"
The potential parts of a principal virtue are called secondary virtues:
for while the principal virtue observes the mode in some principal
matter, these observe the mode in some other matter wherein moderation
is not so difficult.
The potential parts of a principal virtue are called secondary virtues:
for while the principal virtue observes the mode in some principal
matter, these observe the mode in some other matter wherein moderation
is not so difficult.
Summa Theologica
1:17) that "to the children" who took
pulse for their food (Dan. 1:12), "God gave knowledge, and
understanding in every book and wisdom. " Therefore insensibility, which
rejects these pleasures altogether, is not sinful.
Objection 3: Further, that which is a very effective means of avoiding
sin would seem not to be sinful. Now the most effective remedy in
avoiding sin is to shun pleasures, and this pertains to insensibility.
For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 9) that "if we deny ourselves
pleasures we are less liable to sin. " Therefore there is nothing
vicious in insensibility.
On the contrary, Nothing save vice is opposed to virtue. Now
insensibility is opposed to the virtue of temperance according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 11). Therefore insensibility is a vice.
I answer that, Whatever is contrary to the natural order is vicious.
Now nature has introduced pleasure into the operations that are
necessary for man's life. Wherefore the natural order requires that man
should make use of these pleasures, in so far as they are necessary for
man's well-being, as regards the preservation either of the individual
or of the species. Accordingly, if anyone were to reject pleasure to
the extent of omitting things that are necessary for nature's
preservation, he would sin, as acting counter to the order of nature.
And this pertains to the vice of insensibility.
It must, however, be observed that it is sometimes praiseworthy, and
even necessary for the sake of an end, to abstain from such pleasures
as result from these operations. Thus, for the sake of the body's
health, certain persons refrain from pleasures of meat, drink, and sex;
as also for the fulfilment of certain engagements: thus athletes and
soldiers have to deny themselves many pleasures, in order to fulfil
their respective duties. In like manner penitents, in order to recover
health of soul, have recourse to abstinence from pleasures, as a kind
of diet, and those who are desirous of giving themselves up to
contemplation and Divine things need much to refrain from carnal
things. Nor do any of these things pertain to the vice of
insensibility, because they are in accord with right reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Daniel abstained thus from pleasures, not through
any horror of pleasure as though it were evil in itself, but for some
praiseworthy end, in order, namely, to adapt himself to the heights of
contemplation by abstaining from pleasures of the body. Hence the text
goes on to tell of the revelation that he received immediately
afterwards.
Reply to Objection 2: Since man cannot use his reason without his
sensitive powers. which need a bodily organ. as stated in the [3447]FP,
Q[84], AA[7],8, man needs to sustain his body in order that he may use
his reason. Now the body is sustained by means of operations that
afford pleasure: wherefore the good of reason cannot be in a man if he
abstain from all pleasures. Yet this need for using pleasures of the
body will be greater or less, according as man needs more or less the
powers of his body in accomplishing the act of reason. Wherefore it is
commendable for those who undertake the duty of giving themselves to
contemplation, and of imparting to others a spiritual good, by a kind
of spiritual procreation, as it were, to abstain from many pleasures,
but not for those who are in duty bound to bodily occupations and
carnal procreation.
Reply to Objection 3: In order to avoid sin, pleasure must be shunned,
not altogether, but so that it is not sought more than necessity
requires.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether intemperance is a childish sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not a childish sin. For
Jerome in commenting on Mat. 18:3, "Unless you be converted, and become
as little children," says that "a child persists not in anger, is
unmindful of injuries, takes no pleasure in seeing a beautiful woman,"
all of which is contrary to intemperance. Therefore intemperance is not
a childish sin.
Objection 2: Further, children have none but natural desires. Now "in
respect of natural desires few sin by intemperance," according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11). Therefore intemperance is not a childish
sin.
Objection 3: Further, children should be fostered and nourished:
whereas concupiscence and pleasure, about which intemperance is
concerned, are always to be thwarted and uprooted, according to Col.
3:5, "Mortify . . . your members upon the earth, which are . . .
concupiscence" [*Vulg. : 'your members which are upon the earth,
fornication . . . concupiscence'], etc. Therefore intemperance is not a
childish sin.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "we apply
the term intemperance* to childish faults. " [*{Akolasia} which
Aristotle refers to {kolazo} to punish, so that its original sense
would be 'impunity' or 'unrestraint. ']
I answer that, A thing is said to be childish for two reasons. First,
because it is becoming to children, and the Philosopher does not mean
that the sin of intemperance is childish in this sense. Secondly. by
way of likeness, and it is in this sense that sins of intemperance are
said to be childish. For the sin of intemperance is one of unchecked
concupiscence, which is likened to a child in three ways. First, as
rewards that which they both desire, for like a child concupiscence
desires something disgraceful. This is because in human affairs a thing
is beautiful according as it harmonizes with reason. Wherefore Tully
says (De Offic. i, 27) under the heading "Comeliness is twofold," that
"the beautiful is that which is in keeping with man's excellence in so
far as his nature differs from other animals. " Now a child does not
attend to the order of reason; and in like manner "concupiscence does
not listen to reason," according to Ethic. vii, 6. Secondly, they are
alike as to the result. For a child, if left to his own will, becomes
more self-willed: hence it is written (Ecclus. 30:8): "A horse not
broken becometh stubborn, and a child left to himself will become
headstrong. " So, too, concupiscence, if indulged, gathers strength:
wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 5): "Lust served became a
custom, and custom not resisted became necessity. " Thirdly, as to the
remedy which is applied to both. For a child is corrected by being
restrained; hence it is written (Prov. 23:13,14): "Withhold not
correction from a child . . . Thou shalt beat him with a rod, and
deliver his soul from Hell. " In like manner by resisting concupiscence
we moderate it according to the demands of virtue. Augustine indicates
this when he says (Music. vi, 11) that if the mind be lifted up to
spiritual things, and remain fixed "thereon, the impulse of custom,"
i. e. carnal concupiscence, "is broken, and being suppressed is
gradually weakened: for it was stronger when we followed it, and though
not wholly destroyed, it is certainly less strong when we curb it. "
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "as a child ought to
live according to the direction of his tutor, so ought the
concupiscible to accord with reason. "
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes the term "childish" as
denoting what is observed in children. It is not in this sense that the
sin of intemperance is said to be childish, but by way of likeness, as
stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: A desire may be said to be natural in two ways.
First, with regard to its genus, and thus temperance and intemperance
are about natural desires, since they are about desires of food and
sex, which are directed to the preservation of nature. Secondly, a
desire may be called natural with regard to the species of the thing
that nature requires for its own preservation; and in this way it does
not happen often that one sins in the matter of natural desires, for
nature requires only that which supplies its need, and there is no sin
in desiring this, save only where it is desired in excess as to
quantity. This is the only way in which sin can occur with regard to
natural desires, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11).
There are other things in respect of which sins frequently occur, and
these are certain incentives to desire devised by human curiosity [*Cf.
Q[167]], such as the nice [curiosa] preparation of food, or the
adornment of women. And though children do not affect these things
much, yet intemperance is called a childish sin for the reason given
above.
Reply to Objection 3: That which regards nature should be nourished and
fostered in children, but that which pertains to the lack of reason in
them should not be fostered, but corrected, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether cowardice* is a greater vice than intemperance? [*Cf. Q[125]]
Objection 1: It would seem that cowardice is a greater vice than
intemperance. For a vice deserves reproach through being opposed to the
good of virtue. Now cowardice is opposed to fortitude, which is a more
excellent virtue than temperance, as stated above [3448](A[2]; Q[141],
A[8]). Therefore cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance.
Objection 2: Further, the greater the difficulty to be surmounted, the
less is a man to be reproached for failure, wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is no wonder, in fact it is pardonable,
if a man is mastered by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains. "
Now seemingly it is more difficult to control pleasures than other
passions; hence it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3, that "it is more
difficult to contend against pleasure than against anger, which would
seem to be stronger than fear. " Therefore intemperance, which is
overcome by pleasure, is a less grievous sin than cowardice, which is
overcome by fear.
Objection 3: Further, it is essential to sin that it be voluntary. Now
cowardice is more voluntary than intemperance, since no man desires to
be intemperate, whereas some desire to avoid dangers of death, which
pertains to cowardice. Therefore cowardice is a more grievous sin than
intemperance.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that
"intemperance seems more akin to voluntary action than cowardice. "
Therefore it is more sinful.
I answer that, one may be compared with another in two ways. First,
with regard to the matter or object; secondly, on the part of the man
who sins: and in both ways intemperance is a more grievous sin than
cowardice.
First, as regards the matter. For cowardice shuns dangers of death, to
avoid which the principal motive is the necessity of preserving life.
On the other hand, intemperance is about pleasures, the desire of which
is not so necessary for the preservation of life, because, as stated
above (A[2], ad 2), intemperance is more about certain annexed
pleasures or desires than about natural desires or pleasures. Now the
more necessary the motive of sin the less grievous the sin. Wherefore
intemperance is a more grievous vice than cowardice, on the part of the
object or motive matter.
In like manner again, on the part of the man who sins, and this for
three reasons. First, because the more sound-minded a man is, the more
grievous his sin, wherefore sins are not imputed to those who are
demented. Now grave fear and sorrow, especially in dangers of death,
stun the human mind, but not so pleasure which is the motive of
intemperance. Secondly, because the more voluntary a sin the graver it
is. Now intemperance has more of the voluntary in it than cowardice
has, and this for two reasons. The first is because actions done
through fear have their origin in the compulsion of an external agent,
so that they are not simply voluntary but mixed, as stated in Ethic.
iii, 1, whereas actions done for the sake of pleasure are simply
voluntary. The second reason is because the actions of an intemperate
man are more voluntary individually and less voluntary generically. For
no one would wish to be intemperate, yet man is enticed by individual
pleasures which make of him an intemperate man. Hence the most
effective remedy against intemperance is not to dwell on the
consideration of singulars. It is the other way about in matters
relating to cowardice: because the particular action that imposes
itself on a man is less voluntary, for instance to cast aside his
shield, and the like, whereas the general purpose is more voluntary,
for instance to save himself by flight. Now that which is more
voluntary in the particular circumstances in which the act takes place,
is simply more voluntary. Wherefore intemperance, being simply more
voluntary than cowardice, is a greater vice. Thirdly, because it is
easier to find a remedy for intemperance than for cowardice, since
pleasures of food and sex, which are the matter of intemperance, are of
everyday occurrence, and it is possible for man without danger by
frequent practice in their regard to become temperate; whereas dangers
of death are of rare occurrence, and it is more dangerous for man to
encounter them frequently in order to cease being a coward.
Reply to Objection 1: The excellence of fortitude in comparison with
temperance may be considered from two standpoints. First, with regard
to the end, which has the aspect of good: because fortitude is directed
to the common good more than temperance is. And from this point of view
cowardice has a certain precedence over intemperance, since by
cowardice some people forsake the defense of the common good. Secondly,
with regard to the difficulty, because it is more difficult to endure
dangers of death than to refrain from any pleasures whatever: and from
this point of view there is no need for cowardice to take precedence of
intemperance. For just as it is a greater strength that does not
succumb to a stronger force, so on the other hand to be overcome by a
stronger force is proof of a lesser vice, and to succumb to a weaker
force, is the proof of a greater vice.
Reply to Objection 2: Love of self-preservation, for the sake of which
one shuns perils of death, is much more connatural than any pleasures
whatever of food and sex which are directed to the preservation of
life. Hence it is more difficult to overcome the fear of dangers of
death, than the desire of pleasure in matters of food and sex: although
the latter is more difficult to resist than anger, sorrow, and fear,
occasioned by certain other evils.
Reply to Objection 3: The voluntary, in cowardice, depends rather on a
general than on a particular consideration: wherefore in such cases we
have the voluntary not simply but in a restricted sense.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not the most
disgraceful of sins. As honor is due to virtue so is disgrace due to
sin. Now some sins are more grievous than intemperance: for instance
murder, blasphemy, and the like. Therefore intemperance is not the most
disgraceful of sins.
Objection 2: Further, those sins which are the more common are
seemingly less disgraceful, since men are less ashamed of them. Now
sins of intemperance are most common, because they are about things
connected with the common use of human life, and in which many happen
to sin. Therefore sins of intemperance do not seem to be most
disgraceful.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) temperance
and intemperance are about human desires and pleasures. Now certain
desires and pleasures are more shameful than human desires and
pleasures; such are brutal pleasures and those caused by disease as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore intemperance is not the
most disgraceful of sins.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that
"intemperance is justly more deserving of reproach than other vices. "
I answer that, Disgrace is seemingly opposed to honor and glory. Now
honor is due to excellence, as stated above ([3449]Q[103], A[1]), and
glory denotes clarity ([3450]Q[103], A[1], ad 3). Accordingly
intemperance is most disgraceful for two reasons. First, because it is
most repugnant to human excellence, since it is about pleasures common
to us and the lower animals, as stated above ([3451]Q[141], AA[2],3).
Wherefore it is written (Ps. 48:21): "Man, when he was in honor, did
not understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made
like to them. " Secondly, because it is most repugnant to man's clarity
or beauty; inasmuch as the pleasures which are the matter of
intemperance dim the light of reason from which all the clarity and
beauty of virtue arises: wherefore these pleasures are described as
being most slavish.
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says [*Moral. xxxiii. 12], "the sins
of the flesh," which are comprised under the head of intemperance,
although less culpable, are more disgraceful. The reason is that
culpability is measured by inordinateness in respect of the end, while
disgrace regards shamefulness, which depends chiefly on the
unbecomingness of the sin in respect of the sinner.
Reply to Objection 2: The commonness of a sin diminishes the
shamefulness and disgrace of a sin in the opinion of men, but not as
regards the nature of the vices themselves.
Reply to Objection 3: When we say that intemperance is most
disgraceful, we mean in comparison with human vices, those, namely,
that are connected with human passions which to a certain extent are in
conformity with human nature. But those vices which exceed the mode of
human nature are still more disgraceful. Nevertheless such vices are
apparently reducible to the genus of intemperance, by way of excess:
for instance, if a man delight in eating human flesh, or in committing
the unnatural vice.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PARTS OF TEMPERANCE, IN GENERAL (ONE ARTICLE)
We must now consider the parts of temperance: we shall consider these
same parts (1) in general; (2) each of them in particular.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the parts of temperance are rightly assigned?
Objection 1: It would seem that Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54)
unbecomingly assigns the parts of temperance, when he asserts them to
be "continence, mildness, and modesty. " For continence is reckoned to
be distinct from virtue (Ethic. vii, 1): whereas temperance is
comprised under virtue. Therefore continence is not a part of
temperance.
Objection 2: Further, mildness seemingly softens hatred or anger. But
temperance is not about these things, but about pleasures of touch, as
stated above ([3452]Q[141], A[4]). Therefore mildness is not a part of
temperance.
Objection 3: Further, modesty concerns external action, wherefore the
Apostle says (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty be known to all men. " Now
external actions are the matter of justice, as stated above
([3453]Q[58], A[8]). Therefore modesty is a part of justice rather than
of temperance.
Objection 4: Further, Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons many more
parts of temperance: for he says that "temperance results in modesty,
shamefacedness, abstinence, chastity, honesty, moderation, lowliness,
sobriety, purity. " Andronicus also says [*De Affectibus] that "the
companions of temperance are gravity, continence, humility, simplicity,
refinement, method, contentment. " [*'Per-se-sufficientiam' which could
be rendered 'self-sufficiency,' but for the fact that this is taken in
a bad sense. See[3454] Q[169], A[1]. ] Therefore it seems that Tully
insufficiently reckoned the parts of temperance.
I answer that, As stated above (QQ[48],128), a cardinal virtue may have
three kinds of parts, namely integral, subjective, and potential. The
integral parts of a virtue are the conditions the concurrence of which
are necessary for virtue: and in this respect there are two integral
parts of temperance, "shamefacedness," whereby one recoils from the
disgrace that is contrary to temperance, and "honesty," whereby one
loves the beauty of temperance. For, as stated above ([3455]Q[141],
A[2], ad 3), temperance more than any other virtue lays claim to a
certain comeliness, and the vices of intemperance excel others in
disgrace.
The subjective parts of a virtue are its species: and the species of a
virtue have to be differentiated according to the difference of matter
or object. Now temperance is about pleasures of touch, which are of two
kinds. For some are directed to nourishment: and in these as regards
meat, there is "abstinence," and as regards drink properly there is
"sobriety. " Other pleasures are directed to the power of procreation,
and in these as regards the principal pleasure of the act itself of
procreation, there is "chastity," and as to the pleasures incidental to
the act, resulting, for instance, from kissing, touching, or fondling,
we have "purity.
"
The potential parts of a principal virtue are called secondary virtues:
for while the principal virtue observes the mode in some principal
matter, these observe the mode in some other matter wherein moderation
is not so difficult. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate pleasures
of touch, which are most difficult to moderate. Wherefore any virtue
that is effective of moderation in some matter or other, and restrains
the appetite in its impulse towards something, may be reckoned a part
of temperance, as a virtue annexed thereto.
This happens in three ways: first, in the inward movements of the soul;
secondly, in the outward movements and actions of the body; thirdly, in
outward things. Now besides the movement of concupiscence, which
temperance moderates and restrains, we find in the soul three movements
towards a particular object. In the first place there is the movement
of the will when stirred by the impulse of passion: and this movement
is restrained by "continence," the effect of which is that, although a
man suffer immoderate concupiscences, his will does not succumb to
them. Another inward movement towards something is the movement of
hope, and of the resultant daring, and this is moderated or restrained
by "humility. " The third movement is that of anger, which tends towards
revenge, and this is restrained by "meekness" or "mildness. "
With regard to bodily movements and actions, moderation and restraint
is the effect of "modesty," which, according to Andronicus, has three
parts. The first of these enables one to discern what to do and what
not to do, and to observe the right order, and to persevere in what we
do: this he assigns to "method. " The second is that a man observe
decorum in what he does, and this he ascribes to "refinement. " The
third has to do with the conversation or any other intercourse between
a man and his friends, and this is called "gravity. "
With regard to external things, a twofold moderation has to be
observed. First, we must not desire too many, and to this Macrobius
assigns "lowliness," and Andronicus "contentment"; secondly, we must
not be too nice in our requirements, and to this Macrobius ascribes
"moderation," Andronicus "simplicity. "
Reply to Objection 1: It is true that continence differs from virtue,
just as imperfect differs from perfect, as we shall state further on
([3456]Q[165], A[1]); and in this sense it is condivided with virtue.
Yet it has something in common with temperance both as to matter, since
it is about pleasures of touch, and as to mode, since it is a kind of
restraint. Hence it is suitably assigned as a part of temperance.
Reply to Objection 2: Mildness or meekness is reckoned a part of
temperance not because of a likeness of matter, but because they agree
as to the mode of restraint and moderation as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: In the matter of external action justice
considers what is due to another. Modesty does not consider this, but
only a certain moderation. Hence it is reckoned a part not of justice
but of temperance.
Reply to Objection 4: Under modesty Tully includes whatever pertains to
the moderation of bodily movements and external things, as well as the
moderation of hope which we reckoned as pertaining to humility.
__________________________________________________________________
OF SHAMEFACEDNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the parts of temperance in particular: and in the
first place the integral parts, which are shamefacedness and honesty.
With regard to shamefacedness there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?
(2) What is its object?
(3) Who are the cause of a man being ashamed?
(4) What kind of people are ashamed?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that shamefacedness is a virtue. For it is proper
to a virtue "to observe the mean as fixed by reason": this is clear
from the definition of virtue given in Ethic. ii, 6. Now shamefacedness
observes the mean in this way, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ii,
7). Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is praiseworthy is either a virtue or
something connected with virtue. Now shamefacedness is praiseworthy.
But it is not part of a virtue. For it is not a part of prudence, since
it is not in the reason but in the appetite; nor is it a part of
justice. since shamefacedness implies a certain passion, whereas
justice is not about the passions; nor again is it a part of fortitude,
because it belongs to fortitude to be persistent and aggressive, while
it belongs to shamefacedness to recoil from something; nor lastly is it
a part of temperance, since the latter is about desires, whereas
shamefacedness is a kind of fear according as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. iv, 9) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15). Hence it follows
that shamefacedness is a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the honest and the virtuous are convertible
according to Tully (De Offic. i, 27). Now shamefacedness is a part of
honesty: for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "shamefacedness is the
companion and familiar of the restful mind, averse to wantonness, a
stranger to any kind of excess, the friend of sobriety and the support
of what is honest, a seeker after the beautiful. " Therefore
shamefacedness is a virtue.
Objection 4: Further, every vice is opposed to a virtue. Now certain
vices are opposed to shamefacedness, namely shamelessness and
inordinate prudery. Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
Objection 5: Further, "like acts beget like habits," according to
Ethic. ii, 1. Now shamefacedness implies a praiseworthy act; wherefore
from many such acts a habit results. But a habit of praiseworthy deeds
is a virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore
shamefacedness is a virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 9) that
shamefacedness is not a virtue.
I answer that, Virtue is taken in two ways, in a strict sense and in a
broad sense. Taken strictly virtue is a perfection, as stated in Phys.
vii, 17,18. Wherefore anything that is inconsistent with perfection,
though it be good, falls short of the notion of virtue. Now
shamefacedness is inconsistent with perfection, because it is the fear
of something base, namely of that which is disgraceful. Hence Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that "shamefacedness is fear of a base
action. " Now just as hope is about a possible and difficult good, so is
fear about a possible and arduous evil, as stated above ([3457]FS,
Q[40], A[1]; [3458]FS, Q[41], A[2]; [3459]FS, Q[42], A[3]), when we
were treating of the passions. But one who is perfect as to a virtuous
habit, does not apprehend that which would be disgraceful and base to
do, as being possible and arduous, that is to say difficult for him to
avoid; nor does he actually do anything base, so as to be in fear of
disgrace. Therefore shamefacedness, properly speaking, is not a virtue,
since it falls short of the perfection of virtue.
Taken, however, in a broad sense virtue denotes whatever is good and
praiseworthy in human acts or passions; and in this way /shamefacedness
is sometimes called a virtue, since it is a praiseworthy passion.
Reply to Objection 1: Observing the mean is not sufficient for the
notion of virtue, although it is one of the conditions included in
virtue's definition: but it is requisite, in addition to this, that it
be "an elective habit," that is to say, operating from choice. Now
shamefacedness denotes, not a habit but a passion, nor does its
movement result from choice, but from an impulse of passion. Hence it
falls short of the notion of virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, shamefacedness is fear of
baseness and disgrace. Now it has been stated ([3460]Q[142], A[4]) that
the vice of intemperance is most base and disgraceful. Wherefore
shamefacedness pertains more to temperance than to any other virtue, by
reason of its motive cause, which is a base action though not according
to the species of the passion, namely fear. Nevertheless in so far as
the vices opposed to other virtues are base and disgraceful,
shamefacedness may also pertain to other virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: Shamefacedness fosters honesty, by removing that
which is contrary thereto, but not so as to attain to the perfection of
honesty.
Reply to Objection 4: Every defect causes a vice, but not every good is
sufficient for the notion of virtue. Consequently it does not follow
that whatever is directly opposed to vice is a virtue, although every
vice is opposed to a virtue, as regards its origin. Hence
shamelessness, in so far as it results from excessive love of
disgraceful things, is opposed to temperance.
Reply to Objection 5: Being frequently ashamed causes the habit of an
acquired virtue whereby one avoids disgraceful things which are the
object of shamefacedness, without continuing to be ashamed in their
regard: although as a consequence of this acquired virtue, a man would
be more ashamed, if confronted with the matter of shamefacedness.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether shamefacedness is about a disgraceful action?
Objection 1: It would seem that shamefacedness is not about a
disgraceful action. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that
"shamefacedness is fear of disgrace. " Now sometimes those who do
nothing wrong suffer ignominy, according to Ps. 67:8, "For thy sake I
have borne reproach, shame hath covered my face. " Therefore
shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.
Objection 2: Further, nothing apparently is disgraceful but what is
sinful. Yet man is ashamed of things that are not sins, for instance
when he performs a menial occupation. Therefore it seems that
shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.
Objection 3: Further, virtuous deeds are not disgraceful but most
beautiful according to Ethic. i, 8. Yet sometimes people are ashamed to
do virtuous deeds, according to Lk. 9:26, "He that shall be ashamed of
Me and My words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed," etc.
Therefore shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful action.
Objection 4: Further, if shamefacedness were properly about a
disgraceful action, it would follow that the more disgraceful the
action the more ashamed would one be. Yet sometimes a man is more
ashamed of lesser sins, while he glories in those which are most
grievous, according to Ps. 51:3, "Why dost thou glory in malice? "
Therefore shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) and Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius, (De Nat. Hom. xx)] say that "shamefacedness is fear of
doing a disgraceful deed or of a disgraceful deed done. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3461]FS, Q[41], A[2]; [3462]FS, Q[42],
A[3]), when we were treating of the passions, fear is properly about an
arduous evil, one, namely, that is difficult to avoid. Now disgrace is
twofold. There is the disgrace inherent to vice, which consists in the
deformity of a voluntary act: and this, properly speaking, has not the
character of an arduous evil. For that which depends on the will alone
does not appear to be arduous and above man's ability: wherefore it is
not apprehended as fearful, and for this reason the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 5) that such evils are not a matter of fear.
The other kind of disgrace is penal so to speak, and it consists in the
reproach that attaches to a person, just as the clarity of glory
consists in a person being honored. And since this reproach has the
character of an arduous evil, just as honor has the character of an
arduous good, shamefacedness, which is fear of disgrace, regards first
and foremost reproach or ignominy. And since reproach is properly due
to vice, as honor is due to virtue, it follows that shamefacedness
regards also the disgrace inherent to vice. Hence the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 5) that "a man is less ashamed of those defects which are
not the result of any fault of his own. "
Now shamefacedness regards fault in two ways. In one way a man refrains
from vicious acts through fear of reproach: in another way a man while
doing a disgraceful deed avoids the public eye through fear of
reproach. In the former case, according to Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius,
De Nat. Hom. xx), we speak of a person "blushing," in the latter we say
that he is "ashamed. " Hence he says that "the man who is ashamed acts
in secret, but he who blushes fears to be disgraced. "
Reply to Objection 1: Shamefacedness properly regards disgrace as due
to sin which is a voluntary defect. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet.
ii, 6) that "a man is more ashamed of those things of which he is the
cause. " Now the virtuous man despises the disgrace to which he is
subject on account of virtue, because he does not deserve it; as the
Philosopher says of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3). Thus we find it
said of the apostles (Acts 5:41) that "they (the apostles) went from
the presence of the council, rejoicing that they were accounted worthy
to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus. " It is owing to imperfection
of virtue that a man is sometimes ashamed of the reproaches which he
suffers on account of virtue, since the more virtuous a man is, the
more he despises external things, whether good or evil. Wherefore it is
written (Is. 51:7): "Fear ye not the reproach of men. "
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3463]Q[63], A[3]), though honor
is not really due save to virtue alone, yet it regards a certain
excellence: and the same applies to reproach, for though it is properly
due to sin alone, yet, at least in man's opinion, it regards any kind
of defect. Hence a man is ashamed of poverty, disrepute, servitude, and
the like.
Reply to Objection 3: Shamefacedness does not regard virtuous deeds as
such. Yet it happens accidentally that a man is ashamed of them either
because he looks upon them as vicious according to human opinion, or
because he is afraid of being marked as presumptuous or hypocritical
for doing virtuous deeds.
Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes more grievous sins are less shameful,
either because they are less disgraceful, as spiritual sins in
comparison with sins of the flesh, or because they connote a certain
abundance of some temporal good; thus a man is more ashamed of
cowardice than of daring, of theft than of robbery, on account of a
semblance of power. The same applies to other sins.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether man is more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with
him?
Objection 1: It would seem that man is not more shamefaced of those who
are more closely connected with him. For it is stated in Rhet. ii, 6
that "men are more shamefaced of those from whom they desire
approbation. " Now men desire this especially from people of the better
sort who are sometimes not connected with them. Therefore man is not
more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly those are more closely connected who
perform like deeds. Now man is not made ashamed of his sin by those
whom he knows to be guilty of the same sin, because according to Rhet.
ii, 6, "a man does not forbid his neighbor what he does himself. "
Therefore he is not more shamefaced of those who are most closely
connected with him.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men take
more shame from those who retail their information to many, such as
jokers and fable-tellers. " But those who are more closely connected
with a man do not retail his vices. Therefore one should not take shame
chiefly from them.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men are
most liable to be made ashamed by those among whom they have done
nothing amiss; by those of whom they ask something for the first time;
by those whose friends they wish to become. " Now these are less closely
connected with us. Therefore man is not made most ashamed by those who
are more closely united to him.
On the contrary, It is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that "man is made most
ashamed by those who are to be continually with him. "
I answer that, Since reproach is opposed to honor, just as honor
denotes attestation to someone's excellence, especially the excellence
which is according to virtue, so too reproach, the fear of which is
shamefacedness, denotes attestation to a person's defect, especially
that which results from sin. Hence the more weighty a person's
attestation is considered to be, the more does he make another person
ashamed. Now a person's attestation may be considered as being more
weighty, either because he is certain of the truth or because of its
effect. Certitude of the truth attaches to a person's attestations for
two reasons. First on account of the rectitude of his judgement, as in
the case of wise and virtuous men, by whom man is more desirous of
being honored and by whom he is brought to a greater sense of shame.
Hence children and the lower animals inspire no one with shame, by
reason of their lack of judgment. Secondly, on account of his knowledge
of the matter attested, because "everyone judges well of what is known
to him" [*Ethic. i, 3]. In this way we are more liable to be made
ashamed by persons connected with us, since they are better acquainted
with our deeds: whereas strangers and persons entirely unknown to us,
who are ignorant of what we do, inspire us with no shame at all.
An attestation receives weight from its effect by reason of some
advantage or harm resulting therefrom; wherefore men are more desirous
of being honored by those who can be of use to them, and are more
liable to be made ashamed by those who are able to do them some harm.
And for this reason again, in a certain respect, persons connected with
us make us more ashamed, since we are to be continually in their
society, as though this entailed a continual harm to us: whereas the
harm that comes from strangers and passersby ceases almost at once.
Reply to Objection 1: People of the better sort make us ashamed for the
same reason as those who are more closely connected with us; because
just as the attestation of the better men carries more weight since
they have a more universal knowledge of things, and in their judgments
hold fast to the truth: so, too, the attestation of those among whom we
live is more cogent since they know more about our concerns in detail.
Reply to Objection 2: We fear not the attestation of those who are
connected with us in the likeness of sin, because we do not think that
they look upon our defect as disgraceful.
Reply to Objection 3: Tale-bearers make us ashamed on account of the
harm they do by making many think ill of us.
Reply to Objection 4: Even those among whom we have done no wrong, make
us more ashamed, on account of the harm that would follow, because, to
wit, we should forfeit the good opinion they had of us: and again
because when contraries are put in juxtaposition their opposition seems
greater, so that when a man notices something disgraceful in one whom
he esteemed good, he apprehends it as being the more disgraceful. The
reason why we are made more ashamed by those of whom we ask something
for the first time, or whose friends we wish to be, is that we fear to
suffer some injury, by being disappointed in our request, or by failing
to become their friends.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether even virtuous men can be ashamed?
Objection 1: It would seem that even virtuous men can be ashamed. For
contraries have contrary effects. Now those who excel in wickedness are
not ashamed, according to Jer. 3:3, "Thou hadst a harlot's forehead,
thou wouldst not blush. " Therefore those who are virtuous are more
inclined to be ashamed.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men are
ashamed not only of vice, but also of the signs of evil": and this
happens also in the virtuous. Therefore virtuous men can be ashamed.
Objection 3: Further, shamefacedness is "fear of disgrace" [*Ethic. iv,
9]. Now virtuous people may happen to be ignominious, for instance if
they are slandered, or if they suffer reproach undeservedly. Therefore
a virtuous man can be ashamed.
Objection 4: Further, shamefacedness is a part of temperance, as stated
above ([3464]Q[143]). Now a part is not separated from its whole. Since
then temperance is in a virtuous man, it means that shamefacedness is
also.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that a "virtuous
man is not shamefaced. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3465]AA[1],2) shamefacedness is fear
of some disgrace. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil is not
feared: first, because it is not reckoned an evil; secondly because one
reckons it impossible with regard to oneself, or as not difficult to
avoid.
Accordingly shame may be lacking in a person in two ways. First,
because the things that should make him ashamed are not deemed by him
to be disgraceful; and in this way those who are steeped in sin are
without shame, for instead of disapproving of their sins, they boast of
them. Secondly, because they apprehend disgrace as impossible to
themselves, or as easy to avoid. In this way the old and the virtuous
are not shamefaced. Yet they are so disposed, that if there were
anything disgraceful in them they would be ashamed of it. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that "shame is in the virtuous
hypothetically. "
Reply to Objection 1: Lack of shame occurs in the best and in the worst
men through different causes, as stated in the Article. In the average
men it is found, in so far as they have a certain love of good, and yet
are not altogether free from evil.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to the virtuous man to avoid not only
vice, but also whatever has the semblance of vice, according to 1
Thess.
pulse for their food (Dan. 1:12), "God gave knowledge, and
understanding in every book and wisdom. " Therefore insensibility, which
rejects these pleasures altogether, is not sinful.
Objection 3: Further, that which is a very effective means of avoiding
sin would seem not to be sinful. Now the most effective remedy in
avoiding sin is to shun pleasures, and this pertains to insensibility.
For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 9) that "if we deny ourselves
pleasures we are less liable to sin. " Therefore there is nothing
vicious in insensibility.
On the contrary, Nothing save vice is opposed to virtue. Now
insensibility is opposed to the virtue of temperance according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 11). Therefore insensibility is a vice.
I answer that, Whatever is contrary to the natural order is vicious.
Now nature has introduced pleasure into the operations that are
necessary for man's life. Wherefore the natural order requires that man
should make use of these pleasures, in so far as they are necessary for
man's well-being, as regards the preservation either of the individual
or of the species. Accordingly, if anyone were to reject pleasure to
the extent of omitting things that are necessary for nature's
preservation, he would sin, as acting counter to the order of nature.
And this pertains to the vice of insensibility.
It must, however, be observed that it is sometimes praiseworthy, and
even necessary for the sake of an end, to abstain from such pleasures
as result from these operations. Thus, for the sake of the body's
health, certain persons refrain from pleasures of meat, drink, and sex;
as also for the fulfilment of certain engagements: thus athletes and
soldiers have to deny themselves many pleasures, in order to fulfil
their respective duties. In like manner penitents, in order to recover
health of soul, have recourse to abstinence from pleasures, as a kind
of diet, and those who are desirous of giving themselves up to
contemplation and Divine things need much to refrain from carnal
things. Nor do any of these things pertain to the vice of
insensibility, because they are in accord with right reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Daniel abstained thus from pleasures, not through
any horror of pleasure as though it were evil in itself, but for some
praiseworthy end, in order, namely, to adapt himself to the heights of
contemplation by abstaining from pleasures of the body. Hence the text
goes on to tell of the revelation that he received immediately
afterwards.
Reply to Objection 2: Since man cannot use his reason without his
sensitive powers. which need a bodily organ. as stated in the [3447]FP,
Q[84], AA[7],8, man needs to sustain his body in order that he may use
his reason. Now the body is sustained by means of operations that
afford pleasure: wherefore the good of reason cannot be in a man if he
abstain from all pleasures. Yet this need for using pleasures of the
body will be greater or less, according as man needs more or less the
powers of his body in accomplishing the act of reason. Wherefore it is
commendable for those who undertake the duty of giving themselves to
contemplation, and of imparting to others a spiritual good, by a kind
of spiritual procreation, as it were, to abstain from many pleasures,
but not for those who are in duty bound to bodily occupations and
carnal procreation.
Reply to Objection 3: In order to avoid sin, pleasure must be shunned,
not altogether, but so that it is not sought more than necessity
requires.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether intemperance is a childish sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not a childish sin. For
Jerome in commenting on Mat. 18:3, "Unless you be converted, and become
as little children," says that "a child persists not in anger, is
unmindful of injuries, takes no pleasure in seeing a beautiful woman,"
all of which is contrary to intemperance. Therefore intemperance is not
a childish sin.
Objection 2: Further, children have none but natural desires. Now "in
respect of natural desires few sin by intemperance," according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11). Therefore intemperance is not a childish
sin.
Objection 3: Further, children should be fostered and nourished:
whereas concupiscence and pleasure, about which intemperance is
concerned, are always to be thwarted and uprooted, according to Col.
3:5, "Mortify . . . your members upon the earth, which are . . .
concupiscence" [*Vulg. : 'your members which are upon the earth,
fornication . . . concupiscence'], etc. Therefore intemperance is not a
childish sin.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "we apply
the term intemperance* to childish faults. " [*{Akolasia} which
Aristotle refers to {kolazo} to punish, so that its original sense
would be 'impunity' or 'unrestraint. ']
I answer that, A thing is said to be childish for two reasons. First,
because it is becoming to children, and the Philosopher does not mean
that the sin of intemperance is childish in this sense. Secondly. by
way of likeness, and it is in this sense that sins of intemperance are
said to be childish. For the sin of intemperance is one of unchecked
concupiscence, which is likened to a child in three ways. First, as
rewards that which they both desire, for like a child concupiscence
desires something disgraceful. This is because in human affairs a thing
is beautiful according as it harmonizes with reason. Wherefore Tully
says (De Offic. i, 27) under the heading "Comeliness is twofold," that
"the beautiful is that which is in keeping with man's excellence in so
far as his nature differs from other animals. " Now a child does not
attend to the order of reason; and in like manner "concupiscence does
not listen to reason," according to Ethic. vii, 6. Secondly, they are
alike as to the result. For a child, if left to his own will, becomes
more self-willed: hence it is written (Ecclus. 30:8): "A horse not
broken becometh stubborn, and a child left to himself will become
headstrong. " So, too, concupiscence, if indulged, gathers strength:
wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 5): "Lust served became a
custom, and custom not resisted became necessity. " Thirdly, as to the
remedy which is applied to both. For a child is corrected by being
restrained; hence it is written (Prov. 23:13,14): "Withhold not
correction from a child . . . Thou shalt beat him with a rod, and
deliver his soul from Hell. " In like manner by resisting concupiscence
we moderate it according to the demands of virtue. Augustine indicates
this when he says (Music. vi, 11) that if the mind be lifted up to
spiritual things, and remain fixed "thereon, the impulse of custom,"
i. e. carnal concupiscence, "is broken, and being suppressed is
gradually weakened: for it was stronger when we followed it, and though
not wholly destroyed, it is certainly less strong when we curb it. "
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "as a child ought to
live according to the direction of his tutor, so ought the
concupiscible to accord with reason. "
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes the term "childish" as
denoting what is observed in children. It is not in this sense that the
sin of intemperance is said to be childish, but by way of likeness, as
stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: A desire may be said to be natural in two ways.
First, with regard to its genus, and thus temperance and intemperance
are about natural desires, since they are about desires of food and
sex, which are directed to the preservation of nature. Secondly, a
desire may be called natural with regard to the species of the thing
that nature requires for its own preservation; and in this way it does
not happen often that one sins in the matter of natural desires, for
nature requires only that which supplies its need, and there is no sin
in desiring this, save only where it is desired in excess as to
quantity. This is the only way in which sin can occur with regard to
natural desires, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11).
There are other things in respect of which sins frequently occur, and
these are certain incentives to desire devised by human curiosity [*Cf.
Q[167]], such as the nice [curiosa] preparation of food, or the
adornment of women. And though children do not affect these things
much, yet intemperance is called a childish sin for the reason given
above.
Reply to Objection 3: That which regards nature should be nourished and
fostered in children, but that which pertains to the lack of reason in
them should not be fostered, but corrected, as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether cowardice* is a greater vice than intemperance? [*Cf. Q[125]]
Objection 1: It would seem that cowardice is a greater vice than
intemperance. For a vice deserves reproach through being opposed to the
good of virtue. Now cowardice is opposed to fortitude, which is a more
excellent virtue than temperance, as stated above [3448](A[2]; Q[141],
A[8]). Therefore cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance.
Objection 2: Further, the greater the difficulty to be surmounted, the
less is a man to be reproached for failure, wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is no wonder, in fact it is pardonable,
if a man is mastered by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains. "
Now seemingly it is more difficult to control pleasures than other
passions; hence it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3, that "it is more
difficult to contend against pleasure than against anger, which would
seem to be stronger than fear. " Therefore intemperance, which is
overcome by pleasure, is a less grievous sin than cowardice, which is
overcome by fear.
Objection 3: Further, it is essential to sin that it be voluntary. Now
cowardice is more voluntary than intemperance, since no man desires to
be intemperate, whereas some desire to avoid dangers of death, which
pertains to cowardice. Therefore cowardice is a more grievous sin than
intemperance.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that
"intemperance seems more akin to voluntary action than cowardice. "
Therefore it is more sinful.
I answer that, one may be compared with another in two ways. First,
with regard to the matter or object; secondly, on the part of the man
who sins: and in both ways intemperance is a more grievous sin than
cowardice.
First, as regards the matter. For cowardice shuns dangers of death, to
avoid which the principal motive is the necessity of preserving life.
On the other hand, intemperance is about pleasures, the desire of which
is not so necessary for the preservation of life, because, as stated
above (A[2], ad 2), intemperance is more about certain annexed
pleasures or desires than about natural desires or pleasures. Now the
more necessary the motive of sin the less grievous the sin. Wherefore
intemperance is a more grievous vice than cowardice, on the part of the
object or motive matter.
In like manner again, on the part of the man who sins, and this for
three reasons. First, because the more sound-minded a man is, the more
grievous his sin, wherefore sins are not imputed to those who are
demented. Now grave fear and sorrow, especially in dangers of death,
stun the human mind, but not so pleasure which is the motive of
intemperance. Secondly, because the more voluntary a sin the graver it
is. Now intemperance has more of the voluntary in it than cowardice
has, and this for two reasons. The first is because actions done
through fear have their origin in the compulsion of an external agent,
so that they are not simply voluntary but mixed, as stated in Ethic.
iii, 1, whereas actions done for the sake of pleasure are simply
voluntary. The second reason is because the actions of an intemperate
man are more voluntary individually and less voluntary generically. For
no one would wish to be intemperate, yet man is enticed by individual
pleasures which make of him an intemperate man. Hence the most
effective remedy against intemperance is not to dwell on the
consideration of singulars. It is the other way about in matters
relating to cowardice: because the particular action that imposes
itself on a man is less voluntary, for instance to cast aside his
shield, and the like, whereas the general purpose is more voluntary,
for instance to save himself by flight. Now that which is more
voluntary in the particular circumstances in which the act takes place,
is simply more voluntary. Wherefore intemperance, being simply more
voluntary than cowardice, is a greater vice. Thirdly, because it is
easier to find a remedy for intemperance than for cowardice, since
pleasures of food and sex, which are the matter of intemperance, are of
everyday occurrence, and it is possible for man without danger by
frequent practice in their regard to become temperate; whereas dangers
of death are of rare occurrence, and it is more dangerous for man to
encounter them frequently in order to cease being a coward.
Reply to Objection 1: The excellence of fortitude in comparison with
temperance may be considered from two standpoints. First, with regard
to the end, which has the aspect of good: because fortitude is directed
to the common good more than temperance is. And from this point of view
cowardice has a certain precedence over intemperance, since by
cowardice some people forsake the defense of the common good. Secondly,
with regard to the difficulty, because it is more difficult to endure
dangers of death than to refrain from any pleasures whatever: and from
this point of view there is no need for cowardice to take precedence of
intemperance. For just as it is a greater strength that does not
succumb to a stronger force, so on the other hand to be overcome by a
stronger force is proof of a lesser vice, and to succumb to a weaker
force, is the proof of a greater vice.
Reply to Objection 2: Love of self-preservation, for the sake of which
one shuns perils of death, is much more connatural than any pleasures
whatever of food and sex which are directed to the preservation of
life. Hence it is more difficult to overcome the fear of dangers of
death, than the desire of pleasure in matters of food and sex: although
the latter is more difficult to resist than anger, sorrow, and fear,
occasioned by certain other evils.
Reply to Objection 3: The voluntary, in cowardice, depends rather on a
general than on a particular consideration: wherefore in such cases we
have the voluntary not simply but in a restricted sense.
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Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not the most
disgraceful of sins. As honor is due to virtue so is disgrace due to
sin. Now some sins are more grievous than intemperance: for instance
murder, blasphemy, and the like. Therefore intemperance is not the most
disgraceful of sins.
Objection 2: Further, those sins which are the more common are
seemingly less disgraceful, since men are less ashamed of them. Now
sins of intemperance are most common, because they are about things
connected with the common use of human life, and in which many happen
to sin. Therefore sins of intemperance do not seem to be most
disgraceful.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) temperance
and intemperance are about human desires and pleasures. Now certain
desires and pleasures are more shameful than human desires and
pleasures; such are brutal pleasures and those caused by disease as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore intemperance is not the
most disgraceful of sins.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that
"intemperance is justly more deserving of reproach than other vices. "
I answer that, Disgrace is seemingly opposed to honor and glory. Now
honor is due to excellence, as stated above ([3449]Q[103], A[1]), and
glory denotes clarity ([3450]Q[103], A[1], ad 3). Accordingly
intemperance is most disgraceful for two reasons. First, because it is
most repugnant to human excellence, since it is about pleasures common
to us and the lower animals, as stated above ([3451]Q[141], AA[2],3).
Wherefore it is written (Ps. 48:21): "Man, when he was in honor, did
not understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made
like to them. " Secondly, because it is most repugnant to man's clarity
or beauty; inasmuch as the pleasures which are the matter of
intemperance dim the light of reason from which all the clarity and
beauty of virtue arises: wherefore these pleasures are described as
being most slavish.
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says [*Moral. xxxiii. 12], "the sins
of the flesh," which are comprised under the head of intemperance,
although less culpable, are more disgraceful. The reason is that
culpability is measured by inordinateness in respect of the end, while
disgrace regards shamefulness, which depends chiefly on the
unbecomingness of the sin in respect of the sinner.
Reply to Objection 2: The commonness of a sin diminishes the
shamefulness and disgrace of a sin in the opinion of men, but not as
regards the nature of the vices themselves.
Reply to Objection 3: When we say that intemperance is most
disgraceful, we mean in comparison with human vices, those, namely,
that are connected with human passions which to a certain extent are in
conformity with human nature. But those vices which exceed the mode of
human nature are still more disgraceful. Nevertheless such vices are
apparently reducible to the genus of intemperance, by way of excess:
for instance, if a man delight in eating human flesh, or in committing
the unnatural vice.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PARTS OF TEMPERANCE, IN GENERAL (ONE ARTICLE)
We must now consider the parts of temperance: we shall consider these
same parts (1) in general; (2) each of them in particular.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the parts of temperance are rightly assigned?
Objection 1: It would seem that Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54)
unbecomingly assigns the parts of temperance, when he asserts them to
be "continence, mildness, and modesty. " For continence is reckoned to
be distinct from virtue (Ethic. vii, 1): whereas temperance is
comprised under virtue. Therefore continence is not a part of
temperance.
Objection 2: Further, mildness seemingly softens hatred or anger. But
temperance is not about these things, but about pleasures of touch, as
stated above ([3452]Q[141], A[4]). Therefore mildness is not a part of
temperance.
Objection 3: Further, modesty concerns external action, wherefore the
Apostle says (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty be known to all men. " Now
external actions are the matter of justice, as stated above
([3453]Q[58], A[8]). Therefore modesty is a part of justice rather than
of temperance.
Objection 4: Further, Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons many more
parts of temperance: for he says that "temperance results in modesty,
shamefacedness, abstinence, chastity, honesty, moderation, lowliness,
sobriety, purity. " Andronicus also says [*De Affectibus] that "the
companions of temperance are gravity, continence, humility, simplicity,
refinement, method, contentment. " [*'Per-se-sufficientiam' which could
be rendered 'self-sufficiency,' but for the fact that this is taken in
a bad sense. See[3454] Q[169], A[1]. ] Therefore it seems that Tully
insufficiently reckoned the parts of temperance.
I answer that, As stated above (QQ[48],128), a cardinal virtue may have
three kinds of parts, namely integral, subjective, and potential. The
integral parts of a virtue are the conditions the concurrence of which
are necessary for virtue: and in this respect there are two integral
parts of temperance, "shamefacedness," whereby one recoils from the
disgrace that is contrary to temperance, and "honesty," whereby one
loves the beauty of temperance. For, as stated above ([3455]Q[141],
A[2], ad 3), temperance more than any other virtue lays claim to a
certain comeliness, and the vices of intemperance excel others in
disgrace.
The subjective parts of a virtue are its species: and the species of a
virtue have to be differentiated according to the difference of matter
or object. Now temperance is about pleasures of touch, which are of two
kinds. For some are directed to nourishment: and in these as regards
meat, there is "abstinence," and as regards drink properly there is
"sobriety. " Other pleasures are directed to the power of procreation,
and in these as regards the principal pleasure of the act itself of
procreation, there is "chastity," and as to the pleasures incidental to
the act, resulting, for instance, from kissing, touching, or fondling,
we have "purity.
"
The potential parts of a principal virtue are called secondary virtues:
for while the principal virtue observes the mode in some principal
matter, these observe the mode in some other matter wherein moderation
is not so difficult. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate pleasures
of touch, which are most difficult to moderate. Wherefore any virtue
that is effective of moderation in some matter or other, and restrains
the appetite in its impulse towards something, may be reckoned a part
of temperance, as a virtue annexed thereto.
This happens in three ways: first, in the inward movements of the soul;
secondly, in the outward movements and actions of the body; thirdly, in
outward things. Now besides the movement of concupiscence, which
temperance moderates and restrains, we find in the soul three movements
towards a particular object. In the first place there is the movement
of the will when stirred by the impulse of passion: and this movement
is restrained by "continence," the effect of which is that, although a
man suffer immoderate concupiscences, his will does not succumb to
them. Another inward movement towards something is the movement of
hope, and of the resultant daring, and this is moderated or restrained
by "humility. " The third movement is that of anger, which tends towards
revenge, and this is restrained by "meekness" or "mildness. "
With regard to bodily movements and actions, moderation and restraint
is the effect of "modesty," which, according to Andronicus, has three
parts. The first of these enables one to discern what to do and what
not to do, and to observe the right order, and to persevere in what we
do: this he assigns to "method. " The second is that a man observe
decorum in what he does, and this he ascribes to "refinement. " The
third has to do with the conversation or any other intercourse between
a man and his friends, and this is called "gravity. "
With regard to external things, a twofold moderation has to be
observed. First, we must not desire too many, and to this Macrobius
assigns "lowliness," and Andronicus "contentment"; secondly, we must
not be too nice in our requirements, and to this Macrobius ascribes
"moderation," Andronicus "simplicity. "
Reply to Objection 1: It is true that continence differs from virtue,
just as imperfect differs from perfect, as we shall state further on
([3456]Q[165], A[1]); and in this sense it is condivided with virtue.
Yet it has something in common with temperance both as to matter, since
it is about pleasures of touch, and as to mode, since it is a kind of
restraint. Hence it is suitably assigned as a part of temperance.
Reply to Objection 2: Mildness or meekness is reckoned a part of
temperance not because of a likeness of matter, but because they agree
as to the mode of restraint and moderation as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: In the matter of external action justice
considers what is due to another. Modesty does not consider this, but
only a certain moderation. Hence it is reckoned a part not of justice
but of temperance.
Reply to Objection 4: Under modesty Tully includes whatever pertains to
the moderation of bodily movements and external things, as well as the
moderation of hope which we reckoned as pertaining to humility.
__________________________________________________________________
OF SHAMEFACEDNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the parts of temperance in particular: and in the
first place the integral parts, which are shamefacedness and honesty.
With regard to shamefacedness there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?
(2) What is its object?
(3) Who are the cause of a man being ashamed?
(4) What kind of people are ashamed?
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Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that shamefacedness is a virtue. For it is proper
to a virtue "to observe the mean as fixed by reason": this is clear
from the definition of virtue given in Ethic. ii, 6. Now shamefacedness
observes the mean in this way, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ii,
7). Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is praiseworthy is either a virtue or
something connected with virtue. Now shamefacedness is praiseworthy.
But it is not part of a virtue. For it is not a part of prudence, since
it is not in the reason but in the appetite; nor is it a part of
justice. since shamefacedness implies a certain passion, whereas
justice is not about the passions; nor again is it a part of fortitude,
because it belongs to fortitude to be persistent and aggressive, while
it belongs to shamefacedness to recoil from something; nor lastly is it
a part of temperance, since the latter is about desires, whereas
shamefacedness is a kind of fear according as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. iv, 9) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15). Hence it follows
that shamefacedness is a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the honest and the virtuous are convertible
according to Tully (De Offic. i, 27). Now shamefacedness is a part of
honesty: for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "shamefacedness is the
companion and familiar of the restful mind, averse to wantonness, a
stranger to any kind of excess, the friend of sobriety and the support
of what is honest, a seeker after the beautiful. " Therefore
shamefacedness is a virtue.
Objection 4: Further, every vice is opposed to a virtue. Now certain
vices are opposed to shamefacedness, namely shamelessness and
inordinate prudery. Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.
Objection 5: Further, "like acts beget like habits," according to
Ethic. ii, 1. Now shamefacedness implies a praiseworthy act; wherefore
from many such acts a habit results. But a habit of praiseworthy deeds
is a virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore
shamefacedness is a virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 9) that
shamefacedness is not a virtue.
I answer that, Virtue is taken in two ways, in a strict sense and in a
broad sense. Taken strictly virtue is a perfection, as stated in Phys.
vii, 17,18. Wherefore anything that is inconsistent with perfection,
though it be good, falls short of the notion of virtue. Now
shamefacedness is inconsistent with perfection, because it is the fear
of something base, namely of that which is disgraceful. Hence Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that "shamefacedness is fear of a base
action. " Now just as hope is about a possible and difficult good, so is
fear about a possible and arduous evil, as stated above ([3457]FS,
Q[40], A[1]; [3458]FS, Q[41], A[2]; [3459]FS, Q[42], A[3]), when we
were treating of the passions. But one who is perfect as to a virtuous
habit, does not apprehend that which would be disgraceful and base to
do, as being possible and arduous, that is to say difficult for him to
avoid; nor does he actually do anything base, so as to be in fear of
disgrace. Therefore shamefacedness, properly speaking, is not a virtue,
since it falls short of the perfection of virtue.
Taken, however, in a broad sense virtue denotes whatever is good and
praiseworthy in human acts or passions; and in this way /shamefacedness
is sometimes called a virtue, since it is a praiseworthy passion.
Reply to Objection 1: Observing the mean is not sufficient for the
notion of virtue, although it is one of the conditions included in
virtue's definition: but it is requisite, in addition to this, that it
be "an elective habit," that is to say, operating from choice. Now
shamefacedness denotes, not a habit but a passion, nor does its
movement result from choice, but from an impulse of passion. Hence it
falls short of the notion of virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, shamefacedness is fear of
baseness and disgrace. Now it has been stated ([3460]Q[142], A[4]) that
the vice of intemperance is most base and disgraceful. Wherefore
shamefacedness pertains more to temperance than to any other virtue, by
reason of its motive cause, which is a base action though not according
to the species of the passion, namely fear. Nevertheless in so far as
the vices opposed to other virtues are base and disgraceful,
shamefacedness may also pertain to other virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: Shamefacedness fosters honesty, by removing that
which is contrary thereto, but not so as to attain to the perfection of
honesty.
Reply to Objection 4: Every defect causes a vice, but not every good is
sufficient for the notion of virtue. Consequently it does not follow
that whatever is directly opposed to vice is a virtue, although every
vice is opposed to a virtue, as regards its origin. Hence
shamelessness, in so far as it results from excessive love of
disgraceful things, is opposed to temperance.
Reply to Objection 5: Being frequently ashamed causes the habit of an
acquired virtue whereby one avoids disgraceful things which are the
object of shamefacedness, without continuing to be ashamed in their
regard: although as a consequence of this acquired virtue, a man would
be more ashamed, if confronted with the matter of shamefacedness.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether shamefacedness is about a disgraceful action?
Objection 1: It would seem that shamefacedness is not about a
disgraceful action. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that
"shamefacedness is fear of disgrace. " Now sometimes those who do
nothing wrong suffer ignominy, according to Ps. 67:8, "For thy sake I
have borne reproach, shame hath covered my face. " Therefore
shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.
Objection 2: Further, nothing apparently is disgraceful but what is
sinful. Yet man is ashamed of things that are not sins, for instance
when he performs a menial occupation. Therefore it seems that
shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.
Objection 3: Further, virtuous deeds are not disgraceful but most
beautiful according to Ethic. i, 8. Yet sometimes people are ashamed to
do virtuous deeds, according to Lk. 9:26, "He that shall be ashamed of
Me and My words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed," etc.
Therefore shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful action.
Objection 4: Further, if shamefacedness were properly about a
disgraceful action, it would follow that the more disgraceful the
action the more ashamed would one be. Yet sometimes a man is more
ashamed of lesser sins, while he glories in those which are most
grievous, according to Ps. 51:3, "Why dost thou glory in malice? "
Therefore shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) and Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius, (De Nat. Hom. xx)] say that "shamefacedness is fear of
doing a disgraceful deed or of a disgraceful deed done. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3461]FS, Q[41], A[2]; [3462]FS, Q[42],
A[3]), when we were treating of the passions, fear is properly about an
arduous evil, one, namely, that is difficult to avoid. Now disgrace is
twofold. There is the disgrace inherent to vice, which consists in the
deformity of a voluntary act: and this, properly speaking, has not the
character of an arduous evil. For that which depends on the will alone
does not appear to be arduous and above man's ability: wherefore it is
not apprehended as fearful, and for this reason the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 5) that such evils are not a matter of fear.
The other kind of disgrace is penal so to speak, and it consists in the
reproach that attaches to a person, just as the clarity of glory
consists in a person being honored. And since this reproach has the
character of an arduous evil, just as honor has the character of an
arduous good, shamefacedness, which is fear of disgrace, regards first
and foremost reproach or ignominy. And since reproach is properly due
to vice, as honor is due to virtue, it follows that shamefacedness
regards also the disgrace inherent to vice. Hence the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 5) that "a man is less ashamed of those defects which are
not the result of any fault of his own. "
Now shamefacedness regards fault in two ways. In one way a man refrains
from vicious acts through fear of reproach: in another way a man while
doing a disgraceful deed avoids the public eye through fear of
reproach. In the former case, according to Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius,
De Nat. Hom. xx), we speak of a person "blushing," in the latter we say
that he is "ashamed. " Hence he says that "the man who is ashamed acts
in secret, but he who blushes fears to be disgraced. "
Reply to Objection 1: Shamefacedness properly regards disgrace as due
to sin which is a voluntary defect. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet.
ii, 6) that "a man is more ashamed of those things of which he is the
cause. " Now the virtuous man despises the disgrace to which he is
subject on account of virtue, because he does not deserve it; as the
Philosopher says of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3). Thus we find it
said of the apostles (Acts 5:41) that "they (the apostles) went from
the presence of the council, rejoicing that they were accounted worthy
to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus. " It is owing to imperfection
of virtue that a man is sometimes ashamed of the reproaches which he
suffers on account of virtue, since the more virtuous a man is, the
more he despises external things, whether good or evil. Wherefore it is
written (Is. 51:7): "Fear ye not the reproach of men. "
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3463]Q[63], A[3]), though honor
is not really due save to virtue alone, yet it regards a certain
excellence: and the same applies to reproach, for though it is properly
due to sin alone, yet, at least in man's opinion, it regards any kind
of defect. Hence a man is ashamed of poverty, disrepute, servitude, and
the like.
Reply to Objection 3: Shamefacedness does not regard virtuous deeds as
such. Yet it happens accidentally that a man is ashamed of them either
because he looks upon them as vicious according to human opinion, or
because he is afraid of being marked as presumptuous or hypocritical
for doing virtuous deeds.
Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes more grievous sins are less shameful,
either because they are less disgraceful, as spiritual sins in
comparison with sins of the flesh, or because they connote a certain
abundance of some temporal good; thus a man is more ashamed of
cowardice than of daring, of theft than of robbery, on account of a
semblance of power. The same applies to other sins.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether man is more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with
him?
Objection 1: It would seem that man is not more shamefaced of those who
are more closely connected with him. For it is stated in Rhet. ii, 6
that "men are more shamefaced of those from whom they desire
approbation. " Now men desire this especially from people of the better
sort who are sometimes not connected with them. Therefore man is not
more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him.
Objection 2: Further, seemingly those are more closely connected who
perform like deeds. Now man is not made ashamed of his sin by those
whom he knows to be guilty of the same sin, because according to Rhet.
ii, 6, "a man does not forbid his neighbor what he does himself. "
Therefore he is not more shamefaced of those who are most closely
connected with him.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men take
more shame from those who retail their information to many, such as
jokers and fable-tellers. " But those who are more closely connected
with a man do not retail his vices. Therefore one should not take shame
chiefly from them.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men are
most liable to be made ashamed by those among whom they have done
nothing amiss; by those of whom they ask something for the first time;
by those whose friends they wish to become. " Now these are less closely
connected with us. Therefore man is not made most ashamed by those who
are more closely united to him.
On the contrary, It is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that "man is made most
ashamed by those who are to be continually with him. "
I answer that, Since reproach is opposed to honor, just as honor
denotes attestation to someone's excellence, especially the excellence
which is according to virtue, so too reproach, the fear of which is
shamefacedness, denotes attestation to a person's defect, especially
that which results from sin. Hence the more weighty a person's
attestation is considered to be, the more does he make another person
ashamed. Now a person's attestation may be considered as being more
weighty, either because he is certain of the truth or because of its
effect. Certitude of the truth attaches to a person's attestations for
two reasons. First on account of the rectitude of his judgement, as in
the case of wise and virtuous men, by whom man is more desirous of
being honored and by whom he is brought to a greater sense of shame.
Hence children and the lower animals inspire no one with shame, by
reason of their lack of judgment. Secondly, on account of his knowledge
of the matter attested, because "everyone judges well of what is known
to him" [*Ethic. i, 3]. In this way we are more liable to be made
ashamed by persons connected with us, since they are better acquainted
with our deeds: whereas strangers and persons entirely unknown to us,
who are ignorant of what we do, inspire us with no shame at all.
An attestation receives weight from its effect by reason of some
advantage or harm resulting therefrom; wherefore men are more desirous
of being honored by those who can be of use to them, and are more
liable to be made ashamed by those who are able to do them some harm.
And for this reason again, in a certain respect, persons connected with
us make us more ashamed, since we are to be continually in their
society, as though this entailed a continual harm to us: whereas the
harm that comes from strangers and passersby ceases almost at once.
Reply to Objection 1: People of the better sort make us ashamed for the
same reason as those who are more closely connected with us; because
just as the attestation of the better men carries more weight since
they have a more universal knowledge of things, and in their judgments
hold fast to the truth: so, too, the attestation of those among whom we
live is more cogent since they know more about our concerns in detail.
Reply to Objection 2: We fear not the attestation of those who are
connected with us in the likeness of sin, because we do not think that
they look upon our defect as disgraceful.
Reply to Objection 3: Tale-bearers make us ashamed on account of the
harm they do by making many think ill of us.
Reply to Objection 4: Even those among whom we have done no wrong, make
us more ashamed, on account of the harm that would follow, because, to
wit, we should forfeit the good opinion they had of us: and again
because when contraries are put in juxtaposition their opposition seems
greater, so that when a man notices something disgraceful in one whom
he esteemed good, he apprehends it as being the more disgraceful. The
reason why we are made more ashamed by those of whom we ask something
for the first time, or whose friends we wish to be, is that we fear to
suffer some injury, by being disappointed in our request, or by failing
to become their friends.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether even virtuous men can be ashamed?
Objection 1: It would seem that even virtuous men can be ashamed. For
contraries have contrary effects. Now those who excel in wickedness are
not ashamed, according to Jer. 3:3, "Thou hadst a harlot's forehead,
thou wouldst not blush. " Therefore those who are virtuous are more
inclined to be ashamed.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men are
ashamed not only of vice, but also of the signs of evil": and this
happens also in the virtuous. Therefore virtuous men can be ashamed.
Objection 3: Further, shamefacedness is "fear of disgrace" [*Ethic. iv,
9]. Now virtuous people may happen to be ignominious, for instance if
they are slandered, or if they suffer reproach undeservedly. Therefore
a virtuous man can be ashamed.
Objection 4: Further, shamefacedness is a part of temperance, as stated
above ([3464]Q[143]). Now a part is not separated from its whole. Since
then temperance is in a virtuous man, it means that shamefacedness is
also.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that a "virtuous
man is not shamefaced. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3465]AA[1],2) shamefacedness is fear
of some disgrace. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil is not
feared: first, because it is not reckoned an evil; secondly because one
reckons it impossible with regard to oneself, or as not difficult to
avoid.
Accordingly shame may be lacking in a person in two ways. First,
because the things that should make him ashamed are not deemed by him
to be disgraceful; and in this way those who are steeped in sin are
without shame, for instead of disapproving of their sins, they boast of
them. Secondly, because they apprehend disgrace as impossible to
themselves, or as easy to avoid. In this way the old and the virtuous
are not shamefaced. Yet they are so disposed, that if there were
anything disgraceful in them they would be ashamed of it. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that "shame is in the virtuous
hypothetically. "
Reply to Objection 1: Lack of shame occurs in the best and in the worst
men through different causes, as stated in the Article. In the average
men it is found, in so far as they have a certain love of good, and yet
are not altogether free from evil.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to the virtuous man to avoid not only
vice, but also whatever has the semblance of vice, according to 1
Thess.
