" But the virtue of
humility
is
opposed to pride.
opposed to pride.
Summa Theologica
Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not
always evil.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 10:28): "Fear ye not them that
kill the body," thus forbidding worldly fear. Now nothing but what is
evil is forbidden by God. Therefore worldly fear is evil.
I answer that, As shown above ([2460]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [2461]FS, Q[18],
A[1]; [2462]FS, Q[54], A[2]) moral acts and habits take their name and
species from their objects. Now the proper object of the appetite's
movement is the final good: so that, in consequence, every appetitive
movement is both specified and named from its proper end. For if anyone
were to describe covetousness as love of work because men work on
account of covetousness, this description would be incorrect, since the
covetous man seeks work not as end but as a means: the end that he
seeks is wealth, wherefore covetousness is rightly described as the
desire or the love of wealth, and this is evil. Accordingly worldly
love is, properly speaking, the love whereby a man trusts in the world
as his end, so that worldly love is always evil. Now fear is born of
love, since man fears the loss of what he loves, as Augustine states
(Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Now worldly fear is that which arises from
worldly love as from an evil root, for which reason worldly fear is
always evil.
Reply to Objection 1: One may have regard for men in two ways. First in
so far as there is in them something divine, for instance, the good of
grace or of virtue, or at least of the natural image of God: and in
this way those are blamed who have no regard for man. Secondly, one may
have regard for men as being in opposition to God, and thus it is
praiseworthy to have no regard for men, according as we read of Elias
or Eliseus (Ecclus. 48:13): "In his days he feared not the prince. "
Reply to Objection 2: When the secular power inflicts punishment in
order to withdraw men from sin, it is acting as God's minister,
according to Rom. 13:4, "For he is God's minister, an avenger to
execute wrath upon him that doth evil. " To fear the secular power in
this way is part, not of worldly fear, but of servile or initial fear.
Reply to Objection 3: It is natural for man to shrink from detriment to
his own body and loss of worldly goods, but to forsake justice on that
account is contrary to natural reason. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iii, 1) that there are certain things, viz. sinful deeds, which
no fear should drive us to do, since to do such things is worse than to
suffer any punishment whatever.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether servile fear is good?
Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is not good. For if the
use of a thing is evil, the thing itself is evil. Now the use of
servile fear is evil, for according to a gloss on Rom. 8:15, "if a man
do anything through fear, although the deed be good, it is not well
done. " Therefore servile fear is not good.
Objection 2: Further, no good grows from a sinful root. Now servile
fear grows from a sinful root, because when commenting on Job 3:11,
"Why did I not die in the womb? " Gregory says (Moral. iv, 25): "When a
man dreads the punishment which confronts him for his sin and no longer
loves the friendship of God which he has lost, his fear is born of
pride, not of humility. " Therefore servile fear is evil.
Objection 3: Further, just as mercenary love is opposed to the love of
charity, so is servile fear, apparently, opposed to chaste fear. But
mercenary love is always evil. Therefore servile fear is also.
On the contrary, Nothing evil is from the Holy Ghost. But servile fear
is from the Holy Ghost, since a gloss on Rom. 8:15, "You have not
received the spirit of bondage," etc. says: "It is the one same spirit
that bestows two fears, viz. servile and chaste fear. " Therefore
servile fear is not evil.
I answer that, It is owing to its servility that servile fear may be
evil. For servitude is opposed to freedom. Since, then, "what is free
is cause of itself" (Metaph. i, 2), a slave is one who does not act as
cause of his own action, but as though moved from without. Now whoever
does a thing through love, does it of himself so to speak, because it
is by his own inclination that he is moved to act: so that it is
contrary to the very notion of servility that one should act from love.
Consequently servile fear as such is contrary to charity: so that if
servility were essential to fear, servile fear would be evil simply,
even as adultery is evil simply, because that which makes it contrary
to charity belongs to its very species.
This servility, however, does not belong to the species of servile
fear, even as neither does lifelessness to the species of lifeless
faith. For the species of a moral habit or act is taken from the
object. Now the object of servile fear is punishment, and it is by
accident that, either the good to which the punishment is contrary, is
loved as the last end, and that consequently the punishment is feared
as the greatest evil, which is the case with one who is devoid of
charity, or that the punishment is directed to God as its end, and
that, consequently, it is not feared as the greatest evil, which is the
case with one who has charity. For the species of a habit is not
destroyed through its object or end being directed to a further end.
Consequently servile fear is substantially good, but is servility is
evil.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Augustine is to be applied to a
man who does something through servile fear as such, so that he loves
not justice, and fears nothing but the punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: Servile fear as to its substance is not born of
pride, but its servility is, inasmuch as man is unwilling, by love, to
subject his affections to the yoke of justice.
Reply to Objection 3: Mercenary love is that whereby God is loved for
the sake of worldly goods, and this is, of itself, contrary to charity,
so that mercenary love is always evil. But servile fear, as to its
substance, implies merely fear of punishment, whether or not this be
feared as the principal evil.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether servile fear is substantially the same as filial fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is substantially the same
as filial fear. For filial fear is to servile fear the same apparently
as living faith is to lifeless faith, since the one is accompanied by
mortal sin and the other not. Now living faith and lifeless faith are
substantially the same. Therefore servile and filial fear are
substantially the same.
Objection 2: Further, habits are diversified by their objects. Now the
same thing is the object of servile and of filial fear, since they both
fear God. Therefore servile and filial fear are substantially the same.
Objection 3: Further, just as man hopes to enjoy God and to obtain
favors from Him, so does he fear to be separated from God and to be
punished by Him. Now it is the same hope whereby we hope to enjoy God,
and to receive other favors from Him, as stated above ([2463]Q[17],
A[2], ad 2). Therefore filial fear, whereby we fear separation from
God, is the same as servile fear whereby we fear His punishments.
On the contrary, Augustine (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) says that
there are two fears, one servile, another filial or chaste fear.
I answer that, The proper object of fear is evil. And since acts and
habits are diversified by their objects, as shown above ([2464]FS,
Q[54], A[2] ), it follows of necessity that different kinds of fear
correspond to different kinds of evil.
Now the evil of punishment, from which servile fear shrinks, differs
specifically from evil of fault, which filial fear shuns, as shown
above [2465](A[2]). Hence it is evident that servile and filial fear
are not the same substantially but differ specifically.
Reply to Objection 1: Living and lifeless faith differ, not as regards
the object, since each of them believes God and believes in a God, but
in respect of something extrinsic, viz. the presence or absence of
charity, and so they do not differ substantially. On the other hand,
servile and filial fear differ as to their objects: and hence the
comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: Servile fear and filial fear do not regard God in
the same light. For servile fear looks upon God as the cause of the
infliction of punishment, whereas filial fear looks upon Him, not as
the active cause of guilt, but rather as the term wherefrom it shrinks
to be separated by guilt. Consequently the identity of object, viz.
God, does not prove a specific identity of fear, since also natural
movements differ specifically according to their different
relationships to some one term, for movement from whiteness is not
specifically the same as movement towards whiteness.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope looks upon God as the principle not only of
the enjoyment of God, but also of any other favor whatever. This cannot
be said of fear; and so there is no comparison.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether servile fear remains with charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear does not remain with
charity. For Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) that
"when charity takes up its abode, it drives away fear which had
prepared a place for it. "
Objection 2: Further, "The charity of God is poured forth in our
hearts, by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5). Now "where
the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17). Since then
freedom excludes servitude, it seems that servile fear is driven away
when charity comes.
Objection 3: Further, servile fear is caused by self-love, in so far as
punishment diminishes one's own good. Now love of God drives away
self-love, for it makes us despise ourselves: thus Augustine testifies
(De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that "the love of God unto the contempt of self
builds up the city of God. " Therefore it seems that servile fear is
driven out when charity comes.
On the contrary, Servile fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as stated
above [2466](A[4]). Now the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not forfeited
through the advent of charity, whereby the Holy Ghost dwells in us.
Therefore servile fear is not driven out when charity comes.
I answer that, Servile fear proceeds from self-love, because it is fear
of punishment which is detrimental to one's own good. Hence the fear of
punishment is consistent with charity, in the same way as self-love is:
because it comes to the same that a man love his own good and that he
fear to be deprived of it.
Now self-love may stand in a threefold relationship to charity. In one
way it is contrary to charity, when a man places his end in the love of
his own good. In another way it is included in charity, when a man
loves himself for the sake of God and in God. In a third way, it is
indeed distinct from charity, but is not contrary thereto, as when a
man loves himself from the point of view of his own good, yet not so as
to place his end in this his own good: even as one may have another
special love for one's neighbor, besides the love of charity which is
founded on God, when we love him by reason of usefulness,
consanguinity, or some other human consideration, which, however, is
referable to charity.
Accordingly fear of punishment is, in one way, included in charity,
because separation from God is a punishment, which charity shuns
exceedingly; so that this belongs to chaste fear. In another way, it is
contrary to charity, when a man shrinks from the punishment that is
opposed to his natural good, as being the principal evil in opposition
to the good which he loves as an end; and in this way fear of
punishment is not consistent with charity. In another way fear of
punishment is indeed substantially distinct from chaste fear, when, to
wit, a man fears a penal evil, not because it separates him from God,
but because it is hurtful to his own good, and yet he does not place
his end in this good, so that neither does he dread this evil as being
the principal evil. Such fear of punishment is consistent with charity;
but it is not called servile, except when punishment is dreaded as a
principal evil, as explained above ([2467]AA[2],4). Hence fear
considered as servile, does not remain with charity, but the substance
of servile fear can remain with charity, even as self-love can remain
with charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of fear considered as
servile: and such is the sense of the two other objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.
For the beginning of a thing is a part thereof. But fear is not a part
of wisdom, since fear is seated in the appetitive faculty, while wisdom
is in the intellect. Therefore it seems that fear is not the beginning
of wisdom.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is the beginning of itself. "Now fear of
the Lord, that is wisdom," according to Job 28:28. Therefore it seems
that fear of God is not the beginning of wisdom.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is prior to the beginning. But something
is prior to fear, since faith precedes fear. Therefore it seems that
fear is not the beginning of wisdom.
On the contrary, It is written in the Ps. 110:10: "The fear of the Lord
is the beginning of wisdom. "
I answer that, A thing may be called the beginning of wisdom in two
ways: in one way because it is the beginning of wisdom itself as to its
essence; in another way, as to its effect. Thus the beginning of an art
as to its essence consists in the principles from which that art
proceeds, while the beginning of an art as to its effect is that
wherefrom it begins to operate: for instance we might say that the
beginning of the art of building is the foundation because that is
where the builder begins his work.
Now, since wisdom is the knowledge of Divine things, as we shall state
further on ([2468]Q[45], A[1]), it is considered by us in one way, and
in another way by philosophers. For, seeing that our life is ordained
to the enjoyment of God, and is directed thereto according to a
participation of the Divine Nature, conferred on us through grace,
wisdom, as we look at it, is considered not only as being cognizant of
God, as it is with the philosophers, but also as directing human
conduct; since this is directed not only by the human law, but also by
the Divine law, as Augustine shows (De Trin. xii, 14). Accordingly the
beginning of wisdom as to its essence consists in the first principles
of wisdom, i. e. the articles of faith, and in this sense faith is said
to be the beginning of wisdom. But as regards the effect, the beginning
of wisdom is the point where wisdom begins to work, and in this way
fear is the beginning of wisdom, yet servile fear in one way, and
filial fear, in another. For servile fear is like a principle disposing
a man to wisdom from without, in so far as he refrains from sin through
fear of punishment, and is thus fashioned for the effect of wisdom,
according to Ecclus. 1:27, "The fear of the Lord driveth out sin. " On
the other hand, chaste or filial fear is the beginning of wisdom, as
being the first effect of wisdom. For since the regulation of human
conduct by the Divine law belongs to wisdom, in order to make a
beginning, man must first of all fear God and submit himself to Him:
for the result will be that in all things he will be ruled by God.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that fear is not the
beginning of wisdom as to the essence of wisdom.
Reply to Objection 2: The fear of God is compared to a man's whole life
that is ruled by God's wisdom, as the root to the tree: hence it is
written (Ecclus. 1:25): "The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, for
[Vulg. : 'and'] the branches thereof are longlived. " Consequently, as
the root is said to be virtually the tree, so the fear of God is said
to be wisdom.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, faith is the beginning of wisdom
in one way, and fear, in another. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 25:16):
"The fear of God is the beginning of love: and the beginning of faith
is to be fast joined to it. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether initial fear differs substantially from filial fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that initial fear differs substantially from
filial fear. For filial fear is caused by love. Now initial fear is the
beginning of love, according to Ecclus. 25:16, "The fear of God is the
beginning of love. " Therefore initial fear is distinct from filial
fear.
Objection 2: Further, initial fear dreads punishment, which is the
object of servile fear, so that initial and servile fear would seem to
be the same. But servile fear is distinct from filial fear. Therefore
initial fear also is substantially distinct from initial fear.
Objection 3: Further, a mean differs in the same ratio from both the
extremes. Now initial fear is the mean between servile and filial fear.
Therefore it differs from both filial and servile fear.
On the contrary, Perfect and imperfect do not diversify the substance
of a thing. Now initial and filial fear differ in respect of perfection
and imperfection of charity, as Augustine states (In prim. canon. Joan.
Tract. ix). Therefore initial fear does not differ substantially from
filial fear.
I answer that, Initial fear is so called because it is a beginning
[initium]. Since, however, both servile and filial fear are, in some
way, the beginning of wisdom, each may be called in some way, initial.
It is not in this sense, however, that we are to understand initial
fear in so far as it is distinct from servile and filial fear, but in
the sense according to which it belongs to the state of beginners, in
whom there is a beginning of filial fear resulting from a beginning of
charity, although they do not possess the perfection of filial fear,
because they have not yet attained to the perfection of charity.
Consequently initial fear stands in the same relation to filial fear as
imperfect to perfect charity. Now perfect and imperfect charity differ,
not as to essence but as to state. Therefore we must conclude that
initial fear, as we understand it here, does not differ essentially
from filial fear.
Reply to Objection 1: The fear which is a beginning of love is servile
fear, which is the herald of charity, just as the bristle introduces
the thread, as Augustine states (Tract. ix in Ep. i Joan. ). Or else, if
it be referred to initial fear, this is said to be the beginning of
love, not absolutely, but relatively to the state of perfect charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Initial fear does not dread punishment as its
proper object, but as having something of servile fear connected with
it: for this servile fear, as to its substance, remains indeed, with
charity, its servility being cast aside; whereas its act remains with
imperfect charity in the man who is moved to perform good actions not
only through love of justice, but also through fear of punishment,
though this same act ceases in the man who has perfect charity, which
"casteth out fear," according to 1 Jn. 4:18.
Reply to Objection 3: Initial fear is a mean between servile and filial
fear, not as between two things of the same genus, but as the imperfect
is a mean between a perfect being and a non-being, as stated in Metaph.
ii, for it is the same substantially as the perfect being, while it
differs altogether from non-being.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
For no gift of the Holy Ghost is opposed to a virtue, which is also
from the Holy Ghost; else the Holy Ghost would be in opposition to
Himself. Now fear is opposed to hope, which is a virtue. Therefore fear
is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, it is proper to a theological virtue to have God
for its object. But fear has God for its object, in so far as God is
feared. Therefore fear is not a gift, but a theological virtue.
Objection 3: Further, fear arises from love. But love is reckoned a
theological virtue. Therefore fear also is a theological virtue, being
connected with the same matter, as it were.
Objection 4: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "fear is
bestowed as a remedy against pride.
" But the virtue of humility is
opposed to pride. Therefore again, fear is a kind of virtue.
Objection 5: Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues,
since they are bestowed in support of the virtues as Gregory says
(Moral. ii, 49). Now hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards
good, while fear regards evil. Since, then, hope is a virtue, it should
not be said that fear is a gift.
On the contrary, The fear of the Lord is numbered among the seven gifts
of the Holy Ghost (Is. 11:3).
I answer that, Fear is of several kinds, as stated above [2469](A[2]).
Now it is not "human fear," according to Augustine (De Gratia et Lib.
Arb. xviii), "that is a gift of God"---for it was by this fear that
Peter denied Christ---but that fear of which it was said (Mat. 10:28):
"Fear Him that can destroy both soul and body into hell. "
Again servile fear is not to be reckoned among the seven gifts of the
Holy Ghost, though it is from Him, because according to Augustine (De
Nat. et Grat. lvii) it is compatible with the will to sin: whereas the
gifts of the Holy Ghost are incompatible with the will to sin, as they
are inseparable from charity, as stated above ([2470]FS, Q[68], A[5]).
It follows, therefore, that the fear of God, which is numbered among
the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, is filial or chaste fear. For it was
stated above ([2471]FS, Q[68], AA[1],3) that the gifts of the Holy
Ghost are certain habitual perfections of the soul's powers, whereby
these are rendered amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost, just as,
by the moral virtues, the appetitive powers are rendered amenable to
the motion of reason. Now for a thing to be amenable to the motion of a
certain mover, the first condition required is that it be a
non-resistant subject of that mover, because resistance of the movable
subject to the mover hinders the movement. This is what filial or
chaste fear does, since thereby we revere God and avoid separating
ourselves from Him. Hence, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in
Monte i, 4) filial fear holds the first place, as it were, among the
gifts of the Holy Ghost, in the ascending order, and the last place, in
the descending order.
Reply to Objection 1: Filial fear is not opposed to the virtue of hope:
since thereby we fear, not that we may fail of what we hope to obtain
by God's help, but lest we withdraw ourselves from this help. Wherefore
filial fear and hope cling together, and perfect one another.
Reply to Objection 2: The proper and principal object of fear is the
evil shunned, and in this way, as stated above [2472](A[1]), God cannot
be an object of fear. Yet He is, in this way, the object of hope and
the other theological virtues, since, by the virtue of hope, we trust
in God's help, not only to obtain any other goods, but, chiefly, to
obtain God Himself, as the principal good. The same evidently applies
to the other theological virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: From the fact that love is the origin of fear, it
does not follow that the fear of God is not a distinct habit from
charity which is the love of God, since love is the origin of all the
emotions, and yet we are perfected by different habits in respect of
different emotions. Yet love is more of a virtue than fear is, because
love regards good, to which virtue is principally directed by reason of
its own nature, as was shown above ([2473]FS, Q[55], AA[3],4); for
which reason hope is also reckoned as a virtue; whereas fear
principally regards evil, the avoidance of which it denotes, wherefore
it is something less than a theological virtue.
Reply to Objection 4: According to Ecclus. 10:14, "the beginning of the
pride of man is to fall off from God," that is to refuse submission to
God, and this is opposed to filial fear, which reveres God. Thus fear
cuts off the source of pride for which reason it is bestowed as a
remedy against pride. Yet it does not follow that it is the same as the
virtue of humility, but that it is its origin. For the gifts of the
Holy Ghost are the origin of the intellectual and moral virtues, as
stated above ([2474]FS, Q[68], A[4]), while the theological virtues are
the origin of the gifts, as stated above ([2475]FS, Q[69], A[4], ad 3).
This suffices for the Reply to the Fifth Objection.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fear decreases when charity increases?
Objection 1: It seems that fear decreases when charity increases. For
Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix): "The more charity
increases, the more fear decreases. "
Objection 2: Further, fear decreases when hope increases. But charity
increases when hope increases, as stated above ([2476]Q[17], A[8]).
Therefore fear decreases when charity increases.
Objection 3: Further, love implies union, whereas fear implies
separation. Now separation decreases when union increases. Therefore
fear decreases when the love of charity increases.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that "the fear of
God not only begins but also perfects wisdom, whereby we love God above
all things, and our neighbor as ourselves. "
I answer that, Fear is twofold, as stated above ([2477]AA[2],4); one is
filial fear, whereby a son fears to offend his father or to be
separated from him; the other is servile fear, whereby one fears
punishment.
Now filial fear must needs increase when charity increases, even as an
effect increases with the increase of its cause. For the more one loves
a man, the more one fears to offend him and to be separated from him.
On the other hand servile fear, as regards its servility, is entirely
cast out when charity comes, although the fear of punishment remains as
to its substance, as stated above [2478](A[6]). This fear decreases as
charity increases, chiefly as regards its act, since the more a man
loves God, the less he fears punishment; first, because he thinks less
of his own good, to which punishment is opposed; secondly, because, the
faster he clings, the more confident he is of the reward, and,
consequently the less fearful of punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine speaks there of the fear of punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: It is fear of punishment that decreases when hope
increases; but with the increase of the latter filial fear increases,
because the more certainly a man expects to obtain a good by another's
help, the more he fears to offend him or to be separated from him.
Reply to Objection 3: Filial fear does not imply separation from God,
but submission to Him, and shuns separation from that submission. Yet,
in a way, it implies separation, in the point of not presuming to equal
oneself to Him, and of submitting to Him, which separation is to be
observed even in charity, in so far as a man loves God more than
himself and more than aught else. Hence the increase of the love of
charity implies not a decrease but an increase in the reverence of
fear.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fear remains in heaven?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear does not remain in heaven. For it
is written (Prov. 1:33): "He . . . shall enjoy abundance, without fear
of evils," which is to be understood as referring to those who already
enjoy wisdom in everlasting happiness. Now every fear is about some
evil, since evil is the object of fear, as stated above ([2479]AA[2],5;
[2480]FS, Q[42], A[1]). Therefore there will be no fear in heaven.
Objection 2: Further, in heaven men will be conformed to God, according
to 1 Jn. 3:2, "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him. " But God
fears nothing. Therefore, in heaven, men will have no fear.
Objection 3: Further, hope is more perfect than fear, since hope
regards good, and fear, evil. Now hope will not be in heaven. Therefore
neither will there be fear in heaven.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:10): "The fear of the Lord is
holy, enduring for ever and ever. "
I answer that, Servile fear, or fear of punishment, will by no means be
in heaven, since such a fear is excluded by the security which is
essential to everlasting happiness, as stated above ([2481]FS, Q[5],
A[4]).
But regard to filial fear, as it increases with the increase of
charity, so is it perfected when charity is made perfect; hence, in
heaven, it will not have quite the same act as it has now.
In order to make this clear, we must observe that the proper object of
fear is a possible evil, just as the proper object of hope is a
possible good: and since the movement of fear is like one of avoidance,
fear implies avoidance of a possible arduous evil, for little evils
inspire no fear. Now as a thing's good consists in its staying in its
own order, so a thing's evil consists in forsaking its order. Again,
the order of a rational creature is that it should be under God and
above other creatures. Hence, just as it is an evil for a rational
creature to submit, by love, to a lower creature, so too is it an evil
for it, if it submit not to God, by presumptuously revolt against Him
or contemn Him. Now this evil is possible to a rational creature
considered as to its nature on account of the natural flexibility of
the free-will; whereas in the blessed, it becomes impossible, by reason
of the perfection of glory. Therefore the avoidance of this evil that
consists in non-subjection to God, and is possible to nature, but
impossible in the state of bliss, will be in heaven; while in this life
there is avoidance of this evil as of something altogether possible.
Hence Gregory, expounding the words of Job (26:11), "The pillars of
heaven tremble, and dread at His beck," says (Moral. xvii, 29): "The
heavenly powers that gaze on Him without ceasing, tremble while
contemplating: but their awe, lest it should be of a penal nature, is
one not of fear but of wonder," because, to wit, they wonder at God's
supereminence and incomprehensibility. Augustine also (De Civ. Dei xiv,
9) in this sense, admits fear in heaven, although he leaves the
question doubtful. "If," he says, "this chaste fear that endureth for
ever and ever is to be in the future life, it will not be a fear that
is afraid of an evil which might possibly occur, but a fear that holds
fast to a good which we cannot lose. For when we love the good which we
have acquired, with an unchangeable love, without doubt, if it is
allowable to say so, our fear is sure of avoiding evil. Because chaste
fear denotes a will that cannot consent to sin, and whereby we avoid
sin without trembling lest, in our weakness, we fall, and possess
ourselves in the tranquillity born of charity. Else, if no kind of fear
is possible there, perhaps fear is said to endure for ever and ever,
because that which fear will lead us to, will be everlasting. "
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted excludes from the blessed, the
fear that denotes solicitude, and anxiety about evil, but not the fear
which is accompanied by security.
Reply to Objection 2: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix) "the same things
are both like and unlike God. They are like by reason of a variable
imitation of the Inimitable"---that is, because, so far as they can,
they imitate God Who cannot be imitated perfectly---"they are unlike
because they are the effects of a Cause of Whom they fall short
infinitely and immeasurably. " Hence, if there be no fear in God (since
there is none above Him to whom He may be subject) it does not follow
that there is none in the blessed, whose happiness consists in perfect
subjection to God.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope implies a certain defect, namely the
futurity of happiness, which ceases when happiness is present: whereas
fear implies a natural defect in a creature, in so far as it is
infinitely distant from God, and this defect will remain even in
heaven. Hence fear will not be cast out altogether.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether poverty of spirit is the beatitude corresponding to the gift of
fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that poverty of spirit is not the beatitude
corresponding to the gift of fear. For fear is the beginning of the
spiritual life, as explained above [2482](A[7]): whereas poverty
belongs to the perfection of the spiritual life, according to Mat.
19:21, "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and give to
the poor. " Therefore poverty of spirit does not correspond to the gift
of fear.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ps. 118:120): "Pierce Thou my
flesh with Thy fear," whence it seems to follow that it belongs to fear
to restrain the flesh. But the curbing of the flesh seems to belong
rather to the beatitude of mourning. Therefore the beatitude of
mourning corresponds to the gift of fear, rather than the beatitude of
poverty.
Objection 3: Further, the gift of fear corresponds to the virtue of
hope, as stated above (A[9], ad 1). Now the last beatitude which is,
"Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of
God," seems above all to correspond to hope, because according to Rom.
5:2, "we . . . glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God. "
Therefore that beatitude corresponds to the gift of fear, rather than
poverty of spirit.
Objection 4: Further, it was stated above ([2483]FS, Q[70], A[2]) that
the fruits correspond to the beatitudes. Now none of the fruits
correspond to the gift of fear. Neither, therefore, does any of the
beatitudes.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "The
fear of the Lord is befitting the humble of whom it is said: Blessed
are the poor in spirit. "
I answer that, Poverty of spirit properly corresponds to fear. Because,
since it belongs to filial fear to show reverence and submission to
God, whatever results from this submission belongs to the gift of fear.
Now from the very fact that a man submits to God, it follows that he
ceases to seek greatness either in himself or in another but seeks it
only in God. For that would be inconsistent with perfect subjection to
God, wherefore it is written (Ps. 19:8): "Some trust in chariots and
some in horses; but we will call upon the name of . . . our God. " It
follows that if a man fear God perfectly, he does not, by pride, seek
greatness either in himself or in external goods, viz. honors and
riches. In either case, this proceeds from poverty of spirit, in so far
as the latter denotes either the voiding of a puffed up and proud
spirit, according to Augustine's interpretation (De Serm. Dom. in Monte
i, 4), or the renunciation of worldly goods which is done in spirit,
i. e. by one's own will, through the instigation of the Holy Spirit,
according to the expounding of Ambrose on Lk. 6:20 and Jerome on Mat.
5:3.
Reply to Objection 1: Since a beatitude is an act of perfect virtue,
all the beatitudes belong to the perfection of spiritual life. And this
perfection seems to require that whoever would strive to obtain a
perfect share of spiritual goods, needs to begin by despising earthly
goods, wherefore fear holds the first place among the gifts.
Perfection, however, does not consist in the renunciation itself of
temporal goods; since this is the way to perfection: whereas filial
fear, to which the beatitude of poverty corresponds, is consistent with
the perfection of wisdom, as stated above ([2484]AA[7],10).
Reply to Objection 2: The undue exaltation of man either in himself or
in another is more directly opposed to that submission to God which is
the result of filial fear, than is external pleasure. Yet this is, in
consequence, opposed to fear, since whoever fears God and is subject to
Him, takes no delight in things other than God. Nevertheless, pleasure
is not concerned, as exaltation is, with the arduous character of a
thing which fear regards: and so the beatitude of poverty corresponds
to fear directly, and the beatitude of mourning, consequently.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope denotes a movement by way of a relation of
tendency to a term, whereas fear implies movement by way of a relation
of withdrawal from a term: wherefore the last beatitude which is the
term of spiritual perfection, fittingly corresponds to hope, by way of
ultimate object; while the first beatitude, which implies withdrawal
from external things which hinder submission to God, fittingly
corresponds to fear.
Reply to Objection 4: As regards the fruits, it seems that those things
correspond to the gift of fear, which pertain to the moderate use of
temporal things or to abstinence therefrom; such are modesty,
continency and chastity.
__________________________________________________________________
OF DESPAIR (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the contrary vices; (1) despair; (2) presumption.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether despair is a sin?
(2) Whether it can be without unbelief?
(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?
(4) Whether it arises from sloth?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether despair is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that despair is not a sin. For every sin
includes conversion to a mutable good, together with aversion from the
immutable good, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). But despair
includes no conversion to a mutable good. Therefore it is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, that which grows from a good root, seems to be no
sin, because "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Mat. 7:18).
Now despair seems to grow from a good root, viz. fear of God, or from
horror at the greatness of one's own sins. Therefore despair is not a
sin.
Objection 3: Further, if despair were a sin, it would be a sin also for
the damned to despair. But this is not imputed to them as their fault
but as part of their damnation. Therefore neither is it imputed to
wayfarers as their fault, so that it is not a sin.
On the contrary, That which leads men to sin, seems not only to be a
sin itself, but a source of sins. Now such is despair, for the Apostle
says of certain men (Eph. 4:19): "Who, despairing, have given
themselves up to lasciviousness, unto the working of all uncleanness
and [Vulg. : 'unto'] covetousness. " Therefore despair is not only a sin
but also the origin of other sins.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2) affirmation
and negation in the intellect correspond to search and avoidance in the
appetite; while truth and falsehood in the intellect correspond to good
and evil in the appetite. Consequently every appetitive movement which
is conformed to a true intellect, is good in itself, while every
appetitive movement which is conformed to a false intellect is evil in
itself and sinful. Now the true opinion of the intellect about God is
that from Him comes salvation to mankind, and pardon to sinners,
according to Ezech. 18:23, "I desire not the death of the sinner, but
that he should be converted, and live" [*Vulg. : 'Is it My will that a
sinner should die . . . and not that he should be converted and live? '
Cf. Ezech. 33:11]: while it is a false opinion that He refuses pardon
to the repentant sinner, or that He does not turn sinners to Himself by
sanctifying grace. Therefore, just as the movement of hope, which is in
conformity with the true opinion, is praiseworthy and virtuous, so the
contrary movement of despair, which is in conformity with the false
opinion about God, is vicious and sinful.
Reply to Objection 1: In every mortal sin there is, in some way,
aversion from the immutable good, and conversion to a mutable good, but
not always in the same way. Because, since the theological virtues have
God for their object, the sins which are contrary to them, such as
hatred of God, despair and unbelief, consist principally in aversion
from the immutable good; but, consequently, they imply conversion to a
mutable good, in so far as the soul that is a deserter from God, must
necessarily turn to other things. Other sins, however, consist
principally in conversion to a mutable good, and, consequently, in
aversion from the immutable good: because the fornicator intends, not
to depart from God, but to enjoy carnal pleasure, the result of which
is that he departs from God.
Reply to Objection 2: A thing may grow from a virtuous root in two
ways: first, directly and on the part of the virtue itself; even as an
act proceeds from a habit: and in this way no sin can grow from a
virtuous root, for in this sense Augustine declared (De Lib. Arb. ii,
18,19) that "no man makes evil use of virtue. " Secondly, a thing
proceeds from a virtue indirectly, or is occasioned by a virtue, and in
this way nothing hinders a sin proceeding from a virtue: thus sometimes
men pride themselves of their virtues, according to Augustine (Ep.
ccxi): "Pride lies in wait for good works that they may die. " In this
way fear of God or horror of one's own sins may lead to despair, in so
far as man makes evil use of those good things, by allowing them to be
an occasion of despair.
Reply to Objection 3: The damned are outside the pale of hope on
account of the impossibility of returning to happiness: hence it is not
imputed to them that they hope not, but it is a part of their
damnation. Even so, it would be no sin for a wayfarer to despair of
obtaining that which he had no natural capacity for obtaining, or which
was not due to be obtained by him; for instance, if a physician were to
despair of healing some sick man, or if anyone were to despair of ever
becoming rich.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there can be despair without unbelief?
always evil.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 10:28): "Fear ye not them that
kill the body," thus forbidding worldly fear. Now nothing but what is
evil is forbidden by God. Therefore worldly fear is evil.
I answer that, As shown above ([2460]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [2461]FS, Q[18],
A[1]; [2462]FS, Q[54], A[2]) moral acts and habits take their name and
species from their objects. Now the proper object of the appetite's
movement is the final good: so that, in consequence, every appetitive
movement is both specified and named from its proper end. For if anyone
were to describe covetousness as love of work because men work on
account of covetousness, this description would be incorrect, since the
covetous man seeks work not as end but as a means: the end that he
seeks is wealth, wherefore covetousness is rightly described as the
desire or the love of wealth, and this is evil. Accordingly worldly
love is, properly speaking, the love whereby a man trusts in the world
as his end, so that worldly love is always evil. Now fear is born of
love, since man fears the loss of what he loves, as Augustine states
(Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Now worldly fear is that which arises from
worldly love as from an evil root, for which reason worldly fear is
always evil.
Reply to Objection 1: One may have regard for men in two ways. First in
so far as there is in them something divine, for instance, the good of
grace or of virtue, or at least of the natural image of God: and in
this way those are blamed who have no regard for man. Secondly, one may
have regard for men as being in opposition to God, and thus it is
praiseworthy to have no regard for men, according as we read of Elias
or Eliseus (Ecclus. 48:13): "In his days he feared not the prince. "
Reply to Objection 2: When the secular power inflicts punishment in
order to withdraw men from sin, it is acting as God's minister,
according to Rom. 13:4, "For he is God's minister, an avenger to
execute wrath upon him that doth evil. " To fear the secular power in
this way is part, not of worldly fear, but of servile or initial fear.
Reply to Objection 3: It is natural for man to shrink from detriment to
his own body and loss of worldly goods, but to forsake justice on that
account is contrary to natural reason. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iii, 1) that there are certain things, viz. sinful deeds, which
no fear should drive us to do, since to do such things is worse than to
suffer any punishment whatever.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether servile fear is good?
Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is not good. For if the
use of a thing is evil, the thing itself is evil. Now the use of
servile fear is evil, for according to a gloss on Rom. 8:15, "if a man
do anything through fear, although the deed be good, it is not well
done. " Therefore servile fear is not good.
Objection 2: Further, no good grows from a sinful root. Now servile
fear grows from a sinful root, because when commenting on Job 3:11,
"Why did I not die in the womb? " Gregory says (Moral. iv, 25): "When a
man dreads the punishment which confronts him for his sin and no longer
loves the friendship of God which he has lost, his fear is born of
pride, not of humility. " Therefore servile fear is evil.
Objection 3: Further, just as mercenary love is opposed to the love of
charity, so is servile fear, apparently, opposed to chaste fear. But
mercenary love is always evil. Therefore servile fear is also.
On the contrary, Nothing evil is from the Holy Ghost. But servile fear
is from the Holy Ghost, since a gloss on Rom. 8:15, "You have not
received the spirit of bondage," etc. says: "It is the one same spirit
that bestows two fears, viz. servile and chaste fear. " Therefore
servile fear is not evil.
I answer that, It is owing to its servility that servile fear may be
evil. For servitude is opposed to freedom. Since, then, "what is free
is cause of itself" (Metaph. i, 2), a slave is one who does not act as
cause of his own action, but as though moved from without. Now whoever
does a thing through love, does it of himself so to speak, because it
is by his own inclination that he is moved to act: so that it is
contrary to the very notion of servility that one should act from love.
Consequently servile fear as such is contrary to charity: so that if
servility were essential to fear, servile fear would be evil simply,
even as adultery is evil simply, because that which makes it contrary
to charity belongs to its very species.
This servility, however, does not belong to the species of servile
fear, even as neither does lifelessness to the species of lifeless
faith. For the species of a moral habit or act is taken from the
object. Now the object of servile fear is punishment, and it is by
accident that, either the good to which the punishment is contrary, is
loved as the last end, and that consequently the punishment is feared
as the greatest evil, which is the case with one who is devoid of
charity, or that the punishment is directed to God as its end, and
that, consequently, it is not feared as the greatest evil, which is the
case with one who has charity. For the species of a habit is not
destroyed through its object or end being directed to a further end.
Consequently servile fear is substantially good, but is servility is
evil.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Augustine is to be applied to a
man who does something through servile fear as such, so that he loves
not justice, and fears nothing but the punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: Servile fear as to its substance is not born of
pride, but its servility is, inasmuch as man is unwilling, by love, to
subject his affections to the yoke of justice.
Reply to Objection 3: Mercenary love is that whereby God is loved for
the sake of worldly goods, and this is, of itself, contrary to charity,
so that mercenary love is always evil. But servile fear, as to its
substance, implies merely fear of punishment, whether or not this be
feared as the principal evil.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether servile fear is substantially the same as filial fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is substantially the same
as filial fear. For filial fear is to servile fear the same apparently
as living faith is to lifeless faith, since the one is accompanied by
mortal sin and the other not. Now living faith and lifeless faith are
substantially the same. Therefore servile and filial fear are
substantially the same.
Objection 2: Further, habits are diversified by their objects. Now the
same thing is the object of servile and of filial fear, since they both
fear God. Therefore servile and filial fear are substantially the same.
Objection 3: Further, just as man hopes to enjoy God and to obtain
favors from Him, so does he fear to be separated from God and to be
punished by Him. Now it is the same hope whereby we hope to enjoy God,
and to receive other favors from Him, as stated above ([2463]Q[17],
A[2], ad 2). Therefore filial fear, whereby we fear separation from
God, is the same as servile fear whereby we fear His punishments.
On the contrary, Augustine (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) says that
there are two fears, one servile, another filial or chaste fear.
I answer that, The proper object of fear is evil. And since acts and
habits are diversified by their objects, as shown above ([2464]FS,
Q[54], A[2] ), it follows of necessity that different kinds of fear
correspond to different kinds of evil.
Now the evil of punishment, from which servile fear shrinks, differs
specifically from evil of fault, which filial fear shuns, as shown
above [2465](A[2]). Hence it is evident that servile and filial fear
are not the same substantially but differ specifically.
Reply to Objection 1: Living and lifeless faith differ, not as regards
the object, since each of them believes God and believes in a God, but
in respect of something extrinsic, viz. the presence or absence of
charity, and so they do not differ substantially. On the other hand,
servile and filial fear differ as to their objects: and hence the
comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 2: Servile fear and filial fear do not regard God in
the same light. For servile fear looks upon God as the cause of the
infliction of punishment, whereas filial fear looks upon Him, not as
the active cause of guilt, but rather as the term wherefrom it shrinks
to be separated by guilt. Consequently the identity of object, viz.
God, does not prove a specific identity of fear, since also natural
movements differ specifically according to their different
relationships to some one term, for movement from whiteness is not
specifically the same as movement towards whiteness.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope looks upon God as the principle not only of
the enjoyment of God, but also of any other favor whatever. This cannot
be said of fear; and so there is no comparison.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether servile fear remains with charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear does not remain with
charity. For Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) that
"when charity takes up its abode, it drives away fear which had
prepared a place for it. "
Objection 2: Further, "The charity of God is poured forth in our
hearts, by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5). Now "where
the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17). Since then
freedom excludes servitude, it seems that servile fear is driven away
when charity comes.
Objection 3: Further, servile fear is caused by self-love, in so far as
punishment diminishes one's own good. Now love of God drives away
self-love, for it makes us despise ourselves: thus Augustine testifies
(De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that "the love of God unto the contempt of self
builds up the city of God. " Therefore it seems that servile fear is
driven out when charity comes.
On the contrary, Servile fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as stated
above [2466](A[4]). Now the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not forfeited
through the advent of charity, whereby the Holy Ghost dwells in us.
Therefore servile fear is not driven out when charity comes.
I answer that, Servile fear proceeds from self-love, because it is fear
of punishment which is detrimental to one's own good. Hence the fear of
punishment is consistent with charity, in the same way as self-love is:
because it comes to the same that a man love his own good and that he
fear to be deprived of it.
Now self-love may stand in a threefold relationship to charity. In one
way it is contrary to charity, when a man places his end in the love of
his own good. In another way it is included in charity, when a man
loves himself for the sake of God and in God. In a third way, it is
indeed distinct from charity, but is not contrary thereto, as when a
man loves himself from the point of view of his own good, yet not so as
to place his end in this his own good: even as one may have another
special love for one's neighbor, besides the love of charity which is
founded on God, when we love him by reason of usefulness,
consanguinity, or some other human consideration, which, however, is
referable to charity.
Accordingly fear of punishment is, in one way, included in charity,
because separation from God is a punishment, which charity shuns
exceedingly; so that this belongs to chaste fear. In another way, it is
contrary to charity, when a man shrinks from the punishment that is
opposed to his natural good, as being the principal evil in opposition
to the good which he loves as an end; and in this way fear of
punishment is not consistent with charity. In another way fear of
punishment is indeed substantially distinct from chaste fear, when, to
wit, a man fears a penal evil, not because it separates him from God,
but because it is hurtful to his own good, and yet he does not place
his end in this good, so that neither does he dread this evil as being
the principal evil. Such fear of punishment is consistent with charity;
but it is not called servile, except when punishment is dreaded as a
principal evil, as explained above ([2467]AA[2],4). Hence fear
considered as servile, does not remain with charity, but the substance
of servile fear can remain with charity, even as self-love can remain
with charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of fear considered as
servile: and such is the sense of the two other objections.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.
For the beginning of a thing is a part thereof. But fear is not a part
of wisdom, since fear is seated in the appetitive faculty, while wisdom
is in the intellect. Therefore it seems that fear is not the beginning
of wisdom.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is the beginning of itself. "Now fear of
the Lord, that is wisdom," according to Job 28:28. Therefore it seems
that fear of God is not the beginning of wisdom.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is prior to the beginning. But something
is prior to fear, since faith precedes fear. Therefore it seems that
fear is not the beginning of wisdom.
On the contrary, It is written in the Ps. 110:10: "The fear of the Lord
is the beginning of wisdom. "
I answer that, A thing may be called the beginning of wisdom in two
ways: in one way because it is the beginning of wisdom itself as to its
essence; in another way, as to its effect. Thus the beginning of an art
as to its essence consists in the principles from which that art
proceeds, while the beginning of an art as to its effect is that
wherefrom it begins to operate: for instance we might say that the
beginning of the art of building is the foundation because that is
where the builder begins his work.
Now, since wisdom is the knowledge of Divine things, as we shall state
further on ([2468]Q[45], A[1]), it is considered by us in one way, and
in another way by philosophers. For, seeing that our life is ordained
to the enjoyment of God, and is directed thereto according to a
participation of the Divine Nature, conferred on us through grace,
wisdom, as we look at it, is considered not only as being cognizant of
God, as it is with the philosophers, but also as directing human
conduct; since this is directed not only by the human law, but also by
the Divine law, as Augustine shows (De Trin. xii, 14). Accordingly the
beginning of wisdom as to its essence consists in the first principles
of wisdom, i. e. the articles of faith, and in this sense faith is said
to be the beginning of wisdom. But as regards the effect, the beginning
of wisdom is the point where wisdom begins to work, and in this way
fear is the beginning of wisdom, yet servile fear in one way, and
filial fear, in another. For servile fear is like a principle disposing
a man to wisdom from without, in so far as he refrains from sin through
fear of punishment, and is thus fashioned for the effect of wisdom,
according to Ecclus. 1:27, "The fear of the Lord driveth out sin. " On
the other hand, chaste or filial fear is the beginning of wisdom, as
being the first effect of wisdom. For since the regulation of human
conduct by the Divine law belongs to wisdom, in order to make a
beginning, man must first of all fear God and submit himself to Him:
for the result will be that in all things he will be ruled by God.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that fear is not the
beginning of wisdom as to the essence of wisdom.
Reply to Objection 2: The fear of God is compared to a man's whole life
that is ruled by God's wisdom, as the root to the tree: hence it is
written (Ecclus. 1:25): "The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, for
[Vulg. : 'and'] the branches thereof are longlived. " Consequently, as
the root is said to be virtually the tree, so the fear of God is said
to be wisdom.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, faith is the beginning of wisdom
in one way, and fear, in another. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 25:16):
"The fear of God is the beginning of love: and the beginning of faith
is to be fast joined to it. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether initial fear differs substantially from filial fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that initial fear differs substantially from
filial fear. For filial fear is caused by love. Now initial fear is the
beginning of love, according to Ecclus. 25:16, "The fear of God is the
beginning of love. " Therefore initial fear is distinct from filial
fear.
Objection 2: Further, initial fear dreads punishment, which is the
object of servile fear, so that initial and servile fear would seem to
be the same. But servile fear is distinct from filial fear. Therefore
initial fear also is substantially distinct from initial fear.
Objection 3: Further, a mean differs in the same ratio from both the
extremes. Now initial fear is the mean between servile and filial fear.
Therefore it differs from both filial and servile fear.
On the contrary, Perfect and imperfect do not diversify the substance
of a thing. Now initial and filial fear differ in respect of perfection
and imperfection of charity, as Augustine states (In prim. canon. Joan.
Tract. ix). Therefore initial fear does not differ substantially from
filial fear.
I answer that, Initial fear is so called because it is a beginning
[initium]. Since, however, both servile and filial fear are, in some
way, the beginning of wisdom, each may be called in some way, initial.
It is not in this sense, however, that we are to understand initial
fear in so far as it is distinct from servile and filial fear, but in
the sense according to which it belongs to the state of beginners, in
whom there is a beginning of filial fear resulting from a beginning of
charity, although they do not possess the perfection of filial fear,
because they have not yet attained to the perfection of charity.
Consequently initial fear stands in the same relation to filial fear as
imperfect to perfect charity. Now perfect and imperfect charity differ,
not as to essence but as to state. Therefore we must conclude that
initial fear, as we understand it here, does not differ essentially
from filial fear.
Reply to Objection 1: The fear which is a beginning of love is servile
fear, which is the herald of charity, just as the bristle introduces
the thread, as Augustine states (Tract. ix in Ep. i Joan. ). Or else, if
it be referred to initial fear, this is said to be the beginning of
love, not absolutely, but relatively to the state of perfect charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Initial fear does not dread punishment as its
proper object, but as having something of servile fear connected with
it: for this servile fear, as to its substance, remains indeed, with
charity, its servility being cast aside; whereas its act remains with
imperfect charity in the man who is moved to perform good actions not
only through love of justice, but also through fear of punishment,
though this same act ceases in the man who has perfect charity, which
"casteth out fear," according to 1 Jn. 4:18.
Reply to Objection 3: Initial fear is a mean between servile and filial
fear, not as between two things of the same genus, but as the imperfect
is a mean between a perfect being and a non-being, as stated in Metaph.
ii, for it is the same substantially as the perfect being, while it
differs altogether from non-being.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
For no gift of the Holy Ghost is opposed to a virtue, which is also
from the Holy Ghost; else the Holy Ghost would be in opposition to
Himself. Now fear is opposed to hope, which is a virtue. Therefore fear
is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, it is proper to a theological virtue to have God
for its object. But fear has God for its object, in so far as God is
feared. Therefore fear is not a gift, but a theological virtue.
Objection 3: Further, fear arises from love. But love is reckoned a
theological virtue. Therefore fear also is a theological virtue, being
connected with the same matter, as it were.
Objection 4: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "fear is
bestowed as a remedy against pride.
" But the virtue of humility is
opposed to pride. Therefore again, fear is a kind of virtue.
Objection 5: Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues,
since they are bestowed in support of the virtues as Gregory says
(Moral. ii, 49). Now hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards
good, while fear regards evil. Since, then, hope is a virtue, it should
not be said that fear is a gift.
On the contrary, The fear of the Lord is numbered among the seven gifts
of the Holy Ghost (Is. 11:3).
I answer that, Fear is of several kinds, as stated above [2469](A[2]).
Now it is not "human fear," according to Augustine (De Gratia et Lib.
Arb. xviii), "that is a gift of God"---for it was by this fear that
Peter denied Christ---but that fear of which it was said (Mat. 10:28):
"Fear Him that can destroy both soul and body into hell. "
Again servile fear is not to be reckoned among the seven gifts of the
Holy Ghost, though it is from Him, because according to Augustine (De
Nat. et Grat. lvii) it is compatible with the will to sin: whereas the
gifts of the Holy Ghost are incompatible with the will to sin, as they
are inseparable from charity, as stated above ([2470]FS, Q[68], A[5]).
It follows, therefore, that the fear of God, which is numbered among
the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, is filial or chaste fear. For it was
stated above ([2471]FS, Q[68], AA[1],3) that the gifts of the Holy
Ghost are certain habitual perfections of the soul's powers, whereby
these are rendered amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost, just as,
by the moral virtues, the appetitive powers are rendered amenable to
the motion of reason. Now for a thing to be amenable to the motion of a
certain mover, the first condition required is that it be a
non-resistant subject of that mover, because resistance of the movable
subject to the mover hinders the movement. This is what filial or
chaste fear does, since thereby we revere God and avoid separating
ourselves from Him. Hence, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in
Monte i, 4) filial fear holds the first place, as it were, among the
gifts of the Holy Ghost, in the ascending order, and the last place, in
the descending order.
Reply to Objection 1: Filial fear is not opposed to the virtue of hope:
since thereby we fear, not that we may fail of what we hope to obtain
by God's help, but lest we withdraw ourselves from this help. Wherefore
filial fear and hope cling together, and perfect one another.
Reply to Objection 2: The proper and principal object of fear is the
evil shunned, and in this way, as stated above [2472](A[1]), God cannot
be an object of fear. Yet He is, in this way, the object of hope and
the other theological virtues, since, by the virtue of hope, we trust
in God's help, not only to obtain any other goods, but, chiefly, to
obtain God Himself, as the principal good. The same evidently applies
to the other theological virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: From the fact that love is the origin of fear, it
does not follow that the fear of God is not a distinct habit from
charity which is the love of God, since love is the origin of all the
emotions, and yet we are perfected by different habits in respect of
different emotions. Yet love is more of a virtue than fear is, because
love regards good, to which virtue is principally directed by reason of
its own nature, as was shown above ([2473]FS, Q[55], AA[3],4); for
which reason hope is also reckoned as a virtue; whereas fear
principally regards evil, the avoidance of which it denotes, wherefore
it is something less than a theological virtue.
Reply to Objection 4: According to Ecclus. 10:14, "the beginning of the
pride of man is to fall off from God," that is to refuse submission to
God, and this is opposed to filial fear, which reveres God. Thus fear
cuts off the source of pride for which reason it is bestowed as a
remedy against pride. Yet it does not follow that it is the same as the
virtue of humility, but that it is its origin. For the gifts of the
Holy Ghost are the origin of the intellectual and moral virtues, as
stated above ([2474]FS, Q[68], A[4]), while the theological virtues are
the origin of the gifts, as stated above ([2475]FS, Q[69], A[4], ad 3).
This suffices for the Reply to the Fifth Objection.
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Whether fear decreases when charity increases?
Objection 1: It seems that fear decreases when charity increases. For
Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix): "The more charity
increases, the more fear decreases. "
Objection 2: Further, fear decreases when hope increases. But charity
increases when hope increases, as stated above ([2476]Q[17], A[8]).
Therefore fear decreases when charity increases.
Objection 3: Further, love implies union, whereas fear implies
separation. Now separation decreases when union increases. Therefore
fear decreases when the love of charity increases.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that "the fear of
God not only begins but also perfects wisdom, whereby we love God above
all things, and our neighbor as ourselves. "
I answer that, Fear is twofold, as stated above ([2477]AA[2],4); one is
filial fear, whereby a son fears to offend his father or to be
separated from him; the other is servile fear, whereby one fears
punishment.
Now filial fear must needs increase when charity increases, even as an
effect increases with the increase of its cause. For the more one loves
a man, the more one fears to offend him and to be separated from him.
On the other hand servile fear, as regards its servility, is entirely
cast out when charity comes, although the fear of punishment remains as
to its substance, as stated above [2478](A[6]). This fear decreases as
charity increases, chiefly as regards its act, since the more a man
loves God, the less he fears punishment; first, because he thinks less
of his own good, to which punishment is opposed; secondly, because, the
faster he clings, the more confident he is of the reward, and,
consequently the less fearful of punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine speaks there of the fear of punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: It is fear of punishment that decreases when hope
increases; but with the increase of the latter filial fear increases,
because the more certainly a man expects to obtain a good by another's
help, the more he fears to offend him or to be separated from him.
Reply to Objection 3: Filial fear does not imply separation from God,
but submission to Him, and shuns separation from that submission. Yet,
in a way, it implies separation, in the point of not presuming to equal
oneself to Him, and of submitting to Him, which separation is to be
observed even in charity, in so far as a man loves God more than
himself and more than aught else. Hence the increase of the love of
charity implies not a decrease but an increase in the reverence of
fear.
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Whether fear remains in heaven?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear does not remain in heaven. For it
is written (Prov. 1:33): "He . . . shall enjoy abundance, without fear
of evils," which is to be understood as referring to those who already
enjoy wisdom in everlasting happiness. Now every fear is about some
evil, since evil is the object of fear, as stated above ([2479]AA[2],5;
[2480]FS, Q[42], A[1]). Therefore there will be no fear in heaven.
Objection 2: Further, in heaven men will be conformed to God, according
to 1 Jn. 3:2, "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him. " But God
fears nothing. Therefore, in heaven, men will have no fear.
Objection 3: Further, hope is more perfect than fear, since hope
regards good, and fear, evil. Now hope will not be in heaven. Therefore
neither will there be fear in heaven.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:10): "The fear of the Lord is
holy, enduring for ever and ever. "
I answer that, Servile fear, or fear of punishment, will by no means be
in heaven, since such a fear is excluded by the security which is
essential to everlasting happiness, as stated above ([2481]FS, Q[5],
A[4]).
But regard to filial fear, as it increases with the increase of
charity, so is it perfected when charity is made perfect; hence, in
heaven, it will not have quite the same act as it has now.
In order to make this clear, we must observe that the proper object of
fear is a possible evil, just as the proper object of hope is a
possible good: and since the movement of fear is like one of avoidance,
fear implies avoidance of a possible arduous evil, for little evils
inspire no fear. Now as a thing's good consists in its staying in its
own order, so a thing's evil consists in forsaking its order. Again,
the order of a rational creature is that it should be under God and
above other creatures. Hence, just as it is an evil for a rational
creature to submit, by love, to a lower creature, so too is it an evil
for it, if it submit not to God, by presumptuously revolt against Him
or contemn Him. Now this evil is possible to a rational creature
considered as to its nature on account of the natural flexibility of
the free-will; whereas in the blessed, it becomes impossible, by reason
of the perfection of glory. Therefore the avoidance of this evil that
consists in non-subjection to God, and is possible to nature, but
impossible in the state of bliss, will be in heaven; while in this life
there is avoidance of this evil as of something altogether possible.
Hence Gregory, expounding the words of Job (26:11), "The pillars of
heaven tremble, and dread at His beck," says (Moral. xvii, 29): "The
heavenly powers that gaze on Him without ceasing, tremble while
contemplating: but their awe, lest it should be of a penal nature, is
one not of fear but of wonder," because, to wit, they wonder at God's
supereminence and incomprehensibility. Augustine also (De Civ. Dei xiv,
9) in this sense, admits fear in heaven, although he leaves the
question doubtful. "If," he says, "this chaste fear that endureth for
ever and ever is to be in the future life, it will not be a fear that
is afraid of an evil which might possibly occur, but a fear that holds
fast to a good which we cannot lose. For when we love the good which we
have acquired, with an unchangeable love, without doubt, if it is
allowable to say so, our fear is sure of avoiding evil. Because chaste
fear denotes a will that cannot consent to sin, and whereby we avoid
sin without trembling lest, in our weakness, we fall, and possess
ourselves in the tranquillity born of charity. Else, if no kind of fear
is possible there, perhaps fear is said to endure for ever and ever,
because that which fear will lead us to, will be everlasting. "
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted excludes from the blessed, the
fear that denotes solicitude, and anxiety about evil, but not the fear
which is accompanied by security.
Reply to Objection 2: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix) "the same things
are both like and unlike God. They are like by reason of a variable
imitation of the Inimitable"---that is, because, so far as they can,
they imitate God Who cannot be imitated perfectly---"they are unlike
because they are the effects of a Cause of Whom they fall short
infinitely and immeasurably. " Hence, if there be no fear in God (since
there is none above Him to whom He may be subject) it does not follow
that there is none in the blessed, whose happiness consists in perfect
subjection to God.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope implies a certain defect, namely the
futurity of happiness, which ceases when happiness is present: whereas
fear implies a natural defect in a creature, in so far as it is
infinitely distant from God, and this defect will remain even in
heaven. Hence fear will not be cast out altogether.
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Whether poverty of spirit is the beatitude corresponding to the gift of
fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that poverty of spirit is not the beatitude
corresponding to the gift of fear. For fear is the beginning of the
spiritual life, as explained above [2482](A[7]): whereas poverty
belongs to the perfection of the spiritual life, according to Mat.
19:21, "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and give to
the poor. " Therefore poverty of spirit does not correspond to the gift
of fear.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ps. 118:120): "Pierce Thou my
flesh with Thy fear," whence it seems to follow that it belongs to fear
to restrain the flesh. But the curbing of the flesh seems to belong
rather to the beatitude of mourning. Therefore the beatitude of
mourning corresponds to the gift of fear, rather than the beatitude of
poverty.
Objection 3: Further, the gift of fear corresponds to the virtue of
hope, as stated above (A[9], ad 1). Now the last beatitude which is,
"Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of
God," seems above all to correspond to hope, because according to Rom.
5:2, "we . . . glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God. "
Therefore that beatitude corresponds to the gift of fear, rather than
poverty of spirit.
Objection 4: Further, it was stated above ([2483]FS, Q[70], A[2]) that
the fruits correspond to the beatitudes. Now none of the fruits
correspond to the gift of fear. Neither, therefore, does any of the
beatitudes.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "The
fear of the Lord is befitting the humble of whom it is said: Blessed
are the poor in spirit. "
I answer that, Poverty of spirit properly corresponds to fear. Because,
since it belongs to filial fear to show reverence and submission to
God, whatever results from this submission belongs to the gift of fear.
Now from the very fact that a man submits to God, it follows that he
ceases to seek greatness either in himself or in another but seeks it
only in God. For that would be inconsistent with perfect subjection to
God, wherefore it is written (Ps. 19:8): "Some trust in chariots and
some in horses; but we will call upon the name of . . . our God. " It
follows that if a man fear God perfectly, he does not, by pride, seek
greatness either in himself or in external goods, viz. honors and
riches. In either case, this proceeds from poverty of spirit, in so far
as the latter denotes either the voiding of a puffed up and proud
spirit, according to Augustine's interpretation (De Serm. Dom. in Monte
i, 4), or the renunciation of worldly goods which is done in spirit,
i. e. by one's own will, through the instigation of the Holy Spirit,
according to the expounding of Ambrose on Lk. 6:20 and Jerome on Mat.
5:3.
Reply to Objection 1: Since a beatitude is an act of perfect virtue,
all the beatitudes belong to the perfection of spiritual life. And this
perfection seems to require that whoever would strive to obtain a
perfect share of spiritual goods, needs to begin by despising earthly
goods, wherefore fear holds the first place among the gifts.
Perfection, however, does not consist in the renunciation itself of
temporal goods; since this is the way to perfection: whereas filial
fear, to which the beatitude of poverty corresponds, is consistent with
the perfection of wisdom, as stated above ([2484]AA[7],10).
Reply to Objection 2: The undue exaltation of man either in himself or
in another is more directly opposed to that submission to God which is
the result of filial fear, than is external pleasure. Yet this is, in
consequence, opposed to fear, since whoever fears God and is subject to
Him, takes no delight in things other than God. Nevertheless, pleasure
is not concerned, as exaltation is, with the arduous character of a
thing which fear regards: and so the beatitude of poverty corresponds
to fear directly, and the beatitude of mourning, consequently.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope denotes a movement by way of a relation of
tendency to a term, whereas fear implies movement by way of a relation
of withdrawal from a term: wherefore the last beatitude which is the
term of spiritual perfection, fittingly corresponds to hope, by way of
ultimate object; while the first beatitude, which implies withdrawal
from external things which hinder submission to God, fittingly
corresponds to fear.
Reply to Objection 4: As regards the fruits, it seems that those things
correspond to the gift of fear, which pertain to the moderate use of
temporal things or to abstinence therefrom; such are modesty,
continency and chastity.
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OF DESPAIR (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the contrary vices; (1) despair; (2) presumption.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether despair is a sin?
(2) Whether it can be without unbelief?
(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?
(4) Whether it arises from sloth?
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Whether despair is a sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that despair is not a sin. For every sin
includes conversion to a mutable good, together with aversion from the
immutable good, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). But despair
includes no conversion to a mutable good. Therefore it is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, that which grows from a good root, seems to be no
sin, because "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Mat. 7:18).
Now despair seems to grow from a good root, viz. fear of God, or from
horror at the greatness of one's own sins. Therefore despair is not a
sin.
Objection 3: Further, if despair were a sin, it would be a sin also for
the damned to despair. But this is not imputed to them as their fault
but as part of their damnation. Therefore neither is it imputed to
wayfarers as their fault, so that it is not a sin.
On the contrary, That which leads men to sin, seems not only to be a
sin itself, but a source of sins. Now such is despair, for the Apostle
says of certain men (Eph. 4:19): "Who, despairing, have given
themselves up to lasciviousness, unto the working of all uncleanness
and [Vulg. : 'unto'] covetousness. " Therefore despair is not only a sin
but also the origin of other sins.
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2) affirmation
and negation in the intellect correspond to search and avoidance in the
appetite; while truth and falsehood in the intellect correspond to good
and evil in the appetite. Consequently every appetitive movement which
is conformed to a true intellect, is good in itself, while every
appetitive movement which is conformed to a false intellect is evil in
itself and sinful. Now the true opinion of the intellect about God is
that from Him comes salvation to mankind, and pardon to sinners,
according to Ezech. 18:23, "I desire not the death of the sinner, but
that he should be converted, and live" [*Vulg. : 'Is it My will that a
sinner should die . . . and not that he should be converted and live? '
Cf. Ezech. 33:11]: while it is a false opinion that He refuses pardon
to the repentant sinner, or that He does not turn sinners to Himself by
sanctifying grace. Therefore, just as the movement of hope, which is in
conformity with the true opinion, is praiseworthy and virtuous, so the
contrary movement of despair, which is in conformity with the false
opinion about God, is vicious and sinful.
Reply to Objection 1: In every mortal sin there is, in some way,
aversion from the immutable good, and conversion to a mutable good, but
not always in the same way. Because, since the theological virtues have
God for their object, the sins which are contrary to them, such as
hatred of God, despair and unbelief, consist principally in aversion
from the immutable good; but, consequently, they imply conversion to a
mutable good, in so far as the soul that is a deserter from God, must
necessarily turn to other things. Other sins, however, consist
principally in conversion to a mutable good, and, consequently, in
aversion from the immutable good: because the fornicator intends, not
to depart from God, but to enjoy carnal pleasure, the result of which
is that he departs from God.
Reply to Objection 2: A thing may grow from a virtuous root in two
ways: first, directly and on the part of the virtue itself; even as an
act proceeds from a habit: and in this way no sin can grow from a
virtuous root, for in this sense Augustine declared (De Lib. Arb. ii,
18,19) that "no man makes evil use of virtue. " Secondly, a thing
proceeds from a virtue indirectly, or is occasioned by a virtue, and in
this way nothing hinders a sin proceeding from a virtue: thus sometimes
men pride themselves of their virtues, according to Augustine (Ep.
ccxi): "Pride lies in wait for good works that they may die. " In this
way fear of God or horror of one's own sins may lead to despair, in so
far as man makes evil use of those good things, by allowing them to be
an occasion of despair.
Reply to Objection 3: The damned are outside the pale of hope on
account of the impossibility of returning to happiness: hence it is not
imputed to them that they hope not, but it is a part of their
damnation. Even so, it would be no sin for a wayfarer to despair of
obtaining that which he had no natural capacity for obtaining, or which
was not due to be obtained by him; for instance, if a physician were to
despair of healing some sick man, or if anyone were to despair of ever
becoming rich.
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Whether there can be despair without unbelief?
