No More Learning

would have proved ineffectual. I dare appeal to the
public records, to the testimony of those who have
opportunities of knowing me, and even to the detail
which the public voice can report of the past acts of
this government, that my time has been neither idly
nor uselessly employed; yet such are the cares and
embarrassments of this various state, that, although
much may be done, much more, even in matters of
moment, must necessarily remain neglected. . To select from the miscellaneous heap which each day's
exigencies present to our choice those points on
which the general welfare of your affairs most essentially depends, to provide expedients for future ad
? ? ? ? SPEECH IN REPLY. - EIGHTH DAY. 289
vantages, and guard against probable evils, are all
that your administration can faithfully promise to
perform for your service, with their united labors
most diligently exerted. They cannot look back
without sacrificing the objects of their immediate
duty, which are those of your interest, to endless researches, which can produce no real good, and may expose your affairs to all the ruinous consequences
of personal malevolence, both here and at home. "
My Lords, you see here, that, after admitting that
he has promised to the Court of Directors to do what
they ordered him to do, (and he had promised to
make a radical reform in their whole service, and to
cure those abuses which they have stated,) he declares that he will not execute them; he pleads a variety of other occupations; but as to that great
fundamental grievance he was appointed to eradicate,
lie declares he will not even attempt it. "Why did
you promise? "- it naturally occurs to ask him that
question. " Why," says lhe, " you will readily perceive
that I must have been sincere in those declarations;
since it would have argued great indiscretion to have
made them, had I known my inability to perform
them. " This is a kind of argument that belongs to
Mr. Hastings exclusively. Most other people would
say, " You may judge of the sincerity of my promises
by my zeal in the performance "; but he says, " You
may judge of the sincerity of my promises, because I
would not promise, if I had not thought I should be
able to perform. " It runs in this ridiculous circle:
" I promised to obey the Court of Directors; therefore I knew that I could obey them: but I could
not obey them; therefore I was absolved from my
VOL. XII. 19
? ? ? ? 290 IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS.
promise, and did not attempt to obey theim. " In
fact, there is not so much as one grievance or abuse
in the country, that he reformed. And this was systematical in Mr. Hastings's conduct,- that he was
resolved to connive at the whole of the iniquities of
the service, because he was resolved that every one
of those existing iniquities should be practised by
himself. "But," says he,' the reformation required
can produce no real good, and inay expose your
affairs to all the ruinous consequences of personal
malevolence, both here and at home. " This he
gives you as a reason why he will not prosecute the
inquiry into abuses abroad, - because he is afraid
that you should punish him at home for doing his
duty abroad, -- that it will expose him to malevolence at home; and therefore, to avoid being subject
to malevolence at home, he would not do his duty
abroad.
He follows this with something that is perfectly
extraordinary: he desires, instead of doing his duty,
which lhe declares it is impossible to do, that he may
be invested with an arbitrary power. I refer your
Lordships to pages 2827, 2828, and 2829 of the printed Minutes, where you will find the system of his
government to be formed upon a resolution not to
use any one legal means of punishing corruption, or
for the prevention of corruption; all that he desires
is, to have an absolute arbitrary power over the servants of the Company. There you will see that arbitrary power for corrupt purposes over the servants of the Company is the foundation of every part of his
whole conduce. Remark what he says here, and then
judge whether these inferences are to be eluded by
any chicane.
? ? ? ? SPEECH IN REPLY. -EIGHTH DAY. 291
" In the charge of oppression, although supported
by the cries of the people and the most authentic
representations, it is yet impossible, in most cases,
to obtain legal proofs of it; and unless the discretionary power which I have recommended be somewhere lodged, the assurance of impunity from any formal inquiry will baffle every order of the board;
as, on the other hand, the fear of the consequences
will restrain every man within the bounds of his
duty, if he knows himself liable to suffer by the
effects of a single control. "
My Lords, you see two things most material for
you to consider in the judgment of this great cause,
which is the cause of nations. The first thing for
you to consider is the declaration of the culprit
at your bar, that a person may be pursued by the
cries of a whole people, -that documents the most
authentic and satisfactory, but deficient in technical
form, may be produced against him, - in short, that
he may be guilty of the most enormous crimes,and yet that legal proofs may be wanting. This
shows you how seriously you ought to consider, before you reject any proof upon the idea that it is
not technical legal proof. To this assertion of Mr.
Hastings I oppose, however, the opinion of a gentleman who sits near his side, Mr. Sumner, which
is much more probable.
Mr. Hastings says, that the power of the Council is
not effectual against the inferior servants, that [it? ]
is too weak to coerce them. With much more truth
Mr. Sumner has said, in his minute, you might easily coerce the inferior servants, but that the dread of
falling upon persons in high stations discourages and
? ? ? ? 292 IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS.
puts an end to complaint. I quote the recorded authority of the gentleman near him, as being of great
weight in the affairs of the Company, to prove what
is infinitely more probable, the falsehood of Mr.
Hastings's assertion, that an inferior servant cannot be coerced, and that they must riot with impunity in the spoils of the people. But we will go to a much more serious part of
the business. After desiring arbitrary power in this
letter, he desires a perpetuation of it. And here
he has given you a description of a bad Governor,
to which I must call your attention, as your Lordships will find it, in every part of his proceeding,
to be exactly applicable to himself and to his own
government.
"The first command of a state so extensive as
that of Bengal is not without opportunities of private
emoluments; and although the allowance which your
bounty has liberally provided for your servants may
be reasonably expected to fix the bounds of their
desires, yet you will find it extremely difficult to
restrain men fron profiting by other means, who
look upon their appointment as the measure of a
day, and who, from the uncertainty of their condition, see no room for any acquisition but of wealth,
since reputation and the consequences which follow
the successful conduct of great affairs are only to
be attained in a course of years. Under such circumstances, however rigid your orders may be, or
however supported, I am afraid that in most instances they will produce no other fruits than either
avowed disobedience or the worst extreme of falsehood and hypocrisy. These are not the principles
? ? ? ? SPEECH IN REPLY. -EIGHTH DAY. 293
which should rule the conduct of men whom you
have constituted the guardians of your property, and
checks on the morals and fidelity of others. The
care of'self-preservation will naturally suggest the
necessity of seizing the opportunity of present power, when the duration of it is considered as limited to the usual term of three years, and of applying
it to the provision of a future independency; therefore every renewal of this term is liable to prove a reiterated oppression. It is perhaps owing to the
causes which I have described, and a proof of their
existence, that this appointment has been for some
years past so eagerly solicited and so easily resigned.
There are yet other inconveniences attendant on this
habit, and perhaps an investigation of them all would
lead to endless discoveries. Every man whom your
choice has honored with so distinguished a trust seeks
to merit approbation and acquire an eclat by innovations, for which the wild scene before him affords ample and justifiable occasion. "
You see, my Lords, he has stated, that, if a Governor is appointed to hold his office only for a short time, the consequence would be either an avowed
disobedience, or, what is worse, extreme falsehood
and hypocrisy. Your Lordsllips know that this man
has held his office for a long time, and yet his disolbedience has been avowed, and his hypocrisy and his falsehood have been discovered, and have been
proved to your Lordships in the course of this trial.
You see this man has declared what are the principles which should rule the conduct of men whom you have constituted the guardians of your property,
and checks upon the morals and fidelity of others.
? ? ? ? 294 IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS.
Mr. Hastings tells you himself directly what his
duty was; he tells you himself, and he pronounces
his own condemnation, what was expected from him,
namely, that he should give a great example himself,
and be a check and guardian of the fidelity of all
that are under him. He declares, at the end of
this letter, that a very short continuance in their
service would enable him to make a fortune up to
the height of his desire. He has since thought
proper to declare to you that he is a beggar and
undone, notwithstanding all his irregular resources
in that very service. . I have read this letter to your Lordships, that you
may contrast it with the conduct of the prisoner, as
stated by us, and proved by the evidence we have
adduced. We have stated and proved that Mr.
Hastings did enter upon a systematic connivance at
the peculation of the Company's servants, that he
refused to institute any check whatever for the purpose of preventing corruption, and that he carried
into execution no one measure of government agreeably to the positive and solemn engagements into
which he had entered with the Directors. We therefore charge him, not only with his own corruptions,
but with a systematic, premeditated corruption of the
whole service, from the time when he was appointed,
in the beginning of the year 1772, down to the year
1785, when lie left it. He never attempted to detect
any one single abuse whatever; he never endeavored
once to put a stop to any corruption in any man,
black or white, in any way whatever. And thus he
has acted in a government of which he himself declares the nature to be such that it is almost impossible so to detect misconduct as to give legal evidence
? ? ? ? SPEECH IN REPLY. -EIGHTH DAY. 295
of it, though a man should be declared by the cries
of the whole people to be guilty.
My Lords, he desires an arbitrary power over the
Company's servants to be given to him. God forbid
arbitrary power should be given into the hands of any
man! At the same time, God forbid, if by power be
meant the ability to discover, to reach, to check, and
to punish subordinate corruption, that he should not
be enabled so to do, and to get at, to prosecute, and
punish delinquency by law! But honesty only, and
not arbitrary power, is necessary for that purpose.
We well know, indeed, that a government requiring
arbitrary power has been the situation in which this
man has attempted to place us.
We know, also, my Lords, that there are cases in
which the act of the delinquent may be' of consequence, while the example of the criminal, from the
obscurity of his situation, is of little importance: in
other cases, the act of the delinquent may be of no
great importance, but the consequences of the example dreadful. We know that crimes of great magnitude, that acts of great tyranny, can but seldom be
exercised, and only by a few persons. They are privileged crimes. They are the dreadful prerogatives of
greatness, and of the higllest situations only. Biut
when a Goverllor-General descends into the muck
and filth of peculationi and corruption, when lie receives bribes and extorts money, he does acts that are
imitable by everybody. There is not a single man,
black or white, from the highest to the lowest, that is
possessed in the smallest degree of momentary authority, that cannot imitate the acts of such a Governor-General. Consider, then, what the consequences will be, when it is laid down as a principle of the
? ? ? ? 296 IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS.
service, that no man is to be called to account according to the existing laws, and that you must either
give, as he says, arbitrary power, or suffer your government to be destroyed.
We asked Mr. Anderson, whether the covenant of
every farmer of the revenue did not forbid him from
giving any presents to any persons, or taking any.
He answered, he did not exactlv remember, (for the
memory of this gentleman is very indifferent, though
the matter was ill his own particular province,) but
he thought it did; and he referred us to the record
of it. I cannot get at the record; and therefore you
must take it as it stands from Mr. Anderson, without
a reference to the record, - that the farmers were
forbidden to take or give any money to any person
whatever, beyond their engagements. Now, if a
Governor-General comes to that farmer, and says,
"You must give a certain sum beyond your engagements," lhe lets him loose to prey upon the landholders and cultivators; and thus a way is prepared for the final desolation of the whole country, by the malversation of the Governor, and by the consequent oppressive conduct of the farmers.
Mr. Hastings being now put over the whole country to regulate it, let us see what he has done. He
says, " Let me have an arbitrary power, and I will
regulate it. " He assumed arbitrary power, and
turned in and out every servant at his pleasure.
But did he by that arbitrary power correct any one
corruption? Indeed, how could he? He does not
say he did. For when a man gives ill examples in
himself, when he cannot set on foot an inquiry that
does not terminate in his own corruption, of course
he cannot institute any inquiry into the corruption
of the Qther servants.
? ? ? ? SPEECH IN REPLY. -EIGHTH DAY. 297
But again, my Lords, the subordinate servant will
say, "I cannot rise" (properly here, as Mr. Hastings has well observed) " to the height of greatness, power, distinction, rank, or honor in the government;
but I call make my fortune, according to my degree,
my measure, and my place. " His views will be then
directed so to make it. And when he sees that the
Governor-General is actuated by no other views, --
when lie himself, as a farmer, is confidently assured
of the corruptions of his superior, -when he knows
it to be laid down as a principle by the GovernorGeneral, that no corruption is to be inquired into, and that, if it be not expressly laid down, yet that his
conduct is such as to make it the same as if he had
actually so laid it down, - then, I say, every part of
the service is instantly and totally corrupted.
I shall next refer your Lordships to the article
of contracts. Five contracts have been laid before
you, the extravagant and corrupt profits of which
have been proved to amount to 500,0001. We have
showni you, by the strongest presumptive evidence,
that these contracts were given for the purpose of
corrupting the Company's servants in India, and
of corrupting the Company itself in England. You
will recollect that 40,0001. was given in one morning for a contract which the contractor was never to execute: I speak of Mr. Sulivan's contract. You
will also recollect that lie was the son of the principal person in the Indian direction, and who, in
or out of office, was known to govern it, and to
be supported by the whole Indian interest of Mr.
Hastings. You have seen the corruption of Sir
Eyre Coote, in giving to Mr. Croftes the bullock
? ? ? ? 298 IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS.
contract. You have seen the bullock contracts stated
to Mr. Hastings's face, and not denied, to have been
made for concealing a number of corrupt interests.
You have seen Mr. Auriol's contract, given to the
secretary of the Company by Mr. Hastings in order
that he might have the whole records and registers
of the Company under his control. You have seen
that the contract and commission for the purchase
of stores and provisions, an enormous job, was given
to Mr. Belli, an obscure mail, for whom Mr. Hastings
offers himself as security, under circumstances that
went to prove that Mr. Belli held this commission
for Mr. Hastings. These, my Lords, are things that
cannot be slurred over. The Governor-General is
corrupt; he corrupts all about him; he does it upon
system; he will make o10 inquiry.
My Lords, I have stated the amount of the sums
which he has squandered away in these contracts;
but you will observe that we have brought forward
but five of them. Good God! when you consider
the magnitude and multiplicity of the Company's
dealings, judge you what must be the enormous
mass of that corruption of which he has been the
cause, and in the profits of which he has partaken.
When your Lordships shall have considered this
document, his defence, which I have read in part
to you, see whether you are not bound, when he
imputes to us and throws upon us the cause of all
his corruption, to throw back the charge by your
decision, arid hurl it with indignation upon himself.
But there is another shameless and most iniquitous circumstance, which I have forgotten to mention, respecting these contracts. He not only con
? ? ? ? SPEECH IN REPLY. - EIGHTH DAY. 299
sidered them as means of present power, and therefore protected his favorites without the least inquiry into their conduct, and with flagrant suspicion of
a corrupt participation in their delinquency, but he
goes still farther: he declares, that, if he should be
removed from his government, he will give them a
lease in these exorbitant profits, for the purpose of
securing a corrupt party to support and bear him
out by their evidence, upon the event of any inquiry
into his conduct, -to give him a razinama, to give
him a flourishing character, whenever he should come
upon his trial. Hear what his principles are; hear
what the man himself avows.
" EFort William, October 4, 1779.
"In answer to Mr. Francis's insinuation, that it
is natural enough for the agent to wish to secure
himself before the expiration of the present government, I avow the fact as to myself as well as the agent. When I see a systematic opposition to every
measure proposed by me for the service of the public, by which an individual may eventually benefit,
I cannot hesitate a moment to declare it to be my
firm belief, that, should the government of this country be placed in the hands of the present minority, they would seek the ruin of every man connected
with me; it is therefore only an act of common justice in me to wish to secure them, as far as I legally can, from the apprehension of future oppression. "
Here is the principle avowed. He takes for granted, and he gives it the name of oppression, that the person who should succeed him would take away
those unlawful and wicked emoluments, and give
? ? ? ? 300 IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS.
them to some other. "But," says he, "I will put
out of the Company's power the very means of redress. "
The document which I am now going to read to
your Lordships contains a declaration by Mr. Hastings of another mean which he used of corrupting
the whole Company's service.
Minute of the Governor- General. - Extract from that
Minute.
" Called upon continually by persons of high rank
and station, both in national and in the Company's
councils, to protect and prefer their friends in the
army, and by the merits and services which have
come under my personal knowledge and observation,
I suffer both pain and humiliation at the want of
power to reward the meritorious, or to show a proper
attention to the wishes of my superiors, without having recourse to means which must be considered as incompatible witlh the dignity of my station. The
slender relief which I entreat of the board from this
state of mortification is the authority to augment the
number of my staff, which will enable me to show
a marked and particular attention in circumstances
such as above stated, and will be no considerable
burden to the Company.
"
My Lords, you here see what he has been endeavoring to effect, for the express purpose of enabling him to secure himself a corrupt influence in Ellgland.
But there is another point much more material,
which brings the matter directly home to this court,
and puts it to you either to punish him or to declare
yourselves to be accomplices in the corruption of the
? ? ? ? SPEECH IN REPLY. -EIGHTH DAY. 01
whole service. Hear what the man himself says.
I am first to mention to your Lordships the occasion
upon which the passage which I shall read to you
was written. It was when he was making his enormous and shameful establishment of a Revenue Board,
in the year 1781, - of which I sliall say a few words
hereafter, as being a gross abuse in itself: he then
felt that the world would be so much shocked at the
enormous prodigality and corrupt profusion of what
he was doing, that he at last spoke out plainly.
A Minute of Mr. Hastings, transmitted in a Letter by
Mr. Wheler.
"In this, as it must be the case in every reformation, the interest of individuals has been our principal, if not our only impediment. We could not at
once deprive so large a body of our fellow-servants
of their bread, without feeling that reluctance which
humanity must dictate, -- not unaccompanied, perhaps, with some concern for the consequence which
our own credit might suffer by an act which involved
the fortunes of many, and extended its influence to
all their connections. This, added to the justice
which was due to your servants, who were removed
for no fault of theirs, but for the public convenience,
induced us to continue their allowances until other offices could be provided for them, and the more cheerfully to submit to the expediency of leaving others in a temporary or partial charge of the internal collections. In effect, the civil officers [offices? ] of this
government might be reduced to a very scanty number, were their exigency alone to determine the list
of your covenanted servants, which at this time consist of no less a number than two hundred and fifty
? ? ? ? 302 IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS.
two, -many of them the sons of the first families in
the kingdom of Great Britain, and every one aspiring
to the rapid acquisition of lacs, and to return to pass
the prime of their lives at home, as multitudes have
done before them. Neither will the revenues of this
country suffice for such boundless pretensions, nor
are they compatible with yours and the national
interests, which may eventually suffer as certain a
ruin from the effects of private competition and the
claims of patronage as from the more dreaded calamities of war, or the other ordinary causes which lead to the decline of dominion. "
My Lords, you have here his declaration, that patronage, which he avows to be one of the principles
of his government, and to be the principle of the last
of his acts, is worse than war, pestilence, and famine,
and that all these calamities together might not
be so effectual as this patronage in wasting and destroying the country. And at what time does he tell you this? He tells it you when he himself had just
wantonly destroyed an old regular establishment for
the purpose of creating a new one, in which he says
he was under the necessity of pensioning the members of the old establishment from motives of mere humanity. He here confesses himself to be the author of the whole mischief. "I could," says he,
"have acted better; I might have avoided desolating
the country by peculation; but," says he, "I had
sons of the first families in the kingdom of Great
Britain, every one aspiring to the rapid acquisition of
lacs, and this would not suffer me to do my duty. "
I hope your Lordships will stigmatize the falsehood
of this assertion. Consider, my Lords, what he has
? ? ? ? SPEECH IN REPLY. -EIGHTH DAY. 303
said, --two hundred and fifty men at once, and in
succession, aspiring to come home in the prime of
their youth with lacs. You cannot take lacs to be
less than two; we cannot make a plural less than
two. Two lacs make 20,0001. Then multiply that
by 252, and you will find more than 2,500,0001. to
be provided for that set of gentlemen, and for the
claims of patronage. Undoubtedly such a patronage
is worse than the most dreadful calamities of war,
and all the other causes which lead to decline of
dominion.
My Lords, I beseech you to consider this plan of
corrupting the Company's servants, beginning with
systematical corruption, and ending with an avowed
declaration that he will persist in this iniquitous
proceeding, and to the utmost of his power entail
it upon the Company, for the purpose of securing
his accomplices against all the consequences of any
change in the Company's government. " I dare not,"
says lie, " be honest: if I make their fortunes, you
will judge favorably of me; if I do not make their
fortunes, I shall findd myself crushed with a load of
reproach and obloquy, from which I cannot escape in
any other way than by bribing the House of Peers. "
What a shameful avowal this to be made in the face
of the world! Your Lordships' judgment upon this
great cause will obliterate it from the memory of
man.
But his apprehension of some change in the Company's government is not his only pretext for some of these corrupt proceedings; he adverts also to the
opposition which lie had to encounter with his colleagues, as another circumstance which drove him to adopt others of these scandalous expediences.
? ? ? ? 304 IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS.
Now there was a period when he had no longer to
contend with, or to fear, that opposition.
When he had got rid of the majority in the Coun
cil, which thwarted him, what did he do? Did he
himself correct any of the evils and disorders which
had prevailed in the service, and which his hostile
majority had purposed to, reform? No, not one,notwithstanding the Court of Directors had supported the majority in all their declarations, and had accused him of corruption and rebellion in every part of his opposition to them. Now that he was free
from the yoke of all the mischief of that cursed majority which he deprecates, and which I have heard
certain persons consider as a great calamity, (a calamity indeed it was to patronage,) -- as soon, I
say, as he was free from this, you would imagine
he had undertaken some great and capital reformation; for all the power which the Company could
give was in his hands, -total, absolute, and unconfined.
I must here remind your Lordships, that the
Provincial Councils was an establishment made by
Mr. Hastings. So confident was he in his own
opinion of the expediency of them, that lie transmitted to the Court of Directors a draught of an act of
Parliament to confirm them. By this act it was his
intention to place them beyond the possibility of mutation. Whatever opinion others might entertain
of their weakness, inefficacy, or other defects, Mr.
Hastings found no such things in them. He had declared in the beginning that lie considered them as
a sort of experiment, but that in the progress he found
them answer so perfectly well that he proposed even
an act of Parliament to support them. The Court
? ? ? ? SPEECH IN REPLY. -EIGHTH DAY. 305
of Directors, knowing the mischiefs that innovation
had produced in their service, and the desolations
which it had brought on the country, commanded
him not to take any step for changing them, without
their orders. Contrary, however, to his own declarations, contrary to the sketch of an act of Parliament, which, for aught he knew, the legislature might then
have passed, (I know that it was in contemplation to
pass, about that time, several acts for regulating the
Company's affairs, and, for one, I should have been,
as I always have been, a good deal concerned in
whatever tended to fix some kind of permanent and
settled government in Bengal,) - in violation, I say,
of his duty, and in contradiction to his own opinion,
he at that time, without giving the parties notice,
turns out of their employments, situations, and bread,
the Provincial Councils.
And who were the members of those Provincial
Councils? They were of high rank in the Company's service; they were not junior servants, boys of a
day, but persons who had gone through some probation, wlbo knew something of the country, who were conversant in its revenues and in the course of its
business; they were, in short, men of considerable
rank in the Company's service. What did he do
with these people? Without any regard to their
rank in the service,- no more than lhe had regarded
the rank of the nobility of the country, - he sweeps
them all, in one day, fiom their independent situations, without reference to the Directors, and turns them all into pensioners upon the Company. And
for what purpose was this done? It was done in order to reduce the Company's servants, who, in their independent situations, were too great a mass and
VOL. XII. 20
? ? ? ? 306 IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS.
volume for him to corrupt, to an abject dependence
upon his absolute power. It was, that he might tell
them, " You have lost your situations; you have
nothing but small alimentary pensions, nothing more
than a maintenance; and you must depend upon me
whether you are to have anything more or not. "
Thus at one stroke a large division of the Company's
servants, and one of the highest orders of them, were
reduced, for their next bread, to an absolute, submissive dependence upon his will; and the Company was
loaded with the pensions of all these discarded servants. Thus were persons in an honorable, independent situation, earned by long service in that country, and who were subject to punishment for their crimes,
if proved against them, all deprived, unheard, of their
employments. You would imagine that Mr. Hastings
had at least charged them with corruption. No, you
will see upon your minutes, that, when he abolished
the Provincial Councils, he declared at the same time
that he found no fault with the persons concerned in
them.
Thus, then, he has got rid, as your Lordships
see, of one whole body of the Company's servants;
he has systematically corrupted the rest, and provided,
as far as lay in his power, for the perpetuation of their
corruption; he has connived at all their delinquencies, and has destroyed the independence of all the
superior orders of them.
Now hear what lie does with regard to the CouncilGeneral itself. They had, by the act that made Mr.
Hastings Governor, the management of the revenues
vested in them. You have been shown by an honorable and able fellow Manager of mine, that lie took
the business of this department wholly out of the
? ? ? ? SPEECH IN REPLY. - EIGHTH DAY. 307
hand of the Council; that he named a committee for
the management of it, at an enormous expense, --
a committee made up of his own creatures and dependants; and that, after destroying the Provincial Councils, he brought down the whole management
of the revenue to Calcutta. This committee took
this important business entirely out of the hands
of the Council, in which the act had vested it, and
this committee lie formed without the orders of the
Court of Directors, and directly contrary to the act,
which put the superintendence in the hands of the
Council.
Oh, but he reserved a superintendence over them.
- You shall hear what the superintendence was; you
shall see, feel, smell, touch; it shall enter into every
avenue and pore of your soul. It will show you what
was the real principle of Mr. Hastings's government.
We will read to you what Sir John Shore says of
that institution, and of the only ends and purposes
which it could answer; your Lordships will then see
how far he was justifiable in violating an act of Parliament, and giving out of the Council's hands the great trust which the laws of his country had vested
in them. It is part of a paper written in 1785 by
Mr. Shore, who was sole acting president of this
committee to which all Bengal was delivered. He
was an old servant of the Company, and he is now
at the head of the government of that country. He
was Mr. Hastings's particular friend, and therefore
you cannot doubt either of his being a competent
evidence, or that he is a favorable evidence for Mr.
Hastings, and that lie would not say one word against
the establishment of which he himself was at the
head, that was not perfectly true, and forced out of
? ? ? ? 308 IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS.
him by the truth of the case. There is not a single
part of it that does not point out some abuse.
" In the actual collection of the revenues, nothing
is more necessary than to give immediate attention
to all complaints, which are preferred daily without
number, and to dispatch them in a summary manner. This cannot be done where the control is remote. In every purgunnall throughout Bengal there are some distinct usages, which cannot be clearly
known at a distance; yet in all complaints of oppression or extortion, these must be known before a
decision can be pronounced. But to learn at Calcutta the particular customs of a district of Rajeshahye
or Dacca is almost impossible; and considering the
channel through'which an explanation must pass,
and through which the complaint is made, any coloring may be given to it, and oppression and extortion, to the ruin of a district, may be practised with impunity. This is a continual source of embarrassment to the Committee of Revenue in Calcutta.
" One object of their institution was to bring the
revenues without the expenses of agency to the
Presidency, and to remove all local control over the
farmers, who were to pay their rents at Calcutta.
When complaints are made against farmers by the
occupiers of the lands, it is almost impossible to discriminate truth from falsehood; but to prevent a
failure in the revenue, it is found necessary, in all
doubtful cases, to support the farmer, --a circumstance which may give rise to and confirm the most
cruel acts of oppression. The real state of any
district cannot be known by the Committee. An
occupier or zemindar may plead, that an inunda
? ? ? ? SPEECH IN REPLY. -EIGHTH DAY. 309
tion nas ruined him, or that his country is a desert
through want of rain. An aumeen is sent to examine the complaint. He returns with an exaggerated
account of losses, proved in volumes of intricate accounts, which the Committee have no time to read,
and for which the aumeen is well paid. Possibly,
however, the whole account is false. Suppose no
aumeen is employed, and the renter is held to the
tenor of his engagement, the loss, if real, must occasion his ruin, unless his assessment is very moderate
indeed.
"' I may venture to pronounce that the real state
of the districts is now less known, and the revenue
less understood, than in the year 1774. Since the
natives have had the disposal of accounts, since they
have been introduced as agents and trusted with authority, intricacy and confision have taken place.
The records and accounts which have been compiled
are numerous, yet, when any particular account is
wanted, it cannot be found. It is the business of
all, from the ryots to the dewan, to conceal and deceive. The simplest matters of fact are designedly
covered with a veil through which no human understanding can penetrate.
"With respect to the present Committee of Revenue, it is morally impossible for them to execute
the business they are intrusted with. They are invested with a general control, and they have an executive authority larger than ever was before given to any board or body of men. They may and must
get through the business; but to pretend to assert
that they really execute it would be folly and falsehood.
"The grand object of the native dewannies was
? ? ? ? 310 IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS.
to acquire independent control, and for many years
they have pursued this with wonderful art. The
farmers and zemindars under the Committee prosecute the same plan, and have already objections to anything that has the least appearance of restriction.
All control removed, they call plunder as they please.
"Thie Committee must have a dewan, or executive officer, call him by what name you please. This
man, in fact, has all the revenues paid at the Presidency at his disposal, and can, if he has any abilities, bring all the renters under contribution. It is of
little advantage to restrain the Committee themselves
from bribery or corruption, when their executive officer has the power of protecting [practising? ] both undetected.
"' To display the arts employed by a native on such
an occasion would fill a volume. He discovers the
secret resources of the zemindar~ and renters, their
enemies and competitors, and by the engines of hope
and fear raised upon these foundations lie can work
them to his purpose. The Committee, with the best intentions, best abilities, and steadiest application, must, after all, be a tool in the hand of their dewan. i'
Here is the account of Mr. Hastings's new Committee of Revenue, substituted in the place of an establishment made by act of Parliament. Here
is what lie has substituted for Provincial Councils.
Here is what he has substituted in the room of the
whole regular order of the service, which he totally
subverted. Can we add anything to this picture?
Can we heighten it? Can we do anythling more
than to recommend it to your Lordships' serious considerationi?
? ? ? ? SPEECH IN REPLY. -EIGHTH DAY. 311
But before I finally dismiss this part of our charge,
I must request your Lordships' most earnest attention to the true character of these atrocious proceedings, as they now stand proved before you, by
direct or the strongest presumptive evidence, upon
the Company's records, and by his own confessions
and declarations, and those of his most intimate
friends and avowed agents.
Your Lordships will recollect, that, previously to
the appointment of Mr. Hastings to be the GovernorGeneral, in 1772, the collection of the revenues was
committed to a naib dewan, or native collector, under
the control of the Supreme Council, -and that Mr.
Hastings did at that time, and upon various occasions
afterwards, declare it to be his decided and fixed opinion, that nothing would be so detrimental to the interests of the Company, and to the happiness and welfare of the inhabitants of their provinces, as changes, and more especially sudden cllanges, in the collection
of their revenues. His opinion was also most strongly
and reiteratedly pressed upon him by his masters, the
Court of Directors. The first step taken after his appointment was to abolish the office of naib dewan, and
to send a committee through the provinces, at the
expense of 50,0001. a year, to make a settlement of
rents to be paid by the natives for five years. At the
same time he appointed one of the Company's servanits to be the collector ill each province, and he abolished the General Board of Revenue, which had been
established at Moorshedabad, chiefly for tile following
reasons: that, by its exercising a separate control, the
members of the Supreme Council at Calcutta were
prevented from acquiring that intimate acquaintance
with the revenues which was necessary to persons
? ? ? ? 312 IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS.
in their station; and because many of the powers necessary for the collection of the revenues could not
be delegated to a subordinate council. In consideration of these opinions, orders, and declarations, hle, in
1773, abolished the office of collector, and transferred
the management of the revenues to several councils
of revenue, called Provincial Councils, and recommended their perpetual establishment by act of Parliament. In the year 1774, in contradiction of his former opinion respecting the necessity of the Supreme Council possessing all possible means of becoming
acquainted with the details of the revenue, he again
recommended the conitinuance of the Provincial Councils in all their parts. This he again declared to be
his deliberate opinion in 1775 and in 1776.
In the mean time a majority of the Supreme Coun
cil, consisting of members who had generally differed
in opinion from Mr. Hastings, had transmitted thei:
advice to the Court of Directors, recommending some
changes in the system of Provincial Councils. The
Directors, in their reply to this recommendation, did
in 1777 order the Supreme Council to form a new
plan for the collection of the revenues, and to transmit it to them for their consideration.
No such plan was transmitted; but in the year
1781, Mr Hastings having obtained a majority in the
Council, he again changed the whole system, both
of collection of the revenue and of the executive administration of civil and criminal justice. And who
were the persons substituted in the place of those
whom he removed? Names, my Lords, with which
you are already but too well acquainted. At their
head stands Munny Begum; then comes his own
domestic, and private bribe-agent, Gunga Govind
? ? ?