Whatis
nikdyasabhdga}
The resemblance of beings.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-1-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
mahdbhumikas without being klesamahdbhumikas .
.
.
"
142. The author does not admit this opinion. Torpor (stydna, laya) and dissipation, which are defiled dharmas, are opposed to the "white" dharmas, like samddhi.
143. According to the Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 220b4, there are five aku/alamahdbhumikas: avidyd, stydna, auddhatya, ahri, and anapatrapya. See iii. 32a-b and above note 102.
144. Hsuan-tsang translates: " . . . the dharmas of this nature (=iti) are termed parittakleU- bhumikas. "
Samghabhadra: The text says "the dharmas of this nature," in order to include aksdnti, arati dghdta, etc. (TD 29, p. 392a6).
145. Dharmatrata: Because they are abandoned through Meditation and not through the Seeing of the Truths, because they are associated with the mental consciousness and not with the five other consciousnesses, and because they do not arise with all minds and exist separately, they are parittakle/abhumika.
146. According to the Chinese. The Japanese editor explains the final et cetera by rdga (v. 2), pratigha, mdna (v. 10), and vicikitsa.
The Vydkhya reads: "kaukrtya, middha, etc. " and explains "etc. " by arati, vijrmbhitd, tendri, bhakte'samatd, etc. It continues: The kief as, rdga, etc. , are also indeterminate, for they are not classified in any of the five categories: they are not mahdbhumikas, because they are not found in any minds; they are not kus'aJamahdbhumikas, because they are repugnant to the good; they are not klesamahdbhumikas, because they are not found in any defiled mind: for there is no rdga or lust in a mind full of hatred (sapratigha).
The Acarya Vasumitra has written a summary, mnemonic Hoka\ "The tradition (smrta) is that there are eight aniyatas, namely vitarka, vicdra, kaukrtya, middha, pratigha, sakti (-rdga), mdna, and vicikitsa'. But we do not admit this number of eight. Why are the drspis (v. 3a) not aniyata? There is no mithyddrsti in a mind full of hatred or scepticism.
147. Compare Kathdvatthu, xiv. 8.
148. Dhammasangani, 1161, Atthasdlim, 784-787. 149. Compare i. 37.
150. Avenika = rdgddiprthagbhuta.
151. All drsti is samttrikdprajnd (i. 4lc-d, vii. l).
152. The mind of the First Dhyana, when it is good, contains twenty-two mental states; defiled- neutral, it contains eighteen mental states whether it is independent of, or associated with drsti, nineteen when it is associated with rdga, mdna or vicikitsa . . .
? 153. Literally: The word "also" (apt) shows that in addition to vicara, one should exclude sdthya and maya.
154. According to the Japanese editor, the Saddharmasmrti upasthdna sutra, TD 17, p. 193bl6. Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 670b24.
155. By adding: "I am the great Brahma", he distinguishes himself from the other Brahmas. 156. Compare Digha, i. 219, and below iv. 8a, v. 53a-b.
157. Jndnaprasthdna, i. Para. 5 (according to Takakusu, p. 87). See TD 26, p. 924c26 and following.
158. Pratisa = guru, because fisyam pratistah.
159. Compare the definition of adhisila:. . . anumdtresv apy avadyesu bhayadarsi. . .
160. These masters observes that the two roots hri and trap (Dhdtupdta, iii. 3 and i. 399) are synonyms and signify shame (lajjd): from whence one cannot see how ahri would be disrespect and atrapd the absence of fear in the commission of transgressions.
161. Vasubandhu, in the Pancaskandhaka, adopts this definition.
162. Jndnaprasthdna, I Para. 4 (according to Takakusu, p. 87). See TD 26, p. 923a13 and
following.
163. Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 151al5.
164. For one cannot have respect for impure (sdsrava) dharmas. (Note of the Japanese editor).
165. This definition comes from a Sutra which is not designated in our sources. See i. 33.
166. Seventh opinion of the Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 219b3.
167. Argument presented in the Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 269bl0, and attributed to the Darstantikas.
168. That is, "it makes the voice surge forth," vdksamutthdpaka.
169. Compare Majjhima i. 301, Samyutta ov. 293: pubbe kho . . . vitakketvd vicdretvd pacchd vdcarh bhindati. On the other hand, Vibhanga, 135: vdcisamcetand = vdcisamkhdro.
170. Samghabhadra says that vitarka and vicara are associated with each thought; but these two dharmas do not enter into aaivity, do not reveal themselves by their action (udbhutavrtti) at one and the same time: the mind and mental states are grosser when vitarka, which is always present, enters into activity . . . In the same way rdga and moha are coexistent: but a person is termed rdgacarita, acting though rdga, when rdga manifests itself . . .
171. Vitarka and vicara do not exist simultaneously, but successively (parydyena). What is the difference between vitarka and vicara} The ancient masters (pUrvdcdrya) say: "What is vitarka} A mental conversation (manojalpa) of inquiry (paryesaka), which has for its support volition (cetand) or the speculative consciousness (prajfid) depending on whether it does or does not contain deduction (abhyilha). This is the grosser state of mind. What is vicara} A mental conversation of appreciation, of judgment (pratyaveksaka), which has for its support volition . . . " According to this theory, vitarka and vicara constitute almost two identical psychological complexes: they differ in that the first includes "inquiry" and the second "judgment. " Some give
an example: Someone feels numerous pots in order to know which one is well baked, and which one is soft: this inquiry (aha) is vitarka; finally, this person arrives at the conclusion, "There are such a number of each category:" this is vicara.
The Vydkhyd, ad i. 37, quotes Vasubandhu's Pancaskandhaka which is very close to the opinion
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of some ancient masters: vitarkah katamah /paryesako manojalpas cetandprajndvisesah / yd cittasyauddrikatd // vicdrah katamah / pratyaveksako manojalpas cetandprajndvisesah / yd cittasyasuksmata. //The Vydkhya adds:anabhyuhdvasthdydmcetand abhyuhdvasthdydm prajtieti vyavasthdpyate.
See Dhammasangani, 7-8, Compendium, p. 10-11, Mi/inda, 62-63. Atthasdlini, 296-297 definesvitarkaasiihanaandgivesitasolarika,whereasvicdraissukhuma. VyasaadYogasutra, i. 17: vitarka/ cittasydlambana sthilla dbhogah / suksmo vicdrah; i. 42-44.
172. Paryddiyate - samnirudhyate; see Siksasamuccaya, 177. 15, Divya, Sutrdlamkdra, 112. Sarhghabhadra's definition: yah svadharmesv eva raktasya darpas cetasah parydddnam
kufaldnyakrtydbhyupapattisamhdro madah.
173. Mada is sensation, "defiled satisfaction" {klisfa saumanasya). The Vaibhasikas do not admit this explanation: in fact, satisfaction does not exist beyond the Second DhySna: but, according to v. 53c, mada exists in the three spheres of existence.
174. Compare Dtgha, i. 21, Samyutta, ii. 94.
175. Its meaning is that it accumulates good and evil (Vydkhya). Tibetan: 'byed pas: because it
distinguishes. Atthasdlini, 293: dlambanam cintetiti cittam.
176. Dhdtupdtha, 4. 67.
177. The Vydkhya adds: bhdvandsamniveiayogena sautrdntikamatena yogacdramatena vd. Paramartha reads: citam subhdSubhair dhdtubhis tan vd cinotiti cittam. The Tibetan translates
in the same way: "because it is charged (bsags-pas) with good and evil dhdtus"
178. The consciousness (vijfidna) discerns a blue object, etc. ; sensation feels it as agreeable, etc. ; ideas grasp its characteristics, etc. Or rather: consciousness perceives the object, in a general manner, as a perceptible (upalabhyatdrupam grhndtt); the mental states perceive its specific characteristics {viiesampena)\ sensation is susceptible of being agreeably experienced (anu- bhavan*yatdrupam)\ ideas are susceptible of being defined (paricchedyatdrupam), etc (116a).
179. That is to say saha vistaraprabheddbhydm or aha vistaraprabhedena.
180. The iti indicates that one should add other viprayuktas like samghabheda (iv. 99), etc to this list. The Prakarana says: ye'py evamjatiyakah: "The dharmas which are of this type are also cittaviprayukta. " Same formula in the Skandhapancaka.
According to the Prakarana, the samskdras disassociated from the mind are: prdpti, asamjtlisamdpatti, nirodhasamdpatti, dsamjnika, jtvitendriya, nikdyasabhdga, dfrayaprdpti, dravya- prdpti (? ), dyatanaprdpti, jdti, jard, sthiti, anityatd ndmakdya, and vyanjanakaya and all the other dharmas of this type disassociated from the mind.
Prdpti is defined as dharmdndm praptih; dSrayaprdpti is airaydyatanaprapti; dravyaprdpti. (? ) is skandhdndm prdptih; dyatanaprdpti is ddhydtmikahdhydyatanaprdpti (TD 26, p. 694al9).
Prakaranapdda (p. 694al4): What is prdpti? Prdpti of the dharmas. What is asamjfiisamd- patti? The cessation of the mind and mental states haying for its antecedent the idea of departure attached to the abandoning of the defilement of the Subhakrtsanas but not to the abandoning of higher defilements. What is nirodhasamdpatti? The cessation of the mind and mental states having for its antecedent the idea of calm attached to the abandoning of the defilement of dkimcanydyatana. What is dsamjnika? The cessation of the mind and mental states of those who arebornamongtheAsamjnisattvagods. Whatisjtvitendriya? AyusoftheThreeDhatus.
Whatis nikdyasabhdga} The resemblance of beings.
181. See i. 38c-d, ii. 59b.
The terms labha and samanvdgama do not have the same meanings in the Abhidharma and
? in the Katbdvatthu, ix. 12. For the Theravadins, labha signifies "possession," for example the power that the Saints posses to realize at their will any given absorption; samanvdgama is understood as the actual realization. Elsewhere (iv. 4) patUdbhasamanndgama and samangi- bhdvasamanndgama, possessor of power {samanvdgama of the Abhidharma) versus its actual possession (sammukhibhdva of the Abhidharma) are distinguished See also xix. 4.
182. There is in me prdpti or aprdpti relative to my defilement, to my action . . . , that is to say, I possess or do not possess my future or past defilement. . . But there is no relation of possession or of non-possession between me and the defilement of another.
183. Hairs should be regarded as "belonging to a living being," for they are bound (sambaddha) to the material organs.
184. A person "bound with all the bonds" {sakalabandhana) is one who has not obtained, by the worldly (laukika) path, the abandoning (=pratisamkhydnirodha) of any of the nine categories of defilements of Kamadhatu. An Aryan, at the first moment(ddiksana = duhkhe dharma-
jnanaksdnti) has not yet obtained the abandoning of the defilements abandoned through the Path (vi. 77). A person who has obtained the abandoning of one category of defilement is called ekaprakdropalikhita (vi. 30a).
185. Dravyadharmah = dravyato dharmah, or rather dravyam ca tad dharmas' ca sa dravya- dharmah, that is to say vidyamdnasvalaksano dharmah See below p. 211-212.
186. These ten dharmas are the eight parts of the Path, plus samyagvimukti and samyagjndna (Anguttara, v. 222); the five abandoned items are not the group of satkdyadrsti, silavrata-
pardmar/a, vicikitsd, kamacchanda, and vyapada, for this group has been abandoned with the acquisition of the result of Anagamin; rather, it is a group relative to the higher spheres, rupardga, drupyardga, auddhatya, mdnay and avidyd.
187. Dtgha, iii. 59: Dalhanemi. . . sattaratanasamanndgato.
188. According to Scripture, things (vastu) are either dravyasat or prajnaptisat, "really existant,"
or "existing as designation. "
189. The cause of arising of a thought of greed is the "possession" of this future thought of greed. 190. The pure dharmas, duhkhe dharmajndnaksdnti, etc.
191. The undefiled and defiled dharmas of Kamadhatu respectively.
192. These definitions answer the questions of the Vaibhasikas: "Is the seed a thing (dravya) different from the mind, or not different from the mind? ," "Is this series a permanent (anasthita) thing within which different dharmas successively arise? ," "Should parindma be included as is the parindma of the Samkhyas? "
See ii. 54c-d The doctrine of the evolution of the series is presented again iv. 3c
193. Tibetan and Paramartha. Hsiian-tsang: "The two paths (the doctrine of the Sautrantikas and the doctrine of the Vaibhasikas) are good. How is this? The first is not in contradiction with reason; and the second is our system. "
Pancaskandha: prdptih katamdP pratilambhah samanvdgamah / . . . bijam vasitvam sammukhibhdvo yathdyogam. (According to the Tibetan).
194. The prdpti of past dharmas is (1) either past, that is: "which has arisen and which has perished:" it was either earlier (agraja), or later (pascdtkdlaja), or simultaneous (sahaja) to these dharmas; (2) or it is future, that is: "that which has not arisen:" it will be later than these dharmas; (3) or present, that is: "that which has arisen and which has not perished:" it is later than these dharmas. And thus following.
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No dharma is susceptible of this threefold prapti. For example, the prapti of the dharmas "of retribution" is solely simultaneous to these dharmas (ii. 38c). One does not "possess" these dharmas before they have arisen, nor after they have perished.
195. The impure dharmas belong to the planes of existence, dhdtvdpta, dhdtupatita. 196. These are the apariydpannas of the Abhidhamma.
197. Pratisamkhydnirodha or "disjunction of defilement" (visamyoga, i. 6a-b, ii. 57d) can be obtained by a Prthagjana or by an Aryan. In the first case, the prapti is of Rupadhatu or Arupyadhatu depending on whether the nirodha is obtained by a (worldly) path of Rupadhatu or Arupyadhatu. In the second case, it is of Rupadhatu and pure, when the nirodha is obtained by a Rupadhatu (or worldly) path; of Arupyadhatu and pure, when the nirodha is obtained by a path of Arupyadhatu; and pure, when the nirodha is obtained by the pure Path (according to the principle formulated vi. 46).
198. The Saiksa dharmas are the pure dharmas of the Saiksa, of the saint who is not an Arhat; the dharmas of an Asaiksa are the pure dharmas of the Arhat.
199. Paramartha: "The same way as the prapti, obtained by a non-Aryan, of apratisamkhyani- rodha and pratisamkhydnirodha^ Hsuan-tsang: ". . . the prapti of pratisamkhydnirodha obtained through a non-Aryan path. "
200. One case is not envisioned: the prapti of pratisamkhydnirodha, by means of a worldly path, by an Aryan. This prapti is at one an the same time pure and impure, as we shall see vi. 46.
201. Durbalatvdt: anabhisamskaravattvdt, because it is not the result of an effort.
202. Vydkhyd: The Vaibhasikas. For example, Visvakarman, the heavenly artisan, possessess past,
present, and future saUpasthdnikas; the Sthavira Asvajit possesses the airydpathikas.
203. The non-possession of the defilements is not defiled, for, in this hypothesis, it would be lacking in a person liberated from the defilements: but it is not good, for it is lacking in the person who has cut off the roots of good {Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 799a21).
204. If an aprdpti can be pure, this would be the aprdpti of the pure dharmas', now the definition of a Prthagjana proves that the aprdpti of the pure dharmas is not pure.
On the prthagjana, see i. 40,41a, ii. 9b-d, iii. 41c-d, 95a, vi. 26a, 28d, 45b. 205. Second masters of the Vibhdsd.
206. Compare Kathdvatthu, iv. 4.
207. Aprdpti or aldbha belongs to the sphere of existence {dhdtu) to which the person belongs who is endowed with it (ii. 40a). Thus a being in Kamadhatu is solely endowed with the quality of Prthagjana (which is aprdpti, ii. 40b-c) of the sphere of Kamadhatu. Thus one cannot say that, by the acquisition of the Path, this being loses the quality of Prthagjana of the sphere of the three realms of existence. Nevertheless, by the acquisition of the Path, any quality of Prthagjana, of whatever sphere, becomes impossible. One can thus say that this quality, under its triple form (of Kamadhatu, etc. ), is abandoned, even though a given being is endowed with it under but one form.
Two aspects of its abandoning are distinguished, vihdni and prahdna.
208. A Prthagjana, detaching himself from Kamadhatu, passes into the First Dhyana: he loses the quality of Prthagjana of the sphere of Kamadhatu, but he does not become, by this fact, an Aryan: for another quality of Prthagjana, of the sphere of the First Dhyana, appears. The same way for the other stages, whether one ascends or descends.
? 209. By taking possession of the good dharmas of hearing and reflection of Kamadhatu, one loses the aprdpti of these dharmas; by taking possession of the innate good dharmas (ii. 71b), one loses the aprdpti of the roots of good which have been cut off (samucchinnakufala). When, dying in Kamadhatu, one is reborn in the First Dhyana, one loses the aprdpti of the dharmas of the First Dhyana. . . This theory raises some delicate problems which the Vydkhyd summarily examines.
210. Compare ii. 45c-d: the play of birth (Jdti) and the arising of birth (jdtijdti).
211. The case of the neutral (avydkrta) dharma is not examined here, because this dharma is
possessed solely at the moment when it exists (tasya sahajaiva prdptih): the numbers differ.
212. The Japanese editor observes that one should add four laksanas and four antdaksanas (ii. 45c-d) for each of these three dharmas; we thus have twenty-seven dharmas of the first moment.
213. At the fourth moment one possesses twenty-seven prdptis, namely the prdptis of the dharmas produced at the three preceeding moments, three, six, and eighteen, plus twenty-seven anuprdptis, or forty-four dharmas. At the fifth moment, eighty-one prdptis and as many anuprdptis.
214. Prakarana, TD 26, p. 694a23:"What is nikdyasabhdga? The commoness of nature (t'ung-lei hsing) of living beings. "
215. Each living being possesses his own sattvasabhdgata. Nevertheless sattvasabhdgatd is said to be general because it is not differenciated. To conceive of it as unique and eternal is an error of the Vaibhasikas.
216. By et cetera one should understand: updsikd, bhiksunt, the naivafaiksandsaiksa, etc. 217. "It is by reason of their dharmasabhdgata that the dhdtus are of Kamadhatu . . . "
218. Compare Anguttara> iv. 247, etc. The Dasabhumaka replaces the formula sa ced. . . with atha cet ptmar manusyesupapadyate.
Divya, 194. 30: manusydndm sabhdgatdyam upapanna iti (Mahdvyutpatti, 245. 54); 122. 16: brahmalokasabhdgatdydm copapanno mahdbrahamd sarhvrttah. Siksdsamucacaya, 176. 9: sarva nikdyasabhdge devamanusydndm priyo bhavati.
219. Hsuan-tsang translates: "This is not admissible, for it is in contradiction with our system;" he omits the formula "The Vaibhasikas say" (The Vaibhasikas say: "This is not admissible . . . "
220. Prakarana, TD 26, p. 694al9. Dtgha, iii. 263: sant'dvuso sattd asannino appatisamvedino seyyathdpi devd asannasattd. i. 28, hi. 3 3 . . . sannuppddd ca pana te devd tamhd kdyd cavanti. One of the nine sattvdvdsas, Anguttara, iv. 401; Kos*ay iii. 6c.
221. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 6l5a5, five opinions.
222. But the foreigners pretend that there are nine divisions in the heaven of the Fourth Dhyana.
On the Vrhatphalas (Vehapphalas), see Burnouf, Introduction, p. 614. 223. Opinion of the Andhakas, condemned in the Kathdvatthu, iii. 14.
142. The author does not admit this opinion. Torpor (stydna, laya) and dissipation, which are defiled dharmas, are opposed to the "white" dharmas, like samddhi.
143. According to the Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 220b4, there are five aku/alamahdbhumikas: avidyd, stydna, auddhatya, ahri, and anapatrapya. See iii. 32a-b and above note 102.
144. Hsuan-tsang translates: " . . . the dharmas of this nature (=iti) are termed parittakleU- bhumikas. "
Samghabhadra: The text says "the dharmas of this nature," in order to include aksdnti, arati dghdta, etc. (TD 29, p. 392a6).
145. Dharmatrata: Because they are abandoned through Meditation and not through the Seeing of the Truths, because they are associated with the mental consciousness and not with the five other consciousnesses, and because they do not arise with all minds and exist separately, they are parittakle/abhumika.
146. According to the Chinese. The Japanese editor explains the final et cetera by rdga (v. 2), pratigha, mdna (v. 10), and vicikitsa.
The Vydkhya reads: "kaukrtya, middha, etc. " and explains "etc. " by arati, vijrmbhitd, tendri, bhakte'samatd, etc. It continues: The kief as, rdga, etc. , are also indeterminate, for they are not classified in any of the five categories: they are not mahdbhumikas, because they are not found in any minds; they are not kus'aJamahdbhumikas, because they are repugnant to the good; they are not klesamahdbhumikas, because they are not found in any defiled mind: for there is no rdga or lust in a mind full of hatred (sapratigha).
The Acarya Vasumitra has written a summary, mnemonic Hoka\ "The tradition (smrta) is that there are eight aniyatas, namely vitarka, vicdra, kaukrtya, middha, pratigha, sakti (-rdga), mdna, and vicikitsa'. But we do not admit this number of eight. Why are the drspis (v. 3a) not aniyata? There is no mithyddrsti in a mind full of hatred or scepticism.
147. Compare Kathdvatthu, xiv. 8.
148. Dhammasangani, 1161, Atthasdlim, 784-787. 149. Compare i. 37.
150. Avenika = rdgddiprthagbhuta.
151. All drsti is samttrikdprajnd (i. 4lc-d, vii. l).
152. The mind of the First Dhyana, when it is good, contains twenty-two mental states; defiled- neutral, it contains eighteen mental states whether it is independent of, or associated with drsti, nineteen when it is associated with rdga, mdna or vicikitsa . . .
? 153. Literally: The word "also" (apt) shows that in addition to vicara, one should exclude sdthya and maya.
154. According to the Japanese editor, the Saddharmasmrti upasthdna sutra, TD 17, p. 193bl6. Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 670b24.
155. By adding: "I am the great Brahma", he distinguishes himself from the other Brahmas. 156. Compare Digha, i. 219, and below iv. 8a, v. 53a-b.
157. Jndnaprasthdna, i. Para. 5 (according to Takakusu, p. 87). See TD 26, p. 924c26 and following.
158. Pratisa = guru, because fisyam pratistah.
159. Compare the definition of adhisila:. . . anumdtresv apy avadyesu bhayadarsi. . .
160. These masters observes that the two roots hri and trap (Dhdtupdta, iii. 3 and i. 399) are synonyms and signify shame (lajjd): from whence one cannot see how ahri would be disrespect and atrapd the absence of fear in the commission of transgressions.
161. Vasubandhu, in the Pancaskandhaka, adopts this definition.
162. Jndnaprasthdna, I Para. 4 (according to Takakusu, p. 87). See TD 26, p. 923a13 and
following.
163. Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 151al5.
164. For one cannot have respect for impure (sdsrava) dharmas. (Note of the Japanese editor).
165. This definition comes from a Sutra which is not designated in our sources. See i. 33.
166. Seventh opinion of the Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 219b3.
167. Argument presented in the Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 269bl0, and attributed to the Darstantikas.
168. That is, "it makes the voice surge forth," vdksamutthdpaka.
169. Compare Majjhima i. 301, Samyutta ov. 293: pubbe kho . . . vitakketvd vicdretvd pacchd vdcarh bhindati. On the other hand, Vibhanga, 135: vdcisamcetand = vdcisamkhdro.
170. Samghabhadra says that vitarka and vicara are associated with each thought; but these two dharmas do not enter into aaivity, do not reveal themselves by their action (udbhutavrtti) at one and the same time: the mind and mental states are grosser when vitarka, which is always present, enters into activity . . . In the same way rdga and moha are coexistent: but a person is termed rdgacarita, acting though rdga, when rdga manifests itself . . .
171. Vitarka and vicara do not exist simultaneously, but successively (parydyena). What is the difference between vitarka and vicara} The ancient masters (pUrvdcdrya) say: "What is vitarka} A mental conversation (manojalpa) of inquiry (paryesaka), which has for its support volition (cetand) or the speculative consciousness (prajfid) depending on whether it does or does not contain deduction (abhyilha). This is the grosser state of mind. What is vicara} A mental conversation of appreciation, of judgment (pratyaveksaka), which has for its support volition . . . " According to this theory, vitarka and vicara constitute almost two identical psychological complexes: they differ in that the first includes "inquiry" and the second "judgment. " Some give
an example: Someone feels numerous pots in order to know which one is well baked, and which one is soft: this inquiry (aha) is vitarka; finally, this person arrives at the conclusion, "There are such a number of each category:" this is vicara.
The Vydkhyd, ad i. 37, quotes Vasubandhu's Pancaskandhaka which is very close to the opinion
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of some ancient masters: vitarkah katamah /paryesako manojalpas cetandprajndvisesah / yd cittasyauddrikatd // vicdrah katamah / pratyaveksako manojalpas cetandprajndvisesah / yd cittasyasuksmata. //The Vydkhya adds:anabhyuhdvasthdydmcetand abhyuhdvasthdydm prajtieti vyavasthdpyate.
See Dhammasangani, 7-8, Compendium, p. 10-11, Mi/inda, 62-63. Atthasdlini, 296-297 definesvitarkaasiihanaandgivesitasolarika,whereasvicdraissukhuma. VyasaadYogasutra, i. 17: vitarka/ cittasydlambana sthilla dbhogah / suksmo vicdrah; i. 42-44.
172. Paryddiyate - samnirudhyate; see Siksasamuccaya, 177. 15, Divya, Sutrdlamkdra, 112. Sarhghabhadra's definition: yah svadharmesv eva raktasya darpas cetasah parydddnam
kufaldnyakrtydbhyupapattisamhdro madah.
173. Mada is sensation, "defiled satisfaction" {klisfa saumanasya). The Vaibhasikas do not admit this explanation: in fact, satisfaction does not exist beyond the Second DhySna: but, according to v. 53c, mada exists in the three spheres of existence.
174. Compare Dtgha, i. 21, Samyutta, ii. 94.
175. Its meaning is that it accumulates good and evil (Vydkhya). Tibetan: 'byed pas: because it
distinguishes. Atthasdlini, 293: dlambanam cintetiti cittam.
176. Dhdtupdtha, 4. 67.
177. The Vydkhya adds: bhdvandsamniveiayogena sautrdntikamatena yogacdramatena vd. Paramartha reads: citam subhdSubhair dhdtubhis tan vd cinotiti cittam. The Tibetan translates
in the same way: "because it is charged (bsags-pas) with good and evil dhdtus"
178. The consciousness (vijfidna) discerns a blue object, etc. ; sensation feels it as agreeable, etc. ; ideas grasp its characteristics, etc. Or rather: consciousness perceives the object, in a general manner, as a perceptible (upalabhyatdrupam grhndtt); the mental states perceive its specific characteristics {viiesampena)\ sensation is susceptible of being agreeably experienced (anu- bhavan*yatdrupam)\ ideas are susceptible of being defined (paricchedyatdrupam), etc (116a).
179. That is to say saha vistaraprabheddbhydm or aha vistaraprabhedena.
180. The iti indicates that one should add other viprayuktas like samghabheda (iv. 99), etc to this list. The Prakarana says: ye'py evamjatiyakah: "The dharmas which are of this type are also cittaviprayukta. " Same formula in the Skandhapancaka.
According to the Prakarana, the samskdras disassociated from the mind are: prdpti, asamjtlisamdpatti, nirodhasamdpatti, dsamjnika, jtvitendriya, nikdyasabhdga, dfrayaprdpti, dravya- prdpti (? ), dyatanaprdpti, jdti, jard, sthiti, anityatd ndmakdya, and vyanjanakaya and all the other dharmas of this type disassociated from the mind.
Prdpti is defined as dharmdndm praptih; dSrayaprdpti is airaydyatanaprapti; dravyaprdpti. (? ) is skandhdndm prdptih; dyatanaprdpti is ddhydtmikahdhydyatanaprdpti (TD 26, p. 694al9).
Prakaranapdda (p. 694al4): What is prdpti? Prdpti of the dharmas. What is asamjfiisamd- patti? The cessation of the mind and mental states haying for its antecedent the idea of departure attached to the abandoning of the defilement of the Subhakrtsanas but not to the abandoning of higher defilements. What is nirodhasamdpatti? The cessation of the mind and mental states having for its antecedent the idea of calm attached to the abandoning of the defilement of dkimcanydyatana. What is dsamjnika? The cessation of the mind and mental states of those who arebornamongtheAsamjnisattvagods. Whatisjtvitendriya? AyusoftheThreeDhatus.
Whatis nikdyasabhdga} The resemblance of beings.
181. See i. 38c-d, ii. 59b.
The terms labha and samanvdgama do not have the same meanings in the Abhidharma and
? in the Katbdvatthu, ix. 12. For the Theravadins, labha signifies "possession," for example the power that the Saints posses to realize at their will any given absorption; samanvdgama is understood as the actual realization. Elsewhere (iv. 4) patUdbhasamanndgama and samangi- bhdvasamanndgama, possessor of power {samanvdgama of the Abhidharma) versus its actual possession (sammukhibhdva of the Abhidharma) are distinguished See also xix. 4.
182. There is in me prdpti or aprdpti relative to my defilement, to my action . . . , that is to say, I possess or do not possess my future or past defilement. . . But there is no relation of possession or of non-possession between me and the defilement of another.
183. Hairs should be regarded as "belonging to a living being," for they are bound (sambaddha) to the material organs.
184. A person "bound with all the bonds" {sakalabandhana) is one who has not obtained, by the worldly (laukika) path, the abandoning (=pratisamkhydnirodha) of any of the nine categories of defilements of Kamadhatu. An Aryan, at the first moment(ddiksana = duhkhe dharma-
jnanaksdnti) has not yet obtained the abandoning of the defilements abandoned through the Path (vi. 77). A person who has obtained the abandoning of one category of defilement is called ekaprakdropalikhita (vi. 30a).
185. Dravyadharmah = dravyato dharmah, or rather dravyam ca tad dharmas' ca sa dravya- dharmah, that is to say vidyamdnasvalaksano dharmah See below p. 211-212.
186. These ten dharmas are the eight parts of the Path, plus samyagvimukti and samyagjndna (Anguttara, v. 222); the five abandoned items are not the group of satkdyadrsti, silavrata-
pardmar/a, vicikitsd, kamacchanda, and vyapada, for this group has been abandoned with the acquisition of the result of Anagamin; rather, it is a group relative to the higher spheres, rupardga, drupyardga, auddhatya, mdnay and avidyd.
187. Dtgha, iii. 59: Dalhanemi. . . sattaratanasamanndgato.
188. According to Scripture, things (vastu) are either dravyasat or prajnaptisat, "really existant,"
or "existing as designation. "
189. The cause of arising of a thought of greed is the "possession" of this future thought of greed. 190. The pure dharmas, duhkhe dharmajndnaksdnti, etc.
191. The undefiled and defiled dharmas of Kamadhatu respectively.
192. These definitions answer the questions of the Vaibhasikas: "Is the seed a thing (dravya) different from the mind, or not different from the mind? ," "Is this series a permanent (anasthita) thing within which different dharmas successively arise? ," "Should parindma be included as is the parindma of the Samkhyas? "
See ii. 54c-d The doctrine of the evolution of the series is presented again iv. 3c
193. Tibetan and Paramartha. Hsiian-tsang: "The two paths (the doctrine of the Sautrantikas and the doctrine of the Vaibhasikas) are good. How is this? The first is not in contradiction with reason; and the second is our system. "
Pancaskandha: prdptih katamdP pratilambhah samanvdgamah / . . . bijam vasitvam sammukhibhdvo yathdyogam. (According to the Tibetan).
194. The prdpti of past dharmas is (1) either past, that is: "which has arisen and which has perished:" it was either earlier (agraja), or later (pascdtkdlaja), or simultaneous (sahaja) to these dharmas; (2) or it is future, that is: "that which has not arisen:" it will be later than these dharmas; (3) or present, that is: "that which has arisen and which has not perished:" it is later than these dharmas. And thus following.
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No dharma is susceptible of this threefold prapti. For example, the prapti of the dharmas "of retribution" is solely simultaneous to these dharmas (ii. 38c). One does not "possess" these dharmas before they have arisen, nor after they have perished.
195. The impure dharmas belong to the planes of existence, dhdtvdpta, dhdtupatita. 196. These are the apariydpannas of the Abhidhamma.
197. Pratisamkhydnirodha or "disjunction of defilement" (visamyoga, i. 6a-b, ii. 57d) can be obtained by a Prthagjana or by an Aryan. In the first case, the prapti is of Rupadhatu or Arupyadhatu depending on whether the nirodha is obtained by a (worldly) path of Rupadhatu or Arupyadhatu. In the second case, it is of Rupadhatu and pure, when the nirodha is obtained by a Rupadhatu (or worldly) path; of Arupyadhatu and pure, when the nirodha is obtained by a path of Arupyadhatu; and pure, when the nirodha is obtained by the pure Path (according to the principle formulated vi. 46).
198. The Saiksa dharmas are the pure dharmas of the Saiksa, of the saint who is not an Arhat; the dharmas of an Asaiksa are the pure dharmas of the Arhat.
199. Paramartha: "The same way as the prapti, obtained by a non-Aryan, of apratisamkhyani- rodha and pratisamkhydnirodha^ Hsuan-tsang: ". . . the prapti of pratisamkhydnirodha obtained through a non-Aryan path. "
200. One case is not envisioned: the prapti of pratisamkhydnirodha, by means of a worldly path, by an Aryan. This prapti is at one an the same time pure and impure, as we shall see vi. 46.
201. Durbalatvdt: anabhisamskaravattvdt, because it is not the result of an effort.
202. Vydkhyd: The Vaibhasikas. For example, Visvakarman, the heavenly artisan, possessess past,
present, and future saUpasthdnikas; the Sthavira Asvajit possesses the airydpathikas.
203. The non-possession of the defilements is not defiled, for, in this hypothesis, it would be lacking in a person liberated from the defilements: but it is not good, for it is lacking in the person who has cut off the roots of good {Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 799a21).
204. If an aprdpti can be pure, this would be the aprdpti of the pure dharmas', now the definition of a Prthagjana proves that the aprdpti of the pure dharmas is not pure.
On the prthagjana, see i. 40,41a, ii. 9b-d, iii. 41c-d, 95a, vi. 26a, 28d, 45b. 205. Second masters of the Vibhdsd.
206. Compare Kathdvatthu, iv. 4.
207. Aprdpti or aldbha belongs to the sphere of existence {dhdtu) to which the person belongs who is endowed with it (ii. 40a). Thus a being in Kamadhatu is solely endowed with the quality of Prthagjana (which is aprdpti, ii. 40b-c) of the sphere of Kamadhatu. Thus one cannot say that, by the acquisition of the Path, this being loses the quality of Prthagjana of the sphere of the three realms of existence. Nevertheless, by the acquisition of the Path, any quality of Prthagjana, of whatever sphere, becomes impossible. One can thus say that this quality, under its triple form (of Kamadhatu, etc. ), is abandoned, even though a given being is endowed with it under but one form.
Two aspects of its abandoning are distinguished, vihdni and prahdna.
208. A Prthagjana, detaching himself from Kamadhatu, passes into the First Dhyana: he loses the quality of Prthagjana of the sphere of Kamadhatu, but he does not become, by this fact, an Aryan: for another quality of Prthagjana, of the sphere of the First Dhyana, appears. The same way for the other stages, whether one ascends or descends.
? 209. By taking possession of the good dharmas of hearing and reflection of Kamadhatu, one loses the aprdpti of these dharmas; by taking possession of the innate good dharmas (ii. 71b), one loses the aprdpti of the roots of good which have been cut off (samucchinnakufala). When, dying in Kamadhatu, one is reborn in the First Dhyana, one loses the aprdpti of the dharmas of the First Dhyana. . . This theory raises some delicate problems which the Vydkhyd summarily examines.
210. Compare ii. 45c-d: the play of birth (Jdti) and the arising of birth (jdtijdti).
211. The case of the neutral (avydkrta) dharma is not examined here, because this dharma is
possessed solely at the moment when it exists (tasya sahajaiva prdptih): the numbers differ.
212. The Japanese editor observes that one should add four laksanas and four antdaksanas (ii. 45c-d) for each of these three dharmas; we thus have twenty-seven dharmas of the first moment.
213. At the fourth moment one possesses twenty-seven prdptis, namely the prdptis of the dharmas produced at the three preceeding moments, three, six, and eighteen, plus twenty-seven anuprdptis, or forty-four dharmas. At the fifth moment, eighty-one prdptis and as many anuprdptis.
214. Prakarana, TD 26, p. 694a23:"What is nikdyasabhdga? The commoness of nature (t'ung-lei hsing) of living beings. "
215. Each living being possesses his own sattvasabhdgata. Nevertheless sattvasabhdgatd is said to be general because it is not differenciated. To conceive of it as unique and eternal is an error of the Vaibhasikas.
216. By et cetera one should understand: updsikd, bhiksunt, the naivafaiksandsaiksa, etc. 217. "It is by reason of their dharmasabhdgata that the dhdtus are of Kamadhatu . . . "
218. Compare Anguttara> iv. 247, etc. The Dasabhumaka replaces the formula sa ced. . . with atha cet ptmar manusyesupapadyate.
Divya, 194. 30: manusydndm sabhdgatdyam upapanna iti (Mahdvyutpatti, 245. 54); 122. 16: brahmalokasabhdgatdydm copapanno mahdbrahamd sarhvrttah. Siksdsamucacaya, 176. 9: sarva nikdyasabhdge devamanusydndm priyo bhavati.
219. Hsuan-tsang translates: "This is not admissible, for it is in contradiction with our system;" he omits the formula "The Vaibhasikas say" (The Vaibhasikas say: "This is not admissible . . . "
220. Prakarana, TD 26, p. 694al9. Dtgha, iii. 263: sant'dvuso sattd asannino appatisamvedino seyyathdpi devd asannasattd. i. 28, hi. 3 3 . . . sannuppddd ca pana te devd tamhd kdyd cavanti. One of the nine sattvdvdsas, Anguttara, iv. 401; Kos*ay iii. 6c.
221. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 6l5a5, five opinions.
222. But the foreigners pretend that there are nine divisions in the heaven of the Fourth Dhyana.
On the Vrhatphalas (Vehapphalas), see Burnouf, Introduction, p. 614. 223. Opinion of the Andhakas, condemned in the Kathdvatthu, iii. 14.
