Now two
things have to be considered with regard to man's honor.
things have to be considered with regard to man's honor.
Summa Theologica
" But this seems inconsistent with the idea of
magnanimity. Therefore confidence does not belong to magnanimity.
Objection 2: Further, confidence seems to be opposed to fear, according
to Is. 12:2, "I will deal confidently and will not fear. " But to be
without fear seems more akin to fortitude. Therefore confidence also
belongs to fortitude rather than to magnanimity.
Objection 3: Further, reward is not due except to virtue. But a reward
is due to confidence, according to Heb. 3:6, where it is said that we
are the house of Christ, "if we hold fast the confidence and glory of
hope unto the end. " Therefore confidence is a virtue distinct from
magnanimity: and this is confirmed by the fact that Macrobius
enumerates it with magnanimity (In Somn. Scip. i).
On the contrary, Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii) seems to substitute
confidence for magnanimity, as stated above in the preceding Question
(ad 6) and in the prologue to this.
I answer that, Confidence takes its name from "fides" [faith]: and it
belongs to faith to believe something and in somebody. But confidence
belongs to hope, according to Job 11:18, "Thou shalt have confidence,
hope being set before thee. " Wherefore confidence apparently denotes
chiefly that a man derives hope through believing the word of one who
promises to help him. Since, however, faith signifies also a strong
opinion, and since one may come to have a strong opinion about
something, not only on account of another's statement, but also on
account of something we observe in another, it follows that confidence
may denote the hope of having something, which hope we conceive through
observing something either in oneself---for instance, through observing
that he is healthy, a man is confident that he will live long. or in
another, for instance, through observing that another is friendly to
him and powerful, a man is confident that he will receive help from
him.
Now it has been stated above (A[1], ad 2) that magnanimity is chiefly
about the hope of something difficult. Wherefore, since confidence
denotes a certain strength of hope arising from some observation which
gives one a strong opinion that one will obtain a certain good, it
follows that confidence belongs to magnanimity.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), it
belongs to the "magnanimous to need nothing," for need is a mark of the
deficient. But this is to be understood according to the mode of a man,
hence he adds "or scarcely anything. " For it surpasses man to need
nothing at all. For every man needs, first, the Divine assistance,
secondly, even human assistance, since man is naturally a social
animal, for he is sufficient by himself to provide for his own life.
Accordingly, in so far as he needs others, it belongs to a magnanimous
man to have confidence in others, for it is also a point of excellence
in a man that he should have at hand those who are able to be of
service to him. And in so far as his own ability goes, it belongs to a
magnanimous man to be confident in himself.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3353]FS, Q[23], A[2]; [3354]FS,
Q[40], A[4]), when we were treating of the passions, hope is directly
opposed to despair, because the latter is about the same object, namely
good. But as regards contrariety of objects it is opposed to fear,
because the latter's object is evil. Now confidence denotes a certain
strength of hope, wherefore it is opposed to fear even as hope is.
Since, however, fortitude properly strengthens a man in respect of
evil, and magnanimity in respect of the obtaining of good, it follows
that confidence belongs more properly to magnanimity than to fortitude.
Yet because hope causes daring, which belongs to fortitude, it follows
in consequence that confidence pertains to fortitude.
Reply to Objection 3: Confidence, as stated above, denotes a certain
mode of hope: for confidence is hope strengthened by a strong opinion.
Now the mode applied to an affection may call for commendation of the
act, so that it become meritorious, yet it is not this that draws it to
a species of virtue, but its matter. Hence, properly speaking,
confidence cannot denote a virtue, though it may denote the conditions
of a virtue. For this reason it is reckoned among the parts of
fortitude, not as an annexed virtue, except as identified with
magnanimity by Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii), but as an integral part, as
stated in the preceding Question.
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Whether security belongs to magnanimity?
Objection 1: It seems that security does not belong to magnanimity. For
security, as stated above (Q[128], ad 6), denotes freedom from the
disturbance of fear. But fortitude does this most effectively.
Wherefore security is seemingly the same as fortitude. But fortitude
does not belong to magnanimity; rather the reverse is the case. Neither
therefore does security belong to magnanimity.
Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man "is said to be
secure because he is without care. " But this seems to be contrary to
virtue, which has a care for honorable things, according to 2 Tim.
2:15, "Carefully study to present thyself approved unto God. " Therefore
security does not belong to magnanimity, which does great things in all
the virtues.
Objection 3: Further, virtue is not its own reward. But security is
accounted the reward of virtue, according to Job 11:14,18, "If thou
wilt put away from thee the iniquity that is in thy hand . . . being
buried thou shalt sleep secure. " Therefore security does not belong to
magnanimity or to any other virtue, as a part thereof.
On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading:
"Magnanimity consists of two things," that "it belongs to magnanimity
to give way neither to a troubled mind, nor to man, nor to fortune. "
But a man's security consists in this. Therefore security belongs to
magnanimity.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear makes a man
take counsel," because, to wit he takes care to avoid what he fears.
Now security takes its name from the removal of this care, of which
fear is the cause: wherefore security denotes perfect freedom of the
mind from fear, just as confidence denotes strength of hope. Now, as
hope directly belongs to magnanimity, so fear directly regards
fortitude. Wherefore as confidence belongs immediately to magnanimity,
so security belongs immediately to fortitude.
It must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause of daring, so
is fear the cause of despair, as stated above when we were treating of
the passion ([3355]FS, Q[45], A[2]). Wherefore as confidence belongs
indirectly to fortitude, in so far as it makes use of daring, so
security belongs indirectly to magnanimity, in so far as it banishes
despair.
Reply to Objection 1: Fortitude is chiefly commended, not because it
banishes fear, which belongs to security, but because it denotes a
firmness of mind in the matter of the passion. Wherefore security is
not the same as fortitude, but is a condition thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: Not all security is worthy of praise but only
when one puts care aside, as one ought, and in things when one should
not fear: in this way it is a condition of fortitude and of
magnanimity.
Reply to Objection 3: There is in the virtues a certain likeness to,
and participation of, future happiness, as stated above ([3356]FS,
Q[5], AA[3],7). Hence nothing hinders a certain security from being a
condition of a virtue, although perfect security belongs to virtue's
reward.
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Whether goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity?
Objection 1: It seems that goods of fortune do not conduce to
magnanimity. For according to Seneca (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi):
"virtue suffices for itself. " Now magnanimity takes every virtue great,
as stated above (A[4], ad 3). Therefore goods of fortune do not conduce
to magnanimity.
Objection 2: Further, no virtuous man despises what is helpful to him.
But the magnanimous man despises whatever pertains to goods of fortune:
for Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: "Magnanimity consists
of two things," that "a great soul is commended for despising external
things. " Therefore a magnanimous man is not helped by goods of fortune.
Objection 3: Further, Tully adds (De Offic. i) that "it belongs to a
great soul so to bear what seems troublesome, as nowise to depart from
his natural estate, or from the dignity of a wise man. " And Aristotle
says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "a magnanimous man does not grieve at
misfortune. " Now troubles and misfortunes are opposed to goods of
fortune, for every one grieves at the loss of what is helpful to him.
Therefore external goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "good fortune
seems to conduce to magnanimity. "
I answer that, As stated above [3357](A[1]), magnanimity regards two
things: honor as its matter, and the accomplishment of something great
as its end. Now goods of fortune conduce to both these things. For
since honor is conferred on the virtuous, not only by the wise, but
also by the multitude who hold these goods of fortune in the highest
esteem, the result is that they show greater honor to those who possess
goods of fortune. Likewise goods of fortune are useful organs or
instruments of virtuous deeds: since we can easily accomplish things by
means of riches, power and friends. Hence it is evident that goods of
fortune conduce to magnanimity.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is said to be sufficient for itself,
because it can be without even these external goods; yet it needs them
in order to act more expeditiously.
Reply to Objection 2: The magnanimous man despises external goods,
inasmuch as he does not think them so great as to be bound to do
anything unbecoming for their sake. Yet he does not despise them, but
that he esteems them useful for the accomplishment of virtuous deeds.
Reply to Objection 3: If a man does not think much of a thing, he is
neither very joyful at obtaining it, nor very grieved at losing it.
Wherefore, since the magnanimous man does not think much of external
goods, that is goods of fortune, he is neither much uplifted by them if
he has them, nor much cast down by their loss.
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OF PRESUMPTION (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to magnanimity; and in the first
place, those that are opposed thereto by excess. These are three,
namely, presumption, ambition, and vainglory. Secondly, we shall
consider pusillanimity which is opposed to it by way of deficiency.
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether presumption is a sin?
(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?
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Whether presumption is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that presumption is not a sin. For the Apostle
says: "Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch forth [Vulg. :
'and stretching forth'] myself to those that are before. " But it seems
to savor of presumption that one should tend to what is above oneself.
Therefore presumption is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 7) "we should not
listen to those who would persuade us to relish human things because we
are men, or mortal things because we are mortal, but we should relish
those that make us immortal": and (Metaph. i) "that man should pursue
divine things as far as possible. " Now divine and immortal things are
seemingly far above man. Since then presumption consists essentially in
tending to what is above oneself, it seems that presumption is
something praiseworthy, rather than a sin.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:5): "Not that we are
sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves. " If then
presumption, by which one strives at that for which one is not
sufficient, be a sin, it seems that man cannot lawfully even think of
anything good: which is absurd. Therefore presumption is not a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 37:3): "O wicked presumption,
whence camest thou? " and a gloss answers: "From a creature's evil
will. " Now all that comes of the root of an evil will is a sin.
Therefore presumption is a sin.
I answer that, Since whatever is according to nature, is ordered by the
Divine Reason, which human reason ought to imitate, whatever is done in
accordance with human reason in opposition to the order established in
general throughout natural things is vicious and sinful. Now it is
established throughout all natural things, that every action is
commensurate with the power of the agent, nor does any natural agent
strive to do what exceeds its ability. Hence it is vicious and sinful,
as being contrary to the natural order, that any one should assume to
do what is above his power: and this is what is meant by presumption,
as its very name shows. Wherefore it is evident that presumption is a
sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders that which is above the active
power of a natural thing, and yet not above the passive power of that
same thing: thus the air is possessed of a passive power by reason of
which it can be so changed as to obtain the action and movement of
fire, which surpass the active power of air. Thus too it would be
sinful and presumptuous for a man while in a state of imperfect virtue
to attempt the immediate accomplishment of what belongs to perfect
virtue. But it is not presumptuous or sinful for a man to endeavor to
advance towards perfect virtue. In this way the Apostle stretched
himself forth to the things that were before him, namely continually
advancing forward.
Reply to Objection 2: Divine and immortal things surpass man according
to the order of nature. Yet man is possessed of a natural power, namely
the intellect, whereby he can be united to immortal and Divine things.
In this respect the Philosopher says that "man ought to pursue immortal
and divine things," not that he should do what it becomes God to do,
but that he should be united to Him in intellect and will.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), "what we
can do by the help of others we can do by ourselves in a sense. " Hence
since we can think and do good by the help of God, this is not
altogether above our ability. Hence it is not presumptuous for a man to
attempt the accomplishment of a virtuous deed: but it would be
presumptuous if one were to make the attempt without confidence in
God's assistance.
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Whether presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess?
Objection 1: It seems that presumption is not opposed to magnanimity by
excess. For presumption is accounted a species of the sin against the
Holy Ghost, as stated above ([3358]Q[14], A[2];[3359] Q[21], A[1]). But
the sin against the Holy Ghost is not opposed to magnanimity, but to
charity. Neither therefore is presumption opposed to magnanimity.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to magnanimity that one should deem
oneself worthy of great things. But a man is said to be presumptuous
even if he deem himself worthy of small things, if they surpass his
ability. Therefore presumption is not directly opposed to magnanimity.
Objection 3: Further, the magnanimous man looks upon external goods as
little things. Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), "on
account of external fortune the presumptuous disdain and wrong others,
because they deem external goods as something great. " Therefore
presumption is opposed to magnanimity, not by excess, but only by
deficiency.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 3) that the
"vain man," i. e. a vaporer or a wind-bag, which with us denotes a
presumptuous man, "is opposed to the magnanimous man by excess. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3360]Q[129], A[3], ad 1), magnanimity
observes the means, not as regards the quantity of that to which it
tends, but in proportion to our own ability: for it does not tend to
anything greater than is becoming to us.
Now the presumptuous man, as regards that to which he tends, does not
exceed the magnanimous, but sometimes falls far short of him: but he
does exceed in proportion to his own ability, whereas the magnanimous
man does not exceed his. It is in this way that presumption is opposed
to magnanimity by excess.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not every presumption that is accounted a
sin against the Holy Ghost, but that by which one contemns the Divine
justice through inordinate confidence in the Divine mercy. The latter
kind of presumption, by reason of its matter, inasmuch, to wit, as it
implies contempt of something Divine, is opposed to charity, or rather
to the gift of fear, whereby we revere God. Nevertheless, in so far as
this contempt exceeds the proportion to one's own ability, it can be
opposed to magnanimity.
Reply to Objection 2: Presumption, like magnanimity, seems to tend to
something great. For we are not, as a rule, wont to call a man
presumptuous for going beyond his powers in something small. If,
however, such a man be called presumptuous, this kind of presumption is
not opposed to magnanimity, but to that virtue which is about ordinary
honor, as stated above ([3361]Q[129], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: No one attempts what is above his ability, except
in so far as he deems his ability greater than it is. In this one may
err in two ways. First only as regards quantity, as when a man thinks
he has greater virtue, or knowledge, or the like, than he has.
Secondly, as regards the kind of thing, as when he thinks himself
great, and worthy of great things, by reason of something that does not
make him so, for instance by reason of riches or goods of fortune. For,
as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), "those who have these things
without virtue, neither justly deem themselves worthy of great things,
nor are rightly called magnanimous. "
Again, the thing to which a man sometimes tends in excess of his
ability, is sometimes in very truth something great, simply as in the
case of Peter, whose intent was to suffer for Christ, which has
exceeded his power; while sometimes it is something great, not simply,
but only in the opinion of fools, such as wearing costly clothes,
despising and wronging others. This savors of an excess of magnanimity,
not in any truth, but in people's opinion. Hence Seneca says (De Quat.
Virtut. ) that "when magnanimity exceeds its measure, it makes a man
high-handed, proud, haughty restless, and bent on excelling in all
things, whether in words or in deeds, without any considerations of
virtue. " Thus it is evident that the presumptuous man sometimes falls
short of the magnanimous in reality, although in appearance he
surpasses him.
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OF AMBITION (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider ambition: and under this head there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a sin?
(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?
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Whether ambition is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that ambition is not a sin. For ambition denotes
the desire of honor. Now honor is in itself a good thing, and the
greatest of external goods: wherefore those who care not for honor are
reproved. Therefore ambition is not a sin; rather is it something
deserving of praise, in so far as a good is laudably desired.
Objection 2: Further, anyone may, without sin, desire what is due to
him as a reward. Now honor is the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. i, 12; iv, 3; viii, 14). Therefore ambition of honor is
not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, that which heartens a man to do good and
disheartens him from doing evil, is not a sin. Now honor heartens men
to do good and to avoid evil; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8)
that "with the bravest men, cowards are held in dishonor, and the brave
in honor": and Tully says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that "honor fosters the
arts. " Therefore ambition is not a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 13:5) that "charity is not
ambitious, seeketh not her own. " Now nothing is contrary to charity,
except sin. Therefore ambition is a sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([3362]Q[103], AA[1],2), honor denotes
reverence shown to a person in witness of his excellence.
Now two
things have to be considered with regard to man's honor. The first is
that a man has not from himself the thing in which he excels, for this
is, as it were, something Divine in him, wherefore on this count honor
is due principally, not to him but to God. The second point that calls
for observation is that the thing in which man excels is given to him
by God, that he may profit others thereby: wherefore a man ought so far
to be pleased that others bear witness to his excellence, as this
enables him to profit others.
Now the desire of honor may be inordinate in three ways. First, when a
man desires recognition of an excellence which he has not: this is to
desire more than his share of honor. Secondly, when a man desires honor
for himself without referring it to God. Thirdly, when a man's appetite
rests in honor itself, without referring it to the profit of others.
Since then ambition denotes inordinate desire of honor, it is evident
that it is always a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The desire for good should be regulated according
to reason, and if it exceed this rule it will be sinful. In this way it
is sinful to desire honor in disaccord with the order of reason. Now
those are reproved who care not for honor in accordance with reason's
dictate that they should avoid what is contrary to honor.
Reply to Objection 2: Honor is not the reward of virtue, as regards the
virtuous man, in this sense that he should seek for it as his reward:
since the reward he seeks is happiness, which is the end of virtue. But
it is said to be the reward of virtue as regards others, who have
nothing greater than honor whereby to reward the virtuous; which honor
derives greatness from the very fact that it bears witness to virtue.
Hence it is evident that it is not an adequate reward, as stated in
Ethic. iv, 3.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as some are heartened to do good and
disheartened from doing evil, by the desire of honor, if this be
desired in due measure; so, if it be desired inordinately, it may
become to man an occasion of doing many evil things, as when a man
cares not by what means he obtains honor. Wherefore Sallust says
(Catilin. ) that "the good as well as the wicked covet honors for
themselves, but the one," i. e. the good, "go about it in the right
way," whereas "the other," i. e. the wicked, "through lack of the good
arts, make use of deceit and falsehood. " Yet they who, merely for the
sake of honor, either do good or avoid evil, are not virtuous,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8), where he says that they
who do brave things for the sake of honor are not truly brave.
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Whether ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess?
Objection 1: It seems that ambition is not opposed to magnanimity by
excess. For one mean has only one extreme opposed to it on the one
side. Now presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess as stated
above ([3363]Q[130], A[2]). Therefore ambition is not opposed to it by
excess.
Objection 2: Further, magnanimity is about honors; whereas ambition
seems to regard positions of dignity: for it is written (2 Macc. 4:7)
that "Jason ambitiously sought the high priesthood. " Therefore ambition
is not opposed to magnanimity.
Objection 3: Further, ambition seems to regard outward show: for it is
written (Acts 25:27) that "Agrippa and Berenice . . . with great pomp
[ambitione]. . . had entered into the hall of audience" [*'Praetorium. '
The Vulgate has 'auditorium,' but the meaning is the same], and (2
Para. 16:14) that when Asa died they "burned spices and . . . ointments
over his body" with very great pomp [ambitione]. But magnanimity is not
about outward show. Therefore ambition is not opposed to magnanimity.
On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) that "the more a man exceeds
in magnanimity, the more he desires himself alone to dominate others. "
But this pertains to ambition. Therefore ambition denotes an excess of
magnanimity.
I answer that, As stated above [3364](A[1]), ambition signifies
inordinate love of honor. Now magnanimity is about honors and makes use
of them in a becoming manner. Wherefore it is evident that ambition is
opposed to magnanimity as the inordinate to that which is well ordered.
Reply to Objection 1: Magnanimity regards two things. It regards one as
its end, in so far as it is some great deed that the magnanimous man
attempts in proportion to his ability. In this way presumption is
opposed to magnanimity by excess: because the presumptuous man attempts
great deeds beyond his ability. The other thing that magnanimity
regards is its matter, viz. honor, of which it makes right use: and in
this way ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess. Nor is it
impossible for one mean to be exceeded in various respects.
Reply to Objection 2: Honor is due to those who are in a position of
dignity, on account of a certain excellence of their estate: and
accordingly inordinate desire for positions of dignity pertains to
ambition. For if a man were to have an inordinate desire for a position
of dignity, not for the sake of honor, but for the sake of a right use
of a dignity exceeding his ability, he would not be ambitious but
presumptuous.
Reply to Objection 3: The very solemnity of outward worship is a kind
of honor, wherefore in such cases honor is wont to be shown. This is
signified by the words of James 2:2,3: "If there shall come into your
assembly a man having a golden ring, in fine apparel . . . and you . .
. shall say to him: Sit thou here well," etc. Wherefore ambition does
not regard outward worship, except in so far as this is a kind of
honor.
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OF VAINGLORY (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider vainglory: under which head there are five points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether desire of glory is a sin?
(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is a capital vice?
(5) Of its daughters.
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Whether the desire of glory is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that the desire of glory is not a sin. For no one
sins in being likened to God: in fact we are commanded (Eph. 5:1): "Be
ye . . . followers of God, as most dear children. " Now by seeking glory
man seems to imitate God, Who seeks glory from men: wherefore it is
written (Is. 43:6,7): "Bring My sons from afar, and My daughters from
the ends of the earth. And every one that calleth on My name, I have
created him for My glory. " Therefore the desire for glory is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, that which incites a mar to do good is apparently
not a sin. Now the desire of glory incites men to do good. For Tully
says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that "glory inflames every man to strive his
utmost": and in Holy Writ glory is promised for good works, according
to Rom. 2:7: "To them, indeed, who according to patience in good work .
. . glory and honor" [*Vulg. : 'Who will render to every man according
to his works, to them indeed who . . . seek glory and honor and
incorruption, eternal life. ']. Therefore the desire for glory is not a
sin.
Objection 3: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that glory is
"consistent good report about a person, together with praise": and this
comes to the same as what Augustine says (Contra Maximin. iii), viz.
that glory is, "as it were, clear knowledge with praise. " Now it is no
sin to desire praiseworthy renown: indeed, it seems itself to call for
praise, according to Ecclus. 41:15, "Take care of a good name," and
Rom. 12:17, "Providing good things not only in the sight of God, but
also in the sight of all men. " Therefore the desire of vainglory is not
a sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v): "He is better advised
who acknowledges that even the love of praise is sinful. "
I answer that, Glory signifies a certain clarity, wherefore Augustine
says (Tract. lxxxii, c, cxiv in Joan. ) that to be "glorified is the
same as to be clarified. " Now clarity and comeliness imply a certain
display: wherefore the word glory properly denotes the display of
something as regards its seeming comely in the sight of men, whether it
be a bodily or a spiritual good. Since, however, that which is clear
simply can be seen by many, and by those who are far away, it follows
that the word glory properly denotes that somebody's good is known and
approved by many, according to the saying of Sallust (Catilin. ) [*The
quotation is from Livy: Hist. , Lib. XXII C, 39]: "I must not boast
while I am addressing one man. "
But if we take the word glory in a broader sense, it not only consists
in the knowledge of many, but also in the knowledge of few, or of one,
or of oneself alone, as when one considers one's own good as being
worthy of praise. Now it is not a sin to know and approve one's own
good: for it is written (1 Cor. 2:12): "Now we have received not the
spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God that we may know
the things that are given us from God. " Likewise it is not a sin to be
willing to approve one's own good works: for it is written (Mat. 5:16):
"Let your light shine before men. " Hence the desire for glory does not,
of itself, denote a sin: but the desire for empty or vain glory denotes
a sin: for it is sinful to desire anything vain, according to Ps. 4:3,
"Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying? "
Now glory may be called vain in three ways. First, on the part of the
thing for which one seeks glory: as when a man seeks glory for that
which is unworthy of glory, for instance when he seeks it for something
frail and perishable: secondly, on the part of him from whom he seeks
glory, for instance a man whose judgment is uncertain: thirdly, on the
part of the man himself who seeks glory, for that he does not refer the
desire of his own glory to a due end, such as God's honor, or the
spiritual welfare of his neighbor.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says on Jn. 13:13, "You call Me
Master and Lord; and you say well" (Tract. lviii in Joan. ):
"Self-complacency is fraught with danger of one who has to beware of
pride. But He Who is above all, however much He may praise Himself,
does not uplift Himself. For knowledge of God is our need, not His: nor
does any man know Him unless he be taught of Him Who knows. " It is
therefore evident that God seeks glory, not for His own sake, but for
ours. In like manner a man may rightly seek his own glory for the good
of others, according to Mat. 5:16, "That they may see your good works,
and glorify your Father Who is in heaven. "
Reply to Objection 2: That which we receive from God is not vain but
true glory: it is this glory that is promised as a reward for good
works, and of which it is written (2 Cor. 10:17,18): "He that glorieth
let him glory in the Lord, for not he who commendeth himself is
approved, but he whom God commendeth. " It is true that some are
heartened to do works of virtue, through desire for human glory, as
also through the desire for other earthly goods. Yet he is not truly
virtuous who does virtuous deeds for the sake of human glory, as
Augustine proves (De Civ. Dei v).
Reply to Objection 3: It is requisite for man's perfection that he
should know himself; but not that he should be known by others,
wherefore it is not to be desired in itself. It may, however, be
desired as being useful for something, either in order that God may be
glorified by men, or that men may become better by reason of the good
they know to be in another man, or in order that man, knowing by the
testimony of others' praise the good which is in him, may himself
strive to persevere therein and to become better. In this sense it is
praiseworthy that a man should "take care of his good name," and that
he should "provide good things in the sight of God and men": but not
that he should take an empty pleasure in human praise.
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Whether vainglory is opposed to magnanimity?
Objection 1: It seems that vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.
For, as stated above [3365](A[1]), vainglory consists in glorying in
things that are not, which pertains to falsehood; or in earthly and
perishable things, which pertains to covetousness; or in the testimony
of men, whose judgment is uncertain, which pertains to imprudence. Now
these vices are not contrary to magnanimity. Therefore vainglory is not
opposed to magnanimity.
Objection 2: Further, vainglory is not, like pusillanimity, opposed to
magnanimity by way of deficiency, for this seems inconsistent with
vainglory. Nor is it opposed to it by way of excess, for in this way
presumption and ambition are opposed to magnanimity, as stated above
([3366]Q[130], A[2];[3367] Q[131], A[2]): and these differ from
vainglory. Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.
Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Phil. 2:3, "Let nothing be done
through contention, neither by vainglory," says: "Some among them were
given to dissension and restlessness, contending with one another for
the sake of vainglory. " But contention [*Cf. Q[38]] is not opposed to
magnanimity. Neither therefore is vainglory.
On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading,
"Magnanimity consists in two things: We should beware of the desire for
glory, since it enslaves the mind, which a magnanimous man should ever
strive to keep untrammeled. " Therefore it is opposed to magnanimity.
I answer that, As stated above ([3368]Q[103], A[1], ad 3), glory is an
effect of honor and praise: because from the fact that a man is
praised, or shown any kind of reverence, he acquires charity in the
knowledge of others. And since magnanimity is about honor, as stated
above ([3369]Q[129], AA[1],2), it follows that it also is about glory:
seeing that as a man uses honor moderately, so too does he use glory in
moderation. Wherefore inordinate desire of glory is directly opposed to
magnanimity.
Reply to Objection 1: To think so much of little things as to glory in
them is itself opposed to magnanimity. Wherefore it is said of the
magnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that honor is of little account to him. In
like manner he thinks little of other things that are sought for
honor's sake, such as power and wealth. Likewise it is inconsistent
with magnanimity to glory in things that are not; wherefore it is said
of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that he cares more for truth than
for opinion. Again it is incompatible with magnanimity for a man to
glory in the testimony of human praise, as though he deemed this
something great; wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic.
iv), that he cares not to be praised. And so, when a man looks upon
little things as though they were great, nothing hinders this from
being contrary to magnanimity, as well as to other virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: He that is desirous of vainglory does in truth
fall short of being magnanimous, because he glories in what the
magnanimous man thinks little of, as stated in the preceding Reply. But
if we consider his estimate, he is opposed to the magnanimous man by
way of excess, because the glory which he seeks is something great in
his estimation, and he tends thereto in excess of his deserts.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3370]Q[127], A[2], ad 2), the
opposition of vices does not depend on their effects. Nevertheless
contention, if done intentionally, is opposed to magnanimity: since no
one contends save for what he deems great. Wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the magnanimous man is not contentious,
because nothing is great in his estimation.
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Whether vainglory is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that vainglory is a mortal sin. For nothing
precludes the eternal reward except a mortal sin. Now vainglory
precludes the eternal reward: for it is written (Mat. 6:1): "Take heed,
that you do not give justice before men, to be seen by them: otherwise
you shall not have a reward of your Father Who is in heaven. " Therefore
vainglory is a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, whoever appropriates to himself that which is
proper to God, sins mortally. Now by desiring vainglory, a man
appropriates to himself that which is proper to God. For it is written
(Is. 42:8): "I will not give My glory to another," and (1 Tim. 1:17):
"To . . . the only God be honor and glory. " Therefore vainglory is a
mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, apparently a sin is mortal if it be most
dangerous and harmful. Now vainglory is a sin of this kind, because a
gloss of Augustine on 1 Thess. 2:4, "God, Who proveth our hearts,"
says: "Unless a man war against the love of human glory he does not
perceive its baneful power, for though it be easy for anyone not to
desire praise as long as one does not get it, it is difficult not to
take pleasure in it, when it is given. " Chrysostom also says (Hom. xix
in Matth. ) that "vainglory enters secretly, and robs us insensibly of
all our inward possessions.
magnanimity. Therefore confidence does not belong to magnanimity.
Objection 2: Further, confidence seems to be opposed to fear, according
to Is. 12:2, "I will deal confidently and will not fear. " But to be
without fear seems more akin to fortitude. Therefore confidence also
belongs to fortitude rather than to magnanimity.
Objection 3: Further, reward is not due except to virtue. But a reward
is due to confidence, according to Heb. 3:6, where it is said that we
are the house of Christ, "if we hold fast the confidence and glory of
hope unto the end. " Therefore confidence is a virtue distinct from
magnanimity: and this is confirmed by the fact that Macrobius
enumerates it with magnanimity (In Somn. Scip. i).
On the contrary, Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii) seems to substitute
confidence for magnanimity, as stated above in the preceding Question
(ad 6) and in the prologue to this.
I answer that, Confidence takes its name from "fides" [faith]: and it
belongs to faith to believe something and in somebody. But confidence
belongs to hope, according to Job 11:18, "Thou shalt have confidence,
hope being set before thee. " Wherefore confidence apparently denotes
chiefly that a man derives hope through believing the word of one who
promises to help him. Since, however, faith signifies also a strong
opinion, and since one may come to have a strong opinion about
something, not only on account of another's statement, but also on
account of something we observe in another, it follows that confidence
may denote the hope of having something, which hope we conceive through
observing something either in oneself---for instance, through observing
that he is healthy, a man is confident that he will live long. or in
another, for instance, through observing that another is friendly to
him and powerful, a man is confident that he will receive help from
him.
Now it has been stated above (A[1], ad 2) that magnanimity is chiefly
about the hope of something difficult. Wherefore, since confidence
denotes a certain strength of hope arising from some observation which
gives one a strong opinion that one will obtain a certain good, it
follows that confidence belongs to magnanimity.
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), it
belongs to the "magnanimous to need nothing," for need is a mark of the
deficient. But this is to be understood according to the mode of a man,
hence he adds "or scarcely anything. " For it surpasses man to need
nothing at all. For every man needs, first, the Divine assistance,
secondly, even human assistance, since man is naturally a social
animal, for he is sufficient by himself to provide for his own life.
Accordingly, in so far as he needs others, it belongs to a magnanimous
man to have confidence in others, for it is also a point of excellence
in a man that he should have at hand those who are able to be of
service to him. And in so far as his own ability goes, it belongs to a
magnanimous man to be confident in himself.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3353]FS, Q[23], A[2]; [3354]FS,
Q[40], A[4]), when we were treating of the passions, hope is directly
opposed to despair, because the latter is about the same object, namely
good. But as regards contrariety of objects it is opposed to fear,
because the latter's object is evil. Now confidence denotes a certain
strength of hope, wherefore it is opposed to fear even as hope is.
Since, however, fortitude properly strengthens a man in respect of
evil, and magnanimity in respect of the obtaining of good, it follows
that confidence belongs more properly to magnanimity than to fortitude.
Yet because hope causes daring, which belongs to fortitude, it follows
in consequence that confidence pertains to fortitude.
Reply to Objection 3: Confidence, as stated above, denotes a certain
mode of hope: for confidence is hope strengthened by a strong opinion.
Now the mode applied to an affection may call for commendation of the
act, so that it become meritorious, yet it is not this that draws it to
a species of virtue, but its matter. Hence, properly speaking,
confidence cannot denote a virtue, though it may denote the conditions
of a virtue. For this reason it is reckoned among the parts of
fortitude, not as an annexed virtue, except as identified with
magnanimity by Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii), but as an integral part, as
stated in the preceding Question.
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Whether security belongs to magnanimity?
Objection 1: It seems that security does not belong to magnanimity. For
security, as stated above (Q[128], ad 6), denotes freedom from the
disturbance of fear. But fortitude does this most effectively.
Wherefore security is seemingly the same as fortitude. But fortitude
does not belong to magnanimity; rather the reverse is the case. Neither
therefore does security belong to magnanimity.
Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man "is said to be
secure because he is without care. " But this seems to be contrary to
virtue, which has a care for honorable things, according to 2 Tim.
2:15, "Carefully study to present thyself approved unto God. " Therefore
security does not belong to magnanimity, which does great things in all
the virtues.
Objection 3: Further, virtue is not its own reward. But security is
accounted the reward of virtue, according to Job 11:14,18, "If thou
wilt put away from thee the iniquity that is in thy hand . . . being
buried thou shalt sleep secure. " Therefore security does not belong to
magnanimity or to any other virtue, as a part thereof.
On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading:
"Magnanimity consists of two things," that "it belongs to magnanimity
to give way neither to a troubled mind, nor to man, nor to fortune. "
But a man's security consists in this. Therefore security belongs to
magnanimity.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear makes a man
take counsel," because, to wit he takes care to avoid what he fears.
Now security takes its name from the removal of this care, of which
fear is the cause: wherefore security denotes perfect freedom of the
mind from fear, just as confidence denotes strength of hope. Now, as
hope directly belongs to magnanimity, so fear directly regards
fortitude. Wherefore as confidence belongs immediately to magnanimity,
so security belongs immediately to fortitude.
It must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause of daring, so
is fear the cause of despair, as stated above when we were treating of
the passion ([3355]FS, Q[45], A[2]). Wherefore as confidence belongs
indirectly to fortitude, in so far as it makes use of daring, so
security belongs indirectly to magnanimity, in so far as it banishes
despair.
Reply to Objection 1: Fortitude is chiefly commended, not because it
banishes fear, which belongs to security, but because it denotes a
firmness of mind in the matter of the passion. Wherefore security is
not the same as fortitude, but is a condition thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: Not all security is worthy of praise but only
when one puts care aside, as one ought, and in things when one should
not fear: in this way it is a condition of fortitude and of
magnanimity.
Reply to Objection 3: There is in the virtues a certain likeness to,
and participation of, future happiness, as stated above ([3356]FS,
Q[5], AA[3],7). Hence nothing hinders a certain security from being a
condition of a virtue, although perfect security belongs to virtue's
reward.
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Whether goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity?
Objection 1: It seems that goods of fortune do not conduce to
magnanimity. For according to Seneca (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi):
"virtue suffices for itself. " Now magnanimity takes every virtue great,
as stated above (A[4], ad 3). Therefore goods of fortune do not conduce
to magnanimity.
Objection 2: Further, no virtuous man despises what is helpful to him.
But the magnanimous man despises whatever pertains to goods of fortune:
for Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: "Magnanimity consists
of two things," that "a great soul is commended for despising external
things. " Therefore a magnanimous man is not helped by goods of fortune.
Objection 3: Further, Tully adds (De Offic. i) that "it belongs to a
great soul so to bear what seems troublesome, as nowise to depart from
his natural estate, or from the dignity of a wise man. " And Aristotle
says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "a magnanimous man does not grieve at
misfortune. " Now troubles and misfortunes are opposed to goods of
fortune, for every one grieves at the loss of what is helpful to him.
Therefore external goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "good fortune
seems to conduce to magnanimity. "
I answer that, As stated above [3357](A[1]), magnanimity regards two
things: honor as its matter, and the accomplishment of something great
as its end. Now goods of fortune conduce to both these things. For
since honor is conferred on the virtuous, not only by the wise, but
also by the multitude who hold these goods of fortune in the highest
esteem, the result is that they show greater honor to those who possess
goods of fortune. Likewise goods of fortune are useful organs or
instruments of virtuous deeds: since we can easily accomplish things by
means of riches, power and friends. Hence it is evident that goods of
fortune conduce to magnanimity.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is said to be sufficient for itself,
because it can be without even these external goods; yet it needs them
in order to act more expeditiously.
Reply to Objection 2: The magnanimous man despises external goods,
inasmuch as he does not think them so great as to be bound to do
anything unbecoming for their sake. Yet he does not despise them, but
that he esteems them useful for the accomplishment of virtuous deeds.
Reply to Objection 3: If a man does not think much of a thing, he is
neither very joyful at obtaining it, nor very grieved at losing it.
Wherefore, since the magnanimous man does not think much of external
goods, that is goods of fortune, he is neither much uplifted by them if
he has them, nor much cast down by their loss.
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OF PRESUMPTION (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to magnanimity; and in the first
place, those that are opposed thereto by excess. These are three,
namely, presumption, ambition, and vainglory. Secondly, we shall
consider pusillanimity which is opposed to it by way of deficiency.
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether presumption is a sin?
(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether presumption is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that presumption is not a sin. For the Apostle
says: "Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch forth [Vulg. :
'and stretching forth'] myself to those that are before. " But it seems
to savor of presumption that one should tend to what is above oneself.
Therefore presumption is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 7) "we should not
listen to those who would persuade us to relish human things because we
are men, or mortal things because we are mortal, but we should relish
those that make us immortal": and (Metaph. i) "that man should pursue
divine things as far as possible. " Now divine and immortal things are
seemingly far above man. Since then presumption consists essentially in
tending to what is above oneself, it seems that presumption is
something praiseworthy, rather than a sin.
Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:5): "Not that we are
sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves. " If then
presumption, by which one strives at that for which one is not
sufficient, be a sin, it seems that man cannot lawfully even think of
anything good: which is absurd. Therefore presumption is not a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 37:3): "O wicked presumption,
whence camest thou? " and a gloss answers: "From a creature's evil
will. " Now all that comes of the root of an evil will is a sin.
Therefore presumption is a sin.
I answer that, Since whatever is according to nature, is ordered by the
Divine Reason, which human reason ought to imitate, whatever is done in
accordance with human reason in opposition to the order established in
general throughout natural things is vicious and sinful. Now it is
established throughout all natural things, that every action is
commensurate with the power of the agent, nor does any natural agent
strive to do what exceeds its ability. Hence it is vicious and sinful,
as being contrary to the natural order, that any one should assume to
do what is above his power: and this is what is meant by presumption,
as its very name shows. Wherefore it is evident that presumption is a
sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders that which is above the active
power of a natural thing, and yet not above the passive power of that
same thing: thus the air is possessed of a passive power by reason of
which it can be so changed as to obtain the action and movement of
fire, which surpass the active power of air. Thus too it would be
sinful and presumptuous for a man while in a state of imperfect virtue
to attempt the immediate accomplishment of what belongs to perfect
virtue. But it is not presumptuous or sinful for a man to endeavor to
advance towards perfect virtue. In this way the Apostle stretched
himself forth to the things that were before him, namely continually
advancing forward.
Reply to Objection 2: Divine and immortal things surpass man according
to the order of nature. Yet man is possessed of a natural power, namely
the intellect, whereby he can be united to immortal and Divine things.
In this respect the Philosopher says that "man ought to pursue immortal
and divine things," not that he should do what it becomes God to do,
but that he should be united to Him in intellect and will.
Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), "what we
can do by the help of others we can do by ourselves in a sense. " Hence
since we can think and do good by the help of God, this is not
altogether above our ability. Hence it is not presumptuous for a man to
attempt the accomplishment of a virtuous deed: but it would be
presumptuous if one were to make the attempt without confidence in
God's assistance.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess?
Objection 1: It seems that presumption is not opposed to magnanimity by
excess. For presumption is accounted a species of the sin against the
Holy Ghost, as stated above ([3358]Q[14], A[2];[3359] Q[21], A[1]). But
the sin against the Holy Ghost is not opposed to magnanimity, but to
charity. Neither therefore is presumption opposed to magnanimity.
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to magnanimity that one should deem
oneself worthy of great things. But a man is said to be presumptuous
even if he deem himself worthy of small things, if they surpass his
ability. Therefore presumption is not directly opposed to magnanimity.
Objection 3: Further, the magnanimous man looks upon external goods as
little things. Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), "on
account of external fortune the presumptuous disdain and wrong others,
because they deem external goods as something great. " Therefore
presumption is opposed to magnanimity, not by excess, but only by
deficiency.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 3) that the
"vain man," i. e. a vaporer or a wind-bag, which with us denotes a
presumptuous man, "is opposed to the magnanimous man by excess. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3360]Q[129], A[3], ad 1), magnanimity
observes the means, not as regards the quantity of that to which it
tends, but in proportion to our own ability: for it does not tend to
anything greater than is becoming to us.
Now the presumptuous man, as regards that to which he tends, does not
exceed the magnanimous, but sometimes falls far short of him: but he
does exceed in proportion to his own ability, whereas the magnanimous
man does not exceed his. It is in this way that presumption is opposed
to magnanimity by excess.
Reply to Objection 1: It is not every presumption that is accounted a
sin against the Holy Ghost, but that by which one contemns the Divine
justice through inordinate confidence in the Divine mercy. The latter
kind of presumption, by reason of its matter, inasmuch, to wit, as it
implies contempt of something Divine, is opposed to charity, or rather
to the gift of fear, whereby we revere God. Nevertheless, in so far as
this contempt exceeds the proportion to one's own ability, it can be
opposed to magnanimity.
Reply to Objection 2: Presumption, like magnanimity, seems to tend to
something great. For we are not, as a rule, wont to call a man
presumptuous for going beyond his powers in something small. If,
however, such a man be called presumptuous, this kind of presumption is
not opposed to magnanimity, but to that virtue which is about ordinary
honor, as stated above ([3361]Q[129], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: No one attempts what is above his ability, except
in so far as he deems his ability greater than it is. In this one may
err in two ways. First only as regards quantity, as when a man thinks
he has greater virtue, or knowledge, or the like, than he has.
Secondly, as regards the kind of thing, as when he thinks himself
great, and worthy of great things, by reason of something that does not
make him so, for instance by reason of riches or goods of fortune. For,
as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), "those who have these things
without virtue, neither justly deem themselves worthy of great things,
nor are rightly called magnanimous. "
Again, the thing to which a man sometimes tends in excess of his
ability, is sometimes in very truth something great, simply as in the
case of Peter, whose intent was to suffer for Christ, which has
exceeded his power; while sometimes it is something great, not simply,
but only in the opinion of fools, such as wearing costly clothes,
despising and wronging others. This savors of an excess of magnanimity,
not in any truth, but in people's opinion. Hence Seneca says (De Quat.
Virtut. ) that "when magnanimity exceeds its measure, it makes a man
high-handed, proud, haughty restless, and bent on excelling in all
things, whether in words or in deeds, without any considerations of
virtue. " Thus it is evident that the presumptuous man sometimes falls
short of the magnanimous in reality, although in appearance he
surpasses him.
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OF AMBITION (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider ambition: and under this head there are two points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a sin?
(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether ambition is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that ambition is not a sin. For ambition denotes
the desire of honor. Now honor is in itself a good thing, and the
greatest of external goods: wherefore those who care not for honor are
reproved. Therefore ambition is not a sin; rather is it something
deserving of praise, in so far as a good is laudably desired.
Objection 2: Further, anyone may, without sin, desire what is due to
him as a reward. Now honor is the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. i, 12; iv, 3; viii, 14). Therefore ambition of honor is
not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, that which heartens a man to do good and
disheartens him from doing evil, is not a sin. Now honor heartens men
to do good and to avoid evil; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8)
that "with the bravest men, cowards are held in dishonor, and the brave
in honor": and Tully says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that "honor fosters the
arts. " Therefore ambition is not a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 13:5) that "charity is not
ambitious, seeketh not her own. " Now nothing is contrary to charity,
except sin. Therefore ambition is a sin.
I answer that, As stated above ([3362]Q[103], AA[1],2), honor denotes
reverence shown to a person in witness of his excellence.
Now two
things have to be considered with regard to man's honor. The first is
that a man has not from himself the thing in which he excels, for this
is, as it were, something Divine in him, wherefore on this count honor
is due principally, not to him but to God. The second point that calls
for observation is that the thing in which man excels is given to him
by God, that he may profit others thereby: wherefore a man ought so far
to be pleased that others bear witness to his excellence, as this
enables him to profit others.
Now the desire of honor may be inordinate in three ways. First, when a
man desires recognition of an excellence which he has not: this is to
desire more than his share of honor. Secondly, when a man desires honor
for himself without referring it to God. Thirdly, when a man's appetite
rests in honor itself, without referring it to the profit of others.
Since then ambition denotes inordinate desire of honor, it is evident
that it is always a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The desire for good should be regulated according
to reason, and if it exceed this rule it will be sinful. In this way it
is sinful to desire honor in disaccord with the order of reason. Now
those are reproved who care not for honor in accordance with reason's
dictate that they should avoid what is contrary to honor.
Reply to Objection 2: Honor is not the reward of virtue, as regards the
virtuous man, in this sense that he should seek for it as his reward:
since the reward he seeks is happiness, which is the end of virtue. But
it is said to be the reward of virtue as regards others, who have
nothing greater than honor whereby to reward the virtuous; which honor
derives greatness from the very fact that it bears witness to virtue.
Hence it is evident that it is not an adequate reward, as stated in
Ethic. iv, 3.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as some are heartened to do good and
disheartened from doing evil, by the desire of honor, if this be
desired in due measure; so, if it be desired inordinately, it may
become to man an occasion of doing many evil things, as when a man
cares not by what means he obtains honor. Wherefore Sallust says
(Catilin. ) that "the good as well as the wicked covet honors for
themselves, but the one," i. e. the good, "go about it in the right
way," whereas "the other," i. e. the wicked, "through lack of the good
arts, make use of deceit and falsehood. " Yet they who, merely for the
sake of honor, either do good or avoid evil, are not virtuous,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8), where he says that they
who do brave things for the sake of honor are not truly brave.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess?
Objection 1: It seems that ambition is not opposed to magnanimity by
excess. For one mean has only one extreme opposed to it on the one
side. Now presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess as stated
above ([3363]Q[130], A[2]). Therefore ambition is not opposed to it by
excess.
Objection 2: Further, magnanimity is about honors; whereas ambition
seems to regard positions of dignity: for it is written (2 Macc. 4:7)
that "Jason ambitiously sought the high priesthood. " Therefore ambition
is not opposed to magnanimity.
Objection 3: Further, ambition seems to regard outward show: for it is
written (Acts 25:27) that "Agrippa and Berenice . . . with great pomp
[ambitione]. . . had entered into the hall of audience" [*'Praetorium. '
The Vulgate has 'auditorium,' but the meaning is the same], and (2
Para. 16:14) that when Asa died they "burned spices and . . . ointments
over his body" with very great pomp [ambitione]. But magnanimity is not
about outward show. Therefore ambition is not opposed to magnanimity.
On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) that "the more a man exceeds
in magnanimity, the more he desires himself alone to dominate others. "
But this pertains to ambition. Therefore ambition denotes an excess of
magnanimity.
I answer that, As stated above [3364](A[1]), ambition signifies
inordinate love of honor. Now magnanimity is about honors and makes use
of them in a becoming manner. Wherefore it is evident that ambition is
opposed to magnanimity as the inordinate to that which is well ordered.
Reply to Objection 1: Magnanimity regards two things. It regards one as
its end, in so far as it is some great deed that the magnanimous man
attempts in proportion to his ability. In this way presumption is
opposed to magnanimity by excess: because the presumptuous man attempts
great deeds beyond his ability. The other thing that magnanimity
regards is its matter, viz. honor, of which it makes right use: and in
this way ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess. Nor is it
impossible for one mean to be exceeded in various respects.
Reply to Objection 2: Honor is due to those who are in a position of
dignity, on account of a certain excellence of their estate: and
accordingly inordinate desire for positions of dignity pertains to
ambition. For if a man were to have an inordinate desire for a position
of dignity, not for the sake of honor, but for the sake of a right use
of a dignity exceeding his ability, he would not be ambitious but
presumptuous.
Reply to Objection 3: The very solemnity of outward worship is a kind
of honor, wherefore in such cases honor is wont to be shown. This is
signified by the words of James 2:2,3: "If there shall come into your
assembly a man having a golden ring, in fine apparel . . . and you . .
. shall say to him: Sit thou here well," etc. Wherefore ambition does
not regard outward worship, except in so far as this is a kind of
honor.
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OF VAINGLORY (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider vainglory: under which head there are five points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether desire of glory is a sin?
(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is a capital vice?
(5) Of its daughters.
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Whether the desire of glory is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that the desire of glory is not a sin. For no one
sins in being likened to God: in fact we are commanded (Eph. 5:1): "Be
ye . . . followers of God, as most dear children. " Now by seeking glory
man seems to imitate God, Who seeks glory from men: wherefore it is
written (Is. 43:6,7): "Bring My sons from afar, and My daughters from
the ends of the earth. And every one that calleth on My name, I have
created him for My glory. " Therefore the desire for glory is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, that which incites a mar to do good is apparently
not a sin. Now the desire of glory incites men to do good. For Tully
says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that "glory inflames every man to strive his
utmost": and in Holy Writ glory is promised for good works, according
to Rom. 2:7: "To them, indeed, who according to patience in good work .
. . glory and honor" [*Vulg. : 'Who will render to every man according
to his works, to them indeed who . . . seek glory and honor and
incorruption, eternal life. ']. Therefore the desire for glory is not a
sin.
Objection 3: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that glory is
"consistent good report about a person, together with praise": and this
comes to the same as what Augustine says (Contra Maximin. iii), viz.
that glory is, "as it were, clear knowledge with praise. " Now it is no
sin to desire praiseworthy renown: indeed, it seems itself to call for
praise, according to Ecclus. 41:15, "Take care of a good name," and
Rom. 12:17, "Providing good things not only in the sight of God, but
also in the sight of all men. " Therefore the desire of vainglory is not
a sin.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v): "He is better advised
who acknowledges that even the love of praise is sinful. "
I answer that, Glory signifies a certain clarity, wherefore Augustine
says (Tract. lxxxii, c, cxiv in Joan. ) that to be "glorified is the
same as to be clarified. " Now clarity and comeliness imply a certain
display: wherefore the word glory properly denotes the display of
something as regards its seeming comely in the sight of men, whether it
be a bodily or a spiritual good. Since, however, that which is clear
simply can be seen by many, and by those who are far away, it follows
that the word glory properly denotes that somebody's good is known and
approved by many, according to the saying of Sallust (Catilin. ) [*The
quotation is from Livy: Hist. , Lib. XXII C, 39]: "I must not boast
while I am addressing one man. "
But if we take the word glory in a broader sense, it not only consists
in the knowledge of many, but also in the knowledge of few, or of one,
or of oneself alone, as when one considers one's own good as being
worthy of praise. Now it is not a sin to know and approve one's own
good: for it is written (1 Cor. 2:12): "Now we have received not the
spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God that we may know
the things that are given us from God. " Likewise it is not a sin to be
willing to approve one's own good works: for it is written (Mat. 5:16):
"Let your light shine before men. " Hence the desire for glory does not,
of itself, denote a sin: but the desire for empty or vain glory denotes
a sin: for it is sinful to desire anything vain, according to Ps. 4:3,
"Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying? "
Now glory may be called vain in three ways. First, on the part of the
thing for which one seeks glory: as when a man seeks glory for that
which is unworthy of glory, for instance when he seeks it for something
frail and perishable: secondly, on the part of him from whom he seeks
glory, for instance a man whose judgment is uncertain: thirdly, on the
part of the man himself who seeks glory, for that he does not refer the
desire of his own glory to a due end, such as God's honor, or the
spiritual welfare of his neighbor.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says on Jn. 13:13, "You call Me
Master and Lord; and you say well" (Tract. lviii in Joan. ):
"Self-complacency is fraught with danger of one who has to beware of
pride. But He Who is above all, however much He may praise Himself,
does not uplift Himself. For knowledge of God is our need, not His: nor
does any man know Him unless he be taught of Him Who knows. " It is
therefore evident that God seeks glory, not for His own sake, but for
ours. In like manner a man may rightly seek his own glory for the good
of others, according to Mat. 5:16, "That they may see your good works,
and glorify your Father Who is in heaven. "
Reply to Objection 2: That which we receive from God is not vain but
true glory: it is this glory that is promised as a reward for good
works, and of which it is written (2 Cor. 10:17,18): "He that glorieth
let him glory in the Lord, for not he who commendeth himself is
approved, but he whom God commendeth. " It is true that some are
heartened to do works of virtue, through desire for human glory, as
also through the desire for other earthly goods. Yet he is not truly
virtuous who does virtuous deeds for the sake of human glory, as
Augustine proves (De Civ. Dei v).
Reply to Objection 3: It is requisite for man's perfection that he
should know himself; but not that he should be known by others,
wherefore it is not to be desired in itself. It may, however, be
desired as being useful for something, either in order that God may be
glorified by men, or that men may become better by reason of the good
they know to be in another man, or in order that man, knowing by the
testimony of others' praise the good which is in him, may himself
strive to persevere therein and to become better. In this sense it is
praiseworthy that a man should "take care of his good name," and that
he should "provide good things in the sight of God and men": but not
that he should take an empty pleasure in human praise.
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Whether vainglory is opposed to magnanimity?
Objection 1: It seems that vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.
For, as stated above [3365](A[1]), vainglory consists in glorying in
things that are not, which pertains to falsehood; or in earthly and
perishable things, which pertains to covetousness; or in the testimony
of men, whose judgment is uncertain, which pertains to imprudence. Now
these vices are not contrary to magnanimity. Therefore vainglory is not
opposed to magnanimity.
Objection 2: Further, vainglory is not, like pusillanimity, opposed to
magnanimity by way of deficiency, for this seems inconsistent with
vainglory. Nor is it opposed to it by way of excess, for in this way
presumption and ambition are opposed to magnanimity, as stated above
([3366]Q[130], A[2];[3367] Q[131], A[2]): and these differ from
vainglory. Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.
Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Phil. 2:3, "Let nothing be done
through contention, neither by vainglory," says: "Some among them were
given to dissension and restlessness, contending with one another for
the sake of vainglory. " But contention [*Cf. Q[38]] is not opposed to
magnanimity. Neither therefore is vainglory.
On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading,
"Magnanimity consists in two things: We should beware of the desire for
glory, since it enslaves the mind, which a magnanimous man should ever
strive to keep untrammeled. " Therefore it is opposed to magnanimity.
I answer that, As stated above ([3368]Q[103], A[1], ad 3), glory is an
effect of honor and praise: because from the fact that a man is
praised, or shown any kind of reverence, he acquires charity in the
knowledge of others. And since magnanimity is about honor, as stated
above ([3369]Q[129], AA[1],2), it follows that it also is about glory:
seeing that as a man uses honor moderately, so too does he use glory in
moderation. Wherefore inordinate desire of glory is directly opposed to
magnanimity.
Reply to Objection 1: To think so much of little things as to glory in
them is itself opposed to magnanimity. Wherefore it is said of the
magnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that honor is of little account to him. In
like manner he thinks little of other things that are sought for
honor's sake, such as power and wealth. Likewise it is inconsistent
with magnanimity to glory in things that are not; wherefore it is said
of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that he cares more for truth than
for opinion. Again it is incompatible with magnanimity for a man to
glory in the testimony of human praise, as though he deemed this
something great; wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic.
iv), that he cares not to be praised. And so, when a man looks upon
little things as though they were great, nothing hinders this from
being contrary to magnanimity, as well as to other virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: He that is desirous of vainglory does in truth
fall short of being magnanimous, because he glories in what the
magnanimous man thinks little of, as stated in the preceding Reply. But
if we consider his estimate, he is opposed to the magnanimous man by
way of excess, because the glory which he seeks is something great in
his estimation, and he tends thereto in excess of his deserts.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3370]Q[127], A[2], ad 2), the
opposition of vices does not depend on their effects. Nevertheless
contention, if done intentionally, is opposed to magnanimity: since no
one contends save for what he deems great. Wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the magnanimous man is not contentious,
because nothing is great in his estimation.
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Whether vainglory is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that vainglory is a mortal sin. For nothing
precludes the eternal reward except a mortal sin. Now vainglory
precludes the eternal reward: for it is written (Mat. 6:1): "Take heed,
that you do not give justice before men, to be seen by them: otherwise
you shall not have a reward of your Father Who is in heaven. " Therefore
vainglory is a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, whoever appropriates to himself that which is
proper to God, sins mortally. Now by desiring vainglory, a man
appropriates to himself that which is proper to God. For it is written
(Is. 42:8): "I will not give My glory to another," and (1 Tim. 1:17):
"To . . . the only God be honor and glory. " Therefore vainglory is a
mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, apparently a sin is mortal if it be most
dangerous and harmful. Now vainglory is a sin of this kind, because a
gloss of Augustine on 1 Thess. 2:4, "God, Who proveth our hearts,"
says: "Unless a man war against the love of human glory he does not
perceive its baneful power, for though it be easy for anyone not to
desire praise as long as one does not get it, it is difficult not to
take pleasure in it, when it is given. " Chrysostom also says (Hom. xix
in Matth. ) that "vainglory enters secretly, and robs us insensibly of
all our inward possessions.
