Consequently it is evident that command
precedes
use.
Summa Theologica
"
I answer that, The use of a thing implies the application of that thing
to an operation: hence the operation to which we apply a thing is
called its use; thus the use of a horse is to ride, and the use of a
stick is to strike. Now we apply to an operation not only the interior
principles of action, viz. the powers of the soul or the members of the
body; as the intellect, to understand; and the eye, to see; but also
external things, as a stick, to strike. But it is evident that we do
not apply external things to an operation save through the interior
principles which are either the powers of the soul, or the habits of
those powers, or the organs which are parts of the body. Now it has
been shown above ([1110]Q[9], A[1]) that it is the will which moves the
soul's powers to their acts, and this is to apply them to operation.
Hence it is evident that first and principally use belongs to the will
as first mover; to the reason, as directing; and to the other powers as
executing the operation, which powers are compared to the will which
applies them to act, as the instruments are compared to the principal
agent. Now action is properly ascribed, not to the instrument, but to
the principal agent, as building is ascribed to the builder, not to his
tools. Hence it is evident that use is, properly speaking, an act of
the will.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason does indeed refer one thing to another;
but the will tends to that which is referred by the reason to something
else. And in this sense to use is to refer one thing to another.
Reply to Objection 2: Damascene is speaking of use in so far as it
belongs to the executive powers.
Reply to Objection 3: Even the speculative reason is applied by the
will to the act of understanding or judging. Consequently the
speculative reason is said to use, in so far as it is moved by the
will, in the same way as the other powers.
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Whether use is to be found in irrational animals?
Objection 1: It would seem that use is to be found in irrational
animals. For it is better to enjoy than to use, because, as Augustine
says (De Trin. x, 10): "We use things by referring them to something
else which we are to enjoy. " But enjoyment is to be found in irrational
animals, as stated above ([1111]Q[11], A[2]). Much more, therefore, is
it possible for them to use.
Objection 2: Further, to apply the members to action is to use them.
But irrational animals apply their members to action; for instance,
their feet, to walk; their horns, to strike. Therefore it is possible
for irrational animals to use.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "None but a rational
animal can make use of a thing. "
I answer that, as stated above [1112](A[1]), to use is to apply an
active principle to action: thus to consent is to apply the appetitive
movement to the desire of something, as stated above (Q[15],
AA[1],2,3). Now he alone who has the disposal of a thing, can apply it
to something else; and this belongs to him alone who knows how to refer
it to something else, which is an act of the reason. And therefore none
but a rational animal consents and uses.
Reply to Objection 1: To enjoy implies the absolute movement of the
appetite to the appetible: whereas to use implies a movement of the
appetite to something as directed to something else. If therefore we
compare use and enjoyment in respect of their objects, enjoyment is
better than use; because that which is appetible absolutely is better
than that which is appetible only as directed to something else. But if
we compare them in respect of the apprehensive power that precedes
them, greater excellence is required on the part of use: because to
direct one thing to another is an act of reason; whereas to apprehend
something absolutely is within the competency even of sense.
Reply to Objection 2: Animals by means of their members do something
from natural instinct; not through knowing the relation of their
members to these operations. Wherefore, properly speaking, they do not
apply their members to action, nor do they use them.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether use regards also the last end?
Objection 1: It would seem that use can regard also the last end. For
Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "Whoever enjoys, uses. " But man enjoys
the last end. Therefore he uses the last end.
Objection 2: Further, "to use is to apply something to the purpose of
the will" (De Trin. x, 11). But the last end, more than anything else,
is the object of the will's application. Therefore it can be the object
of use.
Objection 3: Further, Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that "Eternity is in
the Father, Likeness in the Image," i. e. in the Son, "Use in the Gift,"
i. e. in the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost, since He is God, is the
last end. Therefore the last end can be the object of use.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "No one rightly uses
God, but one enjoys Him. " But God alone is the last end. Therefore we
cannot use the last end.
I answer that, Use, as stated above [1113](A[1]), implies the
application of one thing to another. Now that which is applied to
another is regarded in the light of means to an end; and consequently
use always regards the means. For this reason things that are adapted
to a certain end are said to be "useful"; in fact their very usefulness
is sometimes called use.
It must, however, be observed that the last end may be taken in two
ways: first, simply; secondly, in respect of an individual. For since
the end, as stated above ([1114]Q[1], A[8];[1115] Q[2], A[7]),
signifies sometimes the thing itself, and sometimes the attainment or
possession of that thing (thus the miser's end is either money or the
possession of it); it is evident that, simply speaking, the last end is
the thing itself; for the possession of money is good only inasmuch as
there is some good in money. But in regard to the individual, the
obtaining of money is the last end; for the miser would not seek for
money, save that he might have it. Therefore, simply and properly
speaking, a man enjoys money, because he places his last end therein;
but in so far as he seeks to possess it, he is said to use it.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of use in general, in so
far as it implies the relation of an end to the enjoyment which a man
seeks in that end.
Reply to Objection 2: The end is applied to the purpose of the will,
that the will may find rest in it. Consequently this rest in the end,
which is the enjoyment thereof, is in this sense called use of the end.
But the means are applied to the will's purpose, not only in being used
as means, but as ordained to something else in which the will finds
rest.
Reply to Objection 3: The words of Hilary refer to use as applicable to
rest in the last end; just as, speaking in a general sense, one may be
said to use the end for the purpose of attaining it, as stated above.
Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10) that "this love, delight,
felicity, or happiness, is called use by him. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether use precedes choice?
Objection 1: It would seem that use precedes choice. For nothing
follows after choice, except execution. But use, since it belongs to
the will, precedes execution. Therefore it precedes choice also.
Objection 2: Further, the absolute precedes the relative. Therefore the
less relative precedes the more relative. But choice implies two
relations: one, of the thing chosen, in relation to the end; the other,
of the thing chosen, in respect of that to which it is preferred;
whereas use implies relation to the end only. Therefore use precedes
choice.
Objection 3: Further, the will uses the other powers in so far as it
removes them. But the will moves itself, too, as stated above
([1116]Q[9], A[3]). Therefore it uses itself, by applying itself to
act. But it does this when it consents. Therefore there is use in
consent. But consent precedes choice as stated above ([1117]Q[15],
A[3], ad 3). Therefore use does also.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "the will
after choosing has an impulse to the operation, and afterwards it uses
(the powers). " Therefore use follows choice.
I answer that, The will has a twofold relation to the thing willed.
One, according as the thing willed is, in a way, in the willing
subject, by a kind of proportion or order to the thing willed.
Wherefore those things that are naturally proportionate to a certain
end, are said to desire that end naturally. Yet to have an end thus is
to have it imperfectly. Now every imperfect thing tends to perfection.
And therefore both the natural and the voluntary appetite tend to have
the end in reality; and this is to have it perfectly. This is the
second relation of the will to the thing willed.
Now the thing willed is not only the end, but also the means. And the
last act that belongs to the first relation of the will to the means,
is choice; for there the will becomes fully proportionate, by willing
the means fully. Use, on the other hand, belongs to the second relation
of the will, in respect of which it tends to the realization of the
thing willed. Wherefore it is evident that use follows choice; provided
that by use we mean the will's use of the executive power in moving it.
But since the will, in a way, moves the reason also, and uses it, we
may take the use of the means, as consisting in the consideration of
the reason, whereby it refers the means to the end. In this sense use
precedes choice.
Reply to Objection 1: The motion of the will to the execution of the
work, precedes execution, but follows choice. And so, since use belongs
to that very motion of the will, it stands between choice and
execution.
Reply to Objection 2: What is essentially relative is after the
absolute; but the thing to which relation is referred need not come
after. Indeed, the more a cause precedes, the more numerous the effects
to which it has relation.
Reply to Objection 3: Choice precedes use, if they be referred to the
same object. But nothing hinders the use of one thing preceding the
choice of another. And since the acts of the will react on one another,
in each act of the will we can find both consent and choice and use; so
that we may say that the will consents to choose, and consents to
consent, and uses itself in consenting and choosing. And such acts as
are ordained to that which precedes, precede also.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL (NINE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the acts commanded by the will; under which head
there are nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether command is an act of the will or of the reason?
(2) Whether command belongs to irrational animals?
(3) Of the order between command and use
(4) Whether command and the commanded act are one act or distinct?
(5) Whether the act of the will is commanded?
(6) Whether the act of the reason is commanded?
(7) Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded?
(8) Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded?
(9) Whether the acts of the external members are commanded?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether command is an act of the reason or of the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that command is not an act of the reason but
of the will. For command is a kind of motion; because Avicenna says
that there are four ways of moving, "by perfecting, by disposing, by
commanding, and by counselling. " But it belongs to the will to move all
the other powers of the soul, as stated above ([1118]Q[9], A[1]).
Therefore command is an act of the will.
Objection 2: Further, just as to be commanded belongs to that which is
subject, so, seemingly, to command belongs to that which is most free.
But the root of liberty is especially in the will. Therefore to command
belongs to the will.
Objection 3: Further, command is followed at once by act. But the act
of the reason is not followed at once by act: for he who judges that a
thing should be done, does not do it at once. Therefore command is not
an act of the reason, but of the will.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi. ] and
the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) say that "the appetite obeys reason. "
Therefore command is an act of the reason.
I answer that, Command is an act of the reason presupposing, however,
an act of the will. In proof of this, we must take note that, since the
acts of the reason and of the will can be brought to bear on one
another, in so far as the reason reasons about willing, and the will
wills to reason, the result is that the act of the reason precedes the
act of the will, and conversely. And since the power of the preceding
act continues in the act that follows, it happens sometimes that there
is an act of the will in so far as it retains in itself something of an
act of the reason, as we have stated in reference to use and choice;
and conversely, that there is an act of the reason in so far as it
retains in itself something of an act of the will.
Now, command is essentially indeed an act of the reason: for the
commander orders the one commanded to do something, by way of
intimation or declaration; and to order thus by intimating or declaring
is an act of the reason. Now the reason can intimate or declare
something in two ways. First, absolutely: and this intimation is
expressed by a verb in the indicative mood, as when one person says to
another: "This is what you should do. " Sometimes, however, the reason
intimates something to a man by moving him thereto; and this intimation
is expressed by a verb in the imperative mood; as when it is said to
someone: "Do this. " Now the first mover, among the powers of the soul,
to the doing of an act is the will, as stated above ([1119]Q[9], A[1]).
Since therefore the second mover does not move, save in virtue of the
first mover, it follows that the very fact that the reason moves by
commanding, is due to the power of the will. Consequently it follows
that command is an act of the reason, presupposing an act of the will,
in virtue of which the reason, by its command, moves (the power) to the
execution of the act.
Reply to Objection 1: To command is to move, not anyhow, but by
intimating and declaring to another; and this is an act of the reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The root of liberty is the will as the subject
thereof; but it is the reason as its cause. For the will can tend
freely towards various objects, precisely because the reason can have
various perceptions of good. Hence philosophers define the free-will as
being "a free judgment arising from reason," implying that reason is
the root of liberty.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that command is an act of
reason not absolutely, but with a kind of motion as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether command belongs to irrational animals?
Objection 1: It would seem that command belongs to irrational animals.
Because, according to Avicenna, "the power that commands movement is
the appetite; and the power that executes movement is in the muscles
and nerves. " But both powers are in irrational animals. Therefore
command is to be found in irrational animals.
Objection 2: Further, the condition of a slave is that of one who
receives commands. But the body is compared to the soul as a slave to
his master, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Therefore the body
is commanded by the soul, even in irrational animals, since they are
composed of soul and body.
Objection 3: Further, by commanding, man has an impulse towards an
action. But impulse to action is to be found in irrational animals, as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22). Therefore command is to be found
in irrational animals.
On the contrary, Command is an act of reason, as stated above
[1120](A[1]). But in irrational animals there is no reason. Neither,
therefore, is there command.
I answer that, To command is nothing else than to direct someone to do
something, by a certain motion of intimation. Now to direct is the
proper act of reason. Wherefore it is impossible that irrational
animals should command in any way, since they are devoid of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: The appetitive power is said to command movement,
in so far as it moves the commanding reason. But this is only in man.
In irrational animals the appetitive power is not, properly speaking, a
commanding faculty, unless command be taken loosely for motion.
Reply to Objection 2: The body of the irrational animal is competent to
obey; but its soul is not competent to command, because it is not
competent to direct. Consequently there is no ratio there of commander
and commanded; but only of mover and moved.
Reply to Objection 3: Impulse to action is in irrational animals
otherwise than in man. For the impulse of man to action arises from the
directing reason; wherefore his impulse is one of command. On the other
hand, the impulse of the irrational animal arises from natural
instinct; because as soon as they apprehend the fitting or the
unfitting, their appetite is moved naturally to pursue or to avoid.
Wherefore they are directed by another to act; and they themselves do
not direct themselves to act. Consequently in them is impulse but not
command.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether use precedes command?
Objection 1: It would seem that use precedes command. For command is an
act of the reason presupposing an act of the will, as stated above
[1121](A[1]). But, as we have already shown (Q[16], A[1]), use is an
act of the will. Therefore use precedes command.
Objection 2: Further, command is one of those things that are ordained
to the end. But use is of those things that are ordained to the end.
Therefore it seems that use precedes command.
Objection 3: Further, every act of a power moved by the will is called
use; because the will uses the other powers, as stated above (Q[16],
A[1]). But command is an act of the reason as moved by the will, as
stated above [1122](A[1]). Therefore command is a kind of use. Now the
common precedes the proper. Therefore use precedes command.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that impulse to
action precedes use. But impulse to operation is given by command.
Therefore command precedes use.
I answer that, use of that which is directed to the end, in so far as
it is in the reason referring this to the end, precedes choice, as
stated above ([1123]Q[16], A[4]). Wherefore still more does it precede
command. On the other hand, use of that which is directed to the end,
in so far as it is subject to the executive power, follows command;
because use in the user is united to the act of the thing used; for one
does not use a stick before doing something with the stick. But command
is not simultaneous with the act of the thing to which the command is
given: for it naturally precedes its fulfilment, sometimes, indeed, by
priority of time.
Consequently it is evident that command precedes use.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every act of the will precedes this act of
the reason which is command; but an act of the will precedes, viz.
choice; and an act of the will follows, viz. use. Because after
counsel's decision, which is reason's judgment, the will chooses; and
after choice, the reason commands that power which has to do what was
chosen; and then, last of all, someone's will begins to use, by
executing the command of reason; sometimes it is another's will, when
one commands another; sometimes the will of the one that commands, when
he commands himself to do something.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as act ranks before power, so does the
object rank before the act. Now the object of use is that which is
directed to the end. Consequently, from the fact that command precedes,
rather than that it follows use.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the act of the will in using the reason
for the purpose of command, precedes the command; so also we may say
that this act whereby the will uses the reason, is preceded by a
command of reason; since the acts of these powers react on one another.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether command and the commanded act are one act, or distinct?
Objection 1: It would seem that the commanded act is not one with the
command itself. For the acts of different powers are themselves
distinct. But the commanded act belongs to one power, and the command
to another; since one is the power that commands, and the other is the
power that receives the command. Therefore the commanded act is not one
with the command.
Objection 2: Further, whatever things can be separate from one another,
are distinct: for nothing is severed from itself. But sometimes the
commanded act is separate from the command: for sometimes the command
is given, and the commanded act follows not. Therefore command is a
distinct act from the act commanded.
Objection 3: Further, whatever things are related to one another as
precedent and consequent, are distinct. But command naturally precedes
the commanded act. Therefore they are distinct.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "where one
thing is by reason of another, there is but one. " But there is no
commanded act unless by reason of the command. Therefore they are one.
I answer that, Nothing prevents certain things being distinct in one
respect, and one in another respect. Indeed, every multitude is one in
some respect, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xiii). But a difference is
to be observed in this, that some are simply many, and one in a
particular aspect: while with others it is the reverse. Now "one" is
predicated in the same way as "being. " And substance is being simply,
whereas accident or being "of reason" is a being only in a certain
respect. Wherefore those things that are one in substance are one
simply, though many in a certain respect. Thus, in the genus substance,
the whole composed of its integral or essential parts, is one simply:
because the whole is being and substance simply, and the parts are
being and substances in the whole. But those things which are distinct
in substance, and one according to an accident, are distinct simply,
and one in a certain respect: thus many men are one people, and many
stones are one heap; which is unity of composition or order. In like
manner also many individuals that are one in genus or species are many
simply, and one in a certain respect: since to be one in genus or
species is to be one according to the consideration of the reason.
Now just as in the genus of natural things, a whole is composed of
matter and form (e. g. man, who is one natural being, though he has many
parts, is composed of soul and body); so, in human acts, the act of a
lower power is in the position of matter in regard to the act of a
higher power, in so far as the lower power acts in virtue of the higher
power moving it: for thus also the act of the first mover is as the
form in regard to the act of its instrument. Hence it is evident that
command and the commanded act are one human act, just as a whole is
one, yet in its parts, many.
Reply to Objection 1: If the distinct powers are not ordained to one
another, their acts are diverse simply. But when one power is the mover
of the other, then their acts are, in a way, one: since "the act of the
mover and the act of the thing moved are one act" (Phys. iii, 3).
Reply to Objection 2: The fact that command and the commanded act can
be separated from one another shows that they are different parts.
Because the parts of a man can be separated from one another, and yet
they form one whole.
Reply to Objection 3: In those things that are many in parts, but one
as a whole, nothing hinders one part from preceding another. Thus the
soul, in a way, precedes the body; and the heart, the other members.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the act of the will is commanded?
Objection 1: It would seem that the act of the will is not commanded.
For Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): "The mind commands the mind to
will, and yet it does not. " But to will is the act of the will.
Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.
Objection 2: Further, to receive a command belongs to one who can
understand the command. But the will cannot understand the command; for
the will differs from the intellect, to which it belongs to understand.
Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.
Objection 3: Further, if one act of the will is commanded, for the same
reason all are commanded. But if all the acts of the will are
commanded, we must needs proceed to infinity; because the act of the
will precedes the act of reason commanding, as stated above
[1124](A[1]); for if that act of the will be also commanded, this
command will be precedes by another act of the reason, and so on to
infinity. But to proceed to infinity is not possible. Therefore the act
of the will is not commanded.
On the contrary, Whatever is in our power, is subject to our command.
But the acts of the will, most of all, are in our power; since all our
acts are said to be in our power, in so far as they are voluntary.
Therefore the acts of the will are commanded by us.
I answer that, As stated above [1125](A[1]), command is nothing else
than the act of the reason directing, with a certain motion, something
to act. Now it is evident that the reason can direct the act of the
will: for just as it can judge it to be good to will something, so it
can direct by commanding man to will. From this it is evident that an
act of the will can be commanded.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9) when the
mind commands itself perfectly to will, then already it wills: but that
sometimes it commands and wills not, is due to the fact that it
commands imperfectly. Now imperfect command arises from the fact that
the reason is moved by opposite motives to command or not to command:
wherefore it fluctuates between the two, and fails to command
perfectly.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as each of the members of the body works not
for itself alone but for the whole body; thus it is for the whole body
that the eye sees; so is it with the powers of the soul. For the
intellect understands, not for itself alone, but for all the powers;
and the will wills not only for itself, but for all the powers too.
Wherefore man, in so far as he is endowed with intellect and will,
commands the act of the will for himself.
Reply to Objection 3: Since command is an act of reason, that act is
commanded which is subject to reason. Now the first act of the will is
not due to the direction of the reason but to the instigation of
nature, or of a higher cause, as stated above ([1126]Q[9], A[4]).
Therefore there is no need to proceed to infinity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the act of the reason is commanded?
Objection 1: It would seem that the act of the reason cannot be
commanded. For it seems impossible for a thing to command itself. But
it is the reason that commands, as stated above [1127](A[1]). Therefore
the act of the reason is not commanded.
Objection 2: Further, that which is essential is different from that
which is by participation. But the power whose act is commanded by
reason, is rational by participation, as stated in Ethic. i, 13.
Therefore the act of that power, which is essentially rational, is not
commanded.
Objection 3: Further, that act is commanded, which is in our power. But
to know and judge the truth, which is the act of reason, is not always
in our power. Therefore the act of the reason cannot be commanded.
On the contrary, That which we do of our free-will, can be done by our
command. But the acts of the reason are accomplished through the
free-will: for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "by his
free-will man inquires, considers, judges, approves. " Therefore the
acts of the reason can be commanded.
I answer that, Since the reason reacts on itself, just as it directs
the acts of other powers, so can it direct its own act. Consequently
its act can be commanded.
But we must take note that the act of the reason may be considered in
two ways. First, as to the exercise of the act. And considered thus,
the act of the reason can always be commanded: as when one is told to
be attentive, and to use one's reason. Secondly, as to the object; in
respect of which two acts of the reason have to be noticed. One is the
act whereby it apprehends the truth about something. This act is not in
our power: because it happens in virtue of a natural or supernatural
light. Consequently in this respect, the act of the reason is not in
our power, and cannot be commanded. The other act of the reason is that
whereby it assents to what it apprehends. If, therefore, that which the
reason apprehends is such that it naturally assents thereto, e. g. the
first principles, it is not in our power to assent or dissent to the
like: assent follows naturally, and consequently, properly speaking, is
not subject to our command. But some things which are apprehended do
not convince the intellect to such an extent as not to leave it free to
assent or dissent, or at least suspend its assent or dissent, on
account of some cause or other; and in such things assent or dissent is
in our power, and is subject to our command.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason commands itself, just as the will moves
itself, as stated above ([1128]Q[9], A[3]), that is to say, in so far
as each power reacts on its own acts, and from one thing tends to
another.
Reply to Objection 2: On account of the diversity of objects subject to
the act of the reason, nothing prevents the reason from participating
in itself: thus the knowledge of principles is participated in the
knowledge of the conclusions.
The reply to the third object is evident from what has been said.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded?
Objection 1: It would seem that the act of the sensitive appetite is
not commanded. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:15): "For I do not that
good which I will": and a gloss explains this by saying that man lusts,
although he wills not to lust. But to lust is an act of the sensitive
appetite. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to
our command.
Objection 2: Further, corporeal matter obeys God alone, to the effect
of formal transmutation, as was shown in the [1129]FP, Q[65], A[4];
[1130]FP, Q[91], A[2]; [1131]FP, Q[110], A[2]. But the act of the
sensitive appetite is accompanied by a formal transmutation of the
body, consisting in heat or cold. Therefore the act of the sensitive
appetite is not subject to man's command.
Objection 3: Further, the proper motive principle of the sensitive
appetite is something apprehended by sense or imagination. But it is
not always in our power to apprehend something by sense or imagination.
Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to our
command.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi. ] says:
"That which obeys reason is twofold, the concupiscible and the
irascible," which belong to the sensitive appetite. Therefore the act
of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason.
I answer that, An act is subject to our command, in so far as it is in
our power, as stated above [1132](A[5]). Consequently in order to
understand in what manner the act of the sensitive appetite is subject
to the command of reason, we must consider in what manner it is in our
power. Now it must be observed that the sensitive appetite differs from
the intellective appetite, which is called the will, in the fact that
the sensitive appetite is a power of a corporeal organ, whereas the
will is not. Again, every act of a power that uses a corporeal organ,
depends not only on a power of the soul, but also on the disposition of
that corporeal organ: thus the act of vision depends on the power of
sight, and on the condition of the eye, which condition is a help or a
hindrance to that act. Consequently the act of the sensitive appetite
depends not only on the appetitive power, but also on the disposition
of the body.
Now whatever part the power of the soul takes in the act, follows
apprehension. And the apprehension of the imagination, being a
particular apprehension, is regulated by the apprehension of reason,
which is universal; just as a particular active power is regulated by a
universal active power. Consequently in this respect the act of the
sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason. On the other
hand, condition or disposition of the body is not subject to the
command of reason: and consequently in this respect, the movement of
the sensitive appetite is hindered from being wholly subject to the
command of reason.
Moreover it happens sometimes that the movement of the sensitive
appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence of an apprehension of the
imagination of sense. And then such movement occurs without the command
of reason: although reason could have prevented it, had it foreseen.
Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2) that the reason governs the
irascible and concupiscible not by a "despotic supremacy," which is
that of a master over his slave; but by a "politic and royal
supremacy," whereby the free are governed, who are not wholly subject
to command.
Reply to Objection 1: That man lusts, although he wills not to lust, is
due to a disposition of the body, whereby the sensitive appetite is
hindered from perfect compliance with the command of reason. Hence the
Apostle adds (Rom. 7:15): "I see another law in my members, fighting
against the law of my mind. " This may also happen through a sudden
movement of concupiscence, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The condition of the body stands in a twofold
relation to the act of the sensitive appetite. First, as preceding it:
thus a man may be disposed in one way or another, in respect of his
body, to this or that passion. Secondly, as consequent to it: thus a
man becomes heated through anger. Now the condition that precedes, is
not subject to the command of reason: since it is due either to nature,
or to some previous movement, which cannot cease at once. But the
condition that is consequent, follows the command of reason: since it
results from the local movement of the heart, which has various
movements according to the various acts of the sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 3: Since the external sensible is necessary for the
apprehension of the senses, it is not in our power to apprehend
anything by the senses, unless the sensible be present; which presence
of the sensible is not always in our power. For it is then that man can
use his senses if he will so to do; unless there be some obstacle on
the part of the organ. On the other hand, the apprehension of the
imagination is subject to the ordering of reason, in proportion to the
strength or weakness of the imaginative power. For that man is unable
to imagine the things that reason considers, is either because they
cannot be imagined, such as incorporeal things; or because of the
weakness of the imaginative power, due to some organic indisposition.
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Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded?
Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of the vegetal soul are
subject to the command of reason. For the sensitive powers are of
higher rank than the vegetal powers. But the powers of the sensitive
soul are subject to the command of reason. Much more, therefore, are
the powers of the vegetal soul.
Objection 2: Further, man is called a "little world" [*Aristotle, Phys.
viii. 2], because the soul is in the body, as God is in the world. But
God is in the world in such a way, that everything in the world obeys
His command. Therefore all that is in man, even the powers of the
vegetal soul, obey the command of reason.
Objection 3: Further, praise and blame are awarded only to such acts as
are subject to the command of reason. But in the acts of the nutritive
and generative power, there is room for praise and blame, virtue and
vice: as in the case of gluttony and lust, and their contrary virtues.
Therefore the acts of these powers are subject to the command of
reason.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii. ] sats
that "the nutritive and generative power is one over which the reason
has no control. "
I answer that, Some acts proceed from the natural appetite, others from
the animal, or from the intellectual appetite: for every agent desires
an end in some way. Now the natural appetite does not follow from some
apprehension, as to the animal and the intellectual appetite. But the
reason commands by way of apprehensive power. Wherefore those acts that
proceed from the intellective or the animal appetite, can be commanded
by reason: but not those acts that proceed from the natural appetite.
And such are the acts of the vegetal soul; wherefore Gregory of Nyssa
(Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii) says "that generation and nutrition
belong to what are called natural powers. " Consequently the acts of the
vegetal soul are not subject to the command of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: The more immaterial an act is, the more noble it
is, and the more is it subject to the command of reason. Hence the very
fact that the acts of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, shows that
they rank lowest.
Reply to Objection 2: The comparison holds in a certain respect:
because, to wit, as God moves the world, so the soul moves the body.
But it does not hold in every respect: for the soul did not create the
body out of nothing, as God created the world; for which reason the
world is wholly subject to His command.
Reply to Objection 3: Virtue and vice, praise and blame do not affect
the acts themselves of the nutritive and generative power, i. e.
digestion, and formation of the human body; but they affect the acts of
the sensitive part, that are ordained to the acts of generation and
nutrition; for example the desire for pleasure in the act of taking
food or in the act of generation, and the right or wrong use thereof.
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Whether the acts of the external members are commanded?
Objection 1: It would seem that the members of the body do not obey
reason as to their acts. For it is evident that the members of the body
are more distant from the reason, than the powers of the vegetal soul.
But the powers of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, as stated above
[1133](A[8]). Therefore much less do the members of the body obey.
Objection 2: Further, the heart is the principle of animal movement.
But the movement of the heart is not subject to the command of reason:
for Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii. ] says that "the
pulse is not controlled by reason. " Therefore the movement of the
bodily members is not subject to the command of reason.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16) that "the
movement of the genital members is sometimes inopportune and not
desired; sometimes when sought it fails, and whereas the heart is warm
with desire, the body remains cold. " Therefore the movements of the
members are not obedient to reason.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): "The mind commands
a movement of the hand, and so ready is the hand to obey, that scarcely
can one discern obedience from command. "
I answer that, The members of the body are organs of the soul's powers.
Consequently according as the powers of the soul stand in respect of
obedience to reason, so do the members of the body stand in respect
thereof. Since then the sensitive powers are subject to the command of
reason, whereas the natural powers are not; therefore all movements of
members, that are moved by the sensitive powers, are subject to the
command of reason; whereas those movements of members, that arise from
the natural powers, are not subject to the command of reason.
I answer that, The use of a thing implies the application of that thing
to an operation: hence the operation to which we apply a thing is
called its use; thus the use of a horse is to ride, and the use of a
stick is to strike. Now we apply to an operation not only the interior
principles of action, viz. the powers of the soul or the members of the
body; as the intellect, to understand; and the eye, to see; but also
external things, as a stick, to strike. But it is evident that we do
not apply external things to an operation save through the interior
principles which are either the powers of the soul, or the habits of
those powers, or the organs which are parts of the body. Now it has
been shown above ([1110]Q[9], A[1]) that it is the will which moves the
soul's powers to their acts, and this is to apply them to operation.
Hence it is evident that first and principally use belongs to the will
as first mover; to the reason, as directing; and to the other powers as
executing the operation, which powers are compared to the will which
applies them to act, as the instruments are compared to the principal
agent. Now action is properly ascribed, not to the instrument, but to
the principal agent, as building is ascribed to the builder, not to his
tools. Hence it is evident that use is, properly speaking, an act of
the will.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason does indeed refer one thing to another;
but the will tends to that which is referred by the reason to something
else. And in this sense to use is to refer one thing to another.
Reply to Objection 2: Damascene is speaking of use in so far as it
belongs to the executive powers.
Reply to Objection 3: Even the speculative reason is applied by the
will to the act of understanding or judging. Consequently the
speculative reason is said to use, in so far as it is moved by the
will, in the same way as the other powers.
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Whether use is to be found in irrational animals?
Objection 1: It would seem that use is to be found in irrational
animals. For it is better to enjoy than to use, because, as Augustine
says (De Trin. x, 10): "We use things by referring them to something
else which we are to enjoy. " But enjoyment is to be found in irrational
animals, as stated above ([1111]Q[11], A[2]). Much more, therefore, is
it possible for them to use.
Objection 2: Further, to apply the members to action is to use them.
But irrational animals apply their members to action; for instance,
their feet, to walk; their horns, to strike. Therefore it is possible
for irrational animals to use.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "None but a rational
animal can make use of a thing. "
I answer that, as stated above [1112](A[1]), to use is to apply an
active principle to action: thus to consent is to apply the appetitive
movement to the desire of something, as stated above (Q[15],
AA[1],2,3). Now he alone who has the disposal of a thing, can apply it
to something else; and this belongs to him alone who knows how to refer
it to something else, which is an act of the reason. And therefore none
but a rational animal consents and uses.
Reply to Objection 1: To enjoy implies the absolute movement of the
appetite to the appetible: whereas to use implies a movement of the
appetite to something as directed to something else. If therefore we
compare use and enjoyment in respect of their objects, enjoyment is
better than use; because that which is appetible absolutely is better
than that which is appetible only as directed to something else. But if
we compare them in respect of the apprehensive power that precedes
them, greater excellence is required on the part of use: because to
direct one thing to another is an act of reason; whereas to apprehend
something absolutely is within the competency even of sense.
Reply to Objection 2: Animals by means of their members do something
from natural instinct; not through knowing the relation of their
members to these operations. Wherefore, properly speaking, they do not
apply their members to action, nor do they use them.
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Whether use regards also the last end?
Objection 1: It would seem that use can regard also the last end. For
Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "Whoever enjoys, uses. " But man enjoys
the last end. Therefore he uses the last end.
Objection 2: Further, "to use is to apply something to the purpose of
the will" (De Trin. x, 11). But the last end, more than anything else,
is the object of the will's application. Therefore it can be the object
of use.
Objection 3: Further, Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that "Eternity is in
the Father, Likeness in the Image," i. e. in the Son, "Use in the Gift,"
i. e. in the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost, since He is God, is the
last end. Therefore the last end can be the object of use.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "No one rightly uses
God, but one enjoys Him. " But God alone is the last end. Therefore we
cannot use the last end.
I answer that, Use, as stated above [1113](A[1]), implies the
application of one thing to another. Now that which is applied to
another is regarded in the light of means to an end; and consequently
use always regards the means. For this reason things that are adapted
to a certain end are said to be "useful"; in fact their very usefulness
is sometimes called use.
It must, however, be observed that the last end may be taken in two
ways: first, simply; secondly, in respect of an individual. For since
the end, as stated above ([1114]Q[1], A[8];[1115] Q[2], A[7]),
signifies sometimes the thing itself, and sometimes the attainment or
possession of that thing (thus the miser's end is either money or the
possession of it); it is evident that, simply speaking, the last end is
the thing itself; for the possession of money is good only inasmuch as
there is some good in money. But in regard to the individual, the
obtaining of money is the last end; for the miser would not seek for
money, save that he might have it. Therefore, simply and properly
speaking, a man enjoys money, because he places his last end therein;
but in so far as he seeks to possess it, he is said to use it.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of use in general, in so
far as it implies the relation of an end to the enjoyment which a man
seeks in that end.
Reply to Objection 2: The end is applied to the purpose of the will,
that the will may find rest in it. Consequently this rest in the end,
which is the enjoyment thereof, is in this sense called use of the end.
But the means are applied to the will's purpose, not only in being used
as means, but as ordained to something else in which the will finds
rest.
Reply to Objection 3: The words of Hilary refer to use as applicable to
rest in the last end; just as, speaking in a general sense, one may be
said to use the end for the purpose of attaining it, as stated above.
Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10) that "this love, delight,
felicity, or happiness, is called use by him. "
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Whether use precedes choice?
Objection 1: It would seem that use precedes choice. For nothing
follows after choice, except execution. But use, since it belongs to
the will, precedes execution. Therefore it precedes choice also.
Objection 2: Further, the absolute precedes the relative. Therefore the
less relative precedes the more relative. But choice implies two
relations: one, of the thing chosen, in relation to the end; the other,
of the thing chosen, in respect of that to which it is preferred;
whereas use implies relation to the end only. Therefore use precedes
choice.
Objection 3: Further, the will uses the other powers in so far as it
removes them. But the will moves itself, too, as stated above
([1116]Q[9], A[3]). Therefore it uses itself, by applying itself to
act. But it does this when it consents. Therefore there is use in
consent. But consent precedes choice as stated above ([1117]Q[15],
A[3], ad 3). Therefore use does also.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "the will
after choosing has an impulse to the operation, and afterwards it uses
(the powers). " Therefore use follows choice.
I answer that, The will has a twofold relation to the thing willed.
One, according as the thing willed is, in a way, in the willing
subject, by a kind of proportion or order to the thing willed.
Wherefore those things that are naturally proportionate to a certain
end, are said to desire that end naturally. Yet to have an end thus is
to have it imperfectly. Now every imperfect thing tends to perfection.
And therefore both the natural and the voluntary appetite tend to have
the end in reality; and this is to have it perfectly. This is the
second relation of the will to the thing willed.
Now the thing willed is not only the end, but also the means. And the
last act that belongs to the first relation of the will to the means,
is choice; for there the will becomes fully proportionate, by willing
the means fully. Use, on the other hand, belongs to the second relation
of the will, in respect of which it tends to the realization of the
thing willed. Wherefore it is evident that use follows choice; provided
that by use we mean the will's use of the executive power in moving it.
But since the will, in a way, moves the reason also, and uses it, we
may take the use of the means, as consisting in the consideration of
the reason, whereby it refers the means to the end. In this sense use
precedes choice.
Reply to Objection 1: The motion of the will to the execution of the
work, precedes execution, but follows choice. And so, since use belongs
to that very motion of the will, it stands between choice and
execution.
Reply to Objection 2: What is essentially relative is after the
absolute; but the thing to which relation is referred need not come
after. Indeed, the more a cause precedes, the more numerous the effects
to which it has relation.
Reply to Objection 3: Choice precedes use, if they be referred to the
same object. But nothing hinders the use of one thing preceding the
choice of another. And since the acts of the will react on one another,
in each act of the will we can find both consent and choice and use; so
that we may say that the will consents to choose, and consents to
consent, and uses itself in consenting and choosing. And such acts as
are ordained to that which precedes, precede also.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL (NINE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the acts commanded by the will; under which head
there are nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether command is an act of the will or of the reason?
(2) Whether command belongs to irrational animals?
(3) Of the order between command and use
(4) Whether command and the commanded act are one act or distinct?
(5) Whether the act of the will is commanded?
(6) Whether the act of the reason is commanded?
(7) Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded?
(8) Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded?
(9) Whether the acts of the external members are commanded?
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Whether command is an act of the reason or of the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that command is not an act of the reason but
of the will. For command is a kind of motion; because Avicenna says
that there are four ways of moving, "by perfecting, by disposing, by
commanding, and by counselling. " But it belongs to the will to move all
the other powers of the soul, as stated above ([1118]Q[9], A[1]).
Therefore command is an act of the will.
Objection 2: Further, just as to be commanded belongs to that which is
subject, so, seemingly, to command belongs to that which is most free.
But the root of liberty is especially in the will. Therefore to command
belongs to the will.
Objection 3: Further, command is followed at once by act. But the act
of the reason is not followed at once by act: for he who judges that a
thing should be done, does not do it at once. Therefore command is not
an act of the reason, but of the will.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi. ] and
the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) say that "the appetite obeys reason. "
Therefore command is an act of the reason.
I answer that, Command is an act of the reason presupposing, however,
an act of the will. In proof of this, we must take note that, since the
acts of the reason and of the will can be brought to bear on one
another, in so far as the reason reasons about willing, and the will
wills to reason, the result is that the act of the reason precedes the
act of the will, and conversely. And since the power of the preceding
act continues in the act that follows, it happens sometimes that there
is an act of the will in so far as it retains in itself something of an
act of the reason, as we have stated in reference to use and choice;
and conversely, that there is an act of the reason in so far as it
retains in itself something of an act of the will.
Now, command is essentially indeed an act of the reason: for the
commander orders the one commanded to do something, by way of
intimation or declaration; and to order thus by intimating or declaring
is an act of the reason. Now the reason can intimate or declare
something in two ways. First, absolutely: and this intimation is
expressed by a verb in the indicative mood, as when one person says to
another: "This is what you should do. " Sometimes, however, the reason
intimates something to a man by moving him thereto; and this intimation
is expressed by a verb in the imperative mood; as when it is said to
someone: "Do this. " Now the first mover, among the powers of the soul,
to the doing of an act is the will, as stated above ([1119]Q[9], A[1]).
Since therefore the second mover does not move, save in virtue of the
first mover, it follows that the very fact that the reason moves by
commanding, is due to the power of the will. Consequently it follows
that command is an act of the reason, presupposing an act of the will,
in virtue of which the reason, by its command, moves (the power) to the
execution of the act.
Reply to Objection 1: To command is to move, not anyhow, but by
intimating and declaring to another; and this is an act of the reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The root of liberty is the will as the subject
thereof; but it is the reason as its cause. For the will can tend
freely towards various objects, precisely because the reason can have
various perceptions of good. Hence philosophers define the free-will as
being "a free judgment arising from reason," implying that reason is
the root of liberty.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that command is an act of
reason not absolutely, but with a kind of motion as stated above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether command belongs to irrational animals?
Objection 1: It would seem that command belongs to irrational animals.
Because, according to Avicenna, "the power that commands movement is
the appetite; and the power that executes movement is in the muscles
and nerves. " But both powers are in irrational animals. Therefore
command is to be found in irrational animals.
Objection 2: Further, the condition of a slave is that of one who
receives commands. But the body is compared to the soul as a slave to
his master, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Therefore the body
is commanded by the soul, even in irrational animals, since they are
composed of soul and body.
Objection 3: Further, by commanding, man has an impulse towards an
action. But impulse to action is to be found in irrational animals, as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22). Therefore command is to be found
in irrational animals.
On the contrary, Command is an act of reason, as stated above
[1120](A[1]). But in irrational animals there is no reason. Neither,
therefore, is there command.
I answer that, To command is nothing else than to direct someone to do
something, by a certain motion of intimation. Now to direct is the
proper act of reason. Wherefore it is impossible that irrational
animals should command in any way, since they are devoid of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: The appetitive power is said to command movement,
in so far as it moves the commanding reason. But this is only in man.
In irrational animals the appetitive power is not, properly speaking, a
commanding faculty, unless command be taken loosely for motion.
Reply to Objection 2: The body of the irrational animal is competent to
obey; but its soul is not competent to command, because it is not
competent to direct. Consequently there is no ratio there of commander
and commanded; but only of mover and moved.
Reply to Objection 3: Impulse to action is in irrational animals
otherwise than in man. For the impulse of man to action arises from the
directing reason; wherefore his impulse is one of command. On the other
hand, the impulse of the irrational animal arises from natural
instinct; because as soon as they apprehend the fitting or the
unfitting, their appetite is moved naturally to pursue or to avoid.
Wherefore they are directed by another to act; and they themselves do
not direct themselves to act. Consequently in them is impulse but not
command.
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Whether use precedes command?
Objection 1: It would seem that use precedes command. For command is an
act of the reason presupposing an act of the will, as stated above
[1121](A[1]). But, as we have already shown (Q[16], A[1]), use is an
act of the will. Therefore use precedes command.
Objection 2: Further, command is one of those things that are ordained
to the end. But use is of those things that are ordained to the end.
Therefore it seems that use precedes command.
Objection 3: Further, every act of a power moved by the will is called
use; because the will uses the other powers, as stated above (Q[16],
A[1]). But command is an act of the reason as moved by the will, as
stated above [1122](A[1]). Therefore command is a kind of use. Now the
common precedes the proper. Therefore use precedes command.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that impulse to
action precedes use. But impulse to operation is given by command.
Therefore command precedes use.
I answer that, use of that which is directed to the end, in so far as
it is in the reason referring this to the end, precedes choice, as
stated above ([1123]Q[16], A[4]). Wherefore still more does it precede
command. On the other hand, use of that which is directed to the end,
in so far as it is subject to the executive power, follows command;
because use in the user is united to the act of the thing used; for one
does not use a stick before doing something with the stick. But command
is not simultaneous with the act of the thing to which the command is
given: for it naturally precedes its fulfilment, sometimes, indeed, by
priority of time.
Consequently it is evident that command precedes use.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every act of the will precedes this act of
the reason which is command; but an act of the will precedes, viz.
choice; and an act of the will follows, viz. use. Because after
counsel's decision, which is reason's judgment, the will chooses; and
after choice, the reason commands that power which has to do what was
chosen; and then, last of all, someone's will begins to use, by
executing the command of reason; sometimes it is another's will, when
one commands another; sometimes the will of the one that commands, when
he commands himself to do something.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as act ranks before power, so does the
object rank before the act. Now the object of use is that which is
directed to the end. Consequently, from the fact that command precedes,
rather than that it follows use.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the act of the will in using the reason
for the purpose of command, precedes the command; so also we may say
that this act whereby the will uses the reason, is preceded by a
command of reason; since the acts of these powers react on one another.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether command and the commanded act are one act, or distinct?
Objection 1: It would seem that the commanded act is not one with the
command itself. For the acts of different powers are themselves
distinct. But the commanded act belongs to one power, and the command
to another; since one is the power that commands, and the other is the
power that receives the command. Therefore the commanded act is not one
with the command.
Objection 2: Further, whatever things can be separate from one another,
are distinct: for nothing is severed from itself. But sometimes the
commanded act is separate from the command: for sometimes the command
is given, and the commanded act follows not. Therefore command is a
distinct act from the act commanded.
Objection 3: Further, whatever things are related to one another as
precedent and consequent, are distinct. But command naturally precedes
the commanded act. Therefore they are distinct.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "where one
thing is by reason of another, there is but one. " But there is no
commanded act unless by reason of the command. Therefore they are one.
I answer that, Nothing prevents certain things being distinct in one
respect, and one in another respect. Indeed, every multitude is one in
some respect, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xiii). But a difference is
to be observed in this, that some are simply many, and one in a
particular aspect: while with others it is the reverse. Now "one" is
predicated in the same way as "being. " And substance is being simply,
whereas accident or being "of reason" is a being only in a certain
respect. Wherefore those things that are one in substance are one
simply, though many in a certain respect. Thus, in the genus substance,
the whole composed of its integral or essential parts, is one simply:
because the whole is being and substance simply, and the parts are
being and substances in the whole. But those things which are distinct
in substance, and one according to an accident, are distinct simply,
and one in a certain respect: thus many men are one people, and many
stones are one heap; which is unity of composition or order. In like
manner also many individuals that are one in genus or species are many
simply, and one in a certain respect: since to be one in genus or
species is to be one according to the consideration of the reason.
Now just as in the genus of natural things, a whole is composed of
matter and form (e. g. man, who is one natural being, though he has many
parts, is composed of soul and body); so, in human acts, the act of a
lower power is in the position of matter in regard to the act of a
higher power, in so far as the lower power acts in virtue of the higher
power moving it: for thus also the act of the first mover is as the
form in regard to the act of its instrument. Hence it is evident that
command and the commanded act are one human act, just as a whole is
one, yet in its parts, many.
Reply to Objection 1: If the distinct powers are not ordained to one
another, their acts are diverse simply. But when one power is the mover
of the other, then their acts are, in a way, one: since "the act of the
mover and the act of the thing moved are one act" (Phys. iii, 3).
Reply to Objection 2: The fact that command and the commanded act can
be separated from one another shows that they are different parts.
Because the parts of a man can be separated from one another, and yet
they form one whole.
Reply to Objection 3: In those things that are many in parts, but one
as a whole, nothing hinders one part from preceding another. Thus the
soul, in a way, precedes the body; and the heart, the other members.
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Whether the act of the will is commanded?
Objection 1: It would seem that the act of the will is not commanded.
For Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): "The mind commands the mind to
will, and yet it does not. " But to will is the act of the will.
Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.
Objection 2: Further, to receive a command belongs to one who can
understand the command. But the will cannot understand the command; for
the will differs from the intellect, to which it belongs to understand.
Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.
Objection 3: Further, if one act of the will is commanded, for the same
reason all are commanded. But if all the acts of the will are
commanded, we must needs proceed to infinity; because the act of the
will precedes the act of reason commanding, as stated above
[1124](A[1]); for if that act of the will be also commanded, this
command will be precedes by another act of the reason, and so on to
infinity. But to proceed to infinity is not possible. Therefore the act
of the will is not commanded.
On the contrary, Whatever is in our power, is subject to our command.
But the acts of the will, most of all, are in our power; since all our
acts are said to be in our power, in so far as they are voluntary.
Therefore the acts of the will are commanded by us.
I answer that, As stated above [1125](A[1]), command is nothing else
than the act of the reason directing, with a certain motion, something
to act. Now it is evident that the reason can direct the act of the
will: for just as it can judge it to be good to will something, so it
can direct by commanding man to will. From this it is evident that an
act of the will can be commanded.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9) when the
mind commands itself perfectly to will, then already it wills: but that
sometimes it commands and wills not, is due to the fact that it
commands imperfectly. Now imperfect command arises from the fact that
the reason is moved by opposite motives to command or not to command:
wherefore it fluctuates between the two, and fails to command
perfectly.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as each of the members of the body works not
for itself alone but for the whole body; thus it is for the whole body
that the eye sees; so is it with the powers of the soul. For the
intellect understands, not for itself alone, but for all the powers;
and the will wills not only for itself, but for all the powers too.
Wherefore man, in so far as he is endowed with intellect and will,
commands the act of the will for himself.
Reply to Objection 3: Since command is an act of reason, that act is
commanded which is subject to reason. Now the first act of the will is
not due to the direction of the reason but to the instigation of
nature, or of a higher cause, as stated above ([1126]Q[9], A[4]).
Therefore there is no need to proceed to infinity.
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Whether the act of the reason is commanded?
Objection 1: It would seem that the act of the reason cannot be
commanded. For it seems impossible for a thing to command itself. But
it is the reason that commands, as stated above [1127](A[1]). Therefore
the act of the reason is not commanded.
Objection 2: Further, that which is essential is different from that
which is by participation. But the power whose act is commanded by
reason, is rational by participation, as stated in Ethic. i, 13.
Therefore the act of that power, which is essentially rational, is not
commanded.
Objection 3: Further, that act is commanded, which is in our power. But
to know and judge the truth, which is the act of reason, is not always
in our power. Therefore the act of the reason cannot be commanded.
On the contrary, That which we do of our free-will, can be done by our
command. But the acts of the reason are accomplished through the
free-will: for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "by his
free-will man inquires, considers, judges, approves. " Therefore the
acts of the reason can be commanded.
I answer that, Since the reason reacts on itself, just as it directs
the acts of other powers, so can it direct its own act. Consequently
its act can be commanded.
But we must take note that the act of the reason may be considered in
two ways. First, as to the exercise of the act. And considered thus,
the act of the reason can always be commanded: as when one is told to
be attentive, and to use one's reason. Secondly, as to the object; in
respect of which two acts of the reason have to be noticed. One is the
act whereby it apprehends the truth about something. This act is not in
our power: because it happens in virtue of a natural or supernatural
light. Consequently in this respect, the act of the reason is not in
our power, and cannot be commanded. The other act of the reason is that
whereby it assents to what it apprehends. If, therefore, that which the
reason apprehends is such that it naturally assents thereto, e. g. the
first principles, it is not in our power to assent or dissent to the
like: assent follows naturally, and consequently, properly speaking, is
not subject to our command. But some things which are apprehended do
not convince the intellect to such an extent as not to leave it free to
assent or dissent, or at least suspend its assent or dissent, on
account of some cause or other; and in such things assent or dissent is
in our power, and is subject to our command.
Reply to Objection 1: Reason commands itself, just as the will moves
itself, as stated above ([1128]Q[9], A[3]), that is to say, in so far
as each power reacts on its own acts, and from one thing tends to
another.
Reply to Objection 2: On account of the diversity of objects subject to
the act of the reason, nothing prevents the reason from participating
in itself: thus the knowledge of principles is participated in the
knowledge of the conclusions.
The reply to the third object is evident from what has been said.
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Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded?
Objection 1: It would seem that the act of the sensitive appetite is
not commanded. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:15): "For I do not that
good which I will": and a gloss explains this by saying that man lusts,
although he wills not to lust. But to lust is an act of the sensitive
appetite. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to
our command.
Objection 2: Further, corporeal matter obeys God alone, to the effect
of formal transmutation, as was shown in the [1129]FP, Q[65], A[4];
[1130]FP, Q[91], A[2]; [1131]FP, Q[110], A[2]. But the act of the
sensitive appetite is accompanied by a formal transmutation of the
body, consisting in heat or cold. Therefore the act of the sensitive
appetite is not subject to man's command.
Objection 3: Further, the proper motive principle of the sensitive
appetite is something apprehended by sense or imagination. But it is
not always in our power to apprehend something by sense or imagination.
Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to our
command.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi. ] says:
"That which obeys reason is twofold, the concupiscible and the
irascible," which belong to the sensitive appetite. Therefore the act
of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason.
I answer that, An act is subject to our command, in so far as it is in
our power, as stated above [1132](A[5]). Consequently in order to
understand in what manner the act of the sensitive appetite is subject
to the command of reason, we must consider in what manner it is in our
power. Now it must be observed that the sensitive appetite differs from
the intellective appetite, which is called the will, in the fact that
the sensitive appetite is a power of a corporeal organ, whereas the
will is not. Again, every act of a power that uses a corporeal organ,
depends not only on a power of the soul, but also on the disposition of
that corporeal organ: thus the act of vision depends on the power of
sight, and on the condition of the eye, which condition is a help or a
hindrance to that act. Consequently the act of the sensitive appetite
depends not only on the appetitive power, but also on the disposition
of the body.
Now whatever part the power of the soul takes in the act, follows
apprehension. And the apprehension of the imagination, being a
particular apprehension, is regulated by the apprehension of reason,
which is universal; just as a particular active power is regulated by a
universal active power. Consequently in this respect the act of the
sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason. On the other
hand, condition or disposition of the body is not subject to the
command of reason: and consequently in this respect, the movement of
the sensitive appetite is hindered from being wholly subject to the
command of reason.
Moreover it happens sometimes that the movement of the sensitive
appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence of an apprehension of the
imagination of sense. And then such movement occurs without the command
of reason: although reason could have prevented it, had it foreseen.
Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2) that the reason governs the
irascible and concupiscible not by a "despotic supremacy," which is
that of a master over his slave; but by a "politic and royal
supremacy," whereby the free are governed, who are not wholly subject
to command.
Reply to Objection 1: That man lusts, although he wills not to lust, is
due to a disposition of the body, whereby the sensitive appetite is
hindered from perfect compliance with the command of reason. Hence the
Apostle adds (Rom. 7:15): "I see another law in my members, fighting
against the law of my mind. " This may also happen through a sudden
movement of concupiscence, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The condition of the body stands in a twofold
relation to the act of the sensitive appetite. First, as preceding it:
thus a man may be disposed in one way or another, in respect of his
body, to this or that passion. Secondly, as consequent to it: thus a
man becomes heated through anger. Now the condition that precedes, is
not subject to the command of reason: since it is due either to nature,
or to some previous movement, which cannot cease at once. But the
condition that is consequent, follows the command of reason: since it
results from the local movement of the heart, which has various
movements according to the various acts of the sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 3: Since the external sensible is necessary for the
apprehension of the senses, it is not in our power to apprehend
anything by the senses, unless the sensible be present; which presence
of the sensible is not always in our power. For it is then that man can
use his senses if he will so to do; unless there be some obstacle on
the part of the organ. On the other hand, the apprehension of the
imagination is subject to the ordering of reason, in proportion to the
strength or weakness of the imaginative power. For that man is unable
to imagine the things that reason considers, is either because they
cannot be imagined, such as incorporeal things; or because of the
weakness of the imaginative power, due to some organic indisposition.
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Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded?
Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of the vegetal soul are
subject to the command of reason. For the sensitive powers are of
higher rank than the vegetal powers. But the powers of the sensitive
soul are subject to the command of reason. Much more, therefore, are
the powers of the vegetal soul.
Objection 2: Further, man is called a "little world" [*Aristotle, Phys.
viii. 2], because the soul is in the body, as God is in the world. But
God is in the world in such a way, that everything in the world obeys
His command. Therefore all that is in man, even the powers of the
vegetal soul, obey the command of reason.
Objection 3: Further, praise and blame are awarded only to such acts as
are subject to the command of reason. But in the acts of the nutritive
and generative power, there is room for praise and blame, virtue and
vice: as in the case of gluttony and lust, and their contrary virtues.
Therefore the acts of these powers are subject to the command of
reason.
On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii. ] sats
that "the nutritive and generative power is one over which the reason
has no control. "
I answer that, Some acts proceed from the natural appetite, others from
the animal, or from the intellectual appetite: for every agent desires
an end in some way. Now the natural appetite does not follow from some
apprehension, as to the animal and the intellectual appetite. But the
reason commands by way of apprehensive power. Wherefore those acts that
proceed from the intellective or the animal appetite, can be commanded
by reason: but not those acts that proceed from the natural appetite.
And such are the acts of the vegetal soul; wherefore Gregory of Nyssa
(Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii) says "that generation and nutrition
belong to what are called natural powers. " Consequently the acts of the
vegetal soul are not subject to the command of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: The more immaterial an act is, the more noble it
is, and the more is it subject to the command of reason. Hence the very
fact that the acts of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, shows that
they rank lowest.
Reply to Objection 2: The comparison holds in a certain respect:
because, to wit, as God moves the world, so the soul moves the body.
But it does not hold in every respect: for the soul did not create the
body out of nothing, as God created the world; for which reason the
world is wholly subject to His command.
Reply to Objection 3: Virtue and vice, praise and blame do not affect
the acts themselves of the nutritive and generative power, i. e.
digestion, and formation of the human body; but they affect the acts of
the sensitive part, that are ordained to the acts of generation and
nutrition; for example the desire for pleasure in the act of taking
food or in the act of generation, and the right or wrong use thereof.
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Whether the acts of the external members are commanded?
Objection 1: It would seem that the members of the body do not obey
reason as to their acts. For it is evident that the members of the body
are more distant from the reason, than the powers of the vegetal soul.
But the powers of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, as stated above
[1133](A[8]). Therefore much less do the members of the body obey.
Objection 2: Further, the heart is the principle of animal movement.
But the movement of the heart is not subject to the command of reason:
for Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii. ] says that "the
pulse is not controlled by reason. " Therefore the movement of the
bodily members is not subject to the command of reason.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16) that "the
movement of the genital members is sometimes inopportune and not
desired; sometimes when sought it fails, and whereas the heart is warm
with desire, the body remains cold. " Therefore the movements of the
members are not obedient to reason.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): "The mind commands
a movement of the hand, and so ready is the hand to obey, that scarcely
can one discern obedience from command. "
I answer that, The members of the body are organs of the soul's powers.
Consequently according as the powers of the soul stand in respect of
obedience to reason, so do the members of the body stand in respect
thereof. Since then the sensitive powers are subject to the command of
reason, whereas the natural powers are not; therefore all movements of
members, that are moved by the sensitive powers, are subject to the
command of reason; whereas those movements of members, that arise from
the natural powers, are not subject to the command of reason.
