No More Learning

Reason affords no good grounds for admitting the existence of intelligible beings, or of intelligible properties of sensuous things, although --as we have no conception either of their possibility or of their impossibility--it will always be out of our power to affirm dogmatically that they do not exist.
In the explanation of given phsenomena, no other things and no other grounds of explanation can be employed, than those which stand in connection with the given phsenomena according to the known laws of experience. A transcendental hypothesis, in which a mere idea of reason is employd to ex plain the phsenomena of nature, would not give us any better insight into a phenomenon, as we should be trying to ex plain what we do not sufficiently understand from known em pirical principles, by what we do not understand at all. The- principle of such a hypothesis might conduce to the satisfac tion of reason, but it would not assist the understanding in its application to objects. Order and conformity to aims in the sphere of nature must be themselves explained upon natural grounds and according to natural laws ; and the wild est hypotheses, if they are only physical, are here more ad missible than a hyperphysical hypothesis, such as that of a divine author. For such a hypothesis would introduce the principle of ignaea ratio, w? iich requires us to giv<< up the
? ? ? ? 470 TBANSCENDEHTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD.
search for causes that might be discovered in the course of experience, and to rest satisfied with a mere idea. As regards the absolute totality of the grounds of explanation in the series of these causes, this can be no hindrance to the understanding in the case of phenomena ; because, as they are to us nothing more than phsenomena, we have no right to look for anything like completeness in the synthesis of the series of their con ditions.
Transcendental hypotheses are therefore inadmissible ; and we
cannot use the liberty of employing, in the absence of physical,
hyperphysical grounds of explanation. And this for two reasons ; first, because such hypotheses do not advance reason, but rather stop it in its progress ; secondly, because this licence would render fruitless all its exertions in its own proper sphere, which ia that of experience. For, when the explanation of natural phsenomena happens to be difficult, we have constantly at hand a transcendental ground of explanation, which lifts us above the necessity of investigating nature ; and our in quiries are brought to a close, not because we have obtained all the requisite knowledge, but because we abut upon a principle, which is incomprehensible, and which, indeed, is so far back in the track of thought, as to contain the conception of the absolutely primal being.
The next requisite for the admissibility of a hypothesis is its sufficiency. That must determine priori the conse
quences which are given in experience, and which are supposed to follow from the hypothesis itself. If we require to employ
auxiliary hypotheses, the suspicion naturally arises that they are mere fictions because the necessity for each of them requires the same justification as in the case of the original hypothesis, and thus their testimony invalid. If we suppose the existence of an infinitely perfect cause, we possess suffi cient grounds for the explanation of the conformity to aims, the order and the greatness which we observe the universe but we find ourselves obliged, when we observe the evil in the world and the exceptions to these laws, to employ new hypo theses in support of the original one. We employ the idea of the simple nature of the human soul as the foundation of all the theories we may form of its phenomena but when we meet with difficulties in our way, when we observe in the soul phsenomena similar to the changes which take place
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matter, we require to call in new auxiliary hypotheses. These may, inched, not be false, but we do not kuow them to be true, because the only witness to their certitude is the hypothesis which they themselves have been called in to explain.
We are not discussing the above-mentioned assertions re
garding the immaterial unity of the soul and the existence of
a Supreme Being, as dogmata, which certain philosophers pro
fess to demonstrate a priori, but purely as hypotheses. In the
former case, the dogmatist must take care that his arguments
possess the apodeictic certainty of a demonstration. For thf
assertion that the reality of such ideas is probable, is as absurd
as a proof of the probability of a proposition in geometry. Pure abstract reason, apart from all experience, can either cog
nize a proposition entirely a priori, and as necessary, or it can cognize nothing at all ; and hence the judgments it enounces are never mere opinions, they are either apodeictic certainties, or declarations that nothing can be known on the subject. Opinions and probable judgments on the nature of things can only be employed to explain given phenomena, or they may relate to the effect, in accordance with empirical laws, of an actually existing cause. In other words, we must restrict the sphere of opinion to the world of experience and nature. Beyond this region opinion is mere invention ; unless we are groping about for the truth on a path not yet fully known, and have some hopes of stumbling upon it by chance.
But, although hypotheses are inadmissible in answers to the questions of pure speculative reason, they may be em ployed in the defence of these answers. That is to say, hypo theses are admissible in polemic, but not in the sphere of dogmatism. By the defenee of statements of this character, I do not mean an attempt at discovering new grounds for their support, but merely the refutation of the arguments of opponents. All a priori synthetical propositions possess the peculiarity, that, although the philosopher who maintains the reality of the ideas contained in the proposition, is not in pos session of sufficient knowledge to establish the certainty of his statements, his opponent is as little able to prove the truth of the opposite. This equality of fortune does not Allow the one party to be superior to the other in the sphere of specu lative cognition ; and it is this sphere accordingly that is the proper arena of these endless speculative conflicts. But we
? ? ? ? 472 rBAKSCENDENTAl DOCTB1NE OF METHOD.
shall afterwards show that, in relation to its practical exercise, Reason has the right of admitting what, in the field of pure speculation, she would not be justified in supposing, except upon perfectly sufficient grounds ; because all such supposi
tions destroy the necessary completeness of speculation --a condition which the practical reason, however, does not con sider to be requisite. Iu this sphere, therefore, Reason is mis tress of a possession, her title to which she does not require to prove --which, in fact, she could not do. The burden of proof accordingly rests upon the opponent. But as he has just as little knowledge regarding the subject discussed, and is as little able to prove the non-existence of the object of mi idea, as the philosopher on the other side is to demonstrate its reality, it is evident that there is an advantage on the side of the philosopher who maintains his proposition as a practi cally necessary supposition (melior est conditio possidentis). For he is at liberty to employ, in self-defence, the same wea pons as his opponent makes use of in attacking him ; that
lie has right to use hypotheses not for the purpose of sup porting the arguments favour of his own propositions, but to show that his opponent knows no more than himself re garding the subject under discussion, and cauuot boast of any
speculative advantage.
Hypotheses are, therefore, admissible the sphere of pure
reason, only as weapons for self-defence, and not as supports to dogmatical assertions. But the opposing party we must always seek for in ourselves. For speculative reason the
sphere of transcendentalism, dialectical initsownnalure. The difficulties and objections we have to fear lie in ourselves. They are like old but never superannuated claims and we must seek them out, and settle them once and for ever, we are to expect permanent peace. External tranquillity hollow and unreal. The root of these contradictions, which lies the nature of human reason, must be destroyed and this can only be done, giving in the first instance, freedom to
? that may send out shoots, and our duty, therefore, to try to discover new objections, to put weapons the hands of
grow, nay, by nourishing thus betray its own existence.
our opponent, and to grant him the most favourable position in the arena that he can wish. We have nothing to fear from these concessions on the contrary, we may rather hope thai
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we shall thus make ourselves master of a possession which no one will ever venture to dispute.
The thinker requires, to be fully equipped, the hypotheses of pure reason, which, although but leaden weapons, (for they have not been steeled in the armoury of experience), are as useful as any that can be employed by his opponents. If, ac cordingly, we have assumed, from a non-speculative point of view, the immaterial nature of the soul, and are met by the ob jection that experience seems to prove that the growth and decay of our mental faculties are mere modifications of the sensuous organism, --we can weaken the force of this objection, by the assumption that the body is nothing but the fundamental phe nomenon, to which, as a necessary condition, all sensibility, and consequently all thought, relates in the present state of our existence ; and that the separation of soul and body forms the conclusion of the sensuous exercise of our power of cog nition, and the beginning of the intellectual. The body
would, in this view of the question, be regarded, not as the cause of thought, but merely as its restrictive condition, as promotive of the sensuoas and animal, but as a hindrance to the pure and spiritual life ; and the dependence of the animal life on the constitution of the body, would not prove that the whole life of man was also dependent on the state of the organism. We might go still farther, and discover new objections, or carry out to their extreme consequences those which have already been adduced.
Generation, in the human race as well as among the ir rational animals, depends on so many accidents --of occasion, of proper sustenance, of the laws enacted by the government of a country, of vice even, that it is difficult to believe in the eternal existence of a being, whose life has begun under cir cumstances so mean and trivial, and so entirely dependent upon our own control. As regards the continuance of the ex istence of the whole race, we need have no difficulties, for accident in single cases is subject to geueral laws ; but, in the case of each individual, it would seem as if we could hardly ex
pect so wonderful an effect from causes so insignificant. But, in answer to these objections, we may adduce the transcendental hypothesis, that all life is properly intelligible, and not subject to changes of time, aud that it neither began in birth, nor will end iu death. We may assume that thi>> life is nothing mon
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than a sensuous representation of pure spiritual life ; that tlie whole world of sense is bnt an image, hovering before the faculty of cognition which we exercise in this sphere, and with no more objective reality than a dream ; and that if we could intuite ourselves and other things as they really are, we should see ourselves in a world of spiritual natures, our connection with which did not begin at our birth, and will not cease with the destruction of the body. And so on.
We cannot be said to know what has been above asserted, nor do we seriously maintain the truth of these assertions ; and the notions therein indicated are not even ideas of reason, they are purely fictitious conceptions. But this hypothetical procedure is in perfect conformity with the laws of reason. Our opponent mistakes the absence of empirical conditions for a proof of the complete impossibility of all that we have as- erted ; and we have to show him that he has not exhausted the whole sphere of possibility, and that he can as little compass that sphere by the laws of experience and nature, as we can . ay a secure foundation for the operations of reason beyond the region of experience. Such hypothetical defences against the pretensions of an opponent must not be regarded as de clarations of opinion. The philosopher abandons them, so soon as the opposite party renounces its dogmatical conceit. To maintain a simply negative position in relation to propo sitions which rest on an insecure foundation, well befits the moderation of a true philosopher ; but to uphold the objections urged against an opponent as proofs of the opposite statement, is a proceeding just as unwarrantable and arrogant as it is to attack the position of a philosopher who advances affirmative propositions regarding such a subject.
It is evident, therefore, that hypotheses, in the speculative sphere, are valid, not as independent propositions, but only relatively to opposite transcendent assumptions. For, to make the principles of possible experience conditions of the possi bility of things in general is just as transcendent a procedure as to maintain the objective reality of ideas which can be ap plied to no objects except such as lie without the limits of possible experience. The judgments enounced by pure reason must be necessary, or they must not be enounced at all. Reason cannot trouble herself with opinions. But the hy potheses we have been discussing ate merely problematical
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judgments, which can neither be confuted nor proved ; while,
therefore, they are not personal opinions, they are indispensable as answers to objections which are liable to be raised. But wo mast take care to confine them to this function, and guard against any assumption on their part of absolute validity, a proceeding which would involve reason in inextricable diffi culties and contradictions.
CHAPTER FIRST.
Section Fourth.
The Discipline of Pure Reason in relation to Proofs.
It is a peculiarity which distinguishes the proofs of tran scendental synthetical propositions from those of all other a priori synthetical cognitions, that reason, in the case of the former, does not apply its conceptions directly to an object, but is first obliged to prove, a priori, the objective validity of these conceptions and the possibility of their syntheses. This is not merely a prudential rule, it is essential to the very possi bility of the proof of a transcendental proposition. If I am required to pass, a priori, beyond the conception of an object, I find that it is utterly impossible without the guidance of something which is not contained in the conception. In mathematics, it is a priori intuition that guides my synthesis ; and, in this case, all our conclusions may be drawn imme diately from pure intuition. In transcendental cognition, so long as we are dealing only with conceptions of the under standing, we are guided by possible experience. That is to say, a proof in the sphere of transcendental cognition does not show that the given conception (that of an event, for ex ample,) leads directly to another conception (that of a cause) --
for this would be a salt us which nothing can justify ; but it shows that experience itself, and consequently the object of experience, is impossible without the connection indicated by these conceptions. It follows that such a proof must demon strate \he possibility of arriving, synthetically and a priori, at a certain knowledge of things, which was not contained in our conceptions of these things. Unless we pay particular attention to this requirement, our proofs, instead of pursuing
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the straight path indicated by reason, follow the tortuous road of mere subjective association. The illusory conviction, which rests upon subjective causes oC^tssociation, and which is con sidered as resulting from the perception of a real and objective natural affinity, is always open to doubt and suspicion. For this reason, all the attempts which have been made to prove the principle of sufficient reason, have, according to the uni versal admission of philosophers, been quite unsuccessful ; and, before the appearance of transcendental criticism, it was considered better, as this principle could not be abandoned, to appeal boldly to the common sense of mankind (a proceed- ing which always proves that the problem, which reason ought to solve, is one in which philosophers find great diffi culties), rather than attempt to discover new dogmatical proofs.
But, if the proposition to be proved is a proposition of pure reason, and if I aim at passing beyond my empirical concep tions by the aid of mere ideas, it is necessary that the proof should first show that such a step in synthesis is possible (which it is not), before it proceeds to prove the truth of the proposition itself. The so-called proof of the simple nature of the soul from the unity of apperception, is a very plausible one. But it contains no answer to the objection, that, as the notion of absolute simplicity is not a conception which is directly applicable to a perception, but is an idea which must be inferred -- if at all -- from observation, it is by no means evident, how the mere fact of consciousness, which is contained in all thought, although in so far a simple representation, can conduct me to the consciousness and cognition of a thing which is purely a thinking substance. When I represent to my mind the power of my body as in motion, my body in this thought is so far absolute unity, and my representation of it is a simple one ; and hence I can indicate this representation by the motion of a point, because I have made abstraction of the size or volume of the body. But I cannot hence infer that, given merely the moving power of a body, the body may be cogitated as simple substance, merely because the representa
tion in my mind takes no account of its content in space, and is consequently simple. The simple, in abstraction, is very different from the objectively simple ; and hence the Ego, which is simple in the first sense, "nay, in the second aense, n>>
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477
indicating the soul itself, be a very complex conception, with a very various content. Thus it is evident, that in all such arguments, there lurks a paralogism. We guess (for without some such surmise our suspicion would not be excited in refer ence to a proof of this character,) at the presence of the paralogism, by keeping ever before us a criterion of the pos sibility of those synthetical propositions which aim at proving more than experience can teach us. This criterion is obtained from the observation that such proofs do not lead us directly from the subject of the proposition to be proved to the required predicate, but find it necessary to presuppose the possibility of extending our cognition a priori by means of ideas. We must, accordingly, always use the greatest caution ; we require,
before attempting any proof, to consider how it is possible to extend the sphere of cognition by the operations of pure reason, and from what source we are to derive knowledge, which is not obtained from the analysis of conceptions, nor
relates, by anticipation, to possible experience. We shall thus spare ourselves much severe and fruitless labour, by 'iot expecting from reason what is beyond its power, or rather by subjecting it to discipline, and teaching it to moderate its vehement desires for the extension of the sphere of cognition.
The first rule for our guidance therefore, not to attempt transcendental proof, before we have considered from what
source we are to derive the principles upon which the proof
to be based, and what right we have to expect that our con clusions from these principles will be veracious. If they are principles of the understanding, vain to expect that we should attain their means to ideas of pure reason for these principles are valid only regard to objects of possible experience. If they are principles of pure reason, our labour
alike in vain. For the principles of reason, employed as
objective, are without exception dialectical, and possess no
validity or truth, except as regulative principles of the syste- . jiatic employment of reason in experience. But when such delusive proofs are presented to us, our duty to meet
them with the non liquet of matured judgment and, although we are unable to expose the particular sophism upon which the proof based, we nave right to demand deduc tion of the principles employed in and, these principles have their origin in pure reason alone, such deduction
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And thus it is unnecessary that we should trouble ourselves with the exposure and confutation of every
sophistical illusion ; we may, at once, bring all dialectic, which is inexhaustible in the production of fallacies, before ihe bar of critical reason, which tests the principles upon which all dialectical procedure is based. The second peculi arity of transcendental proof that transcendental propo sition cannot rest upon more than single proof. If am drawing conclusions, not from conceptions, but from intuition
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DOCTBINB Of MEtHOD.
absolutely impossible.
to conception, be pure intuition, as in mathematics, or empirical, as in natural science, the intuition
which forms the basis of my inferences, presents me with ma
terials for many synthetical propositions, which can connect various modes, while, as allowable to proceed from dif ferent points in the intention, can arrive different paths
at the same proposition.
But every transcendental proposition sets out from con
ception, and posits the synthetical condition of the possibility of an object according to this conception. There must, there fore, be but one ground of proof, because the conception alone which determines the object and thus the proof cannot contain anything more than the determination of the object according to the conception. In our Transcendental Analytic, for example, we inferred the principle, Every event has cause, from the only condition of the objective possibility of our conception of an event. 'This that an event cannot be
experience, unless stands under this dynamical law. This the only possible ground of proof for our conception of an
event possesses objective validity, that is, true conception, only because the law of causality determines an object to which can refer. Other arguments in support of this principle have been attempted--such as that from the contingent nature of phenomenon but when this argument considered, we
sition, Every thinking being simple, keep to the conception of the Ego, which which all thought has relation. The same
corresponding
? can discover no criterion of coutingeucy, except the fact of an event--of something happening, that to say, the existence which preceded by the non-existence of an object, and thus we fall back on the very thing to be proved.
If the propo to be proved, we simple, and to the case with
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the transcendental proof of the existence of a Deity, which ia based solely upon the harmony and reciprocal fitness of the conceptions of an ena realissimum and a necessary being, and cannot be attempted in any other manner.
This caution serves to simplify very much the criticism of all propositions of reason. When reason employs conceptions alone, only one proof of its thesis is possible, if any. When, therefore, the dogmatist advances with ten arguments in favour of a proposition, we may be sure that not one of them is con clusive. For if he possessed one which proved the proposi tion he brings forward to demonstration --as must always be the case with the propositions of pure reason -- what need is there for any more ? His intention can only be similar to that of the advocate, who had different arguments for different judges ; thus availing himself of the weakness of those who examine his arguments, who, without going into any profound investigation, adopt the view of the case which seems most
probable at first sight, and decide according to it.
The third rule for the guidance of pure reason in the conduct of a proof is, that all transcendental proofs must never be apagogic or indirect, but always ostensive or direct. The direct or ostensive proof not only establishes the truth of the proposition to be proved, but exposes the grounds of its truth ;
the apagogic, on the other hand, may assure us of the truth of the proposition, but it cannot enable us to comprehend the grounds of its possibility. The latter accordingly, rather an auxiliary to an argument, than strictly philosophical and rational mode of procedure. In one respect, however, they have an advantage over direct proofs, from the fact, that the mode of arguing contradiction, which they employ, renders our understanding of the question more clear, and approxi
mates the proof to the certainty of an intuitional demonstra tion.
The true reason why indirect proofs are employed in dif ferent sciences, this. When the grounds upon which we seek to base cognition are too various or too profound, we try whether or not we may not discover the truth of our cog nition from its consequences. The modutponeru of reasoning from the truth of its inferences to the truth of proposition, would be admissible all the inferences that can be drawu from are k. iown to be true for in this case there can be
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only one possible ground for these inferences, and that is the
true one. But this is a quite impracticable procedure, as it surpasses Ail our powers to discover all the possible inferences that can be drawn from a proposition. But this mode of reasoning is employed, under favour, when we wish to prove the truth of a hypothesis ; in whieh cnse we admit the truth of the conclusion --which is supported by analogy --that, if all the inferences we have drawn and examined agree with the proposition assumed, all other possible inferences will also
lgree with it. But, in this way, an hypothesis can never be established as a demonstrated truth. The modus tollens of reasoning from known inferences to the unknown proposition, is not only a rigorous, but a very easy mode of proof. For, if it can be shown that but one inference from a proposition is false, then the proposition must itself be false. Instead, then, of examining, in an ostensive argument, the whole series of the grounds on which the truth of a proposition rests, we need only take the opposite of this proposition, and if one inference from it be false, then must the opposite be itself false ; and, consequently, the proposition which we wished to prove, must be true.
The apagogic method of proof is admissible only in those sciences where it is impossible to mistake a subjective re presentation for an objective cognition. Where this is pos sible, it is plain that the opposite of a given proposition may contradict merely the subjective conditions of thought, and not the objective cognition ; or it may happen that both propose tions contradict each other only under a subjective condition, which is incorrectly considered to be objective, and, as the condition is itself false, both propositions may be false, and it will, consequently, be impossible to conclude the truth of the
one from the falseness of the other.
In mathematics such subreptions are impossible ; and it is
in this science, accordingly, that the indirect mode of proof has its true place. In the science of nature, where all asser tion is based upon empirical intuition, such subreptions may
be guarded against by the repeated comparison of observa tions ; but this mode of proof is of little value in this sphere of knowledge. But the transcendental efforts of pure reason are all made in the sphere of the subjective, which is the roa. medium of all dialectical illusion ; and thus reason endeavours.
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in its premisses, to impose upon ns subjective representations for objective cognitions. In the transcendental sphere of pure reason, then, and in the case of synthetical propositions, it is inadmissible to support a statement by disproving the counter- statement. For only two cases are possible ; either, the counter-statement is nothing but the enouncement of the inconsistency of the opposite opinion with the subjective con ditions of reason, which does not affect the real case (for example, we cannot comprehend the unconditioned necessity of the existence of a being, and hence every speculative proof of the existence of such a being must be opposed on subjective grounds, while the possibility of this being in itself cannot with justice be denied) ; or, both propositions, being dia lectical in their nature, are based upon an impossible con ception. In this latter case the rule applies --non entis nulla sunt predieata ; that is to say, what we affirm and what we deny, respecting such an object, are equally untrue, and the apagogic mode of arriving at the truth is in this case impos sible. If, for example, we presuppose that the world of sense is given in itself in its totality, it is false, either that is infinite, or that it is finite and limited in space. Both are false, because the hypothesis is false. For the notion of phenomena (as mere representations) which are given in themselves (as objects) i>> self- contradictory ; and the infinitude of this imaginary whole would, indeed, be unconditioned, but would be inconsistent (as every thing in the pheno menal world is conditioned) with the unconditioned deter mination and finitude of quantities which is presupposed in our conception.
The apagogic mode of proof is the true source of those illu sions which have always had so strong an attraction for the admirers of dogmatical philosophy.
It may be compared to a champion, who maintains the honour and claims of the party he has adopted, by offering battle to all who doubt the validity of these claims and the purity of that honour ; while nothing can be proved in this way, except the respective strength oi the combatants, and the advantage, in this respect, is always on the side of the attacking party. Spectators, observing that each party is alternately conqueror and conquered, are led to
regard the subject of dispute as beycnc' the power of man to II
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decide upon. But such au opinion cannot be justified ; and it is sufficient to apply to these reasoners the remark :--
Non defensoribui istis Tempus eget.
Each must try to establish his assertions by a transcendental deduction of the grounds of proof employed in his argument, and thus enable us to see in what way the claims of reason may be supported. If an opponent bases his assertions upon subjective grounds, he may be refuted with ease ; not, how
ever to the advantage of the dogmatist, who likewise depends upon subjective sources of cognition, and is in like manner driven into a corner by his opponent. But, if parties employ the direct method of procedure, they will soon discover the difficulty, nay, the impossibility of proving their assertions, and will be forced to appeal to prescription and precedence ; or they will, by the help of criticism, discover with ease the dogmatical illusions by which they had been mocked, and compel reason to renounce its exaggerated pretensions to speculative insight, and to confine itself within the Limits of its ptoper sphere--that of practical principles.
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. CHAPTER SECOND.
The Canon of Pcee Reason.
It is a humiliating consideration for human reason, that it
is incompetent to discover truth by means of pure speculation, but, on the contrary, stands in need of discipline to check its deviations from the straight path, and to expose the illusions which it originates. But, on the other hand, this consider ation ought to elevate and to give it confidence, for this disci pline is exercised by itself alone, and it is subject to the censure of no other power. The bounds, moreover, which it is forced to set to its speculative exercise, form likewise a check upon the fallacious pretensions of opponents ; and thus what remains of its possessions, after these exaggerate I claims have been disallowed, is secure from attack or usurpa tion. The greatest, and perhaps the only, use of all philo sophy of pure reason accordingly, of purely negativ*
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character. It is not an organon for the extension, but a dis cipline for the determination of the limits of its exercise ; and without laying claim to the discovery of new truth, it has the modest merit of guarding against error.
At the same time, there must be some source of positive cognitions which belong to the domain of pure reason, and which become the causes of error only, from our mistaking their true character, while they form the goal towards which reason continually strives. How else can we account for the inextinguishable desire in the human mind to find a firm foot ing in some region beyond the limits of the world of experi ence ? --It hopes to attain to the possession of a knowledge in which it has the deepest interest. It enters upon the path of pure speculation ; but in vain. We have some reason, however, to expect that, in the only other way that lies open to --the path of practical reason, -- may meet with better success.
understand canon list of the a priori principles ot the proper employment of certain faculties of cognition. Thus general logic, in its analytical department, formal canon for the faculties of understanding and reason. In the same way, Transcendental Analytic was seen to be canon of the pure understanding for alone competent to enounce true a
priori synthetical cognitions. But, when no proper employ ment of faculty of cognition possible, no canon can exist. But the synthetical cognition of pure speculative reason as has been shown, completely impossible. There cannot, there fore, exist any canon for the speculative exercise of this faculty -- for its speculative exercise entirely dialectical and conse quently, transcendental logic, in this respect, merely dis cipline, and not canon. then, there any proper mode of employing the faculty of pure reason, --in which case there must be canon for this faculty, --this canon will relate, not to the speculative, but to the practical use reason. This canon we now proceed to investigate.
THE CANON OF PURE REASON. Section Fibst.
Of the Ultimate End the Pure Uce of Reason.
There exists in the faculty of reason natural desire so veiuure beyond the field of experience, to attempt to reach the
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utmost bounds of all cognition by the help of ideas alone, and not to rest satisfied, until it has fulfilled its course and raised the sum of its cognitions into a self-subsistent systematic whole. Is the motive for this endeavour to be found in ita speculative, or in its practical interests alone ?
Setting aside, at present, the results of the labours of pure reason in its speculative exercise, I shall merely inquire re- garding the problems, the solution of which forms its ultimate aim--whether reached or not, and in relation to which all other aims are but partial and intermediate. These highest aims must, from the nature of reason, possess complete unity ; otherwise the highest interest of humanity could not be suc cessfully promoted.
The transcendental speculation of reason relates to three things : the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God. The speculative interest which reason has in those questions is very small ; and, for its sake alone, we should not undertake the labour of transcendental investigation --a labour full of toil and ceaseless struggle. We should be loth to undertake this labour, because the dis coveries we might make would not be of the smallest use in the sphere of concrete or physical investigation. We may find out that the will is free, but this knowledge only relates to the intelligible cause of our volition. As regards the phsenomena or expressions of this will, that our actions, we are bound, in obedience to an inviolable maxim, without which reason cannot be employed in the sphere of experience, to explain these the same way as we explain all the other phenomena of nature, that to say, according to its un changeable laws. We may have discovered the spirituality and immortality of the soul, but we cannot employ this know ledge to explain the pheuomena of this life, nor the peculiar nature of the future because our conception of an incorporeal uature purely negative and does not add anything to our knowledge, and the only inferences to be drawn from are jmrely fictitious. If, again, we prove the existence of supreme intelligence, we should be able from to make the conformity to timi existing in the arrangement of the world comprehen sible but we should not be justified in deducing from anv
particular arrangement or disposition, or, inferring any, where
? not perceived. For
necessary rule of the specula
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? THE CANON OF PURE REASON.
485
tire use of reason, that we must not overlook natural causes, or refuse to listen to the teaching of experience, for the sake of deducing what we know and perceive from something that transcends all our knowledge. In one word, these three pro positions are, for the speculative reason, always transcendent, and cannot be employed as immanent principles in relation to the objects of experience ; they are, consequently, of no use to us in this sphere, being but the valueless results of the severs but unprofitable efforts of reason.
If, then, the actual cognition of these three cardinal propo sitions is perfectly useless, while Reason uses her utmost en deavours to induce ns to admit them, it is plain that their real value and importance relate to our practical, and not to our speculative interest.
? I term all that is possible through free-will, practical. But if the conditions of the exercise of free volition are empirical, reason can have only a regulative, and not a constitutive, influ ence upon and serviceable merely for the introduction of unity into its empirical laws. In the moral philosophy of prudence, for example, the sole business of reason to bring about union of all the ends, which are aimed at by our inclinations, into one ultimate end -- that of happiness, and to show the agreement which should exist among the means of attaining that end. In this sphere, accordingly, reason cannot present to us any other than pragmatical laws of free action, for oar guidance towards the aims set up by the senses, and
incompetent to give us laws which are pure and determined completely priori. On the other hand, pure practical laws, the ends of which have been given reason entirely priori, and which are not empirically conditioned, but are, on the contrary, absolutely imperative in their nature, would be pro ducts of pure reason. Such are the moral laws and these alone belong to the sphere of the practical exercise of reason, and admit of canon.
All the powers of reason, in the sphere of what may be termed pure philosophy, are, in fact, directed to the three above-mentioned These again have still higher end--the answer to the question, what we ought to do,
the will free, there God, and future world. Now, as this problem relates to our conduct, in reference to the highest aim of humanity, evident that the ultimate inten-
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? 486 TlANBCEITDEnTAL DOCTBime OF MKTHOD.
tion of nature, in the constitution of our reason, has been directed to the moral alone.
We must take care, however, in turning our attention to an object which is foreign* to the sphere of transcendental philoso phy, not to injure the unity of our system by digressions, nor, on the other hand, to fail in clearness, by saying too little on the new subject of discussion. I hope to avoid both extremes, by keeping as close as possible to the transcendental, and ex
cluding all psychological, that empirical elements.
have to remark, in the first place, that at present treat of the conception of freedom in the practical sense only, and set aside the corresponding transcendental conception, which cannot be employed as ground of explanation in the phe-
nomenal world, but itself problem for pure reason.
will purely animal (zrbitrium brutum), when determined
sensuous impulses or instincts only, that is, when de
termined in pathological manner. will, which can be de
termined independently of sensuous impulses, consequently by motives presented reason alone, called free will (or- bitrium liberum) and everything which connected with this free will, either as principle or consequence, termed
practical. The existence of practical freedom can be proved from experience alone. For the human will not determined
that alone which immediately affects the senses on the contrary, we have the power, calling up the notion of what
useful or hurtful in more distant relation, of overcoming the immediate impressions on our sensuous faculty of desire. But these considerations of what desirable in relation to our whole state, that in the end good and useful, are based entirely upon reason. This faculty, accordingly, enounces laws, which are imperative or objective laws of freedom, and which tell us what ought to take place, thus distinguishing themselves from the laws of nature, which relate to that which does take place The laws of freedom or of free will are hence termed practical laws.
All practical conceptions relate to objects of pleasure and pain, and consequently,--in an Indirect manner, at least, --to objects of feeling. But is feeling not faculty of representation, but lies out of the sphere of our powers of cognition, the elements of our judgments, in so far as they relate to pleasure or pain, that is, the elements of our practical judgments, do not belong to transcendental philosophy, which has to do
ivith pure a priori cognitions alone.
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? Tut canon of rvRt mason. 487
Whether reason is not itself, in the actual delivery of these aws, determined in it* turn by other influences, and whether the action which, in relation to sensuous impulses, we call free, may not, in relation to higher and more remote operative causes, really form a part of nature, --these are questions which do not here concern us. They are purely speculative questions ; and all we have to do, in the practical sphere, is to inquire into the
rule of conduct which reason has to present. Experience de monstrates to us the existence of practical freedom as one of the causes which exist in nature, that shows the causal power of reason in the determination of the will. The idea of transcendental freedom, on the contrary, requires that reason -- in relation to its causal power of commencing series of phenomena -- should be independent of all sensuous de termining causes and thus seems to be in opposition to the law of nature and to all possible experience. therefore re mains problem for the human mind. But this problem does not concern reason in its practical use and we have, therefore, in canon of pure reason, to do with only two questions, which relate to the practical interest of pure reason --Is there God and, there future life The question of transcendental freedom purely speculative, and we may therefore set entirely aside when we come to treat of practical reason. Besides, we have already fully discussed this subject
the antinomy of pure reason.
THE CANON OF PURE REASON.
Section Second.
Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Determining Ground of the Ultimate End of Pure Reaton.
Reason conducted na, in its speculative use, through the field of experience, and, as can never find complete satisfaction that sphere, from thence to speculative ideas, --which, how
ever, in the end brought us back again to experience, and thus fulfilled the purpose of reason, in a manner which, though useful, was not at all in accordance with our expectations.
now remains for us to consider whether pure reason can be employed in practical sphere, and whether will here conduct us to those ideas which attain the highest ends of pure reason.
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It
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? ? 188 TBANSCKTDEnTAl DOOTEIITB OF HETHOD.
is we have just otited thfm. We shall thus astertaui whether, from the point of view of its practical interest, reason may not he able to supply us with that which, on the speculative side, it wholly denies us.
The whole interest of reason, speculative as well as practical, is centred in the three following questions:
1. What can 1 know?
2. What ouont I to do?
3. What mat I hofe ?
The first question is purely speculative. We have, as I flatter
myself, exhausted all the replies of which it is susceptible, and have at last found the reply with which reason must con tent itself, and with which it ought to be content, so long as it pays no regnrd to the practical. But from the two great ends lo the attainment of which all these efforts of pure reason were in fact directed, we remain just as far removed as if we had consulted our ease, and declined the task at the outset. So far, then, as knowledge s concerned, thus much, at least, is established, that, in regard to those two problems, it lies beyond our reach.
The second question is purely practical. As such it may indeed fall within the province of pure reason, but still it is not transcendental, but moral, and consequently cannot in it self form the subject of our criticism.
The third question, If I act as I onglit to do, what may I then hope? --is at once practical and theoretical. The prac tical forms a clue to the answer of the theoretical, and--in its highest form --speculative question. For all hoping has happiness for its object, and stands in precisely the same re lation to the practical and the law of morality, as knowing to the theoretical cognition of things and the law of nature. 'I he former arrives finally at the conclusion that something is (which determines the ultimate end), because something ought
to take place ; the latter, that something is (which operates as the highest cause), because something does take place.
Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires ; extensive, in regard to their multiplicity ; intensive, in regard to their degree ; and protensive, in regard to their duration. The practical law based on the motive of happiness, I term a prag matical law (or prudential rule) ; but that law, assuming such to exist, which has no other motive than the worthiness qf
? ? ? ? TBI CANON OF MTU HUM*. 4S<<I
iein^ hapyf, I term a moral or ethical law. The first telis ua what ws have to do, if we wish to become possessed of happiness ; the second dictates how we ought to act, in order to deserve happiness. The first is based upon empirical principles ; for it is only by experience that I can learn either what incli nations exist which desire satisfaction, or what are the natural means of satisfying them. The second takes no account of our desires or the means of satisfying them, and regards only the freedom of a rational being, and the necessary conditions under which alone this freedom can harmonize with the dis tribution of happiness according to principles. This second law may therefore rest upon mere ideas of pure reason, and may be cognized a priori.
? I assume tha* there are pure moral laws which determine, entirely a priori (without regard to empirical motives, that is, to happiness), the conduct of a rational being, or in other words, the use which it makes of ita freedom, and that these
laws are absolutely imperative (not merely hypothetically, on the supposition of other empirical ends), and therefore in all respects necessary. I am warranted in assuming this, not only by the arguments of the most enlightened moralists, but by the moral judgment of every man who will make the at
tempt to form a distinct conception of such a law.
Pure reason, then, contains, not indeed in its speculative, but in its practical, or, more strictly, its moral use, principles of the possibility of experience, of such actions, namely, as, in accordance with ethical precepts, might be met with in the
history of man. For since reason commands that such actions should take place, it must be possible for them to take place ; and hence a particular kind of systematic unity -- the moral, must be possible. We have found, it is true, that the syste matic unity of nature could not be established according to speculative principles of reason, because, while reason possesses a causal power in relation to freedom, it has none in relation
to the whole sphere of nature ; and, while moral principles of reason can produce free actions, they cannot produce natural laws. It is, then, in its practical, but especially iu its moral use, that the principles of pure reason possess objective reality.
I call the world a moral world, in so far as it may be in accordance with all the ethical law* --which, by virtue of the
? ? ? 4(J0
TUANSCENDEKTAX DOCTRISE OF METHOJ!
freedom of reasonable beings, it can be, and according to the necessary laws of morality it ought to be. But tbis world must be conceived only as an intelligible world, inasmuch as abstraction is therein made of all conditions (ends), and even of all impediments to morality (the weakness or pravity of human nature). --So far, then, it is a mere idea, -- though still a practical idea, which may have, and ought to have, an in fluence on the world of sense, so as to bring it as far as pos sible into conformity with itself. The idea of a moral world has, therefore, objective reality, not as referring to an ODject of intelligible intuition, -- for of such an object we can form no conception whatever, --but to the world of sense, --conceived, however, as an object of pure reason in ift practical use, ? and to a corpus mysticum of rational beings in in so far as the liberum arbitrium of the individual placed, under and virtue of mornl laws, in complete systematic unity both with itself, and with the freedom of all others.
That the answer to the first of the two questions of pure reason which relate to its practical interest :--Do that which will render thee worthy of happiness. The second question this If conduct myself so as not to be unworthy of hsppi ness, may hope thereby to obtain happiness In order to arrive at the solution of this question, we must inquire whether the principles of pare reason, which prescribe a priori the law, necessarily also connect this hope with it.
? say, then, that just as the moral principles are necessary according to reason in its practical use, so equally neces sary according to reason in its theoretical use, to assume that every one has ground to hope for happiness in the measure which he has made himself worthy of his conduct, and that therefore the system of morality
only in the idea of pure reason) connected with that of hap
piness.
Now in an intelligible, that in the moral world, in the
conception of which we make abstraction of all the impedi ments to morality (sensuous desires), such system of happi ness, connected with and proportioned to morality, may be conceived as necessary, because freedom of volition--partly incited, and partly restrained moral laws --would be itself the cause of general happiness and thus rational beings, under the guidance of such principles, would be themselves the autbon
inseparably (though
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? THE OAK OK OF FUSE HEABON. 491
ooth of their own enduring welfare and that of others. But Mich a system of self-rewarding morality is only an idea, the carrying out of which depends upon the condition that every one acta as he ought ; in other words, that all' actions of reasonable beings be such as they would be if they sprung from a Supreme Will, comprehending in, or under, itself all particular wills. But since the moral law is binding on each individual in the use of his freedom of volition, even if others should not act in conformity with this law, neither the nature of things, nor the causality of actions and their relation to morality, determine how the consequences of these actions will be related to happiness ; and the necessary connection of the hope of happiness with the unceasing endeavour to become worthy of happiness, cannot be cognized by reason, if we take nature alone for our guide. This connection can be hoped for only on the assumption that the cause of nature is a supreme reason, which governs according to moral laws.
I term the idea of an intelligence in which the morally most perfect will, united with supreme blessedness, is the cause of all happiness in the world, so far as happiness stands in strict relation to morality (as the worthiness of being happy), the Ideal of the Supreme Good. It is only, then, in the ideal of the supreme original good, that pure reason can find the ground of the practically necessary connection of both elements of the highest derivative good, and accordingly of an intelligible, that moral world. Now since we are necessitated by reason to conceive ourselves as belonging to such world, while the senses present to us nothing but world of phenomena, we must assume the former as consequence of our conduct in the world of sense (since the world of sense gives us no hint of it), and therefore as future in relation to us. Thus God and future life are two hypotheses which, according to the principles of pure reason, are inseparable from the obligation which this reason imposes upon us.
Morality per te constitutes system. But we can form no system of happiness, except in so far as dispensed in strict proportion to morality. But this only possible in the in telligible world, under wise author and ruler. Such ruler, together with life in such world, which we must look upon m future, reason finds itself compelled to assume or must
regard the moral laws as idle dreams, since the necessary con.
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? 492 TRA5SCMTDEKTAX DOCTRIKE OF METHOD.
sequence which this same reason connects with them, must, without this hypothesis, fall to the ground. Hence also the moral laws are universally regarded as commands, which they could not be, did they not connect a priori adequate conse quences with their dictates, and thus carry with them promise* and threats. But this, again, they could not do, did they not reside in a necessary being, as the Supreme Good, which alone can render such a teleological unity possible.
Leibnitz termed the world, when viewed in relation to the rational beings which it contains, and the moral relations in which they stand to each other, under the government of the Supreme Good, the kingdom of Grace, and distinguished it from the kingdom ofNature, in which these rational beings live, under moral laws, indeed, but expect no other conse quences from their actions than such as follow according to the course of nature in the world of sense. To view ourselves, therefore, as in the kingdom of grace, in which all happiness awaits us, except in so far as we ourselves limit our partici pation in it by actions which render us unworthy of happiness, is a practically necessary idea of reason.
Practical laws, in so far as they are subjective grounds of actions, that subjective principles, are termed maxims. The judgments of morality, in its purity and ultimate results, are framed according to ideas the observance of its laws, accord ing to maxims.
The whole course of our life must be subject to moral maxims but this impossible, unless with the moral law, which mere idea, reason connects an efficient cause which ordains to all conduct which in conformity with the moral law an issue either in this or in another life, which exact conformity with our highest aims. Thus, without God and without world, invisible to us now, but hoped for, the glorious ideas of morality are, indeed, objects of approbation and of admiration, but cannot be the springs of purpose and action. For they do not satisfy all the aims which are natural to every rational being, and which are determined priori pure reason itself, and necessary.
Happiness alone is, in the view of reason, far from being
? the complete good. Reason does not approve of
much inclination may desire it), except as united with desert. On the other hand, morality "lone, and with mere desert.
(however
?