In May 1947, he was
appointed
the Dewan of the
state.
state.
Cambridge History of India - v4 - Indian Empire
In March, 1933, the White Paper containing the propo-
## p. 907 (#951) ############################################
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT & INDIAN STATES 907
sals of the British Government with regard to India was published
and in April, 1933, a Joint Select Committee of both Houses of
Parliament was appointed to consider the future Government of
India with special reference to the White Paper proposals. The
Committee was given the authority to consult delegates from Bri-
tish India and Indian States. The Joint Select Committee submit-
ted its Report in October, 1934. In December, 1934, a Bill based
on the Joint Select Committee's Report was introduced. The
Chamber of Princes appointed a Committee to examine the Gov-
ernment of India Bili. The Committee suggested a number of
amendments and alterations. Those suggestions were thoroughly
examined by the Secretary of State for India. On 4th August,
1935, the Government of India Bill received the Royal assent.
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1935
The Government of India Act, 1935, provided for a federal form
of Government for the whole of India. Under that Act, the Indian
States were given more representation in the federal legislature than
was due to them on the basis of their population and area.
While
250 seats were allotted to British India, the Indian States got 125
seats. In the Council of State, the Indian States were given the
right to send 104 members out of a total of 260 members. While
the representatives from the provinces were to be elected, those
from the States were to be nominated by the rulers of the States
concerned. While the inclusion of the provinces into the federa-
tion was to be automatic or compulsory, the Indian States were
given the option to join the federation or not. While the control
of the federal Government over the provinces was to be uniform,
it was to vary in the case of Indian States according to the terms
of the Instrument of Accession signed by the particular ruler at
the time of joining the federation and accepted by the Crown.
A critical examination shows that the Indian States were given
more representation than was due to them on the basis of their
area, population or resources. Moreover, they were given the
option to join or not to join the federation. The Joint Select Com-
mittee's Report gave the following reasons for treating the provin-
ces and the Indian States differently: “The main difficulties are
two: that the Indian States are wholly different in status and cha-
racter from the Provinces of British India, and that they are not
prepared to federate on the same terms as it is proposed to apply
to the Provinces. On the first point, the Indian States, unlike the
British Indian Provinces, possess sovereignty in various degrees and
they are, broadly speaking, under a system of personal government.
## p. 908 (#952) ############################################
908
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
Their accession to a Federation cannot, therefore, take place other-
wise than by the voluntary act of the ruler of each State, and after
accession the representatives of the acceding State in the Federal
Legislature will be nominated by the ruler and its subjects will
continue to owe allegiance to him. On the second point the rulers
have made it clear that while they are willing to consider Federa-
tion now with the Provinces of British India on certain terms, they
could not, as sovereign States, agree to the exercise by a Federal
Government in relation to them of a range of powers identical to
the Provinces on whom autonomy has yet to be conferred. ”
Lord Linlithgow succeeded Lord Willingdon in 1936. He came
to India with the determination to inaugurate the Federation dur-
ing his tenure of office. His view was that a direct personal ap-
proach to the Indian rulers would help him to persuade most of
them to join the Federation. It was with that object in view that
he sent his emissaries to the rulers of the Indian States. Those emis-
saries were provided with draft copies of Instrument of Accession
and written instructions from the Viceroy. The three emissaries
to the various States met the Indian Rulers and their Advisers. As
a result of the talks, it became clear that what was worrying the
Indian rulers was not whether the proposed Federation would en-
able them to contribute to the glory of India as a whole but whether
their own position would be better and safer inside the Federation
than outside it. Their attitude could be summed up in these
words: “We are being given the opportunity of entering a federa-
tion from which, when once we are in, there is no escape. Nor,
since the ultimate interpreter of the federal constitution is the Fede-
ral Court, can the Government of India or anyone else predict the
course of future events or anticipate the use which federation will
make of its powers. We owe it, therefore, to ourselves and to our
successors to safeguard to the utmost our own position inside the
federation. That is the light in which you must regard the limita-
tions which we have proposed, and if they seem unduly numerous
and too widely drawn, remember that we have good reason for
making them so. "
It is true that Lord Linlithgow was very serious about his work,
but the Political Department of the Government of India was creat-
ing hurdles in the way by putting emphasis on the loss which the
rulers were to incur as a result of joining the Federation. Although
many concessions were offered to the Indian rulers, they could not
be persuaded to join the federation. While all this was happen-
ing, the Second World War broke out in September, 1939. On
11 September, 1939, Lord Linlithgow declared that while Federa-
tion remained, as before, the objective of His Majesty's Government,
## p. 909 (#953) ############################################
CRIPPS AND INDIAN STATES
909
“the compulsion of the present international situation and the fact
that, given the necessity for concentrating on the emergency that
confronts us, we have no choice but to hold in suspense the work in
connection with preparations for Federation. ”
In August, 1940, Lord Linlithgow put forward certain proposals
on behalf of His Majesty's Government with a view to securing the
co-operation of the people of India. One of the proposals was to
set up a War Advisory Council containing the representatives of
British India and the Indian States. However, the so-called August
offer was rejected by the Congress.
In March, 1942, Sir Stafford Cripps came to India with certain
proposals on behalf of His Majesty's Government with regard to
the future set-up in the country. In one of his interviews, Sir
Stafford stated that it was the intention of the British Government
to give full freedom to all provincial units and the Indian States to
come into the new Union or to stay out. Moreover the British
Government did not intend to stay in India unless the Indian people
wanted them in their own interest to stay and except to the extent
that it might be unavoidable for the fulfilment of the British Gov-
ernment's Treaty obligations to the non-adhering States. On 10
April, 1942, the Indian States' delegation met and adopted the fol-
lowing resolution which was conveyed to Sir Stafford: "The Indian
States will be glad as always, in the interest of their motherland,
to make their contribution in every reasonable manner compatible
with the sovereignty and integrity of the States, towards the fram-
ing of a Constitution for India. The States should be assured, how-
ever, that in the event of a number of States not finding it feasible
to adhere, the non-adhering States or groups of States, so desiring,
would have the right to form a union of their own, with full sove-
reign status in accordance with a suitable and agreed procedure
devised for the purpose. '
The Cripps mission was a failure but the rulers of the Indian
States realized after the departure of the mission that their future
was not safe. It was found that if the interests of the Indian States
came into conflict with those of British India, the British Govern-
ment was going to care for British India and not for them.
at this time that Jawaharlal Nehru declared that treaties with the
Indian States must be scrapped and those who talked of those trea-
ties were “lunatics, knaves or fools. ” It was in this atmosphere
that the rulers of the Indian States started devising plans to safe-
guard their own interests in the future. The Nawab of Bhopal
urged upon the Political Department to take all those measures
which were necessary to safeguard their position in the event of
changes taking place in the constitutional set-up in the country.
It was
## p. 910 (#954) ############################################
910
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
In his address to a meeting of the Chamber of Princes held on 17
January, 1946, Lord Wavell assured the Indian Princes that no
changes in their relationship with the Crown or the rights guaran-
teed to them by treaties and engagements would be initiated with-
out their consent. However, he impressed upon the rulers the
necessity of placing their administration on modern lines for the
welfare of their subjects which could be done only by ensuring that
all States fulfilled the three fundamental criteria of good Govern-
ment: political stability, adequate financial resources, and effective
association of the people with the administration. The Viceroy
asked the rulers of the smaller States to pool their resources and
form political entities of a sufficient size.
On 19 February, 1946, Prime Minister Attlee announced the
decision of the British Cabinet to send three Cabinet Ministers to
India. On 15 March, 1946, he referred to the Indian States in
the British Parliament in these words: “I hope that the statesmen
of British India and of Princely India will be able to work out a
solution of the problem of bringing together, in one great policy,
these disparate constituent parts. There again, we must see that
the Indian States find their due place; there can be no positive
veto on advance and I do not believe for a moment that the Indian
Princes would desire to be a bar to the forward march of India.
But, as in the case of many other problems, this is a matter that
Indians will settle themselves. ”
In his interview with the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy held
on 2 April, 1946, the Nawab of Bhopal pointed out that the Indian
States wanted to continue their existence with the maximum degree
of sovereignty. They desired no interference in their internal affairs
by British India. He suggested the formation of a Privy Council
of the Indian States of British India. The Nawab urged that para-
mountcy should not be transferred to an Indian Government in the
event of India becoming independent. In the same afternoon,
Lord Pethick-Lawrence and the other members of the Cabinet Mis-
sion met the Standing Committee of the Chamber of Princes. The
rulers were told that if British India became independent, para-
mountcy would end. The British Government did not contem-
plate keeping any troops in India for the maintenance of internal
order. The Crown would not be in a position to carry out its
treaty obligations and hence the Indian States would also be releas-
ed from their obligations under their treaties.
On 16 May, 1946, the Cabinet Mission announced its proposals
with regard to the future set-up of India. About the States, it was
declared that with the attainment of independence by British India,
whether within or without the British Commonwealth, the relation-
## p. 911 (#955) ############################################
CABINET MISSION AND INDIAN STATES
911
ship which had hitherto existed between the Indian States and the
British Crown would come to an end. Paramountcy could neither
be retained by the British nor transferred to the new Government.
It was pointed out that the rulers had given an assurance to the
Mission that they were ready and willing to co-operate in the new
development of India. The form of co-operation was to depend
upon the result of negotiations between the Indian States and the
future Government of India. In their broadcast on 16 May, 1946,
both the Secretary of State for India and Sir Stafford Cripps made
only casual references to the States. They asserted that para-
mountcy could not be handed over to any one and hence it must
cease. They left the future relationship between the States and
British India for negotiations.
On 22 May, 1946, the Cabinet Mission published a Memoran-
dum on States' Treaties and Paramountcy. It was pointed out
in that Memorandum that when a new fully self-governing or
independent Government or Governments came into being in Bri-
tish India, the influence of His Majesty's Government with those
Governments would not be such as to enable them to carry out the
cbligations of paramountcy. The British Government had no in-
tention of keeping British troops in India for that purpose. The
result was that paramountcy would come to an end. The existing
political arrangements between the States on the one hand and the
British Crown and British India on the other were to come to an
end. The void was to be filled up by the States entering into a
federal relationship with the successor Government or Governments
in British India. The Memorandum referred to the desirability of
the States forming or joining administrative units large enough to
enable them to be fitted into the constitutional structure.
On 17 May, 1946, the Nawab of Bhopal asked for certain clarifi-
cations from Lord Wavell, particularly regarding the independence
of the Indian States. The reply of Lord Wavell was that the
settlement of most of the matters raised by the Nawab did not rest
with him or the Cabinet Mission as they related to the terms which
the States were free to negotiate for their own association with the
new constitutional structure. To the Nawab, the letter of Lord
Wavell was disappointing and he wrote to him again asserting that
the States were entitled to claim that the Crown should not leave them
at the mercy of British India. He pointed out that it could never be
the intention of His Majesty's Government to leave the States as "a
sort of no man's child” without any effort on the part of the Crown
to protect their legitimate and reasonable rights and claims. The
reply of Lord Wavell was that he appreciated the anxiety of the
Nawab but he could not help him in the matter and he asked him
## p. 912 (#956) ############################################
912
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
to discuss the matter with Sir Conrad Corfield, the Political Advi-
ser to the Government of India. The view of Sir Conrad was that
the decision regarding the lapse of paramountcy at the end of the
interim period placed the Indian States in the best bargaining posi-
tion possible for the purpose of fitting themselves in the future
constitutional structure. He advised the States to set up a Nego-
tiating Committee to settle the terms on which they would be pre-
pared to participate in the discussions of the Constituent Assembly.
He gave a promise of help to the Indian States by the Political
Department during the interim period.
It was under these circumstances that the Standing Committee
of the Chamber of Princes set up a Negotiating Committee and
authorised the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes to arrange
discussions with the corresponding body of the British Indian Con-
stituent Assembly as contemplated by the Cabinet Mission. It was
on 21 December, 1946 that the Constituent Assembly passed a reso-
lution appointing a Negotiating Committee to negotiate with the
Negotiating Committee set up by the Indian States. Speaking on
the resolution, Jawaharlal Nehru declared: “I regret, I say frankly,
, I I
that we have to meet the Rulers' Negotiating Committee. I think
that, on the part of the States, there should have been on the
Negotiating Committee representatives of the people of the States.
I think even now that the Negotiating Committee, if it wants to do
the right thing, should include some such representatives; but I
feel that we cannot insist upon this at this stage. ” However, this
had no effect on the Indian Princes.
On 20 February, 1947, Prime Minister Attlee declared in the
House of Commons that the British Government would transfer
power to responsible Indian hands not later than June, 1948. With
regard to the States, he observed: “As was explicitly stated by the
Cabinet Mission, His Majesty's Government do not intend to hand
over their powers and obligations under paramountcy to any Gov-
ernment of British India. It is not intended to bring paramountcy,
as a system, to a conclusion earlier than the date of the final trans-
fer of power, but it is contemplated that for the intervening period,
the relations of the Crown with individual States may be adjusted
by agreement. "
This announcement introduced an element of urgency and
Jawaharlal Nehru contended that it would be to the advantage of
the States if their representatives joined the Constituent Assembly
during the April Session. The Nawab of Bhopal who was the
Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, pointed out the difficulty to
do so without a meeting of the Indian rulers for that purpose. It
was, however, decided that 50% of the States representatives should
## p. 913 (#957) ############################################
ATTITUDE OF STATES TOWARDS FREE INDIA 913
be elected and efforts should be made to increase the elected quota
as far as possible. Jawaharlal Nehru also invited the representa-
tives of the States to function forthwith on some of the Committees
set up by the Constituent Assembly, particularly the Union Powers
Committee and the Fundamental Rights Committee. However,
the attitude of the Chancellor was that he could not arrive at any
decision without consulting the General Conference of the rulers.
There arose differences between the Chancellor of the Chamber
of Princes and the Maharaja of Bikaner. The Maharaja did not
approve of the policy of “Wait-and-see" adopted by the Chancel-
lor. He was in favour of the Indian States joining the Constituent
Assembly at once. The lead of the Maharaja of Bikaner was fol-
lowed by the Maharaja of Patiala who issued a public statement
criticising the policy of sitting on the fence. The Chancellor,
Nawab of Bhopal, tried to dissuade the rulers from entering the
Constituent Assembly and even his personal appeals to the rulers
had no effect. On 18 April, 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru declared
that any State which did not come into the Constituent Assembly,
would be treated as a hostile State. Such a State would have to
bear the consequences of being so treated. Liaquat Ali Khan, the
leader of the Muslim League in the Central Legislature and the
Cabinet, criticised the statement of Nehru and observed that the
Congress had no right to coerce the States. According to him,
“The States were perfectly within their right in refusing to join the
Constituent Assembly. He appealed to the States to "disregard
the idle threat. " In spite of this, on 28 April, 1947, the representa-
tives of the States of Baroda, Bikaner, Patiala, Jaipur, Cochin and
Rewa took their seats in the Constituent Assembly. After that, one
by one, the other States also started sending their representatives to
the Constituent Assembly.
On 3 June, 1947, Lord Mountbatten announced his plan by
which power was to be transferred into the hands of the Indians
much earlier than June, 1948. However, the policy towards the
Indian States was to be governed by the Cabinet Mission Memo-
randum of 12 May, 1946. The Nawab of Bhopal resigned his
Chancellorship of the Chamber of Princes and stated thus in his
letter of resignation: “Now that Your Excellency has indicated to
us the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to the future
of the Indian States, and Bhopal State would, as soon as para-
mountcy is withdrawn, be assuming an independent status, I consi-
der it desirable that I should tender my resignation of the office of
Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes with effect from today.
Another reason for my resignation is that the Chamber, as now
constituted, formed part of a constitutional machinery which, in
>
## p. 914 (#958) ############################################
914
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
my opinion, will now become functus officio. ” In another letter
addressed to the Viceroy, the Nawab observed that “the State of
Bhopal does not wish to remain associated in any manner whatso-
ever with the Chamber of Princes or any of its subordinate organ-
izations. It cannot therefore be represented by the Standing Com-
mittee of that body and will negotiate direct with the successor
Governments of British India in regard to its interests, and its future
political relationship with Pakistan and Hindustan. ” On the resig-
nation of Nawab of Bhopal as Chancellor, the Maharaja of Patiala
became the Chancellor and it must be said to his credit that he
played a very glorious role so far as the higher interests of India
as a whole were concerned and it will be the height of ingratitude
for the people of India to forget the services rendered by him to
his country at that critical moment. There was every possibility
of the division of India into a very large number of independent
States. The rulers had their own armies and the danger was a
very real one. The Maharaja of Patiala threw in his lot with the
Indian Government and all the intrigues of the Political Depart-
ment ultimately came to nothing.
On 11 June, 1947, Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar declared that
the State of Travancore had decided to become an independent
sovereign State. On 12 June, 1947, a similar announcement was
made by the Nizam of Hyderabad. On 15 June, 1947, the All-
India Congress Committee laid down its policy towards the Indian
States. The Princes who had not joined the Indian Constituent
Assembly were invited to do the same and “co-operate in the build-
ing of the constitutional structure of free India in which the States
will be equal and autonomous sharers with other units of the Feder-
ation. ” The Congress also urged the States to hasten progress
towards responsible Government “so as to keep in line with the fast
changing situation in India and at the same time to produce content-
ment and self-reliance in their people”. The Congress rejected
the claim of the Princes to become independent. It claimed for
the people of the States the dominant voice in decisions concerning
them. The Congress Resolution declared that the All-India Con-
gress Committee did not admit the right of any State in India to
declare its independence and to live in isolation from the rest of
India. That would be a denial of the course of Indian history and
of the objectives of the Indian people today. Jawaharlal Nehru
also declared that the claim of the States to independence could not
be sustained as independence did not depend on a mere declar-
ation by a State but rested fundamentally on recognition by other
States. The lapse of paramountcy of the British Crown did not
make the Indian States independent. To quote him, “I should like
## p. 915 (#959) ############################################
INDIAN STATES AFTER JUNE 3 PLAN
915
to say and other countries to know that we shall not recognise the
independence of any State in India, further that any recognition of
any such independence by any Foreign Power will be considered
an unfriendly act. ”
The Indian Independence Act, 1947 was passed by the British
Parliament and it provided that "the suzerainty of His Majesty
over the Indian States lapsed with all its treaties and agreements in
force on that date”. The result was that the Indian States became
completely independent and the Governments of India and Pakistan
were not to inherit the rights and authority of the former Govern-
ment of India over the Indian States. The Act did not attempt a
solution of the problem of the Indian States but left the same to
be tackled by the new Dominions themselves. It appears that the
authors of the Act did not contemplate that the Indian States would
become independent States and thereby disrupt the unity of India.
Sir Hartley W. Shawcross, Attorney-General of England, observ-
ed thus in the British Parliament: "We do not propose to recognise
the States as separate international entities on August 15”.
The Congress was able to tackle the problem of the Indian States
successfully and the credit for that goes to Sardar Patel, Lord
Mountbatten and Mr. V. P. Menon. On the suggestion of Sardar
Patel, the States Ministry was set up and he himself became its
head. An Instrument of Accession was drawn up which was ac-
ceptable to the Princes. They were required to hand over to the
Indian Union only the subjects of defence, foreign relations and
communications. In other matters, their autonomy was to
be
scrupulously respected. Sardar Patel made it clear to the Princes
that it was not the desire of the Congress “to interfere in any
manner in the domestic affairs of the States. " He also appealed
to the patriotism of the Indian Princes thus: “We are at a moment-
ous stage in the history of India. By common endeavour we can
raise the country to a new greatness while lack of unity will expose
us to fresh calamities. I hope the Indian States will bear in mind
that the alternative to co-operation in the general interest is anarchy
and chaos which will overwhelm great and small alike in common
ruin if we are unable to act together in the minimum of common
tasks. Let not the future generations curse us for having had the
opportunity but failed to turn it to our mutual advantage. In-
stead, let it to be our proud privilege to leave a legacy of mutually
beneficial relationship which would raise this Sacred Land to its
proper place among the nations of the world and turn it into an
abode of peace and prosperity. ” Addressing the Chamber of Princes
on 25 July, 1947, Lord Mountbatten also endorsed the appeal of
Sardar Patel and advised the Indian States to accede to one or the
## p. 916 (#960) ############################################
916
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
other of the Dominions before 15 August, 1947. He pointed out
that if nothing was put in the place of co-ordinated administration
that had grown up under the British rule, only chaos would result
and that was bound to hurt the States most. No State could live
in isolation. The subjects which were proposed to be vested in the
Federation were the subjects which the States could not handle
themselves. The States had not administered their external re-
lations or their defence and were not in a position to handle them
in the future. Communications were a means of maintaining the
life-blood of the whole sub-continent. The three subjects were such
which could be left to be handled on their behalf “for their conven-
ience and advantage by a larger organisation. ” Lord Mountbatten
also stressed the factors that were to be taken into consideration by
the States while acceding to any Dominion. “There are certain
geographical compulsions which cannot be evaded. ” “The vast
majority of States were irretrievably linked up with India. ” He
concluded his address thus: “I am not asking any State to make in-
tolerable sacrifice of either its internal autonomy or independence.
My scheme leaves you with all the practical independence that you
can possibly use and make you free of all those subjects which you
cannot possibly manage of your own. You cannot run away from
the Dominion Government which is your neighbour any more than
you can run away from the subjects for whose welfare you
responsible. ”
The net result of all the efforts was that by 15 August 1947, with
the exception of Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir, as many as
136 salute and fully jurisdictional States acceded to the Indian
Union. On 15 August, Lord Mountbaten paid the following tri-
bute to Sardar Patel: “Thanks to that far-sighted statesman, Sardar
Vallabhabhai Patel, Minister-in-charge of the States Department, a
scheme was produced which appeared to me to be equally in the
interests of the States as of the Dominion of India. It is a great
triumph for the realism and sense of responsibility of the rulers
and the Governments of the States as well as for the Government
of India that it was possible to produce an Instrument of Acces-
sion, which was equally acceptable to both sides, and one more-
over so simple and straightforward that within less than 3 weeks,
practically all the States concerned had signed the Instrument of
Accession. "
are
JUNAGADH
Junagadh was an important state in the group of the Kathiawar
## p. 917 (#961) ############################################
STATE OF JUNAGADH
917
states. It was bounded by other Indian states except the South
and South-west where the Arabian Sea lies. This state had no
geographical contiguity with Pakistan. The distance between Port
Veraval of Junagadh and Karachi is about 300 miles. The area
of the state was 3,337 square miles and its population according to
the census of 1941 was 6,70,719. More than 80% of the people
were Hindus. There were many islands of the Junagadh state in
the states of Gondal, Bhavnagar and Navanagar. Parts of the
states which had acceded to India were interspersed with Junagadh
territory and access to them was possible only through Junagadh.
The railways and posts and telegraphs of the state were an integral
part of the Indian system. The railway police, telegraphs and
telephones were administerd by the Government of India. The
Nawab of the state lived a life of luxury and his chief pre-occupation
in life was dogs of which he had hundreds.
There was speculation that Junagadh was going to join Pakistan
and the Nawab took pains to contradict it. The following press
nute was issued by the Government of Junagadh on 11 April 1947:
“What Junagadh pre-eminently stands for is the solidarity of
Kathiawar and would welcome the formation of a self-contained
group of Kathiawar States. Such a group while providing for the
autonomy and entity of individual States and their subjects would
be a suitable basis for co-operation in matters of common concern
generally and co-ordination where necessary. ”
A similar repudi-
ation was issued on 22 April, 1947.
Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, a Muslim League politician of Karachi,
was appointed a member of the State Council of Ministers of
Junagadh.
In May 1947, he was appointed the Dewan of the
state. The Nawab of Junagadh came under the influence of the
Muslim League.
The Government of India sent an Instrument of Accession to
the Nawab of Junagadh for his signatures. On 13 August, 1947,
Sir Shah Nawaz sent the reply that the matter was under consider-
ation. In spite of it, the Government of Junagadh issued the
following communique on 15 August, 1947, announcing her acces-
sion to Pakistan: “The Government of Junagadh has during the
"
past few weeks been faced with the problem of making its choice
between accession to the Dominion of India and accession to the
Dominion of Pakistan. It has had to take into very careful con-
sideration every aspect of this problem. Its main pre-occupation
has been to adopt a course that would, in the long run, make the
largest contribution towards the permanent welfare and prosperity
of the people of Junagadh and help to preserve the integrity of the
State and to safeguard its independence and autonomy over the
## p. 918 (#962) ############################################
918
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
largest possible field. After anxious consideration and the careful
balancing of all factors the Government of the State has decided to
accede to Pakistan and hereby announces its decision to that effect.
The State is confident that its decision will be welcomed by all loyal
subjects of the State who have its real welfare and prosperity at
heart. ”
The Government of Junagadh did not communicate to the Gov-
ernment of India the fact of its accession to Pakistan. There was a
lot of correspondence between the Governments of India and Pakis-
tan about Junagadh and ultimately on 13 September, 1947, the
Government of Pakistan informed the Government of India that she
had accepted the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan and also signed
a Standstill Agreement. There is no doubt about the fact that
there were prolonged secret negotiations between the Nawab and
the Dewan on the one hand and the Government of Pakistan and
Mr. M. A. Jinnah on the other. When the Nawab and the Dewan
ran away from the state, many letters fell into the hands of the
Government of India and in one of those letters, it was stated that
Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto had written to Mr. Jinnah about the in-
terview he granted him on 16 July, 1947 in which Mr. Jinnah had
advised the Nawab to keep out under any circumstances until 15
August. There was also a reference to the assurances of Mr.
Jinnah that he would not allow Junagadh to starve as “Veraval is
not far from Karachi. ” There was also the following passage in
one of those letters: “Junagadh stands all alone surrounded by
Hindu rulers' territories and British Indian Congress provinces.
We are of course connected by sea with Pakistan. If geographical
position by land was fairly considered, Kutch, Jamnagar and other
territories adjoining Junagadh geographically should be considered
connected with Pakistan as they once in the past actually formed
part of Sind. Though the Muslim population of Junagadh is
nearly 20% and non-Muslims form 80 per cent, 7 lakh Muslims
of Kathiawar survived because of Junagadh. I consider that no
sacrifice is too great to preserve the prestige, honour and rule of
His Highness and to protect Islam and the Muslims of Kathiawar. "
The accession of Junagadh to Pakistan was condemned by the
rulers of the other states of Kathiawar. Jam Saheb of Nawanagar
and the rulers of Bhavnagar, Dhrangadhra, Morvi, Porbandar,
Gondal and Wankaner sent their protests. The reply of the Nawab
was in these words: “The Indian Independence Act did not and
does not require a ruler to consult his people before deciding on
accession. I think we are making an unnecessary fetish of the argu-
ment of geographical contiguity. Even then, this is sufficiently
## p. 919 (#963) ############################################
STATE OF JUNAGADH
919
provided by Junagadh's sea coast with several ports which can keep
connection with Pakistan. "
The Jam Saheb of Nawanagar told the Government of India
that if the latter did not take immediate and effective steps to
protect the other Kathiawar states, the people would lose all faith
in the Government of India. There were also rumours that
Pakistan had offered to give military assistance to Junagadh. On
17 September, 1947, the Government of India decided to disperse
around Junagadh troops of the acceding states. However, there
were strict orders that the State of Junagadh was not to be occupied.
On 24 September 1947, the Government of India decided that a
brigade should be suitably dispersed in Kathiawar to protect the
states which had acceded to the Indian Union. It was also de-
cided to send troops to the states of Mangrol and Babariawad. On
September 25, 1947, the Prime Minister of Pakistan sent a tele-
gram to the Government of India in which it was asserted that the
Nawab of Junagadh had every right to accede to Pakistan regard-
less of the territorial location of his state.
The situation in Junagadh was deteriorating day by day. More
than a lac of Hindus ran away from the state of Junagadh. Law
and order in the whole of Kathiawar practically collapsed. It was
at this stage that the Congress leaders of Kathiawar announced in
Bombay on 25 September, 1947, the establishment of a provisional
Government (Arzi Hakumat) of Junagadh. The provisional Gov-
ernment consisted of 6 members with Samaldas Gandhi as Presi-
dent "with all power, authority and jurisdiction heretofore vested
in and exercised by the Nawab of Junagadh prior to 15 September
1947. ” When Samaldas Gandhi and his colleague journeyed from
Bombay to Rajkot, they were greeted by large crowds at the way-
side railway stations. They set up their headquarters at Rajkot
and enrolled a large number of volunteers. Junagadh troops entered
the State of Mangrol which had acceded to the Dominion of India.
It was then decided to send Indian troops to occupy the State of
Mangrol. It was found that the Khan of Manavadar was arrest-
ing local leaders and harassing the people. In order to prevent a
flare up in the state, that state was also taken over on 22 October,
1947.
When the Nawab of Junagadh found that help from Pakistan
was not enough to keep him on the throne, he ran away from the
state towards the end of October, 1947. He took with him to
Karachi not only the members of his family but also all his jewellery
and all the available cash in the state treasury. Although the
Nawab ran away, Sir Shah Nawaz continued as Dewan of the state
of Junagadh. On 27 October, 1947, Sir Shah Nawaz wrote the
## p. 920 (#964) ############################################
920
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
following letter to Mr. Jinnah: “Our principal sources of revenue,
railways and customs, have gone to the bottom. Food situation is
terribly embarrassing though Pakistan has come to our rescue with
a generous allotment of foodgrains. There has been a harsh treat-
ment of Muslims travelling on Kathiawar railway lines who have
been subjected to several kinds of hardships and humiliations.
Added to this, His Highness and the royal family have had to leave
because our secret service gave us information in advance of seri-
ous consequences to their presence and safety. Though immedi-
ately after accession, His Highness and myself received hundreds of
messages chiefly from Muslims congratulating us on the decision,
today our brethren are indifferent and cold. Muslims of Kathia-
war seem to have lost all enthusiasm for Pakistan. ” Again, “No
doubt Your Excellency's Government offered us seven companies
of Crown Police but we felt that if they were to come and be con-
fronted by the vast enemy forces arrayed against us it would be
sheer wastage of human material and equipment. The situation
has therefore so worsened that responsible Muslims and others have
come to press me to seek a solution of the impasse. I do not wish
to say much more. My Senior Member of Council, Capt. Harvey
Jones, must have apprised you of the serious state of things. The
question is delicate but I feel it must be settled honourably to the
satisfaction of all. It is impossible for me to court any further
bloodshed, hardship and persecution of loyal people. Myself I
do not mind what suffering is imposed on me but I do not wish to
take the responsibility any further if it can be avoided for thousands
of His Highness' subjects. I should therefore suggest that you
immediately arrange for a conference of the representatives of the
two Dominions to decide the Junagadh issue. ”
Finding his position precarious, Sir Shah Nawaz opened negotia-
tions with Samaldas Gandhi on 7 November, 1947 through Cap-
tain Harvey Jones, Senior Member of the Junagadh State Council,
requesting Samaldas Gandhi to take over the reins of Government
and restore law and order in the State. However, the Muslims of
Junagadh prevailed upon Shah Nawaz to hand over the Govern-
ment not to Samaldas Gandhi but to Mr. Buch who at that time
was the Regional Commissioner, Western India and Gujarat States.
It was under these circumstances that Mr. Buch took over the
administration of Junagadhon 9 November, 1947. Sir Shah
Nawaz had already left for Karachi a day earlier.
As soon as normal conditions were restored, the Government of
India arranged a referendum of the people of Junagadh with regard
to the question of accession. Shri C. B. Nagarkar, I. C. S. , super-
vised the referendum which took place on 20 February, 1948. Out
## p. 921 (#965) ############################################
STATE OF HYDERABAD
921
of a total of 2,01,457 registered voters, 1,90,870 exercised their right
of vote. Only 91 voters voted for accession to Pakistan. A refe-
rendum was also held in the States of Mangrol, Manavadar, Baba-
riawad, Bantwa, and Sardargarh. Out of 31,434 votes cast for all
these states, only 39 voted for accession to Pakistan. It was in this
way that the problem of Junagadh was solved.
HYDERABAD
Geographically, Hyderabad occupied a pivotal position in the
heart of India. This State was surrounded by the Central Provin-
ces in the North, Bombay in the West and Madras on the East and
South. Its population was nearly 60 million and the annual reve-
nue was Rs. 26 crores. Its area was more than 82,000 sq. miles.
It had its own coinage, paper currency and stamps. Although the
Hindus formed more than 85% of the total population of Hyder-
abad, their representation in the Civil Services and the army was
practically nil and the Government machinery was a monopoly of
the Muslims. ' Although it was a very important State, it was not
given any privileged position by the British Government. The lat-
ter asserted its right to intervene in its affairs whenever it consider-
ed to be necessary. After the announcement of 3rd June, 1947
plan by the British Government, the Nizam of Hyderabad issued a
firman declaring his intention not to send his representatives to the
Constituent Assembly of either India or Pakistan. He made it
clear that after 15 August, 1947, he would be a completely inde-
pendent sovereign ruler. The intention of the Nizam was to make
Hyderabad a Dominion of the Commonwealth of Nations.
On July 11, 1947, the Nizam sent a delegation to Delhi to meet
Lord Mountbatten. One of the members of the delegation was
Sir Valter Monckton. The discussions centred round three points:
the retrocession of Berar to the Nizam, the grant of Dominion
Status to Hyderabad and the accession of the State of Hyderabad
to the Indian Union. The delegation was told that it was not pos-
sible to hand over Berar to the Nizam. The delegation was also
told that it was not possible to grant Dominion Status to Hyder-
abad. The members of the delegation went to the extent of saying
that if the Nizam was pressed hard, he might join Pakistan. The
delegation was told that the Government would not enter into a
Stand-still agreement without the State of Hyderabad acceding to
India. The Nizam asked for two months to consider his position
and that time was allowed to him. Lord Mountbatten was hope-
ful that ultimately Hyderabad would accede to India.
On 8 August, 1947, the Nizam wrote to Lord Mountbatten that
## p. 922 (#966) ############################################
922
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
he could not think of bringing Hyderabad into an organic Union
with either India or Pakistan. He was, however, prepared to enter into
a treaty with India which would conform to all-India standards so
far as railway communications were concerned. Hyderabad would
also contribute an agreed number of troops for the defence of
India. He was prepared to conduct the foreign policy of his State
in general conformity with the foreign policy of India. All this
was to be done on the condition that in the event of a war between
India and Pakistan, Hyderabad would remain neutral. Hyder-
abad was also to have the right to appoint Agents-General wher-
ever it thought fit. There was also to be a provision in the treaty
that if India seceded from the British Commonwealth, Hyderabad
was free to review the situation de novo. Sir Walter Monckton
resigned as Constitutional Adviser to the Nizam as there was a vio-
lent attack upon him in the Hyderabad press but he was persuaded
to continue by Lord Mountbatten.
The suggestion of Sir Walter Monckton was that the Nizam
could be persuaded to enter into a treaty provided the term “Instru-
ment of Accession” was substituted by the term “Articles of Asso-
ciation. ” However, this was not acceptable to Sardar Patel who
insisted on the Nizam acceding to the Dominion of India. His
view was that if the Nizam was given a special treatment, that
would be mis-interpreted by the rulers of the Indian States who had
already acceded to the Dominion of India. The view of Sardar
Patel was that the Nizam must refer the question of accession to
the people of his State and act according to their decision. Lord
Mountbatten offered to the Nizam to have the referendum under
the supervision of British Officers. However, that offer was reject-
ed by the Nizam. On 18 September, 1947, the Nizam wrote that
short of accession, Hyderabad was ready and willing to enter into
a treaty of association with India. At the same time, the Nizam
contacted Mr. M. A. Jinnah with a view to secure the services of
Sir Zafrullah Khan as the President of his Executive Council.
However, he was not successful in that. The Nizam pointed out
to the Government of India that if Hyderabad acceded to the
Dominion of India, the Muslims who formed about half the popula-
tion of Hyderabad city would not tolerate it and they would create
such a trouble as would not be possible to control. Sir Walter
Monckton wrote to Lord Mountbatten that the attitude of the
Nizam had stiffened and he was not prepared to reconsider the
question of accession. He would prefer the negotiations to break
down rather than accept accession. That was due to the influence
of Pakistan on the Nizam and the latter wanted him to go to
Karachi to have an interview with Mr. Jinnah.
## p. 923 (#967) ############################################
STATE OF HYDERABAD
923
There were protracted negotiations in which Sir Walter Monck-
ton and Sir Sultan Ahmed, besides others, participated. Ultimate-
ly, drafts were prepared which were acceptable to the Government
of India and the delegation sent by the Nizam. Those drafts were
taken by the delegation to Hyderabad on 22 October, 1947, for the
approval of the Nizam with the promise that they would come
back on 26 October, 1947. The Nizam referred the matter to his
Executive Council for advice and the Executive Council advised
the Nizam to accept those drafts. The Nizam approved the deci-
sion of the Executive Council but postponed the signing of the
agreement till 26 October, 1947. At about 3 o'clock in the morn-
ing of 26 October, 1947, a crowd estimated at about 25,000 to
30,000 surrounded the houses of Sir Walter Monckton, Nawab of
Chhattari and Sir Sultan Ahmed. They shouted that the delega-
tion would not go to Delhi. The result was that the Nizam order-
ed that the delegation should not go to Delhi. The advice of
Qasim Razvi to the Nizam was that as the hands of the Indian
Union were full with other problems, they would not be able to
take action against Hyderabad and the Nizam could afford not to
accede to the Indian Union. Although Sir Walter Monckton, Sir
Sultan Ahmed and the Nawab of Chhattari suggested to the Nizam
that the advice of Qasim Razvi was likely to lead to disaster, the
Nizam was inclined to listen to Qasim Razvi and hence all of
them tendered their resignations. The Nizam sent a letter to Lord
Mountbatten in which he said that if negotiations with the Govern-
ment of India broke down, he would immediately negotiate and
conclude an agreement with Pakistan. As a matter of fact, the
Nizam had already sent two persons to Karachi and they had come
back with a reply from Pakistan. Lord Mountbatten was very
unhappy about the change in the attitude of the Nizam. He did
not like the replacement of the old delegation by a new one. He
told the members of the new delegation that it was not wise on
the part of the Nizam to threaten to conclude a Stand-still Agree-
ment with Pakistan if he failed to sign one with India. He ex-
pressed the view that the time had come for the Nizam to take a
final decision one way or the other. India would be put to some
inconvenience if no Stand-still Agreement was signed but that would
ultimately prove to be disastrous for the Nizam. Lord Mount-
batten tried to remove the impression that India was weak and
hence could not give full attention to the problem of Hyderabad.
Kasim Razvi also visited Delhi and met Sardar Patel. In his
interviews, he declared that Hyderabad would never surrender
her independence and if the Government of India insisted on a
plebiscite, the sword would be the final arbiter.
a
## p. 924 (#968) ############################################
924
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
In spite of the difficulties in the way, a Stand-still Agreement
was signed between the Government of India and the Nizam on
29 November, 1947. It was provided that until new arrangements
were made, all the agreements and administrative arrangements
on matters of common concern, including defence, external affairs
and communications which had existed between the Crown Repre-
sentative and the Nizam before the transfer of power, would be
continued as between the Government of India and the Nizam.
The Government of India and the Nizam also agreed to appoint
their agents in Hyderabad and Delhi respectively and give them
every facility for the discharge of their functions. The Govern-
ment of India was not to exercise any paramountcy function in
their relations with Hyderabad. Nothing in the Agreement was
to create, in favour of either party, any right continuing after its
termination, or derogate from any right which, but for the Agree-
ment, would have been exercisable by either party after the date
of its termination. Any dispute arising out of the Agreement was
to be referred to two arbitrators, one to be appointed by each of
the parties and an umpire to be selected by those arbitrators. The
Agreement was to come into force immediately and was to remain
in force for a period of one year.
The Stand-still Agreement was taken in different lights. Lord
Mountbatten hoped that the Agreement would provide a basis for
a satisfactory long term solution. He hoped that before the Stand-
still Agreement expired, it would be possible for Hyderabad to
accede to India. The view of Jawaharlal Nehru was that the
Agreement would purchase communal peace in the south for at
least one year. Sardar Patel was doubtful about the bona fides of
the Government of Hyderabad. The Nizam and his advisers took
the Agreement as something which gave them breathing space in
which they were to secure the withdrawal of the Indian troops from
Hyderabad and ultimately become independent.
Shri K. M. Munshi was appointed as India's Agent-General in
Hyderabad. Unfortunately, the attitude of the Nizam Govern-
ment towards him was positively hostile from the very beginning.
He was not given even a building for his residence or office. Ulti-
mately, two of the buildings belonging to the Indian army were
put at his disposal.
The Nizam began to press for the speedy withdrawal of the
Indian troops and the supply of arms and ammunitions for the
Hyderabad army and police. The Nizam also issued two Ordi-
nances by which he put restrictions on the export of all precious
metals from Hyderabad to India and also made Indian currency
as not legal tender in the Hyderabad State. The Government of
## p. 925 (#969) ############################################
STATE OF HYDERABAD
925
SO
Hyderabad also advanced a loan of Rs. 20 crores to Pakistan in the
form of Government of India's Securities. The Government of
India protested against these developments but nothing was done to
remove the objection. At this time, the activities of the Razakars
increased tremendously. Kasim Razvi and his followers made all
kinds of objectionable speeches with the object of inflaming com-
munal passions inside and outside of Hyderabad. Razvi declared
that the Razakars were the liberators of the Muslims of India. The
Razakars began to attack the neighbouring provinces like Madras,
Bombay, and the Central Provinces. The situation became
serious that the common saying was that the Razakars ruled by
day and the Communists ruled by night. The Government of
Madras asked for military help to save its people from the raids
of Razakars. This state of affairs continued for many months.
Shri K. M. Munshi was practically a prisoner in his house in
Hyderabad. El Edroos, the Commander-in-Chief for the Hydera-
bad forces, called upon the people in a radio talk to be ready for
any emergency. In his speech delivered on 31 March, 1948 on the
occasion of the inauguration of the Hyderabad Weapons Week,
Kasim Razvi urged the Muslims of Hyderabad not to sheathe their
swords until their objective for Islamic supremacy was achieved.
He asked them to march forward with the Koran in one hand and
the swor in the er to hound out the enemy.
He also declared
that "the forty-five million Muslims in the Indian Union would be
columnists in
any
showdown. ” On 12 April, 1948,
Kasim Razvi declared, “The day is not far off when the waves of
the Bay of Bengal will be washing the feet of our Sovereign. " He
went to the extent of saying that he would plant the Asaf Jahi Flag
on the Red Fort in Delhi. When Laik Ali, the new Prime Minister
of Hyderabad, met Sardar Patel, the latter referred to the speech
of Kasim Razvi and asserted that such things could not be tolerated.
## p. 907 (#951) ############################################
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT & INDIAN STATES 907
sals of the British Government with regard to India was published
and in April, 1933, a Joint Select Committee of both Houses of
Parliament was appointed to consider the future Government of
India with special reference to the White Paper proposals. The
Committee was given the authority to consult delegates from Bri-
tish India and Indian States. The Joint Select Committee submit-
ted its Report in October, 1934. In December, 1934, a Bill based
on the Joint Select Committee's Report was introduced. The
Chamber of Princes appointed a Committee to examine the Gov-
ernment of India Bili. The Committee suggested a number of
amendments and alterations. Those suggestions were thoroughly
examined by the Secretary of State for India. On 4th August,
1935, the Government of India Bill received the Royal assent.
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1935
The Government of India Act, 1935, provided for a federal form
of Government for the whole of India. Under that Act, the Indian
States were given more representation in the federal legislature than
was due to them on the basis of their population and area.
While
250 seats were allotted to British India, the Indian States got 125
seats. In the Council of State, the Indian States were given the
right to send 104 members out of a total of 260 members. While
the representatives from the provinces were to be elected, those
from the States were to be nominated by the rulers of the States
concerned. While the inclusion of the provinces into the federa-
tion was to be automatic or compulsory, the Indian States were
given the option to join the federation or not. While the control
of the federal Government over the provinces was to be uniform,
it was to vary in the case of Indian States according to the terms
of the Instrument of Accession signed by the particular ruler at
the time of joining the federation and accepted by the Crown.
A critical examination shows that the Indian States were given
more representation than was due to them on the basis of their
area, population or resources. Moreover, they were given the
option to join or not to join the federation. The Joint Select Com-
mittee's Report gave the following reasons for treating the provin-
ces and the Indian States differently: “The main difficulties are
two: that the Indian States are wholly different in status and cha-
racter from the Provinces of British India, and that they are not
prepared to federate on the same terms as it is proposed to apply
to the Provinces. On the first point, the Indian States, unlike the
British Indian Provinces, possess sovereignty in various degrees and
they are, broadly speaking, under a system of personal government.
## p. 908 (#952) ############################################
908
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
Their accession to a Federation cannot, therefore, take place other-
wise than by the voluntary act of the ruler of each State, and after
accession the representatives of the acceding State in the Federal
Legislature will be nominated by the ruler and its subjects will
continue to owe allegiance to him. On the second point the rulers
have made it clear that while they are willing to consider Federa-
tion now with the Provinces of British India on certain terms, they
could not, as sovereign States, agree to the exercise by a Federal
Government in relation to them of a range of powers identical to
the Provinces on whom autonomy has yet to be conferred. ”
Lord Linlithgow succeeded Lord Willingdon in 1936. He came
to India with the determination to inaugurate the Federation dur-
ing his tenure of office. His view was that a direct personal ap-
proach to the Indian rulers would help him to persuade most of
them to join the Federation. It was with that object in view that
he sent his emissaries to the rulers of the Indian States. Those emis-
saries were provided with draft copies of Instrument of Accession
and written instructions from the Viceroy. The three emissaries
to the various States met the Indian Rulers and their Advisers. As
a result of the talks, it became clear that what was worrying the
Indian rulers was not whether the proposed Federation would en-
able them to contribute to the glory of India as a whole but whether
their own position would be better and safer inside the Federation
than outside it. Their attitude could be summed up in these
words: “We are being given the opportunity of entering a federa-
tion from which, when once we are in, there is no escape. Nor,
since the ultimate interpreter of the federal constitution is the Fede-
ral Court, can the Government of India or anyone else predict the
course of future events or anticipate the use which federation will
make of its powers. We owe it, therefore, to ourselves and to our
successors to safeguard to the utmost our own position inside the
federation. That is the light in which you must regard the limita-
tions which we have proposed, and if they seem unduly numerous
and too widely drawn, remember that we have good reason for
making them so. "
It is true that Lord Linlithgow was very serious about his work,
but the Political Department of the Government of India was creat-
ing hurdles in the way by putting emphasis on the loss which the
rulers were to incur as a result of joining the Federation. Although
many concessions were offered to the Indian rulers, they could not
be persuaded to join the federation. While all this was happen-
ing, the Second World War broke out in September, 1939. On
11 September, 1939, Lord Linlithgow declared that while Federa-
tion remained, as before, the objective of His Majesty's Government,
## p. 909 (#953) ############################################
CRIPPS AND INDIAN STATES
909
“the compulsion of the present international situation and the fact
that, given the necessity for concentrating on the emergency that
confronts us, we have no choice but to hold in suspense the work in
connection with preparations for Federation. ”
In August, 1940, Lord Linlithgow put forward certain proposals
on behalf of His Majesty's Government with a view to securing the
co-operation of the people of India. One of the proposals was to
set up a War Advisory Council containing the representatives of
British India and the Indian States. However, the so-called August
offer was rejected by the Congress.
In March, 1942, Sir Stafford Cripps came to India with certain
proposals on behalf of His Majesty's Government with regard to
the future set-up in the country. In one of his interviews, Sir
Stafford stated that it was the intention of the British Government
to give full freedom to all provincial units and the Indian States to
come into the new Union or to stay out. Moreover the British
Government did not intend to stay in India unless the Indian people
wanted them in their own interest to stay and except to the extent
that it might be unavoidable for the fulfilment of the British Gov-
ernment's Treaty obligations to the non-adhering States. On 10
April, 1942, the Indian States' delegation met and adopted the fol-
lowing resolution which was conveyed to Sir Stafford: "The Indian
States will be glad as always, in the interest of their motherland,
to make their contribution in every reasonable manner compatible
with the sovereignty and integrity of the States, towards the fram-
ing of a Constitution for India. The States should be assured, how-
ever, that in the event of a number of States not finding it feasible
to adhere, the non-adhering States or groups of States, so desiring,
would have the right to form a union of their own, with full sove-
reign status in accordance with a suitable and agreed procedure
devised for the purpose. '
The Cripps mission was a failure but the rulers of the Indian
States realized after the departure of the mission that their future
was not safe. It was found that if the interests of the Indian States
came into conflict with those of British India, the British Govern-
ment was going to care for British India and not for them.
at this time that Jawaharlal Nehru declared that treaties with the
Indian States must be scrapped and those who talked of those trea-
ties were “lunatics, knaves or fools. ” It was in this atmosphere
that the rulers of the Indian States started devising plans to safe-
guard their own interests in the future. The Nawab of Bhopal
urged upon the Political Department to take all those measures
which were necessary to safeguard their position in the event of
changes taking place in the constitutional set-up in the country.
It was
## p. 910 (#954) ############################################
910
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
In his address to a meeting of the Chamber of Princes held on 17
January, 1946, Lord Wavell assured the Indian Princes that no
changes in their relationship with the Crown or the rights guaran-
teed to them by treaties and engagements would be initiated with-
out their consent. However, he impressed upon the rulers the
necessity of placing their administration on modern lines for the
welfare of their subjects which could be done only by ensuring that
all States fulfilled the three fundamental criteria of good Govern-
ment: political stability, adequate financial resources, and effective
association of the people with the administration. The Viceroy
asked the rulers of the smaller States to pool their resources and
form political entities of a sufficient size.
On 19 February, 1946, Prime Minister Attlee announced the
decision of the British Cabinet to send three Cabinet Ministers to
India. On 15 March, 1946, he referred to the Indian States in
the British Parliament in these words: “I hope that the statesmen
of British India and of Princely India will be able to work out a
solution of the problem of bringing together, in one great policy,
these disparate constituent parts. There again, we must see that
the Indian States find their due place; there can be no positive
veto on advance and I do not believe for a moment that the Indian
Princes would desire to be a bar to the forward march of India.
But, as in the case of many other problems, this is a matter that
Indians will settle themselves. ”
In his interview with the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy held
on 2 April, 1946, the Nawab of Bhopal pointed out that the Indian
States wanted to continue their existence with the maximum degree
of sovereignty. They desired no interference in their internal affairs
by British India. He suggested the formation of a Privy Council
of the Indian States of British India. The Nawab urged that para-
mountcy should not be transferred to an Indian Government in the
event of India becoming independent. In the same afternoon,
Lord Pethick-Lawrence and the other members of the Cabinet Mis-
sion met the Standing Committee of the Chamber of Princes. The
rulers were told that if British India became independent, para-
mountcy would end. The British Government did not contem-
plate keeping any troops in India for the maintenance of internal
order. The Crown would not be in a position to carry out its
treaty obligations and hence the Indian States would also be releas-
ed from their obligations under their treaties.
On 16 May, 1946, the Cabinet Mission announced its proposals
with regard to the future set-up of India. About the States, it was
declared that with the attainment of independence by British India,
whether within or without the British Commonwealth, the relation-
## p. 911 (#955) ############################################
CABINET MISSION AND INDIAN STATES
911
ship which had hitherto existed between the Indian States and the
British Crown would come to an end. Paramountcy could neither
be retained by the British nor transferred to the new Government.
It was pointed out that the rulers had given an assurance to the
Mission that they were ready and willing to co-operate in the new
development of India. The form of co-operation was to depend
upon the result of negotiations between the Indian States and the
future Government of India. In their broadcast on 16 May, 1946,
both the Secretary of State for India and Sir Stafford Cripps made
only casual references to the States. They asserted that para-
mountcy could not be handed over to any one and hence it must
cease. They left the future relationship between the States and
British India for negotiations.
On 22 May, 1946, the Cabinet Mission published a Memoran-
dum on States' Treaties and Paramountcy. It was pointed out
in that Memorandum that when a new fully self-governing or
independent Government or Governments came into being in Bri-
tish India, the influence of His Majesty's Government with those
Governments would not be such as to enable them to carry out the
cbligations of paramountcy. The British Government had no in-
tention of keeping British troops in India for that purpose. The
result was that paramountcy would come to an end. The existing
political arrangements between the States on the one hand and the
British Crown and British India on the other were to come to an
end. The void was to be filled up by the States entering into a
federal relationship with the successor Government or Governments
in British India. The Memorandum referred to the desirability of
the States forming or joining administrative units large enough to
enable them to be fitted into the constitutional structure.
On 17 May, 1946, the Nawab of Bhopal asked for certain clarifi-
cations from Lord Wavell, particularly regarding the independence
of the Indian States. The reply of Lord Wavell was that the
settlement of most of the matters raised by the Nawab did not rest
with him or the Cabinet Mission as they related to the terms which
the States were free to negotiate for their own association with the
new constitutional structure. To the Nawab, the letter of Lord
Wavell was disappointing and he wrote to him again asserting that
the States were entitled to claim that the Crown should not leave them
at the mercy of British India. He pointed out that it could never be
the intention of His Majesty's Government to leave the States as "a
sort of no man's child” without any effort on the part of the Crown
to protect their legitimate and reasonable rights and claims. The
reply of Lord Wavell was that he appreciated the anxiety of the
Nawab but he could not help him in the matter and he asked him
## p. 912 (#956) ############################################
912
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
to discuss the matter with Sir Conrad Corfield, the Political Advi-
ser to the Government of India. The view of Sir Conrad was that
the decision regarding the lapse of paramountcy at the end of the
interim period placed the Indian States in the best bargaining posi-
tion possible for the purpose of fitting themselves in the future
constitutional structure. He advised the States to set up a Nego-
tiating Committee to settle the terms on which they would be pre-
pared to participate in the discussions of the Constituent Assembly.
He gave a promise of help to the Indian States by the Political
Department during the interim period.
It was under these circumstances that the Standing Committee
of the Chamber of Princes set up a Negotiating Committee and
authorised the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes to arrange
discussions with the corresponding body of the British Indian Con-
stituent Assembly as contemplated by the Cabinet Mission. It was
on 21 December, 1946 that the Constituent Assembly passed a reso-
lution appointing a Negotiating Committee to negotiate with the
Negotiating Committee set up by the Indian States. Speaking on
the resolution, Jawaharlal Nehru declared: “I regret, I say frankly,
, I I
that we have to meet the Rulers' Negotiating Committee. I think
that, on the part of the States, there should have been on the
Negotiating Committee representatives of the people of the States.
I think even now that the Negotiating Committee, if it wants to do
the right thing, should include some such representatives; but I
feel that we cannot insist upon this at this stage. ” However, this
had no effect on the Indian Princes.
On 20 February, 1947, Prime Minister Attlee declared in the
House of Commons that the British Government would transfer
power to responsible Indian hands not later than June, 1948. With
regard to the States, he observed: “As was explicitly stated by the
Cabinet Mission, His Majesty's Government do not intend to hand
over their powers and obligations under paramountcy to any Gov-
ernment of British India. It is not intended to bring paramountcy,
as a system, to a conclusion earlier than the date of the final trans-
fer of power, but it is contemplated that for the intervening period,
the relations of the Crown with individual States may be adjusted
by agreement. "
This announcement introduced an element of urgency and
Jawaharlal Nehru contended that it would be to the advantage of
the States if their representatives joined the Constituent Assembly
during the April Session. The Nawab of Bhopal who was the
Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, pointed out the difficulty to
do so without a meeting of the Indian rulers for that purpose. It
was, however, decided that 50% of the States representatives should
## p. 913 (#957) ############################################
ATTITUDE OF STATES TOWARDS FREE INDIA 913
be elected and efforts should be made to increase the elected quota
as far as possible. Jawaharlal Nehru also invited the representa-
tives of the States to function forthwith on some of the Committees
set up by the Constituent Assembly, particularly the Union Powers
Committee and the Fundamental Rights Committee. However,
the attitude of the Chancellor was that he could not arrive at any
decision without consulting the General Conference of the rulers.
There arose differences between the Chancellor of the Chamber
of Princes and the Maharaja of Bikaner. The Maharaja did not
approve of the policy of “Wait-and-see" adopted by the Chancel-
lor. He was in favour of the Indian States joining the Constituent
Assembly at once. The lead of the Maharaja of Bikaner was fol-
lowed by the Maharaja of Patiala who issued a public statement
criticising the policy of sitting on the fence. The Chancellor,
Nawab of Bhopal, tried to dissuade the rulers from entering the
Constituent Assembly and even his personal appeals to the rulers
had no effect. On 18 April, 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru declared
that any State which did not come into the Constituent Assembly,
would be treated as a hostile State. Such a State would have to
bear the consequences of being so treated. Liaquat Ali Khan, the
leader of the Muslim League in the Central Legislature and the
Cabinet, criticised the statement of Nehru and observed that the
Congress had no right to coerce the States. According to him,
“The States were perfectly within their right in refusing to join the
Constituent Assembly. He appealed to the States to "disregard
the idle threat. " In spite of this, on 28 April, 1947, the representa-
tives of the States of Baroda, Bikaner, Patiala, Jaipur, Cochin and
Rewa took their seats in the Constituent Assembly. After that, one
by one, the other States also started sending their representatives to
the Constituent Assembly.
On 3 June, 1947, Lord Mountbatten announced his plan by
which power was to be transferred into the hands of the Indians
much earlier than June, 1948. However, the policy towards the
Indian States was to be governed by the Cabinet Mission Memo-
randum of 12 May, 1946. The Nawab of Bhopal resigned his
Chancellorship of the Chamber of Princes and stated thus in his
letter of resignation: “Now that Your Excellency has indicated to
us the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to the future
of the Indian States, and Bhopal State would, as soon as para-
mountcy is withdrawn, be assuming an independent status, I consi-
der it desirable that I should tender my resignation of the office of
Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes with effect from today.
Another reason for my resignation is that the Chamber, as now
constituted, formed part of a constitutional machinery which, in
>
## p. 914 (#958) ############################################
914
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
my opinion, will now become functus officio. ” In another letter
addressed to the Viceroy, the Nawab observed that “the State of
Bhopal does not wish to remain associated in any manner whatso-
ever with the Chamber of Princes or any of its subordinate organ-
izations. It cannot therefore be represented by the Standing Com-
mittee of that body and will negotiate direct with the successor
Governments of British India in regard to its interests, and its future
political relationship with Pakistan and Hindustan. ” On the resig-
nation of Nawab of Bhopal as Chancellor, the Maharaja of Patiala
became the Chancellor and it must be said to his credit that he
played a very glorious role so far as the higher interests of India
as a whole were concerned and it will be the height of ingratitude
for the people of India to forget the services rendered by him to
his country at that critical moment. There was every possibility
of the division of India into a very large number of independent
States. The rulers had their own armies and the danger was a
very real one. The Maharaja of Patiala threw in his lot with the
Indian Government and all the intrigues of the Political Depart-
ment ultimately came to nothing.
On 11 June, 1947, Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar declared that
the State of Travancore had decided to become an independent
sovereign State. On 12 June, 1947, a similar announcement was
made by the Nizam of Hyderabad. On 15 June, 1947, the All-
India Congress Committee laid down its policy towards the Indian
States. The Princes who had not joined the Indian Constituent
Assembly were invited to do the same and “co-operate in the build-
ing of the constitutional structure of free India in which the States
will be equal and autonomous sharers with other units of the Feder-
ation. ” The Congress also urged the States to hasten progress
towards responsible Government “so as to keep in line with the fast
changing situation in India and at the same time to produce content-
ment and self-reliance in their people”. The Congress rejected
the claim of the Princes to become independent. It claimed for
the people of the States the dominant voice in decisions concerning
them. The Congress Resolution declared that the All-India Con-
gress Committee did not admit the right of any State in India to
declare its independence and to live in isolation from the rest of
India. That would be a denial of the course of Indian history and
of the objectives of the Indian people today. Jawaharlal Nehru
also declared that the claim of the States to independence could not
be sustained as independence did not depend on a mere declar-
ation by a State but rested fundamentally on recognition by other
States. The lapse of paramountcy of the British Crown did not
make the Indian States independent. To quote him, “I should like
## p. 915 (#959) ############################################
INDIAN STATES AFTER JUNE 3 PLAN
915
to say and other countries to know that we shall not recognise the
independence of any State in India, further that any recognition of
any such independence by any Foreign Power will be considered
an unfriendly act. ”
The Indian Independence Act, 1947 was passed by the British
Parliament and it provided that "the suzerainty of His Majesty
over the Indian States lapsed with all its treaties and agreements in
force on that date”. The result was that the Indian States became
completely independent and the Governments of India and Pakistan
were not to inherit the rights and authority of the former Govern-
ment of India over the Indian States. The Act did not attempt a
solution of the problem of the Indian States but left the same to
be tackled by the new Dominions themselves. It appears that the
authors of the Act did not contemplate that the Indian States would
become independent States and thereby disrupt the unity of India.
Sir Hartley W. Shawcross, Attorney-General of England, observ-
ed thus in the British Parliament: "We do not propose to recognise
the States as separate international entities on August 15”.
The Congress was able to tackle the problem of the Indian States
successfully and the credit for that goes to Sardar Patel, Lord
Mountbatten and Mr. V. P. Menon. On the suggestion of Sardar
Patel, the States Ministry was set up and he himself became its
head. An Instrument of Accession was drawn up which was ac-
ceptable to the Princes. They were required to hand over to the
Indian Union only the subjects of defence, foreign relations and
communications. In other matters, their autonomy was to
be
scrupulously respected. Sardar Patel made it clear to the Princes
that it was not the desire of the Congress “to interfere in any
manner in the domestic affairs of the States. " He also appealed
to the patriotism of the Indian Princes thus: “We are at a moment-
ous stage in the history of India. By common endeavour we can
raise the country to a new greatness while lack of unity will expose
us to fresh calamities. I hope the Indian States will bear in mind
that the alternative to co-operation in the general interest is anarchy
and chaos which will overwhelm great and small alike in common
ruin if we are unable to act together in the minimum of common
tasks. Let not the future generations curse us for having had the
opportunity but failed to turn it to our mutual advantage. In-
stead, let it to be our proud privilege to leave a legacy of mutually
beneficial relationship which would raise this Sacred Land to its
proper place among the nations of the world and turn it into an
abode of peace and prosperity. ” Addressing the Chamber of Princes
on 25 July, 1947, Lord Mountbatten also endorsed the appeal of
Sardar Patel and advised the Indian States to accede to one or the
## p. 916 (#960) ############################################
916
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
other of the Dominions before 15 August, 1947. He pointed out
that if nothing was put in the place of co-ordinated administration
that had grown up under the British rule, only chaos would result
and that was bound to hurt the States most. No State could live
in isolation. The subjects which were proposed to be vested in the
Federation were the subjects which the States could not handle
themselves. The States had not administered their external re-
lations or their defence and were not in a position to handle them
in the future. Communications were a means of maintaining the
life-blood of the whole sub-continent. The three subjects were such
which could be left to be handled on their behalf “for their conven-
ience and advantage by a larger organisation. ” Lord Mountbatten
also stressed the factors that were to be taken into consideration by
the States while acceding to any Dominion. “There are certain
geographical compulsions which cannot be evaded. ” “The vast
majority of States were irretrievably linked up with India. ” He
concluded his address thus: “I am not asking any State to make in-
tolerable sacrifice of either its internal autonomy or independence.
My scheme leaves you with all the practical independence that you
can possibly use and make you free of all those subjects which you
cannot possibly manage of your own. You cannot run away from
the Dominion Government which is your neighbour any more than
you can run away from the subjects for whose welfare you
responsible. ”
The net result of all the efforts was that by 15 August 1947, with
the exception of Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir, as many as
136 salute and fully jurisdictional States acceded to the Indian
Union. On 15 August, Lord Mountbaten paid the following tri-
bute to Sardar Patel: “Thanks to that far-sighted statesman, Sardar
Vallabhabhai Patel, Minister-in-charge of the States Department, a
scheme was produced which appeared to me to be equally in the
interests of the States as of the Dominion of India. It is a great
triumph for the realism and sense of responsibility of the rulers
and the Governments of the States as well as for the Government
of India that it was possible to produce an Instrument of Acces-
sion, which was equally acceptable to both sides, and one more-
over so simple and straightforward that within less than 3 weeks,
practically all the States concerned had signed the Instrument of
Accession. "
are
JUNAGADH
Junagadh was an important state in the group of the Kathiawar
## p. 917 (#961) ############################################
STATE OF JUNAGADH
917
states. It was bounded by other Indian states except the South
and South-west where the Arabian Sea lies. This state had no
geographical contiguity with Pakistan. The distance between Port
Veraval of Junagadh and Karachi is about 300 miles. The area
of the state was 3,337 square miles and its population according to
the census of 1941 was 6,70,719. More than 80% of the people
were Hindus. There were many islands of the Junagadh state in
the states of Gondal, Bhavnagar and Navanagar. Parts of the
states which had acceded to India were interspersed with Junagadh
territory and access to them was possible only through Junagadh.
The railways and posts and telegraphs of the state were an integral
part of the Indian system. The railway police, telegraphs and
telephones were administerd by the Government of India. The
Nawab of the state lived a life of luxury and his chief pre-occupation
in life was dogs of which he had hundreds.
There was speculation that Junagadh was going to join Pakistan
and the Nawab took pains to contradict it. The following press
nute was issued by the Government of Junagadh on 11 April 1947:
“What Junagadh pre-eminently stands for is the solidarity of
Kathiawar and would welcome the formation of a self-contained
group of Kathiawar States. Such a group while providing for the
autonomy and entity of individual States and their subjects would
be a suitable basis for co-operation in matters of common concern
generally and co-ordination where necessary. ”
A similar repudi-
ation was issued on 22 April, 1947.
Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, a Muslim League politician of Karachi,
was appointed a member of the State Council of Ministers of
Junagadh.
In May 1947, he was appointed the Dewan of the
state. The Nawab of Junagadh came under the influence of the
Muslim League.
The Government of India sent an Instrument of Accession to
the Nawab of Junagadh for his signatures. On 13 August, 1947,
Sir Shah Nawaz sent the reply that the matter was under consider-
ation. In spite of it, the Government of Junagadh issued the
following communique on 15 August, 1947, announcing her acces-
sion to Pakistan: “The Government of Junagadh has during the
"
past few weeks been faced with the problem of making its choice
between accession to the Dominion of India and accession to the
Dominion of Pakistan. It has had to take into very careful con-
sideration every aspect of this problem. Its main pre-occupation
has been to adopt a course that would, in the long run, make the
largest contribution towards the permanent welfare and prosperity
of the people of Junagadh and help to preserve the integrity of the
State and to safeguard its independence and autonomy over the
## p. 918 (#962) ############################################
918
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
largest possible field. After anxious consideration and the careful
balancing of all factors the Government of the State has decided to
accede to Pakistan and hereby announces its decision to that effect.
The State is confident that its decision will be welcomed by all loyal
subjects of the State who have its real welfare and prosperity at
heart. ”
The Government of Junagadh did not communicate to the Gov-
ernment of India the fact of its accession to Pakistan. There was a
lot of correspondence between the Governments of India and Pakis-
tan about Junagadh and ultimately on 13 September, 1947, the
Government of Pakistan informed the Government of India that she
had accepted the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan and also signed
a Standstill Agreement. There is no doubt about the fact that
there were prolonged secret negotiations between the Nawab and
the Dewan on the one hand and the Government of Pakistan and
Mr. M. A. Jinnah on the other. When the Nawab and the Dewan
ran away from the state, many letters fell into the hands of the
Government of India and in one of those letters, it was stated that
Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto had written to Mr. Jinnah about the in-
terview he granted him on 16 July, 1947 in which Mr. Jinnah had
advised the Nawab to keep out under any circumstances until 15
August. There was also a reference to the assurances of Mr.
Jinnah that he would not allow Junagadh to starve as “Veraval is
not far from Karachi. ” There was also the following passage in
one of those letters: “Junagadh stands all alone surrounded by
Hindu rulers' territories and British Indian Congress provinces.
We are of course connected by sea with Pakistan. If geographical
position by land was fairly considered, Kutch, Jamnagar and other
territories adjoining Junagadh geographically should be considered
connected with Pakistan as they once in the past actually formed
part of Sind. Though the Muslim population of Junagadh is
nearly 20% and non-Muslims form 80 per cent, 7 lakh Muslims
of Kathiawar survived because of Junagadh. I consider that no
sacrifice is too great to preserve the prestige, honour and rule of
His Highness and to protect Islam and the Muslims of Kathiawar. "
The accession of Junagadh to Pakistan was condemned by the
rulers of the other states of Kathiawar. Jam Saheb of Nawanagar
and the rulers of Bhavnagar, Dhrangadhra, Morvi, Porbandar,
Gondal and Wankaner sent their protests. The reply of the Nawab
was in these words: “The Indian Independence Act did not and
does not require a ruler to consult his people before deciding on
accession. I think we are making an unnecessary fetish of the argu-
ment of geographical contiguity. Even then, this is sufficiently
## p. 919 (#963) ############################################
STATE OF JUNAGADH
919
provided by Junagadh's sea coast with several ports which can keep
connection with Pakistan. "
The Jam Saheb of Nawanagar told the Government of India
that if the latter did not take immediate and effective steps to
protect the other Kathiawar states, the people would lose all faith
in the Government of India. There were also rumours that
Pakistan had offered to give military assistance to Junagadh. On
17 September, 1947, the Government of India decided to disperse
around Junagadh troops of the acceding states. However, there
were strict orders that the State of Junagadh was not to be occupied.
On 24 September 1947, the Government of India decided that a
brigade should be suitably dispersed in Kathiawar to protect the
states which had acceded to the Indian Union. It was also de-
cided to send troops to the states of Mangrol and Babariawad. On
September 25, 1947, the Prime Minister of Pakistan sent a tele-
gram to the Government of India in which it was asserted that the
Nawab of Junagadh had every right to accede to Pakistan regard-
less of the territorial location of his state.
The situation in Junagadh was deteriorating day by day. More
than a lac of Hindus ran away from the state of Junagadh. Law
and order in the whole of Kathiawar practically collapsed. It was
at this stage that the Congress leaders of Kathiawar announced in
Bombay on 25 September, 1947, the establishment of a provisional
Government (Arzi Hakumat) of Junagadh. The provisional Gov-
ernment consisted of 6 members with Samaldas Gandhi as Presi-
dent "with all power, authority and jurisdiction heretofore vested
in and exercised by the Nawab of Junagadh prior to 15 September
1947. ” When Samaldas Gandhi and his colleague journeyed from
Bombay to Rajkot, they were greeted by large crowds at the way-
side railway stations. They set up their headquarters at Rajkot
and enrolled a large number of volunteers. Junagadh troops entered
the State of Mangrol which had acceded to the Dominion of India.
It was then decided to send Indian troops to occupy the State of
Mangrol. It was found that the Khan of Manavadar was arrest-
ing local leaders and harassing the people. In order to prevent a
flare up in the state, that state was also taken over on 22 October,
1947.
When the Nawab of Junagadh found that help from Pakistan
was not enough to keep him on the throne, he ran away from the
state towards the end of October, 1947. He took with him to
Karachi not only the members of his family but also all his jewellery
and all the available cash in the state treasury. Although the
Nawab ran away, Sir Shah Nawaz continued as Dewan of the state
of Junagadh. On 27 October, 1947, Sir Shah Nawaz wrote the
## p. 920 (#964) ############################################
920
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
following letter to Mr. Jinnah: “Our principal sources of revenue,
railways and customs, have gone to the bottom. Food situation is
terribly embarrassing though Pakistan has come to our rescue with
a generous allotment of foodgrains. There has been a harsh treat-
ment of Muslims travelling on Kathiawar railway lines who have
been subjected to several kinds of hardships and humiliations.
Added to this, His Highness and the royal family have had to leave
because our secret service gave us information in advance of seri-
ous consequences to their presence and safety. Though immedi-
ately after accession, His Highness and myself received hundreds of
messages chiefly from Muslims congratulating us on the decision,
today our brethren are indifferent and cold. Muslims of Kathia-
war seem to have lost all enthusiasm for Pakistan. ” Again, “No
doubt Your Excellency's Government offered us seven companies
of Crown Police but we felt that if they were to come and be con-
fronted by the vast enemy forces arrayed against us it would be
sheer wastage of human material and equipment. The situation
has therefore so worsened that responsible Muslims and others have
come to press me to seek a solution of the impasse. I do not wish
to say much more. My Senior Member of Council, Capt. Harvey
Jones, must have apprised you of the serious state of things. The
question is delicate but I feel it must be settled honourably to the
satisfaction of all. It is impossible for me to court any further
bloodshed, hardship and persecution of loyal people. Myself I
do not mind what suffering is imposed on me but I do not wish to
take the responsibility any further if it can be avoided for thousands
of His Highness' subjects. I should therefore suggest that you
immediately arrange for a conference of the representatives of the
two Dominions to decide the Junagadh issue. ”
Finding his position precarious, Sir Shah Nawaz opened negotia-
tions with Samaldas Gandhi on 7 November, 1947 through Cap-
tain Harvey Jones, Senior Member of the Junagadh State Council,
requesting Samaldas Gandhi to take over the reins of Government
and restore law and order in the State. However, the Muslims of
Junagadh prevailed upon Shah Nawaz to hand over the Govern-
ment not to Samaldas Gandhi but to Mr. Buch who at that time
was the Regional Commissioner, Western India and Gujarat States.
It was under these circumstances that Mr. Buch took over the
administration of Junagadhon 9 November, 1947. Sir Shah
Nawaz had already left for Karachi a day earlier.
As soon as normal conditions were restored, the Government of
India arranged a referendum of the people of Junagadh with regard
to the question of accession. Shri C. B. Nagarkar, I. C. S. , super-
vised the referendum which took place on 20 February, 1948. Out
## p. 921 (#965) ############################################
STATE OF HYDERABAD
921
of a total of 2,01,457 registered voters, 1,90,870 exercised their right
of vote. Only 91 voters voted for accession to Pakistan. A refe-
rendum was also held in the States of Mangrol, Manavadar, Baba-
riawad, Bantwa, and Sardargarh. Out of 31,434 votes cast for all
these states, only 39 voted for accession to Pakistan. It was in this
way that the problem of Junagadh was solved.
HYDERABAD
Geographically, Hyderabad occupied a pivotal position in the
heart of India. This State was surrounded by the Central Provin-
ces in the North, Bombay in the West and Madras on the East and
South. Its population was nearly 60 million and the annual reve-
nue was Rs. 26 crores. Its area was more than 82,000 sq. miles.
It had its own coinage, paper currency and stamps. Although the
Hindus formed more than 85% of the total population of Hyder-
abad, their representation in the Civil Services and the army was
practically nil and the Government machinery was a monopoly of
the Muslims. ' Although it was a very important State, it was not
given any privileged position by the British Government. The lat-
ter asserted its right to intervene in its affairs whenever it consider-
ed to be necessary. After the announcement of 3rd June, 1947
plan by the British Government, the Nizam of Hyderabad issued a
firman declaring his intention not to send his representatives to the
Constituent Assembly of either India or Pakistan. He made it
clear that after 15 August, 1947, he would be a completely inde-
pendent sovereign ruler. The intention of the Nizam was to make
Hyderabad a Dominion of the Commonwealth of Nations.
On July 11, 1947, the Nizam sent a delegation to Delhi to meet
Lord Mountbatten. One of the members of the delegation was
Sir Valter Monckton. The discussions centred round three points:
the retrocession of Berar to the Nizam, the grant of Dominion
Status to Hyderabad and the accession of the State of Hyderabad
to the Indian Union. The delegation was told that it was not pos-
sible to hand over Berar to the Nizam. The delegation was also
told that it was not possible to grant Dominion Status to Hyder-
abad. The members of the delegation went to the extent of saying
that if the Nizam was pressed hard, he might join Pakistan. The
delegation was told that the Government would not enter into a
Stand-still agreement without the State of Hyderabad acceding to
India. The Nizam asked for two months to consider his position
and that time was allowed to him. Lord Mountbatten was hope-
ful that ultimately Hyderabad would accede to India.
On 8 August, 1947, the Nizam wrote to Lord Mountbatten that
## p. 922 (#966) ############################################
922
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
he could not think of bringing Hyderabad into an organic Union
with either India or Pakistan. He was, however, prepared to enter into
a treaty with India which would conform to all-India standards so
far as railway communications were concerned. Hyderabad would
also contribute an agreed number of troops for the defence of
India. He was prepared to conduct the foreign policy of his State
in general conformity with the foreign policy of India. All this
was to be done on the condition that in the event of a war between
India and Pakistan, Hyderabad would remain neutral. Hyder-
abad was also to have the right to appoint Agents-General wher-
ever it thought fit. There was also to be a provision in the treaty
that if India seceded from the British Commonwealth, Hyderabad
was free to review the situation de novo. Sir Walter Monckton
resigned as Constitutional Adviser to the Nizam as there was a vio-
lent attack upon him in the Hyderabad press but he was persuaded
to continue by Lord Mountbatten.
The suggestion of Sir Walter Monckton was that the Nizam
could be persuaded to enter into a treaty provided the term “Instru-
ment of Accession” was substituted by the term “Articles of Asso-
ciation. ” However, this was not acceptable to Sardar Patel who
insisted on the Nizam acceding to the Dominion of India. His
view was that if the Nizam was given a special treatment, that
would be mis-interpreted by the rulers of the Indian States who had
already acceded to the Dominion of India. The view of Sardar
Patel was that the Nizam must refer the question of accession to
the people of his State and act according to their decision. Lord
Mountbatten offered to the Nizam to have the referendum under
the supervision of British Officers. However, that offer was reject-
ed by the Nizam. On 18 September, 1947, the Nizam wrote that
short of accession, Hyderabad was ready and willing to enter into
a treaty of association with India. At the same time, the Nizam
contacted Mr. M. A. Jinnah with a view to secure the services of
Sir Zafrullah Khan as the President of his Executive Council.
However, he was not successful in that. The Nizam pointed out
to the Government of India that if Hyderabad acceded to the
Dominion of India, the Muslims who formed about half the popula-
tion of Hyderabad city would not tolerate it and they would create
such a trouble as would not be possible to control. Sir Walter
Monckton wrote to Lord Mountbatten that the attitude of the
Nizam had stiffened and he was not prepared to reconsider the
question of accession. He would prefer the negotiations to break
down rather than accept accession. That was due to the influence
of Pakistan on the Nizam and the latter wanted him to go to
Karachi to have an interview with Mr. Jinnah.
## p. 923 (#967) ############################################
STATE OF HYDERABAD
923
There were protracted negotiations in which Sir Walter Monck-
ton and Sir Sultan Ahmed, besides others, participated. Ultimate-
ly, drafts were prepared which were acceptable to the Government
of India and the delegation sent by the Nizam. Those drafts were
taken by the delegation to Hyderabad on 22 October, 1947, for the
approval of the Nizam with the promise that they would come
back on 26 October, 1947. The Nizam referred the matter to his
Executive Council for advice and the Executive Council advised
the Nizam to accept those drafts. The Nizam approved the deci-
sion of the Executive Council but postponed the signing of the
agreement till 26 October, 1947. At about 3 o'clock in the morn-
ing of 26 October, 1947, a crowd estimated at about 25,000 to
30,000 surrounded the houses of Sir Walter Monckton, Nawab of
Chhattari and Sir Sultan Ahmed. They shouted that the delega-
tion would not go to Delhi. The result was that the Nizam order-
ed that the delegation should not go to Delhi. The advice of
Qasim Razvi to the Nizam was that as the hands of the Indian
Union were full with other problems, they would not be able to
take action against Hyderabad and the Nizam could afford not to
accede to the Indian Union. Although Sir Walter Monckton, Sir
Sultan Ahmed and the Nawab of Chhattari suggested to the Nizam
that the advice of Qasim Razvi was likely to lead to disaster, the
Nizam was inclined to listen to Qasim Razvi and hence all of
them tendered their resignations. The Nizam sent a letter to Lord
Mountbatten in which he said that if negotiations with the Govern-
ment of India broke down, he would immediately negotiate and
conclude an agreement with Pakistan. As a matter of fact, the
Nizam had already sent two persons to Karachi and they had come
back with a reply from Pakistan. Lord Mountbatten was very
unhappy about the change in the attitude of the Nizam. He did
not like the replacement of the old delegation by a new one. He
told the members of the new delegation that it was not wise on
the part of the Nizam to threaten to conclude a Stand-still Agree-
ment with Pakistan if he failed to sign one with India. He ex-
pressed the view that the time had come for the Nizam to take a
final decision one way or the other. India would be put to some
inconvenience if no Stand-still Agreement was signed but that would
ultimately prove to be disastrous for the Nizam. Lord Mount-
batten tried to remove the impression that India was weak and
hence could not give full attention to the problem of Hyderabad.
Kasim Razvi also visited Delhi and met Sardar Patel. In his
interviews, he declared that Hyderabad would never surrender
her independence and if the Government of India insisted on a
plebiscite, the sword would be the final arbiter.
a
## p. 924 (#968) ############################################
924
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
In spite of the difficulties in the way, a Stand-still Agreement
was signed between the Government of India and the Nizam on
29 November, 1947. It was provided that until new arrangements
were made, all the agreements and administrative arrangements
on matters of common concern, including defence, external affairs
and communications which had existed between the Crown Repre-
sentative and the Nizam before the transfer of power, would be
continued as between the Government of India and the Nizam.
The Government of India and the Nizam also agreed to appoint
their agents in Hyderabad and Delhi respectively and give them
every facility for the discharge of their functions. The Govern-
ment of India was not to exercise any paramountcy function in
their relations with Hyderabad. Nothing in the Agreement was
to create, in favour of either party, any right continuing after its
termination, or derogate from any right which, but for the Agree-
ment, would have been exercisable by either party after the date
of its termination. Any dispute arising out of the Agreement was
to be referred to two arbitrators, one to be appointed by each of
the parties and an umpire to be selected by those arbitrators. The
Agreement was to come into force immediately and was to remain
in force for a period of one year.
The Stand-still Agreement was taken in different lights. Lord
Mountbatten hoped that the Agreement would provide a basis for
a satisfactory long term solution. He hoped that before the Stand-
still Agreement expired, it would be possible for Hyderabad to
accede to India. The view of Jawaharlal Nehru was that the
Agreement would purchase communal peace in the south for at
least one year. Sardar Patel was doubtful about the bona fides of
the Government of Hyderabad. The Nizam and his advisers took
the Agreement as something which gave them breathing space in
which they were to secure the withdrawal of the Indian troops from
Hyderabad and ultimately become independent.
Shri K. M. Munshi was appointed as India's Agent-General in
Hyderabad. Unfortunately, the attitude of the Nizam Govern-
ment towards him was positively hostile from the very beginning.
He was not given even a building for his residence or office. Ulti-
mately, two of the buildings belonging to the Indian army were
put at his disposal.
The Nizam began to press for the speedy withdrawal of the
Indian troops and the supply of arms and ammunitions for the
Hyderabad army and police. The Nizam also issued two Ordi-
nances by which he put restrictions on the export of all precious
metals from Hyderabad to India and also made Indian currency
as not legal tender in the Hyderabad State. The Government of
## p. 925 (#969) ############################################
STATE OF HYDERABAD
925
SO
Hyderabad also advanced a loan of Rs. 20 crores to Pakistan in the
form of Government of India's Securities. The Government of
India protested against these developments but nothing was done to
remove the objection. At this time, the activities of the Razakars
increased tremendously. Kasim Razvi and his followers made all
kinds of objectionable speeches with the object of inflaming com-
munal passions inside and outside of Hyderabad. Razvi declared
that the Razakars were the liberators of the Muslims of India. The
Razakars began to attack the neighbouring provinces like Madras,
Bombay, and the Central Provinces. The situation became
serious that the common saying was that the Razakars ruled by
day and the Communists ruled by night. The Government of
Madras asked for military help to save its people from the raids
of Razakars. This state of affairs continued for many months.
Shri K. M. Munshi was practically a prisoner in his house in
Hyderabad. El Edroos, the Commander-in-Chief for the Hydera-
bad forces, called upon the people in a radio talk to be ready for
any emergency. In his speech delivered on 31 March, 1948 on the
occasion of the inauguration of the Hyderabad Weapons Week,
Kasim Razvi urged the Muslims of Hyderabad not to sheathe their
swords until their objective for Islamic supremacy was achieved.
He asked them to march forward with the Koran in one hand and
the swor in the er to hound out the enemy.
He also declared
that "the forty-five million Muslims in the Indian Union would be
columnists in
any
showdown. ” On 12 April, 1948,
Kasim Razvi declared, “The day is not far off when the waves of
the Bay of Bengal will be washing the feet of our Sovereign. " He
went to the extent of saying that he would plant the Asaf Jahi Flag
on the Red Fort in Delhi. When Laik Ali, the new Prime Minister
of Hyderabad, met Sardar Patel, the latter referred to the speech
of Kasim Razvi and asserted that such things could not be tolerated.
