What I want, indeed, is that two sorts of form be considered: one is the cause which, even if not the efficient, allows the
efficient
to produce its effects; the other is the principle, called forth from matter by the efficient cause.
Bruno-Cause-Principle-and-Unity
Good.
Butthesepeopledonotdeservereproach,somuchas those deserve the highest praise who strive towards the knowledge of this principle and this cause, to apprehend its grandeur as far as possible by inspecting, with the eyes of orderly consideration, those magnificent stars and luminous bodies which are so many inhabited worlds, great creatures and superlative divinities: those which seem to be, and are, innumerable worlds not very unlike that in which we find ourselves.
Since it is impos- sible for them to have being in and of themselves, being composite and dissoluble (not that they are, therefore, deserving of dissolution, as was well expressed in the Timaeus), it is necessary that they have a principle and cause, and that, as consequence of the greatness of their being, living and acting, they manifest and proclaim in an infinite space and with innu- merable voices the excellence and infinite majesty of their first cause and first principle.
Leaving aside, then, as you say, that speculation, since it surpasses all sense and intellect, let us look into the principle or cause insofar as, as vestige, either it is nature itself, or it shines in the element and the bosom of nature.
Question me, then, methodically, if you want me to answer likewise.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . So I will. But first of all, since you frequently employ the terms 'cause' and 'principle', I would like to know whether you consider them synonymous.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . No.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . But then what difference is there between the two? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . When we say that God is first principle and first cause,
we mean one and the same thing, using different concepts, but when we speak of principles and causes in nature, we are talking of different things using different concepts. We say that God is first principle, in so far as all things come after him according to a definite order of anteriority and posteriority, in terms of either their nature, their duration or their merit. We speak of God as first cause, in so far as all things are distinct from him, as the effect from the efficient cause, and the thing produced from its producer. And these two definitions are different, because not every- thing which is prior and of higher value is the cause of what comes after it and is of lesser value, and because not every cause is prior and of higher value than that which is caused, as is clear to whoever ponders the matter carefully.
? ?
Second dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then, tell me, what difference is there between cause and principle, as far as natural things are concerned?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Although the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, nonetheless, speaking properly, not everything that is a principle is a cause. The point is the principle or origin of the line, but not its cause; the instant is the principle or origin of activity [but not the cause of the act]; the point of departure is the principle of movement, and not the cause of movement; the premises are the principles of an argument, but not its cause. 'Principle' is, thus, a more general term than 'cause'.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then, to narrow these two terms within certain proper meanings, observing the procedure of those who express themselves most correctly, I think you take 'principle' to be that which intrinsically con- tributes to the constitution of things and remains in the effect, as they say of matter and form, which remain in the composite, or else the elements from which a thing is composed and into which a thing is resolved. You call 'cause' that which contributes to the production of things from outside, and which exists outside the composition, as is the case of the efficient cause, and of the end to which the thing produced is directed.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Verygood.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Now that we have answered the question of the difference between these things, I would like you to turn your attention first to the causes, and then to the principles. Regarding the causes, I would first like to know about the first efficient cause, then the formal, which you say is linked to the efficient, and lastly the final cause, understood as the mover of the efficient cause.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Theorderofyourpropositionpleasesmeverymuch. Asfor the efficient cause, I say that the universal physical efficient cause is the uni- versal intellect, which is the first and principal faculty of the world soul, which, in turn, is the universal form of it.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You seem to me to be not only in agreement with Empedocles' opinion, but still more certain, precise, explicit and even, as far as I can see by your statements, more profound. Thus, I would appre- ciate it if you would explain in greater detail just what you conceive this universal intellect to be.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Theuniversalintellectistheinnermost,mostrealandmost proper faculty or potential part of the world soul. It is that one and the same thing that fills everything, illuminates the universe and directs nature to produce her various species suitably. It is to the production of natural
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? things what our intellect is to the production of the representations of things. The Pythagoreans call it the 'mover' and 'agitator of the universe'. As the poet has expressed:
totamque infusa per artus,
mens agitat molem, et toto se corpore miscet. 2
[pervading its members, mind stirs the whole mass and mingles with the whole body]
The Platonists call it 'world artificer'. They believe that it proceeds from the higher world, which is indeed one, to this sensible world, which is divided into many, and where, because of the separations of its parts, both harmony and discord reign. This intellect, infusing and instilling some- thing of its own into matter, while itself remaining immobile and undis- turbed, produces all things. The hermeticists say that it is 'most fecund in seeds' or yet that it is the 'seed sower', because it impregnates matter with all forms, which, according to their nature and manner of being, succeed in shaping, forming and weaving matter in ways that are so remarkable and numerous that they cannot be ascribed to chance, nor to any other princi- ple incapable of differentiation and arrangement. Orpheus calls it 'the eye of the world', because it sees both the inside and outside of all natural things, in order that they may succeed in producing and maintaining them- selves in their proper proportions, intrinsically as well as extrinsically. Empedocles calls it 'the differentiator', since it never tires of distinguish- ing the forms confused within nature's bosom, and of summoning the gen- eration of one from the corruption of another. Plotinus says it is 'the father and progenitor', because it distributes seeds in nature's field and is the proximate dispenser of forms. As for us, we call it the 'internal artificer', because it shapes matter, forming it from inside like a seed or root shoot- ing forth and unfolding the trunk, from within the trunk thrusting out the boughs, from inside the boughs the derived branches, and unfurling buds from within these. From therein it forms, fashions and weaves, as with nerves, the leaves, flowers and fruits, and it is from the inside that, at cer- tain times, it calls back its sap from the leaves and the fruits to the twigs, from the twigs to the branches, from the branch to the trunk, from the trunk to the root. Similarly, in animals, it begins by deploying its work from the seed and from the centre of the heart, towards the outer members, and from these it finally gathers back towards the heart the faculties it had 2 Virgil, Aeneid, ? ? , ? ? ? -? .
? ? ?
Second dialogue
? extended, as if it were twining up thread it had first unwound. Now, if we believe that intellect and reason are required to produce those works - dead works, so to speak - that we know how to fashion according to certain order and by imitation on the surface of matter, as when stripping and whittling a piece of wood we cause the shape of a horse to appear, how much supe- rior must we hold that artistic intellect that, from the interior of the semi- nal matter, solders together the bones, extends the cartilage, hollows the arteries, airs the pores, interweaves the fibres, branches out the nerves and arranges the whole with such praiseworthy mystery? How much greater an artificer, I say, is he who is not limited to one part of matter, but works, con- tinually present in the whole, on the whole! There are three kinds of intel- lect: the divine, which is everything, the mundane, of which we have just spoken, which makes everything, and the other, particular ones, which become everything, because a middle term is needed between the extremes, and this is the true efficient cause, not only extrinsic, but also intrinsic, of all natural things.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I would like to hear you distinguish between your concep- tion of an efficient cause as extrinsic cause, and your idea of it as intrinsic cause.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Icallacauseextrinsicwhen,asefficient,itisnotapartofthe things composed and things produced; it is intrinsic in so far as it does not operate on the matter or outside it, but in the way we have just described. Thus, it is an extrinsic cause by its being, which is distinct from the sub- stance and the essence of its effects, and because its being does not resem- ble that of things susceptible to generation and corruption, although it operates in those things; a cause is extrinsic, with regard to the action of its operation.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . It seems to me you have spoken enough about the efficient cause. Now I would like to understand what that formal cause could be which you maintain is linked to the efficient cause: is it, perhaps, the ideal reason? For every agent which operates by means of a regulating intellect strives to produce its effects only by means of some intention, and this is impossible without the apprehension of something, which is none other than the form of the thing to be produced. Consequently, that intellect, which possesses the faculty of producing all species, and of sending them forth with such fine architecture from the potency of matter to act, must contain them all in advance, after the manner of forms, without which the agent could not proceed to manufacture, just as the sculptor cannot
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? execute different statues without having a preconception of their different forms.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You understand all that excellently.
What I want, indeed, is that two sorts of form be considered: one is the cause which, even if not the efficient, allows the efficient to produce its effects; the other is the principle, called forth from matter by the efficient cause.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . The aim, the final cause which is sought by the efficient, is the perfection of the universe, which consists of all forms having actual material existence; the intellect delights and takes such pleasure in pursu- ing this goal, that it never tires of calling forth from matter all sorts of forms, as Empedocles himself seems to maintain.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Quiteright,andIaddthat,justasthisefficientisuniversalin the universe, but specific and particular in the universe's parts and members, so are also its form and its purpose.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Butenoughconcerningcauses. Letuscometoprinciples.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . In order to get at the constitutive principles of things, I will first discuss form, since, in a way, it is identical to the efficient cause we have just defined: we said, in fact, that the intellect, which is a potency of the world soul, is the proximate efficient cause of all natural things.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . But how can the same subject be principle and cause of natural things? How can it have the character of an intrinsic part, and not that of an extrinsic part?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thatisnocontradiction,ifweconsiderthatthesoulisinthe body as the pilot is in the ship: since the pilot is part of the ship, he moves with it; yet, considering that he governs and moves it, he must not be included as a part, but as a distinct efficient cause. Likewise, the soul of the universe, in so far as it animates and informs it, is found to be an intrinsic and formal part of the universe, but in so far as it directs and governs the universe, it is not a part, and does not have the character of principle, but of a cause. Aristotle himself grants us this, since, though he denies that the soul has the same relation to the body as the pilot to the ship, he does not go so far, when he considers it with regard to its power to know and to understand, as to call it the act and form of the body, but he looks on it as an efficient cause separate in its being from matter. The intellect is some- thing that comes from outside from the point of view of its substantiality, independent of the composite.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I approve of what you say, because if it is correct that the intellectual potency of our soul is separated from the body and has the
? ?
Second dialogue
? character of an efficient cause, it is all the more true of the world soul. As Plotinus writes against the Gnostics, 'the world soul governs the universe more easily than the soul governs our body', since there is a great difference between their ways of governing. The former rules the world without being fettered to it, so that what it controls does not bind it, nor does it suffer through or with other things. It raises itself without impediment to higher things; giving life and perfection to bodies, it does not itself become infected with any imperfection: and that is why it is eternally united with the same subject. As for the latter, it is clear that its condition is completely different. Now, if, according to your principle, the perfections found in inferior natures must be attributed to, and recognized in, superior natures to a higher degree, we must agree, without the slightest doubt, with the dis- tinction you have established. This assertion is valid not only for the world soul, but also for every star, since (as the aforementioned philosopher holds) they all have the power to contemplate God, the principles of all things and the distribution of the orders of the universe. He holds that this does not occur by means of memory, reasoning or reflection, for all their operations are eternal operations; no act can be new to them, and, in con- sequence, they do nothing which is inappropriate to the whole, nor any- thing which is not perfect or does not follow a definite and predetermined order, and all this completely without any act of deliberation. This is what Aristotle himself shows with the examples of the perfect writer or perfect lute player, when he denies that, under the pretext that nature does not reason or reflect, one can conclude that it operates without intellect or final intention: for great musicians and writers pay less attention to what they are doing than their less talented colleagues, who, because they reflect more, produce work that is less perfect and, what is worse, not free from error.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You have understood. But let us look at things a bit more closely now. It seems to me that those who will not understand or affirm that the world and its parts are animated detract from the divine goodness and from the excellence of this great living being and simulacrum of the first principle; as if God were jealous of his image, as if the architect failed to love his own work - he of whom Plato3 remarks that he appreciated his creation for its resemblance to himself, for the reflection of himself he sees in it. And, indeed, what could be presented to the eyes of the divinity which is more beautiful than this universe? And since the universe is composed of its parts, which of these parts should we hold to be more important than
3 Timaeus ? ? E. ? ?
? Cause, principle and unity
? the formal principle? I leave for a better and more detailed analysis the examination of the thousand natural reasons that can be added to this topical or logical one.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I am not concerned to have you exert yourself over this point, for there is no philosopher enjoying some reputation, even among the Peripatetics, who does not hold that the world and its spheres are animated in some way. For now, I would like to understand how, in your opinion, this form comes to introduce itself into the matter of the universe.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . It joins itself to it in such a way that the nature of the body, which is not beautiful in itself, comes to participate as far as it can in beauty, for there is no beauty which does not consist of some species or form, and there is no form that is not produced by the soul.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I seem to be hearing something very novel. Are you claim- ing, perhaps, that not only the form of the universe, but also all the forms of natural things are souls?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Butwhowillagreewithyouthere?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Butwhocouldreasonablyrefuteit?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Common sense tells us that not everything is alive. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Themostcommonsenseisnotthetruestsense.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I can readily believe that that last point is defensible. But it
is not enough for one to be be able to defend a thing to render it true: we must be able to provide a proof.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thatisnotdifficult. Aretherenotphilosopherswhosaythat the world is animated?
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . So I will. But first of all, since you frequently employ the terms 'cause' and 'principle', I would like to know whether you consider them synonymous.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . No.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . But then what difference is there between the two? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . When we say that God is first principle and first cause,
we mean one and the same thing, using different concepts, but when we speak of principles and causes in nature, we are talking of different things using different concepts. We say that God is first principle, in so far as all things come after him according to a definite order of anteriority and posteriority, in terms of either their nature, their duration or their merit. We speak of God as first cause, in so far as all things are distinct from him, as the effect from the efficient cause, and the thing produced from its producer. And these two definitions are different, because not every- thing which is prior and of higher value is the cause of what comes after it and is of lesser value, and because not every cause is prior and of higher value than that which is caused, as is clear to whoever ponders the matter carefully.
? ?
Second dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then, tell me, what difference is there between cause and principle, as far as natural things are concerned?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Although the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, nonetheless, speaking properly, not everything that is a principle is a cause. The point is the principle or origin of the line, but not its cause; the instant is the principle or origin of activity [but not the cause of the act]; the point of departure is the principle of movement, and not the cause of movement; the premises are the principles of an argument, but not its cause. 'Principle' is, thus, a more general term than 'cause'.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then, to narrow these two terms within certain proper meanings, observing the procedure of those who express themselves most correctly, I think you take 'principle' to be that which intrinsically con- tributes to the constitution of things and remains in the effect, as they say of matter and form, which remain in the composite, or else the elements from which a thing is composed and into which a thing is resolved. You call 'cause' that which contributes to the production of things from outside, and which exists outside the composition, as is the case of the efficient cause, and of the end to which the thing produced is directed.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Verygood.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Now that we have answered the question of the difference between these things, I would like you to turn your attention first to the causes, and then to the principles. Regarding the causes, I would first like to know about the first efficient cause, then the formal, which you say is linked to the efficient, and lastly the final cause, understood as the mover of the efficient cause.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Theorderofyourpropositionpleasesmeverymuch. Asfor the efficient cause, I say that the universal physical efficient cause is the uni- versal intellect, which is the first and principal faculty of the world soul, which, in turn, is the universal form of it.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You seem to me to be not only in agreement with Empedocles' opinion, but still more certain, precise, explicit and even, as far as I can see by your statements, more profound. Thus, I would appre- ciate it if you would explain in greater detail just what you conceive this universal intellect to be.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Theuniversalintellectistheinnermost,mostrealandmost proper faculty or potential part of the world soul. It is that one and the same thing that fills everything, illuminates the universe and directs nature to produce her various species suitably. It is to the production of natural
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? things what our intellect is to the production of the representations of things. The Pythagoreans call it the 'mover' and 'agitator of the universe'. As the poet has expressed:
totamque infusa per artus,
mens agitat molem, et toto se corpore miscet. 2
[pervading its members, mind stirs the whole mass and mingles with the whole body]
The Platonists call it 'world artificer'. They believe that it proceeds from the higher world, which is indeed one, to this sensible world, which is divided into many, and where, because of the separations of its parts, both harmony and discord reign. This intellect, infusing and instilling some- thing of its own into matter, while itself remaining immobile and undis- turbed, produces all things. The hermeticists say that it is 'most fecund in seeds' or yet that it is the 'seed sower', because it impregnates matter with all forms, which, according to their nature and manner of being, succeed in shaping, forming and weaving matter in ways that are so remarkable and numerous that they cannot be ascribed to chance, nor to any other princi- ple incapable of differentiation and arrangement. Orpheus calls it 'the eye of the world', because it sees both the inside and outside of all natural things, in order that they may succeed in producing and maintaining them- selves in their proper proportions, intrinsically as well as extrinsically. Empedocles calls it 'the differentiator', since it never tires of distinguish- ing the forms confused within nature's bosom, and of summoning the gen- eration of one from the corruption of another. Plotinus says it is 'the father and progenitor', because it distributes seeds in nature's field and is the proximate dispenser of forms. As for us, we call it the 'internal artificer', because it shapes matter, forming it from inside like a seed or root shoot- ing forth and unfolding the trunk, from within the trunk thrusting out the boughs, from inside the boughs the derived branches, and unfurling buds from within these. From therein it forms, fashions and weaves, as with nerves, the leaves, flowers and fruits, and it is from the inside that, at cer- tain times, it calls back its sap from the leaves and the fruits to the twigs, from the twigs to the branches, from the branch to the trunk, from the trunk to the root. Similarly, in animals, it begins by deploying its work from the seed and from the centre of the heart, towards the outer members, and from these it finally gathers back towards the heart the faculties it had 2 Virgil, Aeneid, ? ? , ? ? ? -? .
? ? ?
Second dialogue
? extended, as if it were twining up thread it had first unwound. Now, if we believe that intellect and reason are required to produce those works - dead works, so to speak - that we know how to fashion according to certain order and by imitation on the surface of matter, as when stripping and whittling a piece of wood we cause the shape of a horse to appear, how much supe- rior must we hold that artistic intellect that, from the interior of the semi- nal matter, solders together the bones, extends the cartilage, hollows the arteries, airs the pores, interweaves the fibres, branches out the nerves and arranges the whole with such praiseworthy mystery? How much greater an artificer, I say, is he who is not limited to one part of matter, but works, con- tinually present in the whole, on the whole! There are three kinds of intel- lect: the divine, which is everything, the mundane, of which we have just spoken, which makes everything, and the other, particular ones, which become everything, because a middle term is needed between the extremes, and this is the true efficient cause, not only extrinsic, but also intrinsic, of all natural things.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I would like to hear you distinguish between your concep- tion of an efficient cause as extrinsic cause, and your idea of it as intrinsic cause.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Icallacauseextrinsicwhen,asefficient,itisnotapartofthe things composed and things produced; it is intrinsic in so far as it does not operate on the matter or outside it, but in the way we have just described. Thus, it is an extrinsic cause by its being, which is distinct from the sub- stance and the essence of its effects, and because its being does not resem- ble that of things susceptible to generation and corruption, although it operates in those things; a cause is extrinsic, with regard to the action of its operation.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . It seems to me you have spoken enough about the efficient cause. Now I would like to understand what that formal cause could be which you maintain is linked to the efficient cause: is it, perhaps, the ideal reason? For every agent which operates by means of a regulating intellect strives to produce its effects only by means of some intention, and this is impossible without the apprehension of something, which is none other than the form of the thing to be produced. Consequently, that intellect, which possesses the faculty of producing all species, and of sending them forth with such fine architecture from the potency of matter to act, must contain them all in advance, after the manner of forms, without which the agent could not proceed to manufacture, just as the sculptor cannot
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? execute different statues without having a preconception of their different forms.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You understand all that excellently.
What I want, indeed, is that two sorts of form be considered: one is the cause which, even if not the efficient, allows the efficient to produce its effects; the other is the principle, called forth from matter by the efficient cause.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . The aim, the final cause which is sought by the efficient, is the perfection of the universe, which consists of all forms having actual material existence; the intellect delights and takes such pleasure in pursu- ing this goal, that it never tires of calling forth from matter all sorts of forms, as Empedocles himself seems to maintain.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Quiteright,andIaddthat,justasthisefficientisuniversalin the universe, but specific and particular in the universe's parts and members, so are also its form and its purpose.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Butenoughconcerningcauses. Letuscometoprinciples.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . In order to get at the constitutive principles of things, I will first discuss form, since, in a way, it is identical to the efficient cause we have just defined: we said, in fact, that the intellect, which is a potency of the world soul, is the proximate efficient cause of all natural things.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . But how can the same subject be principle and cause of natural things? How can it have the character of an intrinsic part, and not that of an extrinsic part?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thatisnocontradiction,ifweconsiderthatthesoulisinthe body as the pilot is in the ship: since the pilot is part of the ship, he moves with it; yet, considering that he governs and moves it, he must not be included as a part, but as a distinct efficient cause. Likewise, the soul of the universe, in so far as it animates and informs it, is found to be an intrinsic and formal part of the universe, but in so far as it directs and governs the universe, it is not a part, and does not have the character of principle, but of a cause. Aristotle himself grants us this, since, though he denies that the soul has the same relation to the body as the pilot to the ship, he does not go so far, when he considers it with regard to its power to know and to understand, as to call it the act and form of the body, but he looks on it as an efficient cause separate in its being from matter. The intellect is some- thing that comes from outside from the point of view of its substantiality, independent of the composite.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I approve of what you say, because if it is correct that the intellectual potency of our soul is separated from the body and has the
? ?
Second dialogue
? character of an efficient cause, it is all the more true of the world soul. As Plotinus writes against the Gnostics, 'the world soul governs the universe more easily than the soul governs our body', since there is a great difference between their ways of governing. The former rules the world without being fettered to it, so that what it controls does not bind it, nor does it suffer through or with other things. It raises itself without impediment to higher things; giving life and perfection to bodies, it does not itself become infected with any imperfection: and that is why it is eternally united with the same subject. As for the latter, it is clear that its condition is completely different. Now, if, according to your principle, the perfections found in inferior natures must be attributed to, and recognized in, superior natures to a higher degree, we must agree, without the slightest doubt, with the dis- tinction you have established. This assertion is valid not only for the world soul, but also for every star, since (as the aforementioned philosopher holds) they all have the power to contemplate God, the principles of all things and the distribution of the orders of the universe. He holds that this does not occur by means of memory, reasoning or reflection, for all their operations are eternal operations; no act can be new to them, and, in con- sequence, they do nothing which is inappropriate to the whole, nor any- thing which is not perfect or does not follow a definite and predetermined order, and all this completely without any act of deliberation. This is what Aristotle himself shows with the examples of the perfect writer or perfect lute player, when he denies that, under the pretext that nature does not reason or reflect, one can conclude that it operates without intellect or final intention: for great musicians and writers pay less attention to what they are doing than their less talented colleagues, who, because they reflect more, produce work that is less perfect and, what is worse, not free from error.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You have understood. But let us look at things a bit more closely now. It seems to me that those who will not understand or affirm that the world and its parts are animated detract from the divine goodness and from the excellence of this great living being and simulacrum of the first principle; as if God were jealous of his image, as if the architect failed to love his own work - he of whom Plato3 remarks that he appreciated his creation for its resemblance to himself, for the reflection of himself he sees in it. And, indeed, what could be presented to the eyes of the divinity which is more beautiful than this universe? And since the universe is composed of its parts, which of these parts should we hold to be more important than
3 Timaeus ? ? E. ? ?
? Cause, principle and unity
? the formal principle? I leave for a better and more detailed analysis the examination of the thousand natural reasons that can be added to this topical or logical one.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I am not concerned to have you exert yourself over this point, for there is no philosopher enjoying some reputation, even among the Peripatetics, who does not hold that the world and its spheres are animated in some way. For now, I would like to understand how, in your opinion, this form comes to introduce itself into the matter of the universe.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . It joins itself to it in such a way that the nature of the body, which is not beautiful in itself, comes to participate as far as it can in beauty, for there is no beauty which does not consist of some species or form, and there is no form that is not produced by the soul.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I seem to be hearing something very novel. Are you claim- ing, perhaps, that not only the form of the universe, but also all the forms of natural things are souls?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Butwhowillagreewithyouthere?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Butwhocouldreasonablyrefuteit?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Common sense tells us that not everything is alive. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Themostcommonsenseisnotthetruestsense.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I can readily believe that that last point is defensible. But it
is not enough for one to be be able to defend a thing to render it true: we must be able to provide a proof.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thatisnotdifficult. Aretherenotphilosopherswhosaythat the world is animated?
? ? ? ? ? ?
