No More Learning

Objection 2: Further, the same work cannot proceed at the same time
from two sources; as neither can one and the same movement belong to
two movable things. Therefore if the creature's operation is from God
operating in the creature, it cannot at the same time proceed from the
creature; and so no creature works at all.

Objection 3: Further, the maker is the cause of the operation of the
thing made, as giving it the form whereby it operates. Therefore, if
God is the cause of the operation of things made by Him, this would be
inasmuch as He gives them the power of operating. But this is in the
beginning, when He makes them. Thus it seems that God does not operate
any further in the operating creature.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 26:12): "Lord, Thou hast wrought
all our works in [Vulg. : 'for'] us. "

I answer that, Some have understood God to work in every agent in such
a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that God
alone is the ultimate cause of everything wrought; for instance, that
it is not fire that gives heat, but God in the fire, and so forth. But
this is impossible. First, because the order of cause and effect would
be taken away from created things: and this would imply lack of power
in the Creator: for it is due to the power of the cause, that it
bestows active power on its effect. Secondly, because the active powers
which are seen to exist in things, would be bestowed on things to no
purpose, if these wrought nothing through them. Indeed, all things
created would seem, in a way, to be purposeless, if they lacked an
operation proper to them; since the purpose of everything is its
operation. For the less perfect is always for the sake of the more
perfect: and consequently as the matter is for the sake of the form, so
the form which is the first act, is for the sake of its operation,
which is the second act; and thus operation is the end of the creature.
We must therefore understand that God works in things in such a manner
that things have their proper operation.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few
kinds of causes; matter is not a principle of action, but is the
subject that receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the end,
the agent, and the form are principles of action, but in a certain
order. For the first principle of action is the end which moves the
agent; the second is the agent; the third is the form of that which the
agent applies to action (although the agent also acts through its own
form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art. For the craftsman
is moved to action by the end, which is the thing wrought, for instance
a chest or a bed; and applies to action the axe which cuts through its
being sharp.

Thus then does God work in every worker, according to these three
things. First as an end. For since every operation is for the sake of
some good, real or apparent; and nothing is good either really or
apparently, except in as far as it participates in a likeness to the
Supreme Good, which is God; it follows that God Himself is the cause of
every operation as its end. Again it is to be observed that where there
are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue of the
first; for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus all agents
act in virtue of God Himself: and therefore He is the cause of action
in every agent. Thirdly, we must observe that God not only moves things
to operated, as it were applying their forms and powers to operation,
just as the workman applies the axe to cut, who nevertheless at times
does not give the axe its form; but He also gives created agents their
forms and preserves them in being. Therefore He is the cause of action
not only by giving the form which is the principle of action, as the
generator is said to be the cause of movement in things heavy and
light; but also as preserving the forms and powers of things; just as
the sun is said to be the cause of the manifestation of colors,
inasmuch as it gives and preserves the light by which colors are made
manifest. And since the form of a thing is within the thing, and all
the more, as it approaches nearer to the First and Universal Cause; and
because in all things God Himself is properly the cause of universal
being which is innermost in all things; it follows that in all things
God works intimately. For this reason in Holy Scripture the operations
of nature are attributed to God as operating in nature, according to
Job 10:11: "Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: Thou hast put me
together with bones and sinews. "

Reply to Objection 1: God works sufficiently in things as First Agent,
but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents
is superfluous.

Reply to Objection 2: One action does not proceed from two agents of
the same order. But nothing hinders the same action from proceeding
from a primary and a secondary agent.

Reply to Objection 3: God not only gives things their form, but He also
preserves them in existence, and applies them to act, and is moreover
the end of every action, as above explained.
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Whether God can do anything outside the established order of nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot do anything outside the
established order of nature. For Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3)
says: "God the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against
nature. " But that which is outside the natural order seems to be
against nature. Therefore God can do nothing outside the natural order.

Objection 2: Further, as the order of justice is from God, so is the
order of nature. But God cannot do anything outside the order of
justice; for then He would do something unjust. Therefore He cannot do
anything outside the order of nature.

Objection 3: Further, God established the order of nature. Therefore it
God does anything outside the order of nature, it would seem that He is
changeable; which cannot be said.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God sometimes
does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of nature. "

I answer that, From each cause there results a certain order to its
effects, since every cause is a principle; and so, according to the
multiplicity of causes, there results a multiplicity of orders,
subjected one to the other, as cause is subjected to cause. Wherefore a
higher cause is not subjected to a cause of a lower order; but
conversely. An example of this may be seen in human affairs. On the
father of a family depends the order of the household; which order is
contained in the order of the city; which order again depends on the
ruler of the city; while this last order depends on that of the king,
by whom the whole kingdom is ordered.

If therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first
cause, God cannot do anything against this order; for, if He did so, He
would act against His foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness. But
if we consider the order of things depending on any secondary cause,
thus God can do something outside such order; for He is not subject to
the order of secondary causes; but, on the contrary, this order is
subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by a natural necessity, but
by the choice of His own will; for He could have created another order
of things. Wherefore God can do something outside this order created by
Him, when He chooses, for instance by producing the effects of
secondary causes without them, or by producing certain effects to which
secondary causes do not extend. So Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi,
3): "God acts against the wonted course of nature, but by no means does
He act against the supreme law; because He does not act against
Himself. "

Reply to Objection 1: In natural things something may happen outside
this natural order, in two ways. It may happen by the action of an
agent which did not give them their natural inclination; as, for
example, when a man moves a heavy body upwards, which does not owe to
him its natural inclination to move downwards; and that would be
against nature. It may also happen by the action of the agent on whom
the natural inclination depends; and this is not against nature, as is
clear in the ebb and flow of the tide, which is not against nature;
although it is against the natural movement of water in a downward
direction; for it is owing to the influence of a heavenly body, on
which the natural inclination of lower bodies depends. Therefore since
the order of nature is given to things by God; if He does anything
outside this order, it is not against nature. Wherefore Augustine says
(Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "That is natural to each thing which is caused
by Him from Whom is all mode, number, and order in nature. "

Reply to Objection 2: The order of justice arises by relation to the
First Cause, Who is the rule of all justice; and therefore God can do
nothing against such order.

Reply to Objection 3: God fixed a certain order in things in such a way
that at the same time He reserved to Himself whatever he intended to do
otherwise than by a particular cause. So when He acts outside this
order, He does not change.
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Whether whatever God does outside the natural order is miraculous?

Objection 1: It would seem that not everything which God does outside
the natural order of things, is miraculous. For the creation of the
world, and of souls, and the justification of the unrighteous, are done
by God outside the natural order; as not being accomplished by the
action of any natural cause. Yet these things are not called miracles.
Therefore not everything that God does outside the natural order is a
miracle.

Objection 2: Further, a miracle is "something difficult, which seldom
occurs, surpassing the faculty of nature, and going so far beyond our
hopes as to compel our astonishment" [*St. Augustine, De utilitate
credendi xvi. ]. But some things outside the order of nature are not
arduous; for they occur in small things, such as the recovery and
healing of the sick. Nor are they of rare occurrence, since they happen
frequently; as when the sick were placed in the streets, to be healed
by the shadow of Peter (Acts 5:15). Nor do they surpass the faculty of
nature; as when people are cured of a fever. Nor are they beyond our
hopes, since we all hope for the resurrection of the dead, which
nevertheless will be outside the course of nature. Therefore not all
things are outside the course of natur are miraculous.

Objection 3: Further, the word miracle is derived from admiration. Now
admiration concerns things manifest to the senses. But sometimes things
happen outside the order of nature, which are not manifest to the
senses; as when the Apostles were endowed with knowledge without
studying or being taught. Therefore not everything that occurs outside
the order of nature is miraculous.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "Where God
does anything against that order of nature which we know and are
accustomed to observe, we call it a miracle. "

I answer that, The word miracle is derived from admiration, which
arises when an effect is manifest, whereas its cause is hidden; as when
a man sees an eclipse without knowing its cause, as the Philosopher
says in the beginning of his Metaphysics. Now the cause of a manifest
effect may be known to one, but unknown to others. Wherefore a thing is
wonderful to one man, and not at all to others: as an eclipse is to a
rustic, but not to an astronomer. Now a miracle is so called as being
full of wonder; as having a cause absolutely hidden from all: and this
cause is God. Wherefore those things which God does outside those
causes which we know, are called miracles.

Reply to Objection 1: Creation, and the justification of the
unrighteous, though done by God alone, are not, properly speaking,
miracles, because they are not of a nature to proceed from any other
cause; so they do not occur outside the order of nature, since they do
not belong to that order.

Reply to Objection 2: An arduous thing is called a miracle, not on
account of the excellence of the thing wherein it is done, but because
it surpasses the faculty of nature: likewise a thing is called unusual,
not because it does not often happen, but because it is outside the
usual natural course of things. Furthermore, a thing is said to be
above the faculty of nature, not only by reason of the substance of the
thing done, but also on account of the manner and order in which it is
done. Again, a miracle is said to go beyond the hope "of nature," not
above the hope "of grace," which hope comes from faith, whereby we
believe in the future resurrection.

Reply to Objection 3: The knowledge of the Apostles, although not
manifest in itself, yet was made manifest in its effect, from which it
was shown to be wonderful.
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Whether one miracle is greater than another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one miracle is not greater than
another. For Augustine says (Epist. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "In
miraculous deeds, the whole measure of the deed is the power of the
doer. " But by the same power of God all miracles are done. Therefore
one miracle is not greater than another.

Objection 2: Further, the power of God is infinite. But the infinite
exceeds the finite beyond all proportion; and therefore no more reason
exists to wonder at one effect thereof than at another. Therefore one
miracle is not greater than another.

On the contrary, The Lord says, speaking of miraculous works (Jn.
14:12): "The works that I do, he also shall do, and greater than these
shall he do. "

I answer that, Nothing is called a miracle by comparison with the
Divine Power; because no action is of any account compared with the
power of God, according to Is. 40:15: "Behold the Gentiles are as a
drop from a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a
balance. " But a thing is called a miracle by comparison with the power
of nature which it surpasses. So the more the power of nature is
surpassed, the greater the miracle. Now the power of nature is
surpassed in three ways: firstly, in the substance of the deed, for
instance, if two bodies occupy the same place, or if the sun goes
backwards; or if a human body is glorified: such things nature is
absolutely unable to do; and these hold the highest rank among
miracles. Secondly, a thing surpasses the power of nature, not in the
deed, but in that wherein it is done; as the raising of the dead, and
giving sight to the blind, and the like; for nature can give life, but
not to the dead; and such hold the second rank in miracles. Thirdly, a
thing surpasses nature's power in the measure and order in which it is
done; as when a man is cured of a fever suddenly, without treatment or
the usual process of nature; or as when the air is suddenly condensed
into rain, by Divine power without a natural cause, as occurred at the
prayers of Samuel and Elias; and these hold the lowest place in
miracles. Moreover, each of these kinds has various degrees, according
to the different ways in which the power of nature is surpassed.

From this is clear how to reply to the objections, arguing as they do
from the Divine power.
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HOW ONE CREATURE MOVES ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)

We next consider how one creature moves another. This consideration
will be threefold: (1) How the angels move, who are purely spiritual
creatures; (2) How bodies move; (3) How man moves, who is composed of a
spiritual and a corporeal nature.

Concerning the first point, there are three things to be considered:
(1) How an angel acts on an angel; (2) How an angel acts on a corporeal
nature; (3) How an angel acts on man.

The first of these raises the question of the enlightenment and speech
of the angels; and of their mutual coordination, both of the good and
of the bad angels.

Concerning their enlightenment there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether one angel moves the intellect of another by enlightenment?

(2) Whether one angel moves the will of another?

(3) Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?

(4) Whether a superior angel enlightens an inferior angel in all that
he knows himself?
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Whether one angel enlightens another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not enlighten another.
For the angels possess now the same beatitude which we hope to obtain.
But one man will not then enlighten another, according to Jer. 31:34:
"They shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his
brother. " Therefore neither does an angel enlighten another now.

Objection 2: Further, light in the angels is threefold; of nature, of
grace, and of glory. But an angel is enlightened in the light of nature
by the Creator; in the light of grace by the Justifier; in the light of
glory by the Beatifier; all of which comes from God. Therefore one
angel does not enlighten another.

Objection 3: Further, light is a form in the mind. But the rational
mind is "informed by God alone, without created intervention," as
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51). Therefore one angel does not enlighten
the mind of another.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that "the angels of
the second hierarchy are cleansed, enlightened and perfected by the
angels of the first hierarchy. "

I answer that, One angel enlightens another. To make this clear, we
must observe that intellectual light is nothing else than a
manifestation of truth, according to Eph. 5:13: "All that is made
manifest is light. " Hence to enlighten means nothing else but to
communicate to others the manifestation of the known truth; according
to the Apostle (Eph. 3:8): "To me the least of all the saints is given
this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the
dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in
God. " Therefore one angel is said to enlighten another by manifesting
the truth which he knows himself. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
vii): "Theologians plainly show that the orders of the heavenly beings
are taught Divine science by the higher minds. "

Now since two things concur in the intellectual operation, as we have
said ([850]Q[105], A[3]), namely, the intellectual power, and the
likeness of the thing understood; in both of these one angel can notify
the known truth to another. First, by strengthening his intellectual
power; for just as the power of an imperfect body is strengthened by
the neighborhood of a more perfect body ---for instance, the less hot
is made hotter by the presence of what is hotter; so the intellectual
power of an inferior angel is strengthened by the superior angel
turning to him: since in spiritual things, for one thing to turn to
another, corresponds to neighborhood in corporeal things. Secondly, one
angel manifests the truth to another as regards the likeness of the
thing understood. For the superior angel receives the knowledge of
truth by a kind of universal conception, to receive which the inferior
angel's intellect is not sufficiently powerful, for it is natural to
him to receive truth in a more particular manner. Therefore the
superior angel distinguishes, in a way, the truth which he conceives
universally, so that it can be grasped by the inferior angel; and thus
he proposes it to his knowledge. Thus it is with us that the teacher,
in order to adapt himself to others, divides into many points the
knowledge which he possesses in the universal. This is thus expressed
by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xv): "Every intellectual substance with
provident power divides and multiplies the uniform knowledge bestowed
on it by one nearer to God, so as to lead its inferiors upwards by
analogy. "

Reply to Objection 1: All the angels, both inferior and superior, see
the Essence of God immediately, and in this respect one does not teach
another. It is of this truth that the prophet speaks; wherefore he
adds: "They shall teach no more every man his brother, saying: 'Know
the Lord': for all shall know Me, from the least of them even to the
greatest. " But all the types of the Divine works, which are known in
God as in their cause, God knows in Himself, because He comprehends
Himself; but of others who see God, each one knows the more types, the
more perfectly he sees God. Hence a superior angel knows more about the
types of the Divine works than an inferior angel, and concerning these
the former enlightens the latter; and as to this Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv) that the angels "are enlightened by the types of existing
things. "

Reply to Objection 2: An angel does not enlighten another by giving him
the light of nature, grace, or glory; but by strengthening his natural
light, and by manifesting to him the truth concerning the state of
nature, of grace, and of glory, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 3: The rational mind is formed immediately by God,
either as the image from the exemplar, forasmuch as it is made to the
image of God alone; or as the subject by the ultimate perfecting form:
for the created mind is always considered to be unformed, except it
adhere to the first truth; while the other kinds of enlightenment that
proceed from man or angel, are, as it were, dispositions to this
ultimate form.
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Whether one angel moves another angel's will?

Objection 1: It would seem that one angel can move another angel's
will. Because, according to Dionysius quoted above [851](A[1]), as one
angel enlightens another, so does he cleanse and perfect another. But
cleansing and perfecting seem to belong to the will: for the former
seems to point to the stain of sin which appertains to will; while to
be perfected is to obtain an end, which is the object of the will.
Therefore an angel can move another angel's will.

Objection 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): "The names
of the angels designate their properties. " Now the Seraphim are so
called because they "kindle" or "give heat": and this is by love which
belongs to the will. Therefore one angel moves another angel's will.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11) that the
higher appetite moves the lower. But as the intellect of the superior
angel is higher, so also is his will. It seems, therefore, that the
superior angel can change the will of another angel.

On the contrary, To him it belongs to change the will, to whom it
belongs to bestow righteousness: for righteousness is the rightness of
the will. But God alone bestows righteousness. Therefore one angel
cannot change another angel's will.

I answer that, As was said above ([852]Q[105], A[4]), the will is
changed in two ways; on the part of the object, and on the part of the
power. On the part of the object, both the good itself which is the
object of the will, moves the will, as the appetible moves the
appetite; and he who points out the object, as, for instance, one who
proves something to be good. But as we have said above ([853]Q[105],
A[4]), other goods in a measure incline the will, yet nothing
sufficiently moves the will save the universal good, and that is God.
And this good He alone shows, that it may be seen by the blessed, Who,
when Moses asked: "Show me Thy glory," answered: "I will show thee all
good" (Ex. 33:18,19). Therefore an angel does not move the will
sufficiently, either as the object or as showing the object. But he
inclines the will as something lovable, and as manifesting some created
good ordered to God's goodness. And thus he can incline the will to the
love of the creature or of God, by way of persuasion.

But on the part of the power the will cannot be moved at all save by
God. For the operation of the will is a certain inclination of the
willer to the thing willed. And He alone can change this inclination,
Who bestowed on the creature the power to will: just as that agent
alone can change the natural inclination, which can give the power to
which follows that natural inclination. Now God alone gave to the
creature the power to will, because He alone is the author of the
intellectual nature. Therefore an angel cannot move another angel's
will.

Reply to Objection 1: Cleansing and perfecting are to be understood
according to the mode of enlightenment. And since God enlightens by
changing the intellect and will, He cleanses by removing defects of
intellect and will, and perfects unto the end of the intellect and
will. But the enlightenment caused by an angel concerns the intellect,
as explained above [854](A[1]); therefore an angel is to be understood
as cleansing from the defect of nescience in the intellect; and as
perfecting unto the consummate end of the intellect, and this is the
knowledge of truth.
Thus Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi): that "in the
heavenly hierarchy the chastening of the inferior essence is an
enlightening of things unknown, that leads them to more perfect
knowledge. " For instance, we might say that corporeal sight is cleansed
by the removal of darkness; enlightened by the diffusion of light; and
perfected by being brought to the perception of the colored object.

Reply to Objection 2: One angel can induce another to love God by
persuasion as explained above.

Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher speaks of the lower sensitive
appetite which can be moved by the superior intellectual appetite,
because it belongs to the same nature of the soul, and because the
inferior appetite is a power in a corporeal organ. But this does not
apply to the angels.
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Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that an inferior angel can enlighten a
superior angel. For the ecclesiastical hierarchy is derived from, and
represents the heavenly hierarchy; and hence the heavenly Jerusalem is
called "our mother" (Gal. 4:26). But in the Church even superiors are
enlightened and taught by their inferiors, as the Apostle says (1 Cor.
14:31): "You may all prophesy one by one, that all may learn and all
may be exhorted. " Therefore, likewise in the heavenly hierarchy, the
superiors can be enlightened by inferiors.

Objection 2: Further, as the order of corporeal substances depends on
the will of God, so also does the order of spiritual substances. But,
as was said above ([855]Q[105], A[6]), God sometimes acts outside the
order of corporeal substances. Therefore He also sometimes acts outside
the order of spiritual substances, by enlightening inferior otherwise
than through their superiors. Therefore in that way the inferiors
enlightened by God can enlighten superiors.

Objection 3: Further, one angel enlightens the other to whom he turns,
as was above explained [856](A[1]). But since this turning to another
is voluntary, the highest angel can turn to the lowest passing over the
others. Therefore he can enlighten him immediately; and thus the latter
can enlighten his superiors.

On the contrary, Dionysius says that "this is the Divine unalterable
law, that inferior things are led to God by the superior" (Coel. Hier.
iv; Eccl. Hier. v).

I answer that, The inferior angels never enlighten the superior, but
are always enlightened by them. The reason is, because, as above
explained ([857]Q[105], A[6]), one order is under another, as cause is
under cause; and hence as cause is ordered to cause, so is order to
order. Therefore there is no incongruity if sometimes anything is done
outside the order of the inferior cause, to be ordered to the superior
cause, as in human affairs the command of the president is passed over
from obedience to the prince. So it happens that God works miraculously
outside the order of corporeal nature, that men may be ordered to the
knowledge of Him. But the passing over of the order that belongs to
spiritual substances in no way belongs to the ordering of men to God;
since the angelic operations are not made known to us; as are the
operations of sensible bodies. Thus the order which belongs to
spiritual substances is never passed over by God; so that the inferiors
are always moved by the superior, and not conversely.

Reply to Objection 1: The ecclesiastical hierarchy imitates the
heavenly in some degree, but by a perfect likeness. For in the heavenly
hierarchy the perfection of the order is in proportion to its nearness
to God; so that those who are the nearer to God are the more sublime in
grade, and more clear in knowledge; and on that account the superiors
are never enlightened by the inferiors, whereas in the ecclesiastical
hierarchy, sometimes those who are the nearer to God in sanctity, are
in the lowest grade, and are not conspicuous for science; and some also
are eminent in one kind of science, and fail in another; and on that
account superiors may be taught by inferiors.

Reply to Objection 2: As above explained, there is no similarity
between what God does outside the order of corporeal nature, and that
of spiritual nature. Hence the argument does not hold.

Reply to Objection 3: An angel turns voluntarily to enlighten another
angel, but the angel's will is ever regulated by the Divine law which
made the order in the angels.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the superior angel enlightens the inferior as regards all he himself
knows?

Objection 1: It would seem that the superior angel does not enlighten
the inferior concerning all he himself knows. For Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. xii) that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge;
and the inferior a more particular and individual knowledge. But more
is contained under a universal knowledge than under a particular
knowledge. Therefore not all that the superior angels know, is known by
the inferior, through these being enlightened by the former.

Objection 2: Further, the Master of the Sentences (ii, D, 11) says that
the superior angels had long known the Mystery of the Incarnation,
whereas the inferior angels did not know it until it was accomplished.
Thus we find that on some of the angels inquiring, as it were, in
ignorance: "Who is this King of glory? " other angels, who knew,
answered: "The Lord of Hosts, He is the King of glory," as Dionysius
expounds (Coel. Hier. vii). But this would not apply if the superior
angels enlightened the inferior concerning all they know themselves.
Therefore they do not do so.

Objection 3: Further, if the superior angels enlighten the inferior
about all they know, nothing that the superior angels know would be
unknown to the inferior angels. Therefore the superior angels could
communicate nothing more to the inferior; which appears open to
objection. Therefore the superior angels enlighten the inferior in all
things.

On the contrary, Gregory [*Peter Lombard, Sent. ii, D, ix; Cf. Gregory,
Hom. xxxiv, in Ev. ] says: "In that heavenly country, though there are
some excellent gifts, yet nothing is held individually. " And Dionysius
says: "Each heavenly essence communicates to the inferior the gift
derived from the superior" (Coel. Hier. xv), as quoted above
[858](A[1]).

I answer that, Every creature participates in the Divine goodness, so
as to diffuse the good it possesses to others; for it is of the nature
of good to communicate itself to others. Hence also corporeal agents
give their likeness to others so far as they can. So the more an agent
is established in the share of the Divine goodness, so much the more
does it strive to transmit its perfections to others as far as
possible. Hence the Blessed Peter admonishes those who by grace share
in the Divine goodness; saying: "As every man hath received grace,
ministering the same one to another; as good stewards of the manifold
grace of God" (1 Pet. 4:10). Much more therefore do the holy angels,
who enjoy the plenitude of participation of the Divine goodness, impart
the same to those below them.

Nevertheless this gift is not received so excellently by the inferior
as by the superior angels; and therefore the superior ever remain in a
higher order, and have a more perfect knowledge; as the master
understands the same thing better than the pupil who learns from him.

Reply to Objection 1: The knowledge of the superior angels is said to
be more universal as regards the more eminent mode of knowledge.

Reply to Objection 2: The Master's words are not to be understood as if
the inferior angels were entirely ignorant of the Mystery of the
Incarnation but that they did not know it as fully as the superior
angels; and that they progressed in the knowledge of it afterwards when
the Mystery was accomplished.

Reply to Objection 3: Till the Judgment Day some new things are always
being revealed by God to the highest angels, concerning the course of
the world, and especially the salvation of the elect. Hence there is
always something for the superior angels to make known to the inferior.
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THE SPEECH OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)

We next consider the speech of the angels. Here there are five points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether one angel speaks to another?

(2) Whether the inferior speaks to the superior?

(3) Whether an angel speaks to God?

(4) Whether the angelic speech is subject to local distance?

(5) Whether all the speech of one angel to another is known to all?
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Whether one angel speaks to another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not speak to another.
For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that, in the state of the resurrection
"each one's body will not hide his mind from his fellows. " Much less,
therefore, is one angel's mind hidden from another. But speech
manifests to another what lies hidden in the mind. Therefore it is not
necessary that one angel should speak to another.

Objection 2: Further, speech is twofold; interior, whereby one speaks
to oneself; and exterior, whereby one speaks to another. But exterior
speech takes place by some sensible sign, as by voice, or gesture, or
some bodily member, as the tongue, or the fingers, and this cannot
apply to the angels. Therefore one angel does not speak to another.

Objection 3: Further, the speaker incites the hearer to listen to what
he says. But it does not appear that one angel incites another to
listen; for this happens among us by some sensible sign. Therefore one
angel does not speak to another.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:1): "If I speak with the
tongues of men and of angels. "

I answer that, The angels speak in a certain way. But, as Gregory says
(Moral. ii): "It is fitting that our mind, rising above the properties
of bodily speech, should be lifted to the sublime and unknown methods
of interior speech. "

To understand how one angel speaks to another, we must consider that,
as we explained above ([859]Q[82], A[4]), when treating of the actions
and powers of the soul, the will moves the intellect to its operation.
Now an intelligible object is present to the intellect in three ways;
first, habitually, or in the memory, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv,
6,7); secondly, as actually considered or conceived; thirdly, as
related to something else. And it is clear that the intelligible object
passes from the first to the second stage by the command of the will,
and hence in the definition of habit these words occur, "which anyone
uses when he wills. " So likewise the intelligible object passes from
the second to the third stage by the will; for by the will the concept
of the mind is ordered to something else, as, for instance, either to
the performing of an action, or to being made known to another. Now
when the mind turns itself to the actual consideration of any habitual
knowledge, then a person speaks to himself; for the concept of the mind
is called "the interior word. " And by the fact that the concept of the
angelic mind is ordered to be made known to another by the will of the
angel himself, the concept of one angel is made known to another; and
in this way one angel speaks to another; for to speak to another only
means to make known the mental concept to another.

Reply to Objection 1: Our mental concept is hidden by a twofold
obstacle. The first is in the will, which can retain the mental concept
within, or can direct it externally. In this way God alone can see the
mind of another, according to 1 Cor. 2:11: "What man knoweth the things
of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him? " The other obstacle
whereby the mental concept is excluded from another one's knowledge,
comes from the body; and so it happens that even when the will directs
the concept of the mind to make itself known, it is not at once make
known to another; but some sensible sign must be used. Gregory alludes
to this fact when he says (Moral. ii): "To other eyes we seem to stand
aloof as it were behind the wall of the body; and when we wish to make
ourselves known, we go out as it were by the door of the tongue to show
what we really are. " But an angel is under no such obstacle, and so he
can make his concept known to another at once.

Reply to Objection 2: External speech, made by the voice, is a
necessity for us on account of the obstacle of the body. Hence it does
not befit an angel; but only interior speech belongs to him, and this
includes not only the interior speech by mental concept, but also its
being ordered to another's knowledge by the will. So the tongue of an
angel is called metaphorically the angel's power, whereby he manifests
his mental concept.

Reply to Objection 3: There is no need to draw the attention of the
good angels, inasmuch as they always see each other in the Word; for as
one ever sees the other, so he ever sees what is ordered to himself.
But because by their very nature they can speak to each other, and even
now the bad angels speak to each other, we must say that the intellect
is moved by the intelligible object just as sense is affected by the
sensible object. Therefore, as sense is aroused by the sensible object,
so the mind of an angel can be aroused to attention by some
intelligible power.
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Whether the inferior angel speaks to the superior?

Objection 1: It would seem that the inferior angel does not speak to
the superior. For on the text (1 Cor. 13:1), "If I speak with the
tongues of men and of angels," a gloss remarks that the speech of the
angels is an enlightenment whereby the superior enlightens the
inferior. But the inferior never enlightens the superior, as was above
explained ([860]Q[106], A[3]). Therefore neither do the inferior speak
to the superior.

Objection 2: Further, as was said above ([861]Q[106], A[1]), to
enlighten means merely to acquaint one man of what is known to another;
and this is to speak. Therefore to speak and to enlighten are the same;
so the same conclusion follows.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii): "God speaks to the
angels by the very fact that He shows to their hearts His hidden and
invisible things. " But this is to enlighten them. Therefore, whenever
God speaks, He enlightens. In the same way every angelic speech is an
enlightening. Therefore an inferior angel can in no way speak to a
superior angel.

On the contrary, According to the exposition of Dionysius (Coel. Hier.
vii), the inferior angels said to the superior: "Who is this King of
Glory? "

I answer that, The inferior angels can speak to the superior. To make
this clear, we must consider that every angelic enlightening is an
angelic speech; but on the other hand, not every speech is an
enlightening; because, as we have said [862](A[1]), for one angel to
speak to another angel means nothing else, but that by his own will he
directs his mental concept in such a way, that it becomes known to the
other. Now what the mind conceives may be reduced to a twofold
principle; to God Himself, Who is the primal truth; and to the will of
the one who understands, whereby we actually consider anything. But
because truth is the light of the intellect, and God Himself is the
rule of all truth; the manifestation of what is conceived by the mind,
as depending on the primary truth, is both speech and enlightenment;
for example, when one man says to another: "Heaven was created by God";
or, "Man is an animal. " The manifestation, however, of what depends on
the will of the one who understands, cannot be called an enlightenment,
but is only a speech; for instance, when one says to another: "I wish
to learn this; I wish to do this or that. " The reason is that the
created will is not a light, nor a rule of truth; but participates of
light. Hence to communicate what comes from the created will is not, as
such, an enlightening. For to know what you may will, or what you may
understand does not belong to the perfection of my intellect; but only
to know the truth in reality.

Now it is clear that the angels are called superior or inferior by
comparison with this principle, God; and therefore enlightenment, which
depends on the principle which is God, is conveyed only by the superior
angels to the inferior. But as regards the will as the principle, he
who wills is first and supreme; and therefore the manifestation of what
belongs to the will, is conveyed to others by the one who wills. In
that manner both the superior angels speak to the inferior, and the
inferior speak to the superior.

From this clearly appear the replies to the first and second
objections.

Reply to Objection 3: Every speech of God to the angels is an
enlightening; because since the will of God is the rule of truth, it
belongs to the perfection and enlightenment of the created mind to know
even what God wills. But the same does not apply to the will of the
angels, as was explained above.
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Whether an angel speaks to God?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not speak to God. For
speech makes known something to another. But an angel cannot make known
anything to God, Who knows all things. Therefore an angel does not
speak to God.

Objection 2: Further, to speak is to order the mental concept in
reference to another, as was shown above [863](A[1]). But an angel ever
orders his mental concept to God. So if an angel speaks to God, he ever
speaks to God; which in some ways appears to be unreasonable, since an
angel sometimes speaks to another angel. Therefore it seems that an
angel never speaks to God.

On the contrary, It is written (Zech. 1:12): "The angel of the Lord
answered and said: O Lord of hosts, how long wilt Thou not have mercy
on Jerusalem. " Therefore an angel speaks to God.

I answer that, As was said above ([864]AA[1],2), the angel speaks by
ordering his mental concept to something else. Now one thing is ordered
to another in a twofold manner. In one way for the purpose of giving
one thing to another, as in natural things the agent is ordered to the
patient, and in human speech the teacher is ordered to the learner; and
in this sense an angel in no way speaks to God either of what concerns
the truth, or of whatever depends on the created will; because God is
the principle and source of all truth and of all will. In another way
one thing is ordered to another to receive something, as in natural
things the passive is ordered to the agent, and in human speech the
disciple to the master; and in this way an angel speaks to God, either
by consulting the Divine will of what ought to be done, or by admiring
the Divine excellence which he can never comprehend; thus Gregory says
(Moral. ii) that "the angels speak to God, when by contemplating what
is above themselves they rise to emotions of admiration. "

Reply to Objection 1: Speech is not always for the purpose of making
something known to another; but is sometimes finally ordered to the
purpose of manifesting something to the speaker himself; as when the
disciples ask instruction from the master.

Reply to Objection 2: The angels are ever speaking to God in the sense
of praising and admiring Him and His works; but they speak to Him by
consulting Him about what ought to be done whenever they have to
perform any new work, concerning which they desire enlightenment.
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Whether local distance influences the angelic speech?

Objection 1: It would seem that local distance affects the angelic
speech. For as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 13): "An angel works
where he is. " But speech is an angelic operation. Therefore, as an
angel is in a determinate place, it seems that an angel's speech is
limited by the bounds of that place.

Objection 2: Further, a speaker cries out on account of the distance of
the hearer. But it is said of the Seraphim that "they cried one to
another" (Is. 6:3). Therefore in the angelic speech local distance has
some effect.

On the contrary, It is said that the rich man in hell spoke to Abraham,
notwithstanding the local distance (Lk. 16:24). Much less therefore
does local distance impede the speech of one angel to another.

I answer that, The angelic speech consists in an intellectual
operation, as explained above ([865]AA[1],2,3). And the intellectual
operation of an angel abstracts from the "here and now. " For even our
own intellectual operation takes place by abstraction from the "here
and now," except accidentally on the part of the phantasms, which do
not exist at all in an angel. But as regards whatever is abstracted
from "here and now," neither difference of time nor local distance has
any influence whatever. Hence in the angelic speech local distance is
no impediment.

Reply to Objection 1: The angelic speech, as above explained (A[1], ad
2), is interior; perceived, nevertheless, by another; and therefore it
exists in the angel who speaks, and consequently where the angel is who
speaks. But as local distance does not prevent one angel seeing
another, so neither does it prevent an angel perceiving what is ordered
to him on the part of another; and this is to perceive his speech.

Reply to Objection 2: The cry mentioned is not a bodily voice raised by
reason of the local distance; but is taken to signify the magnitude of
what is said, or the intensity of the affection, according to what
Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The less one desires, the less one cries
out. "
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Whether all the angels know what one speaks to another?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels know what one speaks to
another. For unequal local distance is the reason why all men do not
know what one man says to another. But in the angelic speech local
distance has no effect, as above explained [866](A[4]). Therefore all
the angels know what one speaks to another.

Objection 2: Further, all the angels have the intellectual power in
common. So if the mental concept of one ordered to another is known by
one, it is for the same reason known by all.

Objection 3: Further, enlightenment is a kind of speech. But the
enlightenment of one angel by another extends to all the angels,
because, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv): "Each one of the heavenly
beings communicates what he learns to the others.