Alone the
mere inherited consciousness of being a higher
creation, with higher claims, produces a cold tem-
perament, and leaves the conscience quiet; we
all of us feel no injustice when the difference is
very great between ourselves and another creature,
and kill a fly, for instance, without any pricks of
conscience.
mere inherited consciousness of being a higher
creation, with higher claims, produces a cold tem-
perament, and leaves the conscience quiet; we
all of us feel no injustice when the difference is
very great between ourselves and another creature,
and kill a fly, for instance, without any pricks of
conscience.
Nietzsche - v06 - Human All-Too-Human - a
Success often gives an
action the whole honest glamour of a good
conscience; failure casts the shadow of re-
morse over the most estimable deed. Hence
arises the well-known practice of the politician,
who thinks, "Only grant me success, with that
I bring all honest souls over to my side and
make myself honest in my own eyes. " In
the same way success must replace a better
argument. Many educated people still believe
that the triumph of Christianity over Greek
philosophy is a proof of the greater truthfulness
of the former,—although in this case it is only
the coarser and more powerful that has triumphed
over the more spiritual and delicate. Which pos-
## p. 81 (#125) #############################################
THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 8l
sesses the greater truth may be seen from the fact
that the awakening sciences have agreed with
Epicurus' philosophy on point after point, but on
point after point have rejected Christianity.
69.
Love and Justice. —Why do we over-esti-
mate love to the disadvantage of justice, and say
the most beautiful things about it, as if it were
something very much higher than the latter? Is
it not visibly more stupid than justice? Certainly,
but precisely for that reason all the pleasanter for
every one. It is blind, and possesses an abundant
cornucopia, out of which it distributes its gifts to
all, even if they do not deserve them, even if they
express no thanks for them. It is as impartial as
the rain, which, according to the Bible and experi-
ence, makes not only the unjust, but also occasion-
ally the just wet through to the skin.
70.
EXECUTION. —How is it that every execution
offends us more than does a murder? It is the
coldness of the judges, the painful preparations,
the conviction that a human being is here being
used as a warning to scare others. For the guilt
is not punished, even if it existed—it lies with
educators, parents, surroundings, in ourselves, not
in the murderer—I mean the determining cir-
cumstances.
VOL. 1. F
## p. 82 (#126) #############################################
82 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
Hope. —Pandora brought the box of ills and
opened it. It was the gift of the gods to men,
outwardly a beautiful and seductive gift, and called
the Casket of Happiness. Out of it flew all the
evils, living winged creatures, thence they now
circulate and do men injury day and night. One
single evil had not yet escaped from the box, and
by the will of Zeus Pandora closed the lid and it
remained within. Now for ever man has the
casket of happiness in his house and thinks he
holds a great treasure; it is at his disposal, he
stretches out his hand for it whenever he desires;
for he does not know the box which Pandora
brought was the casket of evil, and he believes the
ill which remains within to be the greatest blessing,
—it is hope. Zeus did not wish man, however
much he might be tormented by the other evils,
to fling away his life, but to go on letting himself
be tormented again and again. Therefore he gives
man hope,—in reality it is the worst of all evils,
because it prolongs the torments of man.
72.
The Degree of Moral Inflammability
Unknown. —According to whether we have or
have not had certain disturbing views and im-
pressions—for instance, an unjustly executed,
killed, or martyred father; a faithless wife; a
cruel hostile attack — it depends whether our
passions reach fever heat and influence our whole
## p. 83 (#127) #############################################
THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 83
life or not. No one knows to what he may
be driven by circumstances, pity, or indignation;
he does not know the degree of his own inflam-
mability. Miserable little circumstances make us
. * miserable; it is generally not the quantity of ex-
periences, but their quality, on which lower and
higher man depends, in good and evil.
> The Martyr in Spite of Himself. —There
was a man belonging to a party who was too
nervous and cowardly ever to contradict his com-
rades; they made use of him for everything, they
demanded everything from him, because he was
> more afraid of the bad opinion of his companions
» than of death itself; his was a miserable, feeble
soul. They recognised this, and on the ground
of these qualities they made a hero of him, and
finally even a martyr. Although the coward in-
wardly always said No, with his lips he always said
Yes, even on the scaffold, when he was about to die
for the opinions of his party; for beside him stood
one of his old companions, who so tyrannised over
him by word and look that he really suffered death
in the most respectable manner, and has ever
since been celebrated as a martyr and a great
character.
74-
> The Every-day Standard. — One will
seldom go wrong if one attributes extreme actions
to vanity, average ones to habit, and petty ones
to fear.
4
## p. 84 (#128) #############################################
84 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
75-
Misunderstanding Concerning Virtue.
—Whoever has known immorality in connection
with pleasure, as is the case with a man who has
a pleasure-seeking youth behind him, imagines
that virtue must be connected with absence of
pleasure. —Whoever, on the contrary, has been
much plagued by his passions and vices, longs to
find in virtue peace and the soul's happiness.
Hence it is possible for two virtuous persons
not to understand each other at all.
76.
The ASCETIC. —The ascetic makes a necessity
of virtue.
77-
Transferring Honour from the Person
TO the Thing. —Deeds of love and sacrifice
for the benefit of one's neighbour are gener-
ally honoured, wherever they are manifested.
Thereby we multiply the valuation of things which
are thus loved, or for which we sacrifice ourselves,
although perhaps they are not worth much in
themselves. A brave army is convinced of the
cause for which it fights.
78.
Ambition a Substitute for the Moral
Sense. —The moral sense must not be lacking in
those natures which have no ambition. The am-
^
## p. 85 (#129) #############################################
The history of the moral sentiments. 85
bitious manage without it, with almost the same
results. For this reason the sons of unpreten-
tious, unambitious families, when once they lose the
moral sense, generally degenerate very quickly
into complete scamps.
79-
Vanity Enriches. —How poor would be the
human mind without vanity! Thus, however, it
resembles a well-stocked and constantly replen-
ished bazaar which attracts buyers of every kind.
There they can find almost everything, obtain
almost everything, provided that they bring the
right sort of coin, namely admiration.
80.
Old Age and Death. —Apart from the com-
mands of religion, the question may well be asked,
Why is it more worthy for an old man who feels
his powers decline, to await his slow exhaustion
and extinction than with full consciousness to set
a limit to his life? Suicide in this case is a per-
fectly natural, obvious action, which should justly
arouse respect as a triumph of reason, and did
arouse it in those times when the heads of Greek
philosophy and the sturdiest patriots used to seek
death through suicide. The seeking, on the con-
trary, to prolong existence from day to day, with
anxious consultation of doctors and painful mode
of living, without the power of drawing nearer to
the actual aim of life, is far less worthy. Religion
is rich in excuses to reply to the demand for
/
## p. 85 (#130) #############################################
84 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
75-
Misunderstanding Concerning Virtue.
—Whoever has known immorality in connection
with pleasure, as is the case with a man who has
a pleasure-seeking youth behind him, imagines
that virtue must be connected with absence of
pleasure. —Whoever, on the contrary, has been
much plagued by his passions and vices, longs to
find in virtue peace and the soul's happiness.
Hence it is possible for two virtuous persons
not to understand each other at all.
76.
The Ascetic. —The ascetic makes a necessity
of virtue.
77-
Transferring Honour from the Person
to the Thing. —Deeds of love and sacrifice
for the benefit of one's neighbour are gener-
ally honoured, wherever they are manifested.
Thereby we multiply the valuation of things which
are thus loved, or for which we sacrifice ourselves,
although perhaps they are not worth much in
themselves. A brave army is convinced of the
cause for which it fights.
78.
Ambition a Substitute for the Moral
SENSE. —The moral sense must not be lacking in
those natures which have no ambition. The am-
## p. 85 (#131) #############################################
The history of the moral sentiments. 85
bitious manage without it, with almost the same
results. For this reason the sons of unpreten-
tious, unambitious families, when once they lose the
moral sense, generally degenerate very quickly
into complete scamps.
79-
Vanity Enriches. —How poor would be the
human mind without vanity! Thus, however, it
resembles a well-stocked and constantly replen-
ished bazaar which attracts buyers of every kind.
There they can find almost everything, obtain
almost everything, provided that they bring the
right sort of coin, namely admiration.
80.
Old Age and Death. —Apart from the com-
mands of religion, the question may well be asked,
Why is it more worthy for an old man who feels
his powers decline, to await his slow exhaustion
and extinction than with full consciousness to set
a limit to his life? Suicide in this case is a per-
fectly natural, obvious action, which should justly
arouse respect as a triumph of reason, and did
arouse it in those times when the heads of Greek
philosophy and the sturdiest patriots used to seek
death through suicide. The seeking, on the con-
trary, to prolong existence from day to day, with
anxious consultation of doctors and painful mode
of living, without the power of drawing nearer to
the actual aim of life, is far less worthy. Religion
is rich in excuses to reply to the demand for
## p. 85 (#132) #############################################
84 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
75-
Misunderstanding Concerning Virtue.
—Whoever has known immorality in connection
with pleasure, as is the case with a man who has
a pleasure-seeking youth behind him, imagines
that virtue must be connected with absence of
pleasure. —Whoever, on the contrary, has been
much plagued by his passions and vices, longs to
find in virtue peace and the soul's happiness.
Hence it is possible for two virtuous persons
not to understand each other at all.
76.
THE ASCETIC. —The ascetic makes a necessity
of virtue.
77-
Transferring Honour from the Person
TO THE THING. —Deeds of love and sacrifice
for the benefit of one's neighbour are gener-
ally honoured, wherever they are manifested.
Thereby we multiply the valuation of things which
are thus loved, or for which we sacrifice ourselves,
although perhaps they are not worth much in
themselves. A brave army is convinced of the
cause for which it fights.
78.
Ambition a Substitute for the Moral
SENSE. —The moral sense must not be lacking in
those natures which have no ambition. The am-
## p. 85 (#133) #############################################
THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 85
bitious manage without it, with almost the same
results. For this reason the sons of unpreten-
tious, unambitious families, when once they lose the
moral sense, generally degenerate very quickly
into complete scamps.
79-
Vanity Enriches. —How poor would be the
human mind without vanity! Thus, however, it
resembles a well-stocked and constantly replen-
ished bazaar which attracts buyers of every kind.
There they can find almost everything, obtain
almost everything, provided that they bring the
right sort of coin, namely admiration.
80.
Old Age and Death. —Apart from the com-
mands of religion, the question may well be asked,
Why is it more worthy for an old man who feels
his powers decline, to await his slow exhaustion
and extinction than with full consciousness to set
a limit to his life? Suicide in this case is a per-
fectly natural, obvious action, which should justly
arouse respect as a triumph of reason, and did
arouse it in those times when the heads of Greek
philosophy and the sturdiest patriots used to seek
death through suicide. The seeking, on the con-
trary, to prolong existence from day to day, with
anxious consultation of doctors and painful mode
of living, without the power of drawing nearer to
the actual aim of life, is far less worthy. Religion
is rich in excuses to reply to the demand for
## p. 85 (#134) #############################################
84 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
75-
Misunderstanding Concerning Virtue.
—Whoever has known immorality in connection
with pleasure, as is the case with a man who has
a pleasure-seeking youth behind him, imagines
that virtue must be connected with absence of
pleasure. —Whoever, on the contrary, has been
much plagued by his passions and vices, longs to
find in virtue peace and the soul's happiness.
Hence it is possible for two virtuous persons
not to understand each other at all.
76.
THE ASCETIC. —The ascetic makes a necessity
of virtue.
77-
Transferring Honour from the Person
TO THE Thing. —Deeds of love and sacrifice
for the benefit of one's neighbour are gener-
ally honoured, wherever they are manifested.
Thereby we multiply the valuation of things which
are thus loved, or for which we sacrifice ourselves,
although perhaps they are not worth much in
themselves. A brave army is convinced of the
cause for which it fights.
78.
Ambition a Substitute for the Moral
SENSE. —The moral sense must not be lacking in
those natures which have no ambition. The am-
## p. 85 (#135) #############################################
The history of the moral sentiments. 85
bitious manage without it, with almost the same
results. For this reason the sons of unpreten-
tious, unambitious families, when once they lose the
moral sense, generally degenerate very quickly
into complete scamps.
79-
Vanity Enriches. —How poor would be the
human mind without vanity! Thus, however, it
resembles a well-stocked and constantly replen-
ished bazaar which attracts buyers of every kind.
There they can find almost everything, obtain
almost everything, provided that they bring the
right sort of coin, namely admiration.
80.
Old Age and Death. —Apart from the com-
mands of religion, the question may well be asked,
Why is it more worthy for an old man who feels
his powers decline, to await his slow exhaustion
and extinction than with full consciousness to set
a limit to his life? Suicide in this case is a per-
fectly natural, obvious action, which should justly
arouse respect as a triumph of reason, and did
arouse it in those times when the heads of Greek
philosophy and the sturdiest patriots used to seek
death through suicide. The seeking, on the con-
trary, to prolong existence from day to day, with
anxious consultation of doctors and painful mode
of living, without the power of drawing nearer to
the actual aim of life, is far less worthy. Religion
is rich in excuses to reply to the demand for
## p. 85 (#136) #############################################
84 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
75-
Misunderstanding Concerning Virtue.
—Whoever has known immorality in connection
with pleasure, as is the case with a man who has
a pleasure-seeking youth behind him, imagines
that virtue must be connected with absence of
pleasure. —Whoever, on the contrary, has been
much plagued by his passions and vices, longs to
find in virtue peace and the soul's happiness.
Hence it is possible for two virtuous persons
not to understand each other at all.
76.
THE ASCETIC. —The ascetic makes a necessity
of virtue.
77-
Transferring Honour from the Person
TO THE THING. —Deeds of love and sacrifice
for the benefit of one's neighbour are gener-
ally honoured, wherever they are manifested.
Thereby we multiply the valuation of things which
are thus loved, or for which we sacrifice ourselves,
although perhaps they are not worth much in
themselves. A brave army is convinced of the
cause for which it fights.
78.
Ambition a Substitute for the Moral
SENSE. —The moral sense must not be lacking in
those natures which have no ambition. The am-
-.
## p. 85 (#137) #############################################
The history of the moral sentiments. 85
bitious manage without it, with almost the same
results. For this reason the sons of unpreten-
tious, unambitious families, when once they lose the
moral sense, generally degenerate very quickly
into complete scamps.
79-
Vanity Enriches. —How poor would be the
human mind without vanity! Thus, however, it
resembles a well-stocked and constantly replen-
ished bazaar which attracts buyers of every kind.
There they can find almost everything, obtain
almost everything, provided that they bring the
right sort of coin, namely admiration.
80.
Old Age and Death. —Apart from the com-
mands of religion, the question may well be asked,
Why is it more worthy for an old man who feels
his powers decline, to await his slow exhaustion
and extinction than with full consciousness to set
a limit to his life? Suicide in this case is a per-
fectly natural, obvious action, which should justly
arouse respect as a triumph of reason, and did
arouse it in those times when the heads of Greek
philosophy and the sturdiest patriots used to seek
death through suicide. The seeking, on the con-
trary, to prolong existence from day to day, with
anxious consultation of doctors and painful mode
of living, without the power of drawing nearer to
the actual aim of life, is far less worthy. Religion
is rich in excuses to reply to the demand for
## p. 86 (#138) #############################################
86 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
suicide, and thus it ingratiates itself with those
who wish to cling to life.
81.
Errors of the Sufferer and the Doer.
—When a rich man deprives a poor man of a
possession (for instance, a prince taking the sweet-
heart of a plebeian), an error arises in the mind of
the poor man; he thinks that the rich man must be
utterly infamous to take away from him the little
that he has. But the rich man does not estimate
so highly the value of a single possession, because
he is accustomed to have many; hence he cannot
imagine himself in the poor man's place, and does
not commit nearly so great a wrong as the latter
supposes. They each have a mistaken idea of the
other. The injustice of the powerful, which, more
than anything else, rouses indignation in history,
is by no means so great as it appears.
Alone the
mere inherited consciousness of being a higher
creation, with higher claims, produces a cold tem-
perament, and leaves the conscience quiet; we
all of us feel no injustice when the difference is
very great between ourselves and another creature,
and kill a fly, for instance, without any pricks of
conscience. Therefore it was no sign of badness
in Xerxes (whom even all Greeks describe as
superlatively noble) when he took a son away
from his father and had him cut in pieces, because
he had expressed a nervous, ominous distrust of
the whole campaign; in this case the individual
is put out of the way like an unpleasant insect; he
## p. 87 (#139) #############################################
THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 87
is too lowly to be allowed any longer to cause
annoyance to a ruler of the world. Yes, every
cruel man is not so cruel as the ill-treated one
imagines; the idea of pain is not the same as its
endurance. It is the same thing in the case
of unjust judges, of the journalist who leads
public opinion astray by small dishonesties. In
all these cases cause and effect are surrounded by
entirely different groups of feelings and thoughts;
yet one unconsciously takes it for granted that
doer and sufferer think and feel alike, and accord-
ing to this supposition we measure the guilt of the
one by the pain of the other.
82.
The Skin of the Soul. —As the bones, flesh,
entrails, and blood-vessels are enclosed within a
skin, which makes the aspect of man endurable,
so the emotions and passions of the soul are
enwrapped with vanity,—it is the skin of the soul.
S3-
The Sleep of Virtue. —^hen virtue has
slept, it will arise again all the fresher.
84.
The Refinement of Shame. —People are
not ashamed to think something foul, but they
are ashamed when they think these foul thoughts
are attributed to them.
-
## p. 88 (#140) #############################################
88 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
85.
Malice is Rare. —Most people are far too
much occupied with themselves to be malicious.
86.
The Tongue in the Balance. —We praise
or blame according as the one or the other affords
more opportunity for exhibiting our power of
judgment.
87.
St. Luke xviii. 14, Improved. —He that
humbleth himself wishes to be exalted.
The Prevention of Suicide. —There is a
certain right by which we may deprive a man of
life, but none by which we may deprive him of
death; this is mere cruelty.
89.
Vanity. —We care for the good opinion of
men, firstly because they are useful to us, and
then because we wish to please them (children
their parents, pupils their teachers, and well-
meaning people generally their fellow-men). Only
where the good opinion of men is of importance
to some one, apart from the advantage thereof or
his wish to please, can we speak of vanity. In
## p. 89 (#141) #############################################
THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 89
this case the man wishes to please himself, but at
the expense of his fellow-men, either by misleading
them into holding a false opinion about him, or by
aiming at a degree of " good opinion " which must
be painful to every one else (by arousing envy).
The individual usually wishes to corroborate the
opinion he holds of himself by the opinion of others,
and to strengthen it in his own eyes; but the strong
habit of authority—a habit as old as man himself
—induces many to support by authority their
belief in themselves: that is to say, they accept it
first from others; they trust the judgment of
others more than their own. The interest in
himself, the wish to please himself, attains to
such a height in a vain man that he misleads
others into having a false, all too elevated estimation
of him, and yet nevertheless sets store by their
authority,—thus causing an error and yet believing
in it. It must be confessed, therefore, that vain
people do not wish to please others so much as
themselves, and that they go so far therein as to
neglect their advantage, for they often endeavour
to prejudice their fellow - men unfavourably,
inimicably, enviously, consequently injuriously
against themselves, merely in order to have
pleasure in themselves, personal pleasure.
90.
The Limits of Human Love. —A man who
has declared that another is an idiot and a bad
companion, is angry when the latter eventually
proves himself to be otherwise.
J*
## p. 90 (#142) #############################################
go HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
91.
Moraute larmoyante. —What a great deal
of pleasure morality gives! Only think what a
sea of pleasant tears has been shed over descrip-
tions of noble and unselfish deeds! This charm
of life would vanish if the belief in absolute
irresponsibility were to obtain supremacy.
92.
The Origin of Justice. —Justice (equity) has
I its origin amongst powers which are fairly equal,
I as Thucydides (in the terrible dialogue between
'the Athenian and Melian ambassadors) rightly
comprehended: that is to say, where there is no
clearly recognisable supremacy, and where a
conflict would be useless and would injure both
sides, there arises the thought of coming to an
understanding and settling the opposing claims;
the character of exchange is the primary character
of justice. Each party satisfies the other, as each
obtains what he values more than the other.
Each one receives that which he desires, as his
own henceforth, and whatever is desired is received
in return. Justice, therefore, is recompense and
\ exchange based on the hypothesis of a fairly equal
degree of power,—thus, originally, revenge belongs
\to the province of justice, it is an exchange. Also
[gratitude. —Justice naturally is based on the point
k>{ view of a judicious self-preservation, on the
egoism, therefore, of that reflection, " Why should
I injure myself uselessly and perhaps not attain
## p. 91 (#143) #############################################
THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 91
my aim after all? " So much about the origin of
justice. Because man, according to his intellectual
custom, has forgotten the original purpose of so-
called just and reasonable actions,-and particularly
because for hundreds of years children have been
taught to admire and imitate such actions, the
idea has gradually arisen that such an action is
un-egoistic; upon this idea, however, is based the
high estimation in which it is held: which, more-
over, like all valuations, is constantly growing, for
something that is valued highly is striven after,
imitated, multiplied, and increases, because the
value of the output of toil and enthusiasm of each
individual is added to the value of the thing itself.
How little moral would the world look without
this forgetfulness! A poet might say that God
had placed forgetfulness as door-keeper in the
temple of human dignity.
93-
The Right of>the Weaker. —When any
one submits under certain conditions to a greater
power, as a besieged town for instance, the counter-
condition is that one can destroy one's self, burn
the town, and so cause the mighty one a great
loss. Therefore there is a kind of equalisation
here, on the basis of which rights may be
determined. The enemy has his advantage in
maintaining it. In so far there are also rights
between slaves and masters, that is, precisely so
far as the possession of the slave is useful and
important to his master. The right originally
r
-
## p. 92 (#144) #############################################
92 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
extends so far as one appears to be valuable
to the other, essentially unlosable, unconquerable,
and so forth. In so far the weaker one also has
rights, but lesser ones. Hence the famous
unusquisque tankum juris habet, quantum potentia
valet (or more/ exactly, quantum potentia valere
creditur).
94-
The Three Phases of Hitherto Existing
MORALITY. —It is the first sign that the animal
has become man when its actions no longer have
regard only to momentary welfare, but to what is
enduring, when it grows useful and practical; there
the free rule of reason first breaks out. A still
higher step is reached when he acts according to
the principle of honour; by this means he brings
ftimself into order, submits to common feelings,
and that exalts him still higher over the phase in
which he was led only by the idea of usefulness
from a personal point of view; he respects and
wishes to be respected, i. e. he understands useful-
ness as dependent upon what he thinks of others
and what others think of him. Eventually he
acts, on the highest step of the hitherto existing
morality, according to his standard of things and
men; he himself decides for himself and others
what is honourable, what is useful; he has become
the law-giver of opinions, in accordance with the
ever more highly developed idea of what is useful
and honourable. Knowledge enables him to place
that which is most useful, that is to say the
general, enduring usefulness, above the personal,
## p. 93 (#145) #############################################
THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 93
the honourable recognition of general, enduring
validity above the momentary; he lives and acts
as a collective individual.
95-
The Morality of the Mature Individual.
—The impersonal has hitherto been looked upon
as the actual distinguishing mark of moral action;
and it has been pointed out that in the beginning
it was in consideration of the common good that
all impersonal actions were praised and distin-
guished. Is not an important change in these
views impending, now when it is more and more
recognised that it is precisely in the most personal
possible considerations that the common good is
the greatest, so that a strictly personal action now
best illustrates the present idea of morality, as
utility for the mass? To make a whole person-
ality out of ourselves, and in all that we do to keep
that personality's highest good in view, carries
us further than those sympathetic emotions and
actions for the benefit of others. We all still
suffer, certainly, from the too small consideration
of the personal in us; it is badly developed,—let
us admit it; rather has our mind been forcibly
drawn away from it and offered as a sacrifice to
the State, to science, or to those who stand in
need of help, as if it were the bad part which
must be sacrificed. We are still willing to work'
for our fellow-men, but only so far as we find our
own greatest advantage in this work, no more and
no less. It is only a question of what we under-
r
## p. 94 (#146) #############################################
94 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
stand as our advantage; the unripe, undeveloped,
crude individual will understand it in the crudest
way.
96.
Custom and Morality. —To be moral,correct,
and virtuous is to be obedient to an old-established
law and custom. Whether we submit with diffi-
culty or willingly is immaterial, enough that we
do so. He is called "good" who, as if naturally,
after long precedent, easily and willingly, there-
fore, does what is right, according to whatever this
may be (as, for instance, taking revenge, if to take
revenge be considered as right, as amongst the
ancient Greeks). He is called good because he
is good "for something"; but as goodwill, pity,
consideration, moderation, and such like, have come,
with the change in manners, to be looked upon as
"good for something," as useful, the good-natured
and helpful have, later on, come to be distinguished
specially as "good. " (In the beginning other and
more important kinds of usefulness stood in the
foreground. ) To be evil is to be "not moral"
(immoral), to be immoral is to be in opposi-
tion to tradition, however sensible or stupid it
may be; injury to the community (the "neigh-
bour" being understood thereby) has, however,
been looked upon by the social laws of all different
ages as being eminently the actual "immorality,"
so that now at the word "evil" we immediately
think of voluntary injury to one's neighbour. The
fundamental antithesis which has taught man the
distinction between moral and immoral, between
## p. 95 (#147) #############################################
THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 95
good and evil, is not the "egoistic" and "un-
egoistic," but the being bound to the tradition,
law, and solution thereof. How the tradition has
arisen is immaterial, at all events without regard
to good and evil or any immanent categorical im-
perative, but above all for the purpose of preserving
a community, a generation, an association, a people;
every superstitious custom that has arisen on
account of some falsely explained accident, creates
a tradition, which it is moral to follow; to separate
one's self from it is dangerous, but more dangerous
for the community than for the individual (because
the Godhead punishes the community for every
outrage and every violation of its rights, and the
individual only in proportion). Now every tradition
grows continually more venerable, the farther off
lies its origin, the more this is lost sight of; the
veneration paid it accumulates from generation
to generation, the tradition at last becomes holy
and excites awe; and thus in any case the morality
of piety is a much older morality than that which
requires un-egoistic actions.
97-
Pleasure in Traditional Custom. —An
important species of pleasure, and therewith
the source of morality, arises out of habit.
Man does what is habitual to him more easily,
better, and therefore more willingly; he feels
a pleasure therein, and knows from experience
that the habitual has been tested, and is there-
fore useful; a custom that we can live with is
proved to be wholesome and advantageous in con-
r
*m.
## p. 96 (#148) #############################################
96 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
trast to all new and not yet tested experiments.
According to this, morality is the union of the
pleasant and the useful; moreover, it requires no
reflection. As soon as man can use compulsion,
he uses it to introduce and enforce his customs; for
in his eyes they are proved as the wisdom of life.
In the same way a company of individuals com-
pels each single one to adopt the same customs.
Here the inference is wrong; because we feel at
ease with a morality, or at least because we are
able to carry on existence with it, therefore this
morality is necessary, for it seems to be the only
possibility of feeling at ease; the ease of life seems
to grow out of it alone. This comprehension of
the habitual as a necessity of existence is pursued
even to the smallest details of custom,—as insight
into genuine causality is very small with lower
peoples and civilisations, they take precautions
with superstitious fear that everything should go
in its same groove; even where custom is
difficult, hard, and burdensome, it is preserved
on account of its apparent highest usefulness. It
is not known that the same degree of well-being
can also exist with other customs, and that even
higher degrees may be attained. We become
aware, however, that all customs, even the hardest,
grow pleasanter and milder with time, and that
the severest way of life may become a habit and
therefore a pleasure.
98.
Pleasure and Social Instinct. —Out of
his relations with other men, man obtains a new
## p. 97 (#149) #############################################
THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 97
species of pleasure in addition to those pleasurable
sensations which he derives from himself; whereby
he greatly increases the scope of enjoyment. Per-
haps he has already taken too many of the pleasures
of this sphere from animals, which visibly feel
pleasure when they play with each other, especially
the mother with her young. Then consider the
sexual relations, which make almost every female
interesting to a male with regard to pleasure, and
j vice versa. The feeling of pleasure on the basis
of human relations generally makes man better;
i joy in common, pleasure enjoyed together is in-
creased, it gives the individual security, makes him
good-tempered, and dispels mistrust and envy, for
we feel ourselves at ease and see others at ease.
Similar manifestations of pleasure awaken the idea
* of the same sensations, the feeling of being like
something; a like effect is produced by common
sufferings, the same bad weather, dangers, enemies.
Upon this foundation is based the oldest alliance,
the object of which is the mutual obviating and
averting of a threatening danger for the benefit
i of each individual. And thus the social instinct
* grows out of pleasure.
99.
The Innocent Side of so-called Evil
ACTIONS. —All "evil" actions are prompted by
the instinct of preservation, or, more exactly, by
the desire for pleasure and the avoidance of pain
on the part of the individual; thus prompted, but
not evil. "To cause pain per se" does not exist,
vol. 1. G
## p. 98 (#150) #############################################
98 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
except in the brains of philosophers, neither does
"to give pleasure per se" (pity in Schopenhauer's
meaning). In the social condition before the State
we kill the creature, be it ape or man, who tries
to take from us the fruit of a tree when we are
hungry and approach the tree, as we should still
do with animals in inhospitable countries. The
evil actions which now most rouse our indignation,
are based upon the error that he who causes them
has a free will, that he had the option, therefore,
of not doing us this injury. This belief in option
arouses hatred, desire for revenge, spite, and the
deterioration of the whole imagination, while we
are much less angry with an animal because we
consider it irresponsible. To do injury, not from
the instinct of preservation, but as requital, is the
consequence of a false judgment and therefore
equally innocent. The individual can in the con-
dition which lies before the State, act sternly and
cruelly towards other creatures for the purpose of
terrifying, to establish his existence firmly by such
terrifying proofs of his power. Thus act the
violent, the mighty, the original founders of States,
who subdue the weaker to themselves. They have
the right to do so, such as the State still takes for
itself; or rather, there is no right that can hinder
this. The ground for all morality can only be
made ready when a stronger individual or a
collective individual, for instance society or the
State, subdues the single individuals, draws them
out of their singleness, and forms them into an
association. Compulsion precedes morality, indeed
morality itself is compulsion for a time, to
## p. 99 (#151) #############################################
THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 99
which one submits for the avoidance of pain.
Later on it becomes custom,—later still, free
obedience, and finally almost instinct,—then, like
everything long accustomed and natural, it is
connected with pleasure—and is henceforth called
virtue.
100.
SHAME. —Shame exists everywhere where there
is a "mystery"; this, however, is a religious
idea, which was widely extended in the older
times of human civilisation. Everywhere were
found bounded domains to which access was for-
bidden by divine right, except under certain con-
ditions; at first locally, as, for example, certain
spots that ought not to be trodden by the feet
of the uninitiated, in the neighbourhood of
which these latter experienced horror and fear.
This feeling was a good deal carried over into
other relations, for instance, the sex relations,
which, as a privilege and aBvrov of riper years,
had to be withheld from the knowledge of the
young for their advantage, relations for the pro-
tection and sanctification of which many gods
were invented and were set up as guardians in
the nuptiaj chamber. (In Turkish this room is
on this account called harem, " sanctuary," and is
distinguished with the same name, therefore, that
is used for the entrance courts of the mosques. )
Thus the kingdom is as a centre from which
radiate power and glory, to the subjects a mystery
full of secrecy and shame, of which many after-
effects may still be felt among nations which
r
## p. 100 (#152) ############################################
IOO HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
otherwise do not by any means belong to the
bashful type. Similarly, the whole world of inner
conditions, the so-called "soul," is still a mystery
for all who are not philosophers, after it has been
looked upon for endless ages as of divine origin
and as worthy of divine intercourse; according
to this it is an SZvtov and arouses shame.
IOI.
JUDGE NOT. —In considering earlier periods,
care must be taken not to fall into unjust abuse.
The injustice in slavery, the cruelty in the sup-
pression of persons and nations, is not to be
measured by our standard. For the instinct of
justice was not then so far developed. Who
dares to reproach the Genevese Calvin with the
burning of the physician Servet? It was an
action following and resulting from his convictions,
and in the same way the Inquisition had a good
right; only the ruling views were false, and pro-
duced a result which seems hard to us because
those views have now grown strange to us. Be-
sides, what is the burning of a single individual
compared with eternal pains of hell for almost
all! And yet this idea was universal at that
time, without essentially injuring by its dreadful-
ness the conception of a God. With us, too,
political sectarians are hardly and cruelly treated,
but because one is accustomed to believe in the
necessity of the State, the cruelty is not so deeply
felt here as it is where we repudiate the views.
Cruelty to animals in children and Italians is
<
## p. 101 (#153) ############################################
THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. IOI
due to ignorance, i. e. the animal, through the
interests of Church teaching, has been placed too
far behind man. Much that is dreadful and in-
human in history, much that one hardly likes to
believe, is mitigated by the reflection that the
one who commands and the one who carries out
are different persons,—the former does not be-
hold the right and therefore does not experience
the strong impression on the imagination; the
latter obeys a superior and therefore feels no
responsibility. Most princes and military heads,
through lack of imagination, easily appear hard
and cruel without really being so. Egoism is
not evil, because the idea of the "neighbour "—
the word is of Christian origin and does not
represent the truth—is very weak in us; and we
feel ourselves almost as free and irresponsible
towards him as towards plants and stones. We
have yet to learn that others suffer, and this can
never be completely learnt.
102.
"Man always Acts Rightly. "—We do not "7
complain of nature as immoral because it sends
a thunderstorm and makes us wet,—why do
we call those who injure us immoral? Because J
in the latter case we take for granted a free will
functioning voluntarily; in the former we see
necessity. But this distinction is an error. Thus
we do not call even intentional injury immoral in )
all circumstances; for instance, we kill a fly un-
hesitatingly and intentionally, only because its
## p. 102 (#154) ############################################
102 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
buzzing annoys us; we punish a criminal
intentionally and hurt him in order to protect
ourselves and society. In the first case it is the
individual who, in order to preserve himself, or
even to protect himself from worry, does inten-
tional injury; in the second case it is the State.
All morals allow intentional injury in the case of
necessity, that is, when it is a matter of self-pre-
'servation! But these two points of view suffice
to explain all evil actions committed by men
against men, we are desirous of obtaining
pleasure or avoiding pain; in any case it is
always a question of self-preservation. Socrates
and Plato are right: whatever man does he always
does well, that is, he does that which seems to
him good (useful) according to the degree of his
'intellect, the particular standard of his reason-
ableness.
103.
The Harmlessness of Malice. —The aim
of malice is not the suffering of others in itself, |
but our own enjoyment; for instance, as the feeling
of revenge, or stronger nervous excitement. All
teasing, even, shows the pleasure it gives to ex- 1]
ercise our power on others and bring it to an
enjoyable feeling of preponderance. Is it im-
moral to taste pleasure at the expense of another's
pain? Is malicious joy * devilish, as Schopen-
hauer says? We give ourselves pleasure in
*This is the untranslatable word Schadenfreude, which
means joy at the misfortune of others. —J. M. K.
## p.
action the whole honest glamour of a good
conscience; failure casts the shadow of re-
morse over the most estimable deed. Hence
arises the well-known practice of the politician,
who thinks, "Only grant me success, with that
I bring all honest souls over to my side and
make myself honest in my own eyes. " In
the same way success must replace a better
argument. Many educated people still believe
that the triumph of Christianity over Greek
philosophy is a proof of the greater truthfulness
of the former,—although in this case it is only
the coarser and more powerful that has triumphed
over the more spiritual and delicate. Which pos-
## p. 81 (#125) #############################################
THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 8l
sesses the greater truth may be seen from the fact
that the awakening sciences have agreed with
Epicurus' philosophy on point after point, but on
point after point have rejected Christianity.
69.
Love and Justice. —Why do we over-esti-
mate love to the disadvantage of justice, and say
the most beautiful things about it, as if it were
something very much higher than the latter? Is
it not visibly more stupid than justice? Certainly,
but precisely for that reason all the pleasanter for
every one. It is blind, and possesses an abundant
cornucopia, out of which it distributes its gifts to
all, even if they do not deserve them, even if they
express no thanks for them. It is as impartial as
the rain, which, according to the Bible and experi-
ence, makes not only the unjust, but also occasion-
ally the just wet through to the skin.
70.
EXECUTION. —How is it that every execution
offends us more than does a murder? It is the
coldness of the judges, the painful preparations,
the conviction that a human being is here being
used as a warning to scare others. For the guilt
is not punished, even if it existed—it lies with
educators, parents, surroundings, in ourselves, not
in the murderer—I mean the determining cir-
cumstances.
VOL. 1. F
## p. 82 (#126) #############################################
82 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
Hope. —Pandora brought the box of ills and
opened it. It was the gift of the gods to men,
outwardly a beautiful and seductive gift, and called
the Casket of Happiness. Out of it flew all the
evils, living winged creatures, thence they now
circulate and do men injury day and night. One
single evil had not yet escaped from the box, and
by the will of Zeus Pandora closed the lid and it
remained within. Now for ever man has the
casket of happiness in his house and thinks he
holds a great treasure; it is at his disposal, he
stretches out his hand for it whenever he desires;
for he does not know the box which Pandora
brought was the casket of evil, and he believes the
ill which remains within to be the greatest blessing,
—it is hope. Zeus did not wish man, however
much he might be tormented by the other evils,
to fling away his life, but to go on letting himself
be tormented again and again. Therefore he gives
man hope,—in reality it is the worst of all evils,
because it prolongs the torments of man.
72.
The Degree of Moral Inflammability
Unknown. —According to whether we have or
have not had certain disturbing views and im-
pressions—for instance, an unjustly executed,
killed, or martyred father; a faithless wife; a
cruel hostile attack — it depends whether our
passions reach fever heat and influence our whole
## p. 83 (#127) #############################################
THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 83
life or not. No one knows to what he may
be driven by circumstances, pity, or indignation;
he does not know the degree of his own inflam-
mability. Miserable little circumstances make us
. * miserable; it is generally not the quantity of ex-
periences, but their quality, on which lower and
higher man depends, in good and evil.
> The Martyr in Spite of Himself. —There
was a man belonging to a party who was too
nervous and cowardly ever to contradict his com-
rades; they made use of him for everything, they
demanded everything from him, because he was
> more afraid of the bad opinion of his companions
» than of death itself; his was a miserable, feeble
soul. They recognised this, and on the ground
of these qualities they made a hero of him, and
finally even a martyr. Although the coward in-
wardly always said No, with his lips he always said
Yes, even on the scaffold, when he was about to die
for the opinions of his party; for beside him stood
one of his old companions, who so tyrannised over
him by word and look that he really suffered death
in the most respectable manner, and has ever
since been celebrated as a martyr and a great
character.
74-
> The Every-day Standard. — One will
seldom go wrong if one attributes extreme actions
to vanity, average ones to habit, and petty ones
to fear.
4
## p. 84 (#128) #############################################
84 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
75-
Misunderstanding Concerning Virtue.
—Whoever has known immorality in connection
with pleasure, as is the case with a man who has
a pleasure-seeking youth behind him, imagines
that virtue must be connected with absence of
pleasure. —Whoever, on the contrary, has been
much plagued by his passions and vices, longs to
find in virtue peace and the soul's happiness.
Hence it is possible for two virtuous persons
not to understand each other at all.
76.
The ASCETIC. —The ascetic makes a necessity
of virtue.
77-
Transferring Honour from the Person
TO the Thing. —Deeds of love and sacrifice
for the benefit of one's neighbour are gener-
ally honoured, wherever they are manifested.
Thereby we multiply the valuation of things which
are thus loved, or for which we sacrifice ourselves,
although perhaps they are not worth much in
themselves. A brave army is convinced of the
cause for which it fights.
78.
Ambition a Substitute for the Moral
Sense. —The moral sense must not be lacking in
those natures which have no ambition. The am-
^
## p. 85 (#129) #############################################
The history of the moral sentiments. 85
bitious manage without it, with almost the same
results. For this reason the sons of unpreten-
tious, unambitious families, when once they lose the
moral sense, generally degenerate very quickly
into complete scamps.
79-
Vanity Enriches. —How poor would be the
human mind without vanity! Thus, however, it
resembles a well-stocked and constantly replen-
ished bazaar which attracts buyers of every kind.
There they can find almost everything, obtain
almost everything, provided that they bring the
right sort of coin, namely admiration.
80.
Old Age and Death. —Apart from the com-
mands of religion, the question may well be asked,
Why is it more worthy for an old man who feels
his powers decline, to await his slow exhaustion
and extinction than with full consciousness to set
a limit to his life? Suicide in this case is a per-
fectly natural, obvious action, which should justly
arouse respect as a triumph of reason, and did
arouse it in those times when the heads of Greek
philosophy and the sturdiest patriots used to seek
death through suicide. The seeking, on the con-
trary, to prolong existence from day to day, with
anxious consultation of doctors and painful mode
of living, without the power of drawing nearer to
the actual aim of life, is far less worthy. Religion
is rich in excuses to reply to the demand for
/
## p. 85 (#130) #############################################
84 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
75-
Misunderstanding Concerning Virtue.
—Whoever has known immorality in connection
with pleasure, as is the case with a man who has
a pleasure-seeking youth behind him, imagines
that virtue must be connected with absence of
pleasure. —Whoever, on the contrary, has been
much plagued by his passions and vices, longs to
find in virtue peace and the soul's happiness.
Hence it is possible for two virtuous persons
not to understand each other at all.
76.
The Ascetic. —The ascetic makes a necessity
of virtue.
77-
Transferring Honour from the Person
to the Thing. —Deeds of love and sacrifice
for the benefit of one's neighbour are gener-
ally honoured, wherever they are manifested.
Thereby we multiply the valuation of things which
are thus loved, or for which we sacrifice ourselves,
although perhaps they are not worth much in
themselves. A brave army is convinced of the
cause for which it fights.
78.
Ambition a Substitute for the Moral
SENSE. —The moral sense must not be lacking in
those natures which have no ambition. The am-
## p. 85 (#131) #############################################
The history of the moral sentiments. 85
bitious manage without it, with almost the same
results. For this reason the sons of unpreten-
tious, unambitious families, when once they lose the
moral sense, generally degenerate very quickly
into complete scamps.
79-
Vanity Enriches. —How poor would be the
human mind without vanity! Thus, however, it
resembles a well-stocked and constantly replen-
ished bazaar which attracts buyers of every kind.
There they can find almost everything, obtain
almost everything, provided that they bring the
right sort of coin, namely admiration.
80.
Old Age and Death. —Apart from the com-
mands of religion, the question may well be asked,
Why is it more worthy for an old man who feels
his powers decline, to await his slow exhaustion
and extinction than with full consciousness to set
a limit to his life? Suicide in this case is a per-
fectly natural, obvious action, which should justly
arouse respect as a triumph of reason, and did
arouse it in those times when the heads of Greek
philosophy and the sturdiest patriots used to seek
death through suicide. The seeking, on the con-
trary, to prolong existence from day to day, with
anxious consultation of doctors and painful mode
of living, without the power of drawing nearer to
the actual aim of life, is far less worthy. Religion
is rich in excuses to reply to the demand for
## p. 85 (#132) #############################################
84 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
75-
Misunderstanding Concerning Virtue.
—Whoever has known immorality in connection
with pleasure, as is the case with a man who has
a pleasure-seeking youth behind him, imagines
that virtue must be connected with absence of
pleasure. —Whoever, on the contrary, has been
much plagued by his passions and vices, longs to
find in virtue peace and the soul's happiness.
Hence it is possible for two virtuous persons
not to understand each other at all.
76.
THE ASCETIC. —The ascetic makes a necessity
of virtue.
77-
Transferring Honour from the Person
TO THE THING. —Deeds of love and sacrifice
for the benefit of one's neighbour are gener-
ally honoured, wherever they are manifested.
Thereby we multiply the valuation of things which
are thus loved, or for which we sacrifice ourselves,
although perhaps they are not worth much in
themselves. A brave army is convinced of the
cause for which it fights.
78.
Ambition a Substitute for the Moral
SENSE. —The moral sense must not be lacking in
those natures which have no ambition. The am-
## p. 85 (#133) #############################################
THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 85
bitious manage without it, with almost the same
results. For this reason the sons of unpreten-
tious, unambitious families, when once they lose the
moral sense, generally degenerate very quickly
into complete scamps.
79-
Vanity Enriches. —How poor would be the
human mind without vanity! Thus, however, it
resembles a well-stocked and constantly replen-
ished bazaar which attracts buyers of every kind.
There they can find almost everything, obtain
almost everything, provided that they bring the
right sort of coin, namely admiration.
80.
Old Age and Death. —Apart from the com-
mands of religion, the question may well be asked,
Why is it more worthy for an old man who feels
his powers decline, to await his slow exhaustion
and extinction than with full consciousness to set
a limit to his life? Suicide in this case is a per-
fectly natural, obvious action, which should justly
arouse respect as a triumph of reason, and did
arouse it in those times when the heads of Greek
philosophy and the sturdiest patriots used to seek
death through suicide. The seeking, on the con-
trary, to prolong existence from day to day, with
anxious consultation of doctors and painful mode
of living, without the power of drawing nearer to
the actual aim of life, is far less worthy. Religion
is rich in excuses to reply to the demand for
## p. 85 (#134) #############################################
84 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
75-
Misunderstanding Concerning Virtue.
—Whoever has known immorality in connection
with pleasure, as is the case with a man who has
a pleasure-seeking youth behind him, imagines
that virtue must be connected with absence of
pleasure. —Whoever, on the contrary, has been
much plagued by his passions and vices, longs to
find in virtue peace and the soul's happiness.
Hence it is possible for two virtuous persons
not to understand each other at all.
76.
THE ASCETIC. —The ascetic makes a necessity
of virtue.
77-
Transferring Honour from the Person
TO THE Thing. —Deeds of love and sacrifice
for the benefit of one's neighbour are gener-
ally honoured, wherever they are manifested.
Thereby we multiply the valuation of things which
are thus loved, or for which we sacrifice ourselves,
although perhaps they are not worth much in
themselves. A brave army is convinced of the
cause for which it fights.
78.
Ambition a Substitute for the Moral
SENSE. —The moral sense must not be lacking in
those natures which have no ambition. The am-
## p. 85 (#135) #############################################
The history of the moral sentiments. 85
bitious manage without it, with almost the same
results. For this reason the sons of unpreten-
tious, unambitious families, when once they lose the
moral sense, generally degenerate very quickly
into complete scamps.
79-
Vanity Enriches. —How poor would be the
human mind without vanity! Thus, however, it
resembles a well-stocked and constantly replen-
ished bazaar which attracts buyers of every kind.
There they can find almost everything, obtain
almost everything, provided that they bring the
right sort of coin, namely admiration.
80.
Old Age and Death. —Apart from the com-
mands of religion, the question may well be asked,
Why is it more worthy for an old man who feels
his powers decline, to await his slow exhaustion
and extinction than with full consciousness to set
a limit to his life? Suicide in this case is a per-
fectly natural, obvious action, which should justly
arouse respect as a triumph of reason, and did
arouse it in those times when the heads of Greek
philosophy and the sturdiest patriots used to seek
death through suicide. The seeking, on the con-
trary, to prolong existence from day to day, with
anxious consultation of doctors and painful mode
of living, without the power of drawing nearer to
the actual aim of life, is far less worthy. Religion
is rich in excuses to reply to the demand for
## p. 85 (#136) #############################################
84 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
75-
Misunderstanding Concerning Virtue.
—Whoever has known immorality in connection
with pleasure, as is the case with a man who has
a pleasure-seeking youth behind him, imagines
that virtue must be connected with absence of
pleasure. —Whoever, on the contrary, has been
much plagued by his passions and vices, longs to
find in virtue peace and the soul's happiness.
Hence it is possible for two virtuous persons
not to understand each other at all.
76.
THE ASCETIC. —The ascetic makes a necessity
of virtue.
77-
Transferring Honour from the Person
TO THE THING. —Deeds of love and sacrifice
for the benefit of one's neighbour are gener-
ally honoured, wherever they are manifested.
Thereby we multiply the valuation of things which
are thus loved, or for which we sacrifice ourselves,
although perhaps they are not worth much in
themselves. A brave army is convinced of the
cause for which it fights.
78.
Ambition a Substitute for the Moral
SENSE. —The moral sense must not be lacking in
those natures which have no ambition. The am-
-.
## p. 85 (#137) #############################################
The history of the moral sentiments. 85
bitious manage without it, with almost the same
results. For this reason the sons of unpreten-
tious, unambitious families, when once they lose the
moral sense, generally degenerate very quickly
into complete scamps.
79-
Vanity Enriches. —How poor would be the
human mind without vanity! Thus, however, it
resembles a well-stocked and constantly replen-
ished bazaar which attracts buyers of every kind.
There they can find almost everything, obtain
almost everything, provided that they bring the
right sort of coin, namely admiration.
80.
Old Age and Death. —Apart from the com-
mands of religion, the question may well be asked,
Why is it more worthy for an old man who feels
his powers decline, to await his slow exhaustion
and extinction than with full consciousness to set
a limit to his life? Suicide in this case is a per-
fectly natural, obvious action, which should justly
arouse respect as a triumph of reason, and did
arouse it in those times when the heads of Greek
philosophy and the sturdiest patriots used to seek
death through suicide. The seeking, on the con-
trary, to prolong existence from day to day, with
anxious consultation of doctors and painful mode
of living, without the power of drawing nearer to
the actual aim of life, is far less worthy. Religion
is rich in excuses to reply to the demand for
## p. 86 (#138) #############################################
86 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
suicide, and thus it ingratiates itself with those
who wish to cling to life.
81.
Errors of the Sufferer and the Doer.
—When a rich man deprives a poor man of a
possession (for instance, a prince taking the sweet-
heart of a plebeian), an error arises in the mind of
the poor man; he thinks that the rich man must be
utterly infamous to take away from him the little
that he has. But the rich man does not estimate
so highly the value of a single possession, because
he is accustomed to have many; hence he cannot
imagine himself in the poor man's place, and does
not commit nearly so great a wrong as the latter
supposes. They each have a mistaken idea of the
other. The injustice of the powerful, which, more
than anything else, rouses indignation in history,
is by no means so great as it appears.
Alone the
mere inherited consciousness of being a higher
creation, with higher claims, produces a cold tem-
perament, and leaves the conscience quiet; we
all of us feel no injustice when the difference is
very great between ourselves and another creature,
and kill a fly, for instance, without any pricks of
conscience. Therefore it was no sign of badness
in Xerxes (whom even all Greeks describe as
superlatively noble) when he took a son away
from his father and had him cut in pieces, because
he had expressed a nervous, ominous distrust of
the whole campaign; in this case the individual
is put out of the way like an unpleasant insect; he
## p. 87 (#139) #############################################
THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 87
is too lowly to be allowed any longer to cause
annoyance to a ruler of the world. Yes, every
cruel man is not so cruel as the ill-treated one
imagines; the idea of pain is not the same as its
endurance. It is the same thing in the case
of unjust judges, of the journalist who leads
public opinion astray by small dishonesties. In
all these cases cause and effect are surrounded by
entirely different groups of feelings and thoughts;
yet one unconsciously takes it for granted that
doer and sufferer think and feel alike, and accord-
ing to this supposition we measure the guilt of the
one by the pain of the other.
82.
The Skin of the Soul. —As the bones, flesh,
entrails, and blood-vessels are enclosed within a
skin, which makes the aspect of man endurable,
so the emotions and passions of the soul are
enwrapped with vanity,—it is the skin of the soul.
S3-
The Sleep of Virtue. —^hen virtue has
slept, it will arise again all the fresher.
84.
The Refinement of Shame. —People are
not ashamed to think something foul, but they
are ashamed when they think these foul thoughts
are attributed to them.
-
## p. 88 (#140) #############################################
88 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
85.
Malice is Rare. —Most people are far too
much occupied with themselves to be malicious.
86.
The Tongue in the Balance. —We praise
or blame according as the one or the other affords
more opportunity for exhibiting our power of
judgment.
87.
St. Luke xviii. 14, Improved. —He that
humbleth himself wishes to be exalted.
The Prevention of Suicide. —There is a
certain right by which we may deprive a man of
life, but none by which we may deprive him of
death; this is mere cruelty.
89.
Vanity. —We care for the good opinion of
men, firstly because they are useful to us, and
then because we wish to please them (children
their parents, pupils their teachers, and well-
meaning people generally their fellow-men). Only
where the good opinion of men is of importance
to some one, apart from the advantage thereof or
his wish to please, can we speak of vanity. In
## p. 89 (#141) #############################################
THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 89
this case the man wishes to please himself, but at
the expense of his fellow-men, either by misleading
them into holding a false opinion about him, or by
aiming at a degree of " good opinion " which must
be painful to every one else (by arousing envy).
The individual usually wishes to corroborate the
opinion he holds of himself by the opinion of others,
and to strengthen it in his own eyes; but the strong
habit of authority—a habit as old as man himself
—induces many to support by authority their
belief in themselves: that is to say, they accept it
first from others; they trust the judgment of
others more than their own. The interest in
himself, the wish to please himself, attains to
such a height in a vain man that he misleads
others into having a false, all too elevated estimation
of him, and yet nevertheless sets store by their
authority,—thus causing an error and yet believing
in it. It must be confessed, therefore, that vain
people do not wish to please others so much as
themselves, and that they go so far therein as to
neglect their advantage, for they often endeavour
to prejudice their fellow - men unfavourably,
inimicably, enviously, consequently injuriously
against themselves, merely in order to have
pleasure in themselves, personal pleasure.
90.
The Limits of Human Love. —A man who
has declared that another is an idiot and a bad
companion, is angry when the latter eventually
proves himself to be otherwise.
J*
## p. 90 (#142) #############################################
go HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
91.
Moraute larmoyante. —What a great deal
of pleasure morality gives! Only think what a
sea of pleasant tears has been shed over descrip-
tions of noble and unselfish deeds! This charm
of life would vanish if the belief in absolute
irresponsibility were to obtain supremacy.
92.
The Origin of Justice. —Justice (equity) has
I its origin amongst powers which are fairly equal,
I as Thucydides (in the terrible dialogue between
'the Athenian and Melian ambassadors) rightly
comprehended: that is to say, where there is no
clearly recognisable supremacy, and where a
conflict would be useless and would injure both
sides, there arises the thought of coming to an
understanding and settling the opposing claims;
the character of exchange is the primary character
of justice. Each party satisfies the other, as each
obtains what he values more than the other.
Each one receives that which he desires, as his
own henceforth, and whatever is desired is received
in return. Justice, therefore, is recompense and
\ exchange based on the hypothesis of a fairly equal
degree of power,—thus, originally, revenge belongs
\to the province of justice, it is an exchange. Also
[gratitude. —Justice naturally is based on the point
k>{ view of a judicious self-preservation, on the
egoism, therefore, of that reflection, " Why should
I injure myself uselessly and perhaps not attain
## p. 91 (#143) #############################################
THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 91
my aim after all? " So much about the origin of
justice. Because man, according to his intellectual
custom, has forgotten the original purpose of so-
called just and reasonable actions,-and particularly
because for hundreds of years children have been
taught to admire and imitate such actions, the
idea has gradually arisen that such an action is
un-egoistic; upon this idea, however, is based the
high estimation in which it is held: which, more-
over, like all valuations, is constantly growing, for
something that is valued highly is striven after,
imitated, multiplied, and increases, because the
value of the output of toil and enthusiasm of each
individual is added to the value of the thing itself.
How little moral would the world look without
this forgetfulness! A poet might say that God
had placed forgetfulness as door-keeper in the
temple of human dignity.
93-
The Right of>the Weaker. —When any
one submits under certain conditions to a greater
power, as a besieged town for instance, the counter-
condition is that one can destroy one's self, burn
the town, and so cause the mighty one a great
loss. Therefore there is a kind of equalisation
here, on the basis of which rights may be
determined. The enemy has his advantage in
maintaining it. In so far there are also rights
between slaves and masters, that is, precisely so
far as the possession of the slave is useful and
important to his master. The right originally
r
-
## p. 92 (#144) #############################################
92 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
extends so far as one appears to be valuable
to the other, essentially unlosable, unconquerable,
and so forth. In so far the weaker one also has
rights, but lesser ones. Hence the famous
unusquisque tankum juris habet, quantum potentia
valet (or more/ exactly, quantum potentia valere
creditur).
94-
The Three Phases of Hitherto Existing
MORALITY. —It is the first sign that the animal
has become man when its actions no longer have
regard only to momentary welfare, but to what is
enduring, when it grows useful and practical; there
the free rule of reason first breaks out. A still
higher step is reached when he acts according to
the principle of honour; by this means he brings
ftimself into order, submits to common feelings,
and that exalts him still higher over the phase in
which he was led only by the idea of usefulness
from a personal point of view; he respects and
wishes to be respected, i. e. he understands useful-
ness as dependent upon what he thinks of others
and what others think of him. Eventually he
acts, on the highest step of the hitherto existing
morality, according to his standard of things and
men; he himself decides for himself and others
what is honourable, what is useful; he has become
the law-giver of opinions, in accordance with the
ever more highly developed idea of what is useful
and honourable. Knowledge enables him to place
that which is most useful, that is to say the
general, enduring usefulness, above the personal,
## p. 93 (#145) #############################################
THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 93
the honourable recognition of general, enduring
validity above the momentary; he lives and acts
as a collective individual.
95-
The Morality of the Mature Individual.
—The impersonal has hitherto been looked upon
as the actual distinguishing mark of moral action;
and it has been pointed out that in the beginning
it was in consideration of the common good that
all impersonal actions were praised and distin-
guished. Is not an important change in these
views impending, now when it is more and more
recognised that it is precisely in the most personal
possible considerations that the common good is
the greatest, so that a strictly personal action now
best illustrates the present idea of morality, as
utility for the mass? To make a whole person-
ality out of ourselves, and in all that we do to keep
that personality's highest good in view, carries
us further than those sympathetic emotions and
actions for the benefit of others. We all still
suffer, certainly, from the too small consideration
of the personal in us; it is badly developed,—let
us admit it; rather has our mind been forcibly
drawn away from it and offered as a sacrifice to
the State, to science, or to those who stand in
need of help, as if it were the bad part which
must be sacrificed. We are still willing to work'
for our fellow-men, but only so far as we find our
own greatest advantage in this work, no more and
no less. It is only a question of what we under-
r
## p. 94 (#146) #############################################
94 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
stand as our advantage; the unripe, undeveloped,
crude individual will understand it in the crudest
way.
96.
Custom and Morality. —To be moral,correct,
and virtuous is to be obedient to an old-established
law and custom. Whether we submit with diffi-
culty or willingly is immaterial, enough that we
do so. He is called "good" who, as if naturally,
after long precedent, easily and willingly, there-
fore, does what is right, according to whatever this
may be (as, for instance, taking revenge, if to take
revenge be considered as right, as amongst the
ancient Greeks). He is called good because he
is good "for something"; but as goodwill, pity,
consideration, moderation, and such like, have come,
with the change in manners, to be looked upon as
"good for something," as useful, the good-natured
and helpful have, later on, come to be distinguished
specially as "good. " (In the beginning other and
more important kinds of usefulness stood in the
foreground. ) To be evil is to be "not moral"
(immoral), to be immoral is to be in opposi-
tion to tradition, however sensible or stupid it
may be; injury to the community (the "neigh-
bour" being understood thereby) has, however,
been looked upon by the social laws of all different
ages as being eminently the actual "immorality,"
so that now at the word "evil" we immediately
think of voluntary injury to one's neighbour. The
fundamental antithesis which has taught man the
distinction between moral and immoral, between
## p. 95 (#147) #############################################
THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 95
good and evil, is not the "egoistic" and "un-
egoistic," but the being bound to the tradition,
law, and solution thereof. How the tradition has
arisen is immaterial, at all events without regard
to good and evil or any immanent categorical im-
perative, but above all for the purpose of preserving
a community, a generation, an association, a people;
every superstitious custom that has arisen on
account of some falsely explained accident, creates
a tradition, which it is moral to follow; to separate
one's self from it is dangerous, but more dangerous
for the community than for the individual (because
the Godhead punishes the community for every
outrage and every violation of its rights, and the
individual only in proportion). Now every tradition
grows continually more venerable, the farther off
lies its origin, the more this is lost sight of; the
veneration paid it accumulates from generation
to generation, the tradition at last becomes holy
and excites awe; and thus in any case the morality
of piety is a much older morality than that which
requires un-egoistic actions.
97-
Pleasure in Traditional Custom. —An
important species of pleasure, and therewith
the source of morality, arises out of habit.
Man does what is habitual to him more easily,
better, and therefore more willingly; he feels
a pleasure therein, and knows from experience
that the habitual has been tested, and is there-
fore useful; a custom that we can live with is
proved to be wholesome and advantageous in con-
r
*m.
## p. 96 (#148) #############################################
96 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
trast to all new and not yet tested experiments.
According to this, morality is the union of the
pleasant and the useful; moreover, it requires no
reflection. As soon as man can use compulsion,
he uses it to introduce and enforce his customs; for
in his eyes they are proved as the wisdom of life.
In the same way a company of individuals com-
pels each single one to adopt the same customs.
Here the inference is wrong; because we feel at
ease with a morality, or at least because we are
able to carry on existence with it, therefore this
morality is necessary, for it seems to be the only
possibility of feeling at ease; the ease of life seems
to grow out of it alone. This comprehension of
the habitual as a necessity of existence is pursued
even to the smallest details of custom,—as insight
into genuine causality is very small with lower
peoples and civilisations, they take precautions
with superstitious fear that everything should go
in its same groove; even where custom is
difficult, hard, and burdensome, it is preserved
on account of its apparent highest usefulness. It
is not known that the same degree of well-being
can also exist with other customs, and that even
higher degrees may be attained. We become
aware, however, that all customs, even the hardest,
grow pleasanter and milder with time, and that
the severest way of life may become a habit and
therefore a pleasure.
98.
Pleasure and Social Instinct. —Out of
his relations with other men, man obtains a new
## p. 97 (#149) #############################################
THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 97
species of pleasure in addition to those pleasurable
sensations which he derives from himself; whereby
he greatly increases the scope of enjoyment. Per-
haps he has already taken too many of the pleasures
of this sphere from animals, which visibly feel
pleasure when they play with each other, especially
the mother with her young. Then consider the
sexual relations, which make almost every female
interesting to a male with regard to pleasure, and
j vice versa. The feeling of pleasure on the basis
of human relations generally makes man better;
i joy in common, pleasure enjoyed together is in-
creased, it gives the individual security, makes him
good-tempered, and dispels mistrust and envy, for
we feel ourselves at ease and see others at ease.
Similar manifestations of pleasure awaken the idea
* of the same sensations, the feeling of being like
something; a like effect is produced by common
sufferings, the same bad weather, dangers, enemies.
Upon this foundation is based the oldest alliance,
the object of which is the mutual obviating and
averting of a threatening danger for the benefit
i of each individual. And thus the social instinct
* grows out of pleasure.
99.
The Innocent Side of so-called Evil
ACTIONS. —All "evil" actions are prompted by
the instinct of preservation, or, more exactly, by
the desire for pleasure and the avoidance of pain
on the part of the individual; thus prompted, but
not evil. "To cause pain per se" does not exist,
vol. 1. G
## p. 98 (#150) #############################################
98 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
except in the brains of philosophers, neither does
"to give pleasure per se" (pity in Schopenhauer's
meaning). In the social condition before the State
we kill the creature, be it ape or man, who tries
to take from us the fruit of a tree when we are
hungry and approach the tree, as we should still
do with animals in inhospitable countries. The
evil actions which now most rouse our indignation,
are based upon the error that he who causes them
has a free will, that he had the option, therefore,
of not doing us this injury. This belief in option
arouses hatred, desire for revenge, spite, and the
deterioration of the whole imagination, while we
are much less angry with an animal because we
consider it irresponsible. To do injury, not from
the instinct of preservation, but as requital, is the
consequence of a false judgment and therefore
equally innocent. The individual can in the con-
dition which lies before the State, act sternly and
cruelly towards other creatures for the purpose of
terrifying, to establish his existence firmly by such
terrifying proofs of his power. Thus act the
violent, the mighty, the original founders of States,
who subdue the weaker to themselves. They have
the right to do so, such as the State still takes for
itself; or rather, there is no right that can hinder
this. The ground for all morality can only be
made ready when a stronger individual or a
collective individual, for instance society or the
State, subdues the single individuals, draws them
out of their singleness, and forms them into an
association. Compulsion precedes morality, indeed
morality itself is compulsion for a time, to
## p. 99 (#151) #############################################
THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 99
which one submits for the avoidance of pain.
Later on it becomes custom,—later still, free
obedience, and finally almost instinct,—then, like
everything long accustomed and natural, it is
connected with pleasure—and is henceforth called
virtue.
100.
SHAME. —Shame exists everywhere where there
is a "mystery"; this, however, is a religious
idea, which was widely extended in the older
times of human civilisation. Everywhere were
found bounded domains to which access was for-
bidden by divine right, except under certain con-
ditions; at first locally, as, for example, certain
spots that ought not to be trodden by the feet
of the uninitiated, in the neighbourhood of
which these latter experienced horror and fear.
This feeling was a good deal carried over into
other relations, for instance, the sex relations,
which, as a privilege and aBvrov of riper years,
had to be withheld from the knowledge of the
young for their advantage, relations for the pro-
tection and sanctification of which many gods
were invented and were set up as guardians in
the nuptiaj chamber. (In Turkish this room is
on this account called harem, " sanctuary," and is
distinguished with the same name, therefore, that
is used for the entrance courts of the mosques. )
Thus the kingdom is as a centre from which
radiate power and glory, to the subjects a mystery
full of secrecy and shame, of which many after-
effects may still be felt among nations which
r
## p. 100 (#152) ############################################
IOO HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
otherwise do not by any means belong to the
bashful type. Similarly, the whole world of inner
conditions, the so-called "soul," is still a mystery
for all who are not philosophers, after it has been
looked upon for endless ages as of divine origin
and as worthy of divine intercourse; according
to this it is an SZvtov and arouses shame.
IOI.
JUDGE NOT. —In considering earlier periods,
care must be taken not to fall into unjust abuse.
The injustice in slavery, the cruelty in the sup-
pression of persons and nations, is not to be
measured by our standard. For the instinct of
justice was not then so far developed. Who
dares to reproach the Genevese Calvin with the
burning of the physician Servet? It was an
action following and resulting from his convictions,
and in the same way the Inquisition had a good
right; only the ruling views were false, and pro-
duced a result which seems hard to us because
those views have now grown strange to us. Be-
sides, what is the burning of a single individual
compared with eternal pains of hell for almost
all! And yet this idea was universal at that
time, without essentially injuring by its dreadful-
ness the conception of a God. With us, too,
political sectarians are hardly and cruelly treated,
but because one is accustomed to believe in the
necessity of the State, the cruelty is not so deeply
felt here as it is where we repudiate the views.
Cruelty to animals in children and Italians is
<
## p. 101 (#153) ############################################
THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. IOI
due to ignorance, i. e. the animal, through the
interests of Church teaching, has been placed too
far behind man. Much that is dreadful and in-
human in history, much that one hardly likes to
believe, is mitigated by the reflection that the
one who commands and the one who carries out
are different persons,—the former does not be-
hold the right and therefore does not experience
the strong impression on the imagination; the
latter obeys a superior and therefore feels no
responsibility. Most princes and military heads,
through lack of imagination, easily appear hard
and cruel without really being so. Egoism is
not evil, because the idea of the "neighbour "—
the word is of Christian origin and does not
represent the truth—is very weak in us; and we
feel ourselves almost as free and irresponsible
towards him as towards plants and stones. We
have yet to learn that others suffer, and this can
never be completely learnt.
102.
"Man always Acts Rightly. "—We do not "7
complain of nature as immoral because it sends
a thunderstorm and makes us wet,—why do
we call those who injure us immoral? Because J
in the latter case we take for granted a free will
functioning voluntarily; in the former we see
necessity. But this distinction is an error. Thus
we do not call even intentional injury immoral in )
all circumstances; for instance, we kill a fly un-
hesitatingly and intentionally, only because its
## p. 102 (#154) ############################################
102 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
buzzing annoys us; we punish a criminal
intentionally and hurt him in order to protect
ourselves and society. In the first case it is the
individual who, in order to preserve himself, or
even to protect himself from worry, does inten-
tional injury; in the second case it is the State.
All morals allow intentional injury in the case of
necessity, that is, when it is a matter of self-pre-
'servation! But these two points of view suffice
to explain all evil actions committed by men
against men, we are desirous of obtaining
pleasure or avoiding pain; in any case it is
always a question of self-preservation. Socrates
and Plato are right: whatever man does he always
does well, that is, he does that which seems to
him good (useful) according to the degree of his
'intellect, the particular standard of his reason-
ableness.
103.
The Harmlessness of Malice. —The aim
of malice is not the suffering of others in itself, |
but our own enjoyment; for instance, as the feeling
of revenge, or stronger nervous excitement. All
teasing, even, shows the pleasure it gives to ex- 1]
ercise our power on others and bring it to an
enjoyable feeling of preponderance. Is it im-
moral to taste pleasure at the expense of another's
pain? Is malicious joy * devilish, as Schopen-
hauer says? We give ourselves pleasure in
*This is the untranslatable word Schadenfreude, which
means joy at the misfortune of others. —J. M. K.
## p.
