In like manner it differs from
faith, since faith assents to the Divine truth in itself, whereas it
belongs to the gift of wisdom to judge according to the Divine truth.
faith, since faith assents to the Divine truth in itself, whereas it
belongs to the gift of wisdom to judge according to the Divine truth.
Summa Theologica
Therefore a venial sin is a mortal sin, which is absurd.
Objection 3: Further, to love God with one's whole heart belongs to
perfection, since according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, text. 64),
"to be whole is to be perfect. " But that which belongs to perfection is
not a matter of precept, but a matter of counsel. Therefore we ought
not to be commanded to love God with our whole heart.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy
God with thy whole heart. "
I answer that, Since precepts are given about acts of virtue, an act is
a matter of precept according as it is an act of virtue. Now it is
requisite for an act of virtue that not only should it fall on its own
matter, but also that it should be endued with its due circumstances,
whereby it is adapted to that matter. But God is to be loved as the
last end, to which all things are to be referred. Therefore some kind
of totality was to be indicated in connection with the precept of the
love of God.
Reply to Objection 1: The commandment that prescribes an act of virtue
does not prescribe the mode which that virtue derives from another and
higher virtue, but it does prescribe the mode which belongs to its own
proper virtue, and this mode is signified in the words "with thy whole
heart. "
Reply to Objection 2: To love God with one's whole heart has a twofold
signification. First, actually, so that a man's whole heart be always
actually directed to God: this is the perfection of heaven. Secondly,
in the sense that a man's whole heart be habitually directed to God, so
that it consent to nothing contrary to the love of God, and this is the
perfection of the way. Venial sin is not contrary to this latter
perfection, because it does not destroy the habit of charity, since it
does not tend to a contrary object, but merely hinders the use of
charity.
Reply to Objection 3: That perfection of charity to which the counsels
are directed, is between the two perfections mentioned in the preceding
reply: and it consists in man renouncing, as much as possible, temporal
things, even such as are lawful, because they occupy the mind and
hinder the actual movement of the heart towards God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether to the words, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole
heart," it was fitting to add "and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole
strength"?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was unfitting to the words, "Thou
shalt love the Lord thy God, with thy whole heart," to add, "and with
thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength" (Dt. 6:5). For heart does
not mean here a part of the body, since to love God is not a bodily
action: and therefore heart is to be taken here in a spiritual sense.
Now the heart understood spiritually is either the soul itself or part
of the soul. Therefore it is superfluous to mention both heart and
soul.
Objection 2: Further, a man's strength whether spiritual or corporal
depends on the heart. Therefore after the words, "Thou shalt love the
Lord thy God with thy whole heart," it was unnecessary to add, "with
all thy strength. "
Objection 3: Further, in Mat. 22:37 we read: "With all thy mind," which
words do not occur here. Therefore it seems that this precept is
unfittingly worded in Dt. 6.
On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, This precept is differently worded in various places:
for, as we said in the first objection, in Dt. 6 three points are
mentioned: "with thy whole heart," and "with thy whole soul," and "with
thy whole strength. " In Mat. 22 we find two of these mentioned, viz.
"with thy whole heart" and "with thy whole soul," while "with thy whole
strength" is omitted, but "with thy whole mind" is added. Yet in Mark
12 we find all four, viz. "with thy whole heart," and "with thy whole
soul," and "with thy whole mind," and "with thy whole force" which is
the same as "strength. " Moreover, these four are indicated in Luke 10,
where in place of "strength" or "force" we read "with all thy might. "
[*St. Thomas is explaining the Latin text which reads "ex tota
fortitudine tua" (Dt. ), "ex tota virtue tua" (Mk. ), and "ex omnibus
tuis" (Lk. ), although the Greek in all three cases has {ex holes tes
ischyos}, which the Douay renders "with thy whole strength. "]
Accordingly these four have to be explained, since the fact that one of
them is omitted here or there is due to one implying another. We must
therefore observe that love is an act of the will which is here denoted
by the "heart," because just as the bodily heart is the principle of
all the movements of the body, so too the will, especially as regards
the intention of the last end which is the object of charity, is the
principle of all the movements of the soul. Now there are three
principles of action that are moved by the will, namely, the intellect
which is signified by "the mind," the lower appetitive power, signified
by "the soul"; and the exterior executive power signified by
"strength," "force" or "might. " Accordingly we are commanded to direct
our whole intention to God, and this is signified by the words "with
thy whole heart"; to submit our intellect to God, and this is expressed
in the words "with thy whole mind"; to regulate our appetite according
to God, in the words "with thy whole soul"; and to obey God in our
external actions, and this is to love God with our whole "strength,"
"force" or "might. "
Chrysostom [*The quotation is from an anonymous author's unfinished
work (Opus imperf. Hom. xlii, in Matth. ) which is included in
Chrysostom's works], on the other hand, takes "heart" and "soul" in the
contrary sense; and Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) refers "heart"
to the thought, "soul" to the manner of life, and "mind" to the
intellect. Again some explain "with thy whole heart" as denoting the
intellect, "with thy whole soul" as signifying the will, "with thy
mind" as pointing to the memory. And again, according to Gregory of
Nyssa (De Hom. Opif. viii), "heart" signifies the vegetative soul,
"soul" the sensitive, and "mind" the intellective soul, because our
nourishment, sensation, and understanding ought all to be referred by
us to God.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is possible in this life to fulfil this precept of the love of
God?
Objection 1: It would seem that in this life it is possible to fulfil
this precept of the love of God. For according to Jerome [*Pelagius,
Exposit. Cath. Fid. ] "accursed is he who says that Cod has commanded
anything impossible. " But God gave this commandment, as is clear from
Dt. 6:5. Therefore it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life.
Objection 2: Further, whoever does not fulfil a precept sins mortally,
since according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) sin is nothing else than "a
transgression of the Divine Law, and disobedience of the heavenly
commandments. " If therefore this precept cannot be fulfilled by
wayfarers, it follows that in this life no man can be without mortal
sin, and this is against the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 1:8): "(Who
also) will confirm you unto the end without crime," and (1 Tim. 3:10):
"Let them minister, having no crime. "
Objection 3: Further, precepts are given in order to direct man in the
way of salvation, according to Ps. 18:9: "The commandment of the Lord
is lightsome, enlightening the eyes. " Now it is useless to direct
anyone to what is impossible. Therefore it is not impossible to fulfill
this precept in this life.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii): "In the
fulness of heavenly charity this precept will be fulfilled: Thou shalt
love the Lord thy God," etc. For as long as any carnal concupiscence
remains, that can be restrained by continence, man cannot love God with
all his heart.
I answer that, A precept can be fulfilled in two ways; perfectly, and
imperfectly. A precept is fulfilled perfectly, when the end intended by
the author of the precept is reached; yet it is fulfilled, imperfectly
however, when although the end intended by its author is not reached,
nevertheless the order to that end is not departed from. Thus if the
commander of an army order his soldiers to fight, his command will be
perfectly obeyed by those who fight and conquer the foe, which is the
commander's intention; yet it is fulfilled, albeit imperfectly, by
those who fight without gaining the victory, provided they do nothing
contrary to military discipline. Now God intends by this precept that
man should be entirely united to Him, and this will be realized in
heaven, when God will be "all in all," according to 1 Cor. 15:28. Hence
this precept will be observed fully and perfectly in heaven; yet it is
fulfilled, though imperfectly, on the way. Nevertheless on the way one
man will fulfil it more perfectly than another, and so much the more,
as he approaches by some kind of likeness to the perfection of heaven.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that the precept can be
fulfilled after a fashion on the way, but not perfectly.
Reply to Objection 2: Even as the soldier who fights legitimately
without conquering is not blamed nor deserves to be punished for this,
so too he that does not fulfil this precept on the way, but does
nothing against the love of God, does not sin mortally.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii),
"why should not this perfection be prescribed to man, although no man
attains it in this life? For one cannot run straight unless one knows
whither to run. And how would one know this if no precept pointed it
out. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the precept of love of our neighbor is fittingly expressed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precept of the love of our neighbor
is unfittingly expressed. For the love of charity extends to all men,
even to our enemies, as may be seen in Mat. 5:44. But the word
"neighbor" denotes a kind of "nighness" which does not seem to exist
towards all men. Therefore it seems that this precept is unfittingly
expressed.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) "the
origin of our friendly relations with others lies in our relation to
ourselves," whence it seems to follow that love of self is the origin
of one's love for one's neighbor. Now the principle is greater than
that which results from it. Therefore man ought not to love his
neighbor as himself.
Objection 3: Further, man loves himself, but not his neighbor,
naturally. Therefore it is unfitting that he should be commanded to
love his neighbor as himself.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 22:39): "The second" commandment
"is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. "
I answer that, This precept is fittingly expressed, for it indicates
both the reason for loving and the mode of love. The reason for loving
is indicated in the word "neighbor," because the reason why we ought to
love others out of charity is because they are nigh to us, both as to
the natural image of God, and as to the capacity for glory. Nor does it
matter whether we say "neighbor," or "brother" according to 1 Jn. 4:21,
or "friend," according to Lev. 19:18, because all these words express
the same affinity.
The mode of love is indicated in the words "as thyself. " This does not
mean that a man must love his neighbor equally as himself, but in like
manner as himself, and this in three ways. First, as regards the end,
namely, that he should love his neighbor for God's sake, even as he
loves himself for God's sake, so that his love for his neighbor is a
"holy" love. Secondly, as regards the rule of love, namely, that a man
should not give way to his neighbor in evil, but only in good things,
even as he ought to gratify his will in good things alone, so that his
love for his neighbor may be a "righteous" love. Thirdly, as regards
the reason for loving, namely, that a man should love his neighbor, not
for his own profit, or pleasure, but in the sense of wishing his
neighbor well, even as he wishes himself well, so that his love for his
neighbor may be a "true" love: since when a man loves his neighbor for
his own profit or pleasure, he does not love his neighbor truly, but
loves himself.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the order of charity is included in the precept?
Objection 1: It would seem that the order of charity is not included in
the precept. For whoever transgresses a precept does a wrong. But if
man loves some one as much as he ought, and loves any other man more,
he wrongs no man. Therefore he does not transgress the precept.
Therefore the order of charity is not included in the precept.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is a matter of precept is sufficiently
delivered to us in Holy Writ. Now the order of charity which was given
above ([2702]Q[26]) is nowhere indicated in Holy Writ. Therefore it is
not included in the precept.
Objection 3: Further, order implies some kind of distinction. But the
love of our neighbor is prescribed without any distinction, in the
words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. " Therefore the order
of charity is not included in the precept.
On the contrary, Whatever God works in us by His grace, He teaches us
first of all by His Law, according to Jer. 31:33: "I will give My Law
in their heart [*Vulg. : 'in their bowels, and I will write it in their
heart']. " Now God causes in us the order of charity, according to Cant
2:4: "He set in order charity in me. " Therefore the order of charity
comes under the precept of the Law.
I answer that, As stated above (A[4], ad 1), the mode which is
essential to an act of virtue comes under the precept which prescribes
that virtuous act. Now the order of charity is essential to the virtue,
since it is based on the proportion of love to the thing beloved, as
shown above ([2703]Q[25], A[12];[2704] Q[26], AA[1],2). It is therefore
evident that the order of charity must come under the precept.
Reply to Objection 1: A man gratifies more the person he loves more, so
that if he loved less one whom he ought to love more, he would wish to
gratify more one whom he ought to gratify less, and so he would do an
injustice to the one he ought to love more.
Reply to Objection 2: The order of those four things we have to love
out of charity is expressed in Holy Writ. For when we are commanded to
love God with our "whole heart," we are given to understand that we
must love Him above all things. When we are commanded to love our
neighbor "as ourselves," the love of self is set before love of our
neighbor. In like manner where we are commanded (1 Jn. 3:16) "to lay
down our souls," i. e. the life of our bodies, "for the brethren," we
are given to understand that a man ought to love his neighbor more than
his own body; and again when we are commanded (Gal. 6:10) to "work good
. . . especially to those who are of the household of the faith," and
when a man is blamed (1 Tim. 5:8) if he "have not care of his own, and
especially of those of his house," it means that we ought to love most
those of our neighbors who are more virtuous or more closely united to
us.
Reply to Objection 3: It follows from the very words, "Thou shalt love
thy neighbor" that those who are nearer to us are to be loved more.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE GIFT OF WISDOM (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gift of wisdom which corresponds to charity;
and firstly, wisdom itself, secondly, the opposite vice. Under the
first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy
Ghost?
(2) What is its subject?
(3) Whether wisdom is only speculative or also practical?
(4) Whether the wisdom that is a gift is compatible with mortal sin?
(5) Whether it is in all those who have sanctifying grace?
(6) Which beatitude corresponds to it?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?
Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom ought not to be reckoned among
the gifts of the Holy Ghost. For the gifts are more perfect than the
virtues, as stated above ([2705]FS, Q[68], A[8]). Now virtue is
directed to the good alone, wherefore Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii,
19) that "no man makes bad use of the virtues. " Much more therefore are
the gifts of the Holy Ghost directed to the good alone. But wisdom is
directed to evil also, for it is written (James 3:15) that a certain
wisdom is "earthly, sensual, devilish. " Therefore wisdom should not be
reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14) "wisdom
is the knowledge of Divine things. " Now that knowledge of Divine things
which man can acquire by his natural endowments, belongs to the wisdom
which is an intellectual virtue, while the supernatural knowledge of
Divine things belongs to faith which is a theological virtue, as
explained above (Q[4], A[5]; [2706]FS, Q[62], A[3]). Therefore wisdom
should be called a virtue rather than a gift.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Job 28:28): "Behold the fear of
the Lord, that is wisdom, and to depart from evil, that is
understanding. " And in this passage according to the rendering of the
Septuagint which Augustine follows (De Trin. xii, 14; xiv, 1) we read:
"Behold piety, that is wisdom. " Now both fear and piety are gifts of
the Holy Ghost. Therefore wisdom should not be reckoned among the gifts
of the Holy Ghost, as though it were distinct from the others.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): "The Spirit of the Lord
shall rest upon Him; the spirit of wisdom and of understanding. "
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. i: 2), it belongs
to wisdom to consider the highest cause. By means of that cause we are
able to form a most certain judgment about other causes, and according
thereto all things should be set in order. Now the highest cause may be
understood in two ways, either simply or in some particular genus.
Accordingly he that knows the highest cause in any particular genus,
and by its means is able to judge and set in order all the things that
belong to that genus, is said to be wise in that genus, for instance in
medicine or architecture, according to 1 Cor. 3:10: "As a wise
architect, I have laid a foundation. " On the other hand, he who knows
the cause that is simply the highest, which is God, is said to be wise
simply, because he is able to judge and set in order all things
according to Divine rules.
Now man obtains this judgment through the Holy Ghost, according to 1
Cor. 2:15: "The spiritual man judgeth all things," because as stated in
the same chapter (1 Cor. 2:10), "the Spirit searcheth all things, yea
the deep things of God. " Wherefore it is evident that wisdom is a gift
of the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: A thing is said to be good in two senses: first
in the sense that it is truly good and simply perfect, secondly, by a
kind of likeness, being perfect in wickedness; thus we speak of a good
or a perfect thief, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. v, text. 21).
And just as with regard to those things which are truly good, we find a
highest cause, namely the sovereign good which is the last end, by
knowing which, man is said to be truly wise, so too in evil things
something is to be found to which all others are to be referred as to a
last end, by knowing which, man is said to be wise unto evil doing,
according to Jer. 4:22: "They are wise to do evils, but to do good they
have no knowledge. " Now whoever turns away from his due end, must needs
fix on some undue end, since every agent acts for an end. Wherefore, if
he fixes his end in external earthly things, his "wisdom" is called
"earthly," if in the goods of the body, it is called "sensual wisdom,"
if in some excellence, it is called "devilish wisdom" because it
imitates the devil's pride, of which it is written (Job 41:25): "He is
king over all the children of pride. "
Reply to Objection 2: The wisdom which is called a gift of the Holy
Ghost, differs from that which is an acquired intellectual virtue, for
the latter is attained by human effort, whereas the latter is
"descending from above" (James 3:15).
In like manner it differs from
faith, since faith assents to the Divine truth in itself, whereas it
belongs to the gift of wisdom to judge according to the Divine truth.
Hence the gift of wisdom presupposes faith, because "a man judges well
what he knows" (Ethic. i, 3).
Reply to Objection 3: Just as piety which pertains to the worship of
God is a manifestation of faith, in so far as we make profession of
faith by worshipping God, so too, piety manifests wisdom. For this
reason piety is stated to be wisdom, and so is fear, for the same
reason, because if a man fear and worship God, this shows that he has a
right judgment about Divine things.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether wisdom is in the intellect as its subject?
Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not in the intellect as its
subject. For Augustine says (Ep. cxx) that "wisdom is the charity of
God. " Now charity is in the will as its subject, and not in the
intellect, as stated above ([2707]Q[24], A[1]). Therefore wisdom is not
in the intellect as its subject.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 6:23): "The wisdom of
doctrine is according to her name," for wisdom [sapientia] may be
described as "sweet-tasting science [sapida scientia]," and this would
seem to regard the appetite, to which it belongs to taste spiritual
pleasure or sweetness. Therefore wisdom is in the appetite rather than
in the intellect.
Objection 3: Further, the intellective power is sufficiently perfected
by the gift of understanding. Now it is superfluous to require two
things where one suffices for the purpose. Therefore wisdom is not in
the intellect.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "wisdom is contrary
to folly. " But folly is in the intellect. Therefore wisdom is also.
I answer that, As stated above [2708](A[1]), wisdom denotes a certain
rectitude of judgment according to the Eternal Law. Now rectitude of
judgment is twofold: first, on account of perfect use of reason,
secondly, on account of a certain connaturality with the matter about
which one has to judge. Thus, about matters of chastity, a man after
inquiring with his reason forms a right judgment, if he has learnt the
science of morals, while he who has the habit of chastity judges of
such matters by a kind of connaturality.
Accordingly it belongs to the wisdom that is an intellectual virtue to
pronounce right judgment about Divine things after reason has made its
inquiry, but it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Ghost to judge
aright about them on account of connaturality with them: thus Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. ii) that "Hierotheus is perfect in Divine things, for
he not only learns, but is patient of, Divine things. "
Now this sympathy or connaturality for Divine things is the result of
charity, which unites us to God, according to 1 Cor. 6:17: "He who is
joined to the Lord, is one spirit. " Consequently wisdom which is a
gift, has its cause in the will, which cause is charity, but it has its
essence in the intellect, whose act is to judge aright, as stated above
([2709]FS, Q[14], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of wisdom as to its cause,
whence also wisdom [sapientia] takes its name, in so far as it denotes
a certain sweetness [saporem]. Hence the Reply to the Second Objection
is evident, that is if this be the true meaning of the text quoted.
For, apparently this is not the case, because such an exposition of the
text would only fit the Latin word for wisdom, whereas it does not
apply to the Greek and perhaps not in other languages. Hence it would
seem that in the text quoted wisdom stands for the renown of doctrine,
for which it is praised by all.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellect exercises a twofold act, perception
and judgment. The gift of understanding regards the former; the gift of
wisdom regards the latter according to the Divine ideas, the gift of
knowledge, according to human ideas.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether wisdom is merely speculative, or practical also?
Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not practical but merely
speculative. For the gift of wisdom is more excellent than the wisdom
which is an intellectual virtue. But wisdom, as an intellectual virtue,
is merely speculative. Much more therefore is wisdom, as a gift,
speculative and not practical.
Objection 2: Further, the practical intellect is about matters of
operation which are contingent. But wisdom is about Divine things which
are eternal and necessary. Therefore wisdom cannot be practical.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "in
contemplation we seek the Beginning which is God, but in action we
labor under a mighty bundle of wants. " Now wisdom regards the vision of
Divine things, in which there is no toiling under a load, since
according to Wis. 8:16, "her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her
company any tediousness. " Therefore wisdom is merely contemplative, and
not practical or active.
On the contrary, It is written (Col. 4:5): "Walk with wisdom towards
them that are without. " Now this pertains to action. Therefore wisdom
is not merely speculative, but also practical.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14), the higher part of
the reason is the province of wisdom, while the lower part is the
domain of knowledge. Now the higher reason according to the same
authority (De Trin. xii, 7) "is intent on the consideration and
consultation of the heavenly," i. e. Divine, "types" [*Cf. [2710]FP,
Q[79], A[9]; [2711]FS, Q[74], A[7]]; it considers them, in so far as it
contemplates Divine things in themselves, and it consults them, in so
far as it judges of human acts by Divine things, and directs human acts
according to Divine rules.
Accordingly wisdom as a gift, is not merely speculative but also
practical.
Reply to Objection 1: The higher a virtue is, the greater the number of
things to which it extends, as stated in De Causis, prop. x, xvii.
Wherefore from the very fact that wisdom as a gift is more excellent
than wisdom as an intellectual virtue, since it attains to God more
intimately by a kind of union of the soul with Him, it is able to
direct us not only in contemplation but also in action.
Reply to Objection 2: Divine things are indeed necessary and eternal in
themselves, yet they are the rules of the contingent things which are
the subject-matter of human actions.
Reply to Objection 3: A thing is considered in itself before being
compared with something else. Wherefore to wisdom belongs first of all
contemplation which is the vision of the Beginning, and afterwards the
direction of human acts according to the Divine rules. Nor from the
direction of wisdom does there result any bitterness or toil in human
acts; on the contrary the result of wisdom is to make the bitter sweet,
and labor a rest.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether wisdom can be without grace, and with mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom can be without grace and with
mortal sin. For saints glory chiefly in such things as are incompatible
with mortal sin, according to 2 Cor. 1:12: "Our glory is this, the
testimony of our conscience. " Now one ought not to glory in one's
wisdom, according to Jer. 9:23: "Let not the wise man glory in his
wisdom. " Therefore wisdom can be without grace and with mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, wisdom denotes knowledge of Divine things, as
stated above [2712](A[1]). Now one in mortal sin may have knowledge of
the Divine truth, according to Rom. 1:18: "(Those men that) detain the
truth of God in injustice. " Therefore wisdom is compatible with mortal
sin.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking
of charity: "Nothing surpasses this gift of God, it is this alone that
divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of
eternal perdition. " But wisdom is distinct from charity. Therefore it
does not divide the children of the kingdom from the children of
perdition. Therefore it is compatible with mortal sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 1:4): "Wisdom will not enter into
a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins. "
I answer that, The wisdom which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as stated
above [2713](A[1]), enables us to judge aright of Divine things, or of
other things according to Divine rules, by reason of a certain
connaturalness or union with Divine things, which is the effect of
charity, as stated above [2714](A[2]; Q[23], A[5]). Hence the wisdom of
which we are speaking presupposes charity. Now charity is incompatible
with mortal sin, as shown above (Q[24], A[12]). Therefore it follows
that the wisdom of which we are speaking cannot be together with mortal
sin.
Reply to Objection 1: These words are to be understood as referring to
worldly wisdom, or to wisdom in Divine things acquired through human
reasons. In such wisdom the saints do not glory, according to Prov.
30:2: "The wisdom of men is not with Me": But they do glory in Divine
wisdom according to 1 Cor. 1:30: "(Who) of God is made unto us wisdom. "
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers, not the wisdom of which
we speak but that which is acquired by the study and research of
reason, and is compatible with mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Although wisdom is distinct from charity, it
presupposes it, and for that very reason divides the children of
perdition from the children of the kingdom.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether wisdom is in all who have grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not in all who have grace.
For it is more to have wisdom than to hear wisdom. Now it is only for
the perfect to hear wisdom, according to 1 Cor. 2:6: "We speak wisdom
among the perfect. " Since then not all who have grace are perfect, it
seems that much less all who have grace have wisdom.
Objection 2: Further, "The wise man sets things in order," as the
Philosopher states (Metaph. i, 2): and it is written (James 3:17) that
the wise man "judges without dissimulation [*Vulg. : 'The wisdom that is
from above . . . is . . . without judging, without dissimulation']".
Now it is not for all that have grace, to judge, or put others in
order, but only for those in authority. Therefore wisdom is not in all
that have grace.
Objection 3: Further, "Wisdom is a remedy against folly," as Gregory
says (Moral. ii, 49). Now many that have grace are naturally foolish,
for instance madmen who are baptized or those who without being guilty
of mortal sin have become insane. Therefore wisdom is not in all that
have grace.
On the contrary, Whoever is without mortal sin, is beloved of God;
since he has charity, whereby he loves God, and God loves them that
love Him (Prov. 8:17). Now it is written (Wis. 7:28) that "God loveth
none but him that dwelleth with wisdom. " Therefore wisdom is in all
those who have charity and are without mortal sin.
I answer that, The wisdom of which we are speaking, as stated above
[2715](A[4]), denotes a certain rectitude of judgment in the
contemplation and consultation of Divine things, and as to both of
these men obtain various degrees of wisdom through union with Divine
things. For the measure of right judgment attained by some, whether in
the contemplation of Divine things or in directing human affairs
according to Divine rules, is no more than suffices for their
salvation. This measure is wanting to none who is without mortal sin
through having sanctifying grace, since if nature does not fail in
necessaries, much less does grace fail: wherefore it is written (1 Jn.
2:27): "(His) unction teacheth you of all things. "
Some, however, receive a higher degree of the gift of wisdom, both as
to the contemplation of Divine things (by both knowing more exalted
mysteries and being able to impart this knowledge to others) and as to
the direction of human affairs according to Divine rules (by being able
to direct not only themselves but also others according to those
rules). This degree of wisdom is not common to all that have
sanctifying grace, but belongs rather to the gratuitous graces, which
the Holy Ghost dispenses as He will, according to 1 Cor. 12:8: "To one
indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom," etc.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle speaks there of wisdom, as extending
to the hidden mysteries of Divine things, as indeed he says himself (2
Cor. 1:7): "We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, a wisdom which is
hidden. "
Reply to Objection 2: Although it belongs to those alone who are in
authority to direct and judge other men, yet every man is competent to
direct and judge his own actions, as Dionysius declares (Ep. ad
Demophil. ).
Reply to Objection 3: Baptized idiots, like little children, have the
habit of wisdom, which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, but they have not
the act, on account of the bodily impediment which hinders the use of
reason in them.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the seventh beatitude corresponds to the gift of wisdom?
Objection 1: It seems that the seventh beatitude does not correspond to
the gift of wisdom. For the seventh beatitude is: "Blessed are the
peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God. " Now both
these things belong to charity: since of peace it is written (Ps.
118:165): "Much peace have they that love Thy law," and, as the Apostle
says (Rom. 5:5), "the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by
the Holy Ghost Who is given to us," and Who is "the Spirit of adoption
of sons, whereby we cry: Abba [Father]" (Rom. 8:15). Therefore the
seventh beatitude ought to be ascribed to charity rather than to
wisdom.
Objection 2: Further, a thing is declared by its proximate effect
rather than by its remote effect. Now the proximate effect of wisdom
seems to be charity, according to Wis. 7:27: "Through nations she
conveyeth herself into holy souls; she maketh the friends of God and
prophets": whereas peace and the adoption of sons seem to be remote
effects, since they result from charity, as stated above ([2716]Q[29],
A[3]). Therefore the beatitude corresponding to wisdom should be
determined in respect of the love of charity rather than in respect of
peace.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (James 3:17): "The wisdom, that is
from above, first indeed is chaste, then peaceable, modest, easy to be
persuaded, consenting to the good, full of mercy and good fruits,
judging without dissimulation [*Vulg. : 'without judging, without
dissimulation']. " Therefore the beatitude corresponding to wisdom
should not refer to peace rather than to the other effects of heavenly
wisdom.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) that
"wisdom is becoming to peacemakers, in whom there is no movement of
rebellion, but only obedience to reason. "
I answer that, The seventh beatitude is fittingly ascribed to the gift
of wisdom, both as to the merit and as to the reward. The merit is
denoted in the words, "Blessed are the peacemakers. " Now a peacemaker
is one who makes peace, either in himself, or in others: and in both
cases this is the result of setting in due order those things in which
peace is established, for "peace is the tranquillity of order,"
according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). Now it belongs to wisdom
to set things in order, as the Philosopher declares (Metaph. i, 2),
wherefore peaceableness is fittingly ascribed to wisdom. The reward is
expressed in the words, "they shall be called the children of God. " Now
men are called the children of God in so far as they participate in the
likeness of the only-begotten and natural Son of God, according to Rom.
8:29, "Whom He foreknew . . . to be made conformable to the image of
His Son," Who is Wisdom Begotten. Hence by participating in the gift of
wisdom, man attains to the sonship of God.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to charity to be at peace, but it
belongs to wisdom to make peace by setting things in order. Likewise
the Holy Ghost is called the "Spirit of adoption" in so far as we
receive from Him the likeness of the natural Son, Who is the Begotten
Wisdom.
Reply to Objection 2: These words refer to the Uncreated Wisdom, which
in the first place unites itself to us by the gift of charity, and
consequently reveals to us the mysteries the knowledge of which is
infused wisdom. Hence, the infused wisdom which is a gift, is not the
cause but the effect of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above [2717](A[3]) it belongs to
wisdom, as a gift, not only to contemplate Divine things, but also to
regulate human acts. Now the first thing, to be effected in this
direction of human acts is the removal of evils opposed to wisdom:
wherefore fear is said to be "the beginning of wisdom," because it
makes us shun evil, while the last thing is like an end, whereby all
things are reduced to their right order; and it is this that
constitutes peace. Hence James said with reason that "the wisdom that
is from above" (and this is the gift of the Holy Ghost) "first indeed
is chaste," because it avoids the corruption of sin, and "then
peaceable," wherein lies the ultimate effect of wisdom, for which
reason peace is numbered among the beatitudes. As to the things that
follow, they declare in becoming order the means whereby wisdom leads
to peace. For when a man, by chastity, avoids the corruption of sin,
the first thing he has to do is, as far as he can, to be moderate in
all things, and in this respect wisdom is said to be modest. Secondly,
in those matters in which he is not sufficient by himself, he should be
guided by the advice of others, and as to this we are told further that
wisdom is "easy to be persuaded. " These two are conditions required
that man may be at peace with himself. But in order that man may be at
peace with others it is furthermore required, first that he should not
be opposed to their good; this is what is meant by "consenting to the
good. " Secondly, that he should bring to his neighbor's deficiencies,
sympathy in his heart, and succor in his actions, and this is denoted
by the words "full of mercy and good fruits. " Thirdly, he should strive
in all charity to correct the sins of others, and this is indicated by
the words "judging without dissimulation [*Vulg. : 'The wisdom that is
from above . . . is . . . without judging, without dissimulation'],"
lest he should purpose to sate his hatred under cover of correction.
__________________________________________________________________
OF FOLLY WHICH IS OPPOSED TO WISDOM (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider folly which is opposed to wisdom; and under this
head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether folly is contrary to wisdom?
(2) Whether folly is a sin?
(3) To which capital sin is it reducible?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether folly is contrary to wisdom?
Objection 1: It would seem that folly is not contrary to wisdom. For
seemingly unwisdom is directly opposed to wisdom. But folly does not
seem to be the same as unwisdom, for the latter is apparently about
Divine things alone, whereas folly is about both Divine and human
things. Therefore folly is not contrary to wisdom.
Objection 2: Further, one contrary is not the way to arrive at the
other. But folly is the way to arrive at wisdom, for it is written (1
Cor. 3:18): "If any man among you seem to be wise in this world, let
him become a fool, that he may be wise. " Therefore folly is not opposed
to wisdom.
Objection 3: Further, one contrary is not the cause of the other. But
wisdom is the cause of folly; for it is written (Jer.
Objection 3: Further, to love God with one's whole heart belongs to
perfection, since according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, text. 64),
"to be whole is to be perfect. " But that which belongs to perfection is
not a matter of precept, but a matter of counsel. Therefore we ought
not to be commanded to love God with our whole heart.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy
God with thy whole heart. "
I answer that, Since precepts are given about acts of virtue, an act is
a matter of precept according as it is an act of virtue. Now it is
requisite for an act of virtue that not only should it fall on its own
matter, but also that it should be endued with its due circumstances,
whereby it is adapted to that matter. But God is to be loved as the
last end, to which all things are to be referred. Therefore some kind
of totality was to be indicated in connection with the precept of the
love of God.
Reply to Objection 1: The commandment that prescribes an act of virtue
does not prescribe the mode which that virtue derives from another and
higher virtue, but it does prescribe the mode which belongs to its own
proper virtue, and this mode is signified in the words "with thy whole
heart. "
Reply to Objection 2: To love God with one's whole heart has a twofold
signification. First, actually, so that a man's whole heart be always
actually directed to God: this is the perfection of heaven. Secondly,
in the sense that a man's whole heart be habitually directed to God, so
that it consent to nothing contrary to the love of God, and this is the
perfection of the way. Venial sin is not contrary to this latter
perfection, because it does not destroy the habit of charity, since it
does not tend to a contrary object, but merely hinders the use of
charity.
Reply to Objection 3: That perfection of charity to which the counsels
are directed, is between the two perfections mentioned in the preceding
reply: and it consists in man renouncing, as much as possible, temporal
things, even such as are lawful, because they occupy the mind and
hinder the actual movement of the heart towards God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether to the words, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole
heart," it was fitting to add "and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole
strength"?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was unfitting to the words, "Thou
shalt love the Lord thy God, with thy whole heart," to add, "and with
thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength" (Dt. 6:5). For heart does
not mean here a part of the body, since to love God is not a bodily
action: and therefore heart is to be taken here in a spiritual sense.
Now the heart understood spiritually is either the soul itself or part
of the soul. Therefore it is superfluous to mention both heart and
soul.
Objection 2: Further, a man's strength whether spiritual or corporal
depends on the heart. Therefore after the words, "Thou shalt love the
Lord thy God with thy whole heart," it was unnecessary to add, "with
all thy strength. "
Objection 3: Further, in Mat. 22:37 we read: "With all thy mind," which
words do not occur here. Therefore it seems that this precept is
unfittingly worded in Dt. 6.
On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, This precept is differently worded in various places:
for, as we said in the first objection, in Dt. 6 three points are
mentioned: "with thy whole heart," and "with thy whole soul," and "with
thy whole strength. " In Mat. 22 we find two of these mentioned, viz.
"with thy whole heart" and "with thy whole soul," while "with thy whole
strength" is omitted, but "with thy whole mind" is added. Yet in Mark
12 we find all four, viz. "with thy whole heart," and "with thy whole
soul," and "with thy whole mind," and "with thy whole force" which is
the same as "strength. " Moreover, these four are indicated in Luke 10,
where in place of "strength" or "force" we read "with all thy might. "
[*St. Thomas is explaining the Latin text which reads "ex tota
fortitudine tua" (Dt. ), "ex tota virtue tua" (Mk. ), and "ex omnibus
tuis" (Lk. ), although the Greek in all three cases has {ex holes tes
ischyos}, which the Douay renders "with thy whole strength. "]
Accordingly these four have to be explained, since the fact that one of
them is omitted here or there is due to one implying another. We must
therefore observe that love is an act of the will which is here denoted
by the "heart," because just as the bodily heart is the principle of
all the movements of the body, so too the will, especially as regards
the intention of the last end which is the object of charity, is the
principle of all the movements of the soul. Now there are three
principles of action that are moved by the will, namely, the intellect
which is signified by "the mind," the lower appetitive power, signified
by "the soul"; and the exterior executive power signified by
"strength," "force" or "might. " Accordingly we are commanded to direct
our whole intention to God, and this is signified by the words "with
thy whole heart"; to submit our intellect to God, and this is expressed
in the words "with thy whole mind"; to regulate our appetite according
to God, in the words "with thy whole soul"; and to obey God in our
external actions, and this is to love God with our whole "strength,"
"force" or "might. "
Chrysostom [*The quotation is from an anonymous author's unfinished
work (Opus imperf. Hom. xlii, in Matth. ) which is included in
Chrysostom's works], on the other hand, takes "heart" and "soul" in the
contrary sense; and Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) refers "heart"
to the thought, "soul" to the manner of life, and "mind" to the
intellect. Again some explain "with thy whole heart" as denoting the
intellect, "with thy whole soul" as signifying the will, "with thy
mind" as pointing to the memory. And again, according to Gregory of
Nyssa (De Hom. Opif. viii), "heart" signifies the vegetative soul,
"soul" the sensitive, and "mind" the intellective soul, because our
nourishment, sensation, and understanding ought all to be referred by
us to God.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is possible in this life to fulfil this precept of the love of
God?
Objection 1: It would seem that in this life it is possible to fulfil
this precept of the love of God. For according to Jerome [*Pelagius,
Exposit. Cath. Fid. ] "accursed is he who says that Cod has commanded
anything impossible. " But God gave this commandment, as is clear from
Dt. 6:5. Therefore it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life.
Objection 2: Further, whoever does not fulfil a precept sins mortally,
since according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) sin is nothing else than "a
transgression of the Divine Law, and disobedience of the heavenly
commandments. " If therefore this precept cannot be fulfilled by
wayfarers, it follows that in this life no man can be without mortal
sin, and this is against the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 1:8): "(Who
also) will confirm you unto the end without crime," and (1 Tim. 3:10):
"Let them minister, having no crime. "
Objection 3: Further, precepts are given in order to direct man in the
way of salvation, according to Ps. 18:9: "The commandment of the Lord
is lightsome, enlightening the eyes. " Now it is useless to direct
anyone to what is impossible. Therefore it is not impossible to fulfill
this precept in this life.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii): "In the
fulness of heavenly charity this precept will be fulfilled: Thou shalt
love the Lord thy God," etc. For as long as any carnal concupiscence
remains, that can be restrained by continence, man cannot love God with
all his heart.
I answer that, A precept can be fulfilled in two ways; perfectly, and
imperfectly. A precept is fulfilled perfectly, when the end intended by
the author of the precept is reached; yet it is fulfilled, imperfectly
however, when although the end intended by its author is not reached,
nevertheless the order to that end is not departed from. Thus if the
commander of an army order his soldiers to fight, his command will be
perfectly obeyed by those who fight and conquer the foe, which is the
commander's intention; yet it is fulfilled, albeit imperfectly, by
those who fight without gaining the victory, provided they do nothing
contrary to military discipline. Now God intends by this precept that
man should be entirely united to Him, and this will be realized in
heaven, when God will be "all in all," according to 1 Cor. 15:28. Hence
this precept will be observed fully and perfectly in heaven; yet it is
fulfilled, though imperfectly, on the way. Nevertheless on the way one
man will fulfil it more perfectly than another, and so much the more,
as he approaches by some kind of likeness to the perfection of heaven.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that the precept can be
fulfilled after a fashion on the way, but not perfectly.
Reply to Objection 2: Even as the soldier who fights legitimately
without conquering is not blamed nor deserves to be punished for this,
so too he that does not fulfil this precept on the way, but does
nothing against the love of God, does not sin mortally.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii),
"why should not this perfection be prescribed to man, although no man
attains it in this life? For one cannot run straight unless one knows
whither to run. And how would one know this if no precept pointed it
out. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the precept of love of our neighbor is fittingly expressed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precept of the love of our neighbor
is unfittingly expressed. For the love of charity extends to all men,
even to our enemies, as may be seen in Mat. 5:44. But the word
"neighbor" denotes a kind of "nighness" which does not seem to exist
towards all men. Therefore it seems that this precept is unfittingly
expressed.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) "the
origin of our friendly relations with others lies in our relation to
ourselves," whence it seems to follow that love of self is the origin
of one's love for one's neighbor. Now the principle is greater than
that which results from it. Therefore man ought not to love his
neighbor as himself.
Objection 3: Further, man loves himself, but not his neighbor,
naturally. Therefore it is unfitting that he should be commanded to
love his neighbor as himself.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 22:39): "The second" commandment
"is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. "
I answer that, This precept is fittingly expressed, for it indicates
both the reason for loving and the mode of love. The reason for loving
is indicated in the word "neighbor," because the reason why we ought to
love others out of charity is because they are nigh to us, both as to
the natural image of God, and as to the capacity for glory. Nor does it
matter whether we say "neighbor," or "brother" according to 1 Jn. 4:21,
or "friend," according to Lev. 19:18, because all these words express
the same affinity.
The mode of love is indicated in the words "as thyself. " This does not
mean that a man must love his neighbor equally as himself, but in like
manner as himself, and this in three ways. First, as regards the end,
namely, that he should love his neighbor for God's sake, even as he
loves himself for God's sake, so that his love for his neighbor is a
"holy" love. Secondly, as regards the rule of love, namely, that a man
should not give way to his neighbor in evil, but only in good things,
even as he ought to gratify his will in good things alone, so that his
love for his neighbor may be a "righteous" love. Thirdly, as regards
the reason for loving, namely, that a man should love his neighbor, not
for his own profit, or pleasure, but in the sense of wishing his
neighbor well, even as he wishes himself well, so that his love for his
neighbor may be a "true" love: since when a man loves his neighbor for
his own profit or pleasure, he does not love his neighbor truly, but
loves himself.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the order of charity is included in the precept?
Objection 1: It would seem that the order of charity is not included in
the precept. For whoever transgresses a precept does a wrong. But if
man loves some one as much as he ought, and loves any other man more,
he wrongs no man. Therefore he does not transgress the precept.
Therefore the order of charity is not included in the precept.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is a matter of precept is sufficiently
delivered to us in Holy Writ. Now the order of charity which was given
above ([2702]Q[26]) is nowhere indicated in Holy Writ. Therefore it is
not included in the precept.
Objection 3: Further, order implies some kind of distinction. But the
love of our neighbor is prescribed without any distinction, in the
words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. " Therefore the order
of charity is not included in the precept.
On the contrary, Whatever God works in us by His grace, He teaches us
first of all by His Law, according to Jer. 31:33: "I will give My Law
in their heart [*Vulg. : 'in their bowels, and I will write it in their
heart']. " Now God causes in us the order of charity, according to Cant
2:4: "He set in order charity in me. " Therefore the order of charity
comes under the precept of the Law.
I answer that, As stated above (A[4], ad 1), the mode which is
essential to an act of virtue comes under the precept which prescribes
that virtuous act. Now the order of charity is essential to the virtue,
since it is based on the proportion of love to the thing beloved, as
shown above ([2703]Q[25], A[12];[2704] Q[26], AA[1],2). It is therefore
evident that the order of charity must come under the precept.
Reply to Objection 1: A man gratifies more the person he loves more, so
that if he loved less one whom he ought to love more, he would wish to
gratify more one whom he ought to gratify less, and so he would do an
injustice to the one he ought to love more.
Reply to Objection 2: The order of those four things we have to love
out of charity is expressed in Holy Writ. For when we are commanded to
love God with our "whole heart," we are given to understand that we
must love Him above all things. When we are commanded to love our
neighbor "as ourselves," the love of self is set before love of our
neighbor. In like manner where we are commanded (1 Jn. 3:16) "to lay
down our souls," i. e. the life of our bodies, "for the brethren," we
are given to understand that a man ought to love his neighbor more than
his own body; and again when we are commanded (Gal. 6:10) to "work good
. . . especially to those who are of the household of the faith," and
when a man is blamed (1 Tim. 5:8) if he "have not care of his own, and
especially of those of his house," it means that we ought to love most
those of our neighbors who are more virtuous or more closely united to
us.
Reply to Objection 3: It follows from the very words, "Thou shalt love
thy neighbor" that those who are nearer to us are to be loved more.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE GIFT OF WISDOM (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gift of wisdom which corresponds to charity;
and firstly, wisdom itself, secondly, the opposite vice. Under the
first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy
Ghost?
(2) What is its subject?
(3) Whether wisdom is only speculative or also practical?
(4) Whether the wisdom that is a gift is compatible with mortal sin?
(5) Whether it is in all those who have sanctifying grace?
(6) Which beatitude corresponds to it?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?
Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom ought not to be reckoned among
the gifts of the Holy Ghost. For the gifts are more perfect than the
virtues, as stated above ([2705]FS, Q[68], A[8]). Now virtue is
directed to the good alone, wherefore Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii,
19) that "no man makes bad use of the virtues. " Much more therefore are
the gifts of the Holy Ghost directed to the good alone. But wisdom is
directed to evil also, for it is written (James 3:15) that a certain
wisdom is "earthly, sensual, devilish. " Therefore wisdom should not be
reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14) "wisdom
is the knowledge of Divine things. " Now that knowledge of Divine things
which man can acquire by his natural endowments, belongs to the wisdom
which is an intellectual virtue, while the supernatural knowledge of
Divine things belongs to faith which is a theological virtue, as
explained above (Q[4], A[5]; [2706]FS, Q[62], A[3]). Therefore wisdom
should be called a virtue rather than a gift.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Job 28:28): "Behold the fear of
the Lord, that is wisdom, and to depart from evil, that is
understanding. " And in this passage according to the rendering of the
Septuagint which Augustine follows (De Trin. xii, 14; xiv, 1) we read:
"Behold piety, that is wisdom. " Now both fear and piety are gifts of
the Holy Ghost. Therefore wisdom should not be reckoned among the gifts
of the Holy Ghost, as though it were distinct from the others.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): "The Spirit of the Lord
shall rest upon Him; the spirit of wisdom and of understanding. "
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. i: 2), it belongs
to wisdom to consider the highest cause. By means of that cause we are
able to form a most certain judgment about other causes, and according
thereto all things should be set in order. Now the highest cause may be
understood in two ways, either simply or in some particular genus.
Accordingly he that knows the highest cause in any particular genus,
and by its means is able to judge and set in order all the things that
belong to that genus, is said to be wise in that genus, for instance in
medicine or architecture, according to 1 Cor. 3:10: "As a wise
architect, I have laid a foundation. " On the other hand, he who knows
the cause that is simply the highest, which is God, is said to be wise
simply, because he is able to judge and set in order all things
according to Divine rules.
Now man obtains this judgment through the Holy Ghost, according to 1
Cor. 2:15: "The spiritual man judgeth all things," because as stated in
the same chapter (1 Cor. 2:10), "the Spirit searcheth all things, yea
the deep things of God. " Wherefore it is evident that wisdom is a gift
of the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: A thing is said to be good in two senses: first
in the sense that it is truly good and simply perfect, secondly, by a
kind of likeness, being perfect in wickedness; thus we speak of a good
or a perfect thief, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. v, text. 21).
And just as with regard to those things which are truly good, we find a
highest cause, namely the sovereign good which is the last end, by
knowing which, man is said to be truly wise, so too in evil things
something is to be found to which all others are to be referred as to a
last end, by knowing which, man is said to be wise unto evil doing,
according to Jer. 4:22: "They are wise to do evils, but to do good they
have no knowledge. " Now whoever turns away from his due end, must needs
fix on some undue end, since every agent acts for an end. Wherefore, if
he fixes his end in external earthly things, his "wisdom" is called
"earthly," if in the goods of the body, it is called "sensual wisdom,"
if in some excellence, it is called "devilish wisdom" because it
imitates the devil's pride, of which it is written (Job 41:25): "He is
king over all the children of pride. "
Reply to Objection 2: The wisdom which is called a gift of the Holy
Ghost, differs from that which is an acquired intellectual virtue, for
the latter is attained by human effort, whereas the latter is
"descending from above" (James 3:15).
In like manner it differs from
faith, since faith assents to the Divine truth in itself, whereas it
belongs to the gift of wisdom to judge according to the Divine truth.
Hence the gift of wisdom presupposes faith, because "a man judges well
what he knows" (Ethic. i, 3).
Reply to Objection 3: Just as piety which pertains to the worship of
God is a manifestation of faith, in so far as we make profession of
faith by worshipping God, so too, piety manifests wisdom. For this
reason piety is stated to be wisdom, and so is fear, for the same
reason, because if a man fear and worship God, this shows that he has a
right judgment about Divine things.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether wisdom is in the intellect as its subject?
Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not in the intellect as its
subject. For Augustine says (Ep. cxx) that "wisdom is the charity of
God. " Now charity is in the will as its subject, and not in the
intellect, as stated above ([2707]Q[24], A[1]). Therefore wisdom is not
in the intellect as its subject.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 6:23): "The wisdom of
doctrine is according to her name," for wisdom [sapientia] may be
described as "sweet-tasting science [sapida scientia]," and this would
seem to regard the appetite, to which it belongs to taste spiritual
pleasure or sweetness. Therefore wisdom is in the appetite rather than
in the intellect.
Objection 3: Further, the intellective power is sufficiently perfected
by the gift of understanding. Now it is superfluous to require two
things where one suffices for the purpose. Therefore wisdom is not in
the intellect.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "wisdom is contrary
to folly. " But folly is in the intellect. Therefore wisdom is also.
I answer that, As stated above [2708](A[1]), wisdom denotes a certain
rectitude of judgment according to the Eternal Law. Now rectitude of
judgment is twofold: first, on account of perfect use of reason,
secondly, on account of a certain connaturality with the matter about
which one has to judge. Thus, about matters of chastity, a man after
inquiring with his reason forms a right judgment, if he has learnt the
science of morals, while he who has the habit of chastity judges of
such matters by a kind of connaturality.
Accordingly it belongs to the wisdom that is an intellectual virtue to
pronounce right judgment about Divine things after reason has made its
inquiry, but it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Ghost to judge
aright about them on account of connaturality with them: thus Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. ii) that "Hierotheus is perfect in Divine things, for
he not only learns, but is patient of, Divine things. "
Now this sympathy or connaturality for Divine things is the result of
charity, which unites us to God, according to 1 Cor. 6:17: "He who is
joined to the Lord, is one spirit. " Consequently wisdom which is a
gift, has its cause in the will, which cause is charity, but it has its
essence in the intellect, whose act is to judge aright, as stated above
([2709]FS, Q[14], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of wisdom as to its cause,
whence also wisdom [sapientia] takes its name, in so far as it denotes
a certain sweetness [saporem]. Hence the Reply to the Second Objection
is evident, that is if this be the true meaning of the text quoted.
For, apparently this is not the case, because such an exposition of the
text would only fit the Latin word for wisdom, whereas it does not
apply to the Greek and perhaps not in other languages. Hence it would
seem that in the text quoted wisdom stands for the renown of doctrine,
for which it is praised by all.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellect exercises a twofold act, perception
and judgment. The gift of understanding regards the former; the gift of
wisdom regards the latter according to the Divine ideas, the gift of
knowledge, according to human ideas.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether wisdom is merely speculative, or practical also?
Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not practical but merely
speculative. For the gift of wisdom is more excellent than the wisdom
which is an intellectual virtue. But wisdom, as an intellectual virtue,
is merely speculative. Much more therefore is wisdom, as a gift,
speculative and not practical.
Objection 2: Further, the practical intellect is about matters of
operation which are contingent. But wisdom is about Divine things which
are eternal and necessary. Therefore wisdom cannot be practical.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "in
contemplation we seek the Beginning which is God, but in action we
labor under a mighty bundle of wants. " Now wisdom regards the vision of
Divine things, in which there is no toiling under a load, since
according to Wis. 8:16, "her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her
company any tediousness. " Therefore wisdom is merely contemplative, and
not practical or active.
On the contrary, It is written (Col. 4:5): "Walk with wisdom towards
them that are without. " Now this pertains to action. Therefore wisdom
is not merely speculative, but also practical.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14), the higher part of
the reason is the province of wisdom, while the lower part is the
domain of knowledge. Now the higher reason according to the same
authority (De Trin. xii, 7) "is intent on the consideration and
consultation of the heavenly," i. e. Divine, "types" [*Cf. [2710]FP,
Q[79], A[9]; [2711]FS, Q[74], A[7]]; it considers them, in so far as it
contemplates Divine things in themselves, and it consults them, in so
far as it judges of human acts by Divine things, and directs human acts
according to Divine rules.
Accordingly wisdom as a gift, is not merely speculative but also
practical.
Reply to Objection 1: The higher a virtue is, the greater the number of
things to which it extends, as stated in De Causis, prop. x, xvii.
Wherefore from the very fact that wisdom as a gift is more excellent
than wisdom as an intellectual virtue, since it attains to God more
intimately by a kind of union of the soul with Him, it is able to
direct us not only in contemplation but also in action.
Reply to Objection 2: Divine things are indeed necessary and eternal in
themselves, yet they are the rules of the contingent things which are
the subject-matter of human actions.
Reply to Objection 3: A thing is considered in itself before being
compared with something else. Wherefore to wisdom belongs first of all
contemplation which is the vision of the Beginning, and afterwards the
direction of human acts according to the Divine rules. Nor from the
direction of wisdom does there result any bitterness or toil in human
acts; on the contrary the result of wisdom is to make the bitter sweet,
and labor a rest.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether wisdom can be without grace, and with mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom can be without grace and with
mortal sin. For saints glory chiefly in such things as are incompatible
with mortal sin, according to 2 Cor. 1:12: "Our glory is this, the
testimony of our conscience. " Now one ought not to glory in one's
wisdom, according to Jer. 9:23: "Let not the wise man glory in his
wisdom. " Therefore wisdom can be without grace and with mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, wisdom denotes knowledge of Divine things, as
stated above [2712](A[1]). Now one in mortal sin may have knowledge of
the Divine truth, according to Rom. 1:18: "(Those men that) detain the
truth of God in injustice. " Therefore wisdom is compatible with mortal
sin.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking
of charity: "Nothing surpasses this gift of God, it is this alone that
divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of
eternal perdition. " But wisdom is distinct from charity. Therefore it
does not divide the children of the kingdom from the children of
perdition. Therefore it is compatible with mortal sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 1:4): "Wisdom will not enter into
a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins. "
I answer that, The wisdom which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as stated
above [2713](A[1]), enables us to judge aright of Divine things, or of
other things according to Divine rules, by reason of a certain
connaturalness or union with Divine things, which is the effect of
charity, as stated above [2714](A[2]; Q[23], A[5]). Hence the wisdom of
which we are speaking presupposes charity. Now charity is incompatible
with mortal sin, as shown above (Q[24], A[12]). Therefore it follows
that the wisdom of which we are speaking cannot be together with mortal
sin.
Reply to Objection 1: These words are to be understood as referring to
worldly wisdom, or to wisdom in Divine things acquired through human
reasons. In such wisdom the saints do not glory, according to Prov.
30:2: "The wisdom of men is not with Me": But they do glory in Divine
wisdom according to 1 Cor. 1:30: "(Who) of God is made unto us wisdom. "
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers, not the wisdom of which
we speak but that which is acquired by the study and research of
reason, and is compatible with mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Although wisdom is distinct from charity, it
presupposes it, and for that very reason divides the children of
perdition from the children of the kingdom.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether wisdom is in all who have grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not in all who have grace.
For it is more to have wisdom than to hear wisdom. Now it is only for
the perfect to hear wisdom, according to 1 Cor. 2:6: "We speak wisdom
among the perfect. " Since then not all who have grace are perfect, it
seems that much less all who have grace have wisdom.
Objection 2: Further, "The wise man sets things in order," as the
Philosopher states (Metaph. i, 2): and it is written (James 3:17) that
the wise man "judges without dissimulation [*Vulg. : 'The wisdom that is
from above . . . is . . . without judging, without dissimulation']".
Now it is not for all that have grace, to judge, or put others in
order, but only for those in authority. Therefore wisdom is not in all
that have grace.
Objection 3: Further, "Wisdom is a remedy against folly," as Gregory
says (Moral. ii, 49). Now many that have grace are naturally foolish,
for instance madmen who are baptized or those who without being guilty
of mortal sin have become insane. Therefore wisdom is not in all that
have grace.
On the contrary, Whoever is without mortal sin, is beloved of God;
since he has charity, whereby he loves God, and God loves them that
love Him (Prov. 8:17). Now it is written (Wis. 7:28) that "God loveth
none but him that dwelleth with wisdom. " Therefore wisdom is in all
those who have charity and are without mortal sin.
I answer that, The wisdom of which we are speaking, as stated above
[2715](A[4]), denotes a certain rectitude of judgment in the
contemplation and consultation of Divine things, and as to both of
these men obtain various degrees of wisdom through union with Divine
things. For the measure of right judgment attained by some, whether in
the contemplation of Divine things or in directing human affairs
according to Divine rules, is no more than suffices for their
salvation. This measure is wanting to none who is without mortal sin
through having sanctifying grace, since if nature does not fail in
necessaries, much less does grace fail: wherefore it is written (1 Jn.
2:27): "(His) unction teacheth you of all things. "
Some, however, receive a higher degree of the gift of wisdom, both as
to the contemplation of Divine things (by both knowing more exalted
mysteries and being able to impart this knowledge to others) and as to
the direction of human affairs according to Divine rules (by being able
to direct not only themselves but also others according to those
rules). This degree of wisdom is not common to all that have
sanctifying grace, but belongs rather to the gratuitous graces, which
the Holy Ghost dispenses as He will, according to 1 Cor. 12:8: "To one
indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom," etc.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle speaks there of wisdom, as extending
to the hidden mysteries of Divine things, as indeed he says himself (2
Cor. 1:7): "We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, a wisdom which is
hidden. "
Reply to Objection 2: Although it belongs to those alone who are in
authority to direct and judge other men, yet every man is competent to
direct and judge his own actions, as Dionysius declares (Ep. ad
Demophil. ).
Reply to Objection 3: Baptized idiots, like little children, have the
habit of wisdom, which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, but they have not
the act, on account of the bodily impediment which hinders the use of
reason in them.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the seventh beatitude corresponds to the gift of wisdom?
Objection 1: It seems that the seventh beatitude does not correspond to
the gift of wisdom. For the seventh beatitude is: "Blessed are the
peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God. " Now both
these things belong to charity: since of peace it is written (Ps.
118:165): "Much peace have they that love Thy law," and, as the Apostle
says (Rom. 5:5), "the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by
the Holy Ghost Who is given to us," and Who is "the Spirit of adoption
of sons, whereby we cry: Abba [Father]" (Rom. 8:15). Therefore the
seventh beatitude ought to be ascribed to charity rather than to
wisdom.
Objection 2: Further, a thing is declared by its proximate effect
rather than by its remote effect. Now the proximate effect of wisdom
seems to be charity, according to Wis. 7:27: "Through nations she
conveyeth herself into holy souls; she maketh the friends of God and
prophets": whereas peace and the adoption of sons seem to be remote
effects, since they result from charity, as stated above ([2716]Q[29],
A[3]). Therefore the beatitude corresponding to wisdom should be
determined in respect of the love of charity rather than in respect of
peace.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (James 3:17): "The wisdom, that is
from above, first indeed is chaste, then peaceable, modest, easy to be
persuaded, consenting to the good, full of mercy and good fruits,
judging without dissimulation [*Vulg. : 'without judging, without
dissimulation']. " Therefore the beatitude corresponding to wisdom
should not refer to peace rather than to the other effects of heavenly
wisdom.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) that
"wisdom is becoming to peacemakers, in whom there is no movement of
rebellion, but only obedience to reason. "
I answer that, The seventh beatitude is fittingly ascribed to the gift
of wisdom, both as to the merit and as to the reward. The merit is
denoted in the words, "Blessed are the peacemakers. " Now a peacemaker
is one who makes peace, either in himself, or in others: and in both
cases this is the result of setting in due order those things in which
peace is established, for "peace is the tranquillity of order,"
according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). Now it belongs to wisdom
to set things in order, as the Philosopher declares (Metaph. i, 2),
wherefore peaceableness is fittingly ascribed to wisdom. The reward is
expressed in the words, "they shall be called the children of God. " Now
men are called the children of God in so far as they participate in the
likeness of the only-begotten and natural Son of God, according to Rom.
8:29, "Whom He foreknew . . . to be made conformable to the image of
His Son," Who is Wisdom Begotten. Hence by participating in the gift of
wisdom, man attains to the sonship of God.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to charity to be at peace, but it
belongs to wisdom to make peace by setting things in order. Likewise
the Holy Ghost is called the "Spirit of adoption" in so far as we
receive from Him the likeness of the natural Son, Who is the Begotten
Wisdom.
Reply to Objection 2: These words refer to the Uncreated Wisdom, which
in the first place unites itself to us by the gift of charity, and
consequently reveals to us the mysteries the knowledge of which is
infused wisdom. Hence, the infused wisdom which is a gift, is not the
cause but the effect of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above [2717](A[3]) it belongs to
wisdom, as a gift, not only to contemplate Divine things, but also to
regulate human acts. Now the first thing, to be effected in this
direction of human acts is the removal of evils opposed to wisdom:
wherefore fear is said to be "the beginning of wisdom," because it
makes us shun evil, while the last thing is like an end, whereby all
things are reduced to their right order; and it is this that
constitutes peace. Hence James said with reason that "the wisdom that
is from above" (and this is the gift of the Holy Ghost) "first indeed
is chaste," because it avoids the corruption of sin, and "then
peaceable," wherein lies the ultimate effect of wisdom, for which
reason peace is numbered among the beatitudes. As to the things that
follow, they declare in becoming order the means whereby wisdom leads
to peace. For when a man, by chastity, avoids the corruption of sin,
the first thing he has to do is, as far as he can, to be moderate in
all things, and in this respect wisdom is said to be modest. Secondly,
in those matters in which he is not sufficient by himself, he should be
guided by the advice of others, and as to this we are told further that
wisdom is "easy to be persuaded. " These two are conditions required
that man may be at peace with himself. But in order that man may be at
peace with others it is furthermore required, first that he should not
be opposed to their good; this is what is meant by "consenting to the
good. " Secondly, that he should bring to his neighbor's deficiencies,
sympathy in his heart, and succor in his actions, and this is denoted
by the words "full of mercy and good fruits. " Thirdly, he should strive
in all charity to correct the sins of others, and this is indicated by
the words "judging without dissimulation [*Vulg. : 'The wisdom that is
from above . . . is . . . without judging, without dissimulation'],"
lest he should purpose to sate his hatred under cover of correction.
__________________________________________________________________
OF FOLLY WHICH IS OPPOSED TO WISDOM (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider folly which is opposed to wisdom; and under this
head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether folly is contrary to wisdom?
(2) Whether folly is a sin?
(3) To which capital sin is it reducible?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether folly is contrary to wisdom?
Objection 1: It would seem that folly is not contrary to wisdom. For
seemingly unwisdom is directly opposed to wisdom. But folly does not
seem to be the same as unwisdom, for the latter is apparently about
Divine things alone, whereas folly is about both Divine and human
things. Therefore folly is not contrary to wisdom.
Objection 2: Further, one contrary is not the way to arrive at the
other. But folly is the way to arrive at wisdom, for it is written (1
Cor. 3:18): "If any man among you seem to be wise in this world, let
him become a fool, that he may be wise. " Therefore folly is not opposed
to wisdom.
Objection 3: Further, one contrary is not the cause of the other. But
wisdom is the cause of folly; for it is written (Jer.
