No More Learning

Papers, 1873, LXXV, 706).
· Fitzmaurice, op. cil. II, 409, 411.
3 Parl. Papers, 1874, Lxxvi, 176.
• Idem, 1878, Lxxx, 466.
5 Rawlinson, op. cit. p. 338; Parl. Papers, 1878, LXXX, 474, 475.
& Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 33.
: Dispatch to Salisbury, 18 September, 1876 (Parl. Papers, 1878, 'xxx, 537).
8 Derby to Loftus, 2 October, 1876 (idem, 534).
• Loftus to Derby, 15 November, 1876 (idem, 543; cf. 549).
19 Salisbury to Derby, 27 January, 1877 (idem, 553).
11 De Giers to Loftus, 5 March, 1877 (idem, 559).
1: Dispatch to Salisbury, 3 May, 1877 (idem, 565).
7


## p. 414 (#452) ############################################

414
CENTRAL ASIA, 1858–1918
1
>
1
>
Considerations of this kind, then, occasioned a reversal of the policy
hitherto followed by the British Government towards the amir. Till
1874 that policy had been one of general inaction, of subsidies, smooth
words, and an amiable acceptance of Russian assurances. The amir
had wanted a definite agreement. Not getting it, he had inclined
towards Russia, and listened, or at all events seemed to listen, to
Russian overtures, either with a serious purpose of seeking external
support from Tashkent or in the hope of alarming the Government of
India into conceding what he wanted, or perhaps in the hope of being
able to balance himself between the two greai states-a policy de-
manding greater dexterity and more accurate information than the
amir could command. But the new cabinet at London with dis-
concerting abruptness resolved upon action. It took the view which
Lord Dufferin expressed so pointedly a few years later. “It would be
manifestly futile”, he wrote, “to base the safety of the North-Western
Frontier of India upon any understanding, stipulation, convention
or treaty with the imperial government. For this view Dufferin
assigned a specific reason.
"I do not mean to imply”, he continued, “that the emperor and his ministers
would wilfully violate their engagements; but the authority of the Russian execu-
tive is so slight, the control it exercises over its distant agents and military chiefs
is so unsteady, and its policy is so designedly tentative, while the forces which
stimulate the aggressive instincts of the nation are so constant, that little reliance
could be ultimately placed upon mere verbal guarantees. ”
Salisbury resolved to seek additional security in two directions-
by occupying a more commanding position on the Afghan frontier
itself, and by inducing the amir to accept British agents within his
territories. The first measure had been eagerly advocated and bitterly
opposed for a long time. Jacob, Rawlinson, Green and Frere had all
urged the need of occupying Quetta, in order to establish a post on
the further side of the hills, control the road to Kandahar, and threaten
the flank of any invader seeking to move through the Khyber or
Kurram Passes. Against these opinions was all the weight of
Lawrence's influence, still strong on the council of the governor-
general and the Council of India. But times had changed and
Lawrence's arguments had come to seem far less unanswerable than
before the advance of Russia. Despite the prolonged visits of elderly
gentlemen who “positively stamped about the room”,? Salisbury
approved the occupation of Quetta under the treaty signed with the
Khan of Kalat at the close of 1876. 3 These negotiations with Kalat
had two objects, the first was military, as indicated above. The second
was political. If the amir altogether refused to accept English agents,
the Kalat mission might be “the father of the Central Asian Mission
1 Dufferin to Salisbury, 16 March, 1880 (F. 0. 65-1099).
Lady Gwendolen Cecil, Life of Salisbury, 11, 159.
3 Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 96 599.


## p. 415 (#453) ############################################

THE PROPOSED MISSION
415
>
a
of the future. The agent would reside. . . chiefly at Quetta. . . . He
would have leisure for collecting information from Candahar-Herat
-Cabul—and Balkh. . . . English rupees would try conclusions with
Russian roubles in the zenana and the divan". 1
In Salisbury's mind this political object was certainly the more
immediate matter. In Afghanistan the Government of India was
represented only by a Muslim agent who wrote (Salisbury thought)
exactly what the amir tells him”, and whose reports did not tally
with other reports received. ? The consequent uncertainty was much
more than a formal disadvantage. Early in 1875 the secretary of state
wrote to the governor-general, Northbrook, “It has the effect of
placing upon our frontier a thick covert, behind which any amount of
hostile intrigue and conspiracy may be masked. I agree with you in
thinking that a Russian advance upon India is a chimaera. But I am
by no means sure that an attempt to throw the Afghans upon us is so
improbable”. : He therefore directed measures to obtain the estab-
lishment of a British agent at Herat, where the amir had already
expressed his readiness to receive one.
This decision was at once criticised on the ground that Sher 'Ali
had never given any formal promise to this effect. But Salisbury did
not assert that he had, and Northbrook himself had to admit that the
amir had “appeared to consent" on condition of the agreement which
had been refused him at Simla. However, he pleaded that the
measure was needless, the time inopportune, and the probable con-
sequence war. ? Salisbury replied in a long and closely reasoned
dispatch. The undoubted conflict between the declared policy of the
Russian Government and the actual conduct of its frontier officials
made absolute the need of speedy and accurate information. “The
case is quite conceivable in which Her Majesty's Government may
be able, by early diplomatic action, to arrest proceedings on the
frontier which a few weeks, or even days later, will have passed beyond
the power even of the government of St Petersburg to control. ” His
orders were therefore to be carried into effect. 8 Northbrook resigned
rather than obey, and Lytton was then appointed governor-general.
He carried with him instructions to send a mission to the amir by way
of Quetta and Kandahar to obtain Sher 'Ali's assent to the establish-
ment of a permanent mission. In return the amir might be conceded
the terms which he had asked for in 1873. 8
After overcoming opposition within his council,10 Lytton broached
· Salisbury to Lytton, 22 August, 1876 (Lady G. Cecil, op. cit. 11, 74).
• Salisbury to Disraeli, 2 January, 1875 (idem, 11, 71).
• Salisbury to Northbrook, 19 February, 1875 (idem).
• Same to same, 22 January, 1875 (Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LVI, 502).
• Northbrook to Salisbury, 20 May, 1875 (Mallet, Northbrook, pp. 101 599. ).
• Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LVI, 503.
? Mallet, op. cit. p. 105.
& Dispatch to Government of India, 19 November, 1875 (Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LVI, 521).
• Dispatch to the governor-general, 28 February, 1876, and encl. (idem, 530).
10 Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 64 599.
.


## p. 416 (#454) ############################################

416
CENTRAL ASIA, 1858–1918
the reception of the special temporary mission to the amir. This was
declined, but an Afghan envoy was sent to discuss matters with the
British authorities at Peshawar. The negotiations, protracted by re-
ferences to Kabul, lasted from October, 1876, till March, 1877, and
ended in complete failure. " It has been usual to lay the blame for this
upon the policy of Salisbury, and no doubt Salisbury's policy was
foredoomed to failure. What Sher 'Ali would have conceded in 1873
he would not grant in 1876. But unless it is argued that British
influence in Afghanistan was worthless, greater blame attaches to
Argyll for throwing away the golden opportunity of 1873 than to
Salisbury for seeking to retrieve his predecessor's error. European
affairs were moving to a crisis. A continuation of the policy of
quiescence would permit Russia to strengthen her growing influence
over the amir and thereby greatly to increase her power of hampering
British foreign policy. European conditions required that Sher 'Ali
should make an open choice between British and Russian friendship,
for, if he was not a friend to Great Britain, he was a dangerous
potential enemy. “A tool in the hands of Russia”, Lytton said, “I will
never allow him to become. Such a tool it would be my duty to break
before it could be used. "'2
In Europe the Balkan troubles had given rise to a situation of
exceptional anxicty and strain. In 1875 a rebellion had broken out
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, leading in 1877 to the Russo-Turkish
War. These events intensified the antagonism of Anglo-Russian rela-
tions. For a year and more after the outbreak of the war a conflict
between the two great powers was by many thought inevitable. Both
sought every means within their reach to limit and control the action
of the other. On the one side the British occupied Quetta in 1877,
and on the other, as British hostility developed to the treaty of San
Stefano, and when Indian troops were dispatched to Malta, the
governor-general of Turkestan sought a specific alliance with the amir
of Afghanistan and initiated a military movement in the direction of
India. In the circumstances of the time nothing less could have been
expected. But the episode also indicated clearly what had been the
underlying motive of Russian policy in Central Asia for the previous
quarter of a century.
The Peshawar discussions had led nowhere. The main reason which
Sher 'Ali had alleged for refusing to receive an English mission had
been that acceptance would prevent his refusing to accept a Russian
mission. His argument proves how much ground had been lost by
1876, for it shows that he had come to regard the Russians and the
British as on an equal footing. He had not done so in 1873. Nor even
now did his answer expose the whole situation that had developed.
For the moment the British proposal was dropped. But relations with
Dispatch to Salisbury, 10 May, 1877 (Parl. Papers, 1878–9, LVI, 534).
Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 30.
a


## p. 417 (#455) ############################################

STOLIETOFF'S MISSION
417
a
Kaufmann grew ever closer. In June, 1878, they culminated in a
letter written by the Russian governor-general to the amir, informing
him that the external relations of Afghanistan required “deep con-
sideration”, and that he was sending a Russian officer-Stolietoff-
“to inform you of all that is hidden in my mind". 1 The envoy carried
”
with him a draft treaty offering terms very similar to those Lytton
had offered at Peshawar-recognition of the heir apparent and
assistance against any external enemy. In case these proposals
should be declined, Kaufmann entered into tentative discussions with
Abd-ur-rahn:an, Sher 'Ali's fugitive nephew. At the same time three
-
columns of troops marched from Tashkent in the direction of the
Afghan frontiers. The Government of India was well served by its
agents. On 9 June it had heard of Stolietoff's intended dispatch; on
the 24th it believed that he had set out. He had in fact left Tashkent
on 13 June—the day on which the Berlin Congress met. His approach
tested the sincerity of Sher 'Ali's excuses to Lytton. Instead of meeting
with any firm refusal, the mission found at the frontier half-hearted,
probably mere ostensible orders not to enter thu country. It ignored
them and arrived at Kabul on 22 July without a shadow of resistance.
On the 21st Stolietoff is said to have received a dispatch from Kauf-
mann, informing him of the settlement reached at Berlin and warning
him not to make any positive promises to the amir. The marching
columns had of course been recalled. .
The envoy's arrival and reception at Kabul raised in an acute form
the question of British relations with the amir. The case anticipated
by Dalhousie had arisen. ? Lytton sought and obtained the home
government's approval for his insisting on Sher 'Ali's acceptance of
an English mission. 8 The letter announcing that an envoy would be
sent arrived at Kabul on 17 August. Abdullah Jan, Sher 'Ali's heir
apparent, died the same day. This event offered a convenient pretext
for deferring an answer. But the letter was read in durbar; Stolietoff
urged the amir to delay matters and if necessary prevent the English
mission from reaching Kabul while he travelled to Tashkent to inform
Kaufmann, who would inform the emperor and thus compel Great
Britain to desist from her demands. ' On the 23rd Sher 'Ali wrote his
reply to Kaufmann, saying that Stolietoff had “reduced to writing
the verbal representations, the object of which was to strengthen the
friendly relations between the illustrious government of His Imperial
Majesty the Emperor and the God-granted government of Afghani-
stan”, and would soon return with the writer's replies. 10 On 21 Sep-
1 Kaufmann to Sher 'Ali, June, 1878 (Parl. Papers, 1881, xcvm, 350).
2 Idem, 351; cf. Roberts, Forty-one Years in India, 11, 248.
3 Abd-ur-rahman, op. cit. 1, 149.
* Parl. Papers, 1878, LXXXI, 584, 591.
5 Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 247. 6 Roberts, op. cit. II, 110.
? Vide p. 405, supra:
& Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LVI, 603.
• Roberts's report based on Yakub's information (Roberts, op. cit. 11, 469).
10 Parl. Papers, 1881, XCVIII, 350.
27
CHIVI


## p. 418 (#456) ############################################

418
CENTRAL ASIA, 1858–1918
» 2
3
tember Neville Chamberlain, the envoy whom Lytton had chosen, was
prevented by threats of violence from passing Ali Masjid. 1 Sher 'Ali
had accepted Stolietoff's advice and resolved to defy the Government
of India.
"The amir's policy”, Lytton wrote, “was to make fools of us in the sight of all
Central Asia and all India without affording us any pretext for active resentment,
My policy was naturally to force the amir either to change his policy or to reveal
it in such a manner as must make the public a partner with the government in the
duty of counteracting it. ” ?
Lytton has generally been represented as taking an over-serious
view of the situation. But the problem was twofold. It was not
merely that of a possible invasion of India. It also included the results
of a widespread belief in its likelihood. Salisbury might scout the
possibility, advise the use of large-scale maps, and point to the essential
weakness of Russia, but an invasion of India was “a common topic
of conversation in every assemblage of chiefs between Tabriz and
Peshawur”. 4 The fundamental weakness of past policy had been that
it had left Russia free to advance so that the day was visibly threatening
when the spheres of interest of the two empires would meet, not at a
convenient distance from, but actually on the Indian frontier. “It
may be very convenient", wrote Frere with great truth, “to say we
will be guided by circumstances; but that is not the sort of policy
which wins friends and deters enemies. "
In the dispatch of the mission Lytton had overrun the wishes of
Beaconsfield and Salisbury. Both were extremely anxious to see the
Russian forces withdrawn from Turkish territory, and feared lest a
sudden flare-up of Afghan difficulties might endanger the execution
of the Treaty of Berlin. They would have preferred to see the Afghan
trouble smoothed over or at all events put off for a twelvemonth; but
Beaconsfield's language and views seem to have varied from day to
day, with the result that the instructions sent to Lytton by the India
Office were not so clear and specific as was expected. It had been
desired that the mission to the amir should proceed not by the Khyber
Pass, where it was expected and likely to be stopped, but by way of
the Bolan and Kandahar where opposition would have been more
difficult and unlikely. ” But the choice of routes seems to have been
left to Lytton, who chose the more provocative. On 25 and 30 October
stormy meetings of the cabinet took place. Salisbury and the Lord
Chancellor severely attacked Lytton's conduct and urged the ex-
pediency of curbing his future proceedings. Cranbrook, the secretary
of state for India, strongly defended the governor-general. In the
interests of cabinet unity Beaconsfield proposed that Lytton should
• Forrest, Life of Sir Neville Chamberlain, pp. 479. 999;
: Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 285.
Cf. Lady G. Cecil, op. cit. 11, 128, 142.
• Frere, Letter to Durand, p. 44.
• Martineau, op. cit. 1, 239.
• Monypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli, vi, 380 599.
' Lady G. Cecil, op. cit. 11, 341.


## p. 419 (#457) ############################################

THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR
419
2
be authorised to occupy the Kurram valley, not as an act of war
but as the taking of a "material guarantee” for the granting of the
English demands. But when it seemed likely that this would be
adopted, Cranbrook refused to have anything to do with so half-
hearted a measure. At last Lytton's and Cranbrook's views prevailed. 1
On 2 November an ultimatum, expiring on the 20th, was dispatched
to Sher 'Ali. The amir had already applied to Kaufmann for assistance
in view of the threatening English attitude, which he rightly ascribed
to the arrival of the Russian mission. 2 Kaufmann advised Sher 'Ali
to make peace if he could. In fact the Russian agents had fallen into
the pit which they had dug for others. Reckoning too hopefully on
the approach of an Anglo-Russian war, they had led Sher 'Ali into
relying on their support, at the moment when they found themselves
unable to accord it. Lytton and Cranbrook were right in seizing this
precise moment to re-establish British ascendancy at Kabul, when
Sher 'Ali's hostility was manifest, when Russian intervention would
have involved tearing up the agreement reached so lately at Berlin,
and when Russian resources, financial and military, were depleted
by the recent war.
The campaign which began with the invasion of Afghan territory
on 20 November was skilfully conducted and speedily successful. *
Two columns advanced by the Kurram and the Khyber passes. On
22 December Sher 'Ali issued a farman in which, after recounting his
numerous triumphs over the invaders, he announced his retirement
into Russian territory. " He died early in 1879, and negotiations were
opened with his son' Yakub leading to the Treaty of Gandammak,
signed 26 May, 1879, before the British forces had entered Kabul.
By this agreement the new amir assigned the districts of Kurram,
Pishin and Sibi to the British Government; he agreed to conduct his
relations with foreign states in accordance with the advice of the
governor-general; and he agreed to accept a permanent British re-
presentative, who was to be stationed at Kabul. s Every object which
had been sought thus seemed to have been secured.
The doubtful point was whether Amir Yakub would succeed in
maintaining his position. Cavagnari, the political agent who had
conducted the negotiations, had not been much impressed by his
talent and character, reporting him as the best of his family, but fickle
of purpose, ignorant of business, and weak of mind. ' The estimate
was not unjust. Roberts noted his shifty eye, retreating forehead, and
lack of vigour. 10 His weakness had already been displayed. Lytton
Monypenny and Buckle, op. cit. VI, 386; Lady G. Cecil, op. cit. 11, 342.
: Parl. Papers, 1881, XCVII, 353.
• The best account is probably to be found in Roberts, op. cit. chaps. xlv 599.
• Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LVI, 702.
• Idem, 355.
• Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 313.
' Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LVI, 691.
• Parl. Papers, 1878-9, LVI, 691; Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 326 sqq.
• Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 322.
10 Roberts, op. cit. 11, 202.
.
27-2


## p. 420 (#458) ############################################

420
CENTRAL ASIA, 1858–1918
3
had strongly desired the establishment of a British mission, but had
contemplated its residence at Herat, not at Kabul. Yakub, however,
had himself proposed Kabul, willing to run any risk provided he
could secure the support of the British army. The proposal was
accepted with some misgivings. Cavagnari, resolute and forceful,
was named resident-an admirable man in a crisis, but less suited for
a position of delicacy. He reached Kabul on 24 July. He was well
received with an Afghan rendering of God save the Queen. On
3 September he was murdered in the course of a real or pretended
mutiny of unpaid troops. Roberts's opinion, probably correct, was
that Yakub intended a demonstration which should show his inability
to protect the mission and so obtain its withdrawal. * Events had
shown that Lytton had been unlucky in finding himself virtually
obliged to adopt Yakub as Sher 'Ali's successor, and unwise in
agreeing to the mission's being placed at Kabul and in selecting
Cavagnari as his agent there.
This misfortune led necessarily to a renewal of the campaign.
Roberts advanced by the Kurram Pass and occupied Kabul on
7 October. Yakub had joined him on the march, declaring that he
would rather be a grass-cutter with the English than attempt to rule
the Afghans. Roberts's swift movement disconcerted the tribesmen,
and though his cantonments were attacked, he had small difficulty
in holding his position through the following winter. Meanwhile the
political problem demanded solution. All agreed that Yakub should
not be restored. He was removed to India, pensioned, and resided at
Dehra Dun till his death in 1923. As no suitable candidate for the
amirat could be found, both Lytton and the home government inclined
to a policy of disintegration. The Foreign Office even began negotia-
tions with Teheran about the terms on which Persia might be suffered
to occupy. Herat, while a representative of the old Sadozai house,
Wali Sher 'Ali Khan, was recognised as sardar of Kandahar. ? Since
this arrangement, together with the occupation of the territory assigned
by Yakub, would secure the line of advance upon Herat whenever
necessary, and outflank any hostile advance from Kabul towards
India, it was thought that it did not greatly matter who held Kabul. 8
These tentative arrangements, however, were quickly brought to an
end by an unexpected and very fortunate development. Ever since
Sher 'Ali's establishment in power in 1868, his nephew, Abd-ur-
rahman, had been living under Russian protection, mainly at
Samarkand. He was now a man of forty-short and stoutly built,
with bluff but pleasant manners and an easy smile, self-possessed,
i Lady B. Balfour, ор. p. 336.
2 Forrest, op. cit. p. 494.
: Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 342 599.
• Roberts, op. cit. 11, 254; cf. Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 375-6.
• Roberts, op. cit. 11, 192 599. ; Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 361.
• Lady G. Cecil, op. cit. 11, 375.
? Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp. 376 sqq.
$ Cf. idem, p. 408.
cit.


## p. 421 (#459) ############################################

ABD-UR-RAHMAN
421
clear-minded. He looked the personification of watchful strength
moved by an inflexible will, and hadindeed inherited his grandfather's,
Dost Muhammad's, vigour, judgment and ferocity. In 1880, after
many discussions with the Russian governor-general, Abd-ur-rahman
obtained leave to return to Afghanistan, and set out from Tashkent
with a small party of men. Next day, as he was on the march, he
received, as he thought, a sign from God. As sometimes happens in
the Central Asian deserts,' he thought he heard a great cavalcade, to
the number of 20,000, draw level with him and gradually pass on
ahead. "By this I reasoned that God had cleared my way for me. "
Full of hope he entered Balkh, praying Allah either to overthrow the
English or to turn their hearts. As soon as Lytton heard of his
appearance, he had directed Lepel Griffin (the English political agent
at Kabul) to send him conciliatory messages, and, in spite of sus-
picions natural against one who had been long connected with
Russians, it was decided to enter into negotiations with him. But at
this stage matters were interrupted by the arrival (8 June, 1880) of
a new governor-general, Lord Ripon.
In the previous spring a general election, in the course of which
Radical speakers had made great play with Lytton's conduct of the
Afghán question, had replaced Beaconsfield by Gladstone as prime
minister, Cranbrook by Hartington at the India Office, and Salisbury
by Granville at the Foreign Office. Northbrook, who took the
Admiralty in the new cabinet, was violently opposed to the policy to
which he had been sacrificed and loudly insisted on the instant need
of surrendering every post on the further side of the hills and returning
to the old frontier line. Accordingly the evacuation of Sibi and Pishin
was promised in the queen's speech in the opening session of 1881. 6
But the zealots for retreat met with unexpected opposition from their
governor-general. Ripon had, indeed, gone out to India with a strong
bias against Lytton and all his works. He had on arrival ransacked
the records of the political department in the hope of finding schemes
that would have blasted for ever the reputations of Lytton and
Beaconsfield. ? But in fact he had taken over the negotiations with
Abd-ur-rahman at the point where Lytton had laid them down and
conducted them to the conclusion at which Lytton had already aimed.
Under his orders Griffin reached an understanding with Abd-ur-
rahman by which Pishin and Sibi were retained, and by which the new
amirplaced the management of his foreign relations under the Govern-
ment of India, in return for which the Indian Government promised
to pay the amir an annual subsidy. 8 Abd-ur-rahman had already
1 Cf. Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. p. 439; Sir Alfred Lyall, ap. Edinburgh Review, April, 1889;
Gray, At the Court of the Amir, p. 158.
· Cf. Marco Polo, Travels (ed. Yule and Cordier), 1, 197.
• Abd-ur-rahman, op. cit. 1, 155599.
• Idem, 1, 192, 194; Lady B. Balfour, op. cit. pp.