No More Learning

The neglect and the surrender of Life and of
well-being is held to be distinguished, as are also
the complete renunciation of individual valuations
and the severe exaction from every one of the
same sacrifice.
“ The value of an action is once


## p. 228 (#252) ############################################

228
THE WILL TO POWER.
and for all fixed : every individual must submit
to this valuation. "
We see: an authority speaks—who speaks —
We must condone it in human pride, if man tried
to make this authority as high as possible, for he
wanted to feel as humble as he possibly could by
the side of it. Thus--God speaks!
God was necessary as an unconditional sanction
which has no superior, as a “Categorical Imperator":
or, in so far as people believed in the authority
of reason, what was needed was a “unitarian
metaphysics” by means of which this view could
be made logical.
Now, admitting that faith in God is dead : the
question arises once more: "who speaks? " My
answer, which I take from biology and not from
metaphysics, is: “the gregarious instinct speaks. "
This is what desires to be master : hence its “ thou
shalt! ”-it will allow the individual to exist only
as a part of a whole, only in favour of the whole,
it hates those who detach themselves from every-
thing—it turns the hatred of all individuals against
him.
276.
The whole of the morality of Europe is based
upon the values which are useful to the herd: the
sorrow of all higher and exceptional men is
explained by the fact that everything which
distinguishes them from others reaches their con-
sciousness in the form of a feeling of their own
smallness and egregiousness. It is the virtues of
modern men which are the causes of pessimistic


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
229
gloominess; the mediocre, like the herd, are not
troubled much with questions or with conscience
-they are cheerful. (Among the gloomy strong
men, Pascal and Schopenhauer are noted examples. )
The more dangerous a quality seems to the herd,
the more completely it is condemned.
277.
The morality of truthfulness in the herd.
“Thou shalt be recognisable, thou shalt express
thy inner nature by means of clear and constant
signs—otherwise thou art dangerous: and sup-
posing thou art evil, thy power of dissimulation is
absolutely the worst thing for the herd.
We
despise the secretive and those whom we cannot
identify. -Consequently thou must regard thyself
as recognisable, thou mayest not remain concealed
from thyself, thou mayest not even believe in the
possibility of thy ever changing. " Thus, the in-
sistence upon truthfulness has as its main object
the recognisability and the stability of the individual.
As a matter of fact, it is the object of education
to make each gregarious unit believe in a certain
definite dogma concerning the nature of man:
education first creates this dogma and thereupon
exacts"truthfulness. "
>
278.
Within the confines of a herd or of a com-
munity—that is to say, inter pares, the over-estima-
tion of truthfulness is very reasonable.
A man


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230
THE WILL TO POWER.
must not allow himself to be deceived and con-
sequently he adopts as his own personal morality
that he should deceive no one ! a sort of mutual
obligation among equals! In his dealings with
the outside world caution and danger demand
that he should be on his guard against deception :
the first psychological condition of this attitude
would mean that he is also on his guard against
his inner self. Mistrust thus appears as the
source of truthfulness.
279.
A criticism of the virtues of the herd. —Inertia
is active: (1) In confidence, because mistrust makes
suspense, reflection, and observation necessary.
(2) In veneration, where the gulf that separates
power is great and submission necessary: then,
so that fear may cease to exist, everybody tries
to love and esteem, while the difference in power
is interpreted as a difference of value: and thus
the relationship to the powerful no longer has any-
thing revolting in it. (3) In the sense of truth.
3
What is truth? Truth is that explanation of
things which causes us the smallest amount of
mental exertion (apart from this, lying is extremely
fatiguing). (4) In sympathy. It is a relief to
know one's self on the same level with all, to feel
as all feel, and to accept a belief which is already
current; it is something passive beside the
activity which appropriates and continually carries
into practice the most individual rights of valua-
tion (the latter process allows of no repose). (5) In


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
231
impartiality and coolness of judgment: people
scout the strain of being moved, and prefer to be
detached and “objective. " (6) In uprightness :
6)
people prefer to obey a law which is to hand
rather than to create a new one, rather than to
command themselves and others: the fear of
commanding—it is better to submit than to
rebel. (7) In toleration : the fear of exercising
a right or of enforcing a judgment.
280.
The instinct of the herd values the juste milieu
and the average as the highest and most precious
of all things: the spot where the majority is to
be found, and the air that it breathes there. In
this way it is the opponent of all order of rank;
it regards a climb from the level to the heights
in the same light as a descent from the majority
to the minority. The herd regards the exception,
whether it be above or beneath its general level,
as something which is antagonistic and dangerous
to itself. Their trick in dealing with the ex-
ceptions above them, the strong, the mighty, the
wise, and the fruitful, is to persuade them to be-
come guardians, herdsmen, and watchmen-in fact,
to become their head-servants : thus they convert
a danger into a thing which is useful. In the
middle, fear ceases : here a man is alone with
nothing; here there is not much room even for
misunderstandings; here there is equality; here
a man's individual existence is not felt as
reproach, but as the right existence; here con-
a


## p. 232 (#256) ############################################

232
THE WILL TO POWER.
tentment reigns supreme. Mistrust is active only
towards the exceptions; to be an exception is to
be a sinner.
281.
If, in compliance with our communal instincts,
we make certain regulations for ourselves and
forbid certain acts, we do not of course, in
common reason, forbid a certain kind of “exist-
ence," nor a certain attitude of mind, but only a
particular application and development of this
“ existence" and "attitude of mind. ” But then
the idealist of virtue, the moralist, comes along and
says: “ God sees into the human heart! What
matters it that ye abstain from certain acts: ye
are not any better on that account ! " Answer:
Mr. Longears and Virtue-Monger, we do not
want to be better at all, we are quite satisfied
with ourselves, all we desire is that we should not
harm one another—and that is why we forbid
certain actions when they take a particular direction
- that is to say, when they are against our own
interests: but that does not alter the fact that
when these same actions are directed against the
enemies of our community — against you, for
instance—we are at a loss to know how to pay
them sufficient honour. We educate our children
up to them; we develop them to the fullest extent.
Did we share that " god-fearing" radicalism which
your holy craziness recommends, if we were green-
rns enough to condemn the source of those for-
bidden “acts” by condemning the “heart” and
the "attitude of mind " which recommends them,


## p. 233 (#257) ############################################

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
233
.
that would mean condemning our very existence,
and with it its greatest prerequisite—an attitude
of mind, a heart, a passion which we revere with
all our soul. By our decrees we prevent this
attitude of mind from breaking out and venting
itself in a useless way—we are prudent when we
prescribe such laws for ourselves; we are also
moral in so doing. . . . Have you no idea-how-
ever vague—what sacrifices it has cost us, how
much self-control, self-subjection, and hardness it
has compelled us to exercise ? We are vehement
in our desires; there are times when we even feel
as if we could devour each other. . . But the
“communal spirit” is master of us: have you
observed that this is almost a definition of
morality?
282.
The weakness of the gregarious animal gives
rise to a morality which is precisely similar to
that resulting from the weakness of the decadent
man: they understand each other; they associate
with each other (the great decadent religions
always rely upon the support of the herd). The
gregarious animal, as such, is free from all morbid
characteristics, it is in itself an invaluable creature;
but it is incapable of taking any initiative; it
must have a "leader”-the priests understand
this. . . The state is not subtle, not secret
enough; the art of " directing consciences” slips
“
its grasp
How is the gregarious animal infected
with illness by the priest?
.


## p. 234 (#258) ############################################

234
THE WILL TO POWER.
283.
The hatred directed against the privileged in
body and spirit: the revolt of the ugly and
bungled souls against the beautiful, the proud, and
the cheerful. The weapons used: contempt of
beauty, of pride, of happiness : “There is no such
thing as merit,” “The danger is enormous: it is
right that one should tremble and feel ill at ease,"
“Naturalness is evil; it is right to oppose all that
is natural — even 'reason' (all that is anti-
natural is elevated to the highest place).
It is again the priests who exploit this condition,
and who win the "people" over to themselves.
“ The sinner over whom there is more joy in
heaven than over “ the just person. " This is the
struggle against “paganism” (the pang of con-
science, a measure for disturbing the harmony of
the soul).
The hatred of the mediocre for the exceptions,
and of the herd for its independent members.
(Custom actually regarded as “morality. ”) The
(
revulsion of feeling against "egotism": that
only is worth anything which is done" for
another. ” “We are all equal”;-against the
love of dominion, against “ dominion” in general;
-against privilege ;-against sectarians, free-
spirits, and sceptics ;-against philosophy (a force
opposing mechanical and automatic instincts);
in philosophers themselves -- "the categorical
imperative," the essential nature of morality,
general and universal. ”
“
»


## p. 235 (#259) ############################################

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY
235
284.
The qualities and tendencies which are praised :
peacefulness, equity, moderation, modesty, rever-
ence, respectfulness, bravery, chastity, honesty,
fidelity, credulity, rectitude, confidence, resigna-
tion, pity, helpfulness, conscientiousness, simplicity,
mildness, justice, generosity, leniency, obedience,
disinterestedness, freedom from envy, good nature,
industry.
We must ascertain to what extent such qualities
are conditioned as means to the attainment of
certain desires and ends (often an "evil” end); or
as results of dominating passions (for instance,
intellectuality): or as the expressions of certain
states of need—that is to say, as preservative
measures (as in the case of citizens, slaves, women,
etc. ).
In short, every one of them is not considered
"good" for its own sake, but rather because it
approximates to a standard prescribed either by
society or by the “herd,” as a means to the
ends of the latter, as necessary for their preserva-
tion and enhancement, and also as the result of
an actual gregarious instinct in the individual ;
these qualities are thus in the service of an
instinct which is fundamentally different from these
states of virtue. For the herd is antagonistic,
selfish, and pitiless to the outside world; it is full
of a love of dominion and of feelings of mistrust, etc.
In the "herdsman " this antagonism comes to
the fore: he must have qualities which are the
reverse of those possessed by the herd,


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236
THE WILL TO POWER.
The mortal enmity of the herd towards all
order of rank: its instinct is in favour of the
leveller (Christ). Towards all strong individuals
(the sovereigns) it is hostile, unfair, intemperate,
arrogant, cheeky, disrespectful, cowardly, false,
lying, pitiless, deceitful, envious, revengeful.
285.
My teaching is this, that the herd seeks to
maintain and preserve one type of man, and that
it defends itself on two sides—that is to say,
against those which are decadents from its ranks
(criminals, etc. ), and against those who rise superior
to its dead level. The instincts of the herd tend
to a stationary state of society ; they merely
preserve. They have no creative power.
The pleasant feelings of goodness and benevol-
ence with which the just man fills us (as opposed
to the suspense and the fear to which the great
innovating man gives rise) are our own sensations
of personal security and equality : in this way
the gregarious animal glorifies the gregarious
nature, and then begins to feel at ease. This
judgment on the part of the “comfortable” ones
rigs itself out in the most beautiful words—and
thus "morality” is born. Let any one observe,
however, the hatred of the herd for all truthful
men.
286.
Let us not deceive ourselves! When a man
hears the whisper of the moral imperative in his


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
237
breast, as altruism would have him hear it, he shows
thereby that he belongs to the herd. When a
man is conscious of the opposite feelings,—that
is to say, when he sees his danger and his undoing
in disinterested and unselfish actions,—then he
does not belong to the herd.
287.
My philosophy aims at a new order of rank:
not at an individualistic morality. * The spirit of
the herd should rule within the herd—but not
beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a
fundamentally different valuation for their actions,
as do also the independent ones or the beasts of
prey, etc.
3. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING
MORALITY.
288.
Morality regarded as an attempt at establishing
human pride. —The "Free-Will” theory is anti-
religious. Its ultimate object is to bestow the
right upon man to regard himself as the cause of
his highest states and actions : it is a form of the
growing feeling of pride.
Man feels his power his “happiness"; as they
say: there must be a will behind these states-
:
»
* TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. —Here is a broad distinction be.
tween Nietzsche and Herbert Spencer.


## p. 238 (#262) ############################################

238
THE WILL TO POWER.
otherwise they do not belong to him. Virtue is
an attempt at postulating a modicum of will, past
or present, as the necessary antecedent to every
exalted and strong feeling of happiness: if the
will to certain actions is regularly present in
consciousness, a sensation of power may be inter-
preted as its result. This is a merely psychological
point of view, based upon the false assumption
that nothing belongs to us which we have not
consciously willed. The whole of the teaching of
responsibility relies upon the ingenuous psycho-
logical rule that the will is the only cause, and
that one must have been aware of having willed
in order to be able to regard one's self as a cause.
Then comes the counter-movement-that of the
moral-philosophers. These men still labour under
the delusion that a man is responsible only for
what he has willed. The value of man is then
made a moral value: thus morality becomes a
causa prima; for this there must be some kind
of principle in man, and " free will” is posited as
prima causa. The arrière pensée is always this :
If man is not a causa prima through his will, he
must be irresponsible,—therefore he does not
come within the jurisdiction of morals,—virtue or
vice is automatic and mechanical.
In short: in order that man may respect
himself he must be capable of becoming evil.
»
.
.
.
289.
Theatricalness regarded as the result of “Free
Will ” morality. It is a step in the development


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
239
:
.
of the feeling of power itself, to believe one's self to
be the author of one's exalted moments (of one's
perfection) and to have willed them. . .
(Criticism : all perfect action is precisely un-
conscious and not deliberate; consciousness is
often the expression of an imperfect and often
morbid constitution. Personal perfection regarded
as determined by will, as an act of consciousness, as
reason with dialectics, is a caricature, a sort of self-
contradiction. Any degree of consciousness
renders perfection impossible.
. . . A form of
theatricalness. )
290.
The moral hypothesis, designed with a view
to justifying God, said: evil must be voluntary
(simply in order that the voluntariness of goodness
might be believed in); and again, all evil and
suffering have an object which is salvation.
The notion "guilt” was considered as some-
thing which had no connection at all with the
ultimate cause of existence, and
of existence, and the notion
“punishment” was held to be an educating and
beneficent act, consequently an act proceeding from
a good God.
The absolute dominion of moral valuations over
all others: nobody doubted that God could not
be evil and could do no harm-that is to say,
perfection was understood merely as moral per-
fection.
291.
How false is the supposition that an action
must depend upon what has preceded it in


## p. 240 (#264) ############################################

240
THE WILL TO POWER,
consciousness! And morality has been measured
in the light of this supposition, as also crimin-
ality. . . .
The value of an action must be judged by its
results, say the utilitarians: to measure
it
according to its origin involves the impossibility
of knowing that origin.
But do we know its results ?
Five stages
ahead, perhaps. Who can tell what an action
provokes and sets in motion ? As a stimulus ?
As the spark which fires a powder-magazine ?
Utilitarians are simpletons. . . And finally,
they would first of all have to know what is
useful ; here also their sight can travel only over
five stages or so. . . . They have no notion of
the great economy which cannot dispense with evil.
We do not know the origin or the results:
has an action, then, any value ?
We have yet the action itself to consider : the
states of consciousness that accompany it, the yea
or nay which follows upon its performance: does
the value of an action lie in the subjective states
which accompany it? (In that case, the value of
music would be measured according to the pleasure
or displeasure which it occasions in us . . . which
it gives to the composer. . . . ) Obviously feelings
of value must accompany it, a sensation of power,
restraint, or impotence for instance, freedom or
lightsomeness. Or, putting the question differently:
could the value of an action be reduced to physio-
logical terms ? could it be the expression of
completely free or constrained life -Maybe its
biological value is expressed in this way. .


## p.
241 (#265) ############################################

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
241
If, then, an action can be judged neither in the
light of its origin, nor its results, nor its accom-
paniments in consciousness, then its value must be
x, unknown.
.
292.
It amounts to a denaturalisation of morality to
separate an action from a man; to direct hatred
or contempt against "sin"; to believe that there
are actions which are good or bad in themselves.
The re-establishment of "Nature": an action in
itself is quite devoid of value; the whole question
is this: who performed it? One and the same
“crime” may, in one case, be the greatest privi-
lege, in the other infamy. As a matter of fact, it
is the selfishness of the judges which interprets an
action (in regard to its author) according as to
whether it was useful or harmful to themselves (or
in relation to its degree of likeness or unlikeness
to them).
"
293
The concept "reprehensible action presents us
with some difficulties. Nothing in all that happens
can be reprehensible in itself: one would not dare
to eliminate it completely; for everything is so
bound up with everything else, that to exclude
one part would mean to exclude the whole.
A reprehensible action, therefore, would mean a
reprehensible world as a whole. .
And even then, in a reprehensible world even
reprehending would be reprehensible. . . . And
the consequence of an attitude of mind that
e
VOL. 1.


## p. 242 (#266) ############################################

242
THE WILL TO POWER.
condemns everything, would be the affirmation of
everything in practice. . . . If Becoming is a huge
ring, everything that forms a part of it is of equal
value, is eternal and necessary. -In all correlations
of yea and nay, of preference and rejection, love
and hate, all that is expressed is a certain point
of view, peculiar to the interests of a certain type
of living organism: everything that lives says yea
by the very fact of its existence.
294.
a
Criticism of the subjective feelings of value. -
Conscience. Formerly people argued: conscience
condemns this action, therefore this action is
reprehensible. But, as a matter of fact, conscience
condemns an action because that action has been
condemned for a long period of time: all conscience
does is to imitate: it does not create values. That
which first led to the condemnation of certain
actions, was not conscience: but the knowledge of
(or the prejudice against) its consequences. . . .
The approbation of conscience, the feeling of well-
being, of “inner peace,” is of the same order of
emotions as the artist's joy over his work—it
proves nothing. . . .
. . Self-contentment proves no
more in favour of that which gives rise to it, than
its absence can prove anything against the value
of the thing which fails to give rise to it.
far too ignorant to be able to judge of the value
of our actions: in this respect we lack the ability
to regard things objectively. Even when we
condemn an action, we do not do so as judges,
.
We are


## p. 243 (#267) ############################################

A ERITICISM OF MORALITY.
243
but as adversaries. When noble sentiments
accompany an action, they prove nothing in its
favour: an artist may present us with an absolutely
insignificant thing, though he be in the throes of
the most exalted pathos during its production. It
were wiser to regard these sentiments as misleading:
they actually beguile our eye and our power, away
from criticism, from caution and from suspicion,
and the result often is that we make fools of our-
selves . . they actually make fools of us.
295.
We are heirs to the conscience-vivisection and
self-crucifixion of two thousand years : in these two
practices lie perhaps our longest efforts at becoming
perfect, our mastery, and certainly our subtlety; we
have affiliated natural propensities with a heavy
conscience
An attempt to produce an entirely opposite
state of affairs would be possible: that is to say,
to affiliate all desires of a beyond, all sympathy
with things which are opposed to the senses, the
intellect, and nature in fact, all the ideals that
have existed hitherto (which were all anti-worldly),
with a heavy conscience.
296.
The great crimes in psychology:
(1) That all pain and unhappiness should have
been falsified by being associated with what is
wrong (guilt). (Thus pain was robbed of its
innocence. )


## p. 244 (#268) ############################################

244
THE WILL TO POWER.
(2) That all strong emotions (wantonness,
voluptuousness, triumph, pride, audacity, know-
ledge, assurance, and happiness in itself) were
branded as sinful, as seductive, and as suspicious.
(3) That feelings of weakness, inner acts of
cowardice, lack of personal courage, should have
decked themselves in the most beautiful words,
and have been taught as desirable in the highest
degree.
(4) That greatness in man should have been
given the meaning of disinterestedness, self-sacrifice
for another's good, for other people; that even in
the scientist and the artist, the elimination of the
individual personality is presented as the cause of
the greatest knowledge and ability.
(5) That love should have been twisted round
to mean submission (and altruism), whereas it is
in reality an act of appropriation or of bestowal,
resulting in the last case from a superabundance
in the wealth of a given personality. Only the
wholest people can love; the disinterested ones,
the “objective” ones, are the worst lovers (just
ask the girls ! ). This principle also applies to the
love of God or of the “home country": a man
must be able to rely absolutely upon himself.
(Egotism may be regarded as the pre-eminence of
the ego, altruism as the pre-eminence of others. )
,
(6) Life regarded as a punishment (happiness
as a means of seduction); the passions regarded
as devilish; confidence in one's self as godless.
The whole of psychology is a psychology of obstacles,
a sort of barricade built out of fear; on the one
hand we find the masses (the botched and bungled,
"


## p. 245 (#269) ############################################

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
245
the mediocre) defending themselves, by means of
it, against the strong (and finally destroying them
in their growth . . ); on the other hand, we
find all the instincts with which these classes are
best able to prosper, sanctified and alone held in
honour by them. Let any one examine the
Jewish priesthood.
297.
The vestiges of the depreciation of Nature through
moral transcendence: The value of disinterested-
ness, the cult of altruism ; the belief in a reward in
the play of natural consequences; the belief in
goodness” and in genius itself, as if the one, like
the other, were the result of disinterestedness; the
continuation of the Church's sanction of the life of
the citizen; the absolutely deliberate misunder-
standing of history (as a means of educating up to
morality) or pessimism in the attitude taken up
towards history (the latter is just as much a
result of the depreciation of Nature, as is that
pseudo-justification of history, that refusal to see
history as the pessimist sees it).
298.
“Morality for its own sake"—this is an im-
portant step in the denaturalisation of morals: in
itself it appears as a final value. In this phase
religion has generally become saturated with it:
as, for instance, in the case of Judaism. It likewise
goes through a phase in which it separates itself


## p. 246 (#270) ############################################

246
THE WILL TO POWER.
.
from religion, and in which no God is “ moral”
enough for it: it then prefers the impersonal
ideal.
This is how the case stands at
present.
“Art
for Art's sake": this is a similarly dangerous
principle: by this means a false contrast is lent
to things—it culminates in the slander of reality
(“idealising” into the hateful). When an ideal
is severed from reality, the latter is debased, im-
poverished, and calumniated. “Beauty for Beauty's
sake," “ Truth for Truth's sake," « Goodness for
Goodness' sake "these are three forms of the evil
eye for reality.
Art, knowledge, and morality are means :
instead of recognising a life-promoting tendency
in them, they have been associated with the
opposite of Lifewith “God,"—they have also
been regarded as revelations of a higher world,
which here and there transpires through them. . .
Beautiful” and “ugly," "true" and "false,"
"good" and "evil”—these things are distinctions
and antagonisms which betray the preservative
and promotive measures of Life, not necessarily
of man alone, but of all stable and enduring
organisms which take up a definite stand against
their opponents. The war which thus ensues is
the essential factor: it is a means of separating
things, leading to stronger isolation. . . .
C
299
Moral naturalism : The tracing back of ap-
parently independent and supernatural values to


## p. 247 (#271) ############################################

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
247
»
-
their real “nature"_that is to say, to natural
immorality, to natural “ utility," etc.
Perhaps I may designate the tendency of these
observations by the term moral naturalism: my
object is to re-translate the moral values which
have apparently become independent and un-
natural into their real nature—that is to say,
into their natural “ immorality. ”
N. B. —Refer to Jewish “holiness” and its
natural basis. The case is the same in regard
to the moral law which has been made sovereign,
emancipated from its real nature (until it is
almost the opposite of Nature).
The stages in the denaturalisation of morality
(or so-called “ Idealisation') :
First it is a road to individual happiness,
then it is the result of knowledge,
then it is a Categorical Imperative,
then it is a way to Salvation,
then it is a denial of the will to live.
(The gradual progress of the hostility of morality
to Life. )
300.
The suppressed and effaced Heresy in morality.
-Concepts: paganism, master-morality, virtù.
301.
My problem : What harm has mankind suffered
hitherto from morals, as also from its own
morality ? Intellectual harm, etc.
,


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THE WILL TO POWER.
302.
Why are not human values once more deposited
nicely in the rut to which they alone have a right
- as routinary values ? Many species of animals
have already become extinct; supposing man
were also to disappear, nothing would be lacking
on earth. A man should be enough of a philo-
sopher to admire even this "nothing” (Nil
admirari).
303
Man, a small species of very excitable animals,
which—fortunately—has its time. Life in general
on earth is a matter of a moment, an incident,
an exception that has no consequence, something
which is of no importance whatever to the general
character of the earth; the earth itself is, like
every star, a hiatus between two nonentities, an
event without a plan, without reason, will, or self-
consciousness-the worst kind of necessity-
foolish necessity. . . . Something in us rebels
against this view; the serpent vanity whispers to
our hearts, “ All this must be false because it is
revolting. . . . Could not all this be appearance?
And man in spite of all, to use Kant's words”.
4. How VIRTUE IS MADE TO DOMINATE.
304
Concerning the ideal of the moralist. -In this
treatise we wish to speak of the great politics of


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
249
>
3
.
virtue. We wrote it for the use of all those who
are interested, not so much in the process of
becoming virtuous as in that of making others
virtuous-in how virtue is made to dominate. I
even intend to prove that in order to desire this
one thing—the dominion of virtue-the other
must be systematically avoided; that is to say,
one must renounce all hopes of becoming virtuous.
This sacrifice is great: but such an end is perhaps
a sufficient reward for such a sacrifice. And even
greater sacrifices ! . . . And some of the most
famous moralists have risked as much.
For these,
indeed, had already recognised and anticipated
the truth which is to be revealed for the first time
in this treatise: that the dominion of virtue is
absolutely attainable only by the use of the same
means which are employed in the attainment of
any other dominion, in any case not by means of
virtue itself. . . .
As I have already said, this treatise deals with
the politics of virtue: it postulates an ideal of
these politics; it describes it as it ought to be,
if anything at all can be perfect on this earth.
Now, no philosopher can be in any doubt as to
what the type of perfection is in politics; it is, of
course, Machiavellianism. But Machiavellianism
which is pur, sans mélange, cru, vert, dans toute sa
force, dans toute son âpreté, is superhuman, divine,
transcendental, and can never be achieved by
man—the most he can do is to approximate it.
Even in this narrower kind of politics—in the
politics of virtue—the ideal never seems to have
been realised. Plato, too, only bordered upon it.


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THE WILL TO POWER.
Granted that one have eyes for concealed things,
one can discover, even in the most guileless and
most conscious moralists (and this is indeed the
name of these moral politicians and of the
founders of all newer moral forces), traces showing
that they too paid their tribute to human weak-
ness. They all aspired to virtue on their own
account--at least in their moments of weariness;
and this is the leading and most capital error on
the part of any moralist—whose duty it is to be
an immoralist in deeds. That he must not exactly
appear to be the latter, is another matter. Or
rather it is not another matter : systematic self-
denial of this kind (or, expressed morally: dis-
simulation) belongs to, and is part and parcel of,
the moralist's canon and of his self-imposed
duties : without it he can never attain to his
particular kind of perfection. Freedom from
morality and from truth when enjoyed for that
purpose which rewards every sacrifice: for the
sake of making morality dominate—that is the
canon, Moralists are in need of the attitudes of
virtue, as also of the attitudes of truth; their
error begins when they yield to virtue, when they
lose control of virtue, when they themselves become
moral or true. A great moralist is, among other
things, necessarily a great actor; his only danger
is that his pose may unconsciously become a
second nature, just like his ideal, which is to keep
his esse and his operari apart in a divine way;
everything he does must be done sub specie boni
-a lofty, remote, and exacting ideal ! A divine
ideal! And, as a matter of fact, they say that


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
251
the moralist thus imitates a model which is no less
than God Himself: God, the greatest Immoralist
in deeds that exists, but who nevertheless under-
stands how to remain what He is, the good
God. .
305.
The dominion of virtue is not established by
means of virtue itself; with virtue itself, one re-
nounces power, one loses the Will to Power.
306.
The victory of a moral ideal is achieved by the
same “immoral” means as any other victory:
violence, lies, slander, injustice.
307
He who knows the way fame originates will be
suspicious even of the fame virtue enjoys.
308.
Morality is just as “immoral”
as any other
thing on earth; morality is in itself a form of
immorality.
The great relief which this conviction brings.
The contradiction between things disappears, the
unity of all phenomena is saved
309.
There are some who seek for the immoral
side of things. When they say:
" this is


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252
THE WILL TO POWER.
wrong," they believe it ought to be done away
with or altered. On the other hand, I do not
rest until I am quite clear concerning the im-
morality of any particular thing which happens
to come under my notice. When I discover it,
I recover my equanimity.
9
310.
A. The ways which lead to power : the presenta-
tion of the new virtue under the name of an old
one, the awakening of “interest” concerning it
(“ happiness” declared to be its reward, and vice
verså),-artistic slandering of all that stands in
its way,—the exploitation of advantages and
accidents with the view of glorifying it,—the con-
version of its adherents into fanatics by means
of sacrifices and separations,-symbolism on a
grand scale.
B. Power attained : (1) Means of constraint of
virtue; (2) seductive means of virtue; (3) the
(court) etiquette of virtue.
311.
By what means does a virtue attain to power? -
With precisely the same means as a political party :
slander, suspicion, the undermining of opposing
virtues that happen to be already in power, the
changing of their names, systematic persecution
and scorn; in short, by means of acts of general
“immorality. "
How does a desire behave towards itself in


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
253
order to become a virtue -A process of re-
christening; systematic denial of its intentions ;
practice in misunderstanding itself; alliance with
established and recognised virtues; ostentatious
enmity towards its adversaries. If possible, too,
the protection of sacred powers must be purchased;
people must also be intoxicated and fired with
enthusiasm ; idealistic humbug must be used, and
a party must be won, which either triumphs or
perishes—one must be unconscious and naïf.
312.
Cruelty has become transformed and elevated
into tragic pity, so that we no longer recognise
it as such. The same has happened to the love
of the sexes which has become amour-passion;
the slavish attitude of mind appears as Christian
obedience; wretchedness becomes humility; the
disease of the nervus sympathicus, for instance, is
eulogised as Pessimism, Pascalism, or Carlylism, etc.
313.
We should begin to entertain doubts concerning
a man if we heard that he required reasons in
order to remain respectable: we should, in any
case, certainly avoid his society. The little word
“ for” in certain cases may be compromising;
sometimes a single "for” is enough to refute one.
If we should hear, in course of time, that such-and-
such an aspirant for virtue was in need of bad
reasons in order to remain respectable, it would not
>


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THE WILL TO POWER.
conduce to increasing our respect for him.
But
he goes further; he comes to us, and tells us
quite openly: “You disturb my morality with
your disbelief, Mr. Sceptic; so long as you cannot
believe in my bad reasons,—that is to say, in my
God, in a disciplinary Beyond, in free will, etc.