thy sensation is single;
in which case I cannot see why thou shouldst extend this
single sensation over a sentient surface, and not content
thyself with a single sentient point;--or thy sensation is
varied; and in this case, since the differences must succeed
each other, I again do not see why thou shouldst not
conceive of these feelings as succeeding each other in the
same point.
in which case I cannot see why thou shouldst extend this
single sensation over a sentient surface, and not content
thyself with a single sentient point;--or thy sensation is
varied; and in this case, since the differences must succeed
each other, I again do not see why thou shouldst not
conceive of these feelings as succeeding each other in the
same point.
Fichte - Nature of the Scholar
org/access_use#pd-google
? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
2G0
Spirit. I would not weary of repeating it in all its appli-
cations, if I thought that thou hadst not thoroughly com-
prehended it, and indelibly impressed it on thy mind.
Canst thou say, I am conscious of external objects.
I. By no means, if I speak accurately; for the sight and
touch by which I grasp these objects are not consciousness
itself, but only that of which I am first and most immedi-
ately conscious. Strictly speaking, I can only say, that I am
conscious of my seeing and touching of these objects.
Spirit. Do not forget, then, what thou hast now clearly
understood. In all perception thou perceivest only thine own
condition.
I shall, however, continue to speak thy language, since it
is most familiar to thee. Thou hast said that thou canst see,
hear, and feel objects. How then,--that is, with what pro-
perties or attributes,--dost thou see or feel them?
I. I see that object red, this blue; when I touch them, I
find this smooth, that rough--this cold, that warm.
Spirit. Thou knowest then what red, blue, smooth, rough,
cold, and warm, really signify.
/. Undoubtedly I do.
Spirit. Wilt thou not describe it to me then?
I. It cannot be described. Look! Turn thine eye to-
wards that object:--what thou becomest conscious of
through thy sight, I call red. Touch the surface of this
other object:--what thou feelest, I call smooth. In this
way I have arrived at this knowledge, and there is no other
way by which it can be acquired
.
Spirit. But can we not, at least from some of these qua-
lities known by immediate sensation, deduce a knowledge
of others differing from them? If, for instance, any one
had seen red, green, yellow, but never a blue colour; had
tasted sour, sweet, salt, but never bitter,--would he not, by
mere reflection and comparison, be able to discover what
is meant by blue or bitter, without having ever seen or
tasted anything of the kind?
I. Certainly not. What is matter of sensation can only
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? 270
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
be felt, it is not discoverable by thought; it is no deduction,
but a direct and immediate perception.
Spirit. Strange! Thou boastest of a knowledge respect-
ing which thou art unable to tell how thou hast attained it.
For see, thou maintainest that thou canst see one quality in
an object, feel another, hear a third; thou must, therefore,
be able to distinguish sight from touch, and both from hear-
ing?
I. Without doubt.
Spirit. Thou maintainest further, that thou seest this ob-
ject red, that blue; and feelest this smooth, that rough.
Thou must therefore be able to distinguish red from blue,
smooth from rough 1
I Without doubt.
Spirit. And thou maintainest that thou hast not discov-
ered this difference by means of reflection and comparison
of these sensations in thyself. But perhaps thou hast learnt,
by comparing the red or blue colours, the smooth or rough
surfaces of objects out of thyself, what thou shouldst feel in
thyself as red or blue, smooth or rough?
I. This is impossible; for my perception of objects pro-
ceeds from my perception of my own internal condition, and
is determined by it, but not the contrary. I,first distinguish
objects by distinguishing my own states of being. I can
learn that this particular sensation is indicated by the
wholly arbitrary sign, red;--and those by the signs, blue,
smooth, rough; but I cannot learn that the sensations them-
selves are distinguished, nor how they are distinguished.
That they are different, I know only by being conscious
of myself, and being conscious of internal change. How
they differ, I cannot describe; but I know that they must
differ as much as my self-consciousness differs; and this dif-
ference of sensations is an immediate, and by no means an
acquired, distinction.
Spirit. Which thou canst make independently of all
knowledge of the objects themselves?
I. Which I must make independently of such knowledge,
for this knowledge is itself dependent on that distinction.
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? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
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Spirit. Which is then given to thee immediately through
mere self-consciousness?
I. In no other way.
Spirit. But shouldst thou not then content thyself with
saying,--" I feel myself affected in the manner that I call
red, blue, smooth, rough. "? Shouldst thou not place these
sensations in thyself alone? and not transfer them to an ob-
ject lying entirely out of thyself, and declare these modifica-
tions of thyself to be properties of this object?
Or, tell me, when thou believest that thou seest an object
red, or feelest it smooth, dost thou really perceiveTanything
more than that thou art affected in a certain manner?
L From what has gone before, T have clearly seen that I
do not, in fact, perceive more than what thou sayest; and
this transference of what is in me to something out of my-
self, from which nevertheless I cannot refrain, now appears
very strange to me.
My sensations are in myself, not in the object, for I am
myself and not the object; I am conscious only of myself
and of my own state, not of the state of the object. If there
is a consciousness of the object, that consciousness is, cer-
tainly, neither sensation nor perception :--thus much is
clear.
Spirit. Thou formest thy conclusions somewhat precipi-
tately. Let us consider this matter on all sides, so that I
may be assured that thou wilt not again retract what thou
hast now freely admitted.
Is there then in the object, as thou usually conceivest of
it, anything more than its red colour, its smooth surface, and
so on; in short, anything besides those characteristic marks
which thou obtainest through immediate sensation?
I. I believe that there is: besides these attributes there
is yet the thing itself to which they belong; the substra-
tum which supports these attributes.
Spirit. But through what sense dost thou perceive this
substratum of these attributes? Dost thou see it, feel it,
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? 272
the vocation of max.
hear it; or is there perhaps a special sense for its percep-
tion?
I. No. I think that I see and feel it.
Spirit. Indeed! Let us examine this more closely. Art
thou then ever conscious of thy sight in itself, or at all times
only of determinate acts of sight?
I. I have always a determinate sensation of sight.
Spirit. And what is this determinate sensation of sight
with respect to that object there?
I. That of red colour.
Spirit. And this red is something positive, a simple sen-
sation, a specific state of thyself?
I. This I have understood.
Spirit. Thou shouldst therefore see the red in itself as
simple, as a mathematical point, and thou dost see it only
as such. In thee at least, as an affection of thyself, it is ob-
viously a simple, determinate state, without connexion with
anything else,--which we can only describe as a mathemati-
cal point. Or dost thou find it otherwise?
I. I must admit that such is the case.
Spirit. But now thou spreadest this simple red over a
broad surface, which thou assuredly dost not see, since thou
seest only a simple red. How dost thou obtain this surface?
I. It is certainly strange. --Yet, I believe that I have
found the explanation. I do not indeed see the surface, but
I feel it when I pass my hand over it. My sensation of
sight remains the same during this process of feeling, and
hence I extend the red colour over the whole surface which
I feel while I continue to see the same red.
Spirit. This might be so, didst thou really feel such a
surface. But let us see whether that be possible. Thou
dost not feel absolutely; thou feelest only thy feelings, and
art only conscious of these 1
I. Certainly, j Each sensation is a determinate something. I never merely see, or hear, or feel, in general, but my sen-
sations are always definite;--red, green, blue colours, cold,
warmth, smoothness, roughness, the sound of the violin, the
voice of man, and the like,--are seen, felt, or heard. Let
that be settled between us.
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? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
273
Spirit Willingly. --Thus, when thou saidst that thou
didst feel a surface, thou hadst only an immediate conscious-
ness of feeling smooth, rough, or the like?
I. Certainly.
Spirit. This smooth or rough is, like the red colour, a
simple sensation,--a point in thee, the subject in which it
abides? And with the same right with which I formerly
asked why thou didst spread a simple sensation of sight
over an imaginary surface, do I now ask why thou shouldst
do the same with a simple sensation of touch?
I. This smooth surface is perhaps not equally smooth in
all points, but possesses in each a different degree of smooth-
ness, only that I want the capacity of strictly distinguishing
these degrees from each other, and language whereby to re-
tain and express their differences. Yet I do distinguish
them, unconsciously, and place them side by side; and thus
I form the conception of a surface.
Spirit. But canst thou, in the same undivided moment of
time, have sensations of opposite kinds, or be affected at the
same time in different ways?
I. By no means.
Spirit. Those different degrees of smoothness, which thou
wouldst assume in order to explain what thou canst not ex-
plain, are nevertheless, in so far as they are different from
each other, mere opposite sensations which succeed each
other in thee?
I. I cannot deny this.
Spirit. Thou shouldst therefore describe them as thou
really findest them,--as successive changes of the same ma-
thematical point, such as thou perceivest in other cases; and
not as adjacent and simultaneous qualities of several points
in one surface.
/. I see this, and I find that nothing is explained by my
assumption. But my hand, with which I touch the object
and cover it, is itself a surface; and by it I perceive the ob-
ject to be a surface, and a greater one than my hand, since I
can extend my hand several times upon it.
Spirit. Thy hand is a surface? How dost thou know that?
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THE VOCATION OF MAN.
How dost thou attain a consciousness of thy hand at all? Is
there any other way than either that thou by means of it
feelest something else, in which case it is an instrument; or
that thou feelest itself by means of some other part of thy
body, in which case it is an object?
I. No, there is no other. With my band I feel some other
definite object, or I feel my hand itself by means of some
other pail of my body. I have no immediate, absolute con-
sciousness of my hand, any more than of my sight or touch.
Spirit. Let us, at present, consider only the case in which
thy hand is an instrument, for this will determine the
second case also. In this case there can be nothing more in
the immediate perception than what belongs to sensation,--
that whereby thou thyself, and here in particular thy hand,
is conceived of as the subject tasting in the act of taste, feel-
ing in the act of touch. Now, oithev.
thy sensation is single;
in which case I cannot see why thou shouldst extend this
single sensation over a sentient surface, and not content
thyself with a single sentient point;--or thy sensation is
varied; and in this case, since the differences must succeed
each other, I again do not see why thou shouldst not
conceive of these feelings as succeeding each other in the
same point. That thy hand should appear to thee as a sur-
face, is just as inexplicable as thy notion of a surface in
general. Do not make use of the first in order to explain
the second, until thou hast explained the first itself. The
second case, in which thy hand, or whatever other member
of thy body thou wilt, is itself the object of a sensation, may
easily be explained by means of the first. Thou perceivest
this member by means of another, which is then the sen-
tient one. I ask the same question concerning this latter
member that I asked concerning thy hand, and thou art as
little able to answer it as before.
So it is with the surface of thy eyes, and with every other
surface of thy body. It may very well be that the conscious-
ness of an extension out of thyself, proceeds from the con-
sciousness of thine own extension as a material body, and is
conditioned by it. But then thou must, in the first place,
explain this extension of thy material body.
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? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
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/. It is enough. I now perceive clearly that I neither see
nor feel the superficial extension of the properties of bodies,
nor apprehend it by any other sense. I see that it is my
habitual practice to extend over a surface, what nevertheless
in sensation is but one point; to represent as adjacent and
simultaneous, what I ought to represent as only successive,
since in mere sensation there is nothing simultaneous, but
all is successive. I discover that I proceed in fact exactly as
the geometer does in the construction of his figures, extend-
ing points to lines, and lines to surfaces. I am astonished
how I should have done this.
Spirit. Thou dost more than this, and what is yet more
strange. This surface which thou attributest to bodies, thou
canst indeed neither see nor feel, nor perceive by any organ;
but it may be said, in a certain sense, that thou canst see the
red colour upon it, or feel the smoothness. But thou oddest
something more even to this surface:--thou extendest it to a
solid mathematical figure; as by thy previous admission
thou hast extended the line to a surface. Thou assumest a
substantial interior existence of the body behind its surface.
Tell me, canst thou then see, feel, or recognise by any sense,
the actual presence of anything behind this surface?
/ By no means:--the space behind the surface is im-
penetrable to my sight, touch, or any of my senses.
Spirit And yet thou dost assume the existence of such
an interior substance, which, nevertheless, thou canst not
perceive 1
I. I confess it, and my astonishment increases.
Spirit. What then is this something which thou ima-
ginest to be behind the surface?
I. Well--I suppose something similar to the surface,--
something tangible.
Spirit. We must ascertain this more distinctly. Canst
thou divide the mass of which thou imaginest the body to
consist?
7. I can divide it to infinity;--I do not mean with in-
struments, but in thought. No possible part is the smallest,
so that it cannot be again divided.
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? 27G
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
Spirit. And in this division dost thou ever arrive at a
portion of which thou canst suppose that it is no longer
perceptible in itself to sight, touch, &c. ;--in itself I say, be-
sides being imperceptible to thy own particular organs of
sense?
I. By no means.
Spirit Visible, perceptible absolutely ? --or with certain
properties of colour, smoothness, roughness, and the like?
/. In the latter way. Nothing is visible or perceptible
absolutely, because there is no absolute sense of sight or
touch. |
Spirit. Then thou dost but spread through the whole
mass thy own sensibility, that which is already familiar to
thee,--visibility as coloured, tangibility as rough, smooth,
or the like; and after all it is this sensibility itself of which
alone thou art sensible? Or dost thou find it otherwise?
I. By no means: what thou sayest follows from what I
have already understood and admitted.
Spirit. And yet thou dost perceive nothing behind the
surface, and hast perceived nothing there?
I. Were I to break through it, I should perceive some-
thing.
Spirit. So much therefore thou knowest beforehand
.
And this infinite divisibility, in which, as thou maintainest,
thou canst never arrive at anything absolutely impercept-
ible, thou hast never carried it out, nor canst thou do so?
I. I cannot carry it out
.
Spirit. To a sensation, therefore, which thou hast really
had, thou addest in imagination another which thou hast
not had? . .
I. I am sensible only of that which I attribute to the
surface; I am not sensible of what lies behind it, and yet I
assume the existence of something there which might be
perceived. Yes, I must admit what thou sayest.
Spirit. And the actual sensation is in part found to cor-
respond with what thou hast thus pre-supposed 1
I. When I break through the surface of a body, I do in-
deed find beneath it something perceptible, as I prc-sup-
po3ed. Yes, I must admit this also.
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? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
277
Spirit. Partly, however, thou hast maintained thatjthere
is something beyond sensation, which cannot become appa-
rent to any actual perception.
I. I maintain, that were I to divide a corporeal mass to
infinity, I could never come to any part which is in itself
imperceptible; although I admit that I can never make the
experiment,--can never practically carry out the division of
a corporeal mass to infinity. Yes, I must agree with thee
in this also.
Spirit. Thus there is nothing remaining of the object
but what is perceptible,--what is a property or attribute;--
this perceptibility thou extendest through a continuous
space which is divisible to infinity; and the true substratum
or supporter of the attributes of things which thou hast
sought, is, therefore, only the space which is thus filled 1
I. Although I cannot be satisfied with this, but feel that
I must still suppose in the object something more than this
perceptibility and the space which it fills, yet I cannot point
out this something, and I must therefore confess that I have
hitherto been unable to discover any substratum but space
itself.
Spirit. Always confess whatever thou perceivest to be
true. The present obscurities will gradually become clear,
and the unknown will be made known. Space itself, how-
ever, is not perceived; and thou canst not understand how
thou hast obtained this conception, or why thou extendest
throughout it this property of perceptibility?
I. It is so.
Spirit. As little dost thou understand how thou hast ob-
tained even this conception of a perceptibility out of thyself,
since thou really perceivest only thine own sensation in thy-
self, not as the property of an external thing, but as an af-
fection of thine own being.
I. So it is. I see clearly that I really perceive only my
own state, and not the object; that I neither see, feel, nor
hear this object; but that, on the contrary, precisely there
where the object should be, all seeing, feeling, and so forth,
comes to an end.
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? 278
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
But I have a presentiment. Sensations, as affections of
myself, have no extension whatever, but . *xe simple states;
in their differences they are not contiguous to each other in
space, but successive to each other in time. Nevertheless,
I do extend them in space. May it not be by means of this
extension, and simultaneously with it, that what is properly
only my own feeling or sensation becomes changed for me
into a perceptible something out of myself; and may not
this be the precise point at which there arises within me a
consciousness of the external object?
Spirit. This conjecture may be confirmed. But could we
raise it immediately to a conviction, we should thereby at-
tain to no complete insight, for this higher question would
still remain to be answered,--How dost thou first come to
extend sensation through space? Let us then proceed at
once to this question; and let us propound it more gene-
rally--I have my reasons for doing so--in the following
manner:--How is it, that, with thy consciousness, which is
but an immediate consciousness of thyself, thou proceedest out of thyself; and to the sensation which thou dost per-
ceive, superaddest an object perceived and perceptible,
which yet thou dost not perceive?
L Sweet or bitter, fragrant or ill-scented, rough or
smooth, cold or warm,--these qualities, when applied to
things, signify whatever excites in me this or that taste,
smell, or other sensation. It is the same with respect to
sounds. A relation to myself is always indicated, and it
never occurs to me that the sweet or bitter taste, the pleas-
ant or unpleasant smell, lies in the thing itself;--it lies in
me, and it only appears to be excited by the object . It
seems indeed to be otherwise with the sensations of sight,--
with colours, for example, which may not be pure sensations,
but a sort of intermediate affections; yet when we consider
it strictly, red, and the others, means nothing more than
what produces in me a certain sensation of sight . This
leads me to understand how it is that I attain to a know-
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? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
279
ledge of things out of myself. I am affected in a particular
manner--this I know absolutely;--this affection must have
a foundation; this foundation is not in myself, and therefore
must be out of myself;--thus I reason rapidly and uncon-
sciously, and forthwith assume the existence of such a foun-
dation,--namely, the object . This foundation must be one
by which the particular affection in~question may be ex-
plained ;--I am affected in the manner which I call a sweet
ta*lc, the object must therefore be of a kind to excite a
sweet taste, or more briefly, must itself be sweet. In this
way I determine the character of the object
.
Spin! . There may be some truth in what thou sayest,
although it is not the whole truth which might be said
upon the subject . How this stands we shall undoubtedly
discover in due time. Since, however, it cannot be denied
that in other cases thou dost discover some truth by means
of this principle of causality,--so I term the doctrine which
thou hast just asserted, that everything (in this case thy af-
fection) must have a foundation or cause,--since this, I say,
cannot be denied, it may not be superfluous to learn strictly
to understand this procedure, and to make it perfectly clear
to ourselves what it is thou really dost when thou adoptest
it. Let us suppose, in the meantime, that thy statement is
perfectly correct, that it is by an unconscious act of reason-
ing, from the effect to the cause, that thou first comest to
assume the existence of an outward object;--what then was
it which thou wert here conscious of perceiving 1
L That I was affected in a certain manner.
Spirit. But of an object, affecting thee in a certain man-
ner, thou wert not conscious, at least not as a perception 1
I. By no meaus. I have already admitted this.
Spirit. Then, by this principle of causality, thou addest to
a knowledge which thou hast, another which thou hast not 1
I. Thy words are strange.
Spirit. Perhaps I may succeed in removing this strange-
ness. But let my words appear to thee as they may. They
ought only to lead thee to produce in thine own mind the
same thought that I have produced in mine; not serve thee
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? 280
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
as a text-book which thou hast only to repeat . When thou
hast the thought itself firmly and clearly in thy grasp, then
express it as thou wilt, and with as much variety as thou
wilt, and be sure that thou wilt always express it well.
How, and by what means, knowest thou of this affection
of thyself?
I. It would be difficult to answer thee in words:--Be-
cause my consciousness, as a subjective attribute, as the
determination of my being in so far as I am an intelligence,
proceeds directly upon the existence of this affection as its
object, as that of which I am conscious, and is inseparable
from it;--because I am possessed of consciousness at all
only in so far as I am cognisant of such an affection--cog-
nisant of it absolutely, just as I am cognisant of my own
existence.
Spirit. Thou hast therefore an organ,--consciousness it-
self,--whereby thou perceivest such an affection of thyself?
Z Ye&
Spirit. But an organ whereby thou perceivest the object
itself, thou hast not?
I. Since thou hast convinced me that I neither see nor
feel the object itself, nor apprehend it by any external sense,
I find myself compelled to confess that I have no such or-
gan.
Spirit. Bethink thee well of this. It may be turned
against thee that thou hast made me this admission. What
then is thy external sense at all, and how canst thou call it
external, if it have no reference to any external object, and
be not the organ whereby thou hast any knowledge of such?
I. I desire truth, and trouble myself little about what
may be turned against me. I distinguish absolutely because
I do distinguish them, green, sweet, red, smooth, bitter, fra-
grant, rough, ill-scented, the sound of a violin and of a trum-
pet. Among these sensations I place some in a certain rela-
tion of likeness to each other, although in other respects I
distinguish them from each other; thus I find green and
red, sweet and bitter, rough and smooth, &c. , to have a cer-
tain relation of similarity to each other, and this similarity I
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? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
2G0
Spirit. I would not weary of repeating it in all its appli-
cations, if I thought that thou hadst not thoroughly com-
prehended it, and indelibly impressed it on thy mind.
Canst thou say, I am conscious of external objects.
I. By no means, if I speak accurately; for the sight and
touch by which I grasp these objects are not consciousness
itself, but only that of which I am first and most immedi-
ately conscious. Strictly speaking, I can only say, that I am
conscious of my seeing and touching of these objects.
Spirit. Do not forget, then, what thou hast now clearly
understood. In all perception thou perceivest only thine own
condition.
I shall, however, continue to speak thy language, since it
is most familiar to thee. Thou hast said that thou canst see,
hear, and feel objects. How then,--that is, with what pro-
perties or attributes,--dost thou see or feel them?
I. I see that object red, this blue; when I touch them, I
find this smooth, that rough--this cold, that warm.
Spirit. Thou knowest then what red, blue, smooth, rough,
cold, and warm, really signify.
/. Undoubtedly I do.
Spirit. Wilt thou not describe it to me then?
I. It cannot be described. Look! Turn thine eye to-
wards that object:--what thou becomest conscious of
through thy sight, I call red. Touch the surface of this
other object:--what thou feelest, I call smooth. In this
way I have arrived at this knowledge, and there is no other
way by which it can be acquired
.
Spirit. But can we not, at least from some of these qua-
lities known by immediate sensation, deduce a knowledge
of others differing from them? If, for instance, any one
had seen red, green, yellow, but never a blue colour; had
tasted sour, sweet, salt, but never bitter,--would he not, by
mere reflection and comparison, be able to discover what
is meant by blue or bitter, without having ever seen or
tasted anything of the kind?
I. Certainly not. What is matter of sensation can only
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? 270
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
be felt, it is not discoverable by thought; it is no deduction,
but a direct and immediate perception.
Spirit. Strange! Thou boastest of a knowledge respect-
ing which thou art unable to tell how thou hast attained it.
For see, thou maintainest that thou canst see one quality in
an object, feel another, hear a third; thou must, therefore,
be able to distinguish sight from touch, and both from hear-
ing?
I. Without doubt.
Spirit. Thou maintainest further, that thou seest this ob-
ject red, that blue; and feelest this smooth, that rough.
Thou must therefore be able to distinguish red from blue,
smooth from rough 1
I Without doubt.
Spirit. And thou maintainest that thou hast not discov-
ered this difference by means of reflection and comparison
of these sensations in thyself. But perhaps thou hast learnt,
by comparing the red or blue colours, the smooth or rough
surfaces of objects out of thyself, what thou shouldst feel in
thyself as red or blue, smooth or rough?
I. This is impossible; for my perception of objects pro-
ceeds from my perception of my own internal condition, and
is determined by it, but not the contrary. I,first distinguish
objects by distinguishing my own states of being. I can
learn that this particular sensation is indicated by the
wholly arbitrary sign, red;--and those by the signs, blue,
smooth, rough; but I cannot learn that the sensations them-
selves are distinguished, nor how they are distinguished.
That they are different, I know only by being conscious
of myself, and being conscious of internal change. How
they differ, I cannot describe; but I know that they must
differ as much as my self-consciousness differs; and this dif-
ference of sensations is an immediate, and by no means an
acquired, distinction.
Spirit. Which thou canst make independently of all
knowledge of the objects themselves?
I. Which I must make independently of such knowledge,
for this knowledge is itself dependent on that distinction.
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? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
271
Spirit. Which is then given to thee immediately through
mere self-consciousness?
I. In no other way.
Spirit. But shouldst thou not then content thyself with
saying,--" I feel myself affected in the manner that I call
red, blue, smooth, rough. "? Shouldst thou not place these
sensations in thyself alone? and not transfer them to an ob-
ject lying entirely out of thyself, and declare these modifica-
tions of thyself to be properties of this object?
Or, tell me, when thou believest that thou seest an object
red, or feelest it smooth, dost thou really perceiveTanything
more than that thou art affected in a certain manner?
L From what has gone before, T have clearly seen that I
do not, in fact, perceive more than what thou sayest; and
this transference of what is in me to something out of my-
self, from which nevertheless I cannot refrain, now appears
very strange to me.
My sensations are in myself, not in the object, for I am
myself and not the object; I am conscious only of myself
and of my own state, not of the state of the object. If there
is a consciousness of the object, that consciousness is, cer-
tainly, neither sensation nor perception :--thus much is
clear.
Spirit. Thou formest thy conclusions somewhat precipi-
tately. Let us consider this matter on all sides, so that I
may be assured that thou wilt not again retract what thou
hast now freely admitted.
Is there then in the object, as thou usually conceivest of
it, anything more than its red colour, its smooth surface, and
so on; in short, anything besides those characteristic marks
which thou obtainest through immediate sensation?
I. I believe that there is: besides these attributes there
is yet the thing itself to which they belong; the substra-
tum which supports these attributes.
Spirit. But through what sense dost thou perceive this
substratum of these attributes? Dost thou see it, feel it,
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? 272
the vocation of max.
hear it; or is there perhaps a special sense for its percep-
tion?
I. No. I think that I see and feel it.
Spirit. Indeed! Let us examine this more closely. Art
thou then ever conscious of thy sight in itself, or at all times
only of determinate acts of sight?
I. I have always a determinate sensation of sight.
Spirit. And what is this determinate sensation of sight
with respect to that object there?
I. That of red colour.
Spirit. And this red is something positive, a simple sen-
sation, a specific state of thyself?
I. This I have understood.
Spirit. Thou shouldst therefore see the red in itself as
simple, as a mathematical point, and thou dost see it only
as such. In thee at least, as an affection of thyself, it is ob-
viously a simple, determinate state, without connexion with
anything else,--which we can only describe as a mathemati-
cal point. Or dost thou find it otherwise?
I. I must admit that such is the case.
Spirit. But now thou spreadest this simple red over a
broad surface, which thou assuredly dost not see, since thou
seest only a simple red. How dost thou obtain this surface?
I. It is certainly strange. --Yet, I believe that I have
found the explanation. I do not indeed see the surface, but
I feel it when I pass my hand over it. My sensation of
sight remains the same during this process of feeling, and
hence I extend the red colour over the whole surface which
I feel while I continue to see the same red.
Spirit. This might be so, didst thou really feel such a
surface. But let us see whether that be possible. Thou
dost not feel absolutely; thou feelest only thy feelings, and
art only conscious of these 1
I. Certainly, j Each sensation is a determinate something. I never merely see, or hear, or feel, in general, but my sen-
sations are always definite;--red, green, blue colours, cold,
warmth, smoothness, roughness, the sound of the violin, the
voice of man, and the like,--are seen, felt, or heard. Let
that be settled between us.
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? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
273
Spirit Willingly. --Thus, when thou saidst that thou
didst feel a surface, thou hadst only an immediate conscious-
ness of feeling smooth, rough, or the like?
I. Certainly.
Spirit. This smooth or rough is, like the red colour, a
simple sensation,--a point in thee, the subject in which it
abides? And with the same right with which I formerly
asked why thou didst spread a simple sensation of sight
over an imaginary surface, do I now ask why thou shouldst
do the same with a simple sensation of touch?
I. This smooth surface is perhaps not equally smooth in
all points, but possesses in each a different degree of smooth-
ness, only that I want the capacity of strictly distinguishing
these degrees from each other, and language whereby to re-
tain and express their differences. Yet I do distinguish
them, unconsciously, and place them side by side; and thus
I form the conception of a surface.
Spirit. But canst thou, in the same undivided moment of
time, have sensations of opposite kinds, or be affected at the
same time in different ways?
I. By no means.
Spirit. Those different degrees of smoothness, which thou
wouldst assume in order to explain what thou canst not ex-
plain, are nevertheless, in so far as they are different from
each other, mere opposite sensations which succeed each
other in thee?
I. I cannot deny this.
Spirit. Thou shouldst therefore describe them as thou
really findest them,--as successive changes of the same ma-
thematical point, such as thou perceivest in other cases; and
not as adjacent and simultaneous qualities of several points
in one surface.
/. I see this, and I find that nothing is explained by my
assumption. But my hand, with which I touch the object
and cover it, is itself a surface; and by it I perceive the ob-
ject to be a surface, and a greater one than my hand, since I
can extend my hand several times upon it.
Spirit. Thy hand is a surface? How dost thou know that?
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? 274
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
How dost thou attain a consciousness of thy hand at all? Is
there any other way than either that thou by means of it
feelest something else, in which case it is an instrument; or
that thou feelest itself by means of some other part of thy
body, in which case it is an object?
I. No, there is no other. With my band I feel some other
definite object, or I feel my hand itself by means of some
other pail of my body. I have no immediate, absolute con-
sciousness of my hand, any more than of my sight or touch.
Spirit. Let us, at present, consider only the case in which
thy hand is an instrument, for this will determine the
second case also. In this case there can be nothing more in
the immediate perception than what belongs to sensation,--
that whereby thou thyself, and here in particular thy hand,
is conceived of as the subject tasting in the act of taste, feel-
ing in the act of touch. Now, oithev.
thy sensation is single;
in which case I cannot see why thou shouldst extend this
single sensation over a sentient surface, and not content
thyself with a single sentient point;--or thy sensation is
varied; and in this case, since the differences must succeed
each other, I again do not see why thou shouldst not
conceive of these feelings as succeeding each other in the
same point. That thy hand should appear to thee as a sur-
face, is just as inexplicable as thy notion of a surface in
general. Do not make use of the first in order to explain
the second, until thou hast explained the first itself. The
second case, in which thy hand, or whatever other member
of thy body thou wilt, is itself the object of a sensation, may
easily be explained by means of the first. Thou perceivest
this member by means of another, which is then the sen-
tient one. I ask the same question concerning this latter
member that I asked concerning thy hand, and thou art as
little able to answer it as before.
So it is with the surface of thy eyes, and with every other
surface of thy body. It may very well be that the conscious-
ness of an extension out of thyself, proceeds from the con-
sciousness of thine own extension as a material body, and is
conditioned by it. But then thou must, in the first place,
explain this extension of thy material body.
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? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
275
/. It is enough. I now perceive clearly that I neither see
nor feel the superficial extension of the properties of bodies,
nor apprehend it by any other sense. I see that it is my
habitual practice to extend over a surface, what nevertheless
in sensation is but one point; to represent as adjacent and
simultaneous, what I ought to represent as only successive,
since in mere sensation there is nothing simultaneous, but
all is successive. I discover that I proceed in fact exactly as
the geometer does in the construction of his figures, extend-
ing points to lines, and lines to surfaces. I am astonished
how I should have done this.
Spirit. Thou dost more than this, and what is yet more
strange. This surface which thou attributest to bodies, thou
canst indeed neither see nor feel, nor perceive by any organ;
but it may be said, in a certain sense, that thou canst see the
red colour upon it, or feel the smoothness. But thou oddest
something more even to this surface:--thou extendest it to a
solid mathematical figure; as by thy previous admission
thou hast extended the line to a surface. Thou assumest a
substantial interior existence of the body behind its surface.
Tell me, canst thou then see, feel, or recognise by any sense,
the actual presence of anything behind this surface?
/ By no means:--the space behind the surface is im-
penetrable to my sight, touch, or any of my senses.
Spirit And yet thou dost assume the existence of such
an interior substance, which, nevertheless, thou canst not
perceive 1
I. I confess it, and my astonishment increases.
Spirit. What then is this something which thou ima-
ginest to be behind the surface?
I. Well--I suppose something similar to the surface,--
something tangible.
Spirit. We must ascertain this more distinctly. Canst
thou divide the mass of which thou imaginest the body to
consist?
7. I can divide it to infinity;--I do not mean with in-
struments, but in thought. No possible part is the smallest,
so that it cannot be again divided.
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? 27G
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
Spirit. And in this division dost thou ever arrive at a
portion of which thou canst suppose that it is no longer
perceptible in itself to sight, touch, &c. ;--in itself I say, be-
sides being imperceptible to thy own particular organs of
sense?
I. By no means.
Spirit Visible, perceptible absolutely ? --or with certain
properties of colour, smoothness, roughness, and the like?
/. In the latter way. Nothing is visible or perceptible
absolutely, because there is no absolute sense of sight or
touch. |
Spirit. Then thou dost but spread through the whole
mass thy own sensibility, that which is already familiar to
thee,--visibility as coloured, tangibility as rough, smooth,
or the like; and after all it is this sensibility itself of which
alone thou art sensible? Or dost thou find it otherwise?
I. By no means: what thou sayest follows from what I
have already understood and admitted.
Spirit. And yet thou dost perceive nothing behind the
surface, and hast perceived nothing there?
I. Were I to break through it, I should perceive some-
thing.
Spirit. So much therefore thou knowest beforehand
.
And this infinite divisibility, in which, as thou maintainest,
thou canst never arrive at anything absolutely impercept-
ible, thou hast never carried it out, nor canst thou do so?
I. I cannot carry it out
.
Spirit. To a sensation, therefore, which thou hast really
had, thou addest in imagination another which thou hast
not had? . .
I. I am sensible only of that which I attribute to the
surface; I am not sensible of what lies behind it, and yet I
assume the existence of something there which might be
perceived. Yes, I must admit what thou sayest.
Spirit. And the actual sensation is in part found to cor-
respond with what thou hast thus pre-supposed 1
I. When I break through the surface of a body, I do in-
deed find beneath it something perceptible, as I prc-sup-
po3ed. Yes, I must admit this also.
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? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
277
Spirit. Partly, however, thou hast maintained thatjthere
is something beyond sensation, which cannot become appa-
rent to any actual perception.
I. I maintain, that were I to divide a corporeal mass to
infinity, I could never come to any part which is in itself
imperceptible; although I admit that I can never make the
experiment,--can never practically carry out the division of
a corporeal mass to infinity. Yes, I must agree with thee
in this also.
Spirit. Thus there is nothing remaining of the object
but what is perceptible,--what is a property or attribute;--
this perceptibility thou extendest through a continuous
space which is divisible to infinity; and the true substratum
or supporter of the attributes of things which thou hast
sought, is, therefore, only the space which is thus filled 1
I. Although I cannot be satisfied with this, but feel that
I must still suppose in the object something more than this
perceptibility and the space which it fills, yet I cannot point
out this something, and I must therefore confess that I have
hitherto been unable to discover any substratum but space
itself.
Spirit. Always confess whatever thou perceivest to be
true. The present obscurities will gradually become clear,
and the unknown will be made known. Space itself, how-
ever, is not perceived; and thou canst not understand how
thou hast obtained this conception, or why thou extendest
throughout it this property of perceptibility?
I. It is so.
Spirit. As little dost thou understand how thou hast ob-
tained even this conception of a perceptibility out of thyself,
since thou really perceivest only thine own sensation in thy-
self, not as the property of an external thing, but as an af-
fection of thine own being.
I. So it is. I see clearly that I really perceive only my
own state, and not the object; that I neither see, feel, nor
hear this object; but that, on the contrary, precisely there
where the object should be, all seeing, feeling, and so forth,
comes to an end.
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? 278
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
But I have a presentiment. Sensations, as affections of
myself, have no extension whatever, but . *xe simple states;
in their differences they are not contiguous to each other in
space, but successive to each other in time. Nevertheless,
I do extend them in space. May it not be by means of this
extension, and simultaneously with it, that what is properly
only my own feeling or sensation becomes changed for me
into a perceptible something out of myself; and may not
this be the precise point at which there arises within me a
consciousness of the external object?
Spirit. This conjecture may be confirmed. But could we
raise it immediately to a conviction, we should thereby at-
tain to no complete insight, for this higher question would
still remain to be answered,--How dost thou first come to
extend sensation through space? Let us then proceed at
once to this question; and let us propound it more gene-
rally--I have my reasons for doing so--in the following
manner:--How is it, that, with thy consciousness, which is
but an immediate consciousness of thyself, thou proceedest out of thyself; and to the sensation which thou dost per-
ceive, superaddest an object perceived and perceptible,
which yet thou dost not perceive?
L Sweet or bitter, fragrant or ill-scented, rough or
smooth, cold or warm,--these qualities, when applied to
things, signify whatever excites in me this or that taste,
smell, or other sensation. It is the same with respect to
sounds. A relation to myself is always indicated, and it
never occurs to me that the sweet or bitter taste, the pleas-
ant or unpleasant smell, lies in the thing itself;--it lies in
me, and it only appears to be excited by the object . It
seems indeed to be otherwise with the sensations of sight,--
with colours, for example, which may not be pure sensations,
but a sort of intermediate affections; yet when we consider
it strictly, red, and the others, means nothing more than
what produces in me a certain sensation of sight . This
leads me to understand how it is that I attain to a know-
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? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
279
ledge of things out of myself. I am affected in a particular
manner--this I know absolutely;--this affection must have
a foundation; this foundation is not in myself, and therefore
must be out of myself;--thus I reason rapidly and uncon-
sciously, and forthwith assume the existence of such a foun-
dation,--namely, the object . This foundation must be one
by which the particular affection in~question may be ex-
plained ;--I am affected in the manner which I call a sweet
ta*lc, the object must therefore be of a kind to excite a
sweet taste, or more briefly, must itself be sweet. In this
way I determine the character of the object
.
Spin! . There may be some truth in what thou sayest,
although it is not the whole truth which might be said
upon the subject . How this stands we shall undoubtedly
discover in due time. Since, however, it cannot be denied
that in other cases thou dost discover some truth by means
of this principle of causality,--so I term the doctrine which
thou hast just asserted, that everything (in this case thy af-
fection) must have a foundation or cause,--since this, I say,
cannot be denied, it may not be superfluous to learn strictly
to understand this procedure, and to make it perfectly clear
to ourselves what it is thou really dost when thou adoptest
it. Let us suppose, in the meantime, that thy statement is
perfectly correct, that it is by an unconscious act of reason-
ing, from the effect to the cause, that thou first comest to
assume the existence of an outward object;--what then was
it which thou wert here conscious of perceiving 1
L That I was affected in a certain manner.
Spirit. But of an object, affecting thee in a certain man-
ner, thou wert not conscious, at least not as a perception 1
I. By no meaus. I have already admitted this.
Spirit. Then, by this principle of causality, thou addest to
a knowledge which thou hast, another which thou hast not 1
I. Thy words are strange.
Spirit. Perhaps I may succeed in removing this strange-
ness. But let my words appear to thee as they may. They
ought only to lead thee to produce in thine own mind the
same thought that I have produced in mine; not serve thee
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? 280
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
as a text-book which thou hast only to repeat . When thou
hast the thought itself firmly and clearly in thy grasp, then
express it as thou wilt, and with as much variety as thou
wilt, and be sure that thou wilt always express it well.
How, and by what means, knowest thou of this affection
of thyself?
I. It would be difficult to answer thee in words:--Be-
cause my consciousness, as a subjective attribute, as the
determination of my being in so far as I am an intelligence,
proceeds directly upon the existence of this affection as its
object, as that of which I am conscious, and is inseparable
from it;--because I am possessed of consciousness at all
only in so far as I am cognisant of such an affection--cog-
nisant of it absolutely, just as I am cognisant of my own
existence.
Spirit. Thou hast therefore an organ,--consciousness it-
self,--whereby thou perceivest such an affection of thyself?
Z Ye&
Spirit. But an organ whereby thou perceivest the object
itself, thou hast not?
I. Since thou hast convinced me that I neither see nor
feel the object itself, nor apprehend it by any external sense,
I find myself compelled to confess that I have no such or-
gan.
Spirit. Bethink thee well of this. It may be turned
against thee that thou hast made me this admission. What
then is thy external sense at all, and how canst thou call it
external, if it have no reference to any external object, and
be not the organ whereby thou hast any knowledge of such?
I. I desire truth, and trouble myself little about what
may be turned against me. I distinguish absolutely because
I do distinguish them, green, sweet, red, smooth, bitter, fra-
grant, rough, ill-scented, the sound of a violin and of a trum-
pet. Among these sensations I place some in a certain rela-
tion of likeness to each other, although in other respects I
distinguish them from each other; thus I find green and
red, sweet and bitter, rough and smooth, &c. , to have a cer-
tain relation of similarity to each other, and this similarity I
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