No More Learning

In summe, the Discourse of the Mind,
when it is governed by designee, is nothing but Seeking, or the faculty
of Invention, which the Latines call Sagacitas, and Solertia; a hunting
out of the causes, of some effect, present or past; or of the effects,
of some present or past cause, sometimes a man seeks what he hath lost;
and from that place, and time, wherein hee misses it, his mind runs
back, from place to place, and time to time, to find where, and when
he had it; that is to say, to find some certain, and limited time and
place, in which to begin a method of seeking. Again, from thence, his
thoughts run over the same places and times, to find what action, or
other occasion might make him lose it. This we call Remembrance,
or Calling to mind: the Latines call it Reminiscentia, as it were a
Re-Conning of our former actions.

Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compasse whereof
his is to seek; and then his thoughts run over all the parts thereof,
in the same manner, as one would sweep a room, to find a jewell; or as
a Spaniel ranges the field, till he find a sent; or as a man should run
over the alphabet, to start a rime.




Prudence

Sometime a man desires to know the event of an action; and then he
thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof one after
another; supposing like events will follow like actions. As he that
foresees what wil become of a Criminal, re-cons what he has seen follow
on the like Crime before; having this order of thoughts, The Crime,
the Officer, the Prison, the Judge, and the Gallowes. Which kind
of thoughts, is called Foresight, and Prudence, or Providence; and
sometimes Wisdome; though such conjecture, through the difficulty of
observing all circumstances, be very fallacious. But this is certain; by
how much one man has more experience of things past, than another; by
so much also he is more Prudent, and his expectations the seldomer faile
him. The Present onely has a being in Nature; things Past have a being
in the Memory onely, but things To Come have no being at all; the Future
being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions Past,
to the actions that are Present; which with most certainty is done by
him that has most Experience; but not with certainty enough. And though
it be called Prudence, when the Event answereth our Expectation; yet in
its own nature, it is but Presumption. For the foresight of things to
come, which is Providence, belongs onely to him by whose will they are
to come. From him onely, and supernaturally, proceeds Prophecy. The best
Prophet naturally is the best guesser; and the best guesser, he that is
most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at: for he hath most
Signes to guesse by.




Signes

A Signe, is the Event Antecedent, of the Consequent; and contrarily,
the Consequent of the Antecedent, when the like Consequences have been
observed, before: And the oftner they have been observed, the lesse
uncertain is the Signe. And therefore he that has most experience in
any kind of businesse, has most Signes, whereby to guesse at the Future
time, and consequently is the most prudent: And so much more prudent
than he that is new in that kind of business, as not to be equalled by
any advantage of naturall and extemporary wit: though perhaps many young
men think the contrary.

Neverthelesse it is not Prudence that distinguisheth man from beast.
There be beasts, that at a year old observe more, and pursue that which
is for their good, more prudently, than a child can do at ten.




Conjecture Of The Time Past

As Prudence is a Praesumtion of the Future, contracted from the
Experience of time Past; So there is a Praesumtion of things Past taken
from other things (not future but) past also. For he that hath seen
by what courses and degrees, a flourishing State hath first come into
civill warre, and then to ruine; upon the sights of the ruines of any
other State, will guesse, the like warre, and the like courses have been
there also. But his conjecture, has the same incertainty almost with the
conjecture of the Future; both being grounded onely upon Experience.

There is no other act of mans mind, that I can remember, naturally
planted in him, so, as to need no other thing, to the exercise of it,
but to be born a man, and live with the use of his five Senses. Those
other Faculties, of which I shall speak by and by, and which seem proper
to man onely, are acquired, and encreased by study and industry; and of
most men learned by instruction, and discipline; and proceed all from
the invention of Words, and Speech. For besides Sense, and Thoughts, and
the Trayne of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion; though by
the help of Speech, and Method, the same Facultyes may be improved to
such a height, as to distinguish men from all other living Creatures.

Whatsoever we imagine, is Finite. Therefore there is no Idea, or
conception of anything we call Infinite. No man can have in his mind an
Image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive the ends, and bounds of
the thing named; having no Conception of the thing, but of our own
inability. And therefore the Name of GOD is used, not to make us
conceive him; (for he is Incomprehensible; and his greatnesse, and power
are unconceivable;) but that we may honour him. Also because whatsoever
(as I said before,) we conceive, has been perceived first by sense,
either all at once, or by parts; a man can have no thought, representing
any thing, not subject to sense. No man therefore can conceive any
thing, but he must conceive it in some place; and indued with some
determinate magnitude; and which may be divided into parts; nor that any
thing is all in this place, and all in another place at the same time;
nor that two, or more things can be in one, and the same place at once:
for none of these things ever have, or can be incident to Sense; but are
absurd speeches, taken upon credit (without any signification at all,)
from deceived Philosophers, and deceived, or deceiving Schoolemen.



CHAPTER IV. OF SPEECH




Originall Of Speech

The Invention of Printing, though ingenious, compared with the invention
of Letters, is no great matter. But who was the first that found the use
of Letters, is not known. He that first brought them into Greece, men
say was Cadmus, the sonne of Agenor, King of Phaenicia. A profitable
Invention for continuing the memory of time past, and the conjunction of
mankind, dispersed into so many, and distant regions of the Earth; and
with all difficult, as proceeding from a watchfull observation of the
divers motions of the Tongue, Palat, Lips, and other organs of Speech;
whereby to make as many differences of characters, to remember them.
But the most noble and profitable invention of all other, was that of
Speech, consisting of Names or Apellations, and their Connexion; whereby
men register their Thoughts; recall them when they are past; and also
declare them one to another for mutuall utility and conversation;
without which, there had been amongst men, neither Common-wealth, nor
Society, nor Contract, nor Peace, no more than amongst Lyons, Bears,
and Wolves. The first author of Speech was GOD himselfe, that instructed
Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight; For the
Scripture goeth no further in this matter. But this was sufficient
to direct him to adde more names, as the experience and use of the
creatures should give him occasion; and to joyn them in such manner by
degrees, as to make himselfe understood; and so by succession of time,
so much language might be gotten, as he had found use for; though not so
copious, as an Orator or Philosopher has need of. For I do not find any
thing in the Scripture, out of which, directly or by consequence can
be gathered, that Adam was taught the names of all Figures, Numbers,
Measures, Colours, Sounds, Fancies, Relations; much less the names
of Words and Speech, as Generall, Speciall, Affirmative, Negative,
Interrogative, Optative, Infinitive, all which are usefull; and least of
all, of Entity, Intentionality, Quiddity, and other significant words of
the School.

But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his posterity,
was again lost at the tower of Babel, when by the hand of God, every man
was stricken for his rebellion, with an oblivion of his former language.
And being hereby forced to disperse themselves into severall parts of
the world, it must needs be, that the diversity of Tongues that now is,
proceeded by degrees from them, in such manner, as need (the mother of
all inventions) taught them; and in tract of time grew every where more
copious.




The Use Of Speech

The generall use of Speech, is to transferre our Mentall Discourse, into
Verbal; or the Trayne of our Thoughts, into a Trayne of Words; and that
for two commodities; whereof one is, the Registring of the Consequences
of our Thoughts; which being apt to slip out of our memory, and put
us to a new labour, may again be recalled, by such words as they were
marked by. So that the first use of names, is to serve for Markes,
or Notes of remembrance. Another is, when many use the same words,
to signifie (by their connexion and order,) one to another, what they
conceive, or think of each matter; and also what they desire, feare,
or have any other passion for, and for this use they are called
Signes. Speciall uses of Speech are these; First, to Register, what by
cogitation, wee find to be the cause of any thing, present or past; and
what we find things present or past may produce, or effect: which in
summe, is acquiring of Arts. Secondly, to shew to others that knowledge
which we have attained; which is, to Counsell, and Teach one another.
Thirdly, to make known to others our wills, and purposes, that we may
have the mutuall help of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight
our selves, and others, by playing with our words, for pleasure or
ornament, innocently.




Abuses Of Speech

To these Uses, there are also foure correspondent Abuses. First,
when men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the
signification of their words; by which they register for their
conceptions, that which they never conceived; and so deceive themselves.
Secondly, when they use words metaphorically; that is, in other sense
than that they are ordained for; and thereby deceive others. Thirdly,
when by words they declare that to be their will, which is not.
Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another: for seeing nature
hath armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and some
with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of Speech, to grieve
him with the tongue, unlesse it be one whom wee are obliged to govern;
and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend.

The manner how Speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence
of causes and effects, consisteth in the imposing of Names, and the
Connexion of them.




Names Proper & Common Universall

Of Names, some are Proper, and singular to one onely thing; as Peter,
John, This Man, This Tree: and some are Common to many things; as Man,
Horse, Tree; every of which though but one Name, is nevertheless the
name of divers particular things; in respect of all which together, it
is called an Universall; there being nothing in the world Universall
but Names; for the things named, are every one of them Individual and
Singular.

One Universall name is imposed on many things, for their similitude in
some quality, or other accident: And whereas a Proper Name bringeth to
mind one thing onely; Universals recall any one of those many.

And of Names Universall, some are of more, and some of lesse extent; the
larger comprehending the lesse large: and some again of equall extent,
comprehending each other reciprocally. As for example, the Name Body is
of larger signification than the word Man, and conprehendeth it; and the
names Man and Rationall, are of equall extent, comprehending mutually
one another. But here wee must take notice, that by a Name is not
alwayes understood, as in Grammar, one onely word; but sometimes by
circumlocution many words together. For all these words, Hee That In
His Actions Observeth The Lawes Of His Country, make but one Name,
equivalent to this one word, Just.

By this imposition of Names, some of larger, some of stricter
signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things
imagined in the mind, into a reckoning of the consequences of
Appellations. For example, a man that hath no use of Speech at all,
(such, as is born and remains perfectly deafe and dumb,) if he set
before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles, (such as are the
corners of a square figure,) he may by meditation compare and find, that
the three angles of that triangle, are equall to those two right angles
that stand by it. But if another triangle be shewn him different in
shape from the former, he cannot know without a new labour, whether the
three angles of that also be equall to the same. But he that hath the
use of words, when he observes, that such equality was consequent, not
to the length of the sides, nor to any other particular thing in his
triangle; but onely to this, that the sides were straight, and the
angles three; and that that was all, for which he named it a Triangle;
will boldly conclude Universally, that such equality of angles is in
all triangles whatsoever; and register his invention in these generall
termes, Every Triangle Hath Its Three Angles Equall To Two Right Angles.
And thus the consequence found in one particular, comes to be registred
and remembred, as a Universall rule; and discharges our mentall
reckoning, of time and place; and delivers us from all labour of the
mind, saving the first; and makes that which was found true Here, and
Now, to be true in All Times and Places.

But the use of words in registring our thoughts, is in nothing so
evident as in Numbering. A naturall foole that could never learn by
heart the order of numerall words, as One, Two, and Three, may observe
every stroak of the Clock, and nod to it, or say one, one, one; but can
never know what houre it strikes. And it seems, there was a time when
those names of number were not in use; and men were fayn to apply their
fingers of one or both hands, to those things they desired to keep
account of; and that thence it proceeded, that now our numerall words
are but ten, in any Nation, and in some but five, and then they begin
again. And he that can tell ten, if he recite them out of order, will
lose himselfe, and not know when he has done: Much lesse will he be
able to add, and substract, and performe all other operations of
Arithmetique. So that without words, there is no possibility of
reckoning of Numbers; much lesse of Magnitudes, of Swiftnesse, of Force,
and other things, the reckonings whereof are necessary to the being, or
well-being of man-kind.

When two Names are joyned together into a Consequence, or Affirmation;
as thus, A Man Is A Living Creature; or thus, If He Be A Man, He Is A
Living Creature, If the later name Living Creature, signifie all that
the former name Man signifieth, then the affirmation, or consequence is
True; otherwise False. For True and False are attributes of Speech, not
of things. And where Speech in not, there is neither Truth nor Falshood.
Errour there may be, as when wee expect that which shall not be; or
suspect what has not been: but in neither case can a man be charged with
Untruth.

Seeing then that Truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our
affirmations, a man that seeketh precise Truth, had need to remember
what every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly; or els
he will find himselfe entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twiggs; the
more he struggles, the more belimed. And therefore in Geometry, (which
is the onely Science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on
mankind,) men begin at settling the significations of their words; which
settling of significations, they call Definitions; and place them in the
beginning of their reckoning.

By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true
Knowledge, to examine the Definitions of former Authors; and either
to correct them, where they are negligently set down; or to make them
himselfe. For the errours of Definitions multiply themselves, according
as the reckoning proceeds; and lead men into absurdities, which at last
they see, but cannot avoyd, without reckoning anew from the beginning;
in which lyes the foundation of their errours. From whence it happens,
that they which trust to books, do as they that cast up many little
summs into a greater, without considering whether those little summes
were rightly cast up or not; and at last finding the errour visible,
and not mistrusting their first grounds, know not which way to cleere
themselves; but spend time in fluttering over their bookes; as birds
that entring by the chimney, and finding themselves inclosed in a
chamber, flitter at the false light of a glasse window, for want of wit
to consider which way they came in. So that in the right Definition
of Names, lyes the first use of Speech; which is the Acquisition of
Science: And in wrong, or no Definitions' lyes the first abuse; from
which proceed all false and senslesse Tenets; which make those men that
take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their
own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as
men endued with true Science are above it. For between true Science,
and erroneous Doctrines, Ignorance is in the middle. Naturall sense and
imagination, are not subject to absurdity. Nature it selfe cannot erre:
and as men abound in copiousnesse of language; so they become more wise,
or more mad than ordinary. Nor is it possible without Letters for any
man to become either excellently wise, or (unless his memory be hurt by
disease, or ill constitution of organs) excellently foolish. For words
are wise mens counters, they do but reckon by them: but they are the
mony of fooles, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a
Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other Doctor whatsoever, if but a man.




Subject To Names

Subject To Names, is whatsoever can enter into, or be considered in an
account; and be added one to another to make a summe; or substracted one
from another, and leave a remainder. The Latines called Accounts of mony
Rationes, and accounting, Ratiocinatio: and that which we in bills or
books of account call Items, they called Nomina; that is, Names: and
thence it seems to proceed, that they extended the word Ratio, to the
faculty of Reckoning in all other things. The Greeks have but one word
Logos, for both Speech and Reason; not that they thought there was no
Speech without Reason; but no Reasoning without Speech: And the act of
reasoning they called syllogisme; which signifieth summing up of the
consequences of one saying to another. And because the same things may
enter into account for divers accidents; their names are (to shew that
diversity) diversly wrested, and diversified. This diversity of names
may be reduced to foure generall heads.

First, a thing may enter into account for Matter, or Body; as Living,
Sensible, Rationall, Hot, Cold, Moved, Quiet; with all which names the
word Matter, or Body is understood; all such, being names of Matter.

Secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for some accident
or quality, which we conceive to be in it; as for Being Moved, for Being
So Long, for Being Hot, &c; and then, of the name of the thing it selfe,
by a little change or wresting, wee make a name for that accident, which
we consider; and for Living put into account Life; for Moved, Motion;
for Hot, Heat; for Long, Length, and the like. And all such Names, are
the names of the accidents and properties, by which one Matter, and Body
is distinguished from another. These are called Names Abstract; Because
Severed (not from Matter, but) from the account of Matter.

Thirdly, we bring into account, the Properties of our own bodies,
whereby we make such distinction: as when any thing is Seen by us, we
reckon not the thing it selfe; but the Sight, the Colour, the Idea of
it in the fancy: and when any thing is Heard, wee reckon it not; but the
Hearing, or Sound onely, which is our fancy or conception of it by the
Eare: and such are names of fancies.

Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names, to Names
themselves, and to Speeches: For, Generall, Universall, Speciall,
Oequivocall, are names of Names. And Affirmation, Interrogation,
Commandement, Narration, Syllogisme, Sermon, Oration, and many other
such, are names of Speeches.




Use Of Names Positive

And this is all the variety of Names Positive; which are put to mark
somewhat which is in Nature, or may be feigned by the mind of man, as
Bodies that are, or may be conceived to be; or of bodies, the Properties
that are, or may be feigned to be; or Words and Speech.




Negative Names With Their Uses

There be also other Names, called Negative; which are notes to signifie
that a word is not the name of the thing in question; as these words
Nothing, No Man, Infinite, Indocible, Three Want Foure, and the
like; which are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting of
reckoning; and call to mind our past cogitations, though they be not
names of any thing; because they make us refuse to admit of Names not
rightly used.




Words Insignificant

All other names, are but insignificant sounds; and those of two
sorts. One, when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained by
Definition; whereof there have been aboundance coyned by Schoole-men,
and pusled Philosophers.

Another, when men make a name of two Names, whose significations are
contradictory and inconsistent; as this name, an Incorporeall Body, or
(which is all one) an Incorporeall Substance, and a great number more.
For whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it
is composed, put together and made one, signifie nothing at all. For
example if it be a false affirmation to say A Quadrangle Is Round,
the word Round Quadrangle signifies nothing; but is a meere sound. So
likewise if it be false, to say that vertue can be powred, or blown up
and down; the words In-powred Vertue, In-blown Vertue, are as absurd
and insignificant, as a Round Quadrangle. And therefore you shall hardly
meet with a senselesse and insignificant word, that is not made up of
some Latin or Greek names. A Frenchman seldome hears our Saviour called
by the name of Parole, but by the name of Verbe often; yet Verbe and
Parole differ no more, but that one is Latin, the other French.




Understanding

When a man upon the hearing of any Speech, hath those thoughts which the
words of that Speech, and their connexion, were ordained and constituted
to signifie; Then he is said to understand it; Understanding being
nothing els, but conception caused by Speech. And therefore if Speech
be peculiar to man (as for ought I know it is,) then is Understanding
peculiar to him also. And therefore of absurd and false affirmations,
in case they be universall, there can be no Understanding; though many
think they understand, then, when they do but repeat the words softly,
or con them in their mind.

What kinds of Speeches signifie the Appetites, Aversions, and Passions
of mans mind; and of their use and abuse, I shall speak when I have
spoken of the Passions.




Inconstant Names

The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please, and
displease us, because all men be not alike affected with the same thing,
nor the same man at all times, are in the common discourses of men, of
Inconstant signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signifie
our conceptions; and all our affections are but conceptions; when we
conceive the same things differently, we can hardly avoyd different
naming of them. For though the nature of that we conceive, be the
same; yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different
constitutions of body, and prejudices of opinion, gives everything a
tincture of our different passions. And therefore in reasoning, a man
bust take heed of words; which besides the signification of what we
imagine of their nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker; such
as are the names of Vertues, and Vices; For one man calleth Wisdome,
what another calleth Feare; and one Cruelty, what another Justice;
one Prodigality, what another Magnanimity; one Gravity, what another
Stupidity, &c. And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any
ratiocination. No more can Metaphors, and Tropes of speech: but these
are less dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy; which the
other do not.



CHAPTER V. OF REASON, AND SCIENCE.




Reason What It Is

When a man Reasoneth, hee does nothing els but conceive a summe totall,
from Addition of parcels; or conceive a Remainder, from Substraction of
one summe from another: which (if it be done by Words,) is conceiving of
the consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole;
or from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other
part. And though in some things, (as in numbers,) besides Adding and
Substracting, men name other operations, as Multiplying and Dividing;
yet they are the same; for Multiplication, is but Addition together of
things equall; and Division, but Substracting of one thing, as often as
we can. These operations are not incident to Numbers onely, but to
all manner of things that can be added together, and taken one out of
another. For as Arithmeticians teach to adde and substract in Numbers;
so the Geometricians teach the same in Lines, Figures (solid and
superficiall,) Angles, Proportions, Times, degrees of Swiftnesse, Force,
Power, and the like; The Logicians teach the same in Consequences
Of Words; adding together Two Names, to make an Affirmation; and Two
Affirmations, to make a syllogisme; and Many syllogismes to make a
Demonstration; and from the Summe, or Conclusion of a syllogisme, they
substract one Proposition, to finde the other. Writers of Politiques,
adde together Pactions, to find mens Duties; and Lawyers, Lawes and
Facts, to find what is Right and Wrong in the actions of private men.
In summe, in what matter soever there is place for Addition and
Substraction, there also is place for Reason; and where these have no
place, there Reason has nothing at all to do.




Reason Defined

Out of all which we may define, (that is to say determine,) what that
is, which is meant by this word Reason, when wee reckon it amongst
the Faculties of the mind. For Reason, in this sense, is nothing but
Reckoning (that is, Adding and Substracting) of the Consequences of
generall names agreed upon, for the Marking and Signifying of our
thoughts; I say Marking them, when we reckon by our selves; and
Signifying, when we demonstrate, or approve our reckonings to other men.




Right Reason Where

And as in Arithmetique, unpractised men must, and Professors themselves
may often erre, and cast up false; so also in any other subject of
Reasoning, the ablest, most attentive, and most practised men, may
deceive themselves, and inferre false Conclusions; Not but that Reason
it selfe is always Right Reason, as well as Arithmetique is a certain
and infallible art: But no one mans Reason, nor the Reason of any
one number of men, makes the certaintie; no more than an account is
therefore well cast up, because a great many men have unanimously
approved it. And therfore, as when there is a controversy in an account,
the parties must by their own accord, set up for right Reason, the
Reason of some Arbitrator, or Judge, to whose sentence they will
both stand, or their controversie must either come to blowes, or be
undecided, for want of a right Reason constituted by Nature; so is
it also in all debates of what kind soever: And when men that think
themselves wiser than all others, clamor and demand right Reason for
judge; yet seek no more, but that things should be determined, by no
other mens reason but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of
men, as it is in play after trump is turned, to use for trump on every
occasion, that suite whereof they have most in their hand. For they do
nothing els, that will have every of their passions, as it comes to
bear sway in them, to be taken for right Reason, and that in their own
controversies: bewraying their want of right Reason, by the claym they
lay to it.




The Use Of Reason

The Use and End of Reason, is not the finding of the summe, and truth
of one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions, and
settled significations of names; but to begin at these; and proceed from
one consequence to another. For there can be no certainty of the last
Conclusion, without a certainty of all those Affirmations and Negations,
on which it was grounded, and inferred. As when a master of a family,
in taking an account, casteth up the summs of all the bills of expence,
into one sum; and not regarding how each bill is summed up, by those
that give them in account; nor what it is he payes for; he advantages
himselfe no more, than if he allowed the account in grosse, trusting to
every of the accountants skill and honesty; so also in Reasoning of all
other things, he that takes up conclusions on the trust of Authors, and
doth not fetch them from the first Items in every Reckoning, (which are
the significations of names settled by definitions), loses his labour;
and does not know any thing; but onely beleeveth.




Of Error And Absurdity

When a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done in
particular things, (as when upon the sight of any one thing, wee
conjecture what was likely to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon
it;) if that which he thought likely to follow, followes not; or that
which he thought likely to have preceded it, hath not preceded it, this
is called ERROR; to which even the most prudent men are subject. But
when we Reason in Words of generall signification, and fall upon a
generall inference which is false; though it be commonly called Error,
it is indeed an ABSURDITY, or senseless Speech. For Error is but a
deception, in presuming that somewhat is past, or to come; of which,
though it were not past, or not to come; yet there was no impossibility
discoverable. But when we make a generall assertion, unlesse it be a
true one, the possibility of it is unconceivable. And words whereby we
conceive nothing but the sound, are those we call Absurd, insignificant,
and Non-sense. And therefore if a man should talk to me of a Round
Quadrangle; or Accidents Of Bread In Cheese; or Immaterial Substances;
or of A Free Subject; A Free Will; or any Free, but free from being
hindred by opposition, I should not say he were in an Errour; but that
his words were without meaning; that is to say, Absurd.

I have said before, (in the second chapter,) that a Man did excell
all other Animals in this faculty, that when he conceived any thing
whatsoever, he was apt to enquire the consequences of it, and what
effects he could do with it. And now I adde this other degree of the
same excellence, that he can by words reduce the consequences he findes
to generall Rules, called Theoremes, or Aphorismes; that is, he can
Reason, or reckon, not onely in number; but in all other things, whereof
one may be added unto, or substracted from another.

But this priviledge, is allayed by another; and that is, by the
priviledge of Absurdity; to which no living creature is subject, but man
onely. And of men, those are of all most subject to it, that professe
Philosophy. For it is most true that Cicero sayth of them somewhere;
that there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in the books of
Philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them
that begins his ratiocination from the Definitions, or Explications of
the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used onely
in Geometry; whose Conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.




Causes Of Absurditie

The first cause of Absurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of Method;
in that they begin not their Ratiocination from Definitions; that
is, from settled significations of their words: as if they could cast
account, without knowing the value of the numerall words, One, Two, and
Three.

And whereas all bodies enter into account upon divers considerations,
(which I have mentioned in the precedent chapter;) these considerations
being diversly named, divers absurdities proceed from the confusion, and
unfit connexion of their names into assertions. And therefore

The second cause of Absurd assertions, I ascribe to the giving of names
of Bodies, to Accidents; or of Accidents, to Bodies; As they do, that
say, Faith Is Infused, or Inspired; when nothing can be Powred, or
Breathed into any thing, but body; and that, Extension is Body; that
Phantasmes are Spirits, &c.

The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the Accidents of
Bodies Without Us, to the Accidents of our Own Bodies; as they do that
say, the Colour Is In The Body; The Sound Is In The Ayre, &c.

The fourth, to the giving of the names of Bodies, to Names, or Speeches;
as they do that say, that There Be Things Universall; that A Living
Creature Is Genus, or A Generall Thing, &c.

The fifth, to the giving of the names of Accidents, to Names and
Speeches; as they do that say, The Nature Of A Thing Is In Its
Definition; A Mans Command Is His Will; and the like.

The sixth, to the use of Metaphors, Tropes, and other Rhetoricall
figures, in stead of words proper. For though it be lawfull to say, (for
example) in common speech, The Way Goeth, Or Leadeth Hither, Or Thither,
The Proverb Sayes This Or That (whereas wayes cannot go, nor Proverbs
speak;) yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to
be admitted.

The seventh, to names that signifie nothing; but are taken up, and
learned by rote from the Schooles, as Hypostatical, Transubstantiate,
Consubstantiate, Eternal-now, and the like canting of Schoole-men.

To him that can avoyd these things, it is not easie to fall into any
absurdity, unlesse it be by the length of an account; wherein he may
perhaps forget what went before. For all men by nature reason alike, and
well, when they have good principles. For who is so stupid, as both to
mistake in Geometry, and also to persist in it, when another detects his
error to him?




Science

By this it appears that Reason is not as Sense, and Memory, borne with
us; nor gotten by Experience onely; as Prudence is; but attayned by
Industry; first in apt imposing of Names; and secondly by getting a good
and orderly Method in proceeding from the Elements, which are Names,
to Assertions made by Connexion of one of them to another; and so to
syllogismes, which are the Connexions of one Assertion to another, till
we come to a knowledge of all the Consequences of names appertaining to
the subject in hand; and that is it, men call SCIENCE. And whereas
Sense and Memory are but knowledge of Fact, which is a thing past, and
irrevocable; Science is the knowledge of Consequences, and dependance
of one fact upon another: by which, out of that we can presently do, we
know how to do something els when we will, or the like, another time;
Because when we see how any thing comes about, upon what causes, and by
what manner; when the like causes come into our power, wee see how to
make it produce the like effects.

Children therefore are not endued with Reason at all, till they have
attained the use of Speech: but are called Reasonable Creatures, for the
possibility apparent of having the use of Reason in time to come. And
the most part of men, though they have the use of Reasoning a little
way, as in numbring to some degree; yet it serves them to little use in
common life; in which they govern themselves, some better, some worse,
according to their differences of experience, quicknesse of memory, and
inclinations to severall ends; but specially according to good or evill
fortune, and the errors of one another. For as for Science, or certain
rules of their actions, they are so farre from it, that they know
not what it is. Geometry they have thought Conjuring: but for other
Sciences, they who have not been taught the beginnings, and some
progresse in them, that they may see how they be acquired and generated,
are in this point like children, that having no thought of generation,
are made believe by the women, that their brothers and sisters are not
born, but found in the garden.

But yet they that have no Science, are in better, and nobler condition
with their naturall Prudence; than men, that by mis-reasoning, or by
trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd generall
rules. For ignorance of causes, and of rules, does not set men so farre
out of their way, as relying on false rules, and taking for causes of
what they aspire to, those that are not so, but rather causes of the
contrary.

To conclude, The Light of humane minds is Perspicuous Words, but by
exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; Reason is
the Pace; Encrease of Science, the Way; and the Benefit of man-kind, the
End. And on the contrary, Metaphors, and senslesse and ambiguous words,
are like Ignes Fatui; and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst
innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention, and sedition, or
contempt.




Prudence & Sapience, With Their Difference

As, much Experience, is Prudence; so, is much Science, Sapience. For
though wee usually have one name of Wisedome for them both; yet
the Latines did always distinguish between Prudentia and Sapientia,
ascribing the former to Experience, the later to Science. But to make
their difference appeare more cleerly, let us suppose one man endued
with an excellent naturall use, and dexterity in handling his armes; and
another to have added to that dexterity, an acquired Science, of where
he can offend, or be offended by his adversarie, in every possible
posture, or guard: The ability of the former, would be to the ability
of the later, as Prudence to Sapience; both usefull; but the later
infallible. But they that trusting onely to the authority of books,
follow the blind blindly, are like him that trusting to the false rules
of the master of fence, ventures praesumptuously upon an adversary, that
either kills, or disgraces him.




Signes Of Science

The signes of Science, are some, certain and infallible; some,
uncertain. Certain, when he that pretendeth the Science of any thing,
can teach the same; that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof
perspicuously to another: Uncertain, when onely some particular events
answer to his pretence, and upon many occasions prove so as he sayes
they must. Signes of prudence are all uncertain; because to observe by
experience, and remember all circumstances that may alter the successe,
is impossible. But in any businesse, whereof a man has not infallible
Science to proceed by; to forsake his own natural judgement, and be
guided by generall sentences read in Authors, and subject to many
exceptions, is a signe of folly, and generally scorned by the name of
Pedantry. And even of those men themselves, that in Councells of the
Common-wealth, love to shew their reading of Politiques and History,
very few do it in their domestique affaires, where their particular
interest is concerned; having Prudence enough for their private
affaires: but in publique they study more the reputation of their owne
wit, than the successe of anothers businesse.



CHAPTER VI. OF THE INTERIOUR BEGINNINGS OF VOLUNTARY MOTIONS

COMMONLY CALLED THE PASSIONS. AND THE SPEECHES BY WHICH THEY ARE
EXPRESSED.




Motion Vitall And Animal

There be in Animals, two sorts of Motions peculiar to them: One called
Vitall; begun in generation, and continued without interruption through
their whole life; such as are the Course of the Bloud, the Pulse, the
Breathing, the Concoctions, Nutrition, Excretion, &c; to which Motions
there needs no help of Imagination: The other in Animal Motion,
otherwise called Voluntary Motion; as to Go, to Speak, to Move any of
our limbes, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds. That Sense,
is Motion in the organs and interiour parts of mans body, caused by
the action of the things we See, Heare, &c. ; And that Fancy is but the
Reliques of the same Motion, remaining after Sense, has been already
sayd in the first and second Chapters. And because Going, Speaking, and
the like Voluntary motions, depend alwayes upon a precedent thought of
Whither, Which Way, and What; it is evident, that the Imagination is
the first internall beginning of all Voluntary Motion. And although
unstudied men, doe not conceive any motion at all to be there, where
the thing moved is invisible; or the space it is moved in, is (for the
shortnesse of it) insensible; yet that doth not hinder, but that such
Motions are. For let a space be never so little, that which is moved
over a greater space, whereof that little one is part, must first be
moved over that. These small beginnings of Motion, within the body
of Man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other
visible actions, are commonly called ENDEAVOUR.




Endeavour; Appetite; Desire; Hunger; Thirst; Aversion

This Endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called
APPETITE, or DESIRE; the later, being the generall name; and the other,
oftentimes restrayned to signifie the Desire of Food, namely Hunger and
Thirst. And when the Endeavour is fromward something, it is generally
called AVERSION. These words Appetite, and Aversion we have from the
Latines; and they both of them signifie the motions, one of approaching,
the other of retiring. So also do the Greek words for the same, which
are orme and aphorme. For nature it selfe does often presse upon men
those truths, which afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond
Nature, they stumble at. For the Schooles find in meere Appetite to go,
or move, no actuall Motion at all: but because some Motion they must
acknowledge, they call it Metaphoricall Motion; which is but an absurd
speech; for though Words may be called metaphoricall; Bodies, and
Motions cannot.

That which men Desire, they are also sayd to LOVE; and to HATE those
things, for which they have Aversion. So that Desire, and Love, are the
same thing; save that by Desire, we alwayes signifie the Absence of
the object; by Love, most commonly the Presence of the same. So also
by Aversion, we signifie the Absence; and by Hate, the Presence of the
Object.

Of Appetites, and Aversions, some are born with men; as Appetite of
food, Appetite of excretion, and exoneration, (which may also and more
properly be called Aversions, from somewhat they feele in their Bodies;)
and some other Appetites, not many. The rest, which are Appetites of
particular things, proceed from Experience, and triall of their effects
upon themselves, or other men. For of things wee know not at all, or
believe not to be, we can have no further Desire, than to tast and try.
But Aversion wee have for things, not onely which we know have hurt us;
but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not.




Contempt

Those things which we neither Desire, nor Hate, we are said to Contemne:
CONTEMPT being nothing els but an immobility, or contumacy of the Heart,
in resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding from that the
Heart is already moved otherwise, by either more potent objects; or from
want of experience of them.
And because the constitution of a mans Body, is in continuall mutation;
it is impossible that all the same things should alwayes cause in him
the same Appetites, and aversions: much lesse can all men consent, in
the Desire of almost any one and the same Object.




Good Evill

But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is
it, which he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate,
and Aversion, evill; And of his contempt, Vile, and Inconsiderable.
For these words of Good, evill, and Contemptible, are ever used with
relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing simply and
absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and evill, to be taken from
the nature of the objects themselves; but from the Person of the man
(where there is no Common-wealth;) or, (in a Common-wealth,) From the
Person that representeth it; or from an Arbitrator or Judge, whom men
disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the Rule
thereof.




Pulchrum Turpe; Delightfull Profitable; Unpleasant Unprofitable

The Latine Tongue has two words, whose significations approach to
those of Good and Evill; but are not precisely the same; And those are
Pulchrum and Turpe. Whereof the former signifies that, which by some
apparent signes promiseth Good; and the later, that, which promiseth
evill. But in our Tongue we have not so generall names to expresse them
by. But for Pulchrum, we say in some things, Fayre; in other Beautifull,
or Handsome, or Gallant, or Honourable, or Comely, or Amiable; and
for Turpe, Foule, Deformed, Ugly, Base, Nauseous, and the like, as the
subject shall require; All which words, in their proper places signifie
nothing els, but the Mine, or Countenance, that promiseth Good and
evill. So that of Good there be three kinds; Good in the Promise,
that is Pulchrum; Good in Effect, as the end desired, which is called
Jucundum, Delightfull; and Good as the Means, which is called Utile,
Profitable; and as many of evill: For evill, in Promise, is that
they call Turpe; evill in Effect, and End, is Molestum, Unpleasant,
Troublesome; and evill in the Means, Inutile, Unprofitable, Hurtfull.




Delight Displeasure

As, in Sense, that which is really within us, is (As I have sayd
before) onely Motion, caused by the action of externall objects, but in
apparence; to the Sight, Light and Colour; to the Eare, Sound; to the
Nostrill, Odour, &c: so, when the action of the same object is continued
from the Eyes, Eares, and other organs to the Heart; the real effect
there is nothing but Motion, or Endeavour; which consisteth in Appetite,
or Aversion, to, or from the object moving. But the apparence, or sense
of that motion, is that wee either call DELIGHT, or TROUBLE OF MIND.




Pleasure Offence

This Motion, which is called Appetite, and for the apparence of it
Delight, and Pleasure, seemeth to be, a corroboration of Vitall motion,
and a help thereunto; and therefore such things as caused Delight, were
not improperly called Jucunda, (A Juvando,) from helping or fortifying;
and the contrary, Molesta, Offensive, from hindering, and troubling the
motion vitall.

Pleasure therefore, (or Delight,) is the apparence, or sense of Good;
and Molestation or Displeasure, the apparence, or sense of evill. And
consequently all Appetite, Desire, and Love, is accompanied with some
Delight more or lesse; and all Hatred, and Aversion, with more or lesse
Displeasure and Offence.




Pleasures Of Sense; Pleasures Of The Mind; Joy Paine Griefe

Of Pleasures, or Delights, some arise from the sense of an object
Present; And those may be called Pleasures Of Sense, (The word Sensuall,
as it is used by those onely that condemn them, having no place till
there be Lawes. ) Of this kind are all Onerations and Exonerations of the
body; as also all that is pleasant, in the Sight, Hearing, Smell,
Tast, Or Touch; Others arise from the Expectation, that proceeds from
foresight of the End, or Consequence of things; whether those things in
the Sense Please or Displease: And these are Pleasures Of The Mind of
him that draweth those consequences; and are generally called JOY. In
the like manner, Displeasures, are some in the Sense, and called PAYNE;
others, in the Expectation of consequences, and are called GRIEFE.

These simple Passions called Appetite, Desire, Love, Aversion, Hate,
Joy, and griefe, have their names for divers considerations diversified.
As first, when they one succeed another, they are diversly called from
the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they
desire. Secondly, from the object loved or hated. Thirdly, from the
consideration of many of them together. Fourthly, from the Alteration or
succession it selfe.


Hope-- For Appetite with an opinion of attaining, is called HOPE.

Despaire-- The same, without such opinion, DESPAIRE.

Feare-- Aversion, with opinion of Hurt from the object, FEARE.

Courage-- The same, with hope of avoyding that Hurt by resistance,
COURAGE.

Anger-- Sudden Courage, ANGER.

Confidence-- Constant Hope, CONFIDENCE of our selves.

Diffidence-- Constant Despayre, DIFFIDENCE of our selves.

Indignation-- Anger for great hurt done to another, when we conceive the
same to be done by Injury, INDIGNATION.

Benevolence-- Desire of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL,
CHARITY. If to man generally, GOOD NATURE.

Covetousnesse-- Desire of Riches, COVETOUSNESSE: a name used alwayes in
signification of blame; because men contending for them, are displeased
with one anothers attaining them; though the desire in it selfe, be to
be blamed, or allowed, according to the means by which those Riches are
sought.

Ambition-- Desire of Office, or precedence, AMBITION: a name used also
in the worse sense, for the reason before mentioned.

Pusillanimity-- Desire of things that conduce but a little to our ends;
And fear of things that are but of little hindrance, PUSILLANIMITY.

Magnanimity-- Contempt of little helps, and hindrances, MAGNANIMITY.

Valour-- Magnanimity, in danger of Death, or Wounds, VALOUR, FORTITUDE.

Liberality-- Magnanimity in the use of Riches, LIBERALITY

Miserablenesse-- Pusillanimity, in the same WRETCHEDNESSE,
MISERABLENESSE; or PARSIMONY; as it is liked or disliked.

Kindnesse-- Love of Persons for society, KINDNESSE.

Naturall Lust-- Love of Persons for Pleasing the sense onely, NATURAL
LUST.

Luxury-- Love of the same, acquired from Rumination, that is Imagination
of Pleasure past, LUXURY.

The Passion Of Love; Jealousie-- Love of one singularly, with desire to
be singularly beloved, THE PASSION OF LOVE. The same, with fear that the
love is not mutuall, JEALOUSIE.

Revengefulnesse-- Desire, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn
some fact of his own, REVENGEFULNESSE.

Curiosity-- Desire, to know why, and how, CURIOSITY; such as is in no
living creature but Man; so that Man is distinguished, not onely by his
Reason; but also by this singular Passion from other Animals; in whom
the appetite of food, and other pleasures of Sense, by praedominance,
take away the care of knowing causes; which is a Lust of the mind,
that by a perseverance of delight in the continuall and indefatigable
generation of Knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnall
Pleasure.

Religion Superstition; True Religion-- Feare of power invisible, feigned
by the mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed, RELIGION; not
allowed, superstition. And when the power imagined is truly such as we
imagine, TRUE RELIGION.

Panique Terrour-- Feare, without the apprehension of why, or what,
PANIQUE TERROR; called so from the fables that make Pan the author of
them; whereas in truth there is always in him that so feareth, first,
some apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by example;
every one supposing his fellow to know why. And therefore this Passion
happens to none but in a throng, or multitude of people.

Admiration-- Joy, from apprehension of novelty, ADMIRATION; proper to
man, because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause.

Glory Vaine-glory-- Joy, arising from imagination of a man's own power
and ability, is that exultation of the mind which is called GLORYING:
which, if grounded upon the experience of his own former actions, is
the same with Confidence: but if grounded on the flattery of others, or
onely supposed by himselfe, for delight in the consequences of it,
is called VAINE-GLORY: which name is properly given; because a
well-grounded Confidence begetteth attempt; whereas the supposing of
power does not, and is therefore rightly called Vaine.

Dejection-- Griefe, from opinion of want of power, is called dejection
of mind.

The Vaine-glory which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of
abilities in ourselves, which we know are not, is most incident to young
men, and nourished by the Histories or Fictions of Gallant Persons; and
is corrected often times by Age, and Employment.

Sudden Glory Laughter-- Sudden glory, is the passion which maketh those
Grimaces called LAUGHTER; and is caused either by some sudden act of
their own, that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some
deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud
themselves. And it is incident most to them, that are conscious of the
fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in
their own favour, by observing the imperfections of other men.
And therefore much Laughter at the defects of others is a signe of
Pusillanimity. For of great minds, one of the proper workes is, to help
and free others from scorn; and compare themselves onely with the most
able.

Sudden Dejection Weeping-- On the contrary, Sudden Dejection is the
passion that causeth WEEPING; and is caused by such accidents, as
suddenly take away some vehement hope, or some prop of their power: and
they are most subject to it, that rely principally on helps externall,
such as are Women, and Children. Therefore, some Weep for the loss of
Friends; Others for their unkindnesse; others for the sudden stop made
to their thoughts of revenge, by Reconciliation. But in all cases, both
Laughter and Weeping, are sudden motions; Custome taking them both away.
For no man Laughs at old jests; or Weeps for an old calamity.

Shame Blushing-- Griefe, for the discovery of some defect of ability
is SHAME, or the passion that discovereth itself in BLUSHING; and
consisteth in the apprehension of some thing dishonourable; and in young
men, is a signe of the love of good reputation; and commendable: in
old men it is a signe of the same; but because it comes too late, not
commendable.

Impudence-- The Contempt of good reputation is called IMPUDENCE.

Pitty-- Griefe, for the calamity of another is PITTY; and ariseth
from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himselfe; and
therefore is called also COMPASSION, and in the phrase of this present
time a FELLOW-FEELING: and therefore for Calamity arriving from
great wickedness, the best men have the least Pitty; and for the same
Calamity, those have least Pitty, that think themselves least obnoxious
to the same.

Cruelty-- Contempt, or little sense of the calamity of others, is that
which men call CRUELTY; proceeding from Security of their own fortune.
For, that any man should take pleasure in other mens' great harmes,
without other end of his own, I do not conceive it possible.

Emulation Envy-- Griefe, for the success of a Competitor in wealth,
honour, or other good, if it be joyned with Endeavour to enforce our own
abilities to equal or exceed him, is called EMULATION: but joyned with
Endeavour to supplant or hinder a Competitor, ENVIE.

Deliberation-- When in the mind of man, Appetites and Aversions, Hopes
and Feares, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and
divers good and evill consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing
propounded, come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we
have an Appetite to it, sometimes an Aversion from it; sometimes Hope to
be able to do it; sometimes Despaire, or Feare to attempt it; the whole
sum of Desires, Aversions, Hopes and Feares, continued till the thing be
either done, or thought impossible, is that we call DELIBERATION.

Therefore of things past, there is no Deliberation; because manifestly
impossible to be changed: nor of things known to be impossible, or
thought so; because men know, or think such Deliberation vaine. But
of things impossible, which we think possible, we may Deliberate; not
knowing it is in vain. And it is called DELIBERATION; because it is a
putting an end to the Liberty we had of doing, or omitting, according to
our own Appetite, or Aversion.

This alternate succession of Appetites, Aversions, Hopes and Feares is
no less in other living Creatures than in Man; and therefore Beasts also
Deliberate.

Every Deliberation is then sayd to End when that whereof they
Deliberate, is either done, or thought impossible; because till then wee
retain the liberty of doing, or omitting, according to our Appetite, or
Aversion.




The Will

In Deliberation, the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhaering
to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that wee call the
WILL; the Act, (not the faculty,) of Willing. And Beasts that have
Deliberation must necessarily also have Will. The Definition of the
Will, given commonly by the Schooles, that it is a Rationall Appetite,
is not good. For if it were, then could there be no Voluntary Act
against Reason. For a Voluntary Act is that, which proceedeth from the
Will, and no other. But if in stead of a Rationall Appetite, we shall
say an Appetite resulting from a precedent Deliberation, then the
Definition is the same that I have given here. Will, therefore, Is The
Last Appetite In Deliberating. And though we say in common Discourse, a
man had a Will once to do a thing, that neverthelesse he forbore to
do; yet that is properly but an Inclination, which makes no Action
Voluntary; because the action depends not of it, but of the last
Inclination, or Appetite. For if the intervenient Appetites make any
action Voluntary, then by the same reason all intervenient Aversions
should make the same action Involuntary; and so one and the same action
should be both Voluntary & Involuntary.

By this it is manifest, that not onely actions that have their beginning
from Covetousness, Ambition, Lust, or other Appetites to the thing
propounded; but also those that have their beginning from Aversion,
or Feare of those consequences that follow the omission, are Voluntary
Actions.




Formes Of Speech, In Passion

The formes of Speech by which the Passions are expressed, are partly the
same, and partly different from those, by which we express our Thoughts.
And first generally all Passions may be expressed Indicatively; as, I
Love, I Feare, I Joy, I Deliberate, I Will, I Command: but some of them
have particular expressions by themselves, which nevertheless are not
affirmations, unless it be when they serve to make other inferences,
besides that of the Passion they proceed from. Deliberation is expressed
Subjunctively; which is a speech proper to signifie suppositions, with
their consequences; as, If This Be Done, Then This Will Follow; and
differs not from the language of Reasoning, save that Reasoning is in
generall words, but Deliberation for the most part is of Particulars.
The language of Desire, and Aversion, is Imperative; as, Do This,
Forbear That; which when the party is obliged to do, or forbear, is
Command; otherwise Prayer; or els Counsell. The language of Vaine-Glory,
of Indignation, Pitty and Revengefulness, Optative: but of the Desire to
know, there is a peculiar expression called Interrogative; as, What Is
It, When Shall It, How Is It Done, and Why So? Other language of the
Passions I find none: for Cursing, Swearing, Reviling, and the like, do
not signifie as Speech; but as the actions of a tongue accustomed.

These forms of Speech, I say, are expressions, or voluntary
significations of our Passions: but certain signes they be not; because
they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such
Passions or not. The best signes of Passions present, are either in the
countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aims, which we
otherwise know the man to have.




Good And Evill Apparent

And because in Deliberation the Appetites and Aversions are raised by
foresight of the good and evill consequences, and sequels of the action
whereof we Deliberate; the good or evill effect thereof dependeth on the
foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldome any man
is able to see to the end. But for so far as a man seeth, if the Good
in those consequences be greater than the evill, the whole chain is that
which Writers call Apparent or Seeming Good. And contrarily, when the
evill exceedeth the good, the whole is Apparent or Seeming Evill: so
that he who hath by Experience, or Reason, the greatest and surest
prospect of Consequences, Deliberates best himself; and is able, when he
will, to give the best counsel unto others.




Felicity

Continual Successe in obtaining those things which a man from time to
time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering, is that men call
FELICITY; I mean the Felicity of this life. For there is no such thing
as perpetual Tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because Life
itself is but Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor without
Feare, no more than without Sense. What kind of Felicity God hath
ordained to them that devoutly honour him, a man shall no sooner know,
than enjoy; being joys, that now are as incomprehensible, as the word of
School-men, Beatifical Vision, is unintelligible.




Praise Magnification

The form of speech whereby men signifie their opinion of the Goodnesse
of anything is PRAISE. That whereby they signifie the power and
greatness of anything is MAGNIFYING. And that whereby they signifie
the opinion they have of a man's felicity is by the Greeks called
Makarismos, for which we have no name in our tongue. And thus much is
sufficient for the present purpose to have been said of the passions.



CHAPTER VII. OF THE ENDS OR RESOLUTIONS OF DISCOURSE


Of all Discourse, governed by desire of Knowledge, there is at last
an End, either by attaining, or by giving over. And in the chain of
Discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an End for that time.




Judgement, or Sentence Final; Doubt

If the Discourse be meerly Mentall, it consisteth of thoughts that the
thing will be, and will not be; or that it has been, and has not been,
alternately. So that wheresoever you break off the chayn of a mans
Discourse, you leave him in a Praesumption of It Will Be, or, It Will
Not Be; or it Has Been, or, Has Not Been. All which is Opinion. And that
which is alternate Appetite, in Deliberating concerning Good and Evil,
the same is alternate Opinion in the Enquiry of the truth of Past, and
Future. And as the last Appetite in Deliberation is called the Will, so
the last Opinion in search of the truth of Past, and Future, is called
the JUDGEMENT, or Resolute and Final Sentence of him that Discourseth.
And as the whole chain of Appetites alternate, in the question of Good
or Bad is called Deliberation; so the whole chain of Opinions alternate,
in the question of True, or False is called DOUBT.

No Discourse whatsoever, can End in absolute knowledge of Fact, past, or
to come. For, as for the knowledge of Fact, it is originally, Sense; and
ever after, Memory. And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have
said before is called Science, it is not Absolute, but Conditionall. No
man can know by Discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will
be; which is to know absolutely: but onely, that if This be, That is; if
This has been, That has been; if This shall be, That shall be: which
is to know conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to
another; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing.




Science Opinion Conscience

And therefore, when the Discourse is put into Speech, and begins with
the Definitions of Words, and proceeds by Connexion of the same into
general Affirmations, and of these again into Syllogismes, the end or
last sum is called the Conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it
signified is that conditional Knowledge, or Knowledge of the consequence
of words, which is commonly called Science. But if the first ground of
such Discourse be not Definitions, or if the Definitions be not rightly
joyned together into Syllogismes, then the End or Conclusion is again
OPINION, namely of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in
absurd and senslesse words, without possibility of being understood.
When two, or more men, know of one and the same fact, they are said
to be CONSCIOUS of it one to another; which is as much as to know it
together. And because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one
another, or of a third, it was, and ever will be reputed a very Evill
act, for any man to speak against his Conscience; or to corrupt or force
another so to do: Insomuch that the plea of Conscience, has been always
hearkened unto very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men made use
of the same word metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own secret
facts, and secret thoughts; and therefore it is Rhetorically said that
the Conscience is a thousand witnesses. And last of all, men, vehemently
in love with their own new opinions, (though never so absurd,) and
obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that
reverenced name of Conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful,
to change or speak against them; and so pretend to know they are true,
when they know at most but that they think so.




Beliefe Faith

When a mans Discourse beginneth not at Definitions, it beginneth either
at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called
Opinion; Or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to
know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth
not; and then the Discourse is not so much concerning the Thing, as the
Person; And the Resolution is called BELEEFE, and FAITH: Faith, In the
man; Beleefe, both Of the man, and Of the truth of what he sayes. So
then in Beleefe are two opinions; one of the saying of the man; the
other of his vertue. To Have Faith In, or Trust To, or Beleeve A Man,
signifie the same thing; namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man:
But to Beleeve What Is Said, signifieth onely an opinion of the truth
of the saying. But wee are to observe that this Phrase, I Beleeve In;
as also the Latine, Credo In; and the Greek, Pisteno Eis, are never used
but in the writings of Divines. In stead of them, in other writings are
put, I Beleeve Him; I Have Faith In Him; I Rely On Him: and in Latin,
Credo Illi; Fido Illi: and in Greek, Pisteno Anto: and that this
singularity of the Ecclesiastical use of the word hath raised many
disputes about the right object of the Christian Faith.

But by Beleeving In, as it is in the Creed, is meant, not trust in the
Person; but Confession and acknowledgement of the Doctrine. For not
onely Christians, but all manner of men do so believe in God, as to hold
all for truth they heare him say, whether they understand it, or not;
which is all the Faith and trust can possibly be had in any person
whatsoever: But they do not all believe the Doctrine of the Creed.

From whence we may inferre, that when wee believe any saying whatsoever
it be, to be true, from arguments taken, not from the thing it selfe, or
from the principles of naturall Reason, but from the Authority, and
good opinion wee have, of him that hath sayd it; then is the speaker, or
person we believe in, or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of
our Faith; and the Honour done in Believing, is done to him onely. And
consequently, when wee Believe that the Scriptures are the word of God,
having no immediate revelation from God himselfe, our Beleefe, Faith,
and Trust is in the Church; whose word we take, and acquiesce therein.
And they that believe that which a Prophet relates unto them in the
name of God, take the word of the Prophet, do honour to him, and in him
trust, and believe, touching the truth of what he relateth, whether he
be a true, or a false Prophet. And so it is also with all other History.
For if I should not believe all that is written By Historians, of the
glorious acts of Alexander, or Caesar; I do not think the Ghost of
Alexander, or Caesar, had any just cause to be offended; or any body
else, but the Historian. If Livy say the Gods made once a Cow speak, and
we believe it not; wee distrust not God therein, but Livy. So that it is
evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason, than what is
drawn from authority of men onely, and their writings; whether they be
sent from God or not, is Faith in men onely.



CHAPTER VIII. OF THE VERTUES COMMONLY CALLED INTELLECTUAL;

AND THEIR CONTRARY DEFECTS




Intellectuall Vertue Defined

Vertue generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued
for eminence; and consisteth in comparison. For if all things
were equally in all men, nothing would be prized. And by Vertues
INTELLECTUALL, are always understood such abilityes of the mind, as men
praise, value, and desire should be in themselves; and go commonly under
the name of a Good Witte; though the same word Witte, be used also, to
distinguish one certain ability from the rest.




Wit, Naturall, Or Acquired

These Vertues are of two sorts; Naturall, and Acquired. By Naturall, I
mean not, that which a man hath from his Birth: for that is nothing else
but Sense; wherein men differ so little one from another, and from brute
Beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst Vertues. But I mean, that
Witte, which is gotten by Use onely, and Experience; without Method,
Culture, or Instruction. This NATURALL WITTE, consisteth principally
in two things; Celerity Of Imagining, (that is, swift succession of one
thought to another;) and Steddy Direction to some approved end. On the
Contrary a slow Imagination, maketh that Defect, or fault of the mind,
which is commonly called DULNESSE, Stupidity, and sometimes by other
names that signifie slownesse of motion, or difficulty to be moved.




Good Wit, Or Fancy; Good Judgement; Discretion

And this difference of quicknesse, is caused by the difference of mens
passions; that love and dislike, some one thing, some another: and
therefore some mens thoughts run one way, some another: and are held to,
and observe differently the things that passe through their imagination.
And whereas in his succession of mens thoughts, there is nothing to
observe in the things they think on, but either in what they be Like One
Another, or in what they be Unlike, or What They Serve For, or How They
Serve To Such A Purpose; Those that observe their similitudes, in case
they be such as are but rarely observed by others, are sayd to have a
Good Wit; by which, in this occasion, is meant a Good Fancy. But they
that observe their differences, and dissimilitudes; which is called
Distinguishing, and Discerning, and Judging between thing and thing; in
case, such discerning be not easie, are said to have a Good Judgement:
and particularly in matter of conversation and businesse; wherein,
times, places, and persons are to be discerned, this Vertue is called
DISCRETION. The former, that is, Fancy, without the help of Judgement,
is not commended as a Vertue: but the later which is Judgement, and
Discretion, is commended for it selfe, without the help of Fancy.
Besides the Discretion of times, places, and persons, necessary to a
good Fancy, there is required also an often application of his thoughts
to their End; that is to say, to some use to be made of them. This done;
he that hath this Vertue, will be easily fitted with similitudes, that
will please, not onely by illustration of his discourse, and adorning it
with new and apt metaphors; but also, by the rarity or their invention.
But without Steddinesse, and Direction to some End, a great Fancy is one
kind of Madnesse; such as they have, that entring into any discourse,
are snatched from their purpose, by every thing that comes in their
thought, into so many, and so long digressions, and parentheses, that
they utterly lose themselves: Which kind of folly, I know no particular
name for: but the cause of it is, sometimes want of experience; whereby
that seemeth to a man new and rare, which doth not so to others:
sometimes Pusillanimity; by which that seems great to him, which other
men think a trifle: and whatsoever is new, or great, and therefore
thought fit to be told, withdrawes a man by degrees from the intended
way of his discourse.

In a good Poem, whether it be Epique, or Dramatique; as also in Sonnets,
Epigrams, and other Pieces, both Judgement and Fancy are required:
But the Fancy must be more eminent; because they please for the
Extravagancy; but ought not to displease by Indiscretion.

In a good History, the Judgement must be eminent; because the goodnesse
consisteth, in the Method, in the Truth, and in the Choyse of the
actions that are most profitable to be known. Fancy has no place, but
onely in adorning the stile.

In Orations of Prayse, and in Invectives, the Fancy is praedominant;
because the designe is not truth, but to Honour or Dishonour; which is
done by noble, or by vile comparisons. The Judgement does but suggest
what circumstances make an action laudable, or culpable.

In Hortatives, and Pleadings, as Truth, or Disguise serveth best to the
Designe in hand; so is the Judgement, or the Fancy most required.

In Demonstration, in Councell, and all rigourous search of Truth,
Judgement does all; except sometimes the understanding have need to be
opened by some apt similitude; and then there is so much use of Fancy.
But for Metaphors, they are in this case utterly excluded. For seeing
they openly professe deceipt; to admit them into Councell, or Reasoning,
were manifest folly.

And in any Discourse whatsoever, if the defect of Discretion be
apparent, how extravagant soever the Fancy be, the whole discourse
will be taken for a signe of want of wit; and so will it never when the
Discretion is manifest, though the Fancy be never so ordinary.

The secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, prophane,
clean, obscene, grave, and light, without shame, or blame; which verball
discourse cannot do, farther than the Judgement shall approve of the
Time, Place, and Persons. An Anatomist, or a Physitian may speak, or
write his judgement of unclean things; because it is not to please,
but profit: but for another man to write his extravagant, and pleasant
fancies of the same, is as if a man, from being tumbled into the dirt,
should come and present himselfe before good company. And 'tis the want
of Discretion that makes the difference. Again, in profest remissnesse
of mind, and familiar company, a man may play with the sounds, and
aequivocal significations of words; and that many times with encounters
of extraordinary Fancy: but in a Sermon, or in publique, or before
persons unknown, or whom we ought to reverence, there is no Gingling of
words that will not be accounted folly: and the difference is onely in
the want of Discretion. So that where Wit is wanting, it is not Fancy
that is wanting, but Discretion. Judgement therefore without Fancy is
Wit, but Fancy without Judgement not.




Prudence

When the thoughts of a man, that has a designe in hand, running over a
multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that designe; or what
designe they may conduce into; if his observations be such as are not
easie, or usuall, This wit of his is called PRUDENCE; and dependeth on
much Experience, and Memory of the like things, and their consequences
heretofore. In which there is not so much difference of Men, as there is
in their Fancies and Judgements; Because the Experience of men equall
in age, is not much unequall, as to the quantity; but lyes in different
occasions; every one having his private designes. To govern well a
family, and a kingdome, are not different degrees of Prudence; but
different sorts of businesse; no more then to draw a picture in little,
or as great, or greater then the life, are different degrees of Art. A
plain husband-man is more Prudent in affaires of his own house, then a
Privy Counseller in the affaires of another man.




Craft

To Prudence, if you adde the use of unjust, or dishonest means, such
as usually are prompted to men by Feare, or Want; you have that Crooked
Wisdome, which is called CRAFT; which is a signe of Pusillanimity. For
Magnanimity is contempt of unjust, or dishonest helps. And that which
the Latines Call Versutia, (translated into English, Shifting,) and is
a putting off of a present danger or incommodity, by engaging into
a greater, as when a man robbs one to pay another, is but a shorter
sighted Craft, called Versutia, from Versura, which signifies taking
mony at usurie, for the present payment of interest.




Acquired Wit

As for Acquired Wit, (I mean acquired by method and instruction,) there
is none but Reason; which is grounded on the right use of Speech; and
produceth the Sciences. But of Reason and Science, I have already spoken
in the fifth and sixth Chapters.

The causes of this difference of Witts, are in the Passions: and
the difference of Passions, proceedeth partly from the different
Constitution of the body, and partly from different Education. For if
the difference proceeded from the temper of the brain, and the organs of
Sense, either exterior or interior, there would be no lesse difference
of men in their Sight, Hearing, or other Senses, than in their Fancies,
and Discretions. It proceeds therefore from the Passions; which are
different, not onely from the difference of mens complexions; but also
from their difference of customes, and education.

The Passions that most of all cause the differences of Wit, are
principally, the more or lesse Desire of Power, of Riches, of Knowledge,
and of Honour. All which may be reduced to the first, that is Desire of
Power. For Riches, Knowledge and Honour are but severall sorts of Power.




Giddinesse Madnesse

And therefore, a man who has no great Passion for any of these things;
but is as men terme it indifferent; though he may be so farre a good
man, as to be free from giving offence; yet he cannot possibly have
either a great Fancy, or much Judgement. For the Thoughts, are to the
Desires, as Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the
things Desired: All Stedinesse of the minds motion, and all quicknesse
of the same, proceeding from thence. For as to have no Desire, is to
be Dead: so to have weak Passions, is Dulnesse; and to have Passions
indifferently for every thing, GIDDINESSE, and Distraction; and to have
stronger, and more vehement Passions for any thing, than is ordinarily
seen in others, is that which men call MADNESSE.

Whereof there be almost as many kinds, as of the Passions themselves.
Sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant Passion, proceedeth from the
evill constitution of the organs of the Body, or harme done them; and
sometimes the hurt, and indisposition of the Organs, is caused by the
vehemence, or long continuance of the Passion. But in both cases the
Madnesse is of one and the same nature.

The Passion, whose violence, or continuance maketh Madnesse, is either
great Vaine-Glory; which is commonly called Pride, and Selfe-Conceipt;
or great Dejection of mind.




Rage

Pride, subjecteth a man to Anger, the excesse whereof, is the Madnesse
called RAGE, and FURY. And thus it comes to passe that excessive desire
of Revenge, when it becomes habituall, hurteth the organs, and becomes
Rage: That excessive love, with jealousie, becomes also Rage: Excessive
opinion of a mans own selfe, for divine inspiration, for wisdome,
learning, forme, and the like, becomes Distraction, and Giddinesse:
the same, joyned with Envy, Rage: Vehement opinion of the truth of any
thing, contradicted by others, Rage.




Melancholy

Dejection, subjects a man to causelesse fears; which is a Madnesse
commonly called MELANCHOLY, apparent also in divers manners; as in
haunting of solitudes, and graves; in superstitious behaviour; and in
fearing some one, some another particular thing. In summe, all Passions
that produce strange and unusuall behaviour, are called by the generall
name of Madnesse. But of the severall kinds of Madnesse, he that
would take the paines, might enrowle a legion. And if the Excesses be
madnesse, there is no doubt but the Passions themselves, when they tend
to Evill, are degrees of the same.

(For example,) Though the effect of folly, in them that are possessed of
an opinion of being inspired, be not visible alwayes in one man, by any
very extravagant action, that proceedeth from such Passion; yet when
many of them conspire together, the Rage of the whole multitude is
visible enough. For what argument of Madnesse can there be greater, than
to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is
somewhat lesse than such a multitude will do. For they will clamour,
fight against, and destroy those, by whom all their lifetime before,
they have been protected, and secured from injury. And if this be
Madnesse in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man. For
as in the middest of the sea, though a man perceive no sound of
that part of the water next him; yet he is well assured, that part
contributes as much, to the Roaring of the Sea, as any other part, of
the same quantity: so also, thought wee perceive no great unquietnesse,
in one, or two men; yet we may be well assured, that their singular
Passions, are parts of the Seditious roaring of a troubled Nation. And
if there were nothing else that bewrayed their madnesse; yet that very
arrogating such inspiration to themselves, is argument enough. If some
man in Bedlam should entertaine you with sober discourse; and you desire
in taking leave, to know what he were, that you might another time
requite his civility; and he should tell you, he were God the Father;
I think you need expect no extravagant action for argument of his
Madnesse.