Taylor and Wheeler have not yet come to understand that, according to the theory of relativity and to quantum physics, any speculation about
phenomena
that is not re- ally observable falls outside the realm of the physical sciences.
Hegel Was Right_nodrm
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42 Hegel was right
Hegel says many times that his Philosophy, the true science, is "that skepticism which is fulfilled" (PG 67). It does not accept anything by authority, not even the definition of science, and hence it is more scientific than the disciplines so-called sciences, for each of them take this definition for granted.
Let us keep this in mind: although it may be legitimate for the indi- vidual scientist to suppose some things, science as a whole cannot do this, for if it supposes something it does not demonstrate and hence it is not science. "First, we cannot make suppositions; this is a big principle which is extremely important" (GP III 128).
It seems obvious to me that Hegel's science is interpretatively cas- trated if we understand it as if it were different from the scientificity towards which other sciences aspire or as if it worked on its own kind of basis. Hegel is extremely clear in that regard: "There can only be one method in every science and knowledge. Method is the concept which displays itself, nothing more, and it is only one. " (PR I 62).
"On this regard one must briefly say that, despite the others' con- ceptions of what Philosophy is, I consider the exercise of Philosophy something intrinsically attached to scientificity. " (A? sth I 50).
Hegel reproaches Kantian philosophy precisely what Hegel's com- mentators want him to do: "Kantian philosophy has been unable to have any influence at all on the treatment of sciences. It leaves the cate- gories and the method of ordinary knowledge completely untouched. " (EPW 60A)
Those who make Hegel innocuous for sciences banish him from the world. Findlay is an example of this: "There is no doubt that Hegel be- lieves in the complete validity of ordinary scientific methods at the level at which they are applied. His criticisms of them are a matter of 'second review', a consideration of them from a vantage-point foreign to them as scientific. " (1958, 349) As we will immediately see, this irenism pretends to place Hegel within the non-agression pact with sciences in which many Philosophy professors have decided to live peacefully and with professional prestige. If we asked Findlay what does he under- stand by science when he says that Hegel accepts the ordinary scienti- fic methods, the vulgar conception of science would certainly float to the surface (a conception which, as we have already examined, destroys itself with the first act of reflection); or at least, the belief according to which it is possible to determine by means of an a posteriori survey what science is would reappear, but we have seen that such belief is a myth.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Science and Literature 43
The same happens with Lauer when he says: "The 'science' of which Hegel speaks bears little resemblance to the contemporary notion of science" (1982, 222). But there is no contemporary notion of science! I mean, aside from the vulgar one that annuls itself. The most learned ones we have mentioned in our list considerably differ from each other and it is impossible to find a common denominator between them.
Findlay and Lauer exemplify the extremes of all Hegelian scholars. The former wants to castrate Hegel because he hates his theses, while the latter, with great sensibility and merit, accepts all the Hegelian theses as a whole, but not scientifically. And that changes everything, even the meaning of the theses themselves. Even a priori it is unthinkable that the parts remain unaltered once we take into account the sole purpose of Hegel's works: "The rebirth of all sciences through Philosophy" (JS 170), for a "new epoch has arrived in the world" (GP III 460).
What has happened to scholars is that, having forgotten that "the spirit has left Art behind" (PG 492), they confuse Philosophy with Literature. Let us see what Findlay says: ". . . his transitions are only necessary and inevitable in the rather indefinite sense in which there is necessity and inevitability in a work of art. " (1958, 74). And Laurer too:
The greatness of the great philosophers does not rest on the inner consistency or on the convincing power of such rational elaborations. Rather, their greatness consists (as does that of the great poet or great artist) in the quality of their experience, its capacity to reveal in a new way the possibilities of human experience. (1977, 25s).
The parenthesis is of Lauer himself.
Those who avoid Hegel's scientific assault in defense of what there is today, get involved, voluntarily or involuntarily, with the modern 'syndrome of science', which is the front-cover of half complete skep- ticism. These skeptics believe blindfoldedly in science in order not to believe in other things (the most important ones), but they do not know what science is or what it says, nor they care to find out; for they do not intend to embrace it; they want to leave it aside so that 'every- thing else' becomes relative and suits the taste of each person. It is very easy to be a fanatic of science without being obliged to say what one understands by science. As we said, they do this blindfolded; they accept to be told what science is and what is not. "What would the
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 44 Hegel was right
ancient skeptics have said of that illegitimate skepticism which dares to look for reconciliation with the bare dogmatism of these sciences? " (JS 226) This text serves us to evaluate the untruthfulness of some commentators when saying that Hegel believes in the validity of ordi- nary scientific methods.
That is the syndrome; no one knows what science is; people point their fingers at each other and no one ventures to defend with ar- guments --that is to say, with Philosophy-- his concept of science. In addition, it is not true that one appeals to what others have said, for while examining what others say or do, one only considers to be scientific that which one had in mind before, so this turns out to be a strategy in order not to defend one's own concept of science, which is only negative since its function is to exclude the themes which are truly important.
While comparing Sextus Empiricus scientific skepticism with modern, half complete skepticism, Hegel says:
The invincible figures of speech of dogmatism were employed by Sextus Empiricus with great success against dogmatism, especially in Physics, a science that, along with applied mathematics, is the true empire (. . . ) of the restricted concepts of the infinite, but physics is for the modern skeptics a science which challenges all reasonable incredulity (JS 246).
Let us point once and for all which is the naive dogmatism of the contemporary sciences that claim to be empirical, for that will be the bridge for our next chapters:
The fundamental deception in scientific empiricism is always this one: it employs metaphysical categories like matter, force, unity, plurality, uni- versality, infinite, etcetera. In addition, it joyfully makes inferences on the grounds of these categories and in doing that it presupposes and applies the forms of inference, and during this process this empiricism does not know that it contains itself and applies metaphysics, and uses the said cat- egories and junctions in a non-critical and unconscious way. (EPW 38 A).
"As a matter of fact, they cannot do without the concept, but by some sort of tacit arrangement they run certain concepts, such as 'parts' and 'forces', without knowing in the least if they contain a truth or how they contain it. " (GP II 171)
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Science and Literature 45
It is impossible to force Hegel into this non-aggression pact that pre- vails in university faculties as well as in the whole world, for that would mean to embrace the 'autonomy of sciences', which is preached by the Church and which is only respected by it. Hegel, who is on the same side as the Church, is not willing to observe this pact, since he explicitly says: "The physical atomism (die Atomistik) places itself face to face before the idea of a creation and a conservation of the world by a different being. But suddenly the research of nature feels that, on account of atomism, it is exempted of having an explanation to the world. " (GP I 361) "In this regard the step contradicts the principle of these sciences [. . . ] On this point the spirit is equal in Catholicism and Protestantism" (WG 913); "the excessively mathematical point of view that identifies the quantity --which is a particular stage of the idea-- with the idea itself, that point of view is nothing else than the principle of materialism" (EPW 99z). "Materialism and naturalism are the following system of empiricism" (EPW 60A).
To a non-aggression proposal Hegel answers: "But there are false truc- es" (EGP 196). "It is a false idea: there can only be one truth. " (EGP 290) Neither sciences nor Theology can pretend to achieve autonomy from reason, and we saw in fact that they never achieve independence from Philosophy, for it is always Philosophy or a pseudo Philosophy
what decides what is scientific and what is not.
The initiative of Hegel, to reach at last truth scientifically, is the most
ambitious enterprise that reason has ever set out on. But it will be accused for being prideful and excessive by him who does not under- stand that "the internal knowledge of the scientificity of knowledge lies in the nature itself of knowledge" (PG 12). It is an initiative that sooner or later someone had to take. It is not possible to think that human rea- son would have eternally resigned itself to this irrational languor in which convictions are adopted because one likes them, or because they are useful, or due to any other motive that is not their scientifically proven truth.
Far from being prideful, it is an authentically humble enterprise, as Hegel repeatedly warns: "The rational is the real path in which every- body goes and nobody stands out. " (Rph 15 Z)
Thinking is what is universal: by this means one places oneself in the point of view of the rest of mankind and renounces to the particularity of his own heart and genius. In that moment all peculiarities step aside and are
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 46
Hegel was right
cancelled. Thinking is what is universal in and by itself. Living on such grounds is the highest humility. Humility means to make aside every distinction, every peculiarity, and to submerge oneself into the universal. (EGP 282)
"Philosophy is not something particular as an artwork" (GP II 23).
Into that position of universality, not of originality, this present book steps forward. For that reason, even though I think like this, even though this is my system, this book presents itself as an interpretation of another philosopher who, on his part, incorporates Plato and Aris- totle and all the history of Philosophy. I prove thereby that I actually believe that truth is knowable to the human mind, for I make clear that it has certainly been known before.
The only way to interpret Hegel is to give more weight to demonstra- tions than to interpretations; otherwise, one does not make Philosophy but literary criticism. Hence our title is Hegel was right. There are certain questions, especially those which are naturally linked with the sub- sequent development of sciences after Hegel's death, in which Hegel only outlined the path which demonstrations ought to follow; the present book cannot leave that only as an outline, which means I will not ex- pose how Hegel thinks without engaging my own views. The only way to do this is to rely only on what is demonstrative, that is to say, on what is truly philosophical.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? chapter ii
Why the subject?
? ? What we will put forward on chapter three in regard to the on- tical consistence of the subject is not only the key to Hegel's philosophy, as he repeatedly warns, but the key to all Phi- losophy and all sciences, and it is the most important discovery that the human mind has ever made in all history.
However, there is a certain school of thought which obstinately re- fuses to take the subject into account, and which even says that science should forbid itself from making any consideration on it. Our present chapter examines this resistance and demonstrates that, far from being scientific, this resistance is scientifically untenable because, once we do away with the subject, it becomes impossible to provide scientific con- cepts with any meaning at all. If we do away with the subject, sciences do not know what they are speaking of. Our present chapter also dis- pels one of the most widespread and inveterate prejudices there are: the belief in the empirical origin of concepts.
1. Something about modem phySicS
We must first say that our century has not contributed with any single wonder to this parade of obstinacies which deny the subject. In fact,
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 48 Hegel was right
in order to avoid it, those positions claim to rely only on the physi- cal manifestations and therefore reduce all realities --even the psychic and biological ones-- to physical processes, in the hope that this sys- tematic and "objective" approach will scare away the subject once and for all. But Physics itself has proven these hopes barren by reinserting the observing subject into the picture, and this is not something trivial but the absolutely decisive factor that determines the characteristics of any observed objects or phenomena: both relativity and quantum physics make all objective data to depend on the subject. Here we see the subject reappearing where they never expected him to be.
One can barely restrain the laughs by reading Taylor and Wheeler when they say: "The word 'observer' is a shorthand way of speaking about the whole collection of recording clocks associated with one inertial frame of reference. " (1966, 19).
They fill up every inch of the universe with watches and rods whose masses and fields would distort even the most robust and delicate physi- cal phenomenon, leaving it unrecognizable and unobservable --which was the only thing at stake. Watches and rods without masses and fields are a physical impossibility; consequently, the unperturbed phe- nomena of which Taylor and Wheeler speak are not effectively observable and hence inexistent to modern physics.
Taylor and Wheeler have not yet come to understand that, according to the theory of relativity and to quantum physics, any speculation about phenomena that is not re- ally observable falls outside the realm of the physical sciences.
The acknowledged physic C. F. von Weizsa? cker sums up very well the present state of affairs of his discipline: "An object is an object for subjects in the world. This would be made even clearer if the concept of object could be reduced to decidable alternatives. " (Bastin 1971, 253)
Avoiding the subject is thus reduced to a simple wishful thinking that lacks any kind of scientificity.
Leon Brillouin provides a more extended analysis of the situation, but the quote here presented is worthwhile examining; I display it here for the best interest of my readers who are not as well acquainted with modern physics:
I become very suspicious whenever I hear the word 'given'. There is only one occasion when it has a definite meaning; this is in the statement of a problem given by an examiner to some helpless students. In this situation the velocity is supposed to be exactly the given velocity, with no possible error or
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Why the subject? 49
discussion. But in real life, this never happens. If I observe an unknown mov- ing object in the sky, nobody can give me its velocity. Whether it be a star or a flying saucer, I have to measure the velocity by some experimental device. I can use optical signals, which would be reflected from the unknown object, to measure the delays, the Doppler shifts, etc. From these measurements, I can compute the velocity, but I should always be aware of the fact that these very experiments always perturb the motion. The velocity after observation is not the same as before observation. Every experiment requires some coupling between the observer and the observed object,. . . (1970, 4).
The photons with which I have to bomb the object to make it visible exert force upon it and modify its state. And I cannot talk of an unper- turbed object because "unperturbed" means 'not observed', something which does not exist to Physics.
To modern physics there are no objects without a subject. If someone believed that by relying on Physics one would put the subject away, his disappointment could not be greater.
As we will later see, what Hegel has to say in order to make the study of the subject scientifically unavoidable is ten thousand times deeper than the entire contribution of Physics in our century. It is not a matter of chance that Physics has finally consented to be more reflexive than the physics of Newton. However, it is timely to point out that the negation of the Newtonian absolute movement and space, a negation which is the point of departure of the theory of relativity, was already implicit in Hegel: "In the empty space there is no movement, for there is only movement in relation to a different place. " (NH 126).
According to Newton and his master and namesake Burrow, although there is no other object towards which the studied object approaches or from which it goes away, the said object would be moving, for its movement is absolute. It takes place in the absolute space which is the sensorium Dei. In other words, although it does not approach to or go away from any other thing, God would see that object moving.
The idea according to which the absolute space is the sensorium Dei goes back to Henry More, and in a certain way, to Pierre Gassendi. But we must take into account that in times of Newton everybody believed that movement was something absolute. And they still think the same thing, all those who have neglected relativity in order to remain attached to the myths of common-sense. Since the times of classic physics, Hegel disproved that belief with the mere analysis of the idea of movement:
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 50 Hegel was right
"Ultimately, it is absolutely clear that movement as such only has meaning and existence in a system of many bodies, and by the way, many bodies which stand in reciprocal relation according to different determinations" (EPW 269A).
For the same reason, Hegel rejects the first law of Newton: "a recti- linear infinite movement is a void mental monster; because movement is always towards something" (GP II 193).
Moreover, Hegel holds that the physics of his times would have avoided those phantasmagorias if they had taken the time to read well Aristotle: "Aristotle shows that the void suppresses movement [. . . ] In movement the body --as distinct-- is a positive relation, not towards nothing. " (GP II 185).
And a little before that point in his book, he says: "Aristotle deals then with the void space, an ancient question for which Physics still cannot find a solution. They could do that if they read Aristotle, but for them thought and Aristotle are things which have absolutely no existence in the world. "
Already with his commentary on Zeno, Hegel had explained the relativity principle of movement: "And this is also true: that movement is definitively relative. " (GP I 315).
In order to reject the notions of absolute space and time as unsci- entific, Hegel did not have to wait until Michelson's experiment: he only needed to realize that those were mere abstractions. Evidently, an abstraction cannot pretend to have the same status of reality: "The word absolute has often no other meaning the word abstract; thus, abso- lute space and absolute time are no other thing that abstract space and abstract time" (EPW 115A).
We have displayed these quotations in order to show that the link between modern physics and Hegel's philosophy is not fortuitous. Our author already knew how unscientific and ungrounded it is in Physics to project as real something not observable.
2. a baSic principLe
Before venturing into the refutation of the different ways out that have been invented to avoid the study of the subject, we beg the reader to consider the following reflection as fundamental, for even though it is obvious in itself, it has been neglected during the last centuries.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Why the subject? 51
If a word does not have an empirical meaning, the origin of the con- cept in question cannot be sensation, and hence it is necessary to look in the subject itself both for the origin and the meaning of it.
For all what follows in this book, the above reflection is essential.
It cannot be stated that the origin of such a concept is sensation, for the simple reason that the origin would have to be an empirical data, but precisely no empirical data corresponds here to the concept.
For example, the concept of 'point', in which definition enters the idea of unextendedness, could have not been caused evidently by any sensible data or by imagination, for every empirical data is extended and every image of fantasy is extended as well; consequently, the ori- gin and the meaning itself of the concept 'point' should be looked for in the subject.
On the other hand, all sciences use at least some concepts whose meaning is not empirical. The science that raises fewer doubts in this regard is Physics, but apart from the example I just mentioned, we already saw that Margenau listed only some of the few concepts which are not empirical: mass, energy, charge, force, wavelength, strength, potential, probability, amplitude, crystal, magnetic field, atom, photon, electron, meson. (1978, 98)
The following text of Hegel deals with Mathematics, but it mentions several terms employed by Physics as well:
Other mathematical determinations such as infinite, relations, infinitesimal, factors, potencies, etcetera, have their true concept in Philosophy itself; and it is wrong to believe that Philosophy should extract and take them borrowed from Mathematics, where they are accepted without concept and often without any meaning at all; these concepts must wait until Philoso- phy gives them their sense and justification. (EPW 259A)
It seems evident to me that none of these terms have an empirical origin.
Einstein, the most acclaimed physic of our century, goes far beyond Margenau. His forceful statement should not be so zealously hidden away from the public by the apologists of the empirical sciences:
And let us say this in regard of the historical development. Hume clearly understood that certain concepts, for instance, that of causality, cannot be ex- tracted from the material of experience by logical methods. Kant, convinced
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 52
Hegel was right
of the indispensable character of certain concepts, considered them --just as they are selected-- as necessary premises of any kind of thought and dis- tinguished them from concepts of empirical origin. But I am convinced that such differentiation is mistaken and does not approach the problem in a natural way. From a logical point of view, all concepts, even the closer ones to experience, are free constructions, just as the concept of causality, which was the starting point of the dispute. (Schilpp, I 1969, 12).
According to Einstein, not only some concepts of Physics but every single concept lacks an empirical origin.
3. what everyone underStandS?
That being said it is now of primal importance to take this into account. More often than not, one believes to 'know' the meaning of a certain word, because one thinks that the meaning is a determined empirical data which is easily observable. But in the cases that the word being considered does not have an empirical meaning, it would be unjusti- fied to suppose, without further investigation, that 'we know what it means'. It is by no means true that we already 'understand' its meaning; we may be imagining something, but that image is not the meaning in question, for imagination can only contain combinations of empirical impressions and accumulate the data provided by the senses; however, if the concept does not have an empirical meaning, no empirical im- pression or combination of them could provide it. Let us go back to the above mentioned example. There are some people who believe they know what the meaning of the word 'point' is; but what they imagine is a speck, not a point; if it were unextended, as it should be to be a point, they could not imagine it. As a matter of fact, they do not know what the word point means; they do not have the concept.
We must look for the meaning and for the concept in the knowing subject.
Let us put another example. In the context of discussion of modern pluridimensional, non- Euclidean spaces, a great number of mathema- ticians and physics do easily away with the problem by saying that space is a group of points. However, since they do not know what a point is, this so-called definition lacks any kind of meaning. The situa- tion gets even worse if they try to define point, for they will irremediably
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Why the subject? 53
say that it is an unextended part of space. They define point in terms of space, and they define space in terms of point. The circularity of this argument is manifest. We do not gain any knowledge by means of this procedure, and clearly, one will notice that these people do not know what they are speaking of.
Here is where what we were discussing occurs: they ease themselves by believing that the meaning of the word space is a certain empiri- cal data that is easily verifiable. An opponent would probably answer to this objection something like 'you are not going to deny that I am looking at the space between my body and the wall in front of me'.
Of course, I will deny this. What this person is seeing is the wall in front of him. Space as such is not observable; it is not an empirical data. Since it is not an empirical data and they do not know how to pro- vide it with meaning by other means, they do not know what they are
speaking about.
One brief digression: if modern physics boasts their rejection of
non-observable entities, one wonders why they keep speaking of spaces, let alone pluridimensional ones. The only justifiable criterion would be the 'necessary factor to explain observable data'. But we will see in our fifth chapter what the Science of Logic has to say about those explicative intended factors.
It is the right time to do away with a false way out. Scientists will admit that many concepts do not have an empirical meaning, and yet they say that they are inferred from empirical data. I do not deny here the logical legitimacy of the inference in question; but it is obvious that, in order to infer certain concepts, we must first need to know what they mean. Precisely, in this case, the meaning does not coincide with any empirical data, for it is necessary to infer it since the meaning is not an object of empirical experience; if it was an empirical data, we would not have the need to infer it. In some of the premises of the inference process, one of these concepts --which are not derived from empirical experience-- appears suddenly: How is it possible to handle it if we do not know what it means? What it seemed to be a way out only makes more acute the need to look in the knowing subject for the origin and the meaning of concepts.
We do not need here to stop for long in order to examine another way out which is identical to the previous one. According to this po- sition, there are some things that are not empirical in themselves but only in their effects. God and the soul also have sensible effects, but that
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 54 Hegel was right
is not enough to know what those terms mean.
Hegel says many times that his Philosophy, the true science, is "that skepticism which is fulfilled" (PG 67). It does not accept anything by authority, not even the definition of science, and hence it is more scientific than the disciplines so-called sciences, for each of them take this definition for granted.
Let us keep this in mind: although it may be legitimate for the indi- vidual scientist to suppose some things, science as a whole cannot do this, for if it supposes something it does not demonstrate and hence it is not science. "First, we cannot make suppositions; this is a big principle which is extremely important" (GP III 128).
It seems obvious to me that Hegel's science is interpretatively cas- trated if we understand it as if it were different from the scientificity towards which other sciences aspire or as if it worked on its own kind of basis. Hegel is extremely clear in that regard: "There can only be one method in every science and knowledge. Method is the concept which displays itself, nothing more, and it is only one. " (PR I 62).
"On this regard one must briefly say that, despite the others' con- ceptions of what Philosophy is, I consider the exercise of Philosophy something intrinsically attached to scientificity. " (A? sth I 50).
Hegel reproaches Kantian philosophy precisely what Hegel's com- mentators want him to do: "Kantian philosophy has been unable to have any influence at all on the treatment of sciences. It leaves the cate- gories and the method of ordinary knowledge completely untouched. " (EPW 60A)
Those who make Hegel innocuous for sciences banish him from the world. Findlay is an example of this: "There is no doubt that Hegel be- lieves in the complete validity of ordinary scientific methods at the level at which they are applied. His criticisms of them are a matter of 'second review', a consideration of them from a vantage-point foreign to them as scientific. " (1958, 349) As we will immediately see, this irenism pretends to place Hegel within the non-agression pact with sciences in which many Philosophy professors have decided to live peacefully and with professional prestige. If we asked Findlay what does he under- stand by science when he says that Hegel accepts the ordinary scienti- fic methods, the vulgar conception of science would certainly float to the surface (a conception which, as we have already examined, destroys itself with the first act of reflection); or at least, the belief according to which it is possible to determine by means of an a posteriori survey what science is would reappear, but we have seen that such belief is a myth.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Science and Literature 43
The same happens with Lauer when he says: "The 'science' of which Hegel speaks bears little resemblance to the contemporary notion of science" (1982, 222). But there is no contemporary notion of science! I mean, aside from the vulgar one that annuls itself. The most learned ones we have mentioned in our list considerably differ from each other and it is impossible to find a common denominator between them.
Findlay and Lauer exemplify the extremes of all Hegelian scholars. The former wants to castrate Hegel because he hates his theses, while the latter, with great sensibility and merit, accepts all the Hegelian theses as a whole, but not scientifically. And that changes everything, even the meaning of the theses themselves. Even a priori it is unthinkable that the parts remain unaltered once we take into account the sole purpose of Hegel's works: "The rebirth of all sciences through Philosophy" (JS 170), for a "new epoch has arrived in the world" (GP III 460).
What has happened to scholars is that, having forgotten that "the spirit has left Art behind" (PG 492), they confuse Philosophy with Literature. Let us see what Findlay says: ". . . his transitions are only necessary and inevitable in the rather indefinite sense in which there is necessity and inevitability in a work of art. " (1958, 74). And Laurer too:
The greatness of the great philosophers does not rest on the inner consistency or on the convincing power of such rational elaborations. Rather, their greatness consists (as does that of the great poet or great artist) in the quality of their experience, its capacity to reveal in a new way the possibilities of human experience. (1977, 25s).
The parenthesis is of Lauer himself.
Those who avoid Hegel's scientific assault in defense of what there is today, get involved, voluntarily or involuntarily, with the modern 'syndrome of science', which is the front-cover of half complete skep- ticism. These skeptics believe blindfoldedly in science in order not to believe in other things (the most important ones), but they do not know what science is or what it says, nor they care to find out; for they do not intend to embrace it; they want to leave it aside so that 'every- thing else' becomes relative and suits the taste of each person. It is very easy to be a fanatic of science without being obliged to say what one understands by science. As we said, they do this blindfolded; they accept to be told what science is and what is not. "What would the
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 44 Hegel was right
ancient skeptics have said of that illegitimate skepticism which dares to look for reconciliation with the bare dogmatism of these sciences? " (JS 226) This text serves us to evaluate the untruthfulness of some commentators when saying that Hegel believes in the validity of ordi- nary scientific methods.
That is the syndrome; no one knows what science is; people point their fingers at each other and no one ventures to defend with ar- guments --that is to say, with Philosophy-- his concept of science. In addition, it is not true that one appeals to what others have said, for while examining what others say or do, one only considers to be scientific that which one had in mind before, so this turns out to be a strategy in order not to defend one's own concept of science, which is only negative since its function is to exclude the themes which are truly important.
While comparing Sextus Empiricus scientific skepticism with modern, half complete skepticism, Hegel says:
The invincible figures of speech of dogmatism were employed by Sextus Empiricus with great success against dogmatism, especially in Physics, a science that, along with applied mathematics, is the true empire (. . . ) of the restricted concepts of the infinite, but physics is for the modern skeptics a science which challenges all reasonable incredulity (JS 246).
Let us point once and for all which is the naive dogmatism of the contemporary sciences that claim to be empirical, for that will be the bridge for our next chapters:
The fundamental deception in scientific empiricism is always this one: it employs metaphysical categories like matter, force, unity, plurality, uni- versality, infinite, etcetera. In addition, it joyfully makes inferences on the grounds of these categories and in doing that it presupposes and applies the forms of inference, and during this process this empiricism does not know that it contains itself and applies metaphysics, and uses the said cat- egories and junctions in a non-critical and unconscious way. (EPW 38 A).
"As a matter of fact, they cannot do without the concept, but by some sort of tacit arrangement they run certain concepts, such as 'parts' and 'forces', without knowing in the least if they contain a truth or how they contain it. " (GP II 171)
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Science and Literature 45
It is impossible to force Hegel into this non-aggression pact that pre- vails in university faculties as well as in the whole world, for that would mean to embrace the 'autonomy of sciences', which is preached by the Church and which is only respected by it. Hegel, who is on the same side as the Church, is not willing to observe this pact, since he explicitly says: "The physical atomism (die Atomistik) places itself face to face before the idea of a creation and a conservation of the world by a different being. But suddenly the research of nature feels that, on account of atomism, it is exempted of having an explanation to the world. " (GP I 361) "In this regard the step contradicts the principle of these sciences [. . . ] On this point the spirit is equal in Catholicism and Protestantism" (WG 913); "the excessively mathematical point of view that identifies the quantity --which is a particular stage of the idea-- with the idea itself, that point of view is nothing else than the principle of materialism" (EPW 99z). "Materialism and naturalism are the following system of empiricism" (EPW 60A).
To a non-aggression proposal Hegel answers: "But there are false truc- es" (EGP 196). "It is a false idea: there can only be one truth. " (EGP 290) Neither sciences nor Theology can pretend to achieve autonomy from reason, and we saw in fact that they never achieve independence from Philosophy, for it is always Philosophy or a pseudo Philosophy
what decides what is scientific and what is not.
The initiative of Hegel, to reach at last truth scientifically, is the most
ambitious enterprise that reason has ever set out on. But it will be accused for being prideful and excessive by him who does not under- stand that "the internal knowledge of the scientificity of knowledge lies in the nature itself of knowledge" (PG 12). It is an initiative that sooner or later someone had to take. It is not possible to think that human rea- son would have eternally resigned itself to this irrational languor in which convictions are adopted because one likes them, or because they are useful, or due to any other motive that is not their scientifically proven truth.
Far from being prideful, it is an authentically humble enterprise, as Hegel repeatedly warns: "The rational is the real path in which every- body goes and nobody stands out. " (Rph 15 Z)
Thinking is what is universal: by this means one places oneself in the point of view of the rest of mankind and renounces to the particularity of his own heart and genius. In that moment all peculiarities step aside and are
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 46
Hegel was right
cancelled. Thinking is what is universal in and by itself. Living on such grounds is the highest humility. Humility means to make aside every distinction, every peculiarity, and to submerge oneself into the universal. (EGP 282)
"Philosophy is not something particular as an artwork" (GP II 23).
Into that position of universality, not of originality, this present book steps forward. For that reason, even though I think like this, even though this is my system, this book presents itself as an interpretation of another philosopher who, on his part, incorporates Plato and Aris- totle and all the history of Philosophy. I prove thereby that I actually believe that truth is knowable to the human mind, for I make clear that it has certainly been known before.
The only way to interpret Hegel is to give more weight to demonstra- tions than to interpretations; otherwise, one does not make Philosophy but literary criticism. Hence our title is Hegel was right. There are certain questions, especially those which are naturally linked with the sub- sequent development of sciences after Hegel's death, in which Hegel only outlined the path which demonstrations ought to follow; the present book cannot leave that only as an outline, which means I will not ex- pose how Hegel thinks without engaging my own views. The only way to do this is to rely only on what is demonstrative, that is to say, on what is truly philosophical.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? chapter ii
Why the subject?
? ? What we will put forward on chapter three in regard to the on- tical consistence of the subject is not only the key to Hegel's philosophy, as he repeatedly warns, but the key to all Phi- losophy and all sciences, and it is the most important discovery that the human mind has ever made in all history.
However, there is a certain school of thought which obstinately re- fuses to take the subject into account, and which even says that science should forbid itself from making any consideration on it. Our present chapter examines this resistance and demonstrates that, far from being scientific, this resistance is scientifically untenable because, once we do away with the subject, it becomes impossible to provide scientific con- cepts with any meaning at all. If we do away with the subject, sciences do not know what they are speaking of. Our present chapter also dis- pels one of the most widespread and inveterate prejudices there are: the belief in the empirical origin of concepts.
1. Something about modem phySicS
We must first say that our century has not contributed with any single wonder to this parade of obstinacies which deny the subject. In fact,
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 48 Hegel was right
in order to avoid it, those positions claim to rely only on the physi- cal manifestations and therefore reduce all realities --even the psychic and biological ones-- to physical processes, in the hope that this sys- tematic and "objective" approach will scare away the subject once and for all. But Physics itself has proven these hopes barren by reinserting the observing subject into the picture, and this is not something trivial but the absolutely decisive factor that determines the characteristics of any observed objects or phenomena: both relativity and quantum physics make all objective data to depend on the subject. Here we see the subject reappearing where they never expected him to be.
One can barely restrain the laughs by reading Taylor and Wheeler when they say: "The word 'observer' is a shorthand way of speaking about the whole collection of recording clocks associated with one inertial frame of reference. " (1966, 19).
They fill up every inch of the universe with watches and rods whose masses and fields would distort even the most robust and delicate physi- cal phenomenon, leaving it unrecognizable and unobservable --which was the only thing at stake. Watches and rods without masses and fields are a physical impossibility; consequently, the unperturbed phe- nomena of which Taylor and Wheeler speak are not effectively observable and hence inexistent to modern physics.
Taylor and Wheeler have not yet come to understand that, according to the theory of relativity and to quantum physics, any speculation about phenomena that is not re- ally observable falls outside the realm of the physical sciences.
The acknowledged physic C. F. von Weizsa? cker sums up very well the present state of affairs of his discipline: "An object is an object for subjects in the world. This would be made even clearer if the concept of object could be reduced to decidable alternatives. " (Bastin 1971, 253)
Avoiding the subject is thus reduced to a simple wishful thinking that lacks any kind of scientificity.
Leon Brillouin provides a more extended analysis of the situation, but the quote here presented is worthwhile examining; I display it here for the best interest of my readers who are not as well acquainted with modern physics:
I become very suspicious whenever I hear the word 'given'. There is only one occasion when it has a definite meaning; this is in the statement of a problem given by an examiner to some helpless students. In this situation the velocity is supposed to be exactly the given velocity, with no possible error or
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Why the subject? 49
discussion. But in real life, this never happens. If I observe an unknown mov- ing object in the sky, nobody can give me its velocity. Whether it be a star or a flying saucer, I have to measure the velocity by some experimental device. I can use optical signals, which would be reflected from the unknown object, to measure the delays, the Doppler shifts, etc. From these measurements, I can compute the velocity, but I should always be aware of the fact that these very experiments always perturb the motion. The velocity after observation is not the same as before observation. Every experiment requires some coupling between the observer and the observed object,. . . (1970, 4).
The photons with which I have to bomb the object to make it visible exert force upon it and modify its state. And I cannot talk of an unper- turbed object because "unperturbed" means 'not observed', something which does not exist to Physics.
To modern physics there are no objects without a subject. If someone believed that by relying on Physics one would put the subject away, his disappointment could not be greater.
As we will later see, what Hegel has to say in order to make the study of the subject scientifically unavoidable is ten thousand times deeper than the entire contribution of Physics in our century. It is not a matter of chance that Physics has finally consented to be more reflexive than the physics of Newton. However, it is timely to point out that the negation of the Newtonian absolute movement and space, a negation which is the point of departure of the theory of relativity, was already implicit in Hegel: "In the empty space there is no movement, for there is only movement in relation to a different place. " (NH 126).
According to Newton and his master and namesake Burrow, although there is no other object towards which the studied object approaches or from which it goes away, the said object would be moving, for its movement is absolute. It takes place in the absolute space which is the sensorium Dei. In other words, although it does not approach to or go away from any other thing, God would see that object moving.
The idea according to which the absolute space is the sensorium Dei goes back to Henry More, and in a certain way, to Pierre Gassendi. But we must take into account that in times of Newton everybody believed that movement was something absolute. And they still think the same thing, all those who have neglected relativity in order to remain attached to the myths of common-sense. Since the times of classic physics, Hegel disproved that belief with the mere analysis of the idea of movement:
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 50 Hegel was right
"Ultimately, it is absolutely clear that movement as such only has meaning and existence in a system of many bodies, and by the way, many bodies which stand in reciprocal relation according to different determinations" (EPW 269A).
For the same reason, Hegel rejects the first law of Newton: "a recti- linear infinite movement is a void mental monster; because movement is always towards something" (GP II 193).
Moreover, Hegel holds that the physics of his times would have avoided those phantasmagorias if they had taken the time to read well Aristotle: "Aristotle shows that the void suppresses movement [. . . ] In movement the body --as distinct-- is a positive relation, not towards nothing. " (GP II 185).
And a little before that point in his book, he says: "Aristotle deals then with the void space, an ancient question for which Physics still cannot find a solution. They could do that if they read Aristotle, but for them thought and Aristotle are things which have absolutely no existence in the world. "
Already with his commentary on Zeno, Hegel had explained the relativity principle of movement: "And this is also true: that movement is definitively relative. " (GP I 315).
In order to reject the notions of absolute space and time as unsci- entific, Hegel did not have to wait until Michelson's experiment: he only needed to realize that those were mere abstractions. Evidently, an abstraction cannot pretend to have the same status of reality: "The word absolute has often no other meaning the word abstract; thus, abso- lute space and absolute time are no other thing that abstract space and abstract time" (EPW 115A).
We have displayed these quotations in order to show that the link between modern physics and Hegel's philosophy is not fortuitous. Our author already knew how unscientific and ungrounded it is in Physics to project as real something not observable.
2. a baSic principLe
Before venturing into the refutation of the different ways out that have been invented to avoid the study of the subject, we beg the reader to consider the following reflection as fundamental, for even though it is obvious in itself, it has been neglected during the last centuries.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Why the subject? 51
If a word does not have an empirical meaning, the origin of the con- cept in question cannot be sensation, and hence it is necessary to look in the subject itself both for the origin and the meaning of it.
For all what follows in this book, the above reflection is essential.
It cannot be stated that the origin of such a concept is sensation, for the simple reason that the origin would have to be an empirical data, but precisely no empirical data corresponds here to the concept.
For example, the concept of 'point', in which definition enters the idea of unextendedness, could have not been caused evidently by any sensible data or by imagination, for every empirical data is extended and every image of fantasy is extended as well; consequently, the ori- gin and the meaning itself of the concept 'point' should be looked for in the subject.
On the other hand, all sciences use at least some concepts whose meaning is not empirical. The science that raises fewer doubts in this regard is Physics, but apart from the example I just mentioned, we already saw that Margenau listed only some of the few concepts which are not empirical: mass, energy, charge, force, wavelength, strength, potential, probability, amplitude, crystal, magnetic field, atom, photon, electron, meson. (1978, 98)
The following text of Hegel deals with Mathematics, but it mentions several terms employed by Physics as well:
Other mathematical determinations such as infinite, relations, infinitesimal, factors, potencies, etcetera, have their true concept in Philosophy itself; and it is wrong to believe that Philosophy should extract and take them borrowed from Mathematics, where they are accepted without concept and often without any meaning at all; these concepts must wait until Philoso- phy gives them their sense and justification. (EPW 259A)
It seems evident to me that none of these terms have an empirical origin.
Einstein, the most acclaimed physic of our century, goes far beyond Margenau. His forceful statement should not be so zealously hidden away from the public by the apologists of the empirical sciences:
And let us say this in regard of the historical development. Hume clearly understood that certain concepts, for instance, that of causality, cannot be ex- tracted from the material of experience by logical methods. Kant, convinced
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 52
Hegel was right
of the indispensable character of certain concepts, considered them --just as they are selected-- as necessary premises of any kind of thought and dis- tinguished them from concepts of empirical origin. But I am convinced that such differentiation is mistaken and does not approach the problem in a natural way. From a logical point of view, all concepts, even the closer ones to experience, are free constructions, just as the concept of causality, which was the starting point of the dispute. (Schilpp, I 1969, 12).
According to Einstein, not only some concepts of Physics but every single concept lacks an empirical origin.
3. what everyone underStandS?
That being said it is now of primal importance to take this into account. More often than not, one believes to 'know' the meaning of a certain word, because one thinks that the meaning is a determined empirical data which is easily observable. But in the cases that the word being considered does not have an empirical meaning, it would be unjusti- fied to suppose, without further investigation, that 'we know what it means'. It is by no means true that we already 'understand' its meaning; we may be imagining something, but that image is not the meaning in question, for imagination can only contain combinations of empirical impressions and accumulate the data provided by the senses; however, if the concept does not have an empirical meaning, no empirical im- pression or combination of them could provide it. Let us go back to the above mentioned example. There are some people who believe they know what the meaning of the word 'point' is; but what they imagine is a speck, not a point; if it were unextended, as it should be to be a point, they could not imagine it. As a matter of fact, they do not know what the word point means; they do not have the concept.
We must look for the meaning and for the concept in the knowing subject.
Let us put another example. In the context of discussion of modern pluridimensional, non- Euclidean spaces, a great number of mathema- ticians and physics do easily away with the problem by saying that space is a group of points. However, since they do not know what a point is, this so-called definition lacks any kind of meaning. The situa- tion gets even worse if they try to define point, for they will irremediably
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Why the subject? 53
say that it is an unextended part of space. They define point in terms of space, and they define space in terms of point. The circularity of this argument is manifest. We do not gain any knowledge by means of this procedure, and clearly, one will notice that these people do not know what they are speaking of.
Here is where what we were discussing occurs: they ease themselves by believing that the meaning of the word space is a certain empiri- cal data that is easily verifiable. An opponent would probably answer to this objection something like 'you are not going to deny that I am looking at the space between my body and the wall in front of me'.
Of course, I will deny this. What this person is seeing is the wall in front of him. Space as such is not observable; it is not an empirical data. Since it is not an empirical data and they do not know how to pro- vide it with meaning by other means, they do not know what they are
speaking about.
One brief digression: if modern physics boasts their rejection of
non-observable entities, one wonders why they keep speaking of spaces, let alone pluridimensional ones. The only justifiable criterion would be the 'necessary factor to explain observable data'. But we will see in our fifth chapter what the Science of Logic has to say about those explicative intended factors.
It is the right time to do away with a false way out. Scientists will admit that many concepts do not have an empirical meaning, and yet they say that they are inferred from empirical data. I do not deny here the logical legitimacy of the inference in question; but it is obvious that, in order to infer certain concepts, we must first need to know what they mean. Precisely, in this case, the meaning does not coincide with any empirical data, for it is necessary to infer it since the meaning is not an object of empirical experience; if it was an empirical data, we would not have the need to infer it. In some of the premises of the inference process, one of these concepts --which are not derived from empirical experience-- appears suddenly: How is it possible to handle it if we do not know what it means? What it seemed to be a way out only makes more acute the need to look in the knowing subject for the origin and the meaning of concepts.
We do not need here to stop for long in order to examine another way out which is identical to the previous one. According to this po- sition, there are some things that are not empirical in themselves but only in their effects. God and the soul also have sensible effects, but that
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 54 Hegel was right
is not enough to know what those terms mean.
