-- Answer ab: If future things are
directly
perceived by way of their own entity in the period before their production, why are non-existent things not seen?
Aryadeva - Four Hundred Verses
So nothing could be used as an objective absolute time comparator.
-- Time, duration, is not directly perceptible; so it is not a true functional thing.
-- Time and duration: not two separate thing, nor either one. One cannot be used to prove the other.
-- Impermanence and things: not separate, not one. In both case there would be no duration possible. So they cannot be used to prove duration, or time.
-- The unclear opposition of two characteristics of things: impermanence and duration
-- Past, present and future: they are not the same, they are not different / separate real existent entities, they are dependent on each other, they are fabrications of the mind because the mind does not understand how continuity really works
-- Not knowing how to posit continuity and transitoriness, They say time is permanent and the three times exist substantially.
.
-- see also
-- Chapter 9 verses: 107- About Refuting permanent time
-- even time, like seasons, is dependent, an effect, thus not an absolute permanent cause
-- because there is no cause without having causes and conditions itself
-- the cause itself change from being non active, to being active, depending on other conditions, thus it is not permanent -- If a permanent cause cannot be the real cause, then there would be no cause at all.
-- how can permanence cause impermanence? )
.
L3: [I. Refuting that time is substantially established by nature] L4: [A. Refuting the past and the future]
L5: [1. Refuting a substantially established future]
L6: [a. Showing the fallacies if the future is truly existent]
.
\ ###
\ 251.
\ The present pot and the past one
\ Do not exist in the future pot.
\ Since both would be future,
\ The future would not exist.
.
(i. e. Past, present and future cannot exist simultaneously - like cause and effect cannot exist simultaneously: Some think time is a primary cause, without being an effect - like with the seasons. Permanent time would mean that the past and present would still exist in the future - or that the future exist in the present. But, the causes, past and present, are not the same as the effect, future, otherwise there would be no need for production of the future. They are not different or consecutive either, otherwise there would be no continuity or causality. )
.
(-- Assertion by Vaidantikas and other proponents of permanent time: Though it is correct to admit a permanent self
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does not exist since it is not established by either direct or inferential cognition, permanent functional things are not non-existent since there is permanent time. Though water, manure, seeds and so forth are present, one observes that sprout, flowers and the like are not produced at certain times but are produced at others. From this one can infer the presence of another cause which is time. Though it is a permanent entity different from the functional things which exist in the three times, it is revealed in terms of instants, moments, brief spans, and so forth.
-- Answer: This is unacceptable, for if time were an entity different from functional things it should be perceived but it is not perceived. That has already been refuted. In this context the refutation is made taking a future pot to represent future time. The same should be understood with respect to the other two times.
-- It follows that the present pot does not exist in the future pot, nor does the past pot exist at that time, for if they both existed at that time, time would be disrupted, since things which are to occur later would already exist at an earlier time. Also at any one time another cannot exist. For these reasons, since both the past and present would be future if they existed at the time of the future pot, they do not already exist at that time. If the future of the future existed by way of its own entity, it should be future. In that case since all three times would have to be future, there could not be any past or present. If that were so, the future itself would not exist, since it could not be posited as future in relation to anything. )
.
L6: [b. Refuting the rejoinder]
.
\ ###
\ 252.
\ If a disintegrated thing exists as
\ A future entity in the future,
\ How can what is future in nature
\ Become that which is past?
.
(i. e. No permanent future: The future becomes the present and then the past. So there is no permanent future, no inherently existing future. )
.
(-- Assertion: The past pot is not altogether non-existent in the future pot. Since there is a part of it which has not yet come into existence as an entity that has occurred, there is no error.
-- Answer: If at the time of the future pot, the disintegrated pot existed in the future as an entity which had not yet come into existence, it would follow that the pot was future because of being, by way of its own entity, that which had not yet occurred at the time of the future pot. If this is accepted, it follows that there would be no past. This would necessarily be so, for how could anything that truly existed as future in nature become past? It is contradictory. Moreover by virtue of this reasoning, if the future relation to the pot is asserted as truly existent it must be accepted as being only future, which undermines the contention. )
.
L6: [c. Consequence that it is present if substantially established]
.
\ ###
\ 253.
\ Because of being future in nature
\ A future functional thing
\ Is thus present
\ And cannot be future.
.
(i. e. A truly existing future would not be the future: If the future is truly existing, it exist now, and is not the future. So there is no truly existent future. )
.
(If, according to proponents of permanent time, future things exist, it follows that the future pot is present because of already being in the nature of a future substantially existent thing. If something exists as a substantially established entity, it must be present since it has been produced and has not disintegrated. If this is accepted, it follows that it cannot be future. )
.
L6: [d. Consequence that impermanence is impossible if all three times are substantially existent]
.
\ ###
\ 254.
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.
\ ###
\ 257.
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\ If the future, past and present exist,
\ What does not exist?
\ How can there be impermanence
\ For one for whom all times exist?
.
(i. e. Truly existing past, present and future would mean nothing is impermanent: If the past continue to exist, the future already exist, as the present, then nothing originate or disintegrate, nothing is impermanent. Thus the tree times cannot truly exist, be permanent. )
.
(-- If it were truly existent, things could undergo no change and there would be nothing impermanent.
-- If, as asserted by Vaisesikas, Vaibhasikas and so forth, things existent by way of their own character exist in the future, exist in the past and exist in the present, what part of a thing could ever not exist? How could there be impermanence for a proponent of substantially existent time? It follows that there cannot be any impermanent things, for if all three times are substantially existent, whatever exist at an earlier time must be accepted as existing later and whatever exists at a later time must be accepted as existing earlier. )
.
L5: [2. Refuting a substantially established past]
.
\ ###
\ 255.
\ If it has passed beyond the past
\ Why is it the past?
\ If it has not passed beyond the past
\ Why is it the past?
.
(i. e. A truly existing past would not be the past: If the past exist, it exist now, and is not the past. Thus the past is not a real existing functional independent thing. )
.
(-- The future is not substantially existent since future time cannot exist in the future. Similarly has the past passed beyond its own nature as the past or not?
-- In the first case, why is it the past? It follows that it is not the past because of having passed beyond and gone from the past [just as curd which is no longer milk cannot be called milk and a youth who has left childhood behind cannot be called a child. ] In the second case, for what reason is it the past? It follows that it is not the past for it has not passed beyond being a past substantial entity but continues to exist as a substantial entity performing a function. )
.
L5: [3. Detailed refutation of the future]
L6: [a. Refuting the assertion of Vaibhasikas and so forth]
L7: [(1) Refutation by examining whether the future is produced or unproduced] L8: [(a) Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 256.
\ If the future is produced
\ Why is it not present?
\ If it is unproduced
\ Is the future permanent or what?
.
(i. e. The future cannot be truly existing, permanent, because we cannot see it. )
.
(-- Regarding Vaibhasikas and so forth who assert that there is a common locus of a pot and the future:
-- If a produced future pot exists, why is it not present? It follows that it should be, because it has been produced and has not ceased. If it is not produced, is the future pot permanent or what? It follows that it should be permanent because of being an unproduced thing. )
.
L8: [(b) Refuting the rejoinder]
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\ If the future is impermanent because
\ Though not produced it disintegrates,
\ Since the past does not disintegrate
\ Why not consider it permanent?
.
(i. e. If one assume future is impermanent because it becomes present, then past would be permanent because it doesn't become present or future? See next verse . . . )
.
( -- Assertion: Although the future is unproduced, causes and conditions make it become the present, thus it is not permanent.
-- Answer: If even the future is not produced, the future pot is impermanent because it subsequently disintegrates [in that it undergoes change], why not consider that past pot permanent since it does not disintegrate? It follows that it is permanent because of being a thing which does not disintegrate. )
.
L7: [(2) Consequence that impermanence is impossible if the two times are substantially established]
.
\ ###
\ 258.
\ If the past and present
\ Are not impermanent,
\ The third which is different
\ From these is also not.
.
(i. e. But, if the past, and present, are permanent, so is the future. Thus nothing would be impermanent, and there would be no need for time; which is absurd. )
.
( -- Alternatively, what is impermanent according to you?
-- The past and present are not impermanent because the past cannot disintegrate, If the present is impermanent by way of its own entity, through its subsequent connection with disintegration it follows that disintegration, too, is impermanent [or that the present is permanent because of its connection with disintegration which is permanent. ] Since the third which is different from both the past and present, namely the future, also is not impermanent, there is nothing impermanent for proponents of inherently existing things. Thus it is inappropriate for them to assert the existence of time. )
.
L7: [(3) Showing that the existence of future functional things is absurd]
.
\ ###
\ 259.
\ If a thing which will be produced
\ later exists beforehand,
\ The contention of Niyativadins
\ Is not erroneous.
.
(i. e. If the future is inherently existing, nothing is produced through causality. But that is not what we observe. )
.
( -- Assertion: Future things exist because they are produced later when the conditions obtain. That which is previously non-existent, like a barren woman's child, will not be produced later.
-- Answer: If a thing to be produced later is substantially existent prior to its production, the contention that things are inherently established as causeless held by Niyativadins and those asserting that things are not created by peoples' activity and are without cause is not erroneous. Yet their assertion are wrong for they contradict everything that is both seen and unseen. )
.
L7: [(4) Consequence that things already produced are produced again]
.
\ ###
\ 260.
\ To say something which will be made to occur
\ Already exists is unreasonable.
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\ If that which exists is produced,
\ What has been produced will arise again.
.
(i. e. If the future exist, now, then is there another production? )
.
( -- Moreover even if the future were substantially existent, it would be unreasonable to say that a thing which will be made to occur later is substantially existent prior to its production. If that which already exist is produced later, what has already been produced will come into existence again, which is purposeless. As a consequence the effect would find no opportunity for production, since the cause must reproduce itself until the end. )
.
L7: [(5) Refuting that Yogic perception of wished for objects directly perceives future things] L8: [(a) Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 261.
\ If future things are seen,
\ Why is the non-existent not seen?
\ For one for whom the future exists
\ There can be no distant [time].
.
(i. e. The Middle-Way about the nature of the three times: not existent, not non-existent, not both, not neither. It is false to pretend that one can see the future as if really existing now. But still this doesn't mean that the future is completely non-existent either. A Buddha can directly see their real non-dual nature: the beginningless chain of causes, and the endless chain of effects. A flow of interdependence without any inherently existing entities in it. )
.
( -- Assertion: The future exist because there is Yogic perception of wished-for objects which focuses on future things, and because predictions concerning the future are later seen to turn out just as predicted. This is impossible in relation to a barren woman's child.
-- Answer ab: If future things are directly perceived by way of their own entity in the period before their production, why are non-existent things not seen? It follows that they would be seen, for it is not feasible to make distinctions between what is seen and not seen with regard to the non-existent. Such fallacies arise for those who assert that the past and future exist by way of their own entity, but no fallacies accrue to us who assert the three times as arising dependently without inherent existence.
Buddhas directly perceive in the present even those things which will occur after ten millions aeons. Though they are future at the time of the consciousness perceiving them, they are neither non-functional nor permanent for they will not remain for a second moment after their formation. There is no need for a Buddha to cognize the present explicitly and the past and future implicitly, for though the latter do not exist at that time, they are in general directly perceived. Similarly it is not contradictory for objects of aspiration, though they do not exist at that time, to appear clearly to Yogic perception of that which is wished for, just as a dream appears to be real.
Even though the barley seed exists, the sprout which has not yet come into existence may be called future but the sprout itself must not be called future. An understanding of the other two times should be inferred from this. In our own
system we accept that Buddhas perceive all three times directly and not at all assert to trainees that they merely appear to do so.
-- cd: Moreover there cannot be a distant time for a protagonist for whom the future exists by way of its own entity because the future exists in terms of its own entity. )
.
L8: [(b) Consequence that fresh restraint from non-virtue and so forth are unnecessary if the future is substantially existent]
.
\ ###
\ 262.
\ If virtue exists though nothing is done,
\ Resolute restraint is meaningless.
\ If even a little is done
\ The effect cannot exist.
.
(i. e. If the future already exist. There is no need to work on it, no need for a path. ) .
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( -- If, because the future is substantially existent, virtue exists without actions such as safeguarding one's ethical conduct once one's faculties have become mature through meeting a spiritual friend and listening to teaching, resolute restraint from unethical conduct and so forth for the sake of future results [such as a high rebirth] is meaningless, for virtue will exist even if that has not been done. If even the slightest thing is done to enhance one's capability, future effects cannot be substantially existent. It is impossible! )
.
L8: [(c) If impermanent it is contradictory for something to exist prior to its production]
.
\ ###
\ 263.
\ If they are impermanent
\ How can it be said effects exist?
\ That which has a beginning and end
\ is called impermanent in the world.
.
(i. e. Future is not existent: To say that something exist inherently and is impermanent is a contradiction. All future (effects) are empty of inherent existence. The future is not something existing, nor non-existing. )
.
( -- In accordance with the assertion that all composite things are impermanent, all functional things are impermanent. -- How can it be said that an effect exist prior to its production? It is unreasonable since impermanence and existence prior to production are contradictor. Anything which has a beginning, in that it is newly produced, and an end, in that it does not last for a second moment after the time of its formation, is called impermanent in the world. )
.
L6: [b. Refuting the assertions of Sautrantikas and so forth]
.
\ ###
\ 264.
\ Liberation will occur without exertion.
\ For the liberated there is no future,
\ Or otherwise, if this were so,
\ Desire would arise without attachment.
.
(i. e. Future is not non-existent: At the other extreme: future is not non-existent at all; otherwise there would be no causality at all, no bounding, and no possibility for liberation. -- Liberation is not an effect, a future; it is not produced through our own effort, or following an absolute path. Liberation is beyond causality space and time. But, still, without a path combining the accumulation of merit and wisdom we will probably remain in samsara for an eternity. The Middle-Way not accepting a path as absolute, not rejecting all virtuous paths as if useless. We need both method and wisdom together all the time. )
.
( -- According to Sautrantikas and so forth who assert that future functional things do not have the slightest existence, liberation will occur without any exertion to generate the paths of the Exalted in order to prevent future disturbing emotions and suffering, because future things do not exist. This would be like liberated Foe Destroyers for whom there are no future disturbing emotions and so forth and who thus do not need to exert themselves because of them. If the future were non-existent and desire were to arise without there being a person, consciousness and so forth or predispositions for attachment as a basis, it follows that desire would arise in a Foe Destroyer too.
-- The words "or otherwise" imply "or otherwise the future is not non-existent. ")
.
L4: [B. Refutation by examining whether the effect exists or not]
.
\ ###
\ 265.
\ For those who assert effects exist,
\ And for those who assert they do not exist,
\ Adornments like pillars and so forth
\ For a home are purposeless.
.
(i. e. The Middle Way about future, avoiding both extremes: accepting future or effect as if inherently existing (realism), rejecting future as if completely not-existing (nihilism). In both case morality would be useless. )
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.
(-- Samkhyas say that since what is non-existent cannot be produced, and since the effect is present in the cause in a potential form, the fallacy that anything arises from anything does not occur.
-- Some Vaibhasikas assert that the three times are substantially existent and that effects exist prior to their production. -- Sautrantikas and so forth assert that although things are truly existent, future effects are non-existent.
It follows that for all of these, adornments such as pillars for a resultant home are purposeless, since according to some it exist from the outset, while according to others the future home is non-existent, like a barren woman's child. For proponents of dependent arising free from inherent existence, there is no possibility of error and thus everything is properly established.
In meditative equipoise the Exalted who are still learning do not perceive dependently arising phenomena as existent. Failure to distinguish between this non-perception and the perception of phenomena as non-existent, as well as inability to posit conventional valid cognition in one's own system, seem to give rise to numerous errors. One must therefore master the meaning of the establishment of the two truths by valid cognition in our own system. )
.
L4: [C. Refuting a truly existent present]
.
\ ###
\ 266.
\ The transformation of things also
\ Is not perceived even by the mind.
\ Those who lack wisdom nevertheless
\ Think that the present exists.
.
(i. e. Emptiness of present: It is contradictory to think that things exist and change. Actual change, production, origination or cessation, . . . are not seen. So there is no clear present. )
.
( -- Assertion: Although existence of the past and future are being refuted, the present exists. Since it does, the future exist too, for the principal, giving up its state of futurity, assumes the state of present curd. Thus the present exists.
-- Answer: It is not feasible for the principal, which is matter and permanent by nature, also to undergo temporary changes into things like milk and curd. Such transformations are not perceived even by mental consciousness that engages with extremely subtle objects, let alone observed by the five kinds of sense consciousness. Although transformation with respect to the present and its causes is not observed, those who lack wisdom and are ignorant about the meaning of suchness consider the present truly existent. )
.
L3: [II. Refuting the proof [of substantially established time]]
L4: [A. Refuting existence of substantially established functional things as a basis for time] L5: [1. Refutation by examining whether or not things have duration]
L6: [a. Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 267.
\ How can there be things with no duration?
\ Being impermanent, how can they endure?
\ If they had duration first,
\ They would not grow old in the end.
.
(i. e. No objective absolute basis for time: Time is usually measured by the duration of something; but there is no real origination, duration, or cessation. Nothing functional is truly existing as shown in another chapter. )
.
( -- Assertion: Time exists because functional things which acts as the basis for imputing time exist. Since time may be investigated by considering functional things but not on its own, time is truly existent.
-- Answer: How can functional things, the basis for time, be truly existent? It follows that they are not because of not having inherent duration. How could they have inherent duration, since they are continually consumed by impermanence? Moreover, if they had inherent duration at the start, they would not grow old in the end, because that which is inherently existent cannot cease. )
.
L6: [b. Proving that duration is not inherently existent]
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.
\ ###
\ 268.
\ Just as a single consciousness
\ Cannot apprehend two objects,
\ Similarly two consciousnesses
\ Cannot apprehend one object.
.
(i. e. Duration is not directly perceptible; so it is no objective absolute basis to measure time. )
.
( -- Furthermore there is no inherent duration, for just as a single moment of consciousness does not apprehend two consecutive objects actually presenting their own likeness, two consecutive moments of consciousness do not apprehend a single object simultaneously, for they undergo momentary production and disintegration.
-- Objection: Well, that contradicts the assertion in the sutras of knowledge that five objects such as visual form are each apprehended by two kinds of consciousness.
-- Answer: If one does not accept momentary disintegration, one is not a Buddhist. If one does, the object of observation of a visual consciousness cannot act as object of observation for a subsequently arising consciousness. The sutra passage means that the visual consciousness cognizes the form clearly and the mental consciousness which is produced subsequently cognizes it in an unclear way. )
.
L5: [2. Refutation by examining whether or not time has duration]
.
\ ###
\ 269.
\ If time has duration
\ Duration is not time.
\ If it has not, without duration
\ There will also be no end.
.
(i. e. Duration cannot be used to define or prove the existence of an absolute time - or vice versa: Like the characteristics and the characterized, time and duration are not two separate things, nor the same. One cannot be used to prove the other. They are interdependent, two co-dependently arisen concepts. )
.
(-- Assertion: Duration has inherent existence because of being the characteristic of present time.
-- Answer: If time and duration are different and have an inherently established relationship, they must act as basis and that which is based upon it.
-- If duration relies on time as something separate, duration is not time because they are mutually exclusive. If time does not have duration, then without duration there cannot finally be disintegration. Therefore since time does not have inherent duration, the latter is unsuitable as the present's characteristic. )
.
L5: [3. Refutation by examining whether things and impermanence are one or different]
.
\ ###
\ 270.
\ If impermanence and things are separate
\ Things are not impermanent.
\ If they are one, since things are precisely that which is
\ Impermanent, how can they have duration?
.
(i. e. Impermanence cannot be used to prove the existence (duration) of something. Like the characteristics and the characterized, impermanence and something (a duration) are not separate, not the same. In both case there would be no duration possible. One cannot be used to prove the other. They are interdependent, two co-dependently arisen concepts. It is contradictory to say that something exist and is impermanent. )
.
( -- Assertion: Duration exists because there are impermanent things that have duration.
-- Answer: If impermanence and functional things are separate in nature, it follows that things are not impermanent. If this is accepted, they must be permanent. If things and impermanence are one, since precisely that which is impermanent is a functional thing, how can they have inherent duration? Duration is impossible. )
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Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
L5: [4. Refutation by examining which is stronger, duration or impermanence]
L6: [a. Consequence that subsequent reversal is unfeasible if impermanence is weaker]
.
\ ###
\ 271.
\ If duration is not weak
\ Because impermanence is weak,
\ Why should a reversal
\ Afterwards be seen?
.
(i. e. Refutation of another position: some think duration and impermanence are two alternate characteristics of everything. But that doesn't explain anything. What makes the switch from duration to impermanence if duration is stronger? )
.
( -- Assertion: While things continue to exist, duration is stronger and impermanence weaker, but it is not impossible for the weak to overcome the strong.
-- Answer: How can such a reversal be seen when things later finally become impermanent? It follows that it is unfeasible. If duration is not weaker because impermanence is weaker while things continue to exist, nothing can harm what has inherent strength. )
.
L6: [b.
-- Time, duration, is not directly perceptible; so it is not a true functional thing.
-- Time and duration: not two separate thing, nor either one. One cannot be used to prove the other.
-- Impermanence and things: not separate, not one. In both case there would be no duration possible. So they cannot be used to prove duration, or time.
-- The unclear opposition of two characteristics of things: impermanence and duration
-- Past, present and future: they are not the same, they are not different / separate real existent entities, they are dependent on each other, they are fabrications of the mind because the mind does not understand how continuity really works
-- Not knowing how to posit continuity and transitoriness, They say time is permanent and the three times exist substantially.
.
-- see also
-- Chapter 9 verses: 107- About Refuting permanent time
-- even time, like seasons, is dependent, an effect, thus not an absolute permanent cause
-- because there is no cause without having causes and conditions itself
-- the cause itself change from being non active, to being active, depending on other conditions, thus it is not permanent -- If a permanent cause cannot be the real cause, then there would be no cause at all.
-- how can permanence cause impermanence? )
.
L3: [I. Refuting that time is substantially established by nature] L4: [A. Refuting the past and the future]
L5: [1. Refuting a substantially established future]
L6: [a. Showing the fallacies if the future is truly existent]
.
\ ###
\ 251.
\ The present pot and the past one
\ Do not exist in the future pot.
\ Since both would be future,
\ The future would not exist.
.
(i. e. Past, present and future cannot exist simultaneously - like cause and effect cannot exist simultaneously: Some think time is a primary cause, without being an effect - like with the seasons. Permanent time would mean that the past and present would still exist in the future - or that the future exist in the present. But, the causes, past and present, are not the same as the effect, future, otherwise there would be no need for production of the future. They are not different or consecutive either, otherwise there would be no continuity or causality. )
.
(-- Assertion by Vaidantikas and other proponents of permanent time: Though it is correct to admit a permanent self
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does not exist since it is not established by either direct or inferential cognition, permanent functional things are not non-existent since there is permanent time. Though water, manure, seeds and so forth are present, one observes that sprout, flowers and the like are not produced at certain times but are produced at others. From this one can infer the presence of another cause which is time. Though it is a permanent entity different from the functional things which exist in the three times, it is revealed in terms of instants, moments, brief spans, and so forth.
-- Answer: This is unacceptable, for if time were an entity different from functional things it should be perceived but it is not perceived. That has already been refuted. In this context the refutation is made taking a future pot to represent future time. The same should be understood with respect to the other two times.
-- It follows that the present pot does not exist in the future pot, nor does the past pot exist at that time, for if they both existed at that time, time would be disrupted, since things which are to occur later would already exist at an earlier time. Also at any one time another cannot exist. For these reasons, since both the past and present would be future if they existed at the time of the future pot, they do not already exist at that time. If the future of the future existed by way of its own entity, it should be future. In that case since all three times would have to be future, there could not be any past or present. If that were so, the future itself would not exist, since it could not be posited as future in relation to anything. )
.
L6: [b. Refuting the rejoinder]
.
\ ###
\ 252.
\ If a disintegrated thing exists as
\ A future entity in the future,
\ How can what is future in nature
\ Become that which is past?
.
(i. e. No permanent future: The future becomes the present and then the past. So there is no permanent future, no inherently existing future. )
.
(-- Assertion: The past pot is not altogether non-existent in the future pot. Since there is a part of it which has not yet come into existence as an entity that has occurred, there is no error.
-- Answer: If at the time of the future pot, the disintegrated pot existed in the future as an entity which had not yet come into existence, it would follow that the pot was future because of being, by way of its own entity, that which had not yet occurred at the time of the future pot. If this is accepted, it follows that there would be no past. This would necessarily be so, for how could anything that truly existed as future in nature become past? It is contradictory. Moreover by virtue of this reasoning, if the future relation to the pot is asserted as truly existent it must be accepted as being only future, which undermines the contention. )
.
L6: [c. Consequence that it is present if substantially established]
.
\ ###
\ 253.
\ Because of being future in nature
\ A future functional thing
\ Is thus present
\ And cannot be future.
.
(i. e. A truly existing future would not be the future: If the future is truly existing, it exist now, and is not the future. So there is no truly existent future. )
.
(If, according to proponents of permanent time, future things exist, it follows that the future pot is present because of already being in the nature of a future substantially existent thing. If something exists as a substantially established entity, it must be present since it has been produced and has not disintegrated. If this is accepted, it follows that it cannot be future. )
.
L6: [d. Consequence that impermanence is impossible if all three times are substantially existent]
.
\ ###
\ 254.
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.
\ ###
\ 257.
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\ If the future, past and present exist,
\ What does not exist?
\ How can there be impermanence
\ For one for whom all times exist?
.
(i. e. Truly existing past, present and future would mean nothing is impermanent: If the past continue to exist, the future already exist, as the present, then nothing originate or disintegrate, nothing is impermanent. Thus the tree times cannot truly exist, be permanent. )
.
(-- If it were truly existent, things could undergo no change and there would be nothing impermanent.
-- If, as asserted by Vaisesikas, Vaibhasikas and so forth, things existent by way of their own character exist in the future, exist in the past and exist in the present, what part of a thing could ever not exist? How could there be impermanence for a proponent of substantially existent time? It follows that there cannot be any impermanent things, for if all three times are substantially existent, whatever exist at an earlier time must be accepted as existing later and whatever exists at a later time must be accepted as existing earlier. )
.
L5: [2. Refuting a substantially established past]
.
\ ###
\ 255.
\ If it has passed beyond the past
\ Why is it the past?
\ If it has not passed beyond the past
\ Why is it the past?
.
(i. e. A truly existing past would not be the past: If the past exist, it exist now, and is not the past. Thus the past is not a real existing functional independent thing. )
.
(-- The future is not substantially existent since future time cannot exist in the future. Similarly has the past passed beyond its own nature as the past or not?
-- In the first case, why is it the past? It follows that it is not the past because of having passed beyond and gone from the past [just as curd which is no longer milk cannot be called milk and a youth who has left childhood behind cannot be called a child. ] In the second case, for what reason is it the past? It follows that it is not the past for it has not passed beyond being a past substantial entity but continues to exist as a substantial entity performing a function. )
.
L5: [3. Detailed refutation of the future]
L6: [a. Refuting the assertion of Vaibhasikas and so forth]
L7: [(1) Refutation by examining whether the future is produced or unproduced] L8: [(a) Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 256.
\ If the future is produced
\ Why is it not present?
\ If it is unproduced
\ Is the future permanent or what?
.
(i. e. The future cannot be truly existing, permanent, because we cannot see it. )
.
(-- Regarding Vaibhasikas and so forth who assert that there is a common locus of a pot and the future:
-- If a produced future pot exists, why is it not present? It follows that it should be, because it has been produced and has not ceased. If it is not produced, is the future pot permanent or what? It follows that it should be permanent because of being an unproduced thing. )
.
L8: [(b) Refuting the rejoinder]
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\ If the future is impermanent because
\ Though not produced it disintegrates,
\ Since the past does not disintegrate
\ Why not consider it permanent?
.
(i. e. If one assume future is impermanent because it becomes present, then past would be permanent because it doesn't become present or future? See next verse . . . )
.
( -- Assertion: Although the future is unproduced, causes and conditions make it become the present, thus it is not permanent.
-- Answer: If even the future is not produced, the future pot is impermanent because it subsequently disintegrates [in that it undergoes change], why not consider that past pot permanent since it does not disintegrate? It follows that it is permanent because of being a thing which does not disintegrate. )
.
L7: [(2) Consequence that impermanence is impossible if the two times are substantially established]
.
\ ###
\ 258.
\ If the past and present
\ Are not impermanent,
\ The third which is different
\ From these is also not.
.
(i. e. But, if the past, and present, are permanent, so is the future. Thus nothing would be impermanent, and there would be no need for time; which is absurd. )
.
( -- Alternatively, what is impermanent according to you?
-- The past and present are not impermanent because the past cannot disintegrate, If the present is impermanent by way of its own entity, through its subsequent connection with disintegration it follows that disintegration, too, is impermanent [or that the present is permanent because of its connection with disintegration which is permanent. ] Since the third which is different from both the past and present, namely the future, also is not impermanent, there is nothing impermanent for proponents of inherently existing things. Thus it is inappropriate for them to assert the existence of time. )
.
L7: [(3) Showing that the existence of future functional things is absurd]
.
\ ###
\ 259.
\ If a thing which will be produced
\ later exists beforehand,
\ The contention of Niyativadins
\ Is not erroneous.
.
(i. e. If the future is inherently existing, nothing is produced through causality. But that is not what we observe. )
.
( -- Assertion: Future things exist because they are produced later when the conditions obtain. That which is previously non-existent, like a barren woman's child, will not be produced later.
-- Answer: If a thing to be produced later is substantially existent prior to its production, the contention that things are inherently established as causeless held by Niyativadins and those asserting that things are not created by peoples' activity and are without cause is not erroneous. Yet their assertion are wrong for they contradict everything that is both seen and unseen. )
.
L7: [(4) Consequence that things already produced are produced again]
.
\ ###
\ 260.
\ To say something which will be made to occur
\ Already exists is unreasonable.
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\ If that which exists is produced,
\ What has been produced will arise again.
.
(i. e. If the future exist, now, then is there another production? )
.
( -- Moreover even if the future were substantially existent, it would be unreasonable to say that a thing which will be made to occur later is substantially existent prior to its production. If that which already exist is produced later, what has already been produced will come into existence again, which is purposeless. As a consequence the effect would find no opportunity for production, since the cause must reproduce itself until the end. )
.
L7: [(5) Refuting that Yogic perception of wished for objects directly perceives future things] L8: [(a) Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 261.
\ If future things are seen,
\ Why is the non-existent not seen?
\ For one for whom the future exists
\ There can be no distant [time].
.
(i. e. The Middle-Way about the nature of the three times: not existent, not non-existent, not both, not neither. It is false to pretend that one can see the future as if really existing now. But still this doesn't mean that the future is completely non-existent either. A Buddha can directly see their real non-dual nature: the beginningless chain of causes, and the endless chain of effects. A flow of interdependence without any inherently existing entities in it. )
.
( -- Assertion: The future exist because there is Yogic perception of wished-for objects which focuses on future things, and because predictions concerning the future are later seen to turn out just as predicted. This is impossible in relation to a barren woman's child.
-- Answer ab: If future things are directly perceived by way of their own entity in the period before their production, why are non-existent things not seen? It follows that they would be seen, for it is not feasible to make distinctions between what is seen and not seen with regard to the non-existent. Such fallacies arise for those who assert that the past and future exist by way of their own entity, but no fallacies accrue to us who assert the three times as arising dependently without inherent existence.
Buddhas directly perceive in the present even those things which will occur after ten millions aeons. Though they are future at the time of the consciousness perceiving them, they are neither non-functional nor permanent for they will not remain for a second moment after their formation. There is no need for a Buddha to cognize the present explicitly and the past and future implicitly, for though the latter do not exist at that time, they are in general directly perceived. Similarly it is not contradictory for objects of aspiration, though they do not exist at that time, to appear clearly to Yogic perception of that which is wished for, just as a dream appears to be real.
Even though the barley seed exists, the sprout which has not yet come into existence may be called future but the sprout itself must not be called future. An understanding of the other two times should be inferred from this. In our own
system we accept that Buddhas perceive all three times directly and not at all assert to trainees that they merely appear to do so.
-- cd: Moreover there cannot be a distant time for a protagonist for whom the future exists by way of its own entity because the future exists in terms of its own entity. )
.
L8: [(b) Consequence that fresh restraint from non-virtue and so forth are unnecessary if the future is substantially existent]
.
\ ###
\ 262.
\ If virtue exists though nothing is done,
\ Resolute restraint is meaningless.
\ If even a little is done
\ The effect cannot exist.
.
(i. e. If the future already exist. There is no need to work on it, no need for a path. ) .
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( -- If, because the future is substantially existent, virtue exists without actions such as safeguarding one's ethical conduct once one's faculties have become mature through meeting a spiritual friend and listening to teaching, resolute restraint from unethical conduct and so forth for the sake of future results [such as a high rebirth] is meaningless, for virtue will exist even if that has not been done. If even the slightest thing is done to enhance one's capability, future effects cannot be substantially existent. It is impossible! )
.
L8: [(c) If impermanent it is contradictory for something to exist prior to its production]
.
\ ###
\ 263.
\ If they are impermanent
\ How can it be said effects exist?
\ That which has a beginning and end
\ is called impermanent in the world.
.
(i. e. Future is not existent: To say that something exist inherently and is impermanent is a contradiction. All future (effects) are empty of inherent existence. The future is not something existing, nor non-existing. )
.
( -- In accordance with the assertion that all composite things are impermanent, all functional things are impermanent. -- How can it be said that an effect exist prior to its production? It is unreasonable since impermanence and existence prior to production are contradictor. Anything which has a beginning, in that it is newly produced, and an end, in that it does not last for a second moment after the time of its formation, is called impermanent in the world. )
.
L6: [b. Refuting the assertions of Sautrantikas and so forth]
.
\ ###
\ 264.
\ Liberation will occur without exertion.
\ For the liberated there is no future,
\ Or otherwise, if this were so,
\ Desire would arise without attachment.
.
(i. e. Future is not non-existent: At the other extreme: future is not non-existent at all; otherwise there would be no causality at all, no bounding, and no possibility for liberation. -- Liberation is not an effect, a future; it is not produced through our own effort, or following an absolute path. Liberation is beyond causality space and time. But, still, without a path combining the accumulation of merit and wisdom we will probably remain in samsara for an eternity. The Middle-Way not accepting a path as absolute, not rejecting all virtuous paths as if useless. We need both method and wisdom together all the time. )
.
( -- According to Sautrantikas and so forth who assert that future functional things do not have the slightest existence, liberation will occur without any exertion to generate the paths of the Exalted in order to prevent future disturbing emotions and suffering, because future things do not exist. This would be like liberated Foe Destroyers for whom there are no future disturbing emotions and so forth and who thus do not need to exert themselves because of them. If the future were non-existent and desire were to arise without there being a person, consciousness and so forth or predispositions for attachment as a basis, it follows that desire would arise in a Foe Destroyer too.
-- The words "or otherwise" imply "or otherwise the future is not non-existent. ")
.
L4: [B. Refutation by examining whether the effect exists or not]
.
\ ###
\ 265.
\ For those who assert effects exist,
\ And for those who assert they do not exist,
\ Adornments like pillars and so forth
\ For a home are purposeless.
.
(i. e. The Middle Way about future, avoiding both extremes: accepting future or effect as if inherently existing (realism), rejecting future as if completely not-existing (nihilism). In both case morality would be useless. )
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.
(-- Samkhyas say that since what is non-existent cannot be produced, and since the effect is present in the cause in a potential form, the fallacy that anything arises from anything does not occur.
-- Some Vaibhasikas assert that the three times are substantially existent and that effects exist prior to their production. -- Sautrantikas and so forth assert that although things are truly existent, future effects are non-existent.
It follows that for all of these, adornments such as pillars for a resultant home are purposeless, since according to some it exist from the outset, while according to others the future home is non-existent, like a barren woman's child. For proponents of dependent arising free from inherent existence, there is no possibility of error and thus everything is properly established.
In meditative equipoise the Exalted who are still learning do not perceive dependently arising phenomena as existent. Failure to distinguish between this non-perception and the perception of phenomena as non-existent, as well as inability to posit conventional valid cognition in one's own system, seem to give rise to numerous errors. One must therefore master the meaning of the establishment of the two truths by valid cognition in our own system. )
.
L4: [C. Refuting a truly existent present]
.
\ ###
\ 266.
\ The transformation of things also
\ Is not perceived even by the mind.
\ Those who lack wisdom nevertheless
\ Think that the present exists.
.
(i. e. Emptiness of present: It is contradictory to think that things exist and change. Actual change, production, origination or cessation, . . . are not seen. So there is no clear present. )
.
( -- Assertion: Although existence of the past and future are being refuted, the present exists. Since it does, the future exist too, for the principal, giving up its state of futurity, assumes the state of present curd. Thus the present exists.
-- Answer: It is not feasible for the principal, which is matter and permanent by nature, also to undergo temporary changes into things like milk and curd. Such transformations are not perceived even by mental consciousness that engages with extremely subtle objects, let alone observed by the five kinds of sense consciousness. Although transformation with respect to the present and its causes is not observed, those who lack wisdom and are ignorant about the meaning of suchness consider the present truly existent. )
.
L3: [II. Refuting the proof [of substantially established time]]
L4: [A. Refuting existence of substantially established functional things as a basis for time] L5: [1. Refutation by examining whether or not things have duration]
L6: [a. Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 267.
\ How can there be things with no duration?
\ Being impermanent, how can they endure?
\ If they had duration first,
\ They would not grow old in the end.
.
(i. e. No objective absolute basis for time: Time is usually measured by the duration of something; but there is no real origination, duration, or cessation. Nothing functional is truly existing as shown in another chapter. )
.
( -- Assertion: Time exists because functional things which acts as the basis for imputing time exist. Since time may be investigated by considering functional things but not on its own, time is truly existent.
-- Answer: How can functional things, the basis for time, be truly existent? It follows that they are not because of not having inherent duration. How could they have inherent duration, since they are continually consumed by impermanence? Moreover, if they had inherent duration at the start, they would not grow old in the end, because that which is inherently existent cannot cease. )
.
L6: [b. Proving that duration is not inherently existent]
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.
\ ###
\ 268.
\ Just as a single consciousness
\ Cannot apprehend two objects,
\ Similarly two consciousnesses
\ Cannot apprehend one object.
.
(i. e. Duration is not directly perceptible; so it is no objective absolute basis to measure time. )
.
( -- Furthermore there is no inherent duration, for just as a single moment of consciousness does not apprehend two consecutive objects actually presenting their own likeness, two consecutive moments of consciousness do not apprehend a single object simultaneously, for they undergo momentary production and disintegration.
-- Objection: Well, that contradicts the assertion in the sutras of knowledge that five objects such as visual form are each apprehended by two kinds of consciousness.
-- Answer: If one does not accept momentary disintegration, one is not a Buddhist. If one does, the object of observation of a visual consciousness cannot act as object of observation for a subsequently arising consciousness. The sutra passage means that the visual consciousness cognizes the form clearly and the mental consciousness which is produced subsequently cognizes it in an unclear way. )
.
L5: [2. Refutation by examining whether or not time has duration]
.
\ ###
\ 269.
\ If time has duration
\ Duration is not time.
\ If it has not, without duration
\ There will also be no end.
.
(i. e. Duration cannot be used to define or prove the existence of an absolute time - or vice versa: Like the characteristics and the characterized, time and duration are not two separate things, nor the same. One cannot be used to prove the other. They are interdependent, two co-dependently arisen concepts. )
.
(-- Assertion: Duration has inherent existence because of being the characteristic of present time.
-- Answer: If time and duration are different and have an inherently established relationship, they must act as basis and that which is based upon it.
-- If duration relies on time as something separate, duration is not time because they are mutually exclusive. If time does not have duration, then without duration there cannot finally be disintegration. Therefore since time does not have inherent duration, the latter is unsuitable as the present's characteristic. )
.
L5: [3. Refutation by examining whether things and impermanence are one or different]
.
\ ###
\ 270.
\ If impermanence and things are separate
\ Things are not impermanent.
\ If they are one, since things are precisely that which is
\ Impermanent, how can they have duration?
.
(i. e. Impermanence cannot be used to prove the existence (duration) of something. Like the characteristics and the characterized, impermanence and something (a duration) are not separate, not the same. In both case there would be no duration possible. One cannot be used to prove the other. They are interdependent, two co-dependently arisen concepts. It is contradictory to say that something exist and is impermanent. )
.
( -- Assertion: Duration exists because there are impermanent things that have duration.
-- Answer: If impermanence and functional things are separate in nature, it follows that things are not impermanent. If this is accepted, they must be permanent. If things and impermanence are one, since precisely that which is impermanent is a functional thing, how can they have inherent duration? Duration is impossible. )
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L5: [4. Refutation by examining which is stronger, duration or impermanence]
L6: [a. Consequence that subsequent reversal is unfeasible if impermanence is weaker]
.
\ ###
\ 271.
\ If duration is not weak
\ Because impermanence is weak,
\ Why should a reversal
\ Afterwards be seen?
.
(i. e. Refutation of another position: some think duration and impermanence are two alternate characteristics of everything. But that doesn't explain anything. What makes the switch from duration to impermanence if duration is stronger? )
.
( -- Assertion: While things continue to exist, duration is stronger and impermanence weaker, but it is not impossible for the weak to overcome the strong.
-- Answer: How can such a reversal be seen when things later finally become impermanent? It follows that it is unfeasible. If duration is not weaker because impermanence is weaker while things continue to exist, nothing can harm what has inherent strength. )
.
L6: [b.
