No More Learning

The Roman central division forced the Viromandui down the declivity. But the right wing, where the general himself was present, was outflanked by the far more numerous Nervii the more easily, as the central division carried away by its own success had evacuated the ground alongside of and even the half-ready camp was occupied by the Nervii; the two legions, each separately rolled together into dense mass and assailed in front and on both flanks, deprived of most of their officers and their best soldiers, appeared on the point of being broken and cut to pieces. The Roman camp-followers and the allied troops were already fleeing in all directions of the Celtic cavalry whole divisions, like the contingent of the Treveri, galloped off at full speed, that from the battle-field itself they might announce at home the welcome news of the defeat which had been sustained. Everything was at stake. The general himself seized his shield and fought among the foremost; his example, his call even now inspiring enthusiasm, induced the wavering ranks to rally. They had already in some measure extricated themselves and had at least restored the connection between the two legions of this wing, when help came up—partly down from the crest of the bank, where in the interval the Roman rearguard with the baggage had arrived, partly from the other bank of the river, where Labienus had meanwhile penetrated to the enemy's camp and taken possession of and now, perceiving at length the danger that menaced the right wing, despatched the victorious
it,
a
it,
;
Subjection of the
54 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
tenth legion to the aid of his general. The Nervii, separated from their confederates and simultaneously assailed on all sides, now showed, when fortune turned, the same heroic courage as when they believed themselves victors; still over the pile of corpses of their fallen comrades they fought to the last man. According to their own statement, of their six hundred senators only three survived this day.
After this annihilating defeat the Nervii, Atrebates, and Viromandui could not but recognize the Roman supremacy. The Aduatuci, who arrived too late to take part in the fight on the Sambre, attempted still to hold their ground in the strongest of their towns (on the mount Falhize near the Maas not far from Huy), but they too soon submitted. A nocturnal attack on the Roman camp in front of the town, which they ventured after the surrender, miscarried ; and the perfidy was avenged by the Romans with fearful severity. The clients of the Aduatuci, consisting of the Eburones between the Maas and Rhine and other small adjoining tribes, were declared independent by the Romans, while the Aduatuci taken prisoners were sold under the hammer en masse for the benefit of the Roman treasury. It seemed as if the fate which had befallen the Cimbri still pursued even this last Cimbrian fragment. Caesar con tented himself with imposing on the other subdued tribes a general disarmament and furnishing of hostages. The Remi became naturally the leading canton in Belgic, like the Haedui in central Gaul ; even in the latter several clans
at enmity with the Haedui preferred to rank among the
clients of the Remi. Only the remote maritime cantons of
the Morini (Artois) and the Menapii (Flanders and Brabant), and the country between the Scheldt and the Rhine inhabited in great part by Germans, remained still for the present exempt from Roman invasion and in possession of their hereditary freedom.
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 55
The turn of the Aremorican cantons came. In the Expedl- autumn of 697 Publius Crassus was sent thither with a ^SnstSe Roman corps ; he induced the Veneti —who as masters of maritime the ports of the modern Morbihan and of a respectable fleet can,ons- occupied the first place among all the Celtic cantons in navigation and commerce —and generally the coast-districts
between the Loire and Seine, to submit to the Romans and
give them hostages. But they soon repented. When in
the following winter (697-698) Roman officers came to these 67-66. legions to levy requisitions of grain there, they were
detained by the Veneti as counter-hostages. The example
thus set was quickly followed not only by the Aremorican
cantons, but also by the maritime cantons of the Belgae
that still remained free ; where, as in some cantons of Normandy, the common council refused to join the insurrection, the multitude put them to death and attached
itself with redoubled zeal to the national cause. The whole Venetian coast from the mouth of the Loire to that of the Rhine war-
rose against Rome ; the most resolute patriots from all the
Celtic cantons hastened thither to co-operate in the great
work of liberation ; they already calculated on the rising of
the whole Belgic confederacy, on aid from Britain, on the
arrival of Germans from beyond the Rhine.
Caesar sent Labienus with all the cavalry to the Rhine, with a view to hold in check the agitation in the Belgic province, and in case of need to prevent the Germans from
the river; another of his lieutenants,
Titurius Sabinus, went with three legions to Normandy, where the main body of the insurgents assembled. But the powerful and intelligent Veneti were the true centre of the insurrection ; the chief attack by land and sea was directed against them. Caesar's lieutenant, Decimus Brutus, brought up the fleet formed partly of the ships of the subject Celtic cartons, partly of a number of Roman galleys hastily built on the Loire and manned with rowers from the Narbonese
crossing
Quintus
56 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
province ; Caesar himself advanced with the flower of his infantry into the territory of the Veneti. But these were prepared beforehand, and had with equal skill and resolu tion availed themselves of the favourable circumstances which the nature of the ground in Brittany and the possession of a considerable naval power presented. The country was much intersected and poorly furnished with grain, the towns were situated for the most part on cliffs and tongues of land, and were accessible from the mainland only by shallows which it was difficult to cross ; the provi sion of supplies and the conducting of sieges were equally difficult for the army attacking by land, while the Celts by means of their vessels could furnish the towns easily with everything needful, and in the event of the worst could accomplish their evacuation. The legions expended their time and strength in the sieges of the Venetian townships, only to see the substantial fruits of victory ultimately carried off in the vessels of the enemy.
Naval Accordingly when the Roman fleet, long detained by r*TM* storms at the mouth of the Loire, arrived at length on the the coast of Brittany, it was left to decide the struggle by a
naval battle. The Celts, conscious of their superiority on Veneti. this element, brought forth their fleet against that of the Romans commanded by Brutus. Not only did it number 2 20 sail, far more than the Romans had been able to brinr;
up, but their high-decked strong sailing-vessels with flat bottoms were also far better adapted for the high-running waves of the Atlantic Ocean than the low, lightly-built oared galleys of the Romans with their sharp keels. Neither the missiles nor the boarding-bridges of the Romans could reach the high deck of the enemy's vessels, and the iron beaks recoiled powerless from the strong oaken plank*. But the Roman mariners cut the ropes, by which the yards were fastened to the masts, by means of sickles fastened t<1 long poles ; the yards and sails fell down, and, as they did
j^jrij?
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 57
not know how to repair the damage speedily, the ship ras thus rendered a wreck just as it is at the present day by the falling of the masts, and the Roman boats easily succeeded by a joint attack in mastering the maimed vessel of the enemy. When the Gauls perceived this manoeuvre, they attempted to move from the coast on which they had taken up the combat with the Romans, and to gain the high seas, whither the Roman galleys could not follow them; but unhappily for them there suddenly set in a dead calm, and the immense fleet, towards the equipment of which the maritime cantons had applied all their energies, was almost wholly destroyed by the Romans. Thus was this naval battle—so far as historical knowledge reaches, the earliest fought on the Atlantic Ocean—just like the engagement at Mylae two hundred years before 175), notwithstanding
the most unfavourable circumstances, decided in favour of the Romans by lucky invention suggested by necessity.
The consequence of the victory achieved by Brutus was the of the surrender of the Veneti and of all Brittany. More with maritime view to impress the Celtic nation, after so manifold evidences of clemency towards the vanquished, an example
of fearful severity now against those whose resistance had been obstinate, than with the view of punishing the breach of treaty and the arrest of the Roman officers, Caesar caused the whole common council to be executed and the people of the Venetian canton to the last man to be sold into slavery. By this dreadful fate, as well as by their intelligence and their patriotism, the Veneti have more than any other Celtic clan acquired title to the sympathy of posterity.
Sabinus meanwhile opposed to the levy of the coast- states assembled on the Channel the same tactics by which Caesar had in the previous year conquered the Belgic general levy on the Aisne he stood on the defensive till impatience and want invaded the ranks of the enemy, and
;
a
(ii.
by
a
a
58 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
then managed by deceiving them as to the temper and strength of his troops, and above all by means of their own impatience, to allure them to an imprudent assault upon the Roman camp, in which they were defeated ; whereupon the militia dispersed and the country as far as the Seine submitted-
The Morini and Menapii alone persevered in withhold-
ExpeAU
agajnst the 'nS tne'r recognition of the Roman supremacy. To compel
Morini and
them to this, Caesar appeared on their borders ; but,
rendered wiser by the experiences of their
they avoided accepting battle on the borders of their land, and retired into the forests which then stretched almost without interruption from the Ardennes towards the German Ocean. The Romans attempted to make a road through the forest with the axe, ranging the felled trees on each side as a barricade against the enemy's attacks ; but even Caesar, daring as he was, found it advisable after some days of most laborious marching, especially as it was verg ing towards winter, to order a retreat, although but a small portion of the Morini had submitted and the powerful Menapii had not been reached at all. In the following
B6. year (699), while Caesar himself was employed in Britain, the greater part of the army was sent afresh against these tribes ; but this expedition also remained in the main un successful. Nevertheless the result of the last campaigns was the almost complete reduction of Gaul under the dominion of the Romans. While central Gaul had sub-
67. mitted to it without resistance, during the campaign of 697 the Belgic, and during that of the following year the mari time, cantons had been compelled by force of arms to acknowledge the Roman rule. The lofty hopes, with which the Celtic patriots had begun the last campaign, had nowhere been fulfilled. Neither Germans nor Britons had come to their aid ; and in Belgica the presence of Labienus had sufficed to prevent the renewal of the con flicts of the previous year.
countrymen,
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 59
While Caesar was thus forming the Roman domain in Establish-
the west by force of arms into a compact whole, he did TMent .
not neglect to open up for the newly-conquered country — cations which was destined in fact to fill up the wide gap in that J" the domain between Italy and Spain — communications both Valais, with the Italian home and with the Spanish provinces.
The communication between Gaul and Italy had certainly been materially facilitated by the military road laid out by Pompeius in 677 over Mont Genevre (iv. 293); but since the 77. whole of Gaul had been subdued by the Romans, there was need of a route crossing the ridge of the Alps from the valley
of the Po, not in a westerly but in a northerly direction,
and furnishing a shorter communication between Italy and central Gaul. The way which leads over the Great St. Bernard into the Valais and along the lake of Geneva had long served the merchant for this purpose ; to get this road into his power, Caesar as early as the autumn of 697 caused 67. Octodurum (Martigny) to be occupied by Servius Galba, and the inhabitants of the Valais to be reduced to subjec
tion — a result which was, of course, merely postponed,
not prevented, by the brave resistance of these mountain-
peoples.
To gain communication with Spain, moreover, Publius and with
Crassus was sent in the following year (698) to Aquitania JSrn* with instructions to compel the Iberian tribes dwelling
there to acknowledge the Roman rule. The task was not without difficulty; the Iberians held together more com
pactly than the Celts and knew better than these how to learn from their enemies. The tribes beyond the Pyrenees, especially the valiant Cantabri, sent a contingent to their threatened countrymen ; with this there came experienced officers trained under the leadership of Sertorius in the Roman fashion, who introduced as far as possible the principles of the Roman art of war, and especially of en campment, among the Aquitanian levy already respectable
y
Fnah violation! of the Rhine- boundary by the German*.
S6-66.
The Utlpetes and Tencteri.
6o THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST hook v
from its numbers and its valour. But the excellent officer who led the Romans knew how to surmount all difficulties, and after some hardly-contested but successful battles he induced the peoples from the Garonne to the vicinity of the Pyrenees to submit to the new masters.
One of the objects which Caesar had proposed to him self —the subjugation of Gaul—had been in substance, with exceptions scarcely worth mentioning, attained so far as it could be attained at all by the sword. But the other half of the work undertaken by Caesar was still far from being satisfactorily accomplished, and the Germans had by no means as yet been everywhere compelled to recognize the Rhine as their limit Even now, in the winter of 698-699, a fresh crossing of the boundary had taken place on the lower course of the river, whither the Romans had not yet penetrated. The German tribes of the Usipetes and Tencteri whose attempts to cross the Rhine in the territory of the Menapii have been already mentioned 37), had at length, eluding the vigilance of their opponents feigned retreat, crossed in the vessels belonging to the Menapii— an enormous host, which said, including women and children, to have amounted to 430,000 persons. They still lay, apparently, in the region of Nimeguen and Cleves but
was said that following the invitations of the Celtic patriot party, they intended to advance into the interior of Gaul and the rumour was confirmed by the fact that bands of their horsemen already roamed as far as the borders of the Treveri. But when Caesar with his legions arrived oppo site to them, the sorely-harassed emigrants seemed not desirous of fresh conflicts, but very ready to accept land from the Romans and to till in peace under their supremacy. While negotiations as to this were going on,
suspicion arose in the mind of the Roman general that the Germans only sought to gain time till the bands of horsemen sent out by them had returned. Whether this
a
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it
; ;
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by a
(p.
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 61
suspicion was well founded or not, we cannot tell i but confirmed in it by an attack, which in spite of the de facto suspension of arms a troop of the enemy made on his van guard, and exasperated by the severe loss thereby sustained, Caesar believed himself entitled to disregard every consi deration of international law. When on the second morning the princes and elders of the Germans appeared in the Roman camp to apologize for the attack made without their knowledge, they were arrested, and the multitude* anticipating no assault and deprived of their leaders were suddenly fallen upon by the Roman army. It was rather a man-hunt than a battle ; those that did not fall under the swords of the Romans were drowned in the Rhine ; almost none but the divisions detached at the time of the attack escaped the massacre and succeeded in recrossing the Rhine, where the Sugambri gave them an asylum in their
on the Lippe. The behaviour of Caesar towards these German immigrants met with severe and just censure in the senate ; but, however little it can be excused, the German encroachments were emphatically
checked by the terror which it occasioned.
Caesar however found it advisable to take yet a further Caesar oa
step and to lead the legions over the Rhine. He was not b^^1 without connections beyond the river. The Germans at the RWn* the stage of culture which they had then reached, lacked
as yet any national coherence ; in political distraction they —though from other causes —fell nothing short of the
Celts. The Ubii (on the Sieg and Lahn), the most citil- ixed among the German tribes, had recently been made subject and tributary by a powerful Suebian canton of the interior, and had as early as 697 through their envoys en- 67. treated Caesar to free them like the Gauls from the Suebian rule. It was not Caesar's design seriously to respond to this suggestion, which would have involved him in endless enterprises ; but it seemed advisable, with the view of pre-
territory, apparently
Eipedi- Britain!
6* THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
venting the appearance of the Germanic arms on the south of the Rhine, at least to show the Roman arms beyond it. The protection which the fugitive Usipetes and Tencteri had found among the Sugambri afforded a suitable occa sion. In the region, apparently between Coblentz and Andernach, Caesar erected a bridge of piles over the Rhine and led his legions across from the Treverian to the Ubian territory. Some smaller cantons gave in their sub mission ; but the Sugambri, against whom the expedition was primarily directed, withdrew, on the approach of the Roman army, with those under their protection into the interior. In like manner the powerful Suebian canton which oppressed the Ubii — presumably the same which subsequently appears under the name of the Chatti— caused the districts immediately adjoining the Ubian terri tory to be evacuated and the non-combatant portion of the people to be placed in safety, while all the men capable of arms were directed to assemble at the centre of the canton. The Roman general had neither occasion nor desire to accept this challenge ; his object — partly to reconnoitre, partly to produce an impressive effect if possible upon the Germans, or at least on the Celts and his countrymen at home, by an expedition over the Rhine—was substantially attained ; after remaining eighteen days on the right bank
of the Rhine he again arrived in Gaul and broke down the 66. Rhine bridge behind him (699).
There remained the insular Celts. From the close connection between them and the Celts of the continent, especially the maritime cantons, it may readily be conceived that they had at least sympathized with the national resist ance, and that if they did not grant armed assistance to the patriots, they gave at any rate an honourable asylum in their sea-protected isle to every one who was no longer safe in his native land. This certainly involved a danger, if not for the present, at any rate for the future ; it seemed judi
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 63
cious —if not to undertake the conquest of the island itself —at any rate to conduct there also defensive operations by offensive means, and to show the islanders by a landing on
the coast that the arm of the Romans reached even across the Channel. The first Roman officer who entered Brittany, Publius Crassus, had already (697) crossed thence to the 67. "tin-islands" at the south-west point of England (Scilly
islands) ; in the summer of 699 Caesar himself with only 65. two legions crossed the Channel at its narrowest part1 He found the coast covered with masses of the enemy's troops and sailed onward with his vessels ; but the British war-chariots moved on quite as fast by land as the Roman galleys by sea, and it was only with the utmost difficulty that the Roman soldiers succeeded in gaining the shore in
the face of the enemy, partly by wading, partly in boats, under the protection of the ships of war, which swept the beach with missiles thrown from machines and by the hand. In the first alarm the nearest villages submitted; but the islanders soon perceived how weak the enemy was, and
1 The nature of the case as well as Caesar's express statement proves that the passages of Caesar to Britain were made from ports of the coast between Calais and Boulogne to the coast of Kent A more exact deter mination of the localities has often been attempted, but without success. All that is recorded is, that on the first voyage the infantry embarked at one port, the cavalry at another distant from the former eight miles in an easterly direction (iv. as, 23, a8), and that the second voyage was made from that one of those two ports which Caesar had found most convenient, tb« (otherwise not further mentioned) Portus Itius, distant from the British coast 30 (so according to the MSS. of Caesar v. 2) or 40 miles ( = 320 stadia, according to Strabo iv. 5, a, who doubtless drew his account from Caesar). From Caesar's words (iv. at) that he had chosen "the shortest crossing," we may doubtless reasonably infer that he crossed not the Channel but the Straits of Calais, but by no means that he crossed the latter by the mathematically shortest line. It requires the implicit faith of local topographers to proceed to the determination of the locality with such data in hand—data of which the best in itself becomes almost useless from the variation of the authorities as to the number ; but among the many possibilities most may perhaps be said in favour of the view that the Itian port (which Strabo I. e. is probably right in identifying with that from which the infantry crossed in the first voyage) is to be sought near Amble- teuse to the west of Cape Gris Nez, and the cavalry-harbour near Ecale (Wissant) to the east of the same promontory, and that the landing took place to the east of Dover near Walmer Castle.
Cusivd- knnus.
64 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
how he did not venture to move far from the shore. The natives disappeared into the interior and returned only to threaten the camp ; and the fleet, which had been left in the open roads, suffered very considerable damage from the first tempest that burst upon The Romans had to reckon themselves fortunate in repelling the attacks of the barbarians till they had bestowed the necessary repairs on the ships, and in regaining with these the Gallic coast before the bad season of the year came on.
Caesar himself was so dissatisfied with the results of this expedition undertaken inconsiderately and with inadequate M-64. means, that he immediately (in the winter of 699-700) ordered transport fleet of 800 sail to be fitted out,
M.
and in the spring of 700 sailed second time for the Kentish coast, on this occasion with five legions and 2000 cavalry. The forces of the Britons, assembled this time also on the shore, retired before the mighty armada without risking battle Caesar immediately set out on his march into the interior, and after some successful conflicts crossed the river Stour; but he was obliged to halt very much against his will, because the fleet in the open roads had been again half destroyed the storms of the Channel. Before they got the ships drawn up upon the beach and the extensive arrangements made for their repair, precious time was lost, which the Celts wisely turned to account.
The brave and cautious prince Cassivellaunus, who ruled in what now Middlesex and the surrounding district —formerly the terror of the Celts to the south of the Thames, but now the protector and champion of the whole nation —had headed the defence of the land. He soon saw that nothing at all could be done with the Celtic infantry against the Roman, and that the mass of the general levy—which was difficult to feed and difficult to control —was only hindrance to the defence he therefore dismissed and retained only the war-chariots, of which
it
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it
;
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by
a ;
a
a
it.
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 65
he collected 4000, and in which the warriors, accustomed to leap down from their chariots and fight on foot, could be employed in a twofold manner like the burgess-cavalry of the earliest Rome. When Caesar was once more able to continue his march, he met with no interruption to it ; but the British war-chariots moved always in front and alongside of the Roman army, induced the evacuation of the country (which from the absence of towns proved no great difficulty), prevented the sending out of detachments, and threatened the communications. The Thames was crossed — apparently between Kingston and Brentford above London — by the Romans ; they moved forward, but made no real progress ; the general achieved no victory, the soldiers made no booty, and the only actual result, the submission of the Trinobantes in the modern Essex, was less the effect of a dread of the Romans than of the deep hostility between this canton and Cassivellaunus. The danger increased with every onward step, and the attack, which the princes of Kent by the orders of Cassivellaunus made on the Roman naval camp, although it was repulsed, was an urgent warning to turn back. The taking by storm of a great British tree-barricade, in which a multitude of cattle fell into the hands of the Romans, furnished a pass able conclusion to the aimless advance and a tolerable pretext for returning. Cassivellaunus was sagacious enough not to drive the dangerous enemy to extremities, and pro mised, as Caesar desired him, to abstain from disturbing the Trinobantes, to pay tribute and to furnish hostages;
nothing was said of delivering up arms or leaving behind a Roman garrison, and even those promises were, it may be presumed, so far as they concerned the future, neither given nor received in earnest. After receiving the hostages Caesar returned to the naval camp and thence to Gaul. If he, as it would certainly seem, had hoped on this occasion to conquer Britain, the scheme was totally thwarted partly by
voi- v 138 f
The
of'the patriot*.
66 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
the wise defensive system of Cassivellaunus, partly and chiefly by the unserviceableness of the Italian oared fleet in the waters of the North Sea; for it is certain that the stipulated tribute was never paid. But the immediate object — of rousing the islanders out of their haughty security and inducing them in their own interest no longer to allow their island to be a rendezvous for continental emigrants—seems certainly to have been attained ; at least no complaints are afterwards heard as to the bestowal of such protection.
The work of repelling the Germanic invasion and of subduing the continental Celts was completed. But it is often easier to subdue a free nation than to keep a subdued one in subjection. The rivalry for the hegemony, by which more even than by the attacks of Rome the Celtic nation had been ruined, was in some measure set aside by the conquest, inasmuch as the conqueror took the hegemony to himself. Separate interests were silent ; under the com mon oppression at any rate they felt themselves again as one people ; and the infinite value of that which they had with indifference gambled away when they possessed it— freedom and nationality —was now, when it was too late, fully appreciated by their infinite longing. But was then, too late With indignant shame they confessed to themselves that nation, which numbered at least million of men capable of arms, nation of ancient and well-founded warlike renown, had allowed the yoke to be imposed upon
by, at the most, 50,000 Romans. The submission of the confederacy of central Gaul without having struck even blow the submission of the Belgic confederacy without having done more than merely shown wish to strike the heroic fall on the other hand of the Nervii and the Veneti,
the sagacious and successful resistance of the Morini, and of the Britons under Cassivellaunus —all that in each case had been done or neglected, had failed or had succeeded—
;
a
it,
a
a ;
it
a
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chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 67
spurred the minds of the patriots to new attempts, if possible, more united and more successful. Especially among the Celtic nobility there prevailed an excitement, which seemed every moment as if it must break out into a general insur rection. Even before the second expedition to Britain in
the spring of 700 Caesar had found it necessary to go in 64. person to the Treveri, who, since they had compromised themselves in the Nervian conflict in 697, had no longer 57. appeared at the general diets and had formed more than suspicious connections with the Germans beyond the Rhine.
At that time Caesar had contented himself with carrying the men of most note among the patriot party, particularly Indutiomarus, along with him to Britain in the ranks of the Treverian cavalry-contingent ; he did his utmost to over look the conspiracy, that he might not by strict measures ripen it into insurrection. But when the Haeduan Dum- norix, who likewise was present in the army destined
for Britain, nominally as a cavalry officer, but really as a hostage, peremptorily refused to embark and rode home instead, Caesar could not do otherwise than have him pursued as a deserter ; he was accordingly overtaken by the division sent after him and, when he stood on his defence,
was cut down (700). That the most esteemed knight of the 64. most powerful and still the least dependent of the Celtic cantons should have been put to death by the Romans, was
a thunder-clap for the whole Celtic nobility ; every one who was conscious of similar sentiments—and they formed the great majority — saw in that catastrophe the picture of what was in store for himself.
If patriotism and despair had induced the heads of the Insurrec-
""
Celtic nobility to conspire, fear and self-defence now drove
the conspirators to strike. In the winter of 700—701, with 54-53. the exception of a legion stationed in Brittany and a second
in the very unsettled canton of the Carnutes (near Chartres),
the whole Roman army numbering six legions was en-
68 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
camped in the Belgic territory. The scantiness of the supplies of grain had induced Caesar to station his troops farther apart than he was otherwise wont to do — in six different camps constructed in the cantons of the Bellovaci, Ambiani, Morini, Nervii, Remi, and Eburones. The fixed camp placed farthest towards the east in the territory of the Eburones, probably not far from the later Aduatuca modern Tongern), the strongest of all, consisting of a legion under one of the most respected of Caesar's leaders of division, Quintus Titurius Sabinus, besides different detachments led by the brave Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta1 and amounting together to the strength of half a legion, found itself all of a sudden surrounded by the general levy of the Eburones under the kings Ambiorix and Catu- volcus. The attack came so unexpectedly, that the very men absent from the camp could not be recalled and were cut of by the enemy ; otherwise the immediate danger was not great, as there was no lack of provisions, and the assault, which the Eburones attempted, recoiled powerless from the Roman intrenchments. But king Ambiorix informed the Roman commander that all the Roman camps in Gaul were similarly assailed on the same day, and that the Romans would undoubtedly be lost if the several corps did not quickly set out and effect a junction ; that Sabinus had the more reason to make haste, as the
1 That Cotta, although not lieutenant-general of Sabinus, but like him legate, was yet the younger and less esteemed general and was probably directed in the event of a difference to yield, may be inferred both from the earlier services of Sabinus and from the fact that, where the two are named together (iv. as, 38 ; v. 24, a6, 52 ; vi. 32 j otherwise in vi. 37) Sabinu* regularly takes precedence, as also from the narrative of the cata strophe itself. Besides we cannot possibly suppose that Caesar should have placed over a camp two officers with equal authority, and have made no arrangement at all for the case of a difference of opinion. The five cohorts are not counted as part of a legion (comp. vi. 3a, 33) any more than the twelve cohorts at the Rhine bridge (vi. 29, comp. 3a, 33), and appear to have consisted of detachments of other portions of the army, which had
been assigned to reinforce this camp situated nearest to the Germans.
(the
chap, vu THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 69
Germans too from beyond the Rhine were already advanc ing against him ; that he himself out of friendship for the Romans would promise them a free retreat as far as the nearest Roman camp, only two days' march distant Some things in these statements seemed no fiction ; that the little canton of the Eburones specially favoured by the Romans 54) should have undertaken the attack of its own accord was in reality incredible, and, owing to the difficulty of effecting communication with the other far-distant camps, the danger of being attacked by the whole mass of the insurgents and destroyed detail was by no means to be esteemed slight nevertheless could not admit of the smallest doubt that both honour and prudence required them to reject the capitulation offered the enemy and to maintain the post entrusted to them. Yet, although in the council of war numerous voices and especially the
voice of Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta supported this view, the commandant determined to accept the pro posal of Ambiorix. The Roman troops accordingly marched off next morning; but when they had arrived at narrow valley about two miles from the camp they found themselves surrounded by the Eburones and every outlet blocked. They attempted to open way for them selves by force of arms but the Eburones would not enter into any close combat, and contented themselves with discharging their missiles from their unassailable posi tions into the dense mass of the Romans. Bewildered, as
seeking deliverance from treachery at the hands of the traitor, Sabinus requested conference with Ambiorix
was granted, and he and the officers accompanying him were first disarmed and then slain. After the fall of the commander the Eburones threw themselves from all sides at once on the exhausted and despairing Romans, and broke their ranks most of them, including Cotta who had already been wounded, met their death in this attack; a
weighty
;
a
;
; it
if
a
by
a
;
in it
(p. a
Cicero
To THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
small portion, who had succeeded in regaining the aban doned camp, flung themselves on their own swords during the following night The whole corps was annihilated.
This success, such as the insurgents themselves had hardly ventured to hope for, increased the ferment among the Celtic patriots so greatly that the Romans were no longer sure of a single district with the exception of the Haedui and Remi, and the insurrection broke out at the most diverse points. First of all the Eburones followed up their victory. Reinforced by the levy of the Aduatuci, who gladly embraced the opportunity of requiting the injury done to them by Caesar, and of the powerful and still unsubdued Menapii, they appeared in the territory of the Nervii, who immediately joined them, and the whole host thus swelled to 60,000 moved forward to confront the Roman camp formed in the Nervian canton.
Cicero, who commanded there, had with his weak corps a difficult position, especially as the besiegers, learning from the foe, constructed ramparts and trenches, testudines and moveable towers after the Roman fashion, and
showered fire - balls and burning spears over the straw- covered huts of the camp. The only hope of the besieged rested on Caesar, who lay not so very far off with three legions in his winter encampment in the region of Amiens. But — a significant proof of the feeling that prevailed in Gaul —for a considerable time not the slightest hint reached the general either of the disaster of Sabinus or of the peril ous situation of Cicero.
At length a Celtic horseman from Cicero's camp suc-
Caesar
hUreiiet10 cee(^ed in stealing through the enemy to Caesar. On
receiving the startling news Caesar immediately set out, although only with two weak legions, together numbering about 7000, and 400 horsemen ; nevertheless the an nouncement that Caesar was advancing sufficed to induce the insurgents to raise the siege. It was time ; not one
Quintus
CHAr. vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 5 1
tenth of the men in Cicero's camp remained unwounded.
Caesar, against whom the insurgent army had turned, The insur- deceived the enemy, in the way which he had already on Sleeked several occasions successfully applied, as to his strength ;
under the most unfavourable circumstances they ventured
an assault upon the Roman camp and in doing so suffered
a defeat It is singular, but characteristic of the Celtic
nation, that in consequence of this one lost battle, or
perhaps rather in consequence of Caesar's appearance in
person on the scene of conflict, the insurrection, which
had commenced so victoriously and extended so widely,
suddenly and pitiably broke off the war. The Nervii,
Menapii, Aduatuci, Eburones, returned to their homes.
The forces of the maritime cantons, who had made pre
parations for assailing the legion in Brittany, did the
same. The Treveri, through whose leader Indutiomarus
the Eburones, the clients of the powerful neighbouring
canton, had been chiefly induced to that so successful
attack, had taken arms on the news of the disaster of Aduatuca and advanced into the territory of the Remi
with the view of attacking the legion cantoned there under
the command of Labienus ; they too desisted for the present
from continuing the struggle. Caesar not unwillingly
farther measures against the revolted districts till the spring, in order not to expose his troops which had suffered much to the whole severity of the Gallic winter, and with the view of only reappearing in the field when the fifteen cohorts destroyed should have been re placed in an imposing manner by the levy of thirty new cohorts which he had ordered. The insurrection mean while pursued its course, although there was for the moment a suspension of arms. Its chief seats in central Gaul were, partly the districts of the Carnutes and the neighbouring Senones (about Sens), the latter of whom drove the king appointed by Caesar out of their country ;
postponed
and sup. pressed.
12 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
partly the region of the Treveri, who invited the whole Celtic emigrants and the Germans beyond the Rhine to take part in the impending national war, and called out their whole force, with a view to advance in the spring a second time into the territory of the Remi, to capture the corps of Labienus, and to seek a communication with the insurgents on the Seine and Loire. The deputies of these three cantons remained absent from the diet convoked by Caesar in central Gaul, and thereby declared war just as openly as a part of the Belgic cantons had done by the attacks on the camps of Sabinus and Cicero,
The winter was drawing to a close when Caesar set out with his army, which meanwhile had been considerably re inforced, against the insurgents. The attempts of the Treveri to concentrate the revolt had not succeeded ; the agitated districts were kept in check by the marching in of Roman troops, and those in open rebellion were attacked in detail. First the Nervii were routed by Caesar in person. The Senones and Carnutes met the same fate. The Menapii, the only canton which had never submitted to the Romans, were compelled by a grand attack simul taneously directed against them from three sides to re nounce their long-preserved freedom. Labienus meanwhile was preparing the same fate for the Treveri. Their first attack had been paralyzed, partly by the refusal of the adjoining German tribes to furnish them with mercenaries, partly by the fact that Indutiomarus, the soul of the whole movement, had fallen in a skirmish with the cavalry of Labienus. But they did not on this account abandon their projects. With their whole levy they appeared in front of Labienus and waited for the German bands that were to follow, for their recruiting agents found a better reception than they had met with from the dwellers on the Rhine, among the warlike tribes of the interior of Germany, especially, as it would appear, among the Chatti. But
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST
73
when Labienus seemed as if he wished to avoid these and to march off in all haste, the Treveri attacked the Romans even before the Germans arrived and in a most unfavour able spot, and were completely defeated. Nothing remained for the Germans who came up too late but to return,
for the Treverian canton but to submit; its
nothing
government
Cingetorix, the son-in-law of Indutiomarus. After these expeditions of Caesar against the Menapii and of Labienus against the Treveri the whole Roman army was again united in the territory of the latter. With the view of rendering the Germans disinclined to come back, Caesar once more crossed the Rhine, in order if possible to strike an emphatic blow against the troublesome neighbours; but, as the Chatti, faithful to their tried tactics, assembled not on their western boundary, but far in the interior, apparently at the Harz mountains, for the defence of the land, he immediately turned back and contented himself with leaving behind a garrison at the passage of the Rhine.
Accounts had thus been settled with all the tribes that Retaliatory took part in the rising; the Eburones alone were passed —^J"^ over but not forgotten. Since Caesar had met with the Eburone*, disaster of Aduatuca, he had worn mourning and had
sworn that he would only lay it aside when he should have
avenged his soldiers, who had not fallen in honourable
war, but had been treacherously murdered. Helpless and
passive the Eburones sat in their huts and looked on, as
the neighbouring cantons one after another submitted to
the Romans, till the Roman cavalry from the Treverian
territory advanced through the Ardennes into their land.
So little were they prepared for the attack, that the cavalry
had almost seized the king Ambiorix in his house; with
great difficulty, while his attendants sacrificed themselves
on his behalf, he escaped into the neighbouring thicket.
Ten Roman legions soon followed the cavalry At the
reverted to the head of the Roman party
Second in- lurrection.
The sagacious calculator had on this occasion miscal- cuiated. The fire was smothered, but not extinguished. The stroke, under which the head of Acco fell, was felt by the whole Celtic nobility. At this very moment the position of affairs presented better prospects than ever. The insurrection of the last winter had evidently failed only through Caesar himself appearing on the scene of action ; now he was at a distance, detained on the Po by the imminence of civil war, and the Gallic army, which
74 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST hook ?
same time a summons was issued to the surrounding tribes to hunt the outlawed Eburones and pillage their land in concert with the Roman soldiers; not a few complied with the call, including even an audacious band of Sugambrian horsemen from the other side of the Rhine, who for that matter treated the Romans no better than the Eburones, and had almost by a daring coup de main surprised the Roman camp at Aduatuca. The fate of the Eburones was dreadful. However they might hide them selves in forests and morasses, there were more hunters than game. Many put themselves to death like the gray- haired prince Catuvolcus ; only a few saved life and liberty, but among these few was the man whom the Romans sought above all to seize, the prince Ambiorix; with but four horsemen he escaped over the Rhine. This execution against the canton which had transgressed above all the rest was followed in the other districts by processes of high treason against individuals. The season for clemency was past. At the bidding of the Roman proconsul the eminent Carnutic knight Acco was beheaded by Roman
68. lictors (701) and the rule of the fasces was thus formally inaugurated. Opposition was silent; tranquillity every where prevailed. Caesar went as he was wont towards
68. the end of the year (701) over the Alps, that through the winter he might observe more closely the daily-increasing complications in the capital.
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 75
was collected on the upper Seine, was far separated from its dreaded leader. If a general insurrection now broke out in central Gaul, the Roman army might be surrounded, and the almost undefended old Roman province be over run, before Caesar reappeared beyond the Alps, even if the Italian complications did not altogether prevent him
from further concerning himself about Gaul.
Conspirators from all the cantons of central Gaul The
arn
assembled ; the Carnutes, as most directly affected by the execution of Acco, offered to take the lead. On a set
day in the winter of 701-702 the Carnutic knights 58-62. Gutruatus and Conconnetodumnus gave at Cenabum (Orleans) the signal for the rising, and put to death in a
body the Romans who happened to be there. The most vehement agitation seized the length and breadth of the
great Celtic land ; the patriots everywhere bestirred them
selves. But nothing stirred the nation so deeply as the insurrection of the Arverni. The government of this The
community, which had formerly under its kings been the first in southern Gaul, and had still after the fall of its principality occasioned by the unfortunate wars against Rome (iii. 418) continued to be one of the wealthiest, most civilized, and most powerful in all Gaul, had hitherto inviolably adhered to Rome. Even now the patriot party in the governing common council was in the minority; an attempt to induce it to join the insurrection was in vain. The attacks of the patriots were therefore directed against the common council and the existing constitution itself; and the more so, that the change of constitution which among the Arverni had substituted the common council for the prince (p. 19) had taken place after the victories of the Romans and probably under their influence.
Ar"rtdm
The leader of the Arvernian patriots Vercingetorix, one Verdnge- of those nobles whom we meet with among the Celts, of Ua^ almost regal repute in and beyond his canton, and a
76 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
ttately, brave, sagacious man to boot, left the capital and summoned the country people, who were as hostile to the ruling oligarchy as to the Romans, at once to re-establish the Arvernian monarchy and to go to war with Rome. The multitude quickly joined him ; the restoration of the throne of Luerius and Betuitus was at the same time the declaration of a national war against Rome. The centre of unity, from the want of which all previous attempts of the nation to shake off the foreign yoke had failed, was now found in the new self-nominated king of the Arverni. Vercingetorix became for the Celts of the continent what
Cassivellaunus was for the insular Celts; the
strongly pervaded the masses that he, if any one, was the man to save the nation.
The west from the mouth of the Garonne to that of the Seine was rapidly infected by the insurrection, and Ver cingetorix was recognized by all the cantons there as commander-in-chief; where the common council made any difficulty, the multitude compelled it to join the movement; only a few cantons, such as that of the Bituriges, required compulsion to join and these per haps only for appearance' sake. The insurrection found
less favourable soil in the regions to the east of the upper Loire. Everything here depended on the Haedui and these wavered. The patriotic party was very strong in this canton but the old antagonism to the leading of the Arverni counterbalanced their influence — to the most serious detriment of the insurrection, as the accession of the eastern cantons, particularly of the Sequani and Helvetii, was conditional on the accession of the Haedui, and generally in this part of Gaul the decision rested with them. While the insurgents were thus labouring partly to induce the cantons that still hesitated, especially the Haedui, to join them, partly to get possession of Narbo— ope of their leaders, the daring Lucterius, had already
feeling
Spread of the insur rection.
;
;
a
it,
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST
77
appeared on the Tarn within the limits of the old pro
vince — the Roman commander-in-chief suddenly presented Appear- himself in the depth of winter, unexpected alike by friend rw,7 and foe, on this side of the Alps. He quickly made the necessary preparations to cover the old province, and not
only so, but sent also a corps over the snow-covered Cevennes into the Arvernian territory ; but he could not
remain here, where the accession of the Haedui to the
Gallic alliance might any moment cut him off from his
army encamped about Sens and Langres. With all secrecy
he went to Vienna, and thence, attended by only a few horsemen, through the territory of the Haedui to his troops.
The hopes, which had induced the conspirators to declare themselves, vanished ; peace continued in Italy, and Caesar
stood once more at the head of his army.
But what were they to do? It was folly under such The circumstances to let the matter come to the decision of G,ftlllc pta*
of war. arms ; for these had already decidedly irrevocably. They
might as well attempt to shake the Alps by throwing stones at them as to shake the legions by means of the Celtic bands, whether these might be congregated in huge masses or sacrificed in detail canton after canton. Vercingetorix despaired of defeating the Romans. He adopted a system of warfare similar to that by which Cassivellaunus had saved the insular Celts. The Roman infantry was not to be vanquished ; but Caesar's cavalry consisted almost exclusively of the contingent of the Celtic nobility, and was practically dissolved by the general revolt It was possible for the insurrection, which was in fact essentially composed of the Celtic nobility, to develop such a superiority in this arm, that it could lay waste the land far and wide, burn
down towns and villages, destroy the magazines, and en danger the supplies and the communications of the enemy, without his being able seriously to hinder it Vercinge torix accordingly directed all his efforts to the increase of his
Beginning of the struggle.
78 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
cavalry, and of the infantry-archers who were according to the mode of fighting of that time regularly associated with He did not send the immense and self-obstructing
masses of the militia of the line to their homes, but he did not allow them to face the enemy, and attempted to impart to them gradually some capacity of intrenching, marching, and manoeuvring, and some perception that the soldier not destined merely for hand-to-hand combat. Learning from the enemy, he adopted in particular the Roman system of encampment, on which depended the whole secret of the tactical superiority of the Romans for in consequence of every Roman corps combined all the advantages of the garrison of fortress with all the advantages of an offensive army. 1 It true that system completely adapted to Britain which had few towns and to its rude, resolute, and on the whole united inhabitants was not absolutely transferable to the rich regions on the Loire and their indolent inhabitants on the eve of utter political dissolution. Vercingetorix at least accomplished this much, that they did not attempt as hitherto to hold every town with the result of holding none they agreed to destroy the townships not capable of defence before attack reached them, but to defend with all their might the strong fortresses. At the same time the Arvernian king did what he could to bind to the cause of their country the cowardly and backward by stern severity, the hesitating by entreaties and representations, the covetous gold, the decided opponents by force, and to compel or allure the rabble high or low to some manifestation of patriotism.
Even before the winter was at an end, he threw himself
This, true, was only possible, so long as offensive weapons chiefly aimed at cutting and stabbing. In the modern mode of warfare, as Napoleon has excellently explained, this system has become inapplicable, because with our offensive weapons operating from a dis'. ance the deployed position more advantageous than the concentrated. In Caesar's time the reverse was the case.
is
is
1
it
by
a is
;
a;
it
is
it.
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST
79
on the Boii settled by Caesar in the territory of the Haedui, with the view of annihilating these, almost the sole trust worthy allies of Rome, before Caesar came up. The news of this attack induced Caesar, leaving behind the baggage and two legions in the winter quarters of Agedincum (Sens), to march immediately and earlier than he would doubtless otherwise have done, against the insurgents. He remedied the sorely-felt want of cavalry and light infantry in some measure by gradually bringing up German mercenaries, who instead of using their own small and weak ponies were furnished with Italian and Spanish horses partly bought, partly procured by requisition of the officers. Caesar, after having by the way caused Cenabum, the capital of the Carnutes, which had given the signal for the revolt, to be pillaged and laid in ashes, moved over the Loire into the country of the Bituriges. He thereby induced Vercingetorix to abandon the siege of the town of the Boii, and to resort likewise to the Bituriges. Here the new mode of warfare was first to be tried. By order of Vercingetorix more than twenty townships of the Bituriges perished in the flames on one day ; the general decreed a similar self-devastation as to the neighbour cantons, so far as they could be reached by the Roman foraging parties.
According to his intention, Avaricum (Bourges), the Caesar rich and strong capital of the Bituriges, was to meet the ^Saiicum. same fate ; but the majority of the war-council yielded to
the suppliant entreaties of the Biturigian authorities, and
resolved rather to defend that city with all their energy.
Thus the war was concentrated in the first instance around Avaricum. Vercingetorix placed his infantry amidst the morasses adjoining the town in a position so unapproach
able, that even without being covered by the cavalry they
needed not to fear the attack of the legions. The Celtic
cavalry covered all the roads and obstructed the communica
tion. The town was strongly garrisoned, and the connec-
Anrlcnm conquered
So THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book V
tion between it and the army before the walls was kept open. Caesar's position was very awkward. The attempt to induce the Celtic infantry to fight was unsuccessful ; it stirred not from its unassailable lines. Bravely as his soldiers in front of the town trenched and fought, the besieged vied with them in ingenuity and courage, and they had almost succeeded in setting fire to the siege apparatus of their opponents. The task withal of supplying an army of nearly 6o,o00 men with provisions in a country devastated far and wide and scoured by far superior bodies of cavalry became daily more difficult. The slender stores of the Boii were soon used up ; the supply promised by the Haedui failed to appear ; the corn was already consumed, and the soldier was placed exclusively on flesh-rations. But the moment was approaching when the town, with whatever contempt of death the garrison fought, could be held no longer. Still it was not impossible to withdraw the troops secretly by night and destroy the town, before the enemy occupied Vercingetorix made arrangements for this purpose, but the cry of distress raised at the moment of evacuation by the women and children left behind attracted
the attention of the Romans the departure miscarried. On the following gloomy and rainy day the Romans scaled the walls, and, exasperated the obstinate defence,
spared neither age nor sex in the conquered town. The ample stores, which the Celts had accumulated in were welcome to the starved soldiers of Caesar. With the capture
02. of Avaricum (spring of 702), first success had been achieved over the insurrection, and according to former ex perience Caesar might well expect that would now dissolve, and that would only be requisite to deal with the cantons individually. After he had therefore shown himself with his whole army in the canton of the Haedui and had by this imposing demonstration compelled the patriot party in
ferment there to keep quiet at least for the moment, he
a
it
it.
a it
by
it,
;
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 81
divided his army and sent Labienus back to Agedincum, Caesar that in combination with the troops left there he might at ^jr* the head of four legions suppress in the first instance the movement in the territory of the Carnutes and Senones,
who on this occasion once more took the lead ; while he himself with the six remaining legions turned to the south and prepared to carry the war into the Arvernian mountains, the proper territory of Vercingetorix.
Labienus moved from Agedincum up the left bank of Labienus the Seine with a view to possess himself of Lutetia (Paris), n1tetL. the town of the Parish situated on an island in the Seine,
and from this well-secured position in the heart of the insurgent country to reduce it again to subjection. But
behind Melodunum (Melun), he found his route barred by
the whole army of the insurgents, which had here taken
up a position between unassailable morasses under the leadership of the aged Camulogenus. Labienus retreated
a certain distance, crossed the Seine at Melodunum, and
moved up its right bank unhindered towards Lutetia; Camulogenus caused this town to be burnt and the bridges
leading to the left bank to be broken down, and took up a
position over against Labienus, in which the latter could
neither bring him to battle nor effect a passage under the
eyes of the hostile army.
The Roman main army in its turn advanced along the Caesar
Allier down into the canton of the Arverni. Vercingetorix attempted to prevent it from crossing to the left bank of the Allier, but Caesar overreached him and after some days stood before the Arvernian capital Gergovia. 1 Ver-
1 This place has been sought on a rising ground which is still named Gergoie, a league to the south of the Arvernian capital Nemetum, the modern Clermont ; and both the remains of rude fortress-walls brought to light in excavations there, and the tradition of the name which is traced in documents up to the tenth century, leave no room for doubt as to the correctness of this determination of the locality. Moreover it accords, as with the other statements of Caesar, so especially with the fact that he pretty clearly indicates Gergovia as the chief place of the Arverni (vii. 4).
VOL. V
139
QenSo*fa.
Fruitless blockade.
THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
cingetorix, however, doubtless even while he was confronting Caesar on the Allier, had caused sufficient stores to be collected in Gergovia and a fixed camp provided with strong stone ramparts to be constructed for his troops in front of the walls of the town, which was situated on the summit of a pretty steep hill ; and, as he had a sufficient start, he arrived before Caesar at Gergovia and awaited the attack in the fortified camp under the wall of the fortress. Caesar with his comparatively weak army could neither regularly besiege the place nor even sufficiently blockade it ; he pitched his camp below the rising ground occupied by Vercingetorix, and was compelled to preserve an attitude as inactive as his opponent It was almost a victory for the insurgents, that Caesar's career of advance from triumph to triumph had been suddenly checked on the Seine as on the Allier. In fact the consequences of this check for Caesar were almost equivalent to those of a defeat
The Haedui, who had hitherto continued vacillating, now made preparations in earnest to join the patriotic party; the body of men, whom Caesar had ordered to Gergovia, had on the march been induced by its officers to declare for the insurgents; at the same time they had begun in the canton itself to plunder and kill the Romans settled there. Caesar, who had gone with two-thirds of the blockading army to meet that corps of the Haedui which was being brought up to Gergovia, had by his sudden appearance recalled it to nominal obedience ; but it was more than ever a hollow and fragile relation, the continuance of which had been almost too dearly purchased
by the great peril of the two legions left behind in front of Gergovia. For Vercingetorix, rapidly and resolutely availing himself of Caesar's departure, had during his
We shall have accordingly to assume, that the Arreraians after their defeat were compelled to transfer their settlement from Gergovia to the neighbouring less strong Nemetum.
The Haedui
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 83
absence made an attack on them, which had wellnigh ended in their being overpowered, and the Roman camp being taken by storm. Caesar's unrivalled celerity alone averted a second catastrophe like that of Aduatuca. Though the Haedui made once more fair promises, it might be foreseen that, if the blockade should still be
without result, they would openly range them selves on the side of the insurgents and would thereby compel Caesar to raise it; for their accession would interrupt the communication between him and Labienus, and expose the latter especially in his isolation to the greatest peril. Caesar was resolved not to let matters come to this pass, but, however painful and even dangerous it was to retire from Gergovia without having accomplished his object, nevertheless, if it must be done, rather to set out immediately and by marching into the canton of the
Haedui to prevent at any cost their formal desertion.
Before entering however on this retreat, which was far Caesar
from agreeable to his quick and confident temperament, he ^^ made yet a last attempt to free himself from his painful Gergovia, perplexity by a brilliant success. While the bulk of the
garrison of Gergovia was occupied in intrenching the side
on which the assault was expected, the Roman general watched his opportunity to surprise another access less conveniently situated but at the moment left bare. In reality the Roman storming columns scaled the camp-wall, and occupied the nearest quarters of the camp; but the whole garrison was already alarmed, and owing to the small distances Caesar found it not advisable to risk the second assault on the city-wall. He gave the signal for retreat; but the foremost legions, carried away by the impetuosity of victory, heard not or did not wish to hear, and pushed forward without halting, up to the city-wall, some even into the city. But masses more and mors
. dense threw themselves in front of the intruders; the fore-
prolonged
Renewed Insurrec tion.
THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
most fell, the columns stopped; in vain centurions and legionaries fought with the most devoted and heroic courage ; the assailants were chased with very considerable loss out of the town and down the hill, where the troops stationed by Caesar in the plain received them and prevented greater mischief. The expected capture of Gergovia had been converted into a defeat, and the con siderable loss in killed and wounded — there were counted 700 soldiers that had fallen, including 46 centurions —was the least part of the misfortune suffered.
The imposing position of Caesar in Gaul depended essentially on the halo of victory that surrounded him ; and this began to grow pale. The conflicts around Avaricum, Caesar's vain attempts to compel the enemy to fight, the resolute defence of the city and its almost accidental capture by storm bore a stamp different from that of the earlier Celtic wars, and had strengthened rather than impaired the confidence of the Celts in themselves and their leader. Moreover, the new system of warfare—the making head against the enemy in intrenched camps under the protection of fortresses —had completely approved itself at Lutetia as well as at Gergovia. Lastly, this defeat, the first which Caesar in person had suffered from the Celts, crowned their success, and it accordingly gave as it were the signal for a second outbreak of the insurrection. The Haedui now broke formally with Caesar and entered into union with Vercingetorix. Their contingent, which was still with Caesar's army, not only deserted from but also took occasion to carry off the depots of the army of Caesar at Noviodunum on the Loire, whereby the chests and magazines, number of remount-horses, and all the hostages furnished to Caesar, fell into the hands of the insurgents. was of at least equal importance, that on this news the Belgae, who had hitherto kept aloof from the whole movement, began to bestir themselves. The
Rising of the Haedui.
Rising of the Belgae,
It
a
it,
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 85
canton of the Bellovaci rose with the view of in the rear the corps of Labienus, while it confronted at Lutetia the levy of the surrounding cantons of central Gaul. Everywhere else too men were taking to arms; the strength of patriotic enthusiasm carried along with it even the most decided and most favoured partisans of Rome, such as Commius king of the Atrebates, who on account of his faithful services had received from the Romans important privileges for his community and the
hegemony over the Morini. The threads of the insurrec tion ramified even into the old Roman province : they cherished the hope, perhaps not without ground, of inducing the Allobroges themselves to take arms against the Romans. With the single exception of the Remi and of the districts — dependent immediately on the Remi —of the Suessiones, Leuci, and Lingones, whose peculiar isolation was not affected even amidst this general en thusiasm, the whole Celtic nation from the Pyrenees to the Rhine was now in reality, for the first and for the last time, in arms for its freedom and nationality ; whereas, singularly enough, the whole German communities, who in the former struggles had held the foremost rank, kept aloof. In fact, the Treveri, and as it would seem the Menapii also, were prevented by their feuds with the Germans from taking an active part in the national war.
powerful attacking
It was a grave and decisive moment, when after the retreat from Gergovia and the loss of Noviodunum a *~ council of war was held in Caesar's headquarters regarding
the measures now to be adopted. Various voices expressed themselves in favour of a retreat over the Cevennes into
the old Roman province, which now lay open on all sides
to the insurrection and certainly was in urgent need of the legions that had been sent from Rome primarily for its protection. But Caesar rejected this timid strategy suggested not by the position of affairs, but by government-
Caesar"!
Caesar unites with Labienus.
86 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
instructions and fear of responsibility. He contented himself with calling the general levy of the Romans settled in the province to arms, and having the frontiers guarded by that levy to the best of its ability. On the other hand he himself set out in the opposite direction and advanced by forced marches to Agedincum, to which he ordered Labienus to retreat in all haste. The Celts naturally endeavoured to prevent the junction of the two Roman armies. Labienus might by crossing the Marne and marching down the right bank of the Seine have reached Agedincum, where he had left his reserve and his baggage ; but he preferred not to allow the Celts again to behold the retreat of Roman troops. He therefore instead of crossing the Marne crossed the Seine under the eyes of the deluded enemy, and on its left bank fought a battle with the hostile forces, in which he conquered, and among many others the Celtic general himself, the old Camulogenus, was left on the field. Nor were the insurgents more successful in detaining Caesar on the Loire ; Caesar gave them no time to assemble larger masses there, and without difficulty dispersed the militia of the Haedui, which alone he found at that point
Thus the junction of the two divisions of the army was happily accomplished. The insurgents meanwhile had con sulted as to the farther conduct of the war at Bibracte (Autun) the capital of the Haedui ; the soul of these con sultations was again Vercingetorix, to whom the nation was enthusiastically attached after the victory of Gergovia. Particular interests were not, it is true, even now silent ; the Haedui still in this death-struggle of the nation asserted their claims to the hegemony, and made a proposal in the national assembly to substitute a leader of their own for Vercingetorix. But the national representatives had not merely declined this and confirmed Vercingetorix in the supreme command, but had also adopted his plan of war
Position of the insurgents at Alesia.
chap, Til THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 87
without alteration. It was substantially the same as that on which he had operated at Avaricum and at Gergovia. As the base of the new position there was selected the strong city of the Mandubii, Alesia (Alise Sainte Reine near Semur in the department Cote d'Or)1 and another entrenched camp was constructed under its walls. Im mense stores were here accumulated, and the army was ordered thither from Gergovia, having its cavalry raised by resolution of the national assembly to 15,000 horse.
Caesar with the whole strength of his army after it was reunited at Agedincum took the direction of Besancon, with the view of now approaching the alarmed province and protecting it from an invasion, for in fact bands of insurgents had already shown themselves in the territory of the Helvii on the south slope of the Cevennes. Alesia lay almost on his way ; the cavalry of the Celts, the only arm with which Vercingetorix chose to operate, attacked him on the route, but to the surprise of all was worsted by the new German squadrons of Caesar and the Roman infantry drawn up in support of them.
Vercingetorix hastened the more to shut himself up in Alesia ; and if Caesar was not disposed altogether to renounce the offensive, no course was left to him but for the third time in this campaign to proceed by way of attack with a far weaker force against an army encamped under a well-garrisoned and well-provisioned fortress and supplied with immense masses of cavalry. But, while the Celts had hitherto been opposed by only a part of the Roman legions, the whole forces of Caesar were united in the lines round Alesia, and Vercingetorix did not succeed, as he had suc ceeded at Avaricum and Gergovia, in placing his infantry under the protection of the walls of the fortress and keeping
1 The question so much discussed of late, whether Alesia is not rather to be Identified with Alaise (25 kilometres to the south of Besancon, dep. Daubs), has been rightly answered in the negative by all judicious inquirers.
Catsar ^^^
Siego of Alesi*•
88 THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST jdok *
his external communications open for his own benefit by his cavalry, while he interrupted those of the enemy. The Celtic cavalry, already discouraged by that defeat inflicted on them by their lightly esteemed opponents, was beaten by Caesar's German horse in every encounter. The line of circumvallation of the besiegers extending about nine miles invested the whole town, including the camp attached to it Vercingetorix had been prepared for a struggle under the walls, but not for being besieged in Alesia ; in that point of view the accumulated stores, considerable as they were, were yet far from sufficient for his army — which was said to amount to 80,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry —and for the numerous inhabitants of the town. Vercinge torix could not but perceive that his plan of warfare had on this occasion turned to his own destruction, and that he was lost unless the whole nation hastened up to the rescue of its blockaded general. The existing provisions were still, when the Roman circumvallation was closed, sufficien for a month and perhaps something more ; at the last moment, when there was still free passage at least fot horsemen, Vercingetorix dismissed his whole cavalry, and sent at the same time to the heads of the nation instructions to call out all their forces and lead them to the relief of Alesia. He himself, resolved to bear in person the re
for the plan of war which he had projected and which had miscarried, remained in the fortress, to share in good or evil the fate of his followers. But Caesar made up his mind at once to besiege and to be besieged. He prepared his line of circumvallation for defence also on its outer side, and furnished himself with provisions for a longer period. The days passed ; they had no longer a boll of grain in the fortress, and they were obliged to drive out the unhappy inhabitants of the town to perish miserably between the entrenchments of the Celts and of the Romans, pitilessly rejected by both.
sponsibility
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 89
At the last hour there appeared behind Caesar's lines Attempt the interminable array of the Celto-Belgic relieving army, "*
said to amount to 250,000 infantry and 8000 cavalry.
From the Channel to the Cevennes the insurgent cantons
had strained every nerve to rescue the flower of their
patriots and the general of their choice — the Bellovaci
alone had answered that they were doubtless disposed to
fight against the Romans, but not beyond their own
bounds. The first assault, which the besieged of Alesia Conflict! and the relieving troops without made on the Roman ai^. double line, was repulsed; but, when after a day's rest it
was repeated, the Celts succeeded — at a spot where the line of circumvallation ran over the slope of a hill and could be assailed from the height above — in filling up the trenches and hurling the defenders down from the ram
Then Labienus, sent thither by Caesar, collected the nearest cohorts and threw himself with four legions on the foe. Under the eyes of the general, who himself
part.
at the most dangerous moment, the assailants were driven back in a desperate hand-to-hand conflict, and the squadrons of cavalry that came with Caesar taking the fugitives in rear completed the defeat.
It was more than a great victory; the fate of Alesia, Alesia
and indeed of the Celtic nation, was thereby irrevocably capitulate*. decided. The Celtic army, utterly disheartened, dispersed
at once from the battle-field and went home. Vercinge-
torix might perhaps have even now taken to flight, or at
least have saved himself by the last means open to a free
man ; he did not do so, but declared in a council of war
that, since he had not succeeded in breaking off the alien
yoke, he was ready to give himself up as a victim and to
avert as far as possible destruction from the nation
bringing it on his own head. This was done. The Celtic
officers delivered their general—the solemn choice of the
whole nation —over to the enemy of their country for such
appeared
by
Vercinge- toriz executed.
Five years afterwards he was led in triumph through the streets of the Italian capital, and, while his conqueror was offering solemn thanks to the gods on the summit of the Capitol, Vercingetorix was beheaded at its foot as guilty of high treason against the Roman nation. As after a day of gloom the sun may perhaps break through the clouds at its setting, so destiny may bestow on nations in their decline yet a last great man. Thus Hannibal stands at the close of the Phoenician history, and Vercingetorix at the close of the Celtic. They were not able to save the nations to which they belonged from a foreign yoke, but they spared them the last remaining disgrace — an inglorious fall. Vercingetorix, just like the Carthaginian, was obliged to contend not merely against the public foe, but also and above all against that anti-national opposition of wounded egotists and startled cowards, which regularly accompanies a degenerate civilization ; for him too a place in history is secured, not by his battles and sieges, but by the fact that he was able to furnish in his own person a centre and rallying -point to a nation distracted and ruined by the rivalry of individual interests. And yet there can hardly
be a more marked contrast than between the sober towns man of the Phoenician mercantile city, whose plans were directed towards one great object with unchanging energy throughout fifty years, and the bold prince of the Celtic land, whose mighty deeds and high-minded self-sacrifice fall within the compass of one brief summer. The whole ancient world presents no more genuine knight, whether as regards his essential character or his outward appear ance. But man ought not to be a mere knight, and least
9° THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book »
punishment as might be thought fit. Mounted on his steed and in full armour the king of the Arverni appeared before the Roman proconsul and rode round his tribunal ; then he surrendered his horse and arms, and sat down in
62. silence on the steps at Caesar's feet (702).
chap, vii THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST 91
of all the statesman. It was the knight, not the hero, who disdained to escape from Alesia, when for the nation more depended on him than on a hundred thousand ordinary brave men. It was the knight, not the hero, who gave himself up as a sacrifice, when the only thing gained by that sacrifice was that the nation publicly dishonoured itself and with equal cowardice and absurdity employed its last breath in proclaiming that its great historical death- struggle was a crime against its oppressor. How very different was the conduct of Hannibal in similar positions ! It is impossible to part from the noble king of the Arverni without a feeling of historical and human sympathy ; but it is a significant trait of the Celtic nation, that its greatest man was after all merely a knight
The fall of Alesia and the capitulation of the army The last enclosed in it were fearful blows for the Celtic insurrection ; conflicts but blows quite as heavy had befallen the nation and yet
the conflict had been renewed. The loss of Vercingetorix, however, was irreparable. With him unity had come to
the nation; with him it seemed also to have departed. We do not find that the insurgents made any attempt to continue their joint defence and to appoint another general issimo; the league of patriots fell to pieces of itself, and every clan was left to fight or come to terms with the Romans as it pleased. Naturally the desire after rest everywhere prevailed. Caesar too had an interest in bring ing the war quickly to an end. Of the ten years of his governorship seven had elapsed, and the last was called in question by his political opponents in the capital ; he could only reckon with some degree of certainty on two more summers, and, while his interest as well as his honour required that he should hand over the newly-acquired regions to his successor in a condition of tolerable peace and tranquillity, there was in truth but scanty time to bring about such a state of things. To exercise mercy was in
with the
^mmges Camutes,
62-61.
with the Bellovaci,
9a THE SUBJUGATION OF THE WEST book v
this case still more a necessity for the victor than for the vanquished ; and he might thank his stars that the internal dissensions and tne easy temperament of the Celts met him in this respect half way. Where —as in the two most eminent cantons of central Gaul, those of the Haedui and Arverni — there existed a strong party well disposed to Rome, the cantons obtained immediately after the fall of Alesia a complete restoration of their former relations with Rome, and even their captives, 20,000 in number, were released without ransom, while those of the other clans passed into the hard bondage of the victorious legionaries. The greater portion of the Gallic districts submitted like the Haedui and Arverni to their fate, and allowed their
inevitable punishment to be inflicted without farther resist- ance.