(1-5) The five false views, of which the first is belief in a self and mine; they will be defined in the Chapter on the
Defilements
(v.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-1-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
They are not accumulation, because the non-material dhatus have nothing in common with agglomeration.
38a. The others are of three types.
v. The other dhatus, that is, the four not mentioned above,--visible matter, smell, taste, and tangibles,--are of three types: retribution, when they are not separable from organic matter (i. 34); accumulation and outflowing.
***
38a. A single dhatu "is real. "
The unconditioned, being permanent, is a "real thing. " The unconditioned forms part of the dharmadhdtu (i. 15); the dharmadhdtu is thus the single dhatu which "contains a real thing. "
***
38b. The last three dhatus are momentary.
The last three dhatus are the mental organ, the object of mental consciousness, and the mental consciousness.
In the dharmas of the moment called duhkhe dharmajndnaksanti, which is the first moment in the Path of Seeing the Truths (vi. 25) and as a consequence the first moment which is pure, these three dhatus are "not produced by a cause similar to its effect" (sabhagahetu, ii. 52), for, in the series which constitutes the person under consideration, a pure dharma has not yet appeared which would be a "cause similar to its effect" of duhkhe dharmajnanaksanti. This is why these three dhatus are called momentary, because, for a moment, they do not proceed from this type of cause.
In the group under consideration, the mind to which the ksanti is associated is manodhdtu and manovijnanadhdtu\ the dharmas which coexist with this mind are dharmadhdtu'. pure discipline (iv. ! 3c);
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sensations, ideas, volition and other mental states; plus the praptis (ii. 36) and the samskrtalaksanas (ii. 46).
***
There is a problem to be examined. Does he who obtains possession of the organ of sight where he had previously been lacking it, also obtain possession of the visual consciousness? And does he who obtains possession of the visual consciousness where he was previously lacking it, also obtain possession of the organ of sight?
38c-d. He can obtain the organ of sight and the visual
160 consciousness either separately or together.
1. A person lacking the organ of sight takes possession of it without at the same time taking possession of the visual consciousness: (a) a being of Kamadhatu whose organs progressively appear (ii. 14), for, before the organ of sight appears within him, he is already in possession of his past and future visual consciousness (in the inter- mediary state, iii. 14; on "possession," ii. 36b); and (b) a being who dies in Arupyadhatu and who is reborn in the heavens of the three higher Dhyanas, where the visual consciousness is lacking although the organ of sight exists there (viii. l3a-c).
2. A person devoid of the visual consciousness takes possession of it without at the same time taking possession of the organ of sight: (a) abeingborninaheavenofthethreehigherDhyanas canmanifesta visual consciousness of the sphere of the First Dhyana (viii. 13): he does not take possession of the organ of sight which he possesses already; and (b) a being who falls from one of the three higher Dhyanas and who is reborn in a lower sphere.
3. A person devoid of the two takes possession of the two: a being who falls from Arupyadhatu and who is reborn either in Kamadhatu or in the First Dhyana (world of Brahma).
We have up to now understood the term that the stanza employs, "to obtain" (labha) in the sense of pratilambha, taking possession; but one can also understand it in the sense of prapti, possession (ii. 36b).
? The question is thus posed: Is one who is endowed with the visual organ also endowed with visual consciousness? Four cases are possible: (a) a being born in a heaven of the three higher Dhyanas necessarily possesses the visual organ, but possesses only the visual
consciousness if he manifests a visual consciousness of the sphere of the First Dhyana;
(b) a being in Kamadhatu who has not taken possession of the visual organ in the course of his embryonic life or who becomes blind: he remains in possession of the visual consciousness acquired in the course of his intermediary existence (iii. 14) or at conception;
(c) a being in Kamadhatu who has taken possession of the organ of sight and who has not lost it, a being born in the heaven of the First Dhyana, a being born in a heaven of the three higher Dhyana who manifests a visual consciousness of the sphere of the First Dhyanas: these three categories of beings are endowed with both the organ and the consciousness;
(d) all other beings,--beings of Arupyadhatu,--are devoid of both the organ of sight and visual consciousness.
The taking possession of and possession, simultaneous or not, of the organ of sight and visible matter, of the visual consciousness and visible matter, of the organ of hearing and sound, etc. , shall be defined, as fitting, in each case.
How many are external? 39a. Twelve are personal
What are these twelve?
39b. With the exception of visible matter, etc.
Twelve dhatus are personal, the six organs and the six conscious- nesses; six dhatus are external, the six objects of consciousness, visible matter, etc.
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But how can one speak of personal dhdtus, or of external dhdtus, since there is no dtmari?
The mind is the object of the idea of self, the mind is what persons
falsely grasp for their self. This mind receives, metaphorically, the
name of dtman. Compare, for example, these two line of Scripture:
is good to subdue the mind; the subdued mind brings happiness. " Now the organs and the consciousnesses are close to the mind to which one gives the name of atman: they are in fact the point of support of them; then one qualifies them as "internal," or "personal," whereas the visible and the other objects of the consciousness are held to be "external. "
But can one say that the six consciousnesses are the point of support of the mind?
They are the point of support of the mind only when, having perished, they acquire the quality of mental organ (i. 17). Thus they are not personal.
This objection is worthless. When the consciousnesses, having perished, becomes the point of support of the mind, it is indeed these consciousnesses themselves which become the point of support; thus, before becoming a point of support, they are not foreign to the quality of point of support. They are thus personal by reason of their future quality of point of support. If it were otherwise, the mental organ would be solely past; it would be neither present nor future. Now it is well understood that the eighteen dhdtus belong to the three time periods. Moreover, if the present or future consciousness does not have the characteristic of manodhdtu, it is absurd to attribute this character- istic to it once it is past. For a dharma does not change its characterstics in the course of time (v. 25; Vibbdsd, TD 27, p. 109al8, p. 200b2).
***
Among the eighteen dhatus, how many are sabhdga, "active" or "in mutual assistance? " How many are tatsabhaga, "analogous to sabhdga? "
'The sage obtains heaven, by means of a well subdued atman" and "It 162
? 163 39b-c. The dhdtu called dharmas is sabhaga.
An object of consciousness is qualified as sabhaga when the consciousness which constitutes its proper sphere arises or is destined to arise with respect to it.
Now there is no dharma with respect to which an unlimited mental consciousness has not arisen or is destined to arise. All the Saints in fact necessarily produce the thought "All dharma are impersonal" (vii. l3a). It is true that this thought bears neither on itself, nor on the dharmas which are coexistent with it (sahabhu, ii. 50b); but this thought and the dharmas which are coexistent with it are the object of a second moment of a thought of universal impersonality; all the dharmas are thus included within the objea of these two moments of thought (vii. l8c-d). Therefore the dharma- dhatu, the proper objea of the mental consciousness, is, in its totality, sabhaga, aaive as an object.
39c-d. The other dhdtus are also tatsabhdga.
The word "also" shows that they are both sabhaga and tatsabhdga.
When are they tatsabhdga^
39d. When they do not do their proper work.
This implies the definition: they are sabhaga when they do their proper work.
1. The organ of sight which has seen, does now see or shall see visible matter, is termed sabhaga. The same with respea to the other organs, by indicating for each its own object and its own operation (karitra, ii. 58).
2. According to the Vaibhasikas of Kasmir, the organ of sight is tatsabhdga in four cases: the organ of sight which has perished, which is now perishing, which will perish without having seen, and the organ of sight destined to arise (anutpattidharman, v. 24). According to the Westerners, the organ of sight not destined to arise constitutes two categories depending on whether it is accompanied by visual con- sciousness or not.
The same with respect to the other organs of sense consciousness.
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The mental organ is tatsabhaga only when it is not destined to 164
arise; in fact, when it arises, it always has an object.
3. Visible matter, which has been seen, which is now seen, or
which will be seen by the organ of sight, is sabhdga.
It is tatsabhaga when it has perished, is now perishing or shall
perish without having seen, or when it is not destined to arise.
The same with respect to the other objects of sense consciousness
by indicating for each organ the function which corresponds to it.
4. The organ of sight which is sabhdga or tatsabhaga is such for
everyone, for the person to whom this organ belongs, and for other persons. The same for the other organs. But a certain visible thing is sabhdga for the person who sees it. In fact, the visible matter that a person sees can be seen by many, for example, the moon, a stage performance, or a contest, whereas two persons do not see by means of the same organ. Consequently, since one organ of sight is not general,
it is though relationship with one person that it will be qualified as sabhdga or tatsabhaga; the organ of sight is sabhdga when he sees a visible thing, even though he has not seen, does not now see, or will not see another visible thing. On the contrary, the visible thing is general: one would qualify it as sabhdga and tatsabhaga by putting oneself in the point of view of numerous persons: it is sabhdga in relation to those who see it, tatsabhaga in relation to those who do not see it.
The same holds for sounds, smells, tastes, and the tangible things
165 as for visible matter.
Granted, one would say, with respect to sound which, like visible matter, is perceived at a distance and can be perceived by many persons (i. 43c-d). But smells, tastes and tangibles are not perceived at a distance, and are perceived only when they enter into a close relationship with the organ: thus the smell that one person perceives
is not perceived by another. Thus these objects are not general, and we should compare them to the organs with respect to the qualification of sabhdga, or tatsabhaga: when they are sabhdga to one person, they are sabhdga to everyone.
We would answer: We regard these objects as general, because they
? can be so. It can be the case that smell--the same atomic group of a smell--which produces a consciousness of smell in one person, is also perceived by another. Now this does not hold for the organs. Consequently smells, tastes and tangibles should be compared to visible matter and sounds.
5. The six consciousnesses are sabhdga or tatsabhdga depending on whether they are destined to arise, or are not destined to arise, like the mental organ.
6. What is the meaning of the expressions sabhdga and tatsabhaga}
Bhaga signifies the mutual services that the organs, their objects and their consciousnesses, render one another in their quality of point of support of the consciousness, of objects of consciousness, of consciousness supporting itself on the organ. Or else bhdga signifies possession of the activity or funaion; the funaion of the organ is to see, etc. ; the funaion of the objea is to be the subjea of the consciousness (visaya or atamband), of being seen, etc. ; the function of consciousness is to be the subject of consciousness, to be "the discerner. "
The dharmas which possess (sa-) bhaga are termed sabhdga, that is to say, the organs, objeas and consciousnesses which are endowed with their proper funaion, or else the organs, objeas and consciousness which render one another mutual service. Or else the dharmas which have "contaa" for their effea, that is, the encounter of the eye, visible
167 matter, the visual consciousness, etc. , (iii. 22), are sabhdga.
That which is not sabhdga, but is nevertheless analogous to sabhdga, is called tatsabhaga, that is to say "analogous (sabhdga) to that
167 (tat)," that is, "analogous to sabhdga. "
***
How many dhatus can be abandoned (ha, v. 28, vi. l) by Seeing the Truths, in other words, by the Path of Seeing or through Seeing (darsana, vi. 25b)? How many can be abandoned by Meditation or repeated consideration of the Truths, in other words, by the Path of Meditation or by Meditation? How many dhatus are not to be
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abandoned, or cannot be abandoned?
40a. Ten and five are abandoned through Meditation.
i. The ten material dhdtus, organs and objects, and the five sense consciousnesses, are abandoned through Meditation.
168 40b. The last three are of three types.
From the point of view of abandoning them, the last three dhatus,--the mental organ, the mental object, and the mental con- sciousness,--include three types of dharmas:
(a) Eighty-eight anusayas (v. 4), with their coexistent dharmas-- whether these coexistents be of the samprayukta class (ii. 24) or of the viprayukta class (ii. 46, i. e. , laksanas and anulaksanas)--are abandoned by Seeing, with the praptis (ii. 36) of the said anusayas and the said coexistents, with their following {anuprdptis and laksanas) of the said praptis.
(b) The other impure dharmas are abandoned by Meditation: 1. ten anusayas (v. 5) with the coexistents, praptis, etc. ; 2. the good- impure (kusalasasrava) and undefiled-neutral (anivrtavyakrta, ii. 66) samskdras', 3. the impure avijnapti with its following (iv. 13).
(c) The pure dharmas, that is, unconditioned things and the dharmas which form part of the Path, are not to be abandoned.
ii. Objection. [The Vatsiputriyas believe that,] not only the eighty-
(l)The quality of Prthagjana is a dharma which is undefiled-neutral, and yet you place it among the dharmas abandoned by Meditation; (2) bad bodily or vocal aaion, retributed by a bad realm of rebirth, is "visible matter," and yet you also place it within the second category. Now the quality of Prthagjana and the aaion which causes a bad realm of rebirth are in contradiction with the Path of Seeing the Truths. Thus, according to us, both are abandoned through Seeing.
In order to refute the thesis [of the Vatsiputriyas,] the author says in summary:
40c. Neither the "undefiled," nor matter, are abandoned by
170 Seeing the Truths.
eight anusayas, but also some other dharmas are abandoned by Seeing. 169
? 1. Nothing that is defiled, that is bad, nor defiled-neutral (nivrtavydkrta, ii. 66), and nothing that is material, can be abandoned by the Seeing of the Truths.
Now the quality of Prthagjana is not defiled: it can belong to a person who has cut off the good roots (iv. 79), but it can also belong to a person who is "detached. "
Bodily action and vocal action are rupa.
The quality of Prthagjana and bodily or vocal action are not contradictory to the Truths,--for the former 1. is not defiled by the defilements, and 2. is not a consciousness, a dharma which has an object. Thus neither are abandoned by the Seeing of the Truths.
Further, if the quality of Prthagjana were abandoned by Seeing, it would follow that it would exist in the first state of the Path of
m
Seeing--which is incorrect.
40d. Nor that which has arisen from the non-sixth.
2. "Sixth" signifies the mental organ. "Arisen from the non-sixth" is what has arisen from an organ different from the sixth organ, that is to say, what has arisen from the five organs, the organ of sight, etc. This then referes to the visual consciousness, etc. These are also not abandoned by Seeing.
***
Among the eighteen dhdtus, how many are "view," how many are not "view? "
41a. The organ of sight and part of the dharmadhatu are view. How many [parts are there to the dharmadhatu]}
41b. Eight parts.
What are these eight parts of the dharmadhatu?
(1-5) The five false views, of which the first is belief in a self and mine; they will be defined in the Chapter on the Defilements (v. 7). (6)
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Worldly correct views, that is to say, prajnd (ii. 24) associated with the mental consciousness, good but impure. (7-8) And the view of the Saiksas and the Asaiksas, that is to say, pure view which is proper to the Arhat (vi. 50).
These eight dhannas, which form part of the dharmadhdbu, are <<? >>
views.
Comparison. In the manner in which visible matter is seen at night
and in the daytime, on a cloudy day and on a clear day, in this same way the dharmas are seen (1) by defiled worldly views,--five false opinions; (2) by non-defiled worldly view or worldly correct views; (3) by Saiksl views; and (4) by non-Asaiksi views.
***
Why are correct worldly views understood solely as prajnd associated with the mental consciousness?
41c-d. The prajnd which arises with the five sense conscious- nesses, is not "view" because it is not judgment after
172 deliberation.
"View" is judgment that preceeds from the consideration of an objea {upadhyana, viii. l). Now the prajnd which arises with the five sense consciousnesses does not present this characteristic. Thus it is not "view. " For the same reason, it happens that prajnd, even though mental, defiled or non-defiled, is not "view" when it is purely intuitive (vii. l).
But, one would say, the organ of sight does not possess "judgment which proceeds from a consideration of the objea. " How do you then say that it is "view? "
"View" is understood here as the seeing of visible matter. 42a. It is the organ of sight which sees visible matter.
? i. A Vijnanavadin is a master who attributes sight, not to the organ of sight, but to visual consciousness. He says: If an organ sees, then the organ of a person occupied with hearing or touch consciousness, would see (i. 6c-d).
42b. When it is sabhaga.
We do not say that all organs of sight see. The organ of sight sees when it is sabhaga (i. 39), that is to say, when it is conjoined with visual consciousness.
42c. It is not the consciousness of which this organ is the point of support.
But then, that which sees is indeed the consciousness which is supported by the organ of sight.
42d For obscured visible matter is not seen. Such is the opinion
173 of the Vaibhasikas.
No, for visible matter, obscured by a wall or any other screen, is not seen. Now the consciousness is non-material, not capable of being repulsed (apratigha, i. 29b). Thus, if the visual consciousness were to see, it would see even the visible matter obscured by a screen.
[The Vijnanavadin replies. ] The visual consciousness does not arise with respea to obscured visible matter; not arising with respea to them, it does not see them.
But why does it not arise with respea to these visible things? For us, the Vaibhasikas, who attribute seeing to the organ and who admit that the organ, being sapratigha or capable of being arrested, does not exercise its aaivity with respea to obscured visible matter, we could easily explain how the visual consciousness does not arise with respea to obscured visible matter: the consciousness, in faa, exercises its aaivity on the same objea that its point of support does. But if you believe that the consciousness sees, how would you explain the faa that it does not arise with respea to obscured visible matter?
2. The author takes into consideration the opinion of the Vijnana- vadin and responds to the last reply of the Vaibhasika.
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Do you maintain that an organ of sight sees its object by entering into a close relationship with its object, in the manner in which the organ of touch feels a tangible object (i. 43c-d)? In this hypothesis I would understand that the organ of sight, being capable of being arrested, does not see obscured visible matter. But you maintain that the organ of sight sees at a distance: you do not then have the right to say that, being capable of being arrested, it does not see obscured visible matter. Moreover, one sees obscured visible matter through a glass, a cloud, a crystal and water: how would you explain this fact? I would say then that the visual consciousness sees, it arises with respea to obscured visible matter when the screen does not form an obstacle
174 to light; it does not arise in the contrary case.
3. The Vaibhasikas make an appeal to Scripture. The Sutra says,
175
"Having seen visible matter through the organ of sight. " Thus the
organ sees, not the visual consciousness.
We would reply that the Sutra intends to say, "Having seen visible
matter by means of the organ of sight as point of support. " In fact, the same Sutra says, "Having discerned the dharmas through the mental organ": now this organ, being past (i. 17), does not discern; it is through the mental consciousness that one discerns; therefore, if the text says "through the mental organ," it means "by supporting itself on the mental organ, the point of support of mental consciousness. " The same for sight and the organ of sight.
One can also admit that the Sutra attributes to the point of support, to the organ, the action which belongs to that which grasps this point of support, that is to say, to the consciousness. It is said in the world "the benches cry out," whereas the benches are actually the persons seated on the benches.
This way of speaking is common to Scripture. We read that "agreeable and disagreeable visible matter is discerned by the organ of sight. " Now you do not maintain that the organ of sight discerns. You attribute discernment to the consciousness of which organ of sight is the point of support.
The Sutra (Samyukta, TD 2, p. 64al0) also says "The organ of sight, Oh Brahmin, is the gate of the sight of visible matter. " This text
? proves that the visual consciousness sees by this gate which is the organ of sight. You would not maintain that "gate" signifies "sight," for it would be absurd to say "The organ of sight is the sight of the sight of visible matter. "
4. [Objection of the Vaibhasikas. ] If the visual consciousness sees, what it is that discerns (i. 48a)?
What is the difference between the two functions of seeing and discerning which would account for a single dhanna not seeing and discerning at one and the same time? Is it not admitted that a certain
176
type of prajna (darsandtmika, vii. l) sees and comprehends? In this
same way a certain consciousness, the visual consciousness, sees and discerns. There is here only a single function designated by two names. 5. [Certain followers of the thesis "The visual consciousness sees," namely the Vatsiputriyas, object:] If the organ of sight sees, what is then the separately existing action of seeing that you attribute to this
organ, the agent of this action?
The objection cannot be made. In the same way that you would
have it that the consciousness discerns, without admitting any differ- ence between the agent and the action, in that same way we hold that an organ sees.
6. According to another opinion, [that of the Dharmaguptakas,] it is the visual consciousness which sees; but, as the organ of sight is the point of support of this consciousness, one says that it sees, the same way one says that the bell rings, because it is the point of support of the sound.
But, according to this principle, one should also say that the organ of sight discerns, for it is the point of support of the visual consciousness.
No. For in the world one agrees to give the name of "seeing" to the visual consciousness; in fact, when this consciousness is produced, one says "The color is seen;" one does not say that the color is discerned. And the Vibhasd (TD 27, p. 489cl9) confirms: "One terms 'seen' that which is attained by the organ of sight, that which falls within its line of vision and is perceived by the visual consciousness. " One says then in the world that the organ of sight sees, because it is the point of
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support of the visual consciousness which sees; one does not say that it discerns, because the function attributed to the visual consciousness is seeing and not discernment. On the other hand, when one says that consciousness discerns, one does not mean that it discerns to the extent that it would be the point of support of a certain discernment, as one understands that the organ of sight sees because it is the point of support of the visual consciousness. One means that the consciousness discerns by itself, that it is in and of itself discernment, in the same way
177 that one says that the sun creates the day.
7. Opinion of the Sautrantikas. What an empty discussion! The Sutra teaches: "By reason of the organ of sight and of visible matter there arises the visual consciousness": there is not there either an organ that sees, or visible matter that is seen; there is not there any action of seeing, nor any agent that sees; this is only a play of cause and effect. In the light of practice, one speaks, metaphorically, of this process: "The eye sees, and the consciousness discerns/' But one should not cling to these metaphors. The Blessed One has said that one should not take them in the manner of popular speech, that one should
178 not seriously grasp an expression in use in the world.
8. According to the system of the Vaibhasikas of Kasmlr, the organ of sight sees, the organ of hearing hears, the organ of smell smells, the organ of taste tastes, the organ of touch touches, and the mental organ discerns.
***
Is visible matter seen by one eye or by both eyes?
43a-b. Visible matter is seen by the two eyes also, as the clarity
179 of sight demonstrates.
[There is no fixed rule: one sees by one eye; one also sees by two eyes. ]
The Abhidharmikas say: "Seen also by the two eyes; the two eyes
180
being open, sight is clearer. " Furthermore, when one eye is covered
and the other half closed, one perceives two moons; but not when one
? completely closes or half closes that which was open, or when one opens or completely closes that which has been half closed.
One should not conclude that the visual consciousness is twofold from the fact that its point of support is twofold, for the consciousness is not material like r&pa\ not having a mass it is not situated in a place.
***
We have said that the organ of sight sees, that the organs of hearing, smell, taste, and touch each perceive their objects; and that the mental organ discerns. Do these organs attain their object, [do they enter into a close physical relationship with their object]?
43c. The organ of sight, the organ of hearing, and the mental
181 organ know their object without attaining it.
i. l. The organ of sight sees visible matter at a distance: it does not see the eye-salve placed on the eye; the organ of hearing hears distant sounds.
The mental organ, being non-material, does not enter into a close physical relationship with its object.
2. If the organs of sight and hearing must necessarily enter into a close relationship with their object, then ascetics in dhyana would not attain divine sight or divine hearing, in the same way that they do not attain a divine sense of smell (vii. 42).
[Objection. ] If the organ of sight sees an object with which it is not
in a close relationship, why does it not see visible matter which is too
182 distant or obscured?
[Reply. ] Why does a magnet not attract all iron? Moreover, the same difficulty remains even if you suppose that the organ enters into a close relationship with the object: why does the organ of sight not see the eye salve, the brush, and all the objects with which it is in close relationship? Or else, let us say that the same rule applies to the organ of sight and to the organs of smell and taste: the organ of smell senses only the smell with which it is in close relationship, but it does not sense the odor which constitutes the organ itself; in the same way, the
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organ of sight sees only certain distant visible matter, but it does not see all distant visible matter.
According to certain masters, from the fact that one hears noise
from the interior of the ear, one can conclude that the organ of hearing
hears the sound with which it is in close relationship, as it also hears
183 distant sound.
3. The other three organs, smell, taste, touch, perceive an objea
with which they are in close relationship. For smell, this results from
184 the fact that in-breathing is necessary to the perception of the smell.
43d. For the other three organs, the opposite.
ii. What should one understand by the expression "to attain" (to enter into a close relationship)? What does one mean when one says that the nose "attains" its object, knows its object "after having attained it? "
To attain is "to arise in nirantaratva" in a state of non- 185
separation. The objea, which renews itself from moment to moment (iv. 2c-d), is found to be arisen in nirantaratva with the organ and vice versa.
[What does nirantaratva mean? According to the Bhadanta, immediate juxtaposition, absence of interval; according to the Vaibha-
186 sikas, immediate vicinity, absence of an interposed body].
iii. The question is therefore posed whether the atoms do or do not touch one another.
1. The Vaibhasikas of Kasmir {Vibhasa TD 27, p. 683a24) say that atoms do not touch one another; (1) if atoms touch one another in their totality, things, that is to say, the different atoms, would "mix with one another," that is, they would only occupy one place; and (2) if atoms touched each other in one spot, they would thus have parts: and
187
atoms do not have any parts.
But, if there is no contact among the atoms, how is sound
produced?
For the very reason that there is no contaa, sound is possible: if
atoms were to touch one another, a hand in collision with a hand would dissolve into it, a rock in collision with another rock would
? dissolve into it, as gum dissolves into gum. And sound would not be produced.
But if atoms do not touch one another, why does an agglomeration of atoms not fall to pieces when it is struck?
Because the wind element holds it together. A certain wind element has dispersion for its function, for example the wind of the period of the destruction of the world; a certain wind element has concentration for its function, for example the wind at the period of
189 creation (iii. 91,100).
2. [The Vaibhasikas continue the presentation of their doctrine].
One says that three organs attain their object, because their object is in a state of non-seperation from them. What does non-seperation consist of?
It consists of the fact that there is nothing which is in the interval between the two. This is also what is meant by "to attain. "
Furthermore, as agglomerations have parts, there is no difficulty in agglomerations touching one another. And, from this point of view the definitions of the Vibhasa (TD 27, p. 684all; see also p. 380al9) are justified: "Does a thing-in-contact arise having for its cause a thing-in- contact, or does it arise having for its cause a thing-outside-of-contact? " Same question with respect to a thing-outside-of-contact.
"One cannot reply in an absolute manner. Sometimes a thing- outside-of-contact arises from a thing-in-contact, as when a thing-in- contact falls to pieces. Sometimes a thing-in-contact arises from a thing-outside-of-contact, as when a thing-outside-of-contact comes together. Sometimes a thing-in-contact arises from a thing-outside-of- contact, as when agglomerations come together. And sometimes a thing-outside-of-contact arises from a thing-outside-of-contact, for example the particles of dust suspended in the void of a window. "
The Bhadanta Vasumitra says: "If atoms touched one another, they
189 would therefore endure two moments. "
iv. Opinions of Vasubandhu. 1. The Bhadanta says: "There is not, in reality, any contact One says, metaphorically, that atoms touch one another when they are juxtaposed without interval. " (Quoted in Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 684a2; see note 189, end).
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190
This opinion is the correct one. In fact, if atoms were to allow an
interval between themselves, since this interval would be empty, what
would hinder the progress of atoms into this interval? For it is
191 admitted that atoms are impenetrable.
2. Agglomerations are not anything other than atoms. They are the same atoms which, in a state of aggregation, are a "thing-in- contact," in the same way that they are rupa (i. 13). It is thus absurd to deny that atoms touch one another, and yet to admit that agglomera- tions touch one another.
3. If you admit spatial division to the atom, then an atom certainly
has parts, whether it enters into contact or not. If you deny it, why
192 would the atom, even if it enters into contact, have parts?
Should we think that the organs solely grasp an objea of their dimension,--if one believes that one sees suddenly extended objects, a mountain for example, it is through illusion, it is because one rapidly sees parts of a mountain: it is evidently thus when one sees the circle of fire delineated by an ember;--or else do the organs indifferently grasp an objea of their dimension and of a different dimension?
44a-b. The three organs of which the organ of smell is the first,
193 grasp an objea of their dimension.
A given number of atoms of an organ, attaining the same number of atoms of an objea, produce consciousness.
38a. The others are of three types.
v. The other dhatus, that is, the four not mentioned above,--visible matter, smell, taste, and tangibles,--are of three types: retribution, when they are not separable from organic matter (i. 34); accumulation and outflowing.
***
38a. A single dhatu "is real. "
The unconditioned, being permanent, is a "real thing. " The unconditioned forms part of the dharmadhdtu (i. 15); the dharmadhdtu is thus the single dhatu which "contains a real thing. "
***
38b. The last three dhatus are momentary.
The last three dhatus are the mental organ, the object of mental consciousness, and the mental consciousness.
In the dharmas of the moment called duhkhe dharmajndnaksanti, which is the first moment in the Path of Seeing the Truths (vi. 25) and as a consequence the first moment which is pure, these three dhatus are "not produced by a cause similar to its effect" (sabhagahetu, ii. 52), for, in the series which constitutes the person under consideration, a pure dharma has not yet appeared which would be a "cause similar to its effect" of duhkhe dharmajnanaksanti. This is why these three dhatus are called momentary, because, for a moment, they do not proceed from this type of cause.
In the group under consideration, the mind to which the ksanti is associated is manodhdtu and manovijnanadhdtu\ the dharmas which coexist with this mind are dharmadhdtu'. pure discipline (iv. ! 3c);
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sensations, ideas, volition and other mental states; plus the praptis (ii. 36) and the samskrtalaksanas (ii. 46).
***
There is a problem to be examined. Does he who obtains possession of the organ of sight where he had previously been lacking it, also obtain possession of the visual consciousness? And does he who obtains possession of the visual consciousness where he was previously lacking it, also obtain possession of the organ of sight?
38c-d. He can obtain the organ of sight and the visual
160 consciousness either separately or together.
1. A person lacking the organ of sight takes possession of it without at the same time taking possession of the visual consciousness: (a) a being of Kamadhatu whose organs progressively appear (ii. 14), for, before the organ of sight appears within him, he is already in possession of his past and future visual consciousness (in the inter- mediary state, iii. 14; on "possession," ii. 36b); and (b) a being who dies in Arupyadhatu and who is reborn in the heavens of the three higher Dhyanas, where the visual consciousness is lacking although the organ of sight exists there (viii. l3a-c).
2. A person devoid of the visual consciousness takes possession of it without at the same time taking possession of the organ of sight: (a) abeingborninaheavenofthethreehigherDhyanas canmanifesta visual consciousness of the sphere of the First Dhyana (viii. 13): he does not take possession of the organ of sight which he possesses already; and (b) a being who falls from one of the three higher Dhyanas and who is reborn in a lower sphere.
3. A person devoid of the two takes possession of the two: a being who falls from Arupyadhatu and who is reborn either in Kamadhatu or in the First Dhyana (world of Brahma).
We have up to now understood the term that the stanza employs, "to obtain" (labha) in the sense of pratilambha, taking possession; but one can also understand it in the sense of prapti, possession (ii. 36b).
? The question is thus posed: Is one who is endowed with the visual organ also endowed with visual consciousness? Four cases are possible: (a) a being born in a heaven of the three higher Dhyanas necessarily possesses the visual organ, but possesses only the visual
consciousness if he manifests a visual consciousness of the sphere of the First Dhyana;
(b) a being in Kamadhatu who has not taken possession of the visual organ in the course of his embryonic life or who becomes blind: he remains in possession of the visual consciousness acquired in the course of his intermediary existence (iii. 14) or at conception;
(c) a being in Kamadhatu who has taken possession of the organ of sight and who has not lost it, a being born in the heaven of the First Dhyana, a being born in a heaven of the three higher Dhyana who manifests a visual consciousness of the sphere of the First Dhyanas: these three categories of beings are endowed with both the organ and the consciousness;
(d) all other beings,--beings of Arupyadhatu,--are devoid of both the organ of sight and visual consciousness.
The taking possession of and possession, simultaneous or not, of the organ of sight and visible matter, of the visual consciousness and visible matter, of the organ of hearing and sound, etc. , shall be defined, as fitting, in each case.
How many are external? 39a. Twelve are personal
What are these twelve?
39b. With the exception of visible matter, etc.
Twelve dhatus are personal, the six organs and the six conscious- nesses; six dhatus are external, the six objects of consciousness, visible matter, etc.
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But how can one speak of personal dhdtus, or of external dhdtus, since there is no dtmari?
The mind is the object of the idea of self, the mind is what persons
falsely grasp for their self. This mind receives, metaphorically, the
name of dtman. Compare, for example, these two line of Scripture:
is good to subdue the mind; the subdued mind brings happiness. " Now the organs and the consciousnesses are close to the mind to which one gives the name of atman: they are in fact the point of support of them; then one qualifies them as "internal," or "personal," whereas the visible and the other objects of the consciousness are held to be "external. "
But can one say that the six consciousnesses are the point of support of the mind?
They are the point of support of the mind only when, having perished, they acquire the quality of mental organ (i. 17). Thus they are not personal.
This objection is worthless. When the consciousnesses, having perished, becomes the point of support of the mind, it is indeed these consciousnesses themselves which become the point of support; thus, before becoming a point of support, they are not foreign to the quality of point of support. They are thus personal by reason of their future quality of point of support. If it were otherwise, the mental organ would be solely past; it would be neither present nor future. Now it is well understood that the eighteen dhdtus belong to the three time periods. Moreover, if the present or future consciousness does not have the characteristic of manodhdtu, it is absurd to attribute this character- istic to it once it is past. For a dharma does not change its characterstics in the course of time (v. 25; Vibbdsd, TD 27, p. 109al8, p. 200b2).
***
Among the eighteen dhatus, how many are sabhdga, "active" or "in mutual assistance? " How many are tatsabhaga, "analogous to sabhdga? "
'The sage obtains heaven, by means of a well subdued atman" and "It 162
? 163 39b-c. The dhdtu called dharmas is sabhaga.
An object of consciousness is qualified as sabhaga when the consciousness which constitutes its proper sphere arises or is destined to arise with respect to it.
Now there is no dharma with respect to which an unlimited mental consciousness has not arisen or is destined to arise. All the Saints in fact necessarily produce the thought "All dharma are impersonal" (vii. l3a). It is true that this thought bears neither on itself, nor on the dharmas which are coexistent with it (sahabhu, ii. 50b); but this thought and the dharmas which are coexistent with it are the object of a second moment of a thought of universal impersonality; all the dharmas are thus included within the objea of these two moments of thought (vii. l8c-d). Therefore the dharma- dhatu, the proper objea of the mental consciousness, is, in its totality, sabhaga, aaive as an object.
39c-d. The other dhdtus are also tatsabhdga.
The word "also" shows that they are both sabhaga and tatsabhdga.
When are they tatsabhdga^
39d. When they do not do their proper work.
This implies the definition: they are sabhaga when they do their proper work.
1. The organ of sight which has seen, does now see or shall see visible matter, is termed sabhaga. The same with respea to the other organs, by indicating for each its own object and its own operation (karitra, ii. 58).
2. According to the Vaibhasikas of Kasmir, the organ of sight is tatsabhdga in four cases: the organ of sight which has perished, which is now perishing, which will perish without having seen, and the organ of sight destined to arise (anutpattidharman, v. 24). According to the Westerners, the organ of sight not destined to arise constitutes two categories depending on whether it is accompanied by visual con- sciousness or not.
The same with respect to the other organs of sense consciousness.
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The mental organ is tatsabhaga only when it is not destined to 164
arise; in fact, when it arises, it always has an object.
3. Visible matter, which has been seen, which is now seen, or
which will be seen by the organ of sight, is sabhdga.
It is tatsabhaga when it has perished, is now perishing or shall
perish without having seen, or when it is not destined to arise.
The same with respect to the other objects of sense consciousness
by indicating for each organ the function which corresponds to it.
4. The organ of sight which is sabhdga or tatsabhaga is such for
everyone, for the person to whom this organ belongs, and for other persons. The same for the other organs. But a certain visible thing is sabhdga for the person who sees it. In fact, the visible matter that a person sees can be seen by many, for example, the moon, a stage performance, or a contest, whereas two persons do not see by means of the same organ. Consequently, since one organ of sight is not general,
it is though relationship with one person that it will be qualified as sabhdga or tatsabhaga; the organ of sight is sabhdga when he sees a visible thing, even though he has not seen, does not now see, or will not see another visible thing. On the contrary, the visible thing is general: one would qualify it as sabhdga and tatsabhaga by putting oneself in the point of view of numerous persons: it is sabhdga in relation to those who see it, tatsabhaga in relation to those who do not see it.
The same holds for sounds, smells, tastes, and the tangible things
165 as for visible matter.
Granted, one would say, with respect to sound which, like visible matter, is perceived at a distance and can be perceived by many persons (i. 43c-d). But smells, tastes and tangibles are not perceived at a distance, and are perceived only when they enter into a close relationship with the organ: thus the smell that one person perceives
is not perceived by another. Thus these objects are not general, and we should compare them to the organs with respect to the qualification of sabhdga, or tatsabhaga: when they are sabhdga to one person, they are sabhdga to everyone.
We would answer: We regard these objects as general, because they
? can be so. It can be the case that smell--the same atomic group of a smell--which produces a consciousness of smell in one person, is also perceived by another. Now this does not hold for the organs. Consequently smells, tastes and tangibles should be compared to visible matter and sounds.
5. The six consciousnesses are sabhdga or tatsabhdga depending on whether they are destined to arise, or are not destined to arise, like the mental organ.
6. What is the meaning of the expressions sabhdga and tatsabhaga}
Bhaga signifies the mutual services that the organs, their objects and their consciousnesses, render one another in their quality of point of support of the consciousness, of objects of consciousness, of consciousness supporting itself on the organ. Or else bhdga signifies possession of the activity or funaion; the funaion of the organ is to see, etc. ; the funaion of the objea is to be the subjea of the consciousness (visaya or atamband), of being seen, etc. ; the function of consciousness is to be the subject of consciousness, to be "the discerner. "
The dharmas which possess (sa-) bhaga are termed sabhdga, that is to say, the organs, objeas and consciousnesses which are endowed with their proper funaion, or else the organs, objeas and consciousness which render one another mutual service. Or else the dharmas which have "contaa" for their effea, that is, the encounter of the eye, visible
167 matter, the visual consciousness, etc. , (iii. 22), are sabhdga.
That which is not sabhdga, but is nevertheless analogous to sabhdga, is called tatsabhaga, that is to say "analogous (sabhdga) to that
167 (tat)," that is, "analogous to sabhdga. "
***
How many dhatus can be abandoned (ha, v. 28, vi. l) by Seeing the Truths, in other words, by the Path of Seeing or through Seeing (darsana, vi. 25b)? How many can be abandoned by Meditation or repeated consideration of the Truths, in other words, by the Path of Meditation or by Meditation? How many dhatus are not to be
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abandoned, or cannot be abandoned?
40a. Ten and five are abandoned through Meditation.
i. The ten material dhdtus, organs and objects, and the five sense consciousnesses, are abandoned through Meditation.
168 40b. The last three are of three types.
From the point of view of abandoning them, the last three dhatus,--the mental organ, the mental object, and the mental con- sciousness,--include three types of dharmas:
(a) Eighty-eight anusayas (v. 4), with their coexistent dharmas-- whether these coexistents be of the samprayukta class (ii. 24) or of the viprayukta class (ii. 46, i. e. , laksanas and anulaksanas)--are abandoned by Seeing, with the praptis (ii. 36) of the said anusayas and the said coexistents, with their following {anuprdptis and laksanas) of the said praptis.
(b) The other impure dharmas are abandoned by Meditation: 1. ten anusayas (v. 5) with the coexistents, praptis, etc. ; 2. the good- impure (kusalasasrava) and undefiled-neutral (anivrtavyakrta, ii. 66) samskdras', 3. the impure avijnapti with its following (iv. 13).
(c) The pure dharmas, that is, unconditioned things and the dharmas which form part of the Path, are not to be abandoned.
ii. Objection. [The Vatsiputriyas believe that,] not only the eighty-
(l)The quality of Prthagjana is a dharma which is undefiled-neutral, and yet you place it among the dharmas abandoned by Meditation; (2) bad bodily or vocal aaion, retributed by a bad realm of rebirth, is "visible matter," and yet you also place it within the second category. Now the quality of Prthagjana and the aaion which causes a bad realm of rebirth are in contradiction with the Path of Seeing the Truths. Thus, according to us, both are abandoned through Seeing.
In order to refute the thesis [of the Vatsiputriyas,] the author says in summary:
40c. Neither the "undefiled," nor matter, are abandoned by
170 Seeing the Truths.
eight anusayas, but also some other dharmas are abandoned by Seeing. 169
? 1. Nothing that is defiled, that is bad, nor defiled-neutral (nivrtavydkrta, ii. 66), and nothing that is material, can be abandoned by the Seeing of the Truths.
Now the quality of Prthagjana is not defiled: it can belong to a person who has cut off the good roots (iv. 79), but it can also belong to a person who is "detached. "
Bodily action and vocal action are rupa.
The quality of Prthagjana and bodily or vocal action are not contradictory to the Truths,--for the former 1. is not defiled by the defilements, and 2. is not a consciousness, a dharma which has an object. Thus neither are abandoned by the Seeing of the Truths.
Further, if the quality of Prthagjana were abandoned by Seeing, it would follow that it would exist in the first state of the Path of
m
Seeing--which is incorrect.
40d. Nor that which has arisen from the non-sixth.
2. "Sixth" signifies the mental organ. "Arisen from the non-sixth" is what has arisen from an organ different from the sixth organ, that is to say, what has arisen from the five organs, the organ of sight, etc. This then referes to the visual consciousness, etc. These are also not abandoned by Seeing.
***
Among the eighteen dhdtus, how many are "view," how many are not "view? "
41a. The organ of sight and part of the dharmadhatu are view. How many [parts are there to the dharmadhatu]}
41b. Eight parts.
What are these eight parts of the dharmadhatu?
(1-5) The five false views, of which the first is belief in a self and mine; they will be defined in the Chapter on the Defilements (v. 7). (6)
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Worldly correct views, that is to say, prajnd (ii. 24) associated with the mental consciousness, good but impure. (7-8) And the view of the Saiksas and the Asaiksas, that is to say, pure view which is proper to the Arhat (vi. 50).
These eight dhannas, which form part of the dharmadhdbu, are <<? >>
views.
Comparison. In the manner in which visible matter is seen at night
and in the daytime, on a cloudy day and on a clear day, in this same way the dharmas are seen (1) by defiled worldly views,--five false opinions; (2) by non-defiled worldly view or worldly correct views; (3) by Saiksl views; and (4) by non-Asaiksi views.
***
Why are correct worldly views understood solely as prajnd associated with the mental consciousness?
41c-d. The prajnd which arises with the five sense conscious- nesses, is not "view" because it is not judgment after
172 deliberation.
"View" is judgment that preceeds from the consideration of an objea {upadhyana, viii. l). Now the prajnd which arises with the five sense consciousnesses does not present this characteristic. Thus it is not "view. " For the same reason, it happens that prajnd, even though mental, defiled or non-defiled, is not "view" when it is purely intuitive (vii. l).
But, one would say, the organ of sight does not possess "judgment which proceeds from a consideration of the objea. " How do you then say that it is "view? "
"View" is understood here as the seeing of visible matter. 42a. It is the organ of sight which sees visible matter.
? i. A Vijnanavadin is a master who attributes sight, not to the organ of sight, but to visual consciousness. He says: If an organ sees, then the organ of a person occupied with hearing or touch consciousness, would see (i. 6c-d).
42b. When it is sabhaga.
We do not say that all organs of sight see. The organ of sight sees when it is sabhaga (i. 39), that is to say, when it is conjoined with visual consciousness.
42c. It is not the consciousness of which this organ is the point of support.
But then, that which sees is indeed the consciousness which is supported by the organ of sight.
42d For obscured visible matter is not seen. Such is the opinion
173 of the Vaibhasikas.
No, for visible matter, obscured by a wall or any other screen, is not seen. Now the consciousness is non-material, not capable of being repulsed (apratigha, i. 29b). Thus, if the visual consciousness were to see, it would see even the visible matter obscured by a screen.
[The Vijnanavadin replies. ] The visual consciousness does not arise with respea to obscured visible matter; not arising with respea to them, it does not see them.
But why does it not arise with respea to these visible things? For us, the Vaibhasikas, who attribute seeing to the organ and who admit that the organ, being sapratigha or capable of being arrested, does not exercise its aaivity with respea to obscured visible matter, we could easily explain how the visual consciousness does not arise with respea to obscured visible matter: the consciousness, in faa, exercises its aaivity on the same objea that its point of support does. But if you believe that the consciousness sees, how would you explain the faa that it does not arise with respea to obscured visible matter?
2. The author takes into consideration the opinion of the Vijnana- vadin and responds to the last reply of the Vaibhasika.
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Do you maintain that an organ of sight sees its object by entering into a close relationship with its object, in the manner in which the organ of touch feels a tangible object (i. 43c-d)? In this hypothesis I would understand that the organ of sight, being capable of being arrested, does not see obscured visible matter. But you maintain that the organ of sight sees at a distance: you do not then have the right to say that, being capable of being arrested, it does not see obscured visible matter. Moreover, one sees obscured visible matter through a glass, a cloud, a crystal and water: how would you explain this fact? I would say then that the visual consciousness sees, it arises with respea to obscured visible matter when the screen does not form an obstacle
174 to light; it does not arise in the contrary case.
3. The Vaibhasikas make an appeal to Scripture. The Sutra says,
175
"Having seen visible matter through the organ of sight. " Thus the
organ sees, not the visual consciousness.
We would reply that the Sutra intends to say, "Having seen visible
matter by means of the organ of sight as point of support. " In fact, the same Sutra says, "Having discerned the dharmas through the mental organ": now this organ, being past (i. 17), does not discern; it is through the mental consciousness that one discerns; therefore, if the text says "through the mental organ," it means "by supporting itself on the mental organ, the point of support of mental consciousness. " The same for sight and the organ of sight.
One can also admit that the Sutra attributes to the point of support, to the organ, the action which belongs to that which grasps this point of support, that is to say, to the consciousness. It is said in the world "the benches cry out," whereas the benches are actually the persons seated on the benches.
This way of speaking is common to Scripture. We read that "agreeable and disagreeable visible matter is discerned by the organ of sight. " Now you do not maintain that the organ of sight discerns. You attribute discernment to the consciousness of which organ of sight is the point of support.
The Sutra (Samyukta, TD 2, p. 64al0) also says "The organ of sight, Oh Brahmin, is the gate of the sight of visible matter. " This text
? proves that the visual consciousness sees by this gate which is the organ of sight. You would not maintain that "gate" signifies "sight," for it would be absurd to say "The organ of sight is the sight of the sight of visible matter. "
4. [Objection of the Vaibhasikas. ] If the visual consciousness sees, what it is that discerns (i. 48a)?
What is the difference between the two functions of seeing and discerning which would account for a single dhanna not seeing and discerning at one and the same time? Is it not admitted that a certain
176
type of prajna (darsandtmika, vii. l) sees and comprehends? In this
same way a certain consciousness, the visual consciousness, sees and discerns. There is here only a single function designated by two names. 5. [Certain followers of the thesis "The visual consciousness sees," namely the Vatsiputriyas, object:] If the organ of sight sees, what is then the separately existing action of seeing that you attribute to this
organ, the agent of this action?
The objection cannot be made. In the same way that you would
have it that the consciousness discerns, without admitting any differ- ence between the agent and the action, in that same way we hold that an organ sees.
6. According to another opinion, [that of the Dharmaguptakas,] it is the visual consciousness which sees; but, as the organ of sight is the point of support of this consciousness, one says that it sees, the same way one says that the bell rings, because it is the point of support of the sound.
But, according to this principle, one should also say that the organ of sight discerns, for it is the point of support of the visual consciousness.
No. For in the world one agrees to give the name of "seeing" to the visual consciousness; in fact, when this consciousness is produced, one says "The color is seen;" one does not say that the color is discerned. And the Vibhasd (TD 27, p. 489cl9) confirms: "One terms 'seen' that which is attained by the organ of sight, that which falls within its line of vision and is perceived by the visual consciousness. " One says then in the world that the organ of sight sees, because it is the point of
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support of the visual consciousness which sees; one does not say that it discerns, because the function attributed to the visual consciousness is seeing and not discernment. On the other hand, when one says that consciousness discerns, one does not mean that it discerns to the extent that it would be the point of support of a certain discernment, as one understands that the organ of sight sees because it is the point of support of the visual consciousness. One means that the consciousness discerns by itself, that it is in and of itself discernment, in the same way
177 that one says that the sun creates the day.
7. Opinion of the Sautrantikas. What an empty discussion! The Sutra teaches: "By reason of the organ of sight and of visible matter there arises the visual consciousness": there is not there either an organ that sees, or visible matter that is seen; there is not there any action of seeing, nor any agent that sees; this is only a play of cause and effect. In the light of practice, one speaks, metaphorically, of this process: "The eye sees, and the consciousness discerns/' But one should not cling to these metaphors. The Blessed One has said that one should not take them in the manner of popular speech, that one should
178 not seriously grasp an expression in use in the world.
8. According to the system of the Vaibhasikas of Kasmlr, the organ of sight sees, the organ of hearing hears, the organ of smell smells, the organ of taste tastes, the organ of touch touches, and the mental organ discerns.
***
Is visible matter seen by one eye or by both eyes?
43a-b. Visible matter is seen by the two eyes also, as the clarity
179 of sight demonstrates.
[There is no fixed rule: one sees by one eye; one also sees by two eyes. ]
The Abhidharmikas say: "Seen also by the two eyes; the two eyes
180
being open, sight is clearer. " Furthermore, when one eye is covered
and the other half closed, one perceives two moons; but not when one
? completely closes or half closes that which was open, or when one opens or completely closes that which has been half closed.
One should not conclude that the visual consciousness is twofold from the fact that its point of support is twofold, for the consciousness is not material like r&pa\ not having a mass it is not situated in a place.
***
We have said that the organ of sight sees, that the organs of hearing, smell, taste, and touch each perceive their objects; and that the mental organ discerns. Do these organs attain their object, [do they enter into a close physical relationship with their object]?
43c. The organ of sight, the organ of hearing, and the mental
181 organ know their object without attaining it.
i. l. The organ of sight sees visible matter at a distance: it does not see the eye-salve placed on the eye; the organ of hearing hears distant sounds.
The mental organ, being non-material, does not enter into a close physical relationship with its object.
2. If the organs of sight and hearing must necessarily enter into a close relationship with their object, then ascetics in dhyana would not attain divine sight or divine hearing, in the same way that they do not attain a divine sense of smell (vii. 42).
[Objection. ] If the organ of sight sees an object with which it is not
in a close relationship, why does it not see visible matter which is too
182 distant or obscured?
[Reply. ] Why does a magnet not attract all iron? Moreover, the same difficulty remains even if you suppose that the organ enters into a close relationship with the object: why does the organ of sight not see the eye salve, the brush, and all the objects with which it is in close relationship? Or else, let us say that the same rule applies to the organ of sight and to the organs of smell and taste: the organ of smell senses only the smell with which it is in close relationship, but it does not sense the odor which constitutes the organ itself; in the same way, the
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organ of sight sees only certain distant visible matter, but it does not see all distant visible matter.
According to certain masters, from the fact that one hears noise
from the interior of the ear, one can conclude that the organ of hearing
hears the sound with which it is in close relationship, as it also hears
183 distant sound.
3. The other three organs, smell, taste, touch, perceive an objea
with which they are in close relationship. For smell, this results from
184 the fact that in-breathing is necessary to the perception of the smell.
43d. For the other three organs, the opposite.
ii. What should one understand by the expression "to attain" (to enter into a close relationship)? What does one mean when one says that the nose "attains" its object, knows its object "after having attained it? "
To attain is "to arise in nirantaratva" in a state of non- 185
separation. The objea, which renews itself from moment to moment (iv. 2c-d), is found to be arisen in nirantaratva with the organ and vice versa.
[What does nirantaratva mean? According to the Bhadanta, immediate juxtaposition, absence of interval; according to the Vaibha-
186 sikas, immediate vicinity, absence of an interposed body].
iii. The question is therefore posed whether the atoms do or do not touch one another.
1. The Vaibhasikas of Kasmir {Vibhasa TD 27, p. 683a24) say that atoms do not touch one another; (1) if atoms touch one another in their totality, things, that is to say, the different atoms, would "mix with one another," that is, they would only occupy one place; and (2) if atoms touched each other in one spot, they would thus have parts: and
187
atoms do not have any parts.
But, if there is no contact among the atoms, how is sound
produced?
For the very reason that there is no contaa, sound is possible: if
atoms were to touch one another, a hand in collision with a hand would dissolve into it, a rock in collision with another rock would
? dissolve into it, as gum dissolves into gum. And sound would not be produced.
But if atoms do not touch one another, why does an agglomeration of atoms not fall to pieces when it is struck?
Because the wind element holds it together. A certain wind element has dispersion for its function, for example the wind of the period of the destruction of the world; a certain wind element has concentration for its function, for example the wind at the period of
189 creation (iii. 91,100).
2. [The Vaibhasikas continue the presentation of their doctrine].
One says that three organs attain their object, because their object is in a state of non-seperation from them. What does non-seperation consist of?
It consists of the fact that there is nothing which is in the interval between the two. This is also what is meant by "to attain. "
Furthermore, as agglomerations have parts, there is no difficulty in agglomerations touching one another. And, from this point of view the definitions of the Vibhasa (TD 27, p. 684all; see also p. 380al9) are justified: "Does a thing-in-contact arise having for its cause a thing-in- contact, or does it arise having for its cause a thing-outside-of-contact? " Same question with respect to a thing-outside-of-contact.
"One cannot reply in an absolute manner. Sometimes a thing- outside-of-contact arises from a thing-in-contact, as when a thing-in- contact falls to pieces. Sometimes a thing-in-contact arises from a thing-outside-of-contact, as when a thing-outside-of-contact comes together. Sometimes a thing-in-contact arises from a thing-outside-of- contact, as when agglomerations come together. And sometimes a thing-outside-of-contact arises from a thing-outside-of-contact, for example the particles of dust suspended in the void of a window. "
The Bhadanta Vasumitra says: "If atoms touched one another, they
189 would therefore endure two moments. "
iv. Opinions of Vasubandhu. 1. The Bhadanta says: "There is not, in reality, any contact One says, metaphorically, that atoms touch one another when they are juxtaposed without interval. " (Quoted in Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 684a2; see note 189, end).
The Dhatus 111
? 122 Chapter One
190
This opinion is the correct one. In fact, if atoms were to allow an
interval between themselves, since this interval would be empty, what
would hinder the progress of atoms into this interval? For it is
191 admitted that atoms are impenetrable.
2. Agglomerations are not anything other than atoms. They are the same atoms which, in a state of aggregation, are a "thing-in- contact," in the same way that they are rupa (i. 13). It is thus absurd to deny that atoms touch one another, and yet to admit that agglomera- tions touch one another.
3. If you admit spatial division to the atom, then an atom certainly
has parts, whether it enters into contact or not. If you deny it, why
192 would the atom, even if it enters into contact, have parts?
Should we think that the organs solely grasp an objea of their dimension,--if one believes that one sees suddenly extended objects, a mountain for example, it is through illusion, it is because one rapidly sees parts of a mountain: it is evidently thus when one sees the circle of fire delineated by an ember;--or else do the organs indifferently grasp an objea of their dimension and of a different dimension?
44a-b. The three organs of which the organ of smell is the first,
193 grasp an objea of their dimension.
A given number of atoms of an organ, attaining the same number of atoms of an objea, produce consciousness.
