Therefore
the marriage consent is a consent to carnal intercourse.
Summa Theologica
(2) Whether a constant man can be compelled by fear?
(3) Whether compulsory consent invalidates marriage?
(4) Whether compulsory consent makes a marriage as regards the party
using compulsion?
(5) Whether conditional consent makes a marriage?
(6) Whether one can be compelled by one's father to marry?
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Whether a compulsory consent is possible?
Objection 1: It would seem that no consent can be compulsory. For, as
stated above (Sent. ii, D, 25 [*[4944]FS, Q[6], A[4]]) the free-will
cannot be compelled. Now consent is an act of the free-will. Therefore
it cannot be compulsory.
Objection 2: Further, violent is the same as compulsory. Now, according
to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1), "a violent action is one the
principle of which is without, the patient concurring not at all. " But
the principle of consent is always within. Therefore no consent can be
compulsory.
Objection 3: Further, every sin is perfected by consent. But that which
perfects a sin cannot be compulsory, for, according to Augustine (De
Lib. Arb. iii, 18), "no one sins in what he cannot avoid. " Since then
violence is defined by jurists (i, ff. de eo quod vi metusve) as the
"force of a stronger being that cannot be repulsed," it would seem that
consent cannot be compulsory or violent.
Objection 4: Further, power is opposed to liberty. But compulsion is
allied to power, as appears from a definition of Tully's in which he
says that "compulsion is the force of one who exercises his power to
detain a thing outside its proper bounds. " Therefore the free-will
cannot be compelled, and consequently neither can consent which is an
act thereof.
On the contrary, That which cannot be, cannot be an impediment. But
compulsory consent is an impediment to matrimony, as stated in the text
(Sent. iv, D, 29). Therefore consent can be compelled.
Further, in marriage there is a contract. Now the will can be compelled
in the matter of contracts; for which reason the law adjudges that
restitution should be made of the whole, for it does not ratify "that
which was done under compulsion or fear" (Sent. iv, D[29]). Therefore
in marriage also it is possible for the consent to be compulsory.
I answer that, Compulsion or violence is twofold. One is the cause of
absolute necessity, and violence of this kind the Philosopher calls
(Ethic. iii, 1) "violent simply," as when by bodily strength one forces
a person to move; the other causes conditional necessity, and the
Philosopher calls this a "mixed violence," as when a person throws his
merchandise overboard in order to save himself. In the latter kind of
violence, although the thing done is not voluntary in itself, yet
taking into consideration the circumstances of place and time it is
voluntary. And since actions are about particulars, it follows that it
is voluntary simply, and involuntary in a certain respect (Cf.
[4945]FS, Q[6], A[6]). Wherefore this latter violence or compulsion is
consistent with consent, but not the former. And since this compulsion
results from one's fear of a threatening danger, it follows that this
violence coincides with fear which, in a manner, compels the will,
whereas the former violence has to do with bodily actions. Moreover,
since the law considers not merely internal actions, but rather
external actions, consequently it takes violence to mean absolute
compulsion, for which reason it draws a distinction between violence
and fear. Here, however, it is a question of internal consent which
cannot be influenced by compulsion or violence as distinct from fear.
Therefore as to the question at issue compulsion and fear are the same.
Now, according to lawyers fear is "the agitation of the mind occasioned
by danger imminent or future" (Ethic. iii, 1).
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections; for the first set of
arguments consider the first kind of compulsion, and the second set of
arguments consider the second.
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Whether a constant man can be compelled by fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that "a constant man" [*Cap. Ad audientiam,
De his quae vi. ] cannot be compelled by fear. Because the nature of a
constant man is not to be agitated in the midst of dangers. Since then
fear is "agitation of the mind occasioned by imminent danger," it would
seem that he is not compelled by fear.
Objection 2: Further, "Of all fearsome things death is the limit,"
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6), as though it were the
most perfect of all things that inspire fear. But the constant man is
not compelled by death, since the brave face even mortal dangers.
Therefore no fear influences a constant man.
Objection 3: Further, of all dangers a good man fears most that which
affects his good name. But the fear of disgrace is not reckoned to
influence a constant man, because, according to the law (vii, ff, de eo
quod metus, etc. ), "fear of disgrace is not included under the
ordinance, 'That which is done through fear'" [*Dig. iv, 2, Quod metus
causa]. Therefore neither does any other kind of fear influence a
constant man.
Objection 4: Further, in him who is compelled by fear, fear leaves a
sin, for it makes him promise what he is unwilling to fulfill, and thus
it makes him lie. But a constant man does not commit a sin, not even a
very slight one, for fear. Therefore no fear influences a constant man.
On the contrary, Abraham and Isaac were constant. Yet they were
influenced by fear, since on account of fear each said that his wife
was his sister (Gn. 12:12; 26:7).
Further, wherever there is mixed violence, it is fear that compels. But
however constant a man may be he may suffer violence of that kind, for
if he be on the sea, he will throw his merchandise overboard if menaced
with shipwreck. Therefore fear can influence a constant man.
I answer that, By fear influencing a man we mean his being compelled by
fear. A man is compelled by fear when he does that which otherwise he
would not wish to do, in order to avoid that which he fears. Now the
constant differs from the inconstant man in two respects. First, in
respect of the quality of the danger feared, because the constant man
follows right reason, whereby he knows whether to omit this rather than
that, and whether to do this rather than that. Now the lesser evil or
the greater good is always to be chosen in preference; and therefore
the constant man is compelled to bear with the lesser evil through fear
of the greater evil, but he is not compelled to bear with the greater
evil in order to avoid the lesser. But the inconstant man is compelled
to bear with the greater evil through fear of a lesser evil, namely to
commit sin through fear of bodily suffering; whereas on the contrary
the obstinate man cannot be compelled even to permit or to do a lesser
evil, in order to avoid a greater. Hence the constant man is a mean
between the inconstant and the obstinate. Secondly, they differ as to
their estimate of the threatening evil, for a constant man is not
compelled unless for grave and probable reasons, while the inconstant
man is compelled by trifling motives: "The wicked man seeth when no man
pursueth" (Prov. 28:1).
Reply to Objection 1: The constant man, like the brave man, is
fearless, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 4), not that he is
altogether without fear, but because he fears not what he ought not to
fear, or where, or when he ought not to fear.
Reply to Objection 2: Sin is the greatest of evils, and consequently a
constant man can nowise be compelled to sin; indeed a man should die
rather than suffer the like, as again the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
6,9). Yet certain bodily injuries are less grievous than certain
others; and chief among them are those which relate to the person, such
as death, blows, the stain resulting from rape, and slavery. Wherefore
the like compel a constant man to suffer other bodily injuries. They
are contained in the verse: "Rape, status, blows, and death. " Nor does
it matter whether they refer to his own person, or to the person of his
wife or children, or the like.
Reply to Objection 3: Although disgrace is a greater injury it is easy
to remedy it. Hence fear of disgrace is not reckoned to influence a
constant man according to law.
Reply to Objection 4: The constant man is not compelled to lie, because
at the time he wishes to give; yet afterwards he wishes to ask for
restitution, or at least to appeal to the judge, if he promised not to
ask for restitution. But he cannot promise not to appeal, for since
this is contrary to the good of justice, he cannot be compelled
thereto, namely to act against justice.
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Whether compulsory consent invalidates a marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that compulsory consent does not invalidate
a marriage. For just as consent is necessary for matrimony, so is
intention necessary for Baptism. Now one who is compelled by fear to
receive Baptism, receives the sacrament. Therefore one who is compelled
by fear to consent is bound by his marriage.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1),
that which is done on account of mixed violence is more voluntary than
involuntary. Now consent cannot be compelled except by mixed violence.
Therefore it is not entirely involuntary, and consequently the marriage
is valid.
Objection 3: Further, seemingly he who has consented to marriage under
compulsion ought to be counseled to stand to that marriage; because to
promise and not to fulfill has an "appearance of evil," and the Apostle
wishes us to refrain from all such things (1 Thess 5:22). But that
would not be the case if compulsory consent invalidated a marriage
altogether. Therefore, etc.
On the contrary, A Decretal says (cap. Cum locum, De sponsal. et
matrim. ): "Since there is no room for consent where fear or compulsion
enters in, it follows that where a person's consent is required, every
pretext for compulsion must be set aside. " Now mutual contract is
necessary in marriage. Therefore, etc.
Further, Matrimony signifies the union of Christ with the Church, which
union is according to the liberty of love. Therefore it cannot be the
result of compulsory consent.
I answer that, The marriage bond is everlasting. Hence whatever is
inconsistent with its perpetuity invalidates marriage. Now the fear
which compels a constant man deprives the contract of its perpetuity,
since its complete rescission can be demanded. Wherefore this
compulsion by fear which influences a constant man, invalidates
marriage, but not the other compulsion. Now a constant man is reckoned
a virtuous man who, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4), is a
measure in all human actions.
However, some say that if there be consent although compulsory, the
marriage is valid in conscience and in God's sight, but not in the eyes
of the Church, who presumes that there was no inward consent on account
of the fear. But this is of no account, because the Church should not
presume a person to sin until it be proved; and he sinned if he said
that he consented whereas he did not consent. Wherefore the Church
presumes that he did consent, but judges this compulsory consent to be
insufficient for a valid marriage.
Reply to Objection 1: The intention is not the efficient cause of the
sacrament in baptism, it is merely the cause that elicits the action of
the agent; whereas the consent is the efficient cause in matrimony.
Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: Not any kind of voluntariness suffices for
marriage: it must be completely voluntary, because it has to be
perpetual; and consequently it is invalidated by violence of a mixed
nature.
Reply to Objection 3: He ought not always to be advised to stand to
that marriage, but only when evil results are feared from its
dissolution. Nor does he sin if he does otherwise, because there is no
appearance of evil in not fulfilling a promise that one has made
unwillingly.
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Whether compulsory consent makes a marriage as regards the party who uses
compulsion?
Objection 1: It would seem that compulsory consent makes a marriage, at
least as regards the party who uses compulsion. For matrimony is a sign
of a spiritual union. But spiritual union which is by charity may be
with one who has not charity. Therefore marriage is possible with one
who wills it not.
Objection 2: Further, if she who was compelled consents afterwards, it
will be a true marriage. But he who compelled her before is not bound
by her consent. Therefore he was married to her by virtue of the
consent he gave before.
On the contrary, Matrimony is an equiparant relation. Now a relation of
that kind is equally in both terms. Therefore if there is an impediment
on the part of one, there will be no marriage on the part of the other.
I answer that, Since marriage is a kind of relation, and a relation
cannot arise in one of the terms without arising in the other, it
follows that whatever is an impediment to matrimony in the one, is an
impediment to matrimony in the other; since it is impossible for a man
to be the husband of one who is not his wife, or for a woman to be a
wife without a husband, just as it is impossible to be a mother without
having a child. Hence it is a common saying that "marriage is not
lame. "
Reply to Objection 1: Although the act of the lover can be directed to
one who loves not, there can be no union between them, unless love be
mutual. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 2) that friendship
which consists in a kind of union requires a return of love.
Reply to Objection 2: Marriage does not result from the consent of her
who was compelled before, except in so far as the other party's
previous consent remains in force; wherefore if he were to withdraw his
consent there would be no marriage.
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Whether conditional consent makes a marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that not even a conditional consent makes a
marriage, because a statement is not made simply if it is made subject
to a condition. But in marriage the words expressive of consent must be
uttered simply. Therefore a conditional consent makes no marriage.
Objection 2: Further, marriage should be certain. But where a statement
is made under a condition it is rendered doubtful. Therefore a like
consent makes no marriage.
On the contrary, In other contracts an obligation is undertaken
conditionally, and holds so long as the condition holds. Therefore
since marriage is a contract, it would seem that it can be made by a
conditional consent.
I answer that, The condition made is either of the present or of the
future. If it is of the present and is not contrary to marriage,
whether it be moral or immoral, the marriage holds if the condition is
verified, and is invalid if the condition is not verified. If, however,
it be contrary to the marriage blessings, the marriage is invalid, as
we have also said in reference to betrothals ([4946]Q[43], A[1]). But
if the condition refer to the future, it is either necessary, as that
the sun will rise tomorrow---and then the marriage is valid, because
such future things are present in their causes---or else it is
contingent, as the payment of a sum of money, or the consent of the
parents, and then the judgment about a consent of this kind is the same
as about a consent expressed in words of the future tense; wherefore it
makes no marriage.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether one can be compelled by one's father's command to marry?
Objection 1: It would seem that one can be compelled by one's father's
command to marry. For it is written (Col. 3:20): "Children, obey your
parents in all things. " Therefore they are bound to obey them in this
also.
Objection 2: Further, Isaac charged Jacob (Gn. 28:1) not to take a wife
from the daughters of Chanaan. But he would not have charged him thus
unless he had the right to command it. Therefore a son is bound to obey
his father in this.
Objection 3: Further, no one should promise, especially with an oath,
for one whom he cannot compel to keep the promise. Now parents promise
future marriages for their children, and even confirm their promise by
oath. Therefore they can compel their children to keep that promise.
Objection 4: Further, our spiritual father, the Pope to wit, can by his
command compel a man to a spiritual marriage, namely to accept a
bishopric. Therefore a carnal father can compel his son to marriage.
On the contrary, A son may lawfully enter religion though his father
command him to marry. Therefore he is not bound to obey him in this.
Further, if he were bound to obey, a betrothal contracted by the
parents would hold good without their children's consent. But this is
against the law (cap. Ex litteris, De despon. impub. ). Therefore, etc.
I answer that, Since in marriage there is a kind of perpetual service,
as it were, a father cannot by his command compel his son to marry,
since the latter is of free condition: but he may induce him for a
reasonable cause; and thus the son will be affected by his father's
command in the same way as he is affected by that cause, so that if the
cause be compelling as indicating either obligation or fitness, his
father's command will compel him in the same measure: otherwise he may
not compel him.
Reply to Objection 1: The words of the Apostle do not refer to those
matters in which a man is his own master as the father is. Such is
marriage by which the son also becomes a father.
Reply to Objection 2: There were other motives why Jacob was bound to
do what Isaac commanded him, both on account of the wickedness of those
women, and because the seed of Chanaan was to be cast forth from the
land which was promised to the seed of the patriarchs. Hence Isaac
could command this.
Reply to Objection 3: They do not swear except with the implied
condition "if it please them"; and they are bound to induce them in
good faith.
Reply to Objection 4: Some say that the Pope cannot command a man to
accept a bishopric, because consent should be free. But if this be
granted there would be an end of ecclesiastical order, for unless a man
can be compelled to accept the government of a church, the Church could
not be preserved, since sometimes those who are qualified for the
purpose are unwilling to accept unless they be compelled. Therefore we
must reply that the two cases are not parallel; for there is no bodily
service in a spiritual marriage as there is in the bodily marriage;
because the spiritual marriage is a kind of office for dispensing the
public weal: "Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ,
and the dispensers of the mysteries of God" (1 Cor. 4:1).
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OF THE OBJECT OF THE CONSENT (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the object of the consent. Under this head there
are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the consent that makes a marriage is a consent to carnal
intercourse?
(2) Whether consent to marry a person for an immoral motive makes a
marriage?
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Whether the consent that makes a marriage is a consent to carnal
intercourse?
Objection 1: It would seem that the consent which makes a marriage is a
consent to carnal intercourse. For Jerome [*The words quoted are found
implicitly in St. Augustine (De Bono Viduit ix)] says that "for those
who have vowed virginity it is wicked, not only to marry, but even to
wish to marry. " But it would not be wicked unless it were contrary to
virginity, and marriage is not contrary to virginity except by reason
of carnal intercourse. Therefore the will's consent in marriage is a
consent to carnal intercourse.
Objection 2: Further, whatever there is in marriage between husband and
wife is lawful between brother and sister except carnal intercourse.
But there cannot lawfully be a consent to marriage between them.
Therefore the marriage consent is a consent to carnal intercourse.
Objection 3: Further, if the woman say to the man: "I consent to take
thee provided however that you know me not," it is not a marriage
consent, because it contains something against the essence of that
consent. Yet this would not be the case unless the marriage consent
were a consent to carnal intercourse. Therefore, etc.
Objection 4: Further, in everything the beginning corresponds to the
consummation. Now marriage is consummated by carnal intercourse.
Therefore, since it begins by the consent, it would seem that the
consent is to carnal intercourse.
On the contrary, No one that consents to carnal intercourse is a virgin
in mind and body. Yet Blessed John the evangelist after consenting to
marriage was a virgin both in mind and body. Therefore he did not
consent to carnal intercourse.
Further, the effect corresponds to its cause. Now consent is the cause
of marriage. Since then carnal intercourse is not essential to
marriage, seemingly neither is the consent which causes marriage a
consent to carnal intercourse.
I answer that, The consent that makes a marriage is a consent to
marriage, because the proper effect of the will is the thing willed.
Wherefore, according as carnal intercourse stands in relation to
marriage, so far is the consent that causes marriage a consent to
carnal intercourse. Now, as stated above ([4947]Q[44], A[1];[4948]
Q[45], AA[1],2), marriage is not essentially the carnal union itself,
but a certain joining together of husband and wife ordained to carnal
intercourse, and a further consequent union between husband and wife,
in so far as they each receive power over the other in reference to
carnal intercourse, which joining together is called the nuptial bond.
Hence it is evident that they said well who asserted that to consent to
marriage is to consent to carnal intercourse implicitly and not
explicitly. For carnal intercourse is not to be understood, except as
an effect is implicitly contained in its cause, for the power to have
carnal intercourse, which power is the object of the consent, is the
cause of carnal intercourse, just as the power to use one's own
property is the cause of the use.
Reply to Objection 1: The reason why consent to marriage after taking
the vow of virginity is sinful, is because that consent gives a power
to do what is unlawful: even so would a man sin if he gave another man
the power to receive that which he has in deposit, and not only by
actually delivering it to him. With regard to the consent of the
Blessed Virgin, we have spoken about it above (Sent. iv, D, 3;
[4949]TP, Q[29], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: Between brother and sister there can be no power
of one over the other in relation to carnal intercourse, even as
neither can there be lawfully carnal intercourse itself. Consequently
the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 3: Such an explicit condition is contrary not only
to the act but also to the power of carnal intercourse, and therefore
it is contrary to marriage.
Reply to Objection 4: Marriage begun corresponds to marriage
consummated, as habit or power corresponds to the act which is
operation.
The arguments on the contrary side show that consent is not given
explicitly to carnal intercourse; and this is true.
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Whether marriage can result from one person's consent to take another for a
base motive?
Objection 1: It would seem that marriage cannot result from one
person's consent to take another for a base motive. For there is but
one reason for one thing. Now marriage is one sacrament. Therefore it
cannot result from the intention of any other end than that for which
it was instituted by God; namely the begetting of children.
Objection 2: Further, the marriage union is from God, according to Mat.
19:6, "What . . . God hath joined together let no man put asunder. " But
a union that is made for immoral motives is not from God. Therefore it
is not a marriage.
Objection 3: Further, in the other sacraments, if the intention of the
Church be not observed, the sacrament is invalid. Now the intention of
the Church in the sacrament of matrimony is not directed to a base
purpose. Therefore, if a marriage be contracted for a base purpose, it
will not be a valid marriage.
Objection 4: Further, according to Boethius (De Diff. , Topic. ii) "a
thing is good if its end be good. " But matrimony is always good.
Therefore it is not matrimony if it is done for an evil end.
Objection 5: Further, matrimony signifies the union of Christ with the
Church; and in this there can be nothing base. Neither therefore can
marriage be contracted for a base motive.
On the contrary, He who baptizes another for the sake of gain baptizes
validly. Therefore if a man marries a woman for the purpose of gain it
is a valid marriage.
Further, the same conclusion is proved by the examples and authorities
quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 30).
I answer that, The final cause of marriage may be taken as twofold,
namely essential and accidental. The essential cause of marriage is the
end to which it is by its very nature ordained, and this is always
good, namely the begetting of children and the avoiding of fornication.
But the accidental final cause thereof is that which the contracting
parties intend as the result of marriage. And since that which is
intended as the result of marriage is consequent upon marriage, and
since that which comes first is not altered by what comes after, but
conversely; marriage does not become good or evil by reason of that
cause, but the contracting parties to whom this cause is the essential
end. And since accidental causes are infinite in number, it follows
that there can be an infinite number of such causes in matrimony, some
of which are good and some bad.
Reply to Objection 1: This is true of the essential and principal
cause; but that which has one essential and principal end may have
several secondary essential ends, and an infinite number of accidental
ends.
Reply to Objection 2: The joining together can be taken for the
relation itself which is marriage, and that is always from God, and is
good, whatever be its cause; or for the act of those who are being
joined together, and thus it is sometimes evil and is not from God
simply. Nor is it unreasonable that an effect be from God, the cause of
which is evil, such as a child born of adultery; for it is not from
that cause as evil, but as having some good in so far as it is from
God, although it is not from God simply.
Reply to Objection 3: The intention of the Church whereby she intends
to confer a sacrament is essential to each sacrament, so that if it be
not observed, all sacraments are null. But the intention of the Church
whereby she intends an advantage resulting from the sacrament belongs
to the well-being and not to the essence of a sacrament; wherefore, if
it be not observed, the sacrament is none the less valid. Yet he who
omits this intention sins; for instance if in baptism one intend not
the healing of the mind which the Church intends. In like manner he who
intends to marry, although he fail to direct it to the end which the
Church intends, nevertheless contracts a valid marriage.
Reply to Objection 4: This evil which is intended is the end not of
marriage, but of the contracting parties.
Reply to Objection 5: The union itself, and not the action of those who
are united, is the sign of the union of Christ with the Church:
wherefore the conclusion does not follow.
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OF THE MARRIAGE GOODS* (SIX ARTICLES) [*"Bona matrimonii," variously rendered
marriage goods, marriage blessings, and advantages of marriage. ]
In the next place we must consider the marriage goods. Under this head
there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether certain goods are necessary in order to excuse marriage?
(2) Whether those assigned are sufficient?
(3) Whether the sacrament is the principal among the goods?
(4) Whether the marriage act is excused from sin by the aforesaid
goods?
(5) Whether it can ever be excused from sin without them?
(6) Whether in their absence it is always a mortal sin?
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Whether certain blessings are necessary in order to excuse marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that certain blessings are not necessary in
order to excuse marriage. For just as the preservation of the
individual which is effected by the nutritive power is intended by
nature, so too is the preservation of the species which is effected by
marriage; and indeed so much the more as the good of the species is
better and more exalted than the good of the individual. But no goods
are necessary to excuse the act of the nutritive power. Neither
therefore are they necessary to excuse marriage.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12)
the friendship between husband and wife is natural, and includes the
virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. But that which is virtuous in
itself needs no excuse. Therefore neither should any goods be assigned
for the excuse of matrimony.
Objection 3: Further, matrimony was instituted as a remedy and as an
office, as stated above ([4950]Q[42], A[2]). Now it needs no excuse in
so far as it is instituted as an office, since then it would also have
needed an excuse in paradise, which is false, for there, as Augustine
says, "marriage would have been without reproach and the marriage-bed
without stain" (Gen. ad lit. ix). In like manner neither does it need
an excuse in so far as it is intended as a remedy, any more than the
other sacraments which were instituted as remedies for sin. Therefore
matrimony does not need these excuses.
Objection 4: Further, the virtues are directed to whatever can be done
aright. If then marriage can be righted by certain goods, it needs
nothing else to right it besides the virtues of the soul; and
consequently there is no need to assign to matrimony any goods whereby
it is righted, any more than to other things in which the virtues
direct us.
On the contrary, Wherever there is indulgence, there must needs be some
reason for excuse. Now marriage is allowed in the state of infirmity
"by indulgence" (1 Cor. 7:6). Therefore it needs to be excused by
certain goods.
Further, the intercourse of fornication and that of marriage are of the
same species as regards the species of nature. But the intercourse of
fornication is wrong in itself. Therefore, in order that the marriage
intercourse be not wrong, something must be added to it to make it
right, and draw it to another moral species.
I answer that, No wise man should allow himself to lose a thing except
for some compensation in the shape of an equal or better good.
Wherefore for a thing that has a loss attached to it to be eligible, it
needs to have some good connected with it, which by compensating for
that loss makes that thing ordinate and right. Now there is a loss of
reason incidental to the union of man and woman, both because the
reason is carried away entirely on account of the vehemence of the
pleasure, so that it is unable to understand anything at the same time,
as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11); and again because of the
tribulation of the flesh which such persons have to suffer from
solicitude for temporal things (1 Cor. 7:28). Consequently the choice
of this union cannot be made ordinate except by certain compensations
whereby that same union is righted. and these are the goods which
excuse marriage and make it right.
Reply to Objection 1: In the act of eating there is not such an intense
pleasure overpowering the reason as in the aforesaid action, both
because the generative power, whereby original sin is transmitted, is
infected and corrupt, whereas the nutritive power, by which original
sin is not transmitted, is neither corrupt nor infected; and again
because each one feels in himself a defect of the individual more than
a defect of the species. Hence, in order to entice a man to take food
which supplies a defect of the individual, it is enough that he feel
this defect; but in order to entice him to the act whereby a defect of
the species is remedied, Divine providence attached pleasure to that
act, which moves even irrational animals in which there is not the
stain of original sin. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: These goods which justify marriage belong to the
nature of marriage, which consequently needs them, not as extrinsic
causes of its rectitude, but as causing in it that rectitude which
belongs to it by nature.
Reply to Objection 3: From the very fact that marriage is intended as
an office or as a remedy it has the aspect of something useful and
right; nevertheless both aspects belong to it from the fact that it has
these goods by which it fulfills the office and affords a remedy to
concupiscence.
Reply to Objection 4: An act of virtue may derive its rectitude both
from the virtue as its elicitive principle, and from its circumstances
as its formal principles; and the goods of marriage are related to
marriage as circumstances to an act of virtue which owes it to those
circumstances that it can be an act of virtue.
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Whether the goods of marriage are sufficiently enumerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the goods of marriage are
insufficiently enumerated by the Master (Sent. iv, D, 31), namely
"faith, offspring, and sacrament. " For the object of marriage among men
is not only the begetting and feeding of children, but also the
partnership of a common life, whereby each one contributes his share of
work to the common stock, as stated in Ethic. viii, 12. Therefore as
the offspring is reckoned a good of matrimony, so also should the
communication of works.
Objection 2: Further, the union of Christ with the Church, signified by
matrimony, is the effect of charity. Therefore charity rather than
faith should be reckoned among the goods of matrimony.
Objection 3: Further, in matrimony, just as it is required that neither
party have intercourse with another, so is it required that the one pay
the marriage debt to the other. Now the former pertains to faith
according to the Master (Sent. iv, D, 31). Therefore justice should
also be reckoned among the goods of marriage on account of the payment
of the debt.
Objection 4: Further, in matrimony as signifying the union of Christ
with the Church, just as indivisibility is required, so also is unity,
whereby one man has one wife. But the sacrament which is reckoned among
the three marriage goods pertains to indivisibility. Therefore there
should be something else pertaining to unity.
Objection 5: On the other hand, it would seem that they are too many.
For one virtue suffices to make one act right. Now faith is one virtue.
Therefore it was not necessary to add two other goods to make marriage
right.
Objection 6: Further, the same cause does not make a thing both useful
and virtuous, since the useful and the virtuous are opposite divisions
of the good. Now marriage derives its character of useful from the
offspring. Therefore the offspring should not be reckoned among the
goods that make marriage virtuous.
Objection 7: Further, nothing should be reckoned as a property or
condition of itself. Now these goods are reckoned to be conditions of
marriage. Therefore since matrimony is a sacrament, the sacrament
should not be reckoned a condition of matrimony.
I answer that, Matrimony is instituted both as an office of nature and
as a sacrament of the Church. As an office of nature it is directed by
two things, like every other virtuous act. one of these is required on
the part of the agent and is the intention of the due end, and thus the
"offspring" is accounted a good of matrimony; the other is required on
the part of the act, which is good generically through being about a
due matter; and thus we have "faith," whereby a man has intercourse
with his wife and with no other woman. Besides this it has a certain
goodness as a sacrament, and this is signified by the very word
"sacrament. "
Reply to Objection 1: Offspring signifies not only the begetting of
children, but also their education, to which as its end is directed the
entire communion of works that exists between man and wife as united in
marriage, since parents naturally "lay up" for their "children" (2 Cor.
12:14); so that the offspring like a principal end includes another, as
it were, secondary end.
Reply to Objection 2: Faith is not taken here as a theological virtue,
but as part of justice, in so far as faith [fides] signifies the
suiting of deed to word [fiant dicta] by keeping one's promises; for
since marriage is a contract it contains a promise whereby this man is
assigned to this woman.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the marriage promise means that neither
party is to have intercourse with a third party, so does it require
that they should mutually pay the marriage debt. The latter is indeed
the chief of the two, since it follows from the power which each
receives over the other. Consequently both these things pertain to
faith, although the Book of Sentences mentions that which is the less
manifest.
Reply to Objection 4: By sacrament we are to understand not only
indivisibility, but all those things that result from marriage being a
sign of Christ's union with the Church. We may also reply that the
unity to which the objection refers pertains to faith, just as
indivisibility belongs to the sacrament.
Reply to Objection 5: Faith here does not denote a virtue, but that
condition of virtue which is a part of justice and is called by the
name of faith.
Reply to Objection 6: Just as the right use of a useful good derives
its rectitude not from the useful but from the reason which causes the
right use, so too direction to a useful good may cause the goodness of
rectitude by virtue of the reason causing the right direction; and in
this way marriage, through being directed to the offspring, is useful,
and nevertheless righteous, inasmuch as it is directed aright.
Reply to Objection 7: As the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 31), sacrament
here does not mean matrimony itself, but its indissolubility, which is
a sign of the same thing as matrimony is.
We may also reply that although marriage is a sacrament, marriage as
marriage is not the same as marriage as a sacrament, since it was
instituted not only as a sign of a sacred thing, but also as an office
of nature. Hence the sacramental aspect is a condition added to
marriage considered in itself, whence also it derives its rectitude.
Hence its sacramentality, if I may use the term, is reckoned among the
goods which justify marriage; and accordingly this third good of
marriage, the sacrament to wit, denotes not only its indissolubility,
but also whatever pertains to its signification.
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Whether the sacrament is the chief of the marriage goods?
Objection 1: It would seem that the "sacrament" is not the chief of the
marriage goods. For the end is principal in everything. Now the end of
marriage is the offspring. Therefore the offspring is the chief
marriage good.
Objection 2: Further, in the specific nature the difference is more
important than the genus, even as the form is more important than
matter in the composition of a natural thing. Now "sacrament" refers to
marriage on the part of its genus, while "offspring" and "faith" refer
thereto on the part of the difference whereby it is a special kind of
sacrament. Therefore these other two are more important than sacrament
in reference to marriage.
Objection 3: Further, just as we find marriage without "offspring" and
without "faith," so do we find it without indissolubility, as in the
case where one of the parties enters religion before the marriage is
consummated. Therefore neither from this point of view is "sacrament"
the most important marriage good.
Objection 4: Further, an effect cannot be more important than its
cause. Now consent, which is the cause of matrimony, is often changed.
Therefore the marriage also can be dissolved and consequently
inseparability is not always a condition of marriage.
Objection 5: Further, the sacraments which produce an everlasting
effect imprint a character. But no character is imprinted in matrimony.
Therefore it is not conditioned by a lasting inseparability.
Consequently just as there is marriage without "offspring" so is there
marriage without "sacrament," and thus the same conclusion follows as
above.
On the contrary, That which has a place in the definition of a thing is
most essential thereto. Now inseparability, which pertains to
sacrament, is placed in the definition of marriage ([4951]Q[44], A[3]),
while offspring and faith are not. Therefore among the other goods
sacrament is the most essential to matrimony.
Further, the Divine power which works in the sacraments is more
efficacious than human power. But "offspring" and "faith" pertain to
matrimony as directed to an office of human nature, whereas "sacrament"
pertains to it as instituted by God. Therefore sacrament takes a more
important part in marriage than the other two.
I answer that, This or that may be more important to a thing in two
ways, either because it is more essential or because it is more
excellent. If the reason is because it is more excellent, then
"sacrament" is in every way the most important of the three marriage
goods, since it belongs to marriage considered as a sacrament of grace;
while the other two belong to it as an office of nature; and a
perfection of grace is more excellent than a perfection of nature. If,
however, it is said to be more important because it is more essential,
we must draw a distinction; for "faith" and "offspring" can be
considered in two ways. First, in themselves, and thus they regard the
use of matrimony in begetting children and observing the marriage
compact; while inseparability, which is denoted by "sacrament," regards
the very sacrament considered in itself, since from the very fact that
by the marriage compact man and wife give to one another power the one
over the other in perpetuity, it follows that they cannot be put
asunder. Hence there is no matrimony without inseparability, whereas
there is matrimony without "faith" and "offspring," because the
existence of a thing does not depend on its use; and in this sense
"sacrament" is more essential to matrimony than "faith" and
"offspring. " Secondly, "faith" and "offspring" may be considered as in
their principles, so that "offspring" denote the intention of having
children, and "faith" the duty of remaining faithful, and there can be
no matrimony without these also, since they are caused in matrimony by
the marriage compact itself, so that if anything contrary to these were
expressed in the consent which makes a marriage, the marriage would be
invalid. Taking "faith" and "offspring" in this sense, it is clear that
"offspring" is the most essential thing in marriage, secondly "faith,"
and thirdly "sacrament"; even as to man it is more essential to be in
nature than to be in grace, although it is more excellent to be in
grace.
Reply to Objection 1: The end as regards the intention stands first in
a thing, but as regards the attainment it stands last. It is the same
with "offspring" among the marriage goods; wherefore in a way it is the
most important and in another way it is not.
Reply to Objection 2: Sacrament, even as holding the third place among
the marriage goods, belongs to matrimony by reason of its difference;
for it is called "sacrament" from its signification of that particular
sacred thing which matrimony signifies.
Reply to Objection 3: According to Augustine (De Bono Conjug. ix),
marriage is a good of mortals, wherefore in the resurrection "they
shall neither marry nor be married" (Mat. 22:30). Hence the marriage
bond does not last after the life wherein it is contracted, and
consequently it is said to be inseparable, because it cannot be
sundered in this life, but either by bodily death after carnal union,
or by spiritual death after a merely spiritual union.
Reply to Objection 4: Although the consent which makes a marriage is
not everlasting materially, i. e. in regard to the substance of the act,
since that act ceases and a contrary act may succeed it, nevertheless
formally speaking it is everlasting, because it is a consent to an ever
lasting bond, else it would not make a marriage, for a consent to take
a woman for a time makes no marriage. Hence it is everlasting formally,
inasmuch as an act takes its species from its object; and thus it is
that matrimony derives its inseparability from the consent.
Reply to Objection 5: In those sacraments wherein a character is
imprinted, power is given to perform spiritual actions; but in
matrimony, to perform bodily actions. Wherefore matrimony by reason of
the power which man and wife receive over one another agrees with the
sacraments in which a character is imprinted, and from this it derives
its inseparability, as the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 31); yet it
differs from them in so far as that power regards bodily acts; hence it
does not confer a spiritual character.
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Whether the marriage act is excused by the aforesaid goods?
Objection 1: It would seem that the marriage act cannot be altogether
excused from sin by the aforesaid goods.
