No More Learning

And because this word "God" is predicated of man not on account of the
human nature, but by reason of the suppositum, it does not follow that
we assert a new God. But this would follow, if we held that "Man"
stands for a created suppositum: even as must be said by those who
assert that there are two supposita in Christ [*Cf. [4049] Q[2],
AA[3],6].
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Whether Christ can be called a lordly man?

[*The question is hardly apposite in English. St. Thomas explains why
we can say in Latin, e. g. 'oratio dominica' (the Lord's Prayer) or
'passio dominica' (Our Lord's Passion), but not speak of our Lord as
'homo dominicus' (a lordly man)].

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ can be called a lordly man. For
Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that "we are to be counseled to
hope for the goods that were in the Lordly Man"; and he is speaking of
Christ. Therefore it seems that Christ was a lordly man.

Objection 2: Further, as lordship belongs to Christ by reason of His
Divine Nature, so does manhood belong to the human nature. Now God is
said to be "humanized," as is plain from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii,
11), where he says that "being humanized manifests the conjunction with
man. " Hence with like reason may it be said denominatively that this
man is lordly.

Objection 3: Further, as "lordly" is derived from "lord," so is Divine
derived from "Deus" [God]. But Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iv) calls Christ
the "most Divine Jesus. " Therefore with like reason may Christ be
called a lordly man.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 19): "I do not see that we
may rightly call Jesus Christ a lordly man, since He is the Lord
Himself. "

I answer that, As was said above (A[2], ad 3), when we say "the Man
Christ Jesus," we signify the eternal suppositum, which is the Person
of the Son of God, because there is only one suppositum of both
natures. Now "God" and "Lord" are predicated essentially of the Son of
God; and hence they ought not to be predicated denominatively, since
this is derogatory to the truth of the union. Hence, since we say
"lordly" denominatively from lord, it cannot truly and properly be said
that this Man is lordly, but rather that He is Lord. But if, when we
say "the Man Christ Jesus," we mean a created suppositum, as those who
assert two supposita in Christ, this man might be called lordly,
inasmuch as he is assumed to a participation of Divine honor, as the
Nestorians said. And, even in this way, the human nature is not called
"divine" by essence, but "deified"---not, indeed, by its being
converted into the Divine Nature, but by its conjunction with the
Divine Nature in one hypostasis, as is plain from Damascene (De Fide
Orth. iii, 11,17).

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine retracts these and the like words
(Retract. i, 19); hence, after the foregoing words (Retract. i, 19), he
adds: "Wherever I have said this," viz. that Christ Jesus is a lordly
man, "I wish it unsaid, having afterwards seen that it ought not to be
said although it may be defended with some reason," i. e. because one
might say that He was called a lordly man by reason of the human
nature, which this word "man" signifies, and not by reason of the
suppositum.

Reply to Objection 2: This one suppositum, which is of the human and
Divine natures, was first of the Divine Nature, i. e. from eternity.
Afterwards in time it was made a suppositum of human nature by the
Incarnation. And for this reason it is said to be "humanized"---not
that it assumed a man, but that it assumed human nature. But the
converse of this is not true, viz. that a suppositum of human nature
assumed the Divine Nature; hence we may not say a "deified" or "lordly"
man.

Reply to Objection 3: This word Divine is wont to be predicated even of
things of which the word God is predicated essentially; thus we say
that "the Divine Essence is God," by reason of identity; and that "the
Essence belongs to God," or is "Divine," on account of the different
way of signifying; and we speak of the "Divine Word," though the Word
is God. So, too, we say "a Divine Person," just as we say "the person
of Plato," on account of its different mode of signification. But
"lordly" is not predicated of those of which "lord" is predicated; for
we are not wont to call a man who is a lord, lordly; but whatsoever
belongs to a lord is called lordly, as the "lordly will," or the
"lordly hand," or the "lordly possession. " And hence the man Christ,
Who is our Lord, cannot be called lordly; yet His flesh can be called
"lordly flesh" and His passion the "lordly passion. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether what belongs to the human nature can be predicated of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that what belongs to the human nature cannot
be said of God. For contrary things cannot be said of the same. Now,
what belongs to human nature is contrary to what is proper to God,
since God is uncreated, immutable, and eternal, and it belongs to the
human nature to be created temporal and mutable. Therefore what belongs
to the human nature cannot be said of God.

Objection 2: Further, to attribute to God what is defective seems to be
derogatory to the Divine honor, and to be a blasphemy. Now what
pertains to the human nature contains a kind of defect, as to suffer,
to die, and the like. Hence it seems that what pertains to the human
nature can nowise be said of God.

Objection 3: Further, to be assumed pertains to the human nature; yet
it does not pertain to God. Therefore what belongs to the human nature
cannot be said of God.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "God
assumed the idioms," i. e. the properties, "of flesh, since God is said
to be passible, and the God of glory was crucified. "

I answer that, On this question there was a difference of opinion
between Nestorians and Catholics. The Nestorians wished to divide words
predicated of Christ, in this way, viz. that such as pertained to human
nature should not be predicated of God, and that such as pertained to
the Divine Nature should not be predicated of the Man. Hence Nestorius
said: "If anyone attempt to attribute sufferings to the Word, let him
be anathema" [*Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 29]. But if there are
any words applicable to both natures, of them they predicated what
pertained to both natures, as "Christ" or "Lord. " Hence they granted
that Christ was born of a Virgin, and that He was from eternity; but
they did not say that God was born of a virgin, or that the Man was
from eternity. Catholics on the other hand maintained that words which
are said of Christ either in His Divine or in His human nature may be
said either of God or of man. Hence Cyril says [*Council of Ephesus,
Part I, ch. 26]: "If anyone ascribes to two persons or substances,"
i. e. hypostases, "such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic
Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the Saints, or by Himself of
Himself, and believes that some are to be applied to the Man, and
apportions some to the Word alone---let him be anathema. " And the
reason of this is that, since there is one hypostasis of both natures,
the same hypostasis is signified by the name of either nature. Thus
whether we say "man" or "God," the hypostasis of Divine and human
nature is signified. And hence, of the Man may be said what belongs to
the Divine Nature, as of a hypostasis of the Divine Nature; and of God
may be said what belongs to the human nature, as of a hypostasis of
human nature.

Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that in a proposition in which
something is predicated of another, we must not merely consider what
the predicate is predicated of, but also the reason of its being
predicated. Thus, although we do not distinguish things predicated of
Christ, yet we distinguish that by reason of which they are predicated,
since those things that belong to the Divine Nature are predicated of
Christ in His Divine Nature, and those that belong to the human nature
are predicated of Christ in His human nature. Hence Augustine says (De
Trin. i, 11): "We must distinguish what is said by Scripture in
reference to the form of God, wherein He is equal to the Father, and
what in reference to the form of a servant, wherein He is less than the
Father": and further on he says (De Trin. i, 13): "The prudent,
careful, and devout reader will discern the reason and point of view of
what is said. "

Reply to Objection 1: It is impossible for contraries to be predicated
of the same in the same respects, but nothing prevents their being
predicated of the same in different aspects. And thus contraries are
predicated of Christ, not in the same, but in different natures.

Reply to Objection 2: If the things pertaining to defect were
attributed to God in His Divine Nature, it would be a blasphemy, since
it would be derogatory to His honor. But there is no kind of wrong done
to God if they are attributed to Him in His assumed nature. Hence in a
discourse of the Council of Ephesus [*Part III, ch. 10] it is said:
"God accounts nothing a wrong which is the occasion of man's salvation.
For no lowliness that He assumed for us injures that Nature which can
be subject to no injury, yet makes lower things Its own, to save our
nature. Therefore, since these lowly and worthless things do no harm to
the Divine Nature, but bring about our salvation, how dost thou
maintain that what was the cause of our salvation was the occasion of
harm to God? "

Reply to Objection 3: To be assumed pertains to human nature, not in
its suppositum, but in itself; and thus it does not belong to God.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether what belongs to the human nature can be predicated of the Divine
Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that what belongs to the human nature can be
said of the Divine Nature. For what belongs to the human nature is
predicated of the Son of God, and of God. But God is His own Nature.
Therefore, what belongs to the human nature may be predicated of the
Divine Nature.

Objection 2: Further, the flesh pertains to human nature. But as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6), "we say, after the blessed
Athanasius and Cyril, that the Nature of the Word was incarnate. "
Therefore it would seem with equal reason that what belongs to the
human nature may be said of the Divine Nature.

Objection 3: Further, what belongs to the Divine Nature belongs to
Christ's human nature; such as to know future things and to possess
saving power. Therefore it would seem with equal reason that what
belongs to the human may be said of the Divine Nature.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4): "When we
mention the Godhead we do not predicate of it the idioms," i. e. the
properties, "of the humanity; for we do not say that the Godhead is
passible or creatable. " Now the Godhead is the Divine Nature. Therefore
what is proper to the human nature cannot be said of the Divine Nature.

I answer that, What belongs to one cannot be said of another, unless
they are both the same; thus "risible" can be predicated only of man.
Now in the mystery of the Incarnation the Divine and human natures are
not the same; but the hypostasis of the two natures is the same. And
hence what belongs to one nature cannot be predicated of the other if
they are taken in the abstract. Now concrete words stand for the
hypostasis of the nature; and hence of concrete words we may predicate
indifferently what belongs to either nature---whether the word of which
they are predicated refers to one nature, as the word "Christ," by
which is signified "both the Godhead anointing and the manhood
anointed"; or to the Divine Nature alone, as this word "God" or "the
Son of God"; or to the manhood alone, as this word "Man" or "Jesus. "
Hence Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Palaest. cxxiv): "It is of no consequence
from what substance we name Christ; because since the unity of person
remains inseparably, one and the same is altogether Son of Man by His
flesh, and altogether Son of God by the Godhead which He has with the
Father. "

Reply to Objection 1: In God, Person and Nature are really the same;
and by reason of this identity the Divine Nature is predicated of the
Son of God. Nevertheless, its mode of predication is different; and
hence certain things are said of the Son of God which are not said of
the Divine Nature; thus we say that the Son of God is born, yet we do
not say that the Divine Nature is born; as was said in the [4050]FP,
Q[39], A[5]. So, too, in the mystery of the Incarnation we say that the
Son of God suffered, yet we do not say that the Divine Nature suffered.

Reply to Objection 2: Incarnation implies union with flesh, rather than
any property of flesh. Now in Christ each nature is united to the other
in person; and by reason of this union the Divine Nature is said to be
incarnate and the human nature deified, as stated above ([4051]Q[2],
A[1], ad 3).

Reply to Objection 3: What belongs to the Divine Nature is predicated
of the human nature---not, indeed, as it belongs essentially to the
Divine Nature, but as it is participated by the human nature. Hence,
whatever cannot be participated by the human nature (as to be uncreated
and omnipotent), is nowise predicated of the human nature. But the
Divine Nature received nothing by participation from the human nature;
and hence what belongs to the human nature can nowise be predicated of
the Divine Nature.
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Whether this is true: "God was made man"?

Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: "God was made man. " For
since man signifies a substance, to be made man is to be made simply.
But this is false: "God was made simply. " Therefore this is false: "God
was made man. "

Objection 2: Further, to be made man is to be changed. But God cannot
be the subject of change, according to Malachi 3:6: "I am the Lord, and
I change not. " Hence this is false: "God was made man. "

Objection 3: Further, man as predicated of Christ stands for the Person
of the Son of God. But this is false: "God was made the Person of the
Son of God. " Therefore this is false: "God was made man. "

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:14): "The Word was made flesh":
and as Athanasius says (Ep. ad Epictetum), "when he said, 'The Word was
made flesh,' it is as if it were said that God was made man. "

I answer that, A thing is said to be made that which begins to be
predicated of it for the first time. Now to be man is truly predicated
of God, as stated above [4052](A[1]), yet in such sort that it pertains
to God to be man, not from eternity, but from the time of His assuming
human nature. Hence, this is true, "God was made man"; though it is
understood differently by some: even as this, "God is man," as we said
above [4053](A[1]).

Reply to Objection 1: To be made man is to be made simply, in all those
in whom human nature begins to be in a newly created suppositum. But
God is said to have been made man, inasmuch as the human nature began
to be in an eternally pre-existing suppositum of the Divine Nature. And
hence for God to be made man does not mean that God was made simply.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, to be made implies that
something. is newly predicated of another. Hence, whenever anything is
predicated of another, and there is a change in that of which it is
predicated, then to be made is to be changed; and this takes place in
whatever is predicated absolutely, for whiteness or greatness cannot
newly affect anything, unless it be newly changed to whiteness or
greatness. But whatever is predicated relatively can be newly
predicated of anything without its change, as a man may be made to be
on the right side without being changed and merely by the change of him
on whose left side he was. Hence in such cases, not all that is said to
be made is changed, since it may happen by the change of something
else. And it is thus we say of God: "Lord, Thou art made [Douay: 'hast
been'] our refuge" (Ps. 89:1). Now to be man belongs to God by reason
of the union, which is a relation. And hence to be man is newly
predicated of God without any change in Him, by a change in the human
nature, which is assumed to a Divine Person. And hence, when it is
said, "God was made man," we understand no change on the part of God,
but only on the part of the human nature.

Reply to Objection 3: Man stands not for the bare Person of the Son of
God, but inasmuch as it subsists in human nature. Hence, although this
is false, "God was made the Person of the Son of God," yet this is
true: "God was made man" by being united to human nature.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether this is true: "Man was made God"?

Objection 1: It would seem that this is true: "Man was made God. " For
it is written (Rom. 1:2,3): "Which He had promised before by His
prophets in the holy Scriptures, concerning His Son Who was made to Him
of the seed of David according to the flesh. " Now Christ, as man, is of
the seed of David according to the flesh. Therefore man was made the
Son of God.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 13) that "such was
this assumption, which made God man, and man God. " But by reason of
this assumption this is true: "God was made man. " Therefore, in like
manner, this is true: "Man was made God. "

Objection 3: Further, Gregory Nazianzen says (Ep. ad Chelid. ci): "God
was humanized and man was deified, or whatever else one may like to
call it. " Now God is said to be humanized by being made man. Therefore
with equal reason man is said to be deified by being made God; and thus
it is true that "Man was made God. "

Objection 4: Further, when it is said that "God was made man," the
subject of the making or uniting is not God, but human nature, which
the word "man" signifies. Now that seems to be the subject of the
making, to which the making is attributed. Hence "Man was made God" is
truer than "God was made man. "

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 2): "We do not say
that man was deified, but that God was humanized. " Now to be made God
is the same as to be deified. Hence this is false: "Man was made God. "

I answer that, This proposition, Man was made God, may be understood in
three ways. First, so that the participle "made" absolutely determines
either the subject or the predicate; and in this sense it is false,
since neither the Man of Whom it is predicated was made, nor is God
made, as will be said ([4054]AA[8],9). And in the same sense this is
false: "God was made man. " But it is not of this sense that we are now
speaking. Secondly, it may be so understood that the word "made"
determines the composition, with this meaning: "Man was made God, i. e.
it was brought about that Man is God. " And in this sense both are true,
viz. that "Man was made God" and that "God was made Man. " But this is
not the proper sense of these phrases; unless, indeed, we are to
understand that "man" has not a personal but a simple supposition. For
although "this man" was not made God, because this suppositum, viz. the
Person of the Son of God, was eternally God, yet man, speaking
commonly, was not always God. Thirdly, properly understood, this
participle "made" attaches making to man with relation to God, as the
term of the making. And in this sense, granted that the Person or
hypostasis in Christ are the same as the suppositum of God and Man, as
was shown ([4055]Q[2], AA[2],3), this proposition is false, because,
when it is said, "Man was made God," "man" has a personal suppositum:
because, to be God is not verified of the Man in His human nature, but
in His suppositum. Now the suppositum of human nature, of Whom "to be
God" is verified, is the same as the hypostasis or Person of the Son of
God, Who was always God. Hence it cannot be said that this Man began to
be God, or is made God, or that He was made God.

But if there were a different hypostasis of God and man, so that "to be
God" was predicated of the man, and, conversely, by reason of a certain
conjunction of supposita, or of personal dignity, or of affection or
indwelling, as the Nestorians said, then with equal reason might it be
said that Man was made God, i. e. joined to God, and that God was made
Man, i. e. joined to man.

Reply to Objection 1: In these words of the Apostle the relative "Who"
which refers to the Person of the Son of God ought not to be considered
as affecting the predicate, as if someone already existing of the "seed
of David according to the flesh" was made the Son of God---and it is in
this sense that the objection takes it. But it ought to be taken as
affecting the subject, with this meaning---that the "Son of God was
made to Him ('namely to the honor of the Father,' as a gloss expounds
it), being of the seed of David according to the flesh," as if to say
"the Son of God having flesh of the seed of David to the honor of God.
"

Reply to Objection 2: This saying of Augustine is to be taken in the
sense that by the assumption that took place in the Incarnation it was
brought about that Man is God and God is Man; and in this sense both
sayings are true as stated above.

The same is to be said in reply to the third, since to be deified is
the same as to be made God.

Reply to Objection 4: A term placed in the subject is taken materially,
i. e. for the suppositum; placed in the predicate it is taken formally,
i. e. for the nature signified. Hence when it is said that "Man was made
God," the being made is not attributed to the human nature but to the
suppositum of the human nature, Which is God from eternity, and hence
it does not befit Him to be made God. But when it is said that "God was
made Man," the making is taken to be terminated in the human nature.
Hence, properly speaking, this is true: "God was made Man," and this is
false: "Man was made God"; even as if Socrates, who was already a man,
were made white, and were pointed out, this would be true: "This man
was made white today," and this would be false; "This white thing was
made man today. " Nevertheless, if on the part of the subject there is
added some word signifying human nature in the abstract, it might be
taken in this way for the subject of the making, e. g. if it were said
that "human nature was made the Son of God's. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether this is true: "Christ is a creature"?

Objection 1: It would seem that this is true: "Christ is a creature. "
For Pope Leo says [*Cf. Append. Opp. August. , Serm. xii de Nativ. ]: "A
new and unheard of covenant: God Who is and was, is made a creature. "
Now we may predicate of Christ whatever the Son of God became by the
Incarnation. Therefore this is true; Christ is a creature.

Objection 2: Further, the properties of both natures may be predicated
of the common hypostasis of both natures, no matter by what word they
are signified, as stated above [4056](A[5]). But it is the property of
human nature to be created, as it is the property of the Divine Nature
to be Creator. Hence both may be said of Christ, viz. that He is a
creature and that he is uncreated and Creator.

Objection 3: Further, the principal part of a man is the soul rather
than the body. But Christ, by reason of the body which He took from the
Virgin, is said simply to be born of the Virgin. Therefore by reason of
the soul which is created by God, it ought simply to be said that He is
a creature.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Trin. i): "Was Christ made by a word?
Was Christ created by a command? " as if to say: "No! " Hence he adds:
"How can there be a creature in God? For God has a simple not a
composite Nature. " Therefore it must not be granted that "Christ is a
creature. "

I answer that, As Jerome [*Gloss, Ord. in Osee 2:16] says, "words
spoken amiss lead to heresy"; hence with us and heretics the very words
ought not to be in common, lest we seem to countenance their error. Now
the Arian heretics said that Christ was a creature and less than the
Father, not only in His human nature, but even in His Divine Person.
And hence we must not say absolutely that Christ is a "creature" or
"less than the Father"; but with a qualification, viz. "in His human
nature. " But such things as could not be considered to belong to the
Divine Person in Itself may be predicated simply of Christ by reason of
His human nature; thus we say simply that Christ suffered, died and was
buried: even as in corporeal and human beings, things of which we may
doubt whether they belong to the whole or the part, if they are
observed to exist in a part, are not predicated of the whole simply,
i. e. without qualification, for we do not say that the Ethiopian is
white but that he is white as regards his teeth; but we say without
qualification that he is curly, since this can only belong to him as
regards his hair.

Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes, for the sake of brevity, the holy
doctors use the word "creature" of Christ, without any qualifying term;
we should however take as understood the qualification, "as man. "

Reply to Objection 2: All the properties of the human, just as of the
Divine Nature, may be predicated equally of Christ. Hence Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "Christ Who God and Man, is called
created and uncreated, passible and impassible. " Nevertheless things of
which we may doubt to what nature they belong, are not to be predicated
without a qualification. Hence he afterwards adds (De Fide Orth. iv, 5)
that "the one hypostasis," i. e. of Christ, "is uncreated in its Godhead
and created in its manhood": even so conversely, we may not say without
qualification, "Christ is incorporeal" or "impassible"; in order to
avoid the error of Manes, who held that Christ had not a true body, nor
truly suffered, but we must say, with a qualification, that Christ was
incorporeal and impassible "in His Godhead. "

Reply to Objection 3: There can be no doubt how the birth from the
Virgin applies to the Person of the Son of God, as there can be in the
case of creation; and hence there is no parity.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether this Man, i. e. Christ, began to be?

Objection 1: It would seem that this Man, i. e. Christ, began to be. For
Augustine says (Tract. cv in Joan. ) that "before the world was, neither
were we, nor the Mediator of God and men---the Man Jesus Christ. " But
what was not always, has begun to be. Therefore this Man, i. e. Christ,
began to be.

Objection 2: Further, Christ began to be Man. But to be man is to be
simply. Therefore this man began to be, simply.

Objection 3: Further, "man" implies a suppositum of human nature. But
Christ was not always a suppositum of human nature. Therefore this Man
began to be.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 13:8): "Jesus Christ yesterday and
today: and the same for ever. "

I answer that, We must not say that "this Man"---pointing to
Christ---"began to be," unless we add something. And this for a twofold
reason. First, for this proposition is simply false, in the judgment of
the Catholic Faith, which affirms that in Christ there is one
suppositum and one hypostasis, as also one Person. For according to
this, when we say "this Man," pointing to Christ, the eternal
suppositum is necessarily meant, with Whose eternity a beginning in
time is incompatible. Hence this is false: "This Man began to be. " Nor
does it matter that to begin to be refers to the human nature, which is
signified by this word "man"; because the term placed in the subject is
not taken formally so as to signify the nature, but is taken materially
so as to signify the suppositum, as was said (A[1], ad 4). Secondly,
because even if this proposition were true, it ought not to be made use
of without qualification; in order to avoid the heresy of Arius, who,
since he pretended that the Person of the Son of God is a creature, and
less than the Father, so he maintained that He began to be, saying
"there was a time when He was not. "

Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted must be qualified, i. e. we must
say that the Man Jesus Christ was not, before the world was, "in His
humanity. "

Reply to Objection 2: With this word "begin" we cannot argue from the
lower species to the higher. For it does not follow if "this began to
be white," that therefore "it began to be colored. " And this because
"to begin" implies being now and not heretofore: for it does not follow
if "this was not white hitherto" that "therefore it was not colored
hitherto. " Now, to be simply is higher than to be man. Hence this does
not follow: "Christ began to be Man---therefore He began to be. "

Reply to Objection 3: This word "Man," as it is taken for Christ,
although it signifies the human nature, which began to be, nevertheless
signifies the eternal suppositum which did not begin to be. Hence,
since it signifies the suppositum when placed in the subject, and
refers to the nature when placed in the predicate, therefore this is
false: "The Man Christ began to be": but this is true: "Christ began to
be Man. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether this is true: "Christ as Man is a creature"?

Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: "Christ as Man is a
creature," or "began to be. " For nothing in Christ is created except
the human nature. But this is false: "Christ as Man is the human
nature. " Therefore this is also false; Christ as Man is a creature.

Objection 2: Further, the predicate is predicated of the term placed in
reduplication, rather than of the subject of the proposition; as when I
say: "A body as colored is visible," it follows that the colored is
visible. But as stated ([4057]AA[8],9) we must not absolutely grant
that "the Man Christ is a creature"; nor consequently that "Christ as
Man is a creature. "

Objection 3: Further, whatever is predicated of a man as man is
predicated of him "per se" and simply, for "per se" is the same as
"inasmuch as itself," as is said Metaph. v, text. 23. But this is
false: "Christ as Man is per se and simply a creature. " Hence this,
too, is false; "Christ as Man is a creature. "

On the contrary, Whatever is, is either Creator or creature. But this
is false: "Christ as Man is Creator. " Therefore this is true: "Christ
as Man is a creature. "

I answer that, When we say "Christ as Man" this word "man" may be added
in the reduplication, either by reason of the suppositum or by reason
of the nature. If it be added by reason of the suppositum, since the
suppositum of the human nature in Christ is eternal and uncreated, this
will be false: "Christ as Man is a creature. " But if it be added by
reason of the human nature, it is true, since by reason of the human
nature or in the human nature, it belongs to Him to be a creature, as
was said [4058](A[8]).

It must however be borne in mind that the term covered by the
reduplication signifies the nature rather than the suppositum, since it
is added as a predicate, which is taken formally, for it is the same to
say "Christ as Man" and to say "Christ as He is a Man. " Hence this is
to be granted rather than denied: "Christ as Man is a creature. " But if
something further be added whereby [the term covered by the
reduplication] is attracted to the suppositum, this proposition is to
be denied rather than granted, for instance were one to say: "Christ as
'this' Man is a creature. "

Reply to Objection 1: Although Christ is not the human nature, He has
human nature. Now the word "creature" is naturally predicated not only
of abstract, but also of concrete things; since we say that "manhood is
a creature" and that "man is a creature. "

Reply to Objection 2: Man as placed in the subject refers to the
suppositum---and as placed in the reduplication refers to the nature,
as was stated above. And because the nature is created and the
suppositum uncreated, therefore, although it is not granted that "this
man is a creature," yet it is granted that "Christ as Man is a
creature. "

Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to every man who is a suppositum of
human nature alone to have his being only in human nature. Hence of
every such suppositum it follows that if it is a creature as man, it is
a creature simply. But Christ is a suppositum not merely of human
nature, but also of the Divine Nature, in which He has an uncreated
being. Hence it does not follow that, if He is a creature as Man, He is
a creature simply.
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Whether this is true: "Christ as Man is God"?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ, as Man, is God. For Christ is
God by the grace of union. But Christ, as Man, has the grace of union.
Therefore Christ as Man is God.

Objection 2: Further, to forgive sins is proper to God, according to
Is. 43:25: "I am He that blot out thy iniquities for My own sake. " But
Christ as Man forgives sin, according to Mat. 9:6: "But that you may
know that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins," etc.
Therefore Christ as Man is God.

Objection 3: Further, Christ is not Man in common, but is this
particular Man. Now Christ, as this Man, is God, since by "this Man" we
signify the eternal suppositum which is God naturally. Therefore Christ
as Man is God.

On the contrary, Whatever belongs to Christ as Man belongs to every
man. Now, if Christ as Man is God, it follows that every man is
God---which is clearly false.

I answer that, This term "man" when placed in the reduplication may be
taken in two ways. First as referring to the nature; and in this way it
is not true that Christ as Man is God, because the human nature is
distinct from the Divine by a difference of nature. Secondly it may be
taken as referring to the suppositum; and in this way, since the
suppositum of the human nature in Christ is the Person of the Son of
God, to Whom it essentially belongs to be God, it is true that Christ,
as Man, is God. Nevertheless because the term placed in the
reduplication signifies the nature rather than the suppositum, as
stated above [4059](A[10]), hence this is to be denied rather than
granted: "Christ as Man is God. "

Reply to Objection 1: It is not with regard to the same, that a thing
moves towards, and that it is, something; for to move belongs to a
thing because of its matter or subject---and to be in act belongs to it
because of its form. So too it is not with regard to the same, that it
belongs to Christ to be ordained to be God by the grace of union, and
to be God. For the first belongs to Him in His human nature, and the
second, in His Divine Nature. Hence this is true: "Christ as Man has
the grace of union"; yet not this: "Christ as Man is God. "

Reply to Objection 2: The Son of Man has on earth the power of
forgiving sins, not by virtue of the human nature, but by virtue of the
Divine Nature, in which Divine Nature resides the power of forgiving
sins authoritatively; whereas in the human nature it resides
instrumentally and ministerially. Hence Chrysostom expounding this
passage says [*Implicitly. Hom. xxx in Matth; cf. St. Thomas, Catena
Aurea on Mk. 2:10]: "He said pointedly 'on earth to forgive sins,' in
order to show that by an indivisible union He united human nature to
the power of the Godhead, since although He was made Man, yet He
remained the Word of God. "

Reply to Objection 3: When we say "this man," the demonstrative pronoun
"this" attracts "man" to the suppositum; and hence "Christ as this Man,
is God, is a truer proposition than Christ as Man is God. "
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Whether this is true: "Christ as Man is a hypostasis or person"?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as Man is a hypostasis or
person. For what belongs to every man belongs to Christ as Man, since
He is like other men according to Phil. 2:7: "Being made in the
likeness of men. " But every man is a person. Therefore Christ as Man is
a person.

Objection 2: Further, Christ as Man is a substance of rational nature.
But He is not a universal substance: therefore He is an individual
substance. Now a person is nothing else than an individual substance of
rational nature; as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat. ). Therefore Christ as
Man is a person.

Objection 3: Further, Christ as Man is a being of human nature, and a
suppositum and a hypostasis of the same nature. But every hypostasis
and suppositum and being of human nature is a person. Therefore Christ
as Man is a person.

On the contrary, Christ as Man is not an eternal person. Therefore if
Christ as Man is a person it would follow that in Christ there are two
persons---one temporal and the other eternal, which is erroneous, as
was said above ([4060]Q[2], A[6];[4061] Q[4], A[2]).

I answer that, As was said ([4062]AA[10],11), the term "Man" placed in
the reduplication may refer either to the suppositum or to the nature.
Hence when it is said: "Christ as Man is a person," if it is taken as
referring to the suppositum, it is clear that Christ as Man is a
person, since the suppositum of human nature is nothing else than the
Person of the Son of God. But if it be taken as referring to the
nature, it may be understood in two ways. First, we may so understand
it as if it belonged to human nature to be in a person, and in this way
it is true, for whatever subsists in human nature is a person. Secondly
it may be taken that in Christ a proper personality, caused by the
principles of the human nature, is due to the human nature; and in this
way Christ as Man is not a person, since the human nature does not
exist of itself apart from the Divine Nature, and yet the notion of
person requires this.

Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to every man to be a person, inasmuch
as everything subsisting in human nature is a person. Now this is
proper to the Man Christ that the Person subsisting in His human nature
is not caused by the principles of the human nature, but is eternal.
Hence in one way He is a person, as Man; and in another way He is not,
as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: The "individual substance," which is included in
the definition of a person, implies a complete substance subsisting of
itself and separate from all else; otherwise, a man's hand might be
called a person, since it is an individual substance; nevertheless,
because it is an individual substance existing in something else, it
cannot be called a person; nor, for the same reason, can the human
nature in Christ, although it may be called something individual and
singular.

Reply to Objection 3: As a person signifies something complete and
self-subsisting in rational nature, so a hypostasis, suppositum, and
being of nature in the genus of substance, signify something that
subsists of itself. Hence, as human nature is not of itself a person
apart from the Person of the Son of God, so likewise it is not of
itself a hypostasis or suppositum or a being of nature. Hence in the
sense in which we deny that "Christ as Man is a person" we must deny
all the other propositions.
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OF CHRIST'S UNITY OF BEING (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider what pertains to Christ's unity in common. For, in
their proper place, we must consider what pertains to unity and
plurality in detail: thus we concluded ([4063]Q[9]) that there is not
only one knowledge in Christ, and it will be concluded hereafter
([4064]Q[35], A[2]) that there is not only one nativity in Christ.

Hence we must consider Christ's unity (1) of being; (2) of will; (3) of
operation.

Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Christ is one or two?

(2) Whether there is only one being in Christ?
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Whether Christ is one or two?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not one, but two. For
Augustine says (De Trin. i, 7): "Because the form of God took the form
of a servant, both are God by reason of God Who assumed, yet both are
Man by reason of the man assumed. " Now "both" may only be said when
there are two. Therefore Christ is two.

Objection 2: Further, where there is one thing and another there are
two. Now Christ is one thing and another; for Augustine says
(Enchiridion xxxv): "Being in the form of God . . . He took the form of
a servant . . .