No More Learning

For in those things men hate, they find a continuall, and
unavoydable molestation; whereby either a mans patience must be
everlasting, or he must be eased by removing the power of that which
molesteth him; The former is difficult; the later is many times
impossible, without some violation of the Law. Ambition, and
Covetousnesse are Passions also that are perpetually incumbent, and
pressing; whereas Reason is not perpetually present, to resist them:
and therefore whensoever the hope of impunity appears, their effects
proceed. And for Lust, what it wants in the lasting, it hath in the
vehemence, which sufficeth to weigh down the apprehension of all easie,
or uncertain punishments.




Fear Sometimes Cause Of Crime, As When The Danger Is Neither Present,

Nor Corporeall

Of all Passions, that which enclineth men least to break the Lawes, is
Fear. Nay, (excepting some generous natures,) it is the onely thing,
(when there is apparence of profit, or pleasure by breaking the Lawes,)
that makes men keep them. And yet in many cases a Crime may be committed
through Feare.

For not every Fear justifies the Action it produceth, but the fear onely
of corporeall hurt, which we call Bodily Fear, and from which a man
cannot see how to be delivered, but by the action. A man is assaulted,
fears present death, from which he sees not how to escape, but by
wounding him that assaulteth him; If he wound him to death, this is no
Crime; because no man is supposed at the making of a Common-wealth, to
have abandoned the defence of his life, or limbes, where the Law cannot
arrive time enough to his assistance. But to kill a man, because from
his actions, or his threatnings, I may argue he will kill me when he
can, (seeing I have time, and means to demand protection, from the
Soveraign Power,) is a Crime. Again, a man receives words of disgrace,
or some little injuries (for which they that made the Lawes, had
assigned no punishment, nor thought it worthy of a man that hath the use
of Reason, to take notice of,) and is afraid, unlesse he revenge it,
he shall fall into contempt, and consequently be obnoxious to the like
injuries from others; and to avoyd this, breaks the Law, and protects
himselfe for the future, by the terrour of his private revenge. This is
a Crime; For the hurt is not Corporeall, but Phantasticall, and (though
in this corner of the world, made sensible by a custome not many years
since begun, amongst young and vain men,) so light, as a gallant man,
and one that is assured of his own courage, cannot take notice of. Also
a man may stand in fear of Spirits, either through his own superstition,
or through too much credit given to other men, that tell him of strange
Dreams and visions; and thereby be made believe they will hurt him, for
doing, or omitting divers things, which neverthelesse, to do, or omit,
is contrary to the Lawes; And that which is so done, or omitted, is not
to be Excused by this fear; but is a Crime. For (as I have shewn before
in the second Chapter) Dreams be naturally but the fancies remaining in
sleep, after the impressions our Senses had formerly received waking;
and when men are by any accident unassured they have slept, seem to be
reall Visions; and therefore he that presumes to break the Law upon his
own, or anothers Dream, or pretended Vision, or upon other Fancy of
the power of Invisible Spirits, than is permitted by the Common-wealth,
leaveth the Law of Nature, which is a certain offence, and followeth the
imagery of his own, or another private mans brain, which he can never
know whether it signifieth any thing, or nothing, nor whether he that
tells his Dream, say true, or lye; which if every private man should
have leave to do, (as they must by the Law of Nature, if any one have
it) there could no Law be made to hold, and so all Common-wealth would
be dissolved.




Crimes Not Equall

From these different sources of Crimes, it appeares already, that all
Crimes are not (as the Stoicks of old time maintained) of the same
allay. There is place, not only for EXCUSE, by which that which seemed
a Crime, is proved to be none at all; but also for EXTENUATION, by which
the Crime, that seemed great, is made lesse. For though all Crimes doe
equally deserve the name of Injustice, as all deviation from a strait
line is equally crookednesse, which the Stoicks rightly observed; yet
it does not follow that all Crimes are equally unjust, no more than that
all crooked lines are equally crooked; which the Stoicks not observing,
held it as great a Crime, to kill a Hen, against the Law, as to kill
ones Father.




Totall Excuses

That which totally Excuseth a Fact, and takes away from it the nature of
a Crime, can be none but that, which at the same time, taketh away the
obligation of the Law. For the fact committed once against the Law,
if he that committed it be obliged to the Law, can be no other than a
Crime.

The want of means to know the Law, totally Excuseth: For the Law whereof
a man has no means to enforme himself, is not obligatory. But the want
of diligence to enquire, shall not be considered as a want of means; Nor
shall any man, that pretendeth to reason enough for the Government of
his own affairs, be supposed to want means to know the Lawes of Nature;
because they are known by the reason he pretends to: only Children, and
Madmen are Excused from offences against the Law Naturall.

Where a man is captive, or in the power of the enemy, (and he is then in
the power of the enemy, when his person, or his means of living, is
so,) if it be without his own fault, the Obligation of the Law ceaseth;
because he must obey the enemy, or dye; and consequently such obedience
is no Crime: for no man is obliged (when the protection of the Law
faileth,) not to protect himself, by the best means he can.

If a man by the terrour of present death, be compelled to doe a fact
against the Law, he is totally Excused; because no Law can oblige a
man to abandon his own preservation. And supposing such a Law were
obligatory; yet a man would reason thus, "If I doe it not, I die
presently; if I doe it, I die afterwards; therefore by doing it, there
is time of life gained;" Nature therefore compells him to the fact.

When a man is destitute of food, or other thing necessary for his life,
and cannot preserve himselfe any other way, but by some fact against
the Law; as if in a great famine he take the food by force, or stealth,
which he cannot obtaine for mony nor charity; or in defence of his life,
snatch away another mans Sword, he is totally Excused, for the reason
next before alledged.




Excuses Against The Author

Again, Facts done against the Law, by the authority of another, are
by that authority Excused against the Author; because no man ought to
accuse his own fact in another, that is but his instrument: but it
is not Excused against a third person thereby injured; because in the
violation of the law, bothe the Author, and Actor are Criminalls.
From hence it followeth that when that Man, or Assembly, that hath the
Soveraign Power, commandeth a man to do that which is contrary to a
former Law, the doing of it is totally Excused: For he ought not to
condemn it himselfe, because he is the Author; and what cannot justly
be condemned by the Soveraign, cannot justly be punished by any other.
Besides, when the Soveraign commandeth any thing to be done against
his own former Law, the Command, as to that particular fact, is an
abrogation of the Law.

If that Man, or Assembly, that hath the Soveraign Power, disclaime
any Right essentiall to the Soveraignty, whereby there accrueth to the
Subject, any liberty inconsistent with the Soveraign Power, that is to
say, with the very being of a Common-wealth, if the Subject shall refuse
to obey the Command in any thing, contrary to the liberty granted, this
is neverthelesse a Sinne, and contrary to the duty of the Subject: for
he ought to take notice of what is inconsistent with the Soveraignty,
because it was erected by his own consent, and for his own defence;
and that such liberty as is inconsistent with it, was granted through
ignorance of the evill consequence thereof. But if he not onely disobey,
but also resist a publique Minister in the execution of it, then it is
a Crime; because he might have been righted, (without any breach of the
Peace,) upon complaint.

The Degrees of Crime are taken on divers Scales, and measured, First, by
the malignity of the Source, or Cause: Secondly, by the contagion of the
Example: Thirdly, by the mischiefe of the Effect; and Fourthly, by the
concurrence of Times, Places, and Persons.




Presumption Of Power, Aggravateth

The same Fact done against the Law, if it proceed from Presumption of
strength, riches, or friends to resist those that are to execute the
Law, is a greater Crime, than if it proceed from hope of not being
discovered, or of escape by flight: For Presumption of impunity by
force, is a Root, from whence springeth, at all times, and upon all
temptations, a contempt of all Lawes; whereas in the later case, the
apprehension of danger, that makes a man fly, renders him more obedient
for the future. A Crime which we know to be so, is greater than the same
Crime proceeding from a false perswasion that it is lawfull: For he that
committeth it against his own conscience, presumeth on his force, or
other power, which encourages him to commit the same again: but he that
doth it by errour, after the errour shewn him, is conformable to the
Law.




Evill Teachers, Extenuate

Hee, whose errour proceeds from the authority of a Teacher, or an
Interpreter of the Law publiquely authorised, is not so faulty, as he
whose errour proceedeth from a peremptory pursute of his own principles,
and reasoning: For what is taught by one that teacheth by publique
Authority, the Common-wealth teacheth, and hath a resemblance of Law,
till the same Authority controuleth it; and in all Crimes that contain
not in them a denyall of the Soveraign Power, nor are against an evident
Law, Excuseth totally: whereas he that groundeth his actions, on his
private Judgement, ought according to the rectitude, or errour thereof,
to stand, or fall.




Examples Of Impunity, Extenuate

The same Fact, if it have been constantly punished in other men, as
a greater Crime, than if there have been may precedent Examples of
impunity. For those Examples, are so many hopes of Impunity given by
the Soveraign himselfe: And because he which furnishes a man with such
a hope, and presumption of mercy, as encourageth him to offend, hath his
part in the offence; he cannot reasonably charge the offender with the
whole.




Praemeditation, Aggravateth

A Crime arising from a sudden Passion, is not so great, as when the same
ariseth from long meditation: For in the former case there is a place
for Extenuation, in the common infirmity of humane nature: but he that
doth it with praemeditation, has used circumspection, and cast his eye,
on the Law, on the punishment, and on the consequence thereof to humane
society; all which in committing the Crime, hee hath contemned, and
postposed to his own appetite. But there is no suddennesse of Passion
sufficient for a totall Excuse: For all the time between the first
knowing of the Law, and the Commission of the Fact, shall be taken for
a time of deliberation; because he ought by meditation of the Law, to
rectifie the irregularity of his Passions.

Where the Law is publiquely, and with assiduity, before all the people
read, and interpreted; a fact done against it, is a greater Crime,
than where men are left without such instruction, to enquire of it with
difficulty, uncertainty, and interruption of their Callings, and
be informed by private men: for in this case, part of the fault is
discharged upon common infirmity; but in the former there is apparent
negligence, which is not without some contempt of the Soveraign Power.




Tacite Approbation Of The Soveraign, Extenuates

Those facts which the Law expresly condemneth, but the Law-maker by
other manifest signes of his will tacitly approveth, are lesse Crimes,
than the same facts, condemned both by the Law, and Lawmaker. For
seeing the will of the Law-maker is a Law, there appear in this case two
contradictory Lawes; which would totally Excuse, if men were bound to
take notice of the Soveraigns approbation, by other arguments, than are
expressed by his command. But because there are punishments consequent,
not onely to the transgression of his Law, but also to the observing
of it, he is in part a cause of the transgression, and therefore cannot
reasonably impute the whole Crime to the Delinquent. For example, the
Law condemneth Duells; the punishment is made capitall: On the contrary
part, he that refuseth Duell, is subject to contempt and scorne, without
remedy; and sometimes by the Soveraign himselfe thought unworthy to
have any charge, or preferment in Warre: If thereupon he accept Duell,
considering all men lawfully endeavour to obtain the good opinion
of them that have the Soveraign Power, he ought not in reason to be
rigorously punished; seeing part of the fault may be discharged on the
punisher; which I say, not as wishing liberty of private revenges,
or any other kind of disobedience; but a care in Governours, not
to countenance any thing obliquely, which directly they forbid. The
examples of Princes, to those that see them, are, and ever have been,
more potent to govern their actions, than the Lawes themselves. And
though it be our duty to do, not what they do, but what they say; yet
will that duty never be performed, till it please God to give men an
extraordinary, and supernaturall grace to follow that Precept.




Comparison Of Crimes From Their Effects

Again, if we compare Crimes by the mischiefe of their Effects, First,
the same fact, when it redounds to the dammage of many, is greater, than
when it redounds to the hurt of few. And therefore, when a fact hurteth,
not onely in the present, but also, (by example) in the future, it is a
greater Crime, than if it hurt onely in the present: for the former,
is a fertile Crime, and multiplyes to the hurt of many; the later is
barren. To maintain doctrines contrary to the Religion established in
the Common-wealth, is a greater fault, in an authorised Preacher, than
in a private person: So also is it, to live prophanely, incontinently,
or do any irreligious act whatsoever. Likewise in a Professor of the
Law, to maintain any point, on do any act, that tendeth to the weakning
of the Soveraign Power, as a greater Crime, than in another man: Also in
a man that hath such reputation for wisedome, as that his counsells are
followed, or his actions imitated by many, his fact against the Law, is
a greater Crime, than the same fact in another: For such men not onely
commit Crime, but teach it for Law to all other men. And generally all
Crimes are the greater, by the scandall they give; that is to say, by
becoming stumbling-blocks to the weak, that look not so much upon the
way they go in, as upon the light that other men carry before them.




Laesae Majestas

Also Facts of Hostility against the present state of the Common-wealth,
are greater Crimes, than the same acts done to private men; For
the dammage extends it selfe to all: Such are the betraying of the
strengths, or revealing of the secrets of the Common-wealth to an Enemy;
also all attempts upon the Representative of the Common-wealth, be it a
monarch, or an Assembly; and all endeavours by word, or deed to diminish
the Authority of the same, either in the present time, or in succession:
which Crimes the Latines understand by Crimina Laesae Majestatis, and
consist in designe, or act, contrary to a Fundamentall Law.




Bribery And False Testimony

Likewise those Crimes, which render Judgements of no effect, are greater
Crimes, than Injuries done to one, or a few persons; as to receive
mony to give False judgement, or testimony, is a greater Crime, than
otherwise to deceive a man of the like, or a greater summe; because not
onely he has wrong, that falls by such judgements; but all Judgements
are rendered uselesse, and occasion ministred to force, and private
revenges.




Depeculation

Also Robbery, and Depeculation of the Publique treasure, or Revenues,
is a greater Crime, than the robbing, or defrauding of a Private man;
because to robbe the publique, is to robbe many at once.




Counterfeiting Authority

Also the Counterfeit usurpation of publique Ministery, the
Counterfeiting of publique Seales, or publique Coine, than
counterfeiting of a private mans person, or his seale; because the fraud
thereof, extendeth to the dammage of many.




Crimes Against Private Men Compared

Of facts against the Law, done to private men, the greater Crime, is
that, where the dammage in the common opinion of men, is most sensible.
And therefore

To kill against the Law, is a greater Crime, that any other injury, life
preserved.

And to kill with Torment, greater, than simply to kill.

And Mutilation of a limbe, greater, than the spoyling a man of his
goods.

And the spoyling a man of his goods, by Terrour of death, or wounds,
than by clandestine surreption.

And by clandestine Surreption, than by consent fraudulently obtained.

And the violation of chastity by Force, greater, than by flattery.

And of a woman Married, than of a woman not married.

For all these things are commonly so valued; though some men are more,
and some lesse sensible of the same offence. But the Law regardeth not
the particular, but the generall inclination of mankind.

And therefore the offence men take, from contumely, in words, or
gesture, when they produce no other harme, than the present griefe of
him that is reproached, hath been neglected in the Lawes of the Greeks,
Romans, and other both antient, and moderne Common-wealths; supposing
the true cause of such griefe to consist, not in the contumely, (which
takes no hold upon men conscious of their own Vertue,) but in the
Pusillanimity of him that is offended by it.

Also a Crime against a private man, is much aggravated by the person,
time, and place. For to kill ones Parent, is a greater Crime, than to
kill another: for the Parent ought to have the honour of a Soveraign,
(though he have surrendred his Power to the Civill Law,) because he had
it originally by Nature. And to Robbe a poore man, is a greater Crime,
than to robbe a rich man; because 'tis to the poore a more sensible
dammage.

And a Crime committed in the Time, or Place appointed for Devotion, is
greater, than if committed at another time or place: for it proceeds
from a greater contempt of the Law.

Many other cases of Aggravation, and Extenuation might be added: but by
these I have set down, it is obvious to every man, to take the altitude
of any other Crime proposed.




Publique Crimes What

Lastly, because in almost all Crimes there is an Injury done, not onely
to some Private man, but also to the Common-wealth; the same Crime, when
the accusation is in the name of the Common-wealth, is called Publique
Crime; and when in the name of a Private man, a Private Crime; And the
Pleas according thereunto called Publique, Judicia Publica, Pleas of the
Crown; or Private Pleas. As in an Accusation of Murder, if the accuser
be a Private man, the plea is a Private plea; if the accuser be the
Soveraign, the plea is a Publique plea.



CHAPTER XXVIII. OF PUNISHMENTS, AND REWARDS




The Definition Of Punishment

"A PUNISHMENT, is an Evill inflicted by publique Authority, on him that
hath done, or omitted that which is Judged by the same Authority to be
a Transgression of the Law; to the end that the will of men may thereby
the better be disposed to obedience. "




Right To Punish Whence Derived

Before I inferre any thing from this definition, there is a question to
be answered, of much importance; which is, by what door the Right, or
Authority of Punishing in any case, came in. For by that which has
been said before, no man is supposed bound by Covenant, not to resist
violence; and consequently it cannot be intended, that he gave any right
to another to lay violent hands upon his person. In the making of a
Common-wealth, every man giveth away the right of defending another; but
not of defending himselfe. Also he obligeth himselfe, to assist him that
hath the Soveraignty, in the Punishing of another; but of himselfe
not. But to covenant to assist the Soveraign, in doing hurt to another,
unlesse he that so covenanteth have a right to doe it himselfe, is not
to give him a Right to Punish. It is manifest therefore that the Right
which the Common-wealth (that is, he, or they that represent it) hath to
Punish, is not grounded on any concession, or gift of the Subjects.
But I have also shewed formerly, that before the Institution of
Common-wealth, every man had a right to every thing, and to do
whatsoever he thought necessary to his own preservation; subduing,
hurting, or killing any man in order thereunto. And this is the
foundation of that right of Punishing, which is exercised in every
Common-wealth. For the Subjects did not give the Soveraign that right;
but onely in laying down theirs, strengthned him to use his own, as he
should think fit, for the preservation of them all: so that it was not
given, but left to him, and to him onely; and (excepting the limits set
him by naturall Law) as entire, as in the condition of meer Nature, and
of warre of every one against his neighbour.




Private Injuries, And Revenges No Punishments

From the definition of Punishment, I inferre, First, that neither
private revenges, nor injuries of private men, can properly be stiled
Punishment; because they proceed not from publique Authority.




Nor Denyall Of Preferment

Secondly, that to be neglected, and unpreferred by the publique
favour, is not a Punishment; because no new evill is thereby on any man
Inflicted; he is onely left in the estate he was in before.




Nor Pain Inflicted Without Publique Hearing

Thirdly, that the evill inflicted by publique Authority, without
precedent publique condemnation, is not to be stiled by the name of
Punishment; but of an hostile act; because the fact for which a man
is Punished, ought first to be Judged by publique Authority, to be a
transgression of the Law.




Nor Pain Inflicted By Usurped Power

Fourthly, that the evill inflicted by usurped power, and Judges
without Authority from the Soveraign, is not Punishment; but an act of
hostility; because the acts of power usurped, have not for Author, the
person condemned; and therefore are not acts of publique Authority.




Nor Pain Inflicted Without Respect To The Future Good

Fifthly, that all evill which is inflicted without intention, or
possibility of disposing the Delinquent, or (by his example) other men,
to obey the Lawes, is not Punishment; but an act of hostility; because
without such an end, no hurt done is contained under that name.




Naturall Evill Consequences, No Punishments

Sixthly, whereas to certain actions, there be annexed by Nature, divers
hurtfull consequences; as when a man in assaulting another, is himselfe
slain, or wounded; or when he falleth into sicknesse by the doing of
some unlawfull act; such hurt, though in respect of God, who is the
author of Nature, it may be said to be inflicted, and therefore a
Punishment divine; yet it is not contaned in the name of Punishment in
respect of men, because it is not inflicted by the Authority of man.




Hurt Inflicted, If Lesse Than The Benefit Of Transgressing,

Is Not Punishment

Seventhly, If the harm inflicted be lesse than the benefit, or
contentment that naturally followeth the crime committed, that harm is
not within the definition; and is rather the Price, or Redemption, than
the Punishment of a Crime: Because it is of the nature of Punishment, to
have for end, the disposing of men to obey the Law; which end (if it
be lesse that the benefit of the transgression) it attaineth not, but
worketh a contrary effect.




Where The Punishment Is Annexed To The Law, A Greater Hurt Is Not

Punishment, But Hostility

Eighthly, If a Punishment be determined and prescribed in the Law it
selfe, and after the crime committed, there be a greater Punishment
inflicted, the excesse is not Punishment, but an act of hostility. For
seeing the aym of Punishment is not a revenge, but terrour; and the
terrour of a great Punishment unknown, is taken away by the declaration
of a lesse, the unexpected addition is no part of the Punishment.
But where there is no Punishment at all determined by the Law, there
whatsoever is inflicted, hath the nature of Punishment. For he that
goes about the violation of a Law, wherein no penalty is determined,
expecteth an indeterminate, that is to say, an arbitrary Punishment.




Hurt Inflicted For A Fact Done Before The Law, No Punishment

Ninthly, Harme inflicted for a Fact done before there was a Law that
forbad it, is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility: For before the
Law, there is no transgression of the Law: But Punishment supposeth a
fact judged, to have been a transgression of the Law; Therefore
Harme inflicted before the Law made, is not Punishment, but an act of
Hostility.




The Representative Of The Common-wealth Unpunishable

Tenthly, Hurt inflicted on the Representative of the Common-wealth, is
not Punishment, but an act of Hostility: Because it is of the nature
of Punishment, to be inflicted by publique Authority, which is the
Authority only of the Representative it self.




Hurt To Revolted Subjects Is Done By Right Of War, Not

By Way Of Punishment

Lastly, Harme inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy, fals not
under the name of Punishment: Because seeing they were either never
subject to the Law, and therefore cannot transgresse it; or having been
subject to it, and professing to be no longer so, by consequence deny
they can transgresse it, all the Harmes that can be done them, must be
taken as acts of Hostility. But in declared Hostility, all infliction of
evill is lawfull. From whence it followeth, that if a subject shall
by fact, or word, wittingly, and deliberatly deny the authority of
the Representative of the Common-wealth, (whatsoever penalty hath
been formerly ordained for Treason,) he may lawfully be made to suffer
whatsoever the Representative will: For in denying subjection, he denyes
such Punishment as by the Law hath been ordained; and therefore suffers
as an enemy of the Common-wealth; that is, according to the will of
the Representative. For the Punishments set down in the Law, are to
Subjects, not to Enemies; such as are they, that having been by their
own act Subjects, deliberately revolting, deny the Soveraign Power.

The first, and most generall distribution of Punishments, is into
Divine, and Humane. Of the former I shall have occasion, to speak, in a
more convenient place hereafter.

Humane, are those Punishments that be inflicted by the Commandement
of Man; and are either Corporall, or Pecuniary, or Ignominy, or
Imprisonment, or Exile, or mixt of these.




Punishments Corporall

Corporall Punishment is that, which is inflicted on the body directly,
and according to the intention of him that inflicteth it: such as are
stripes, or wounds, or deprivation of such pleasures of the body, as
were before lawfully enjoyed.




Capitall

And of these, some be Capitall, some Lesse than Capitall. Capitall, is
the Infliction of Death; and that either simply, or with torment. Lesse
than Capitall, are Stripes, Wounds, Chains, and any other corporall
Paine, not in its own nature mortall. For if upon the Infliction of
a Punishment death follow not in the Intention of the Inflicter, the
Punishment is not be bee esteemed Capitall, though the harme prove
mortall by an accident not to be foreseen; in which case death is not
inflicted, but hastened.

Pecuniary Punishment, is that which consisteth not only in the
deprivation of a Summe of Mony, but also of Lands, or any other goods
which are usually bought and sold for mony. And in case the Law, that
ordaineth such a punishment, be made with design to gather mony, from
such as shall transgresse the same, it is not properly a Punishment,
but the Price of priviledge, and exemption from the Law, which doth not
absolutely forbid the fact, but only to those that are not able to pay
the mony: except where the Law is Naturall, or part of Religion; for in
that case it is not an exemption from the Law, but a transgression of
it. As where a Law exacteth a Pecuniary mulct, of them that take the
name of God in vaine, the payment of the mulct, is not the price of a
dispensation to sweare, but the Punishment of the transgression of a Law
undispensable. In like manner if the Law impose a Summe of Mony to be
payd, to him that has been Injured; this is but a satisfaction for the
hurt done him; and extinguisheth the accusation of the party injured,
not the crime of the offender.




Ignominy

Ignominy, is the infliction of such Evill, as is made Dishonorable;
or the deprivation of such Good, as is made Honourable by the
Common-wealth. For there be some things Honorable by Nature; as the
effects of Courage, Magnanimity, Strength, Wisdome, and other abilities
of body and mind: Others made Honorable by the Common-wealth; as Badges,
Titles, Offices, or any other singular marke of the Soveraigns favour.
The former, (though they may faile by nature, or accident,) cannot be
taken away by a Law; and therefore the losse of them is not Punishment.
But the later, may be taken away by the publique authority that made
them Honorable, and are properly Punishments: Such are degrading men
condemned, of their Badges, Titles, and Offices; or declaring them
uncapable of the like in time to come.




Imprisonment

Imprisonment, is when a man is by publique Authority deprived of
liberty; and may happen from two divers ends; whereof one is the safe
custody of a man accused; the other is the inflicting of paine on a man
condemned. The former is not Punishment; because no man is supposed
to be Punisht, before he be Judicially heard, and declared guilty.
And therefore whatsoever hurt a man is made to suffer by bonds, or
restraint, before his cause be heard, over and above that which is
necessary to assure his custody, is against the Law of Nature. But the
Later is Punishment, because Evill, and inflicted by publique Authority,
for somewhat that has by the same Authority been Judged a Transgression
of the Law. Under this word Imprisonment, I comprehend all restraint of
motion, caused by an externall obstacle, be it a House, which is called
by the generall name of a Prison; or an Iland, as when men are said to
be confined to it; or a place where men are set to worke, as in old time
men have been condemned to Quarries, and in these times to Gallies; or
be it a Chaine, or any other such impediment.




Exile

Exile, (Banishment) is when a man is for a crime, condemned to depart
out of the dominion of the Common-wealth, or out of a certaine part
thereof; and during a prefixed time, or for ever, not to return into it:
and seemeth not in its own nature, without other circumstances, to be
a Punishment; but rather an escape, or a publique commandement to
avoid Punishment by flight. And Cicero sayes, there was never any such
Punishment ordained in the City of Rome; but cals it a refuge of men in
danger. For if a man banished, be neverthelesse permitted to enjoy
his Goods, and the Revenue of his Lands, the meer change of ayr is no
punishment; nor does it tend to that benefit of the Common-wealth, for
which all Punishments are ordained, (that is to say, to the forming of
mens wils to the observation of the Law;) but many times to the dammage
of the Common-wealth. For a Banished man, is a lawfull enemy of the
Common-wealth that banished him; as being no more a Member of the
same. But if he be withall deprived of his Lands, or Goods, then
the Punishment lyeth not in the Exile, but is to be reckoned amongst
Punishments Pecuniary.




The Punishment Of Innocent Subjects Is Contrary To The Law Of Nature

All Punishments of Innocent subjects, be they great or little, are
against the Law of Nature; For Punishment is only of Transgression of
the Law, and therefore there can be no Punishment of the Innocent. It
is therefore a violation, First, of that Law of Nature, which forbiddeth
all men, in their Revenges, to look at any thing but some future good:
For there can arrive no good to the Common-wealth, by Punishing the
Innocent. Secondly, of that, which forbiddeth Ingratitude: For seeing
all Soveraign Power, is originally given by the consent of every one of
the Subjects, to the end they should as long as they are obedient, be
protected thereby; the Punishment of the Innocent, is a rendring of
Evill for Good. And thirdly, of the Law that commandeth Equity; that
is to say, an equall distribution of Justice; which in Punishing the
Innocent is not observed.




But The Harme Done To Innocents In War, Not So

But the Infliction of what evill soever, on an Innocent man, that is not
a Subject, if it be for the benefit of the Common-wealth, and without
violation of any former Covenant, is no breach of the Law of Nature.
For all men that are not Subjects, are either Enemies, or else they have
ceased from being so, by some precedent covenants. But against Enemies,
whom the Common-wealth judgeth capable to do them hurt, it is lawfull by
the originall Right of Nature to make warre; wherein the Sword Judgeth
not, nor doth the Victor make distinction of Nocent and Innocent, as to
the time past; nor has other respect of mercy, than as it conduceth to
the good of his own People. And upon this ground it is, that also
in Subjects, who deliberatly deny the Authority of the Common-wealth
established, the vengeance is lawfully extended, not onely to the
Fathers, but also to the third and fourth generation not yet in being,
and consequently innocent of the fact, for which they are afflicted:
because the nature of this offence, consisteth in the renouncing of
subjection; which is a relapse into the condition of warre, commonly
called Rebellion; and they that so offend, suffer not as Subjects, but
as Enemies. For Rebellion, is but warre renewed.




Reward, Is Either Salary, Or Grace

REWARD, is either of Gift, or by Contract. When by Contract, it is
called Salary, and Wages; which is benefit due for service performed, or
promised. When of Gift, it is benefit proceeding from the Grace of them
that bestow it, to encourage, or enable men to do them service. And
therefore when the Soveraign of a Common-wealth appointeth a Salary
to any publique Office, he that receiveth it, is bound in Justice
to performe his office; otherwise, he is bound onely in honour, to
acknowledgement, and an endeavour of requitall. For though men have no
lawfull remedy, when they be commanded to quit their private businesse,
to serve the publique, without Reward, or Salary; yet they are not
bound thereto, by the Law of Nature, nor by the institution of the
Common-wealth, unlesse the service cannot otherwise be done; because it
is supposed the Soveraign may make use of all their means, insomuch as
the most common Souldier, may demand the wages of his warrefare, as a
debt.




Benefits Bestowed For Fear, Are Not Rewards

The benefits which a Soveraign bestoweth on a Subject, for fear of some
power, and ability he hath to do hurt to the Common-wealth, are not
properly Rewards; for they are not Salaryes; because there is in this
case no contract supposed, every man being obliged already not to do the
Common-wealth disservice: nor are they Graces; because they be extorted
by feare, which ought not to be incident to the Soveraign Power: but
are rather Sacrifices, which the Soveraign (considered in his naturall
person, and not in the person of the Common-wealth) makes, for the
appeasing the discontent of him he thinks more potent than himselfe; and
encourage not to obedience, but on the contrary, to the continuance, and
increasing of further extortion.




Salaries Certain And Casuall

And whereas some Salaries are certain, and proceed from the publique
Treasure; and others uncertain, and casuall, proceeding from the
execution of the Office for which the Salary is ordained; the later
is in some cases hurtfull to the Common-wealth; as in the case of
Judicature. For where the benefit of the Judges, and Ministers of a
Court of Justice, ariseth for the multitude of Causes that are brought
to their cognisance, there must needs follow two Inconveniences: One,
is the nourishing of sutes; for the more sutes, the greater benefit: and
another that depends on that, which is contention about Jurisdiction;
each Court drawing to it selfe, as many Causes as it can. But in
offices of Execution there are not those Inconveniences; because their
employment cannot be encreased by any endeavour of their own. And thus
much shall suffice for the nature of Punishment, and Reward; which are,
as it were, the Nerves and Tendons, that move the limbes and joynts of a
Common-wealth.

Hitherto I have set forth the nature of Man, (whose Pride and other
Passions have compelled him to submit himselfe to Government;) together
with the great power of his Governour, whom I compared to Leviathan,
taking that comparison out of the two last verses of the one and
fortieth of Job; where God having set forth the great power of
Leviathan, called him King of the Proud. "There is nothing," saith he,
"on earth, to be compared with him. He is made so as not be afraid. Hee
seeth every high thing below him; and is King of all the children of
pride. " But because he is mortall, and subject to decay, as all other
Earthly creatures are; and because there is that in heaven, (though not
on earth) that he should stand in fear of, and whose Lawes he ought to
obey; I shall in the next following Chapters speak of his Diseases, and
the causes of his Mortality; and of what Lawes of Nature he is bound to
obey.



CHAPTER XXIX. OF THOSE THINGS THAT WEAKEN, OR TEND TO THE DISSOLUTION OF
A COMMON-WEALTH


Dissolution Of Common-wealths Proceedeth From Imperfect Institution

Though nothing can be immortall, which mortals make; yet, if men had the
use of reason they pretend to, their Common-wealths might be secured, at
least, from perishing by internall diseases. For by the nature of their
Institution, they are designed to live, as long as Man-kind, or as
the Lawes of Nature, or as Justice it selfe, which gives them life.
Therefore when they come to be dissolved, not by externall violence, but
intestine disorder, the fault is not in men, as they are the Matter; but
as they are the Makers, and orderers of them. For men, as they become
at last weary of irregular justling, and hewing one another, and desire
with all their hearts, to conforme themselves into one firme and lasting
edifice; so for want, both of the art of making fit Laws, to square
their actions by, and also of humility, and patience, to suffer the rude
and combersome points of their present greatnesse to be taken off, they
cannot without the help of a very able Architect, be compiled, into any
other than a crasie building, such as hardly lasting out their own time,
must assuredly fall upon the heads of their posterity.

Amongst the Infirmities therefore of a Common-wealth, I will reckon in
the first place, those that arise from an Imperfect Institution,
and resemble the diseases of a naturall body, which proceed from a
Defectuous Procreation.




Want Of Absolute Power

Of which, this is one, "That a man to obtain a Kingdome, is sometimes
content with lesse Power, than to the Peace, and defence of the
Common-wealth is necessarily required. " From whence it commeth to passe,
that when the exercise of the Power layd by, is for the publique safety
to be resumed, it hath the resemblance of as unjust act; which disposeth
great numbers of men (when occasion is presented) to rebell; In the
same manner as the bodies of children, gotten by diseased parents, are
subject either to untimely death, or to purge the ill quality, derived
from their vicious conception, by breaking out into biles and scabbs.
And when Kings deny themselves some such necessary Power, it is not
alwayes (though sometimes) out of ignorance of what is necessary to the
office they undertake; but many times out of a hope to recover the same
again at their pleasure: Wherein they reason not well; because such as
will hold them to their promises, shall be maintained against them by
forraign Common-wealths; who in order to the good of their own Subjects
let slip few occasions to Weaken the estate of their Neighbours. So was
Thomas Beckett Archbishop of Canterbury, supported against Henry
the Second, by the Pope; the subjection of Ecclesiastiques to the
Common-wealth, having been dispensed with by William the Conqueror at
his reception, when he took an Oath, not to infringe the liberty of the
Church. And so were the Barons, whose power was by William Rufus (to
have their help in transferring the Succession from his Elder brother,
to himselfe,) encreased to a degree, inconsistent with the Soveraign
Power, maintained in their Rebellion against King John, by the French.
Nor does this happen in Monarchy onely. For whereas the stile of the
antient Roman Common-wealth, was, The Senate, and People of Rome;
neither Senate, nor People pretended to the whole Power; which first
caused the seditions, of Tiberius Gracchus, Caius Gracchus, Lucius
Saturnius, and others; and afterwards the warres between the Senate and
the People, under Marius and Sylla; and again under Pompey and Caesar,
to the Extinction of their Democraty, and the setting up of Monarchy.

The people of Athens bound themselves but from one onely Action; which
was, that no man on pain of death should propound the renewing of the
warre for the Island of Salamis; And yet thereby, if Solon had not
caused to be given out he was mad, and afterwards in gesture and habit
of a mad-man, and in verse, propounded it to the People that flocked
about him, they had had an enemy perpetually in readinesse, even at the
gates of their Citie; such dammage, or shifts, are all Common-wealths
forced to, that have their Power never so little limited.




Private Judgement Of Good and Evill

In the second place, I observe the Diseases of a Common-wealth, that
proceed from the poyson of seditious doctrines; whereof one is, "That
every private man is Judge of Good and Evill actions. " This is true in
the condition of meer Nature, where there are no Civill Lawes; and also
under Civill Government, in such cases as are not determined by the
Law. But otherwise, it is manifest, that the measure of Good and Evill
actions, is the Civill Law; and the Judge the Legislator, who is alwayes
Representative of the Common-wealth. From this false doctrine, men are
disposed to debate with themselves, and dispute the commands of the
Common-wealth; and afterwards to obey, or disobey them, as in their
private judgements they shall think fit. Whereby the Common-wealth is
distracted and Weakened.




Erroneous Conscience

Another doctrine repugnant to Civill Society, is, that "Whatsoever a
man does against his Conscience, is Sinne;" and it dependeth on the
presumption of making himself judge of Good and Evill. For a mans
Conscience, and his Judgement is the same thing; and as the Judgement,
so also the Conscience may be erroneous. Therefore, though he that is
subject to no Civill Law, sinneth in all he does against his Conscience,
because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it is
not so with him that lives in a Common-wealth; because the Law is the
publique Conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided.
Otherwise in such diversity, as there is of private Consciences, which
are but private opinions, the Common-wealth must needs be distracted,
and no man dare to obey the Soveraign Power, farther than it shall seem
good in his own eyes.




Pretence Of Inspiration

It hath been also commonly taught, "That Faith and Sanctity, are not to
be attained by Study and Reason, but by supernaturall Inspiration, or
Infusion," which granted, I see not why any man should render a reason
of his Faith; or why every Christian should not be also a Prophet; or
why any man should take the Law of his Country, rather than his own
Inspiration, for the rule of his action. And thus wee fall again into
the fault of taking upon us to Judge of Good and Evill; or to make
Judges of it, such private men as pretend to be supernaturally Inspired,
to the Dissolution of all Civill Government. Faith comes by hearing,
and hearing by those accidents, which guide us into the presence of them
that speak to us; which accidents are all contrived by God Almighty; and
yet are not supernaturall, but onely, for the great number of them that
concurre to every effect, unobservable. Faith, and Sanctity, are indeed
not very frequent; but yet they are not Miracles, but brought to passe
by education, discipline, correction, and other naturall wayes, by which
God worketh them in his elect, as such time as he thinketh fit. And
these three opinions, pernicious to Peace and Government, have in this
part of the world, proceeded chiefly from the tongues, and pens of
unlearned Divines; who joyning the words of Holy Scripture together,
otherwise than is agreeable to reason, do what they can, to make men
think, that Sanctity and Naturall Reason, cannot stand together.




Subjecting The Soveraign Power To Civill Lawes

A fourth opinion, repugnant to the nature of a Common-wealth, is this,
"That he that hath the Soveraign Power, is subject to the Civill Lawes. "
It is true, that Soveraigns are all subjects to the Lawes of Nature;
because such lawes be Divine, and cannot by any man, or Common-wealth
be abrogated. But to those Lawes which the Soveraign himselfe, that is,
which the Common-wealth maketh, he is not subject. For to be subject to
Lawes, is to be subject to the Common-wealth, that is to the Soveraign
Representative, that is to himselfe; which is not subjection, but
freedome from the Lawes. Which errour, because it setteth the Lawes
above the Soveraign, setteth also a Judge above him, and a Power to
punish him; which is to make a new Soveraign; and again for the same
reason a third, to punish the second; and so continually without end, to
the Confusion, and Dissolution of the Common-wealth.




Attributing Of Absolute Propriety To The Subjects

A Fifth doctrine, that tendeth to the Dissolution of a Common-wealth,
is, "That every private man has an absolute Propriety in his Goods;
such, as excludeth the Right of the Soveraign. " Every man has indeed a
Propriety that excludes the Right of every other Subject: And he has it
onely from the Soveraign Power; without the protection whereof, every
other man should have equall Right to the same. But if the Right of the
Soveraign also be excluded, he cannot performe the office they have put
him into; which is, to defend them both from forraign enemies, and
from the injuries of one another; and consequently there is no longer a
Common-wealth.

And if the Propriety of Subjects, exclude not the Right of the
Soveraign Representative to their Goods; much lesse to their offices
of Judicature, or Execution, in which they Represent the Soveraign
himselfe.




Dividing Of The Soveraign Power

There is a Sixth doctrine, plainly, and directly against the essence
of a Common-wealth; and 'tis this, "That the Soveraign Power may be
divided. " For what is it to divide the Power of a Common-wealth, but
to Dissolve it; for Powers divided mutually destroy each other. And for
these doctrines, men are chiefly beholding to some of those, that making
profession of the Lawes, endeavour to make them depend upon their own
learning, and not upon the Legislative Power.




Imitation Of Neighbour Nations

And as False Doctrine, so also often-times the Example of different
Government in a neighbouring Nation, disposeth men to alteration of
the forme already setled. So the people of the Jewes were stirred up to
reject God, and to call upon the Prophet Samuel, for a King after
the manner of the Nations; So also the lesser Cities of Greece, were
continually disturbed, with seditions of the Aristocraticall, and
Democraticall factions; one part of almost every Common-wealth, desiring
to imitate the Lacedaemonians; the other, the Athenians. And I doubt
not, but many men, have been contented to see the late troubles in
England, out of an imitation of the Low Countries; supposing there
needed no more to grow rich, than to change, as they had done, the forme
of their Government. For the constitution of mans nature, is of it selfe
subject to desire novelty: When therefore they are provoked to the same,
by the neighbourhood also of those that have been enriched by it, it is
almost impossible for them, not to be content with those that solicite
them to change; and love the first beginnings, though they be grieved
with the continuance of disorder; like hot blouds, that having gotten
the itch, tear themselves with their own nayles, till they can endure
the smart no longer.




Imitation Of The Greeks, And Romans

And as to Rebellion in particular against Monarchy; one of the most
frequent causes of it, is the Reading of the books of Policy, and
Histories of the antient Greeks, and Romans; from which, young men,
and all others that are unprovided of the Antidote of solid Reason,
receiving a strong, and delightfull impression, of the great exploits
of warre, atchieved by the Conductors of their Armies, receive withall
a pleasing Idea, of all they have done besides; and imagine their great
prosperity, not to have proceeded from the aemulation of particular men,
but from the vertue of their popular form of government: Not considering
the frequent Seditions, and Civill Warres, produced by the imperfection
of their Policy. From the reading, I say, of such books, men have
undertaken to kill their Kings, because the Greek and Latine writers,
in their books, and discourses of Policy, make it lawfull, and laudable,
for any man so to do; provided before he do it, he call him Tyrant. For
they say not Regicide, that is, killing of a King, but Tyrannicide, that
is, killing of a Tyrant is lawfull. From the same books, they that live
under a Monarch conceive an opinion, that the Subjects in a Popular
Common-wealth enjoy Liberty; but that in a Monarchy they are all Slaves.
I say, they that live under a Monarchy conceive such an opinion; not
they that live under a Popular Government; for they find no such matter.
In summe, I cannot imagine, how anything can be more prejudiciall to a
Monarchy, than the allowing of such books to be publikely read, without
present applying such correctives of discreet Masters, as are fit to
take away their Venime; Which Venime I will not doubt to compare to
the biting of a mad Dogge, which is a disease the Physicians call
Hydrophobia, or Fear Of Water. For as he that is so bitten, has a
continuall torment of thirst, and yet abhorreth water; and is in such
an estate, as if the poyson endeavoured to convert him into a Dogge:
So when a Monarchy is once bitten to the quick, by those Democraticall
writers, that continually snarle at that estate; it wanteth nothing
more than a strong Monarch, which neverthelesse out of a certain
Tyrannophobia, or feare of being strongly governed, when they have him,
they abhorre.
As here have been Doctors, that hold there be three Soules in a man;
so there be also that think there may be more Soules, (that is, more
Soveraigns,) than one, in a Common-wealth; and set up a Supremacy
against the Soveraignty; Canons against Lawes; and a Ghostly Authority
against the Civill; working on mens minds, with words and distinctions,
that of themselves signifie nothing, but bewray (by their obscurity)
that there walketh (as some think invisibly) another Kingdome, as it
were a Kingdome of Fayries, in the dark. Now seeing it is manifest, that
the Civill Power, and the Power of the Common-wealth is the same
thing; and that Supremacy, and the Power of making Canons, and granting
Faculties, implyeth a Common-wealth; it followeth, that where one is
Soveraign, another Supreme; where one can make Lawes, and another
make Canons; there must needs be two Common-wealths, of one & the same
Subjects; which is a Kingdome divided in it selfe, and cannot stand. For
notwithstanding the insignificant distinction of Temporall, and Ghostly,
they are still two Kingdomes, and every Subject is subject to two
Masters. For seeing the Ghostly Power challengeth the Right to declare
what is Sinne it challengeth by consequence to declare what is Law,
(Sinne being nothing but the transgression of the Law;) and again, the
Civill Power challenging to declare what is Law, every Subject must
obey two Masters, who bothe will have their Commands be observed as Law;
which is impossible. Or, if it be but one Kingdome, either the Civill,
which is the Power of the Common-wealth, must be subordinate to the
Ghostly; or the Ghostly must be subordinate to the Temporall and then
there is no Supremacy but the Temporall. When therefore these two Powers
oppose one another, the Common-wealth cannot but be in great danger
of Civill warre, and Dissolution. For the Civill Authority being more
visible, and standing in the cleerer light of naturall reason cannot
choose but draw to it in all times a very considerable part of the
people: And the Spirituall, though it stand in the darknesse of Schoole
distinctions, and hard words; yet because the fear of Darknesse, and
Ghosts, is greater than other fears, cannot want a party sufficient to
Trouble, and sometimes to Destroy a Common-wealth. And this is a Disease
which not unfitly may be compared to the Epilepsie, or Falling-sicknesse
(which the Jewes took to be one kind of possession by Spirits) in the
Body Naturall. For as in this Disease, there is an unnaturall spirit,
or wind in the head that obstructeth the roots of the Nerves, and moving
them violently, taketh away the motion which naturally they should have
from the power of the Soule in the Brain, and thereby causeth violent,
and irregular motions (which men call Convulsions) in the parts;
insomuch as he that is seized therewith, falleth down sometimes into the
water, and sometimes into the fire, as a man deprived of his senses;
so also in the Body Politique, when the Spirituall power, moveth the
Members of a Common-wealth, by the terrour of punishments, and hope of
rewards (which are the Nerves of it,) otherwise than by the Civill Power
(which is the Soule of the Common-wealth) they ought to be moved; and by
strange, and hard words suffocates the people, and either Overwhelm
the Common-wealth with Oppression, or cast it into the Fire of a Civill
warre.




Mixt Government

Sometimes also in the meerly Civill government, there be more than
one Soule: As when the Power of levying mony, (which is the Nutritive
faculty,) has depended on a generall Assembly; the Power of conduct and
command, (which is the Motive Faculty,) on one man; and the Power of
making Lawes, (which is the Rationall faculty,) on the accidentall
consent, not onely of those two, but also of a third; This endangereth
the Common-wealth, somtimes for want of consent to good Lawes; but most
often for want of such Nourishment, as is necessary to Life, and Motion.
For although few perceive, that such government, is not government,
but division of the Common-wealth into three Factions, and call it
mixt Monarchy; yet the truth is, that it is not one independent
Common-wealth, but three independent Factions; nor one Representative
Person, but three. In the Kingdome of God, there may be three Persons
independent, without breach of unity in God that Reigneth; but where men
Reigne, that be subject to diversity of opinions, it cannot be so. And
therefore if the King bear the person of the People, and the generall
Assembly bear also the person of the People, and another assembly bear
the person of a Part of the people, they are not one Person, nor one
Soveraign, but three Persons, and three Soveraigns.

To what Disease in the Naturall Body of man, I may exactly compare this
irregularity of a Common-wealth, I know not. But I have seen a man, that
had another man growing out of his side, with an head, armes, breast,
and stomach, of his own: If he had had another man growing out of his
other side, the comparison might then have been exact.




Want Of Mony

Hitherto I have named such Diseases of a Common-wealth, as are of the
greatest, and most present danger. There be other, not so great; which
neverthelesse are not unfit to be observed. As first, the difficulty of
raising Mony, for the necessary uses of the Common-wealth; especially
in the approach of warre. This difficulty ariseth from the opinion, that
every Subject hath of a Propriety in his lands and goods, exclusive of
the Soveraigns Right to the use of the same. From whence it commeth to
passe, that the Soveraign Power, which foreseeth the necessities and
dangers of the Common-wealth, (finding the passage of mony to the
publique Treasure obstructed, by the tenacity of the people,) whereas
it ought to extend it selfe, to encounter, and prevent such dangers in
their beginnings, contracteth it selfe as long as it can, and when it
cannot longer, struggles with the people by strategems of Law, to obtain
little summes, which not sufficing, he is fain at last violently to
open the way for present supply, or Perish; and being put often to these
extremities, at last reduceth the people to their due temper; or else
the Common-wealth must perish. Insomuch as we may compare this Distemper
very aptly to an Ague; wherein, the fleshy parts being congealed, or
by venomous matter obstructed; the Veins which by their naturall course
empty themselves into the Heart, are not (as they ought to be) supplyed
from the Arteries, whereby there succeedeth at first a cold contraction,
and trembling of the limbes; and afterwards a hot, and strong endeavour
of the Heart, to force a passage for the Bloud; and before it can do
that, contenteth it selfe with the small refreshments of such things as
coole of a time, till (if Nature be strong enough) it break at last
the contumacy of the parts obstructed, and dissipateth the venome into
sweat; or (if Nature be too weak) the Patient dyeth.




Monopolies And Abuses Of Publicans

Again, there is sometimes in a Common-wealth, a Disease, which
resembleth the Pleurisie; and that is, when the Treasure of the
Common-wealth, flowing out of its due course, is gathered together in
too much abundance, in one, or a few private men, by Monopolies, or by
Farmes of the Publique Revenues; in the same manner as the Blood in a
Pleurisie, getting into the Membrane of the breast, breedeth there an
Inflammation, accompanied with a Fever, and painfull stitches.




Popular Men

Also, the Popularity of a potent Subject, (unlesse the Common-wealth
have very good caution of his fidelity,) is a dangerous Disease; because
the people (which should receive their motion from the Authority of the
Soveraign,) by the flattery, and by the reputation of an ambitious man,
are drawn away from their obedience to the Lawes, to follow a man, of
whose vertues, and designes they have no knowledge. And this is commonly
of more danger in a Popular Government, than in a Monarchy; as it may
easily be made believe, they are the People. By this means it was, that
Julius Caesar, who was set up by the People against the Senate, having
won to himselfe the affections of his Army, made himselfe Master, both
of Senate and People. And this proceeding of popular, and ambitious men,
is plain Rebellion; and may be resembled to the effects of Witchcraft.




Excessive Greatnesse Of A Town, Multitude Of Corporations

Another infirmity of a Common-wealth, is the immoderate greatnesse of a
Town, when it is able to furnish out of its own Circuit, the number, and
expence of a great Army: As also the great number of Corporations; which
are as it were many lesser Common-wealths in the bowels of a greater,
like wormes in the entrayles of a naturall man.




Liberty Of Disputing Against Soveraign Power

To which may be added, the Liberty of Disputing against absolute Power,
by pretenders to Politicall Prudence; which though bred for the most
part in the Lees of the people; yet animated by False Doctrines, are
perpetually medling with the Fundamentall Lawes, to the molestation
of the Common-wealth; like the little Wormes, which Physicians call
Ascarides.

We may further adde, the insatiable appetite, or Bulimia, of enlarging
Dominion; with the incurable Wounds thereby many times received from
the enemy; And the Wens, of ununited conquests, which are many times a
burthen, and with lesse danger lost, than kept; As also the Lethargy of
Ease, and Consumption of Riot and Vain Expence.




Dissolution Of The Common-wealth

Lastly, when in a warre (forraign, or intestine,) the enemies got a
final Victory; so as (the forces of the Common-wealth keeping the field
no longer) there is no farther protection of Subjects in their loyalty;
then is the Common-wealth DISSOLVED, and every man at liberty to protect
himselfe by such courses as his own discretion shall suggest unto him.
For the Soveraign, is the publique Soule, giving Life and Motion to the
Common-wealth; which expiring, the Members are governed by it no more,
than the Carcasse of a man, by his departed (though Immortal) Soule. For
though the Right of a Soveraign Monarch cannot be extinguished by the
act of another; yet the Obligation of the members may. For he that
wants protection, may seek it anywhere; and when he hath it, is obliged
(without fraudulent pretence of having submitted himselfe out of fear,)
to protect his Protection as long as he is able. But when the Power of
an Assembly is once suppressed, the Right of the same perisheth utterly;
because the Assembly it selfe is extinct; and consequently, there is no
possibility for the Soveraignty to re-enter.



CHAPTER XXX. OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOVERAIGN REPRESENTATIVE




The Procuration Of The Good Of The People

The OFFICE of the Soveraign, (be it a Monarch, or an Assembly,)
consisteth in the end, for which he was trusted with the Soveraign
Power, namely the procuration of the Safety Of The People; to which he
is obliged by the Law of Nature, and to render an account thereof to
God, the Author of that Law, and to none but him. But by Safety here, is
not meant a bare Preservation, but also all other Contentments of life,
which every man by lawfull Industry, without danger, or hurt to the
Common-wealth, shall acquire to himselfe.




By Instruction & Lawes

And this is intended should be done, not by care applyed to
Individualls, further than their protection from injuries, when they
shall complain; but by a generall Providence, contained in publique
Instruction, both of Doctrine, and Example; and in the making, and
executing of good Lawes, to which individuall persons may apply their
own cases.




Against The Duty Of A Soveraign To Relinquish Any Essentiall Right

of Soveraignty Or Not To See The People Taught The Grounds Of Them

And because, if the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty (specified before
in the eighteenth Chapter) be taken away, the Common-wealth is thereby
dissolved, and every man returneth into the condition, and calamity of a
warre with every other man, (which is the greatest evill that can happen
in this life;) it is the Office of the Soveraign, to maintain those
Rights entire; and consequently against his duty, First, to transferre
to another, or to lay from himselfe any of them. For he that deserteth
the Means, deserteth the Ends; and he deserteth the Means, that being
the Soveraign, acknowledgeth himselfe subject to the Civill Lawes; and
renounceth the Power of Supreme Judicature; or of making Warre, or
Peace by his own Authority; or of Judging of the Necessities of the
Common-wealth; or of levying Mony, and Souldiers, when, and as much as
in his own conscience he shall judge necessary; or of making Officers,
and Ministers both of Warre, and Peace; or of appointing Teachers, and
examining what Doctrines are conformable, or contrary to the Defence,
Peace, and Good of the people. Secondly, it is against his duty, to let
the people be ignorant, or mis-in-formed of the grounds, and reasons
of those his essentiall Rights; because thereby men are easie to be
seduced, and drawn to resist him, when the Common-wealth shall require
their use and exercise.

And the grounds of these Rights, have the rather need to be diligently,
and truly taught; because they cannot be maintained by any Civill Law,
or terrour of legal punishment. For a Civill Law, that shall forbid
Rebellion, (and such is all resistance to the essentiall Rights of
Soveraignty,) is not (as a Civill Law) any obligation, but by vertue
onely of the Law of Nature, that forbiddeth the violation of Faith;
which naturall obligation if men know not, they cannot know the Right of
any Law the Soveraign maketh. And for the Punishment, they take it
but for an act of Hostility; which when they think they have strength
enough, they will endeavour by acts of Hostility, to avoyd.




Objection Of Those That Say There Are No Principles Of Reason For

Absolute Soveraignty

As I have heard some say, that Justice is but a word, without substance;
and that whatsoever a man can by force, or art, acquire to himselfe,
(not onely in the condition of warre, but also in a Common-wealth,) is
his own, which I have already shewed to be false: So there be also
that maintain, that there are no grounds, nor Principles of Reason, to
sustain those essentiall Rights, which make Soveraignty absolute. For
if there were, they would have been found out in some place, or other;
whereas we see, there has not hitherto been any Common-wealth, where
those Rights have been acknowledged, or challenged. Wherein they argue
as ill, as if the Savage people of America, should deny there were any
grounds, or Principles of Reason, so to build a house, as to last as
long as the materials, because they never yet saw any so well built.
Time, and Industry, produce every day new knowledge. And as the art
of well building, is derived from Principles of Reason, observed by
industrious men, that had long studied the nature of materials, and
the divers effects of figure, and proportion, long after mankind
began (though poorly) to build: So, long time after men have begun to
constitute Common-wealths, imperfect, and apt to relapse into disorder,
there may, Principles of Reason be found out, by industrious meditation,
to make use of them, or be neglected by them, or not, concerneth my
particular interest, at this day, very little. But supposing that
these of mine are not such Principles of Reason; yet I am sure they are
Principles from Authority of Scripture; as I shall make it appear, when
I shall come to speak of the Kingdome of God, (administred by Moses,)
over the Jewes, his peculiar people by Covenant.




Objection From The Incapacity Of The Vulgar

But they say again, that though the Principles be right, yet Common
people are not of capacity enough to be made to understand them. I
should be glad, that the Rich, and Potent Subjects of a Kingdome, or
those that are accounted the most Learned, were no lesse incapable than
they. But all men know, that the obstructions to this kind of doctrine,
proceed not so much from the difficulty of the matter, as from the
interest of them that are to learn. Potent men, digest hardly any thing
that setteth up a Power to bridle their affections; and Learned men,
any thing that discovereth their errours, and thereby lesseneth their
Authority: whereas the Common-peoples minds, unlesse they be tainted
with dependance on the Potent, or scribbled over with the opinions
of their Doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by
Publique Authority shall be imprinted in them. Shall whole Nations be
brought to Acquiesce in the great Mysteries of Christian Religion, which
are above Reason; and millions of men be made believe, that the same
Body may be in innumerable places, at one and the same time, which
is against Reason; and shall not men be able, by their teaching, and
preaching, protected by the Law, to make that received, which is so
consonant to Reason, that any unprejudicated man, needs no more to learn
it, than to hear it? I conclude therefore, that in the instruction
of the people in the Essentiall Rights (which are the Naturall, and
Fundamentall Lawes) of Soveraignty, there is no difficulty, (whilest a
Soveraign has his Power entire,) but what proceeds from his own fault,
or the fault of those whom he trusteth in the administration of the
Common-wealth; and consequently, it is his Duty, to cause them so to be
instructed; and not onely his Duty, but his Benefit also, and Security,
against the danger that may arrive to himselfe in his naturall Person,
from Rebellion.




Subjects Are To Be Taught, Not To Affect Change Of Government

And (to descend to particulars) the People are to be taught, First, that
they ought not to be in love with any forme of Government they see
in their neighbour Nations, more than with their own, nor (whatsoever
present prosperity they behold in Nations that are otherwise governed
than they,) to desire change. For the prosperity of a People ruled by
an Aristocraticall, or Democraticall assembly, commeth not from
Aristocracy, nor from Democracy, but from the Obedience, and Concord of
the Subjects; nor do the people flourish in a Monarchy, because one man
has the right to rule them, but because they obey him. Take away in
any kind of State, the Obedience, (and consequently the Concord of the
People,) and they shall not onely not flourish, but in short time be
dissolved. And they that go about by disobedience, to doe no more than
reforme the Common-wealth, shall find they do thereby destroy it; like
the foolish daughters of Peleus (in the fable;) which desiring to renew
the youth of their decrepit Father, did by the Counsell of Medea, cut
him in pieces, and boyle him, together with strange herbs, but made not
of him a new man. This desire of change, is like the breach of the first
of Gods Commandements: For there God says, Non Habebis Deos Alienos;
Thou shalt not have the Gods of other Nations; and in another place
concerning Kings, that they are Gods.




Nor Adhere (Against The Soveraign) To Popular Men

Secondly, they are to be taught, that they ought not to be led with
admiration of the vertue of any of their fellow Subjects, how
high soever he stand, nor how conspicuously soever he shine in the
Common-wealth; nor of any Assembly, (except the Soveraign Assembly,)
so as to deferre to them any obedience, or honour, appropriate to the
Soveraign onely, whom (in their particular stations) they represent; nor
to receive any influence from them, but such as is conveighed by them
from the Soveraign Authority. For that Soveraign, cannot be imagined to
love his People as he ought, that is not Jealous of them, but suffers
them by the flattery of Popular men, to be seduced from their loyalty,
as they have often been, not onely secretly, but openly, so as to
proclaime Marriage with them In Facie Ecclesiae by Preachers; and by
publishing the same in the open streets: which may fitly be compared to
the violation of the second of the ten Commandements.



Nor To Dispute The Soveraign Power

Thirdly, in consequence to this, they ought to be informed, how great
fault it is, to speak evill of the Soveraign Representative, (whether
One man, or an Assembly of men;) or to argue and dispute his Power, or
any way to use his Name irreverently, whereby he may be brought into
Contempt with his People, and their Obedience (in which the safety
of the Common-wealth consisteth) slackened. Which doctrine the third
Commandement by resemblance pointeth to.




And To Have Dayes Set Apart To Learn Their Duty

Fourthly, seeing people cannot be taught this, nor when 'tis taught,
remember it, nor after one generation past, so much as know in whom the
Soveraign Power is placed, without setting a part from their ordinary
labour, some certain times, in which they may attend those that are
appointed to instruct them; It is necessary that some such times be
determined, wherein they may assemble together, and (after prayers and
praises given to God, the Soveraign of Soveraigns) hear those their
Duties told them, and the Positive Lawes, such as generally concern them
all, read and expounded, and be put in mind of the Authority that maketh
them Lawes. To this end had the Jewes every seventh day, a Sabbath, in
which the Law was read and expounded; and in the solemnity whereof they
were put in mind, that their King was God; that having created the world
in six days, he rested the seventh day; and by their resting on it from
their labour, that that God was their King, which redeemed them from
their servile, and painfull labour in Egypt, and gave them a time, after
they had rejoyced in God, to take joy also in themselves, by lawfull
recreation. So that the first Table of the Commandements, is spent all,
in setting down the summe of Gods absolute Power; not onely as God,
but as King by pact, (in peculiar) of the Jewes; and may therefore give
light, to those that have the Soveraign Power conferred on them by the
consent of men, to see what doctrine they Ought to teach their Subjects.




And To Honour Their Parents

And because the first instruction of Children, dependeth on the care
of their Parents; it is necessary that they should be obedient to them,
whilest they are under their tuition; and not onely so, but that also
afterwards (as gratitude requireth,) they acknowledge the benefit of
their education, by externall signes of honour. To which end they are
to be taught, that originally the Father of every man was also his
Soveraign Lord, with power over him of life and death; and that the
Fathers of families, when by instituting a Common-wealth, they resigned
that absolute Power, yet it was never intended, they should lose the
honour due unto them for their education. For to relinquish such right,
was not necessary to the Institution of Soveraign Power; nor would there
be any reason, why any man should desire to have children, or take the
care to nourish, and instruct them, if they were afterwards to have no
other benefit from them, than from other men. And this accordeth with
the fifth Commandement.




And To Avoyd Doing Of Injury:

Again, every Soveraign Ought to cause Justice to be taught, which
(consisting in taking from no man what is his) is as much as to say, to
cause men to be taught not to deprive their Neighbour, by violence,
or fraud, of any thing which by the Soveraign Authority is theirs. Of
things held in propriety, those that are dearest to a man are his own
life, & limbs; and in the next degree, (in most men,) those that
concern conjugall affection; and after them riches and means of living.
Therefore the People are to be taught, to abstain from violence to
one anothers person, by private revenges; from violation of conjugall
honour; and from forcibly rapine, and fraudulent surreption of one
anothers goods. For which purpose also it is necessary they be shewed
the evill consequences of false Judgement, by corruption either of
Judges or Witnesses, whereby the distinction of propriety is taken away,
and Justice becomes of no effect: all which things are intimated in the
sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth Commandements.




And To Do All This Sincerely From The Heart

Lastly, they are to be taught, that not onely the unjust facts, but the
designes and intentions to do them, (though by accident hindred,) are
Injustice; which consisteth in the pravity of the will, as well as in
the irregularity of the act. And this is the intention of the tenth
Commandement, and the summe of the Second Table; which is reduced all to
this one Commandement of mutuall Charity, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour
as thy selfe:" as the summe of the first Table is reduced to "the love
of God;" whom they had then newly received as their King.




The Use Of Universities

As for the Means, and Conduits, by which the people may receive this
Instruction, wee are to search, by what means so may Opinions,
contrary to the peace of Man-kind, upon weak and false Principles, have
neverthelesse been so deeply rooted in them. I mean those, which I have
in the precedent Chapter specified: as That men shall Judge of what is
lawfull and unlawfull, not by the Law it selfe, but by their own
private Judgements; That Subjects sinne in obeying the Commands of the
Common-wealth, unlesse they themselves have first judged them to be
lawfull: That their Propriety in their riches is such, as to exclude the
Dominion, which the Common-wealth hath over the same: That it is lawfull
for Subjects to kill such, as they call Tyrants: That the Soveraign
Power may be divided, and the like; which come to be instilled into
the People by this means. They whom necessity, or covetousnesse keepeth
attent on their trades, and labour; and they, on the other side, whom
superfluity, or sloth carrieth after their sensuall pleasures, (which
two sorts of men take up the greatest part of Man-kind,) being diverted
from the deep meditation, which the learning of truth, not onely in the
matter of Naturall Justice, but also of all other Sciences necessarily
requireth, receive the Notions of their duty, chiefly from Divines
in the Pulpit, and partly from such of their Neighbours, or familiar
acquaintance, as having the Faculty of discoursing readily, and
plausibly, seem wiser and better learned in cases of Law, and
Conscience, than themselves. And the Divines, and such others as make
shew of Learning, derive their knowledge from the Universities, and from
the Schooles of Law, or from the Books, which by men eminent in
those Schooles, and Universities have been published. It is therefore
manifest, that the Instruction of the people, dependeth wholly, on the
right teaching of Youth in the Universities. But are not (may some men
say) the Universities of England learned enough already to do that? or
is it you will undertake to teach the Universities? Hard questions. Yet
to the first, I doubt not to answer; that till towards the later end of
Henry the Eighth, the Power of the Pope, was alwayes upheld against the
Power of the Common-wealth, principally by the Universities; and that
the doctrines maintained by so many Preachers, against the Soveraign
Power of the King, and by so many Lawyers, and others, that had their
education there, is a sufficient argument, that though the Universities
were not authors of those false doctrines, yet they knew not how to
plant the true. For in such a contradiction of Opinions, it is most
certain, that they have not been sufficiently instructed; and 'tis no
wonder, if they yet retain a relish of that subtile liquor, wherewith
they were first seasoned, against the Civill Authority. But to the later
question, it is not fit, nor needfull for me to say either I, or No: for
any man that sees what I am doing, may easily perceive what I think.

The safety of the People, requireth further, from him, or them that have
the Soveraign Power, that Justice be equally administred to all degrees
of People; that is, that as well the rich, and mighty, as poor and
obscure persons, may be righted of the injuries done them; so as the
great, may have no greater hope of impunity, when they doe violence,
dishonour, or any Injury to the meaner sort, than when one of these,
does the like to one of them: For in this consisteth Equity; to which,
as being a Precept of the Law of Nature, a Soveraign is as much subject,
as any of the meanest of his People. All breaches of the Law, are
offences against the Common-wealth: but there be some, that are also
against private Persons. Those that concern the Common-wealth onely, may
without breach of Equity be pardoned; for every man may pardon what is
done against himselfe, according to his own discretion. But an offence
against a private man, cannot in Equity be pardoned, without the consent
of him that is injured; or reasonable satisfaction.

The Inequality of Subjects, proceedeth from the Acts of Soveraign Power;
and therefore has no more place in the presence of the Soveraign; that
is to say, in a Court of Justice, then the Inequality between Kings,
and their Subjects, in the presence of the King of Kings. The honour of
great Persons, is to be valued for their beneficence, and the aydes
they give to men of inferiour rank, or not at all. And the violences,
oppressions, and injuries they do, are not extenuated, but aggravated by
the greatnesse of their persons; because they have least need to commit
them. The consequences of this partiality towards the great, proceed in
this manner. Impunity maketh Insolence; Insolence Hatred; and Hatred,
an Endeavour to pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatnesse,
though with the ruine of the Common-wealth.




Equall Taxes

To Equall Justice, appertaineth also the Equall imposition of Taxes;
the equality whereof dependeth not on the Equality of riches, but on the
Equality of the debt, that every man oweth to the Common-wealth for his
defence. It is not enough, for a man to labour for the maintenance
of his life; but also to fight, (if need be,) for the securing of his
labour. They must either do as the Jewes did after their return from
captivity, in re-edifying the Temple, build with one hand, and hold the
Sword in the other; or else they must hire others to fight for them. For
the Impositions that are layd on the People by the Soveraign Power, are
nothing else but the Wages, due to them that hold the publique Sword,
to defend private men in the exercise of severall Trades, and Callings.
Seeing then the benefit that every one receiveth thereby, is the
enjoyment of life, which is equally dear to poor, and rich; the debt
which a poor man oweth them that defend his life, is the same which a
rich man oweth for the defence of his; saving that the rich, who have
the service of the poor, may be debtors not onely for their own persons,
but for many more. Which considered, the Equality of Imposition,
consisteth rather in the Equality of that which is consumed, than of the
riches of the persons that consume the same. For what reason is there,
that he which laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labour,
consumeth little, should be more charged, then he that living idlely,
getteth little, and spendeth all he gets; seeing the one hath no
more protection from the Common-wealth, then the other? But when the
Impositions, are layd upon those things which men consume, every man
payeth Equally for what he useth: Nor is the Common-wealth defrauded, by
the luxurious waste of private men.




Publique Charity

And whereas many men, by accident unevitable, become unable to maintain
themselves by their labour; they ought not to be left to the Charity
of private persons; but to be provided for, (as far-forth as the
necessities of Nature require,) by the Lawes of the Common-wealth. For
as it is Uncharitablenesse in any man, to neglect the impotent; so it
is in the Soveraign of a Common-wealth, to expose them to the hazard of
such uncertain Charity.




Prevention Of Idlenesse

But for such as have strong bodies, the case is otherwise: they are to
be forced to work; and to avoyd the excuse of not finding employment,
there ought to be such Lawes, as may encourage all manner of Arts; as
Navigation, Agriculture, Fishing, and all manner of Manifacture that
requires labour. The multitude of poor, and yet strong people still
encreasing, they are to be transplanted into Countries not sufficiently
inhabited: where neverthelesse, they are not to exterminate those they
find there; but constrain them to inhabit closer together, and not range
a great deal of ground, to snatch what they find; but to court each
little Plot with art and labour, to give them their sustenance in due
season. And when all the world is overchargd with Inhabitants, then the
last remedy of all is Warre; which provideth for every man, by Victory,
or Death.




Good Lawes What

To the care of the Soveraign, belongeth the making of Good Lawes. But
what is a good Law? By a Good Law, I mean not a Just Law: for no Law can
be Unjust. The Law is made by the Soveraign Power, and all that is done
by such Power, is warranted, and owned by every one of the people; and
that which every man will have so, no man can say is unjust. It is in
the Lawes of a Common-wealth, as in the Lawes of Gaming: whatsoever
the Gamesters all agree on, is Injustice to none of them. A good Law
is that, which is Needfull, for the Good Of The People, and withall
Perspicuous.




Such As Are Necessary

For the use of Lawes, (which are but Rules Authorised) is not to bind
the People from all Voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in
such a motion, as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires,
rashnesse, or indiscretion, as Hedges are set, not to stop Travellers,
but to keep them in the way. And therefore a Law that is not Needfull,
having not the true End of a Law, is not Good. A Law may be conceived to
be Good, when it is for the benefit of the Soveraign; though it be
not Necessary for the People; but it is not so. For the good of the
Soveraign and People, cannot be separated. It is a weak Soveraign, that
has weak Subjects; and a weak People, whose Soveraign wanteth Power to
rule them at his will. Unnecessary Lawes are not good Lawes; but trapps
for Mony: which where the right of Soveraign Power is acknowledged, are
superfluous; and where it is not acknowledged, unsufficient to defend
the People.




Such As Are Perspicuous

The Perspicuity, consisteth not so much in the words of the Law it
selfe, as in a Declaration of the Causes, and Motives, for which it was
made. That is it, that shewes us the meaning of the Legislator, and the
meaning of the Legislator known, the Law is more easily understood
by few, than many words. For all words, are subject to ambiguity;
and therefore multiplication of words in the body of the Law, is
multiplication of ambiguity: Besides it seems to imply, (by too much
diligence,) that whosoever can evade the words, is without the compasse
of the Law. And this is a cause of many unnecessary Processes. For when
I consider how short were the Lawes of antient times; and how they
grew by degrees still longer; me thinks I see a contention between the
Penners, and Pleaders of the Law; the former seeking to circumscribe
the later; and the later to evade their circumscriptions; and that the
Pleaders have got the Victory. It belongeth therefore to the Office of
a Legislator, (such as is in all Common-wealths the Supreme
Representative, be it one Man, or an Assembly,) to make the reason
Perspicuous, why the Law was made; and the Body of the Law it selfe, as
short, but in as proper, and significant termes, as may be.




Punishments

It belongeth also to the Office of the Soveraign, to make a right
application of Punishments, and Rewards. And seeing the end of punishing
is not revenge, and discharge of choler; but correction, either of the
offender, or of others by his example; the severest Punishments are to
be inflicted for those Crimes, that are of most Danger to the
Publique; such as are those which proceed from malice to the Government
established; those that spring from contempt of Justice; those that
provoke Indignation in the Multitude; and those, which unpunished, seem
Authorised, as when they are committed by Sonnes, Servants, or Favorites
of men in Authority: For Indignation carrieth men, not onely against the
Actors, and Authors of Injustice; but against all Power that is likely
to protect them; as in the case of Tarquin; when for the Insolent act of
one of his Sonnes, he was driven out of Rome, and the Monarchy it selfe
dissolved. But Crimes of Infirmity; such as are those which proceed
from great provocation, from great fear, great need, or from ignorance
whether the Fact be a great Crime, or not, there is place many times for
Lenity, without prejudice to the Common-wealth; and Lenity when there is
such place for it, is required by the Law of Nature. The Punishment of
the Leaders, and teachers in a Commotion; not the poore seduced People,
when they are punished, can profit the Common-wealth by their example.
To be severe to the People, is to punish that ignorance, which may in
great part be imputed to the Soveraign, whose fault it was, they were no
better instructed.




Rewards

In like manner it belongeth to the Office, and Duty of the Soveraign,
to apply his Rewards alwayes so, as there may arise from them benefit
to the Common-wealth: wherein consisteth their Use, and End; and is then
done, when they that have well served the Common-wealth, are with
as little expence of the Common Treasure, as is possible, so well
recompenced, as others thereby may be encouraged, both to serve the same
as faithfully as they can, and to study the arts by which they may be
enabled to do it better. To buy with Mony, or Preferment, from a Popular
ambitious Subject, to be quiet, and desist from making ill impressions
in the mindes of the People, has nothing of the nature of Reward; (which
is ordained not for disservice, but for service past;) nor a signe of
Gratitude, but of Fear: nor does it tend to the Benefit, but to the
Dammage of the Publique. It is a contention with Ambition, like that of
Hercules with the Monster Hydra, which having many heads, for every one
that was vanquished, there grew up three. For in like manner, when the
stubbornnesse of one Popular man, is overcome with Reward, there arise
many more (by the Example) that do the same Mischiefe, in hope of like
Benefit: and as all sorts of Manifacture, so also Malice encreaseth by
being vendible. And though sometimes a Civill warre, may be differred,
by such wayes as that, yet the danger growes still the greater, and the
Publique ruine more assured. It is therefore against the Duty of the
Soveraign, to whom the Publique Safety is committed, to Reward those
that aspire to greatnesse by disturbing the Peace of their Country, and
not rather to oppose the beginnings of such men, with a little danger,
than after a longer time with greater.




Counsellours

Another Businesse of the Soveraign, is to choose good Counsellours;
I mean such, whose advice he is to take in the Government of the
Common-wealth. For this word Counsell, Consilium, corrupted from
Considium, is a large signification, and comprehendeth all Assemblies
of men that sit together, not onely to deliberate what is to be done
hereafter, but also to judge of Facts past, and of Law for the present.
I take it here in the first sense onely: And in this sense, there is no
choyce of Counsell, neither in a Democracy, nor Aristocracy; because the
persons Counselling are members of the person Counselled. The choyce
of Counsellours therefore is to Monarchy; In which, the Soveraign that
endeavoureth not to make choyce of those, that in every kind are the
most able, dischargeth not his Office as he ought to do. The most able
Counsellours, are they that have least hope of benefit by giving evill
Counsell, and most knowledge of those things that conduce to the Peace,
and Defence of the Common-wealth. It is a hard matter to know who
expecteth benefit from publique troubles; but the signes that guide to a
just suspicion, is the soothing of the people in their unreasonable,
or irremediable grievances, by men whose estates are not sufficient to
discharge their accustomed expences, and may easily be observed by any
one whom it concerns to know it. But to know, who has most knowledge of
the Publique affaires, is yet harder; and they that know them, need them
a great deale the lesse. For to know, who knowes the Rules almost of any
Art, is a great degree of the knowledge of the same Art; because no
man can be assured of the truth of anothers Rules, but he that is first
taught to understand them. But the best signes of Knowledge of any
Art, are, much conversing in it, and constant good effects of it. Good
Counsell comes not by Lot, nor by Inheritance; and therefore there is no
more reason to expect good Advice from the rich, or noble, in matter
of State, than in delineating the dimensions of a fortresse; unlesse we
shall think there needs no method in the study of the Politiques, (as
there does in the study of Geometry,) but onely to be lookers on; which
is not so. For the Politiques is the harder study of the two. Whereas
in these parts of Europe, it hath been taken for a Right of certain
persons, to have place in the highest Councell of State by Inheritance;
it is derived from the Conquests of the antient Germans; wherein many
absolute Lords joyning together to conquer other Nations, would not
enter in to the Confederacy, without such Priviledges, as might be
marks of difference in time following, between their Posterity, and the
posterity of their Subjects; which Priviledges being inconsistent with
the Soveraign Power, by the favour of the Soveraign, they may seem to
keep; but contending for them as their Right, they must needs by
degrees let them go, and have at last no further honour, than adhaereth
naturally to their abilities.

And how able soever be the Counsellours in any affaire, the benefit
of their Counsell is greater, when they give every one his Advice, and
reasons of it apart, than when they do it in an Assembly, by way of
Orations; and when they have praemeditated, than when they speak on the
sudden; both because they have more time, to survey the consequences
of action; and are lesse subject to be carried away to contradiction,
through Envy, Emulation, or other Passions arising from the difference
of opinion.

The best Counsell, in those things that concern not other Nations, but
onely the ease, and benefit the Subjects may enjoy, by Lawes that
look onely inward, is to be taken from the generall informations, and
complaints of the people of each Province, who are best acquainted
with their own wants, and ought therefore, when they demand nothing in
derogation of the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty, to be diligently
taken notice of. For without those Essentiall Rights, (as I have often
before said,) the Common-wealth cannot at all subsist.




Commanders

A Commander of an Army in chiefe, if he be not Popular, shall not be
beloved, nor feared as he ought to be by his Army; and consequently
cannot performe that office with good successe. He must therefore be
Industrious, Valiant, Affable, Liberall and Fortunate, that he may gain
an opinion both of sufficiency, and of loving his Souldiers. This is
Popularity, and breeds in the Souldiers both desire, and courage, to
recommend themselves to his favour; and protects the severity of
the Generall, in punishing (when need is) the Mutinous, or negligent
Souldiers. But this love of Souldiers, (if caution be not given of
the Commanders fidelity,) is a dangerous thing to Soveraign Power;
especially when it is in the hands of an Assembly not popular. It
belongeth therefore to the safety of the People, both that they be good
Conductors, and faithfull subjects, to whom the Soveraign Commits his
Armies.

But when the Soveraign himselfe is Popular, that is, reverenced and
beloved of his People, there is no danger at all from the Popularity of
a Subject. For Souldiers are never so generally unjust, as to side with
their Captain; though they love him, against their Soveraign, when they
love not onely his Person, but also his Cause. And therefore those,
who by violence have at any time suppressed the Power of their Lawfull
Soveraign, before they could settle themselves in his place, have been
alwayes put to the trouble of contriving their Titles, to save the
People from the shame of receiving them. To have a known Right to
Soveraign Power, is so popular a quality, as he that has it needs no
more, for his own part, to turn the hearts of his Subjects to him, but
that they see him able absolutely to govern his own Family: Nor, on the
part of his enemies, but a disbanding of their Armies. For the greatest
and most active part of Mankind, has never hetherto been well contented
with the present.

Concerning the Offices of one Soveraign to another, which are
comprehended in that Law, which is commonly called the Law of Nations,
I need not say any thing in this place; because the Law of Nations, and
the Law of Nature, is the same thing. And every Soveraign hath the same
Right, in procuring the safety of his People, that any particular man
can have, in procuring the safety of his own Body. And the same Law,
that dictateth to men that have no Civil Government, what they ought to
do, and what to avoyd in regard of one another, dictateth the same to
Common-wealths, that is, to the Consciences of Soveraign Princes, and
Soveraign Assemblies; there being no Court of Naturall Justice, but
in the Conscience onely; where not Man, but God raigneth; whose Lawes,
(such of them as oblige all Mankind,) in respect of God, as he is the
Author of Nature, are Naturall; and in respect of the same God, as he is
King of Kings, are Lawes. But of the Kingdome of God, as King of Kings,
and as King also of a peculiar People, I shall speak in the rest of this
discourse.



CHAPTER XXXI. OF THE KINGDOME OF GOD BY NATURE




The Scope Of The Following Chapters

That the condition of meer Nature, that is to say, of absolute Liberty,
such as is theirs, that neither are Soveraigns, nor Subjects, is
Anarchy, and the condition of Warre: That the Praecepts, by which men
are guided to avoyd that condition, are the Lawes of Nature: That
a Common-wealth, without Soveraign Power, is but a word, without
substance, and cannot stand: That Subjects owe to Soveraigns, simple
Obedience, in all things, wherein their obedience is not repugnant
to the Lawes of God, I have sufficiently proved, in that which I have
already written. There wants onely, for the entire knowledge of Civill
duty, to know what are those Lawes of God. For without that, a man knows
not, when he is commanded any thing by the Civill Power, whether it be
contrary to the Law of God, or not: and so, either by too much civill
obedience, offends the Divine Majesty, or through feare of offending
God, transgresses the commandements of the Common-wealth. To avoyd both
these Rocks, it is necessary to know what are the Lawes Divine. And
seeing the knowledge of all Law, dependeth on the knowledge of the
Soveraign Power; I shall say something in that which followeth, of the
KINGDOME OF GOD.




Who Are Subjects In The Kingdome Of God

"God is King, let the Earth rejoice," saith the Psalmist. (Psal. 96. 1).
And again, "God is King though the Nations be angry; and he that sitteth
on the Cherubins, though the earth be moved. " (Psal. 98. 1). Whether
men will or not, they must be subject alwayes to the Divine Power. By
denying the Existence, or Providence of God, men may shake off their
Ease, but not their Yoke. But to call this Power of God, which extendeth
it selfe not onely to Man, but also to Beasts, and Plants, and Bodies
inanimate, by the name of Kingdome, is but a metaphoricall use of
the word. For he onely is properly said to Raigne, that governs his
Subjects, by his Word, and by promise of Rewards to those that obey
it, and by threatning them with Punishment that obey it not. Subjects
therefore in the Kingdome of God, are not Bodies Inanimate, nor
creatures Irrationall; because they understand no Precepts as his: Nor
Atheists; nor they that believe not that God has any care of the actions
of mankind; because they acknowledge no Word for his, nor have hope of
his rewards, or fear of his threatnings. They therefore that believe
there is a God that governeth the world, and hath given Praecepts, and
propounded Rewards, and Punishments to Mankind, are Gods Subjects; all
the rest, are to be understood as Enemies.




A Threefold Word Of God, Reason, Revelation, Prophecy

To rule by Words, requires that such Words be manifestly made known;
for else they are no Lawes: For to the nature of Lawes belongeth a
sufficient, and clear Promulgation, such as may take away the excuse of
Ignorance; which in the Lawes of men is but of one onely kind, and that
is, Proclamation, or Promulgation by the voyce of man. But God
declareth his Lawes three wayes; by the Dictates of Naturall Reason, By
Revelation, and by the Voyce of some Man, to whom by the operation of
Miracles, he procureth credit with the rest. From hence there ariseth
a triple Word of God, Rational, Sensible, and Prophetique: to which
Correspondeth a triple Hearing; Right Reason, Sense Supernaturall, and
Faith. As for Sense Supernaturall, which consisteth in Revelation, or
Inspiration, there have not been any Universall Lawes so given, because
God speaketh not in that manner, but to particular persons, and to
divers men divers things.

A Twofold Kingdome Of God, Naturall And Prophetique From the difference
between the other two kinds of Gods Word, Rationall, and Prophetique,
there may be attributed to God, a two-fold Kingdome, Naturall, and
Prophetique: Naturall, wherein he governeth as many of Mankind as
acknowledge his Providence, by the naturall Dictates of Right Reason;
And Prophetique, wherein having chosen out one peculiar Nation (the
Jewes) for his Subjects, he governed them, and none but them, not onely
by naturall Reason, but by Positive Lawes, which he gave them by the
mouths of his holy Prophets. Of the Naturall Kingdome of God I intend to
speak in this Chapter.

The Right Of Gods Soveraignty Is Derived From His Omnipotence The Right
of Nature, whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth those that
break his Lawes, is to be derived, not from his Creating them, as if
he required obedience, as of Gratitude for his benefits; but from his
Irresistible Power. I have formerly shewn, how the Soveraign Right
ariseth from Pact: To shew how the same Right may arise from Nature,
requires no more, but to shew in what case it is never taken away.
Seeing all men by Nature had Right to All things, they had Right every
one to reigne over all the rest. But because this Right could not be
obtained by force, it concerned the safety of every one, laying by that
Right, to set up men (with Soveraign Authority) by common consent,
to rule and defend them: whereas if there had been any man of Power
Irresistible; there had been no reason, why he should not by that Power
have ruled, and defended both himselfe, and them, according to his own
discretion. To those therefore whose Power is irresistible, the dominion
of all men adhaereth naturally by their excellence of Power; and
consequently it is from that Power, that the Kingdome over men, and
the Right of afflicting men at his pleasure, belongeth Naturally to God
Almighty; not as Creator, and Gracious; but as Omnipotent. And though
Punishment be due for Sinne onely, because by that word is understood
Affliction for Sinne; yet the Right of Afflicting, is not alwayes
derived from mens Sinne, but from Gods Power.