17
supernaturalism
as a theology, which only claims in vain to be philosophical, was not a serious intellectual challenge to Hegel, although it attacked his position within the public sphere and annihilated his philosophy after Hegel's death with simple positions about immortality and god's personality.
Hegels Philosophy of the Historical Religions
According to louis massignon, islam and islamic mysticism is essentially 'testimonial monism', the 'monism' of a lover testifying of his beloved: 'you are the only one'.
only with regard to the mystical thinker ibn Arabi one sometimes still speaks of pantheism or of 'existential monism', but certainly not of rumi, whose spiritual world is very testimonial, dynamic and personal as hegel knew.
69
but with the inadequate qualification of pantheism, he still could discover something typical of, for example, hafiz' poetry. when hegel stresses that his poetry is ensouling the whole world of finite things by god's presence, and gives them their own place, he reproduces in his own way a typical feature of that literature. in hafiz you never know whether the poem is about god and mystical rapture or just about wine, drunk- enness and the tavern. still modern interpreters estimate the dictum of
68 Cf. Annemarie schimmel, As Through a Veil, Mystical Poetry in Islam, new york: Columbia university press 1982, pp. 49, 216 note 17.
69 for a critical discussion see, Annemarie schimmel, The Mystical Dimensions of Islam, Chapel hill, north Carolina: the university of north Carolina press 1975, p. 267.
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ru? ckert that hafiz always expresses by means of sensual realities a super- sensible realm of being. 70 the question is of course whether this poetical technique of hafiz has something to do with hegel's idea of the (semi) autonomy of the finite world. moreover, hegel makes things complicated by using this poetry, mediated by goethe, in a polemic with modern 'sub- jectivist' trends in german literature of his days. however, hegel's analysis of the problem of pantheism, his stressing of the relational character of finiteness and infinity as such, is still of vital importance for the under- standing of religion. moreover, hegel rightly uses mysticism as testimonial evidence.
Conclusion
what strikes us most in hegel's dealing with islam, is how modern already the religious world is his days was. the discussion about the fanatic char- acter of islam, or of all monotheism, is going on since then. the hindu philosopher and first president of india, s. radhakrishnan, writing in times of muslim separatism and Christian missions, again praised the greek and romans and reproached islam and Christianity for intolerance. At the same time, he tried to unite all religions by mysticism. 71 in modern times, the former president of iran, Khatami, tried to find access to the western world by sufism. hegel's enthusiasm for sufism and the bhagavad-gita elu- cidates the saying of the poet heinrich heine (1779-1856), that it was fash- ionable among german students of his time to learn sanskrit and to read hegel. 72 the romantic enthusiasm for mysticism, including islamic sufism, as the internationale of all religion and philosophy, present in the bud in hegel's thought, is a returning phenomenon in modern european history. it manifested itself again heavily between the two world wars and once more in the 'hippy' sixties of the twentieth century. reincarnated in the 'sixties', hegel himself could have been, for a while, a long-haired student-, striving for a better world, reading mystical texts and, god knows, smok- ing a joint. At the end, of course, hegel criticized romanticism heavily and did not want to give in to its innate tendency to take refuge to another
70 J. Ch. bu? rgel, 'einleitung', in: muhammad schams Ad-din hafis, Gedichte aus dem Diwan, ed. J. Ch. bu? rgel, stuttgart: reclam 1972, pp. 3-31.
71 s. radhakrishnan, A Hindu View of Life, london: Allan and unwinn 1964 (first edition 1927), pp. 37-40.
72 dierk mo? ller, 'nachwort' in: heinrich heine, Ideen, Das Buch Le Grand, stuttgart: reclam 1972, pp. 75-96, 82.
? a religion after christianity? 241
world, to idealized oriental cultures or to the greek and mediaeval past. therefore, he went back to Christianity as the cultural source of his own place and time, the reality he wanted to understand. this of course does not justify his neglect of the islam as a genuine religion in his lectures on the philosophy of religion. Certainly not acceptable is his interpretation of islam in function of Christian-european evolution. A good comparison of religion starts with the destruction of teleological schemes, as was done by romantics like herder and hermeneutical thinkers like dilthey. never- theless, hegel certainly was a romantic too and reaped the fruits of that movement. the positive emphatic understanding hegel has of islam, his genuine and appropriate admiration for islamic mystical poetry is due to this romantic background. hegel read all he could read about islam and other religions in his days, but sciences, like 'history of religions', 'compar- ative sciences of religions', were not really developed at that time. from that point of view, it is amazing that hegel could develop sometimes such a sympathetic understanding of islam.
Hegel and Protestantism lu de Vos
1. introduction
in the text 'Concerning an accusation of Public disparagement of the Catholic religion' (U? ber eine Anklage wegen o? ffentlicher Verunglimpfung der katholischen Religion), Hegel claims to be born, to be educated and to live as a lutheran, and to give courses at a lutheran university. 1 such a state- ment shows that Hegel remains a lutheran Protestant, while also being a philosopher who claims to present truth philosophically. this leads to the question, what could be the philosophical value and thus the true ratio- nality of lutheran Protestantism as a specific form of Christian religion. 2 is this denomination realy as prominent in Hegel's writings and courses, as it seems to be in his personal letters? 3 a simple observation, however, seems to contradict Hegel's Protestant claim: at least in his courses on the philosophy of religion (and what were a better place to show it? ), Hegel focuses only on how the lutheran confession gives the most insightful interpretation of the Christian eucharist. moreover, his interpretation of religion more generally seems eclectic and transconfessional. 4 is Hegel fundamentally a Protestant; or is he first and foremost a speculative phi- losopher? moreover, how are these two roles linked together?
Hegel was in fact born and educated in a Protestant family, followed the courses at the Stift in tu? bingen to become a preacher, and gave les- sons on religion at the Protestant Gymnasium in nurnberg, a Protestant city in Catholic Bavaria. However, these biographical details do not suf- ficiently address the questions about the rationality and philosophical
1 g. W. F. Hegel, Berliner Schriften, Werke 11, Frankfurt am main: suhrkamp Verlag 1970, pp. 68-70; this text is part of a defensive answer against an attack by a roman-Catholic priest, following Hegel's courses given at the University of Berlin.
2 let us be prudent from the beginning: the notions of Protestantism (and of other Christian denominations) discussed here are only those of the beginning of the 19th cen- tury, not those of our--hopefully more ecumenical--time.
3 see P. Jonkers, ? Hegel on Catholic religion? (in this volume).
4 P. Hodgson, Hegel and Christian Theology, oxford: oxford University Press 2005, p. 193.
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importance of Protestantism as such. even the claim (given only in e2)5 that religion and philosophy have the same content, is too vague to be helpful on this point.
to answer the question on the relative significance of Hegel's Protes- tantism and his philosophical presentation of it, i will focus on Hegel's later period (1827-1831), the period that follows immediately after the (either personal or strategic) confession quoted above. 6 Hegel's presenta- tion of Christianity (even of its highest form--Protestantism) is too dif- ferentiated to summarize effectively in one paper. 7 the publications on which i will focus are the second and third versions of the Encyclopaedia (e2 from 1827 & e3 of 1830), some book-reviews from the Jahrbu? cher fu? r wissenschaftliche Kritik (16: 17-310) and the latin Oratio (Speech for the Celebration of the Jubilee of the Confessio Augustana, 1830; 16: 311-322). the most interesting and important texts for our purposes here will be the courses on the philosophy of religion from 1827 and 1831 (the latter of which is only extant in summaries),8 and the further courses on the Proofs of the existence of god (1829; 18: 215-218 & 228-336) and on his- tory (1830/31, with a new introduction-manuscript, 18: 119-214) from this period. 9 even as Hegel's work progresses further (it is visible in the
5 to be clear on the difference: Encyclopedia (1817) (further e1) gives no parallel claim, but stresses the beginning of philosophy (such as the Science of Logic), and only from the second Preface of the same book (1827), is there a difficult discussion with people of simple faith. the third Preface (1830), on the contrary, may be read as a full discussion with all those who cannot distinguish between religious forms 'of the catechism' and the task of philosophical thinking, a discussion, which has its origin in the criticisms of anonymous writers as well as of non-philosophers, refuted by Hegelian Recensions.
6 the basis of this restriction is that Hegel (by 1827) seems to have elaborated a good deal of his philosophical problems. He is neither under academic pressure as he was when writing e1, nor under the stress of the competition with schleiermacher as he was when composing his first course on religion (1821). instead, he was at the pinnacle of his renown, but even then still under harsh criticism, just on the point of the Christianity of his phi- losophy (on the issue of his or schelling's pantheism).
7 even the quote from the handbook, that religion could or should be the representa- tion of absolute knowing is, as position within the framework of the PhSp, limited to that book or time. moreover, even there it should be said, that it is not religion, but religious, speculative knowledge (9: 407), which is the first content containing aspect of absolute knowing.
8 it would be very useful and interesting to find a new student notebook of the course on religion of 1831, to be certain of the changes in structure and content of the concept and of the elaboration of religion there.
9 i'm quoting here in each case Hegel's writings from the Gesammelte Werke with Volume and page number (the encyclopedia with e2 or e3 and ? , if necessary also with a (=remarks)); the Courses (Vorlesungen, Hamburg: meiner Verlag 1983 ff ) are cited by V{olume} and page; the course on world-history, g. W. F. Hegel, Die Philosophie der Geschichte, 1830/31 -Heimann, Hrsg. Kl. Vieweg, mu? nchen: Fink 2005 (quoted as Vie and page).
? hegel and protestantism 245
structure of the concept of religion as well as in the new introduction to the philosophy of history), he has reached such maturity that things are as clear as possible; and in fact there is a consistency in his philosophical view on Protestantism, that it renders Hegel's struggle with the reality of the different aspects of Protestantism coherent. 10
insofar as lutheran Protestantism is a religious, Christian phenomenon, this paper will inquire into the program of the Hegelian philosophy of religion, in four stages. 1) it will determine the place of religion and Chris- tianity within Hegel's general philosophical program. 2) it will argue that the Protestant or lutheran form of Christianity is a more complex phe- nomenon than is expressed by its denominational particularity; it also has a special significance for world-history in general. 3) thirdly, this paper will address some possible religious objections to Hegel's philosophical program or approach. 4) Finally, there will follow a short conclusion in which the main Hegelian thesis will reappear, that a philosophy (even of religion) cannot be sufficiently criticised by religious means alone.
2. Hegel's Program of a Philosophy of religion
Hegel's philosophy of religion is not (Christian) theology. it is not apolo- getic. its concern is not the metaphysical validity of a specific religion, nor is this its main topic. it is not a part (i. e. a 'handmaid') of the theological defence of a certain, Christian or Protestant form of religion. 11 it is not a philosophy that accepts the rational validity of Christian faith and reli- gion. in this sense, it is not a generally Christian, nor specifically lutheran philosophy, but rather simply philosophy. Hegel's speculative philosophy of religion is also not a simple description of what is,12 it is not a presen- tation of how believers hope (and mostly claim dogmatically) that their
10 For differences even within that view, one may refer to my Die Grenze der Politik, in: Hegel-Jahrbuch 2000, 236-245 and Religion--Staat--Geschichte bei Hegel (1827-1831), in: a. arndt u. a. (Hrsg. ) Staat und Religion in Hegels Rechtsphilosophie. Berlin: akademie Ver- lag 2009, 37-55.
11 such a form was often taken up by the obviously metaphysical (mostly neo-thomis- tic) theodicies in a catholic vein (until the sixties of the last century), where the existence of god could be proven by philosophical reason alone, and the specific religious form was that given by Christian religion.
12 if philosophy is only a description, it is a needless duplication of actuality, insofar as it is the concern of all theoretical sciences to give an (understandable and reliable) descrip- tion of actuality. a rational presentation has to give a more interesting version of actuality than simple (self-evident, phenomenal, and/or experience-based) description.
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beliefs, as well as the objects of those beliefs, are in fact true and real. Hegel's philosophy of religion is a methodologically rational presentation of religion as such (not particularly Jewish, islamic or Christian, etc. ). in order to find and discover at least the possibility of reason in religion, reason must be present even in (Protestant) Christianity.
reason is primarily and most importantly that which we all use in think- ing and acting, but moreover, it is that which indicates that an insight is knowable for everyone, and able to be judged on just such justifiable grounds. For a critical philosopher (after Kant or Fichte), rationality in this sense must be the object of its own thematic inquiry, and such an inquiry is the central task of philosophy, called 'logic' by Kant and Hegel (or 'science of knowledge' by Fichte). this basic point already sets apart every simple argument of a normal (i. e. non-philosophical) kind, which include religious arguments, and which presuppose, and never question, the content of rationality itself. such an inquiry, the special task of phi- losophy, is thus neither Christian, nor Catholic, nor Protestant, but rather necessarily and simply rational. Hegel's philosophy is in this way critical of every normal (positivist, religious, and/or merely descriptive) understand- ing, insofar as such an understanding claims to be philosophical in an immediate sense. only if a content can be said to be rational (that is, can be addressed in and through in critical terms), can it be said to be philo- sophical. therefore, according to Hegel, even the topic 'god' is no longer available to philosophy in a strict sense, as the (traditional, metaphysical) topic of a natural theology, insofar as Hegel accepts the fundamental cri- tique of Kant against any substrate that could be considered independent of rational thinking. 13 if such a religious and purely theological topic is to have any coherence, it may appear only within a philosophy of that reality, that is, within a philosophy of religion.
Hegel's philosophy of religion, at the same time, opposes the reduction by the enlightenment, which claims that religion lacks any validity (of its own), that only positive knowledge of sensible things of the visible and measurable world is knowledge properly speaking, and that the notion of 'god' is either ideologically false (i. e. atheism) or is an empty metaphysi-
13 see my 'l'ontologie proble? matique dans la philosophie allemande classique', in: e. gaziaux (e? d. ), Philosophie et Theologie, leuven, 2007, 61-84; see also H. F. Fulda, 'die ontologie und ihr schicksal' in: Hegel, Critique de Kant, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 53, 1999, pp. 465-483. the theological description of its topics--god and revelation--, is under critique only insofar as a theology pretents to speak also for those people, who do not participate in the same religious faith.
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cal claim (i. e. deism) (V3, p. 356). this latter conclusion, however, is also accepted by Hegel, albeit on other grounds, in relation to metaphysics. that such a conclusion is not destructive to religion is just Hegel's point, insofar as religion can present the name of god and the matters, which are His domain, on their own terms, as living spirit. neither was Hegel's goal a historical, exegetical one, following from the enlightenment, in which the historical sources alone where the primary objects of inquiry, as in schleiermacher (V3, pp. 356-7; V5, p. 300). that sort of inquiry, however, was not completely foreign to him, insofar as Hegel himself participated in the movement of the Leben Jesu-Forschung (in moral terms). more spe- cifically, Hegel accepts the main difference between the 'Jesus' of histori- cal biblical science on the one hand, and the communal or ecclesiastic (theological) 'Christ' on the other, which he posits after the controversy over Protestant orthodoxy with reimarus and lessing. 14
Hegel's philosophy rejects supernaturalism, which accepts faith or posi- tive revelation ('Offenbarungsglaube') as the origin of (even philosophical) knowledge. in fact, such supernaturalism is the position of faith, which regards itself (in its self-certainty) as an insight acceptable for everybody, even philosophically. 15 Furthermore, Hegel's philosophy has no confidence in the rationality of pietism, which holds that there may be no (reflected) knowledge of divine things, but only the inner awareness of the existence of god and divine events, for the pietist himself. Both of these positions are responses to the enlightenment and are (specifically) religious posi- tions, in which the notion of rational knowledge is neither justified by critical inquiry, nor open to everyone. therefore, they are purely religious positions, certain of themselves, but not philosophical ones. in fact, Hegel will consider enlightenment rationality and pietism as specifically (philo- sophically) 'problematic' positions. on the contrary, the position of faith as a religious (rather than philosophical) position is rejected or accepted as what it is in truth: simple faith. the enlightenment is very critical or sceptical of the (misuses of ) religion, but uses only the reflected criterion
14 Hegel will not apply this strict division between Jesus and Christ in his texts, but insofar as he does not accept the resurrection as an historical fact, but rather as a fact of the community of spirit, was the result of the controversy started by lessing-reimarus (Fragmenten-streit), he is indebted to that movement. see also H. gutschmidt, Vernunft- einsicht und Glaube, go? ttingen: Vandenhoeck & ruprecht 2007, p. 61.
15 For Hegel, there is no specifically Christian philosophy at all. Philosophy is the wis- dom of the world, where even an atheist must think in a valid way about the rationality of religion, at least as an important social and historical fact with its own truth-claims.
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of reason (for Hegel, as understanding). 16 Pietism represents a simple form of religion, which is necessary, but not sufficient for religion to be grasped in its full sense. 17
the rational presentation of religion (by philosophy), on the other hand, is a conceptual presentation; and in as far as conceptuality is the mark of philosophy, this presentation is a discourse on (conceptual) knowing, and not on things. in such a presentation, a 'given' phenom- enon or domain (i. e. religion) is conceptually situated and determined within the framework of a conceptual approach to actuality: religion is neither reduced to a pre-given other domain (that of neuroscience or his- tory e. g. , as in the positivist approach), nor accepted without question, in a dogmatic or emotional way. such a rational presentation does not reject other rational (domain-specific) presentations of specific religions (i. e. historical or theological ones), which present religion either not in religious terms or, on the other hand, as religion elucidated only for the faithful. these presentations are not the affair of reason as such, nor are they philosophical. However, theological presentations, in as far as there is no one true religion, are nevertheless systematic interlocutors. Hegel's presentation shows (or proves) to what extent theological entities and events should be interpreted as concepts, and thus be considered ratio- nally valid. in this way, religion as such, and not any specific (even con- summated) religion, is taken up within a philosophical framework that can be considered rational. 18
16 For Hegel (as for Kant), there is a difference between understanding and reason; the understanding is the normal use of rationality, reason is the philosophical inquiry about the meaning of rationality in every sense (theoretical in sciences, practical, political, his- torical). applied, the rationality used within a specific sphere of inquiry is that of a fixed ontology, whereas rationality as such is to be determined by philosophical logic or phi- losophy as such.
17 supernaturalism as a theology, which only claims in vain to be philosophical, was not a serious intellectual challenge to Hegel, although it attacked his position within the public sphere and annihilated his philosophy after Hegel's death with simple positions about immortality and god's personality.
18 a philosophy of religion is a philosophical discipline of 'reality'. a philosophy of nature or history has to be based on physics in general (i. e. in the sense of 'the science of nature') or on the science of history. However, philosophy transforms the philosophical presuppositions of these constituted sciences (beings (entia) or events e. g. ). in the same way, a philosophy of religion has to take seriously theologies as sciences of religion, but such a philosophy is no longer part of any theology, but rather treats all theology as provid- ing it with conceptually insufficient data about religion for its philosophical elaboration. if this restriction were not accepted by theology, then such a theology would seem to present a positivistic version of religion (or to be supernaturalism).
? hegel and protestantism 249 3. religion and Christianity
the development of a specific philosophy of religion (as a human activ- ity) is (after Kant) a philosophical necessity, insofar as 'god' as an inde- pendent being can no longer be considered a valid topic of philosophical inquiry, as was the case in the metaphysical proofs of natural theology, in view of his status as the highest being. 19 How religion specifically fits into the framework of philosophy or how religion can deliver valid thoughts in philosophy, is subsequently the basic problem. Philosophy of religion remains a possibility. this is--evidently--not itself a theological problem, nor a problem for a philosophy that is only concerned with the potential intelligibility of dogmatically accepted faith.
Hegel's treatment of philosophy in the Encyclopaedia answers the fun- damental question of the place of religion in philosophy: the whole sphere of absolute spirit is called 'religion'. this absolute spirit, however, is not a new 'entity', independent of knowing, but is rather 'only' a new self- conception of spirit. Within this sphere, a possible definition of the treat- ment of religious topics in a philosophical manner is also given. 20 the validity of religion seems restricted, insofar as its definition is concerned, to philosophical knowing, which does not claim a transcendent (non- conceptual) validity. 21 religion itself is defined as the highest sphere of the whole philosophy of spirit, where spirit in its ultimate self-conception justifies or reflects the whole of philosophy. moreover, spirit is not some thing, but a concept, which appears in different forms. these forms (indi- viduals, states, the arts) are only forms of spirit, in as far as these forms constitute the minimal concept of spirit; through this constitution they construct a specific identity as a particular coming out of nature (e3 ? 381). in this way, there are subjective spirits, who constitute singular individu- als, since they claim in their natural individuality to be thinking and free forms. moreover, there are objective spirits, which constitute their identity
19 see W. Jaeschke, Die Vernunft in der Religion, stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann- Holzboog 1986, pp. 18-133. For an (insufficient but very interesting) attempt to refute Kantian premises in order to give new proofs, see W. Cramer, Das Absolute und das Kontin- gente, Frankfurt a. m. : Klostermann 1959, 19762 and Gottesbeweise und ihre Kritik, Frankfurt am main: Klostermann 1967.
20 see H. -F. Fulda, Hegels Begriff des absoluten Geistes, in Hegel-Studien 36, Berlin: 2001, pp. 171-198, who stresses that even an atheist should accept this proposed definition in search of a further justification.
21 in e (with exclusion of the revealed religion), the term 'god' does not appear in the main text, as it is a specifically religious term. the encyclopaedia, indeed, is a philosophical book, neither a religious or a theological treatise.
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in taking together their own nature, the many of (individual) spirits, living on their territory.
absolute spirit is, as will become clear, not an entity, but its own form (thinkable as a philosophical concept), in which, only by thinking such an absolute sphere, spirit can completely guarantee its own specificity, and show itself as the pure manifestation of freedom. in opposition to enlightenment thought, Hegel asserts: if god is spirit, his concept is not empty (as was that of the god of natural theology), but he has fulfilled the minimal definitions and claims or requirements of the notion of spirit, in as far as only his spiritual form enables him to construct an intelligible identity as spirit. 22 only within this presentation does Hegel's philosophy assume the task of natural philosophy to 'close' the system of philosophy. However, this task is not performed in the manner or method of theology, to guarantee independent beings, nor according to its content, concerned with the highest being.
this concept of religion is the elaboration of the introduction to 'abso- lute spirit' (e3 ? ? 553-555), and this encyclopaedic concept of religion (or, of absolute spirit) is proposed to be further determined by art, consummated religion, and philosophy. if this is really the case, then some problems arise, insofar as it is not immediately clear how this concept of absolute spirit can be the starting point of a philosophy of religion. 23 to begin a philosophy of religion, a sort of philosophy which seems to be presented independently, there is to be taken up out of religion a name 'god' (i. e. the term ? god? ), that must constitute the specific difference, defined by the notion of spirit itself. such a name is itself not the result of other parts of philosophy, but it has, as a new term (and thus, as representation), the mark of the real philosophy, a new and empty form (which, through phi- losophy, must be determined further).
thus: (a) With this concept of religion, the conceptual necessity of a religious form is presented. (b) in such a philosophical presentation, it is
22 this program is dependent upon the speculative doctrine of the concept, which has to spell out its own (negatively discerned or in a sceptical way attacked) determinations, so that the result is, at the same time, the completed concept and the justification of its real specificity.
23 the second problem, for those who are familiar with Hegel in a general way, is, why philosophy, and not the Christian religion, which is called the truth of religion, would be the ultimate result. a solution to this could be that the Christian religion is the truth of the concept of religion as religion. Philosophy, on the other hand, fulfils the concept of spirit adequately, insofar as it negates the form of representation, and presents the concept of spirit itself in its truth (and purity).
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the rationality or--minimally--the universal recognition of the specifi- cally Christian religion--as the truth of religion as such--which will be worked out thereafter.
a. The Concept of Religion Proper
in Hegel's elaboration of his philosophy of religion, the concept of religion is its specific starting point. it has three parts, the concept of god (not given in this form in the philosophy of absolute spirit), religious knowl- edge, and cult.
this elaborated concept begins from the (at this point, empty) term 'god' as with that which is specific to religious claims. 'god' is the name for a specific religious reality fulfilling the (initially abstract) definition of absolute spirit as the correspondence of real spirit with its concept. With- out such a name, whether it is Zeus, JHWH or simply 'god', there is no recognisable religious dimension at all. on this introduction, two points can be made: 'god' is a name, so it is the initial approach of religion as such and, on the other hand, if religion is the highest form within spirit, god is also taken as the philosophical (or philosophically explainable) truth of the totality of spirit. 24
'god' as the new, specifically religious term and, up to this point, as an unknown determination, must unfold through its elaboration or devel- opment in a conceptual, scientific way. at this point, there is only the thought of the empty concept 'god' as the specificity or the claimed truth of all infinitude. only in as far as it can be elaborated within forms and institutions, which are the specifications for the use of such a concept (i. e. religions), can it be seen how and in what way it is rational. only in this way is there a new content (i. e. religions), which works in and through history to explain the specific (ideal) spirituality of spirit, or, in as far as freedom has such a spiritual form, to be recognised by all
24 With this definition, Hegel is not following the alternative that there is either a new philosophical theology (Jaeschke's position on the view of Hodgson) or a theo-anthropol- ogy (Feuerbach), given by Hodgson, (op. cit. , 13). religion is in fact not reducible to some- thing less complex or less determined (say biology, psychology (Feuerbach), ethics (Kant), politics (neo-marxism), or history. But, its main concern does remain rationally empty as long as there is not a (religiously) attributable essence of spirit (i. e. the truth of spirit). rationally, this essence could be interpreted as something other than spirit, but this is not a strange independent entity called 'god'. in fact, philosophy of religion replaces (ersetzt) the old philosophical theology, but is neither a new form of particular metaphysics, nor an aspect of speculative metaphysics proper.
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spirit. 25 However, as the starting point (of a philosophy of religion), such a truth remains abstract. it claims nothing, with the exception that god is, and that he is one truth over and against all other truths that have been asserted and sublated before (like those of nature and finite spirit, which failed to bring themselves to completion). even as absolute subsistence, 'god' is not concrete. 26 there is nothing in the name alone that the differ- ent names of god(s) can fulfil immediately, or that corresponds to the dif- ferent names of god(s) (ghost(s), re, Zeus, Jupiter, JHWH, god the Father, etc. ). With a name alone, it may be a concept or a pure representation, but there is not yet religion.
such a god becomes concrete only if he is the basis and moment of his development (as a concept), and the principle of his own (conceptual) particularisation. 27 there are two ways to attain such a particularisation: in the movement from either god to religious consciousness or from knowing to god. the first movement is attributed to him by religious people. the claim that god is the truth of all, is indeed a fact of religious conscious- ness, a claim that is related to the basic subsistent substance, using merely formal modes rationally, insofar as 'creation' by god and 'spiritualisation' from god are, in themselves, empty terms, if we attribute them without further determination to that truthful substance. therefore, philosophy must determine how the religious knowledge asserted by some people could lead to an insight available to everyone, and furthermore also arrive at this insight in a philosophical way, insofar as He may be conceptually reconstructed. specific to Hegel's treatment of religious knowledge is his survey of the forms of religious knowledge and his (even more specific) thesis that the proofs of god's existence show the elevation of the reli- gious subject that is involved in the topic of religion itself.
this religious knowledge (according to the account given around 1820) demonstrates the elevation of itself to that truth. For a human being, the question is: how does his religious knowledge come to god? For
25 against all sceptics who could imagine that man could be the gods of the animals, animals can have perceptions and feelings, and there are kingdoms in the animal sphere, but art, religion or philosophy do not exist in the animal domain, insofar as we wouldn't accept that a dog could be a religious being (Vorrede zu Hinrichs, gW 15: 137).
26 With such a notion, Hegel attributes to religion the claim that god is 'a se', not the philosophical but contradictory claim that he is 'causa sui'.
27 god is thus the example par excellence of the universal, or of the manner in which the universal can be represented. He may be determined by nature or by (finite) spirit, but until this point it can only be done in a negative way; only from this determination is he something, but, from now on, he is this determination as his own determination (if that may be seen in religions) by which he is himself or singular.
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this elevation, there are a number of possibilities that are presented and accepted in religion as religious knowledge (mainly in Protestant circles) rationally. 28 minimally, there is an immediate knowing or an immediate certainty that god is not only a name or merely a story i tell myself, but that he is and exists independently of me. at this starting point, the reli- gious subject and god are linked, insofar as that subject is aware of the fact and claims that god is or that this content (god) is as spiritual as the subject is. 29 However, at this stage, this claim cannot be justified further.
at this point, the claim is as empty as when the name 'god' alone was asserted. However, it is now a claim of knowledge, not simply a proposal or empty definition. it will only authentically become a content of knowl- edge when it is justified by representation and thinking. as representation, it shows itself in sensuous figures, images, myths, narratives and histories, according to the content of different religions. such representations of the acts of salvation are the beginning of religious education, but even with all these moments, the insight available for everybody (and thus justifi- able), the place of religion is not defined in a precise way. this justified determination is a thinking in which the different moments are posited as conceptually necessary. in this thinking originates the different proofs of the existence of god. these proofs are neither the concern of merely immediate knowledge, nor of simple religious faith. they are, however, religious knowledge, considered (by philosophy) in its elevation of reli- gious knowledge to god. the proofs, in this interpretation of Hegel's phi- losophy of religion, also give structure to the historical forms of religion, which do not restrict themselves to their (immediate) inwardness. 30
in as far as the proofs are specific forms of elevation, Hegel is not returning to ontology, but is rather trying to justify forms of knowledge (of absolute spirit). 31 such an interpretation of religion may be seen as
28 With this typology, Hegel has in mind all of the theological versions of Protestant religion of his time: Jacobi as a pietist, schleiermacher as an enlightened theologian, and the simple faith of the people, all of which are insufficient forms for a properly philosophi- cal approach to religion.
29 such an immediate knowledge was a common claim in pietistic and even cultivated Protestant circles around 1820-30. see Hegel's discussion of go? schel (16: 188-215) and the commentary of P. Jonkers, 'Unmittelbares Wissen und absolutes Wissen', in: W. Jaeschke & B. sandkaulen, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Hamburg: meiner Verlag 2004, pp. 359-375.
30 With this thesis, Hegel is not claiming that there is a temporal history of religions exposed in his philosophy of religion, but rather that there is a rational (and conceptually based) exposition of religions, which is recognisable in the history of religion.
31 see g. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen u? ber die Beweise vom Daseyn Gottes (gW 18: 228-317). see also d. murphy, Gottesbeweis in: P. Cobben e. o. (ed), Hegel-Lexikon, darmstadt: WBg 2006, pp. 247-249.
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'heterodox',32 but is the result of the philosophical insight that the imme- diate (ontological) understanding of religion (in terms of separate enti- ties, such as a god independent of the use of religious words, or immortal souls) is not rational. the proofs of the existence of god are the explication of religious consciousness and, in that sense, of religion itself. the most important of these proofs is the ontological one (anselm, descartes and Wolff ), which is used only in Christian times. in this case, Hegel is address- ing the Christian tradition in general, not a particularly lutheran or particu- larly Protestant one, insofar as this proof is itself rational and not based on any particular faith alone. in this proof, as well as in Hegel's philosophy of religion generally, the being or the objectivity is indicated and justified in terms of the concept, for, only in the case of god, does its substance include his own being in himself. this philosophical exposition of the ontological proof is just the return to that concept that is posited at the beginning of the philosophy of religion.
educated religious people exercise their religious identity and proper ele- vation through a particular system of religious worship (i. e. 'cult'), which gives them a real unity with 'god'. in the elevation of the proofs of god's existence, which presuppose a (metaphysical) concept, it remains unclear for the religious consciousness that it is itself that is elevating itself. at this level, however, religiously knowing consciousness remains within in its own representation, separated from its divine object. to overcome this represented separation or presupposed split is the purpose of ritual and ceremonial practices (i. e. cult). Cult thus provides the highest form of enjoyment to self-consciousness, in the way in which it reconciles that consciousness with the absolute. Participation in this (represented) reconciliation, which is (for the religious subject) fully and already per- formed by the divine act of salvation, is the basic activity of cult. this cult takes on a multiplicity of different forms; it is first of all devotion or con- templative prayer, which is active faith, or, in other words, it is engaged religious thinking, participating in god, so that the reconciliation is actual for him.
the particular forms of sacrifice, however, are secondly, from the point of view of the religious subject, essential. these forms are outer or exter- nal, but, from the point of view of the religious subject, essential. the external forms reproduce the reconciliation in little sacrifices and sac- ramental rites. in such practices, the religious subject is performing the
32 see C. o'regan, The Heterodox Hegel, albany: sUnY Press 1994.
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same elevation, but now for and with his own consciousness, so that the form of representation is destroyed. such a ritual sacrifice is the negation and offering of some finite thing through which the subject demonstrates that he is enjoying ('geniessend') the unity of himself with his god. 33
the most important and authentic form of sacrifice is the sacrifice of the heart, not only in the sense of the purification of desire and of par- ticular passions, but also in the production of spirituality in the form of universality. the finitude or particularity of every subject has to elevate itself to its own purity, so that there is a universal law (of reconciliation), recognisable for everybody. this is the promotion of ethicity (Sittlichkeit) or the production of such an actuality that manifests the reconciliation in this world, but with which the consciousness of the truth remains reli- giously linked. ethicity, then, does not involve simply the singular act of repentance, as it were merely a response to something bad, but it is a genuine form of reconciliation. such a realisation of the annihilation of the particularity of the heart is not so much an extension of the cult as it is the true liberation of the freedom of the world to its own (spiritual) affair ('Sache'). even better, it is not a particular grace, but everyone's actual striving toward real reconciliation! such an account, that it is not the enjoyment of the external cult, but the purification of the heart, as the highest form of cult, may seem to be particularly Protestant in its inspira- tion (as will become clear in Hegel's presentation of Christianity). the true consciousness of the actual purification in ethicity seems to be insightful religion, or that it has become a practical insight available to everybody, or, in other words, that it has become philosophy. religion depends upon this ethicity insofar as such an elevation (or purification) is linked with philosophy as the consciousness of truth, and also in as far as it is only out of this ethicity that god is no longer only a religious substance, but also interpreted as 'free spirit' (e3 ? 552 a).
at this point, this internally elaborated concept could be an illusory or merely an internal philosophical concept (or a merely semantic defini- tion) without validity, even with its allusion to real forms like sacraments and ethicity. to prove such forms have more than a merely illusory, inter- nal, or semantic validity, they should be singularised for consciousness in real religion(s).
33 Hegel is describing all religious forms, in and through his own religious attitude, in terms of Christianity. However, the sense of this conceptual presentation is formal, valid for every religion.
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b. Revealed or Consummate Religion is Christianity34
Hegel claims that the Christian religion fulfils, in historical actuality, the concept of religion, and is, as the result of the conceptual development of all other religions, therefore also true religion. in this rational form ('Gestalt'), the philosophical presentation of Christianity must be recogn- isable for everyone, including faithful or religious people. so, such a philo- sophical presentation must not be based only on a traditional view, or a view that is guaranteed by a religious authority or by the faithful, because a philosophical interpretation of Christianity is not a form of catechism (Dritter Replik, 16: 273). However, in such an interpretation, even religious people should not miss essential features of their faith (e. g. in Christianity, there must be attention to Jesus, who is their Christ) and this exposition should be a philosophical presentation of theological insights. in his sum- mary, Hegel claims that the specifically essential aspects of Christianity are the trinity (which was not taken to be theologically very essential during his time), the appearance of Jesus as Christ, the immortality of the soul and the state (when understood as the modern version of the King- dom of god) (l. c. , 16: 270). 35
in as far as Christianity is the truth of the concept, as well as of other forms of religion, all marks of such religious conceptions are emphasised, and where the central preconceptions are Christian ones. 36 in this reli- gion, the full realisation of such views is asserted, such as the trinity (in the form of religious triplicity), the incarnation (V5, 236, from W2) and the death of god (in Jesus). the differences in the views on immortal- ity between pre-Christian and Christian religions are elaborated in the courses, in order to point to the essential meaning of Christianity.
not presupposed, however, is the concrete concept of spirit. this con- cept is the idea of religion, specifying the concept of god, insofar as it
34 For a reliable english version: P. Hodgson, Hegel and Christian Theology, oxford: oxford UP 2005; the best philosophical books on Hegel's religion remain, however, W. Jaeschke, Die Religionsphilosophie Hegels, darmstadt: WBg 1983 and Jaeschke, Die Ver- nunft, (o. c. ).
35 this claim is very difficult, insofar as religious people (and religious authorities) seem to be unaware of their (particular) assumptions (e.
but with the inadequate qualification of pantheism, he still could discover something typical of, for example, hafiz' poetry. when hegel stresses that his poetry is ensouling the whole world of finite things by god's presence, and gives them their own place, he reproduces in his own way a typical feature of that literature. in hafiz you never know whether the poem is about god and mystical rapture or just about wine, drunk- enness and the tavern. still modern interpreters estimate the dictum of
68 Cf. Annemarie schimmel, As Through a Veil, Mystical Poetry in Islam, new york: Columbia university press 1982, pp. 49, 216 note 17.
69 for a critical discussion see, Annemarie schimmel, The Mystical Dimensions of Islam, Chapel hill, north Carolina: the university of north Carolina press 1975, p. 267.
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ru? ckert that hafiz always expresses by means of sensual realities a super- sensible realm of being. 70 the question is of course whether this poetical technique of hafiz has something to do with hegel's idea of the (semi) autonomy of the finite world. moreover, hegel makes things complicated by using this poetry, mediated by goethe, in a polemic with modern 'sub- jectivist' trends in german literature of his days. however, hegel's analysis of the problem of pantheism, his stressing of the relational character of finiteness and infinity as such, is still of vital importance for the under- standing of religion. moreover, hegel rightly uses mysticism as testimonial evidence.
Conclusion
what strikes us most in hegel's dealing with islam, is how modern already the religious world is his days was. the discussion about the fanatic char- acter of islam, or of all monotheism, is going on since then. the hindu philosopher and first president of india, s. radhakrishnan, writing in times of muslim separatism and Christian missions, again praised the greek and romans and reproached islam and Christianity for intolerance. At the same time, he tried to unite all religions by mysticism. 71 in modern times, the former president of iran, Khatami, tried to find access to the western world by sufism. hegel's enthusiasm for sufism and the bhagavad-gita elu- cidates the saying of the poet heinrich heine (1779-1856), that it was fash- ionable among german students of his time to learn sanskrit and to read hegel. 72 the romantic enthusiasm for mysticism, including islamic sufism, as the internationale of all religion and philosophy, present in the bud in hegel's thought, is a returning phenomenon in modern european history. it manifested itself again heavily between the two world wars and once more in the 'hippy' sixties of the twentieth century. reincarnated in the 'sixties', hegel himself could have been, for a while, a long-haired student-, striving for a better world, reading mystical texts and, god knows, smok- ing a joint. At the end, of course, hegel criticized romanticism heavily and did not want to give in to its innate tendency to take refuge to another
70 J. Ch. bu? rgel, 'einleitung', in: muhammad schams Ad-din hafis, Gedichte aus dem Diwan, ed. J. Ch. bu? rgel, stuttgart: reclam 1972, pp. 3-31.
71 s. radhakrishnan, A Hindu View of Life, london: Allan and unwinn 1964 (first edition 1927), pp. 37-40.
72 dierk mo? ller, 'nachwort' in: heinrich heine, Ideen, Das Buch Le Grand, stuttgart: reclam 1972, pp. 75-96, 82.
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world, to idealized oriental cultures or to the greek and mediaeval past. therefore, he went back to Christianity as the cultural source of his own place and time, the reality he wanted to understand. this of course does not justify his neglect of the islam as a genuine religion in his lectures on the philosophy of religion. Certainly not acceptable is his interpretation of islam in function of Christian-european evolution. A good comparison of religion starts with the destruction of teleological schemes, as was done by romantics like herder and hermeneutical thinkers like dilthey. never- theless, hegel certainly was a romantic too and reaped the fruits of that movement. the positive emphatic understanding hegel has of islam, his genuine and appropriate admiration for islamic mystical poetry is due to this romantic background. hegel read all he could read about islam and other religions in his days, but sciences, like 'history of religions', 'compar- ative sciences of religions', were not really developed at that time. from that point of view, it is amazing that hegel could develop sometimes such a sympathetic understanding of islam.
Hegel and Protestantism lu de Vos
1. introduction
in the text 'Concerning an accusation of Public disparagement of the Catholic religion' (U? ber eine Anklage wegen o? ffentlicher Verunglimpfung der katholischen Religion), Hegel claims to be born, to be educated and to live as a lutheran, and to give courses at a lutheran university. 1 such a state- ment shows that Hegel remains a lutheran Protestant, while also being a philosopher who claims to present truth philosophically. this leads to the question, what could be the philosophical value and thus the true ratio- nality of lutheran Protestantism as a specific form of Christian religion. 2 is this denomination realy as prominent in Hegel's writings and courses, as it seems to be in his personal letters? 3 a simple observation, however, seems to contradict Hegel's Protestant claim: at least in his courses on the philosophy of religion (and what were a better place to show it? ), Hegel focuses only on how the lutheran confession gives the most insightful interpretation of the Christian eucharist. moreover, his interpretation of religion more generally seems eclectic and transconfessional. 4 is Hegel fundamentally a Protestant; or is he first and foremost a speculative phi- losopher? moreover, how are these two roles linked together?
Hegel was in fact born and educated in a Protestant family, followed the courses at the Stift in tu? bingen to become a preacher, and gave les- sons on religion at the Protestant Gymnasium in nurnberg, a Protestant city in Catholic Bavaria. However, these biographical details do not suf- ficiently address the questions about the rationality and philosophical
1 g. W. F. Hegel, Berliner Schriften, Werke 11, Frankfurt am main: suhrkamp Verlag 1970, pp. 68-70; this text is part of a defensive answer against an attack by a roman-Catholic priest, following Hegel's courses given at the University of Berlin.
2 let us be prudent from the beginning: the notions of Protestantism (and of other Christian denominations) discussed here are only those of the beginning of the 19th cen- tury, not those of our--hopefully more ecumenical--time.
3 see P. Jonkers, ? Hegel on Catholic religion? (in this volume).
4 P. Hodgson, Hegel and Christian Theology, oxford: oxford University Press 2005, p. 193.
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importance of Protestantism as such. even the claim (given only in e2)5 that religion and philosophy have the same content, is too vague to be helpful on this point.
to answer the question on the relative significance of Hegel's Protes- tantism and his philosophical presentation of it, i will focus on Hegel's later period (1827-1831), the period that follows immediately after the (either personal or strategic) confession quoted above. 6 Hegel's presenta- tion of Christianity (even of its highest form--Protestantism) is too dif- ferentiated to summarize effectively in one paper. 7 the publications on which i will focus are the second and third versions of the Encyclopaedia (e2 from 1827 & e3 of 1830), some book-reviews from the Jahrbu? cher fu? r wissenschaftliche Kritik (16: 17-310) and the latin Oratio (Speech for the Celebration of the Jubilee of the Confessio Augustana, 1830; 16: 311-322). the most interesting and important texts for our purposes here will be the courses on the philosophy of religion from 1827 and 1831 (the latter of which is only extant in summaries),8 and the further courses on the Proofs of the existence of god (1829; 18: 215-218 & 228-336) and on his- tory (1830/31, with a new introduction-manuscript, 18: 119-214) from this period. 9 even as Hegel's work progresses further (it is visible in the
5 to be clear on the difference: Encyclopedia (1817) (further e1) gives no parallel claim, but stresses the beginning of philosophy (such as the Science of Logic), and only from the second Preface of the same book (1827), is there a difficult discussion with people of simple faith. the third Preface (1830), on the contrary, may be read as a full discussion with all those who cannot distinguish between religious forms 'of the catechism' and the task of philosophical thinking, a discussion, which has its origin in the criticisms of anonymous writers as well as of non-philosophers, refuted by Hegelian Recensions.
6 the basis of this restriction is that Hegel (by 1827) seems to have elaborated a good deal of his philosophical problems. He is neither under academic pressure as he was when writing e1, nor under the stress of the competition with schleiermacher as he was when composing his first course on religion (1821). instead, he was at the pinnacle of his renown, but even then still under harsh criticism, just on the point of the Christianity of his phi- losophy (on the issue of his or schelling's pantheism).
7 even the quote from the handbook, that religion could or should be the representa- tion of absolute knowing is, as position within the framework of the PhSp, limited to that book or time. moreover, even there it should be said, that it is not religion, but religious, speculative knowledge (9: 407), which is the first content containing aspect of absolute knowing.
8 it would be very useful and interesting to find a new student notebook of the course on religion of 1831, to be certain of the changes in structure and content of the concept and of the elaboration of religion there.
9 i'm quoting here in each case Hegel's writings from the Gesammelte Werke with Volume and page number (the encyclopedia with e2 or e3 and ? , if necessary also with a (=remarks)); the Courses (Vorlesungen, Hamburg: meiner Verlag 1983 ff ) are cited by V{olume} and page; the course on world-history, g. W. F. Hegel, Die Philosophie der Geschichte, 1830/31 -Heimann, Hrsg. Kl. Vieweg, mu? nchen: Fink 2005 (quoted as Vie and page).
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structure of the concept of religion as well as in the new introduction to the philosophy of history), he has reached such maturity that things are as clear as possible; and in fact there is a consistency in his philosophical view on Protestantism, that it renders Hegel's struggle with the reality of the different aspects of Protestantism coherent. 10
insofar as lutheran Protestantism is a religious, Christian phenomenon, this paper will inquire into the program of the Hegelian philosophy of religion, in four stages. 1) it will determine the place of religion and Chris- tianity within Hegel's general philosophical program. 2) it will argue that the Protestant or lutheran form of Christianity is a more complex phe- nomenon than is expressed by its denominational particularity; it also has a special significance for world-history in general. 3) thirdly, this paper will address some possible religious objections to Hegel's philosophical program or approach. 4) Finally, there will follow a short conclusion in which the main Hegelian thesis will reappear, that a philosophy (even of religion) cannot be sufficiently criticised by religious means alone.
2. Hegel's Program of a Philosophy of religion
Hegel's philosophy of religion is not (Christian) theology. it is not apolo- getic. its concern is not the metaphysical validity of a specific religion, nor is this its main topic. it is not a part (i. e. a 'handmaid') of the theological defence of a certain, Christian or Protestant form of religion. 11 it is not a philosophy that accepts the rational validity of Christian faith and reli- gion. in this sense, it is not a generally Christian, nor specifically lutheran philosophy, but rather simply philosophy. Hegel's speculative philosophy of religion is also not a simple description of what is,12 it is not a presen- tation of how believers hope (and mostly claim dogmatically) that their
10 For differences even within that view, one may refer to my Die Grenze der Politik, in: Hegel-Jahrbuch 2000, 236-245 and Religion--Staat--Geschichte bei Hegel (1827-1831), in: a. arndt u. a. (Hrsg. ) Staat und Religion in Hegels Rechtsphilosophie. Berlin: akademie Ver- lag 2009, 37-55.
11 such a form was often taken up by the obviously metaphysical (mostly neo-thomis- tic) theodicies in a catholic vein (until the sixties of the last century), where the existence of god could be proven by philosophical reason alone, and the specific religious form was that given by Christian religion.
12 if philosophy is only a description, it is a needless duplication of actuality, insofar as it is the concern of all theoretical sciences to give an (understandable and reliable) descrip- tion of actuality. a rational presentation has to give a more interesting version of actuality than simple (self-evident, phenomenal, and/or experience-based) description.
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beliefs, as well as the objects of those beliefs, are in fact true and real. Hegel's philosophy of religion is a methodologically rational presentation of religion as such (not particularly Jewish, islamic or Christian, etc. ). in order to find and discover at least the possibility of reason in religion, reason must be present even in (Protestant) Christianity.
reason is primarily and most importantly that which we all use in think- ing and acting, but moreover, it is that which indicates that an insight is knowable for everyone, and able to be judged on just such justifiable grounds. For a critical philosopher (after Kant or Fichte), rationality in this sense must be the object of its own thematic inquiry, and such an inquiry is the central task of philosophy, called 'logic' by Kant and Hegel (or 'science of knowledge' by Fichte). this basic point already sets apart every simple argument of a normal (i. e. non-philosophical) kind, which include religious arguments, and which presuppose, and never question, the content of rationality itself. such an inquiry, the special task of phi- losophy, is thus neither Christian, nor Catholic, nor Protestant, but rather necessarily and simply rational. Hegel's philosophy is in this way critical of every normal (positivist, religious, and/or merely descriptive) understand- ing, insofar as such an understanding claims to be philosophical in an immediate sense. only if a content can be said to be rational (that is, can be addressed in and through in critical terms), can it be said to be philo- sophical. therefore, according to Hegel, even the topic 'god' is no longer available to philosophy in a strict sense, as the (traditional, metaphysical) topic of a natural theology, insofar as Hegel accepts the fundamental cri- tique of Kant against any substrate that could be considered independent of rational thinking. 13 if such a religious and purely theological topic is to have any coherence, it may appear only within a philosophy of that reality, that is, within a philosophy of religion.
Hegel's philosophy of religion, at the same time, opposes the reduction by the enlightenment, which claims that religion lacks any validity (of its own), that only positive knowledge of sensible things of the visible and measurable world is knowledge properly speaking, and that the notion of 'god' is either ideologically false (i. e. atheism) or is an empty metaphysi-
13 see my 'l'ontologie proble? matique dans la philosophie allemande classique', in: e. gaziaux (e? d. ), Philosophie et Theologie, leuven, 2007, 61-84; see also H. F. Fulda, 'die ontologie und ihr schicksal' in: Hegel, Critique de Kant, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 53, 1999, pp. 465-483. the theological description of its topics--god and revelation--, is under critique only insofar as a theology pretents to speak also for those people, who do not participate in the same religious faith.
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cal claim (i. e. deism) (V3, p. 356). this latter conclusion, however, is also accepted by Hegel, albeit on other grounds, in relation to metaphysics. that such a conclusion is not destructive to religion is just Hegel's point, insofar as religion can present the name of god and the matters, which are His domain, on their own terms, as living spirit. neither was Hegel's goal a historical, exegetical one, following from the enlightenment, in which the historical sources alone where the primary objects of inquiry, as in schleiermacher (V3, pp. 356-7; V5, p. 300). that sort of inquiry, however, was not completely foreign to him, insofar as Hegel himself participated in the movement of the Leben Jesu-Forschung (in moral terms). more spe- cifically, Hegel accepts the main difference between the 'Jesus' of histori- cal biblical science on the one hand, and the communal or ecclesiastic (theological) 'Christ' on the other, which he posits after the controversy over Protestant orthodoxy with reimarus and lessing. 14
Hegel's philosophy rejects supernaturalism, which accepts faith or posi- tive revelation ('Offenbarungsglaube') as the origin of (even philosophical) knowledge. in fact, such supernaturalism is the position of faith, which regards itself (in its self-certainty) as an insight acceptable for everybody, even philosophically. 15 Furthermore, Hegel's philosophy has no confidence in the rationality of pietism, which holds that there may be no (reflected) knowledge of divine things, but only the inner awareness of the existence of god and divine events, for the pietist himself. Both of these positions are responses to the enlightenment and are (specifically) religious posi- tions, in which the notion of rational knowledge is neither justified by critical inquiry, nor open to everyone. therefore, they are purely religious positions, certain of themselves, but not philosophical ones. in fact, Hegel will consider enlightenment rationality and pietism as specifically (philo- sophically) 'problematic' positions. on the contrary, the position of faith as a religious (rather than philosophical) position is rejected or accepted as what it is in truth: simple faith. the enlightenment is very critical or sceptical of the (misuses of ) religion, but uses only the reflected criterion
14 Hegel will not apply this strict division between Jesus and Christ in his texts, but insofar as he does not accept the resurrection as an historical fact, but rather as a fact of the community of spirit, was the result of the controversy started by lessing-reimarus (Fragmenten-streit), he is indebted to that movement. see also H. gutschmidt, Vernunft- einsicht und Glaube, go? ttingen: Vandenhoeck & ruprecht 2007, p. 61.
15 For Hegel, there is no specifically Christian philosophy at all. Philosophy is the wis- dom of the world, where even an atheist must think in a valid way about the rationality of religion, at least as an important social and historical fact with its own truth-claims.
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of reason (for Hegel, as understanding). 16 Pietism represents a simple form of religion, which is necessary, but not sufficient for religion to be grasped in its full sense. 17
the rational presentation of religion (by philosophy), on the other hand, is a conceptual presentation; and in as far as conceptuality is the mark of philosophy, this presentation is a discourse on (conceptual) knowing, and not on things. in such a presentation, a 'given' phenom- enon or domain (i. e. religion) is conceptually situated and determined within the framework of a conceptual approach to actuality: religion is neither reduced to a pre-given other domain (that of neuroscience or his- tory e. g. , as in the positivist approach), nor accepted without question, in a dogmatic or emotional way. such a rational presentation does not reject other rational (domain-specific) presentations of specific religions (i. e. historical or theological ones), which present religion either not in religious terms or, on the other hand, as religion elucidated only for the faithful. these presentations are not the affair of reason as such, nor are they philosophical. However, theological presentations, in as far as there is no one true religion, are nevertheless systematic interlocutors. Hegel's presentation shows (or proves) to what extent theological entities and events should be interpreted as concepts, and thus be considered ratio- nally valid. in this way, religion as such, and not any specific (even con- summated) religion, is taken up within a philosophical framework that can be considered rational. 18
16 For Hegel (as for Kant), there is a difference between understanding and reason; the understanding is the normal use of rationality, reason is the philosophical inquiry about the meaning of rationality in every sense (theoretical in sciences, practical, political, his- torical). applied, the rationality used within a specific sphere of inquiry is that of a fixed ontology, whereas rationality as such is to be determined by philosophical logic or phi- losophy as such.
17 supernaturalism as a theology, which only claims in vain to be philosophical, was not a serious intellectual challenge to Hegel, although it attacked his position within the public sphere and annihilated his philosophy after Hegel's death with simple positions about immortality and god's personality.
18 a philosophy of religion is a philosophical discipline of 'reality'. a philosophy of nature or history has to be based on physics in general (i. e. in the sense of 'the science of nature') or on the science of history. However, philosophy transforms the philosophical presuppositions of these constituted sciences (beings (entia) or events e. g. ). in the same way, a philosophy of religion has to take seriously theologies as sciences of religion, but such a philosophy is no longer part of any theology, but rather treats all theology as provid- ing it with conceptually insufficient data about religion for its philosophical elaboration. if this restriction were not accepted by theology, then such a theology would seem to present a positivistic version of religion (or to be supernaturalism).
? hegel and protestantism 249 3. religion and Christianity
the development of a specific philosophy of religion (as a human activ- ity) is (after Kant) a philosophical necessity, insofar as 'god' as an inde- pendent being can no longer be considered a valid topic of philosophical inquiry, as was the case in the metaphysical proofs of natural theology, in view of his status as the highest being. 19 How religion specifically fits into the framework of philosophy or how religion can deliver valid thoughts in philosophy, is subsequently the basic problem. Philosophy of religion remains a possibility. this is--evidently--not itself a theological problem, nor a problem for a philosophy that is only concerned with the potential intelligibility of dogmatically accepted faith.
Hegel's treatment of philosophy in the Encyclopaedia answers the fun- damental question of the place of religion in philosophy: the whole sphere of absolute spirit is called 'religion'. this absolute spirit, however, is not a new 'entity', independent of knowing, but is rather 'only' a new self- conception of spirit. Within this sphere, a possible definition of the treat- ment of religious topics in a philosophical manner is also given. 20 the validity of religion seems restricted, insofar as its definition is concerned, to philosophical knowing, which does not claim a transcendent (non- conceptual) validity. 21 religion itself is defined as the highest sphere of the whole philosophy of spirit, where spirit in its ultimate self-conception justifies or reflects the whole of philosophy. moreover, spirit is not some thing, but a concept, which appears in different forms. these forms (indi- viduals, states, the arts) are only forms of spirit, in as far as these forms constitute the minimal concept of spirit; through this constitution they construct a specific identity as a particular coming out of nature (e3 ? 381). in this way, there are subjective spirits, who constitute singular individu- als, since they claim in their natural individuality to be thinking and free forms. moreover, there are objective spirits, which constitute their identity
19 see W. Jaeschke, Die Vernunft in der Religion, stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann- Holzboog 1986, pp. 18-133. For an (insufficient but very interesting) attempt to refute Kantian premises in order to give new proofs, see W. Cramer, Das Absolute und das Kontin- gente, Frankfurt a. m. : Klostermann 1959, 19762 and Gottesbeweise und ihre Kritik, Frankfurt am main: Klostermann 1967.
20 see H. -F. Fulda, Hegels Begriff des absoluten Geistes, in Hegel-Studien 36, Berlin: 2001, pp. 171-198, who stresses that even an atheist should accept this proposed definition in search of a further justification.
21 in e (with exclusion of the revealed religion), the term 'god' does not appear in the main text, as it is a specifically religious term. the encyclopaedia, indeed, is a philosophical book, neither a religious or a theological treatise.
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in taking together their own nature, the many of (individual) spirits, living on their territory.
absolute spirit is, as will become clear, not an entity, but its own form (thinkable as a philosophical concept), in which, only by thinking such an absolute sphere, spirit can completely guarantee its own specificity, and show itself as the pure manifestation of freedom. in opposition to enlightenment thought, Hegel asserts: if god is spirit, his concept is not empty (as was that of the god of natural theology), but he has fulfilled the minimal definitions and claims or requirements of the notion of spirit, in as far as only his spiritual form enables him to construct an intelligible identity as spirit. 22 only within this presentation does Hegel's philosophy assume the task of natural philosophy to 'close' the system of philosophy. However, this task is not performed in the manner or method of theology, to guarantee independent beings, nor according to its content, concerned with the highest being.
this concept of religion is the elaboration of the introduction to 'abso- lute spirit' (e3 ? ? 553-555), and this encyclopaedic concept of religion (or, of absolute spirit) is proposed to be further determined by art, consummated religion, and philosophy. if this is really the case, then some problems arise, insofar as it is not immediately clear how this concept of absolute spirit can be the starting point of a philosophy of religion. 23 to begin a philosophy of religion, a sort of philosophy which seems to be presented independently, there is to be taken up out of religion a name 'god' (i. e. the term ? god? ), that must constitute the specific difference, defined by the notion of spirit itself. such a name is itself not the result of other parts of philosophy, but it has, as a new term (and thus, as representation), the mark of the real philosophy, a new and empty form (which, through phi- losophy, must be determined further).
thus: (a) With this concept of religion, the conceptual necessity of a religious form is presented. (b) in such a philosophical presentation, it is
22 this program is dependent upon the speculative doctrine of the concept, which has to spell out its own (negatively discerned or in a sceptical way attacked) determinations, so that the result is, at the same time, the completed concept and the justification of its real specificity.
23 the second problem, for those who are familiar with Hegel in a general way, is, why philosophy, and not the Christian religion, which is called the truth of religion, would be the ultimate result. a solution to this could be that the Christian religion is the truth of the concept of religion as religion. Philosophy, on the other hand, fulfils the concept of spirit adequately, insofar as it negates the form of representation, and presents the concept of spirit itself in its truth (and purity).
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the rationality or--minimally--the universal recognition of the specifi- cally Christian religion--as the truth of religion as such--which will be worked out thereafter.
a. The Concept of Religion Proper
in Hegel's elaboration of his philosophy of religion, the concept of religion is its specific starting point. it has three parts, the concept of god (not given in this form in the philosophy of absolute spirit), religious knowl- edge, and cult.
this elaborated concept begins from the (at this point, empty) term 'god' as with that which is specific to religious claims. 'god' is the name for a specific religious reality fulfilling the (initially abstract) definition of absolute spirit as the correspondence of real spirit with its concept. With- out such a name, whether it is Zeus, JHWH or simply 'god', there is no recognisable religious dimension at all. on this introduction, two points can be made: 'god' is a name, so it is the initial approach of religion as such and, on the other hand, if religion is the highest form within spirit, god is also taken as the philosophical (or philosophically explainable) truth of the totality of spirit. 24
'god' as the new, specifically religious term and, up to this point, as an unknown determination, must unfold through its elaboration or devel- opment in a conceptual, scientific way. at this point, there is only the thought of the empty concept 'god' as the specificity or the claimed truth of all infinitude. only in as far as it can be elaborated within forms and institutions, which are the specifications for the use of such a concept (i. e. religions), can it be seen how and in what way it is rational. only in this way is there a new content (i. e. religions), which works in and through history to explain the specific (ideal) spirituality of spirit, or, in as far as freedom has such a spiritual form, to be recognised by all
24 With this definition, Hegel is not following the alternative that there is either a new philosophical theology (Jaeschke's position on the view of Hodgson) or a theo-anthropol- ogy (Feuerbach), given by Hodgson, (op. cit. , 13). religion is in fact not reducible to some- thing less complex or less determined (say biology, psychology (Feuerbach), ethics (Kant), politics (neo-marxism), or history. But, its main concern does remain rationally empty as long as there is not a (religiously) attributable essence of spirit (i. e. the truth of spirit). rationally, this essence could be interpreted as something other than spirit, but this is not a strange independent entity called 'god'. in fact, philosophy of religion replaces (ersetzt) the old philosophical theology, but is neither a new form of particular metaphysics, nor an aspect of speculative metaphysics proper.
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spirit. 25 However, as the starting point (of a philosophy of religion), such a truth remains abstract. it claims nothing, with the exception that god is, and that he is one truth over and against all other truths that have been asserted and sublated before (like those of nature and finite spirit, which failed to bring themselves to completion). even as absolute subsistence, 'god' is not concrete. 26 there is nothing in the name alone that the differ- ent names of god(s) can fulfil immediately, or that corresponds to the dif- ferent names of god(s) (ghost(s), re, Zeus, Jupiter, JHWH, god the Father, etc. ). With a name alone, it may be a concept or a pure representation, but there is not yet religion.
such a god becomes concrete only if he is the basis and moment of his development (as a concept), and the principle of his own (conceptual) particularisation. 27 there are two ways to attain such a particularisation: in the movement from either god to religious consciousness or from knowing to god. the first movement is attributed to him by religious people. the claim that god is the truth of all, is indeed a fact of religious conscious- ness, a claim that is related to the basic subsistent substance, using merely formal modes rationally, insofar as 'creation' by god and 'spiritualisation' from god are, in themselves, empty terms, if we attribute them without further determination to that truthful substance. therefore, philosophy must determine how the religious knowledge asserted by some people could lead to an insight available to everyone, and furthermore also arrive at this insight in a philosophical way, insofar as He may be conceptually reconstructed. specific to Hegel's treatment of religious knowledge is his survey of the forms of religious knowledge and his (even more specific) thesis that the proofs of god's existence show the elevation of the reli- gious subject that is involved in the topic of religion itself.
this religious knowledge (according to the account given around 1820) demonstrates the elevation of itself to that truth. For a human being, the question is: how does his religious knowledge come to god? For
25 against all sceptics who could imagine that man could be the gods of the animals, animals can have perceptions and feelings, and there are kingdoms in the animal sphere, but art, religion or philosophy do not exist in the animal domain, insofar as we wouldn't accept that a dog could be a religious being (Vorrede zu Hinrichs, gW 15: 137).
26 With such a notion, Hegel attributes to religion the claim that god is 'a se', not the philosophical but contradictory claim that he is 'causa sui'.
27 god is thus the example par excellence of the universal, or of the manner in which the universal can be represented. He may be determined by nature or by (finite) spirit, but until this point it can only be done in a negative way; only from this determination is he something, but, from now on, he is this determination as his own determination (if that may be seen in religions) by which he is himself or singular.
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this elevation, there are a number of possibilities that are presented and accepted in religion as religious knowledge (mainly in Protestant circles) rationally. 28 minimally, there is an immediate knowing or an immediate certainty that god is not only a name or merely a story i tell myself, but that he is and exists independently of me. at this starting point, the reli- gious subject and god are linked, insofar as that subject is aware of the fact and claims that god is or that this content (god) is as spiritual as the subject is. 29 However, at this stage, this claim cannot be justified further.
at this point, the claim is as empty as when the name 'god' alone was asserted. However, it is now a claim of knowledge, not simply a proposal or empty definition. it will only authentically become a content of knowl- edge when it is justified by representation and thinking. as representation, it shows itself in sensuous figures, images, myths, narratives and histories, according to the content of different religions. such representations of the acts of salvation are the beginning of religious education, but even with all these moments, the insight available for everybody (and thus justifi- able), the place of religion is not defined in a precise way. this justified determination is a thinking in which the different moments are posited as conceptually necessary. in this thinking originates the different proofs of the existence of god. these proofs are neither the concern of merely immediate knowledge, nor of simple religious faith. they are, however, religious knowledge, considered (by philosophy) in its elevation of reli- gious knowledge to god. the proofs, in this interpretation of Hegel's phi- losophy of religion, also give structure to the historical forms of religion, which do not restrict themselves to their (immediate) inwardness. 30
in as far as the proofs are specific forms of elevation, Hegel is not returning to ontology, but is rather trying to justify forms of knowledge (of absolute spirit). 31 such an interpretation of religion may be seen as
28 With this typology, Hegel has in mind all of the theological versions of Protestant religion of his time: Jacobi as a pietist, schleiermacher as an enlightened theologian, and the simple faith of the people, all of which are insufficient forms for a properly philosophi- cal approach to religion.
29 such an immediate knowledge was a common claim in pietistic and even cultivated Protestant circles around 1820-30. see Hegel's discussion of go? schel (16: 188-215) and the commentary of P. Jonkers, 'Unmittelbares Wissen und absolutes Wissen', in: W. Jaeschke & B. sandkaulen, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Hamburg: meiner Verlag 2004, pp. 359-375.
30 With this thesis, Hegel is not claiming that there is a temporal history of religions exposed in his philosophy of religion, but rather that there is a rational (and conceptually based) exposition of religions, which is recognisable in the history of religion.
31 see g. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen u? ber die Beweise vom Daseyn Gottes (gW 18: 228-317). see also d. murphy, Gottesbeweis in: P. Cobben e. o. (ed), Hegel-Lexikon, darmstadt: WBg 2006, pp. 247-249.
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'heterodox',32 but is the result of the philosophical insight that the imme- diate (ontological) understanding of religion (in terms of separate enti- ties, such as a god independent of the use of religious words, or immortal souls) is not rational. the proofs of the existence of god are the explication of religious consciousness and, in that sense, of religion itself. the most important of these proofs is the ontological one (anselm, descartes and Wolff ), which is used only in Christian times. in this case, Hegel is address- ing the Christian tradition in general, not a particularly lutheran or particu- larly Protestant one, insofar as this proof is itself rational and not based on any particular faith alone. in this proof, as well as in Hegel's philosophy of religion generally, the being or the objectivity is indicated and justified in terms of the concept, for, only in the case of god, does its substance include his own being in himself. this philosophical exposition of the ontological proof is just the return to that concept that is posited at the beginning of the philosophy of religion.
educated religious people exercise their religious identity and proper ele- vation through a particular system of religious worship (i. e. 'cult'), which gives them a real unity with 'god'. in the elevation of the proofs of god's existence, which presuppose a (metaphysical) concept, it remains unclear for the religious consciousness that it is itself that is elevating itself. at this level, however, religiously knowing consciousness remains within in its own representation, separated from its divine object. to overcome this represented separation or presupposed split is the purpose of ritual and ceremonial practices (i. e. cult). Cult thus provides the highest form of enjoyment to self-consciousness, in the way in which it reconciles that consciousness with the absolute. Participation in this (represented) reconciliation, which is (for the religious subject) fully and already per- formed by the divine act of salvation, is the basic activity of cult. this cult takes on a multiplicity of different forms; it is first of all devotion or con- templative prayer, which is active faith, or, in other words, it is engaged religious thinking, participating in god, so that the reconciliation is actual for him.
the particular forms of sacrifice, however, are secondly, from the point of view of the religious subject, essential. these forms are outer or exter- nal, but, from the point of view of the religious subject, essential. the external forms reproduce the reconciliation in little sacrifices and sac- ramental rites. in such practices, the religious subject is performing the
32 see C. o'regan, The Heterodox Hegel, albany: sUnY Press 1994.
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same elevation, but now for and with his own consciousness, so that the form of representation is destroyed. such a ritual sacrifice is the negation and offering of some finite thing through which the subject demonstrates that he is enjoying ('geniessend') the unity of himself with his god. 33
the most important and authentic form of sacrifice is the sacrifice of the heart, not only in the sense of the purification of desire and of par- ticular passions, but also in the production of spirituality in the form of universality. the finitude or particularity of every subject has to elevate itself to its own purity, so that there is a universal law (of reconciliation), recognisable for everybody. this is the promotion of ethicity (Sittlichkeit) or the production of such an actuality that manifests the reconciliation in this world, but with which the consciousness of the truth remains reli- giously linked. ethicity, then, does not involve simply the singular act of repentance, as it were merely a response to something bad, but it is a genuine form of reconciliation. such a realisation of the annihilation of the particularity of the heart is not so much an extension of the cult as it is the true liberation of the freedom of the world to its own (spiritual) affair ('Sache'). even better, it is not a particular grace, but everyone's actual striving toward real reconciliation! such an account, that it is not the enjoyment of the external cult, but the purification of the heart, as the highest form of cult, may seem to be particularly Protestant in its inspira- tion (as will become clear in Hegel's presentation of Christianity). the true consciousness of the actual purification in ethicity seems to be insightful religion, or that it has become a practical insight available to everybody, or, in other words, that it has become philosophy. religion depends upon this ethicity insofar as such an elevation (or purification) is linked with philosophy as the consciousness of truth, and also in as far as it is only out of this ethicity that god is no longer only a religious substance, but also interpreted as 'free spirit' (e3 ? 552 a).
at this point, this internally elaborated concept could be an illusory or merely an internal philosophical concept (or a merely semantic defini- tion) without validity, even with its allusion to real forms like sacraments and ethicity. to prove such forms have more than a merely illusory, inter- nal, or semantic validity, they should be singularised for consciousness in real religion(s).
33 Hegel is describing all religious forms, in and through his own religious attitude, in terms of Christianity. However, the sense of this conceptual presentation is formal, valid for every religion.
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b. Revealed or Consummate Religion is Christianity34
Hegel claims that the Christian religion fulfils, in historical actuality, the concept of religion, and is, as the result of the conceptual development of all other religions, therefore also true religion. in this rational form ('Gestalt'), the philosophical presentation of Christianity must be recogn- isable for everyone, including faithful or religious people. so, such a philo- sophical presentation must not be based only on a traditional view, or a view that is guaranteed by a religious authority or by the faithful, because a philosophical interpretation of Christianity is not a form of catechism (Dritter Replik, 16: 273). However, in such an interpretation, even religious people should not miss essential features of their faith (e. g. in Christianity, there must be attention to Jesus, who is their Christ) and this exposition should be a philosophical presentation of theological insights. in his sum- mary, Hegel claims that the specifically essential aspects of Christianity are the trinity (which was not taken to be theologically very essential during his time), the appearance of Jesus as Christ, the immortality of the soul and the state (when understood as the modern version of the King- dom of god) (l. c. , 16: 270). 35
in as far as Christianity is the truth of the concept, as well as of other forms of religion, all marks of such religious conceptions are emphasised, and where the central preconceptions are Christian ones. 36 in this reli- gion, the full realisation of such views is asserted, such as the trinity (in the form of religious triplicity), the incarnation (V5, 236, from W2) and the death of god (in Jesus). the differences in the views on immortal- ity between pre-Christian and Christian religions are elaborated in the courses, in order to point to the essential meaning of Christianity.
not presupposed, however, is the concrete concept of spirit. this con- cept is the idea of religion, specifying the concept of god, insofar as it
34 For a reliable english version: P. Hodgson, Hegel and Christian Theology, oxford: oxford UP 2005; the best philosophical books on Hegel's religion remain, however, W. Jaeschke, Die Religionsphilosophie Hegels, darmstadt: WBg 1983 and Jaeschke, Die Ver- nunft, (o. c. ).
35 this claim is very difficult, insofar as religious people (and religious authorities) seem to be unaware of their (particular) assumptions (e.
