace, it would be against the justice which He
Himself established. Or if it refers to the movement of free-will
before grace, it is speaking in the sense that man's flight to God is
by a Divine motion, which ought not, in justice, to fail.
Reply to Objection 2: The first cause of the defect of grace is on our
part; but the first cause of the bestowal of grace is on God's
according to Osee 13:9: "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is
only in Me. "
Reply to Objection 3: Even in natural things, the form does not
necessarily ensue the disposition of the matter, except by the power of
the agent that causes the disposition.
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Whether grace is greater in one than in another?
Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not greater in one than in
another. For grace is caused in us by the Divine love, as stated above
([2208]Q[110], A[1]). Now it is written (Wis. 6:8): "He made the little
and the great and He hath equally care of all. " Therefore all obtain
grace from Him equally.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is the greatest possible, cannot be more
or less. But grace is the greatest possible, since it joins us with our
last end. Therefore there is no greater or less in it. Hence it is not
greater in one than in another.
Objection 3: Further, grace is the soul's life, as stated above
([2209]Q[110], A[1], ad 2). But there is no greater or less in life.
Hence, neither is there in grace.
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:7): "But to every one of us is
given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ. " Now what
is given in measure, is not given to all equally. Hence all have not an
equal grace.
I answer that, As stated above ([2210]Q[52], AA[1],2;[2211] Q[56],
AA[1],2), habits can have a double magnitude: one, as regards the end
or object, as when a virtue is said to be more noble through being
ordained to a greater good; the other on the part of the subject, which
more or less participates in the habit inhering to it.
Now as regards the first magnitude, sanctifying grace cannot be greater
or less, since, of its nature, grace joins man to the Highest Good,
which is God. But as regards the subject, grace can receive more or
less, inasmuch as one may be more perfectly enlightened by grace than
another. And a certain reason for this is on the part of him who
prepares himself for grace; since he who is better prepared for grace,
receives more grace.
